
# Rescuing Tit-for-Tat with Source Coding

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## **Motivation: Collaboration is mandatory!**

P2P computing has many advantages over the traditional client server model:

- Increased scalability
- Better use of bandwidth
- Fault tolerance
- $\triangleright$

However, it only works if peers cooperate → All p2p systems crucially depend on collaboration!

How can collaboration be guaranteed?



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## **Motivation: Solutions in practice**

Do popular file sharing networks guarantee a fair sharing of resources?

#### Examples:

FastTrack: No.

"Participation level" can be manipulated.

> eDonkey: No.

Local credits can improve the peer's position in the queue, but otherwise no incentives to upload.

➤ Gnutella: No.

There are many studies about free riding on Gnutella. Most users do not share anything!

The free riding client RitT

➤ BitTorrent: No.

The free riding client **BitThief** never uploads anything!

Kazaa Lite sets it to

the maximum (1000)

Its weak incentive mechanism encourages users to upload, but uploading is not enforced.



## **Motivation: Incentive Mechanisms**

1. BitTorrent uses a tit-for-tat-like mechanism where uploading peers are favored. All peers repeatedly get a chance to reciprocate ("optimistic unchoking").

Weaknesses of BitTorrent:

Seeders do not only "seed" the file, they give it out for free!

- > The seeders can be exploited.
- ➤ The "optimistic unchoking" can be exploited. ∈

These weaknesses can also be considered "features"....

For example, Dandelion

- A centralized server to enforce fair sharing could be used:
   Every data exchange is monitored by the server.
   Weaknesses of this approach:
- Limited scalability
- Single point of failure...



## **Motivation: Why not Tit-for-Tat?**

Tit-for-tat is believed to be the most effective strategy to enforce collaboration.

Initially cooperate and then respond in kind to the other peer's previous action!



#### Why isn't this simple strategy used in file sharing networks???

Short answer: Because it does not work (if applied directly):

• Bootstrap problem: Initially, peers have nothing to share.



• Deadlocks: Nothing to offer to other peers!




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#### Motivation: Selfish Behavior

System based on T4T:

- Peers exchange blocks using the tit-for-tat strategy.
- Peers leave after downloading all blocks.
- Single seeder leaves after ≈1h.



- → 17 minutes later, peers can no longer finish their downloads, because some blocks are not available anymore!
- → Such a system is inefficient (deadlocks) and often fails (peers leave) in selfish environments!

What can be done to solve this problem ...?



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#### **Outline**

- Motivation
- II. System Overview
- III. Evaluation
- IV. Conclusion

## **System Overview: Source Coding**


Basic idea: If m blocks from a much larger set of blocks suffice to reconstruct the file and much more than m blocks are in circulation ("block diversity"), the deadlock problem can be mitigated!



How can the block diversity be increased? The blocks are encoded at the seeders (source coding):

k random blocks are combined into a new block.

The total number of blocks increases from m to m choose k (# blocks  $\in$  O(m $^k$ ))!



How are the blocks encoded?







## **System Overview: Finite Field**


Each block b is interpreted as a sequence of elements e<sub>i</sub> from a finite alphabet.



The elements are taken from the finite field  $GF(2^{x}-1) \rightarrow$ Computations are carried out modulo the *Mersenne prime number*  $P = 2^{x}-1$ .

(For example, we used  $P = 2^{31} - 1$  and a block size of 128 KB, resulting in s = 33.825 elements per block)

When two blocks  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  are combined, the elements at the same positions are added up!



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System Overview: Algebra

All basic arithmetic operations are efficient:

What:	How:
e <sub>1</sub> +e <sub>2</sub>	Bitwise addition + add carry-over bit
-е	Flip all bits
$e_1 \times e_2$	Bitwise multiplication (using addition from above)
1/e	Extended Euclidean Algorithm

How many blocks are added up?
How can the original blocks be reconstructed?





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## System Overview: Small Parameter k

Simulations show: Combining k = 2, 3... blocks suffices to boost the block diversity.

However, k must be larger, otherwise the resulting coefficient

If rank(C) < m, more than m blocks have to be downloaded!

In network coding, the field GF(2q) is used!

is practically always m!

→ Exactly m blocks have to be downloaded, which is optimal!



Advantages over regular network coding:


No coding at the leechers required!

- Every block occurs at most once in every encoded block → Simple bitmap as a representation is enough!
- ➤ The leecher strategy is simple: Play tit-for-tat with all neighboring peers and download every encoded block that is not locally available!

## **System Overview: Seeder Strategy**

The following rules prevent free riders from exploiting the seeders:

- Each peer can download *only* a small, *specific* pseudo-random subset of the blocks!
- If there are n peers and m blocks, the seeders adaptively set the size of this subset to t ≈ m/n.



### Advantages of this approach:

- > Different peers obtain entirely different blocks.
- → Large block diversity!
- Leechers are forced to collaborate.
- Seeders have to provide only little data.

It is cheap to be (and remain) a seeder!



#### Outline


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#### **Evaluation: Decoding Time**



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# **Evaluation: Block Diversity**

Flash

Simulation scenario:

crowd!

- ≥ 2000 peers arrive &
- > Peers leave after downloading m=1024 blocks
- ➤ Block size = 128 KB
- > # Blocks combined: k = 12

#### Two cases:

- 1) One seeder stays forever
- 2) The seeder leaves after uploading 4:m blocks

2‰ of all data that needs to be exchanged!

# Seeder stays! Seeder leaves! Time (Hours)


#### We learn that:

- The block diversity in the first case is larger!
- In the second case, the block diversity is large enough!!!

## **Evaluation: Download Time**

The download time correlates with the upload bandwidth!

→ This indicates that the system is fair!




Firewalled peers cannot open enough connections to other peers

→ Longer download times!






## **Evaluation: Performance Without Coding**



## **Evaluation: Performance With Coding**



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#### Conclusion

- Source coding to ensure fairness
  - Increased block diversity keeps network alive!
  - New seeder strategy: Seeders cannot be exploited.
  - Leechers must engage in fair tit-for-tat exchanges.
- Different encoding technique
  - Simple block representation!
  - The matrix can be kept sparse!
- Main challenge
  - Reducing the decoding time...



Tit for tat





### **Questions and Comments?**

# Thank you for your attention!




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## **Additional Slide: Disadvantages**

The system has a few disadvantages:



- ➤ Computations modulo  $P = 2^x 1$   $\rightarrow$  00...0 = 11...1 (mod P)
- ➤ One bit X "missing" in the encoding of each block:



A "helper block" solves the two problems:

Very rare in compressed files!

- ➤ Store indices where the element 11...1 occurs <sup>€</sup>
- > Store the last bit of each block separately >

Only **1KB** if file size is **1GB**!



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