

# Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation

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# Networking Equipment is Critical

- It forms a technological foundation for communication
- It contributes to the economy
- Vital for national security

# Backdoors, exploits and 0days in Networking Equipment

(TS//SI//NF) Such operations involving **supply-chain interdiction** are some of the most productive operations in TAO, because they pre-position access points into hard target networks around the world.



(TS//SI//NF) Left: Intercepted packages are opened carefully; Right: A “load station” implants a beacon

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RISK ASSESSMENT —

## A simple command allows the CIA to commandeer 318 models of Cisco switches

Bug relies on telnet protocol used by hardware on internal networks.

DAN GOODIN - 3/20/2017, 5:35 PM

## [ovs-announce] CVE-2016-2074: MPLS buffer overflow vulnerabilities in Open vSwitch

Ben Pfaff [blp@ovn.org](mailto:blp@ovn.org)  
Mon Mar 28 17:10:13 PDT 2016

- Next message: [\[ovs-announce\] Open vSwitch 2.4.1 and 2.3.3 Available](#)
- Messages sorted by: [\[ date \]](#) [\[ thread \]](#) [\[ subject \]](#) [\[ author \]](#)

### Description =====


Multiple versions of Open vSwitch are vulnerable to remote buffer overflow attacks, in which crafted MPLS packets could overflow the buffer reserved for MPLS labels in an OVS internal data structure. The MPLS packets that trigger the vulnerability and the potential for exploitation vary depending on version:

# Backdoors in SDN equipment


- Does that introduce new attacks?
- Can we detect backdoor activity?

# Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a networking paradigm

- Separated planes
- Centralized model



# SDN Teleportation: An attack previously not possible




# SDN Teleportation poses several threats

- Bypass security mechanisms
- Attack coordination
- Exfiltration
- Eavesdrop

# The Teleportation Model

- 1) Switch to Controller
- 2) Controller to Switches
- 3) Destination Processing




# Teleportation Techniques

- Out-of-band Forwarding
- Flow (re-)configurations
- Switch Identification


# Out-of-band Forwarding Teleportation

- Complete packets from one switch are teleported to another switch




# Flow (Re-)Configuration Teleportation

- Exploit the controllers centralized control to reconfigure the network when a host moves across the network



# Switch Identification Teleportation


- Impersonate the Datapath-ID to communicate information



# Attacks using Teleportation

- Bypass firewalls, IDS and IPS
- Exfiltration
- Man-in-the-middle
- Rendezvous/Attack coordination

# Teleportation Bandwidth



# Countermeasures

- Packet-in-Packet-Out Watcher
- Audit-Trails and Accountability
- Enhanced IDS with Waypoint Enforcement

# Conclusions

- Introduced a conceptually novel SDN attack
- Teleportation enables several attacks
- Teleportation has high quality and throughput
- Suggested Teleportation countermeasures

# Questions