

Two Presentations of Tenets

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Presentation of Tenets by Jetsün Chökyi Gyältsen

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Precious Garland of Tenets by Künkhyen Jigmé Wangpo



Translated by Shahar Tene

Version 1.0 (23/04/2025)

Translated by Shahar Tene using:
Jetsünpa: Sera Je Edition (SJRB-0057) and Künkhyen Sherig Parkhang Edition (2011)

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Presentation of Tenets

By Jetsün Chökyi Gyältsen

I prostrate to the Holy Venerable Ones who are indivisible with the Lama Protector Mañjuśrī!

The explanation of the presentation of tenets in this context [has three sections:]

1. Definition
2. Divisions
3. Explanation of the individual meanings

1. [Definition]

The **definition of a person who is a Buddhist proponent of tenets** is:

A person who 1) asserts the three jewels as correct sources of refuge and 2) does not accept a source of refuge other than those.

2. [Divisions]

When those are divided, there are four:

1. Vaibhāṣika
2. Sautrāntika
3. Cittamātra
4. Proponents of Non-Nature

The first two are also referred to as Proponents of Objects.

3. [Explanation of the individual meanings]

[This has four sections:]

1. Explanation of the Vaibhāṣika system
2. Explanation of the Sautrāntika system
3. Explanation of the Cittamātra system
4. Explanation of the systems of the Proponents of Non-Nature

3.1 [Explanation of the Vaibhāṣika system]

[This has seven sections:]

1. Definition
2. Divisions
3. Etymology
4. Way of asserting objects
5. Way of asserting object-possessors
6. Way of asserting selflessness
7. Presentation of grounds and paths

3.1.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Vaibhāṣika** is:

A person propounding Hīnayāna tenets who 1) does not assert self-knowers and 2) asserts external objects as truly established.

3.1.2 [Divisions]

When those are divided, there are three:

1. Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas
2. Western Vaibhāṣikas
3. Central Vaibhāṣikas

3.1.3 [Etymology]

Why are they called Vaibhāṣika? They are called as such either due to propounding tenets following the [Abhidharma] Mahāvibhāṣā or due to propounding the three times as particular substances.

3.1.4 [Way of asserting objects]

The **definition of functioning thing** is:

That able to perform a function.

Functioning thing, existent, and object of knowledge are mutually inclusive.

When that is divided, there are two:

1. Permanent functioning things
2. Impermanent functioning things

Illustrations of the first are uncompounded space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations.

Illustrations of the second are product, compounded [phenomenon], and impermanent.

Moreover, when functioning things are divided, there are two:

1. Conventional truths
2. Ultimate truths

The **definition of a conventional truth** is:

That observed as a phenomenon whose apprehending awareness is lost when it is destroyed or mentally separated into parts.

Illustrations are pot and cloth because:

- When a pot is destroyed with a hammer, its apprehending awareness is lost; and
- When cloth is separated into individual threads, its apprehending awareness is lost.

The **definition of an ultimate truth** is:

That observed as a phenomenon whose apprehending awareness is not lost when it is destroyed or mentally separated into parts.

Illustrations are directionally partless particles, temporally partless consciousnesses, and uncompounded phenomena.

This is because [Vasubandhu's] *Abhidharmakośa* says:

That which when destroyed or mentally
Separated, awareness does not engage it,
Like a water-pot, exists conventionally;
Ultimate existents are the others.

As such, they assert that:

- The three times are substances;
- Pot exists at the time of pot's past and
- Pot also exists at the time of pot's future.

3.1.5 Way of asserting object-possessors

There are assertions that the mere collection of the five aggregates is the illustration of the person, that the mental consciousness is the illustration of the person, and so forth.

Regarding awareness, there are two: valid cognition and non-valid awarenesses.

Regarding the first, there are two: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

Regarding the first, there are three:

1. Sense direct perception
2. Mental direct perception
3. Yogic direct perception

Sense direct valid cognition is not pervaded by being consciousness because the eye sense-faculty is a direct valid cogniser.

Moreover, regarding yogic direct perception, there are two:

1. Yogic direct perception that directly realises the selflessness of persons
2. Yogic direct perception that directly realises subtle impermanence

Regarding the first, there are two:

1. Yogic direct perception that realises the person as empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent
2. Yogic direct perception that realises the person as empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent.

3.1.6 Way of asserting selflessness

They assert that subtle selflessness and the subtle selflessness of persons are mutually inclusive; they do not assert a selflessness of phenomena because they assert that if it is an established-base, then it is pervaded by being a self of phenomena.

Among them, the Vātsīputrīyas assert a selflessness of persons that is the emptiness of being permanent, unitary, and independent, but do not assert a selflessness of persons that is the emptiness of being self-sufficient substantially existent because they assert a self-sufficient substantially existent self that is inexpressible as being the same or different nature as the aggregates, as permanent or impermanent.

3.1.7 Presentation of grounds and paths

Regarding this, there are two [sections]:

1. Explanation of objects of abandonment
2. Actual presentation of grounds and paths

3.1.7.1 [Explanation of objects of abandonment]

Regarding obscurations, they are asserted as two:

1. Afflicted obscurations
2. Non-afflicted obscurations

The term “knowledge obscurations” does not exist. The first functions to mainly hinder the attainment of liberation; the second functions to mainly hinder the attainment of all-knowing.

Illustrations of the first are conceptions apprehending the person as self-sufficient substantially existent and the three poisons that arise through the force of that together with their seeds.

Illustrations of the second are the imprints of the conception apprehending the person as self-sufficient substantially existent and negative mental states that arise through the force of that.

3.1.7.2 Actual presentation of grounds and paths

There is a difference in the way the persons of the three vehicles progress along their paths because:

- Hearer lineage-bearers unite the view realising the person as empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent with a small collection of merit, familiarise with that for up to three lifetimes and so forth, and attain the small enlightenment;
- Solitary Realiser lineage-bearers unite that view with a middling collection of merit, familiarise with that for up to a hundred eons and so forth, and attain the middling enlightenment;
- Bodhisattvas unite that view with a great collection of merit, familiarise with that for up to three countless great eons and so forth, and attain the great enlightenment.

There is a difference in the way they accumulate the collections because:

- Bodhisattvas, having accumulated the collections for up to three countless great eons and so forth on the great path of accumulation and below, actualise the heat level of the path of preparation and up to the path of no-more-learning in a single session;
- Solitary realiser lineage-bearers, having accumulated the collections for up to a hundred eons and so forth on the great path of accumulation and below, actualise the heat level of the path of preparation and up to the path of no-more-learning in a single session;
- Hearer lineage-bearers accumulate the collections during all four learner paths and there are those who must train in the learner paths for up to fourteen birth-existences even after having attained an Arya path.

Therefore, they assert that the Buddha’s form aggregate is not a Buddha because it is an object of abandonment; because of being included within the same preceding support and lifetime of the Bodhisattva on the path of preparation. There is pervasion because the physical support of that Bodhisattva on the path of preparation is an aggregate projected by previous actions and afflictions.

They do not assert the Complete Enjoyment Body and assert that when the Supreme Emanation Body passes beyond sorrow¹ without remainder, the mental continuum is severed. Although Arya Buddhas have abandoned suffering and origins without exception, it is not contradictory with the existence of true sufferings in their continua because they posit that true suffering are abandoned when afflictions observing true sufferings have been abandoned without exception.

Hearers and Solitary Realisers attain the state of a Foe-Destroyer and then:

- Until they give up their compositional-factor of life, that is posited as Nirvana with remainder;
- Having given up their compositional-factor of life, that is posited as Nirvana without remainder.

At the time of Nirvana with remainder, despite having abandoned afflicted obscuration without exception, they have not abandoned the non-afflicted obscurations. At the time of Nirvana without remainder, despite not destroying those through the force of an antidote, they are non-existent because at that time, the mental continuum (their support) is severed.

When Proponents of Things differentiate between interpretative and definite meaning sutras, they differentiate by way of whether or not they are suitable to be accepted literally. The two Proponents of Objects do not accept the Mahāyāna Basket as the Words of the Buddha because most Vaibhāṣikas assert that sutras are pervaded by being definite meaning sutras.

¹ i.e. attains Nirvana without remainder.

3.2 Explanation of the Sautrāntika system

This has seven [sections]:

1. Definition
2. Divisions
3. Etymology
4. Way of asserting objects
5. Way of asserting object-possessors
6. Way of asserting selflessness
7. Presentation of grounds and paths

3.2.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Sautrāntika** is:

A person who is a Hīnayāna tenet holder that asserts both self-knowers and external objects.

Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntika are mutually inclusive.

3.2.2. [Divisions]

When divided, there are two:

1. Sautrāntika who are followers of scripture
2. Sautrāntika who are followers of reasoning

The first are Sautrāntika who are followers of the Abhidharmakośa, for example.

The second are Sautrāntika who are followers of the Seven Treatises on Pramāṇa, for example.

3.2.3 [Etymology]

Why are they called Sautrāntika?

Due to propounding tenets through following the sutras of the Bhagavān, they are called Sautrāntika; due to indicating all phenomena by way of examples, they are called Dārṣṭāntika.

3.2.4 [Way of asserting objects]

The **definition of existent** is:

That observed by valid cognition.

When that is divided, there are two:

1. Conventional truths
2. Ultimate truths

The **definition of a conventional truth** is:

A phenomenon that is ultimately able to perform a function.

Truly established, thing, product, impermanent, compounded, substance, and specifically characterised [phenomena] are mutually inclusive.

The **definition of an ultimate truth** is:

A phenomenon that is ultimately not able to perform a function.

Conventional truth, substantially established, permanent, and generally characterised [phenomena] are mutually inclusive.

Alternatively, when existent is divided, there are two:

1. Negations
2. Positive [phenomena]

The **definition of a negation** is:

That realised by its apprehending awareness by way of eliminating its object of negation.

The **definition of a positive [phenomenon]** is:

That realised by its apprehending awareness by way of not eliminating its object of negation.

Moreover, the first has two:

1. Non-implicative negations
2. Implicative negations

Illustrations of the first are uncompounded space, true cessations, and emptiness, for example.

Illustrations of the second are the opposite of not being a thing, and the appearance of the opposite of not being a vase to the conceptual consciousness apprehending vase, for example.

Alternatively, when existent is divided, there are two:

1. One
2. Different

Moreover, the first has two:

1. Falsely one
2. Truly one

The first is object of knowledge and generally characterised phenomenon, for example.

The second is functioning thing and impermanent, for example.

Moreover, the second, different, has two:

1. Falsely different
2. Truly different

The first is isolate of vase and isolate of pillar, for example.

The second is vase and pillar, for example.

Therefore, past and future are permanent; present and thing are mutually inclusive.

3.2.5 Way of asserting object-possessors

There are two Sautrāntikas:

1. Those who assert the continuum of the aggregates as the illustration of the person
2. Those who assert the mental consciousness as the illustration of the person

The first are the Sautrāntika who are followers of the Abhidharmakośa, for example.

The second are the Sautrāntika who are followers of the Seven Treatises on Pramāṇa, for example.

The **definition of awareness** is:

Clear and knowing.

When awareness is divided, there are two:

1. Valid cognition
2. Non-valid awareness

[3.2.5.1 Valid cognition]

The **definition of valid cognition** is:

New non-deceptive knower.

There is a purpose for mentioning “new”, “non-deceptive”, and “knower” as parts of the definition of valid cognition:

- “New” eliminates subsequent cognition from being valid cognition;
- “Non-deceptive” eliminates correct assumption from being valid cognition; and
- “Knower” eliminates the sense-faculties from being valid cognition.

When valid cognition is divided, there are two:

1. Direct valid cognition
2. Inferential valid cognition

The **definition of direct perception** is:

A non-mistaken knower free from conceptuality.

The **definition of direct valid cognition** is:

A new non-deceptive knower free from conceptuality.

When direct valid cognition is divided, there are four:

1. Self-knowing direct valid cognition
2. Sense direct valid cognition
3. Mental direct valid cognition
4. Yogic direct valid cognition

The **definition of the first** is:

A new non-deceptive knower free from conceptuality that is only inwardly directed and solely an apprehender.

The **definition of the second** is:

A new non-deceptive knower free from conceptuality that arises in dependence upon the physical sense-faculty that is its uncommon empowering condition.

The **definition of the third** is:

A new non-deceptive knower free from conceptuality that arises in dependence upon the mental sense-faculty that is its uncommon empowering condition.

The **definition of the fourth** is:

An exalted wisdom directly realising either subtle impermanence, or the coarse or subtle selflessness of persons, in dependence upon the meditative stabilisation that is a union of calm abiding and special insight (its empowering condition).

When yogic direct valid cognition is divided, there are three:

1. Valid cognition directly realising subtle impermanence;
2. Valid cognition directly realising the coarse selflessness of persons; and
3. Valid cognition directly realising the subtle selflessness of persons.

The **definition of inferential valid cognition** is:

A new non-deceptive determinative knower that is produced in dependence upon the correct sign that is its support.

When that is divided, there are three:

1. Factual inference
2. Inference through renown
3. Inference through conviction

An illustration of the first is an inference realising that sound is impermanent using the sign “product”.

An illustration of the second is an inference realising that the rabbit-possessor is suitable to be referred to using the term “moon” through the sign “existing among objects of conception”.

An illustration of the third is an inference realising that the passage “Due to generosity, enjoyments; due to ethics, happiness.” is non-deceptive with respect to its indicated-meaning through the sign “a scripture purified through the threefold analysis”.

Inference through renown is pervaded by being factual inference.

If it is direct perception, then it is not pervaded by being direct valid cognition and if it is an inference, then it is not pervaded by being an inferential valid cognition because the second moment of a sense direct valid cognition apprehending form and the second moment of an inference realising sound is impermanent are subsequent cognitions.

This is because [Dharmottara’s] *The Correct* says:

The first moments of direct perception and inference are valid cognitions; their continua, due to their difference in establishment and abiding, have abandoned being valid cognition.

3.2.5.2 [Non-valid awareness]

The **definition of a non-valid awareness** is:

A knower that is not new and non-deceptive.

When that is divided, there are five:

1. Subsequent cognition
2. Wrong consciousness
3. Doubt
4. Correct assumption
5. Awareness that does not ascertain its appearance

[3.2.5.2.1 Subsequent cognition]

The **definition of the first** is:

A knower realising that which has already been realised.

Moreover, that has two:

1. Conceptual subsequent cognition
2. Non-conceptual subsequent cognition

The first is a memory-consciousness remembering blue that has been produced following a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue and the second moment of an inference realising sound is impermanent, for example.

The second is the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending form, for example.

3.2.5.2.2 [Wrong consciousness]

The **definition of a wrong consciousness** is:

A knower that has engaged erroneously.

That also has two:

1. Conceptual wrong consciousness
2. Non-conceptual wrong consciousness

The first is a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound is permanent, for example.

The second is a sense consciousness to which one moon appears as two moons and a sense consciousness to which snow mountains appear blue, for example.

3.2.5.2.3 [Doubt]

The **definition of doubt** is:

A mental factor that wavers between two extremes through its own force.

The mental consciousness that it is concomitant with and the feeling in its retinue are not wavering between two extremes through their own force because they are wavering between two extremes through the force of that doubt.

Moreover, that has three:

1. Doubt tending towards the fact
2. Doubt tending away from the fact
3. Even doubt

The first is doubt thinking “Is sound impermanent?”, for example.

The second is doubt thinking “Is sound permanent?”, for example.

The third is doubt thinking “Is sound permanent or impermanent?”, for example.

3.2.5.2.4 [Correct assumption]

The **definition of correct assumption** is:

A factually concordant determinative knower that is deceived by its determination of its object.

Moreover, there are five:

1. Correct assumption without reason
2. Correct assumption with a contradictory reason
3. Correct assumption with an indefinite reason
4. Correct assumption with a non-established reason
5. Correct assumption with a reason that has not been settled

An illustration of the first is an awareness apprehending that sound is impermanent in dependence upon the mere statement “sound is impermanent”, for example, because the words “sound is impermanent” express the assertion that sound is impermanent but do not express the correct reason for sound being impermanent.

An illustration of the second is an awareness apprehending that sound is impermanent through the sign “empty of being able to perform a function”, for example, because “empty of being able to perform a function” is mutually exclusive with sound.

An illustration of the third is an awareness apprehending that sound is impermanent through the sign “object of comprehension”, for example, because “object of comprehension” is an indefinite reason in the proof that sound is impermanent.

An illustration of the fourth is an awareness apprehending that sound is impermanent through the sign “apprehended-object of an eye-consciousness”, for example, because “apprehended-object of an eye-consciousness” is a non-established reason in the proof that sound is impermanent.

An illustration of the fifth is an awareness apprehending that sound is impermanent through the sign “product” in the continuum of a person who has not ascertained by valid cognition that sound is impermanent, for example, because although “product” is a correct reason in the proof that sound is impermanent, such a person has not settled that correct reason.

3.2.5.2.5 [Awareness that does not ascertain its appearance]

The definition of an awareness that does not ascertain its appearance is:

A non-mistaken knower that possesses clear appearance but has not ascertained its object.

When that is divided, there are three:

1. Sense direct perception that is that
2. Mental direct perception that is that
3. Self-knowing direct perception that is that

The first is an ear consciousness apprehending sound at the time the eyes are exceedingly attached to a beautiful form, for example.

The second is mental direct perceivers apprehending the five objects (forms and so forth) in the continua of ordinary beings, for example.

The third is the self-knowers experiencing the mental direct perceivers apprehending the five objects (forms and so forth) in the continua of ordinary beings, for example.

In general, when object-possessors are divided, there are three:

1. Beings
2. Speech
3. Valid [cognition]

When valid object-possessors are divided, there are three:

1. Valid beings
2. Valid speech
3. Valid consciousness

The first is the Teacher Buddha, for example.

The second is the Dharma Wheel of the Four Truths, for example.

The third is direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition, for example.

3.2.6 Way of asserting selflessness

The person being empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent is asserted as the coarse selflessness of persons and the person being empty of self-sufficient substantial existence is asserted as the subtle selflessness of persons.

A selflessness of phenomena is not asserted, similarly to the Vaibhāṣika.

3.2.7 Presentation of grounds and paths

When accumulating the collections, all three lineage-bearers accumulate the collections during all four learner paths; due to that reason, the form aggregate of the Buddha is asserted to be a Buddha.

The presentation of the obscurations, the way of progressing along the grounds and paths, and so forth are similar to the Vaibhāṣika.

3.3 Explanation of the Cittamātra system

From among the seven outlines as above:

3.3.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Cittamātrin** is:

A person propounding Mahāyāna tenets that does not assert external objects and asserts truly established self-knowers.

Cittamātra, Vijñaptimātra, and Yogācāra are mutually inclusive.

3.3.2 [Divisions]

When those are divided, there are two:

1. True Aspectarian Cittamātra
2. False Aspectarian Cittamātra

The **definition of the first** is:

That which 1) is a Cittamātrin and 2) asserts that the appearance-factor of coarse forms to direct perception apprehending form in the continua of ordinary beings is not affected by the imprints of ignorance.

The **definition of the second** is:

That which is 1) that and 2) asserts that the appearance-factor of coarse forms to direct perception apprehending form in the continua of ordinary beings is affected by the imprints of ignorance.

When True Aspectarians are divided, there are three:

1. Equal number of apprehendeds and apprehenders
2. Half-eggists
3. Non-pluralists

They have their individual assertions:

1. Due to asserting that when apprehending the pattern of a butterfly's wing with the eye-consciousness, each of the individual aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are projected from the side of the object and each of the individual aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are produced as true aspects from the side of the object-possessor; they are called "equal number of apprehendeds and apprehenders"
2. Due to asserting that when apprehending as such, each of the individual aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are projected from the side of the object and each of the individual aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are produced without aspect from the side of the object-possessor; they are called "half-eggists"
3. Due to asserting that when apprehending as such, each of the individual aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are not projected from the side of the object, but rather the aspect of just the pattern is projected, and each of the individual aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are not produced without aspect from the side of the object-possessor, but rather the aspect of just the pattern is produced without aspect; they are called "non-pluralists".

When False Aspectarians are divided, there are two:

1. Contaminated False Aspectarians
2. Uncontaminated False Aspectarians

3.3.3 Etymology

Why are they called Cittamātra?

Due to asserting that phenomena are merely the nature of mind, they are called Cittamātra and due to asserting that all phenomena are merely in the nature of knowing, they are called Vijñaptimātra.

3.3.4 Way of asserting objects

When objects of knowledge are divided, there are two:

1. Ultimate truths
2. Conventional truths

The **definition of the first** is:

That realised by way of the disappearance of dualistic appearances by the direct valid cognition directly realising it.

Ultimate truth, dharmatā, dharmadhātu, and final mode of abiding are mutually inclusive.

When ultimate truth is divided, there are two:

1. Subtle selflessness of phenomena
2. Subtle selflessness of persons

When subtle selflessness of phenomena is divided by way of the empty bases, there are twenty, which are subsumed into eighteen, which are subsumed into sixteen, which are subsumed into the four emptinesses and so forth.

Illustrations of the subtle selflessness of phenomena are, for example:

- The emptiness that is forms and the valid cognitions apprehending forms being empty of being different substances; and
- The emptiness that is forms being empty of being established by way of their own-characteristics as the bases for applying the term “form”.

An illustration of the subtle selflessness of persons is the emptiness that is the person being empty of self-sufficient substantial existence, for example.

The **definition of conventional truth** is:

That realised by way of possessing dualistic appearances by the direct valid cognition directly realising it.

When divided, there are two: Conventional truths that are included in

1. Other-powered natures
2. Imputational natures

The first and compounded phenomena are mutually inclusive.

The second and uncompounded phenomena other than ultimate truths are mutually inclusive.

All things are asserted as the common locus of being truly established and false. All dharmatā are asserted as the common locus of truly established and true. All uncompounded phenomena other than dharmatā are asserted as the common locus of falsely established and false.

Dharmatā are pervaded by non-implicative negations. Illustrations of other non-implicative negations are the same as for the Sautrāntika.

The five objects (forms and so forth) are produced within the substance of the inner consciousness in dependence upon common and uncommon imprints deposited upon the Ālayavijñāna; they are not established as external objects.

According to the True Aspectarians, although those five objects (forms and so forth) are not external objects, they are asserted to be established as coarse. According to the False Aspectarians the five objects (forms and so forth) are not coarse because if they were established as coarse, then they would necessarily be established as external.

3.3.5 Way of asserting object-possessors

According to the True Aspectarians, eight types of consciousness are asserted because on top of the six types of consciousness asserted by the other proponents of tenets, they add the Ālayavijñāna and the afflicted mentality to assert eight types of consciousness.

There are illustrations of the Ālayavijñāna and the afflicted mentality:

1. The first is asserted as a consciousness that is other than the six types of consciousness and that does not depend upon a sense-faculty as its empowering condition; and
2. The second is asserted as a consciousness that observes the Ālayavijñāna (its observed-object) and apprehends it as a self-sufficient substantially existent “I” (its aspect).

According to the False Aspectarians, six types of consciousness are asserted and the mere mental consciousness is posited as the illustration of the person that is the support for causes and their effects.

Awareness is asserted as the two: valid and non-valid awarenesses.

Valid awarenesses are asserted as the two: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

Direct perception has four [divisions], self-knowing direct perception and yogic direct perception are pervaded by being non-mistaken consciousnesses, sense direct perception in the continua of ordinary beings is pervaded by being mistaken consciousnesses, and mental direct perception in their continua can be both mistaken and non-mistaken consciousnesses.

Direct perception is not pervaded by being direct valid cognition because although mental direct perceivers apprehending forms exist in the continua of ordinary beings, mental direct valid cognition apprehending forms does not exist in their continua; because the self-knowers experiencing mental direct perception apprehending forms and the second moments of sense direct perception apprehending forms in their continua are not valid cognition.

Yogic direct perception has four [divisions]:

1. Yogic direct perception directly realising subtle impermanence
2. Yogic direct perception directly realising the subtle selflessness of persons
3. Yogic direct perception directly realising the coarse selflessness of persons
4. Yogic direct perception directly realising the selflessness of phenomena

Inferential valid cognition is pervaded by being conceptual but if it is an inference with respect to a phenomenon, then it is not pervaded by being a conceptual consciousness with respect to that phenomenon because although the inference realising sound is impermanent is an inference with respect to sound being empty of permanence, it is not a conceptual consciousness with respect to that; because 1) if it is a conceptual consciousness with respect to a phenomenon, then it is pervaded by the aspect of that phenomenon appearing to it and 2) the aspect of sound being empty of permanence does not appear to the inference realising sound is impermanent; because that is not explicitly realised by that; because that realises that implicitly upon the explicit realisation of sound being impermanent.

3.3.6 Way of asserting selflessness

The illustrations of the coarse and subtle selflessnesses of persons are posited similarly to the Svātantrika and below. The illustration of the selflessness of phenomena is the emptiness that is forms and the valid cognitions apprehending forms being empty of being different substances, for example.

3.3.7 Presentation of paths and grounds

[This has two sections:]

1. Explanation of objects of abandonment
2. Actual presentation of grounds and paths

3.3.7.1 [Explanation of objects of abandonment]

The apprehension of a self of persons together with its seeds, as well as the three poisons that arise through the force of that together with their seeds are posited as the afflictive obscurations.

The apprehension of true existence together with its seeds, as well as its imprints and all mistaken dualistic appearances that arise through the force of that are posited as knowledge obscurations.

3.3.7.2 [Actual presentation of grounds and paths]

The view realising the selflessness of persons is conjoined by the Hearer lineage-bearers with a small collection of merit towards their objective (their own welfare) and by the Solitary Realiser lineage-bearers with a middling collection of merit towards their objective (their own welfare), and in dependence upon having familiarised with that over three lifetimes and a hundred eons, respectively, actualise their respective enlightenments.

The Bodhisattvas conjoin the view realising apprehendeds and apprehenders as empty of being different substances with a great collection of merit towards their objective (the welfare of others) and in dependence upon having familiarised with that over three countless eons actualise their enlightenment.

According to the True Aspectarians, when Hearer and Solitary Realiser Foe-Destroyers pass beyond sorrow without remainder, their mental continuum is asserted to be severed. It is asserted that it is impossible for the mental continuum of Arya Buddhas to be severed because it is asserted that Bodhisattvas initially [attain] Buddhahood as the Enjoyment Body in Akaniṣṭha and that Enjoyment Body, in an uninterrupted continuum of similar type until Samsara is empty, enacts the welfare of others by means of various emanations in accordance with the individual fortunes of disciples.

The three vehicles are definite individual lineages because it is asserted that sentient beings since beginningless time have three different lineages or dhātu; from that, three different dispositions; from that, three different practices; and from that, they attain three different results.

According to the False Aspectarians, when Hearer and Solitary Realiser Foe-Destroyers pass beyond sorrow without remainder, their mental continuum is not asserted to be severed because although they assert that the continuity of just the awareness included within suffering and origins is severed at that time, they assert that a mere awareness continues into the Buddha-ground. Therefore, they assert one final vehicle.

3.4 Explanation of the systems of the Proponents of Non-Nature

[This has three sections:]

1. Definitions
2. Divisions
3. Explanation of the individual divisions

3.4.1 [Definitions]

The **definition of a Proponent of Non-Nature** is:

A person propounding Mahāyāna tenets who does not accept truly existent things even conventionally.

3.4.2 [Divisions]

When divided, there are two:

1. Svātantrika
2. Prāsaṅgika

3.4.3 [Explanation of the individual divisions]

[This has two sections:]

1. Explanation of the Svātantrika system
2. Explanation of the Prāsaṅgika system

3.4.3.1 [Explanation of the Svātantrika system]

This has seven sections:

1. Definition
2. Divisions
3. Etymology
4. Way of asserting objects
5. Way of asserting object-possessors
6. Way of asserting selflessness
7. Presentation of paths and grounds

3.4.3.1.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Svātantrika** is:

A Mādhyamika who does not assert truly existent things even conventionally by way of asserting autonomous signs.

This and a Mādhyamika who propounds inherent existence are mutually inclusive.

3.4.3.1.2 [Divisions]

When divided, there are two:

1. Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyaṃika
2. Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyaṃika

The **definition of the first** is:

A Mādhyaṃika propounding the presentation of conventionalities mainly in accordance with the Sautrāntikas.

The **definition of the second** is:

A Mādhyaṃika propounding the presentation of conventionalities mainly in accordance with the Cittamātrins.

Illustrations of the first: Bhāvaṃviveka and Jñānagarbha, for example.

Illustrations of the second: Śāntarakṣita, Haribhadra, Kamalaśīla, the masters and disciples, for example.

3.4.3.1.3 [Etymology]

The subject – Bhāvaṃviveka – there is a reason for calling him a Svātantrika-Mādhyaṃika: he is called as such due to being a Mādhyaṃika who asserts autonomous signs.

3.4.3.1.4 [Way of asserting objects]

Established by way of its own-characteristics, established from its own-side, and inherently established are mutually inclusive.

Uncompounded space, true cessations, past, future, and the subtle selflessness of persons are asserted to be both non-implicative negations and conventional truths.

Ultimate truth, dharmatā, and the subtle selflessness of phenomena are mutually inclusive.

According to the Sautrāntika-Mādhyaṃikas, the five objects (forms and so forth) are asserted to be a different entity to consciousness and to be coarse external objects composed of partless particles.

According to the Yogācāra-Mādhyaṃikas, the five objects (forms and so forth) are asserted to be one entity with the consciousness apprehending them.

3.4.3.1.5 [Way of asserting object-possessors]

They assert the mental consciousness as the illustration of the person and six types of consciousness.

Awareness is divided into two: valid cognition and non-valid awareness.

The first is divided into two: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

According to the Sautrāntika-Mādhyaṃikas, a self-knowing direct perception is not asserted.

According to the [Yogācāra-Mādhyaṃikas]:

- All four [types of] direct perceptions are asserted;
- Self-knowing direct perception and yogic direct-perception are pervaded by being non-mistaken consciousnesses;
- The other two can be both mistaken and non-mistaken.

Sautrāntikas, Cittamātrins, and Svātantrikas assert that:

- Direct perception is pervaded by being non-conceptual consciousnesses;
- Subsequent cognition is pervaded by being consciousnesses that are non-valid awarenesses;
- Consciousnesses that are mistaken with respect to their conceived-object are pervaded by being wrong consciousnesses;
- If it is a mistaken consciousness with respect to a phenomenon, then it is pervaded by not being a valid cognition with respect to that phenomenon;
- If it is an inference, then it is pervaded by not being a valid cognition with respect to its appearing object;

And so forth.

3.4.3.1.6 [Way of asserting selflessness]

They assert:

- The person being empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent as the coarse selflessness of persons; and
- The person being empty of self-sufficient substantial existence as the subtle selflessness of persons.

According to the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas:

- Form and the valid cognition apprehending form being empty of being different substances is asserted as the coarse selflessness of phenomena; and
- All phenomena being empty of true existence is asserted as the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

The two selflessnesses are differentiated by way of their objects of negation and not by way of the basis of emptiness because:

- Negating true establishment (the object of negation) on the basis of the person (the basis) is the subtle selflessness of phenomena; and
- Negating self-sufficient substantial existence on the basis of the person (the basis) is the subtle selflessness of persons.

The two apprehensions of self are differentiated by way of their mode of apprehension and not by way of their observed-objects because:

- Observing the person (the basis) and apprehending it to be truly established is the apprehension of a self of phenomena; and
- Observing the person (the basis) and apprehending it to be self-sufficient substantially established is the apprehension of a self of persons.

3.4.3.1.7 [Presentation of grounds and paths]

According to the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas, the individual persons of the three vehicles are posited by way of:

- Three different obscurations that are their main objects of abandonment and
- Three different views that are their main objects of cultivation.

This is because:

- Hearer lineage-bearers take the conception apprehending self-sufficient substantial existence together with its retinue as the main objects of abandonment and its antidote, i.e. the view realising the person is empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent, as their main object of cultivation; thereby attaining the small enlightenment.
- Solitary Realiser lineage-bearers take the conception apprehending form and the valid cognition apprehending form as being different substances as their main object of abandonment and its antidote, i.e. the view realising apprehendeds and apprehenders are empty of being different substances, as their main object of cultivation; thereby attaining the middling enlightenment.
- Bodhisattvas take the apprehension of true existence together with its imprints as their main objects of abandonment and its antidote, i.e. the view realising all phenomena are empty of true existence, as their main object of cultivation; thereby attaining the great enlightenment.

According to the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas, there is no difference between the main objects of abandonment and cultivation of Hearers and Solitary Realisers because both:

- Similarly take the afflictive obscurations as their main object of abandonment and
- Similarly take the selflessness of persons as their main object of cultivation.

Nevertheless, there is a reason for the difference in the results of those two because there is a difference in terms of how vast their collection of merit is and in how long [they accumulate it for].

They assert that sutras are divided into Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sutras and that there are parts that are interpretative and definitive; similar to the Cittamātrins. However, their illustrations are different because:

- Cittamātrins assert the first two Turnings to be interpretative meaning sutras and the Last [Turning] to be definitive meaning sutras.
- In this context, the first and last Turnings are asserted to be interpretative meaning sutras and the Middle [Turning] to have both interpretative and definitive parts.

This is because [sections of] the Middle Turning where the distinction “ultimately” is affixed to the object of negation are asserted to be definitive meaning sutras, whereas those where that is not affixed are asserted to be interpretative meaning sutras.

3.4.3.2 Explanation of the Prāsaṅgika system

There are seven [sections] as before.

3.4.3.2.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Prāsaṅgika** is:

A Madhyamika that does not assert truly existent things even conventionally by way of asserting only other-approved consequences.

3.4.3.2.2 [Divisions]

The Ācārya Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Śāntideva, for example.

3.4.3.2.3 [Etymology]

The subject – Ācārya Buddhapālita – there is a reason for calling him a Prāsaṅgika: he is called as such due to asserting that an inference realising the probandum can be produced in the opponent's continuum merely using consequences.

3.4.3.2.4 Way of asserting objects

Regarding objects, there are two:

1. Hidden
2. Manifest

Objects that must be realised in dependence upon signs are posited as hidden and objects that ordinary beings can ascertain through the force of experience without depending upon signs are posited as manifest.

Illustrations of the first are taken to be sound being impermanent and sound's emptiness of true existence, for example.

Illustrations of the second are taken to be pot and cloth, for example.

Directly-perceptible² and manifest are mutually inclusive.

Alternatively, regarding objects, there are two:

1. Conventional truth
2. Ultimate truth

The **definition of x being a conventional truth** is:

1) It is the found-object of valid cognition analysing the conventional and 2) valid cognition analysing the conventional has become a valid cognition analysing the conventional with respect to x.

Moreover, regarding that, it is unsuitable to divide into real conventionalities and unreal conventionalities because real conventionalities do not exist; because if it is a conventionality, then it is necessarily not real; because if it is that, then it is necessarily unreal.

² Tib: *mngon sum*; for the lower schools this refers to the object-possessor, i.e. “direct perception”, for Prāsaṅgika it refers instead to the object.

It is suitable to divide conventional truth into real and unreal in relation to worldly knowledge because:

- Forms are real in relation to worldly knowledge; and
- The reflection of a face in the mirror is unreal in relation to worldly knowledge.

If it is real in relation to worldly knowledge, then it is not pervaded by existing because truly established forms are that.

The **definition of x being an ultimate truth** is:

1) It is the found-object of valid cognition analysing the ultimate and 2) valid cognition analysing the ultimate has become a valid cognition analysing the ultimate with respect to x.

Its divisions are like in the context of the Cittamātra.

In this context, true cessations are asserted to be pervaded by being ultimate truths.

3.4.3.2.5 Way of asserting object-possessors

The mere “I” designated in dependence upon the five aggregates is asserted as the illustration of the person and the person is pervaded by being a non-concomitant compositional factor.

Awareness is divided into two: valid cognition and non-valid awareness.

Valid cognition is divided into two: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

They do not assert self-knowing direct perception; sense consciousnesses in the continua of sentient beings are pervaded by being mistaken consciousnesses; and mental consciousnesses and yogic direct perception can be both mistaken and non-mistaken.

Direct perception is divided into two:

1. Conceptual direct perception
2. Non-conceptual direct perception

Illustrations of the first are taken to be the second moment of an inference realising sound is impermanent and factually concordant memory-consciousness remembering blue that is produced following a sense direct perception apprehending blue, for example.

Illustration of the second are taken to be sense direct perception apprehending form, for example.

If it is direct valid cognition, then it is not pervaded by being directly-perceptible because if it is yogic direct perception, then it is necessarily not directly-perceptible; because directly-perceptible and manifest are mutually inclusive.³

When inference is divided, there are four:

1. Factual inference
2. Inference through renown
3. Inference through analogy
4. Inference through conviction

³ This plays off the habit of reading *mngon sum* as “direct perception”.

Inference of renown and inference through analogy are included within factual inference.

If it is a valid cognition, then it is not pervaded by being non-mistaken with respect to its conceived-object because an inference realising sound is impermanent is a mistaken consciousness with respect to impermanent sound.

If it is a consciousness, then it is pervaded by realising its object of comprehension because the meaning-generality of rabbit horns is the object of comprehension of the conception apprehending rabbit horns and the meaning-generality of permanent sound is the object of comprehension of the conception apprehending permanent sound.

3.4.3.2.6 Way of asserting selflessness

The person being empty of self-sufficient substantial existence is asserted as the coarse selflessness of persons and the person being empty of true existence is asserted as the subtle selflessness of persons.

Coarse [forms] that are accumulations of partless particles and the valid cognitions apprehending them being empty of being different substances is asserted as the coarse selflessness of phenomena and the aggregates (the basis of designation) being empty of true existence is asserted to be the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

The two selflessnesses are differentiated by way of the basis of emptiness and not by way of the object of negation:

- The negation of true establishment (the object of negation) on the basis of the person (the basis) is the subtle selflessness of persons and
- The negation of true establishment (the object of negation) on the basis of the aggregates and so forth (the basis) is the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

The two apprehensions of self are differentiated by way of their observed-objects and not by way of their mode of apprehension because:

- Observing the person (the basis) and apprehending it as truly established is posited as the apprehension of a self of persons and
- Observing the aggregates and so forth (the basis of designation) and apprehending them as truly established is posited as the subtle apprehension of a self of phenomena.

3.4.3.2.7 Presentation of grounds and paths

[This has two sections:]

1. Explanation of objects of abandonment
2. Actual presentation of grounds and paths

3.4.3.2.7.1 [Explanation of objects of abandonment]

The coarse and subtle apprehensions of self together with their seeds as well as the attachment and so forth that arise through the force of those together with their seeds are posited as the afflictive obscurations and as obscurations that mainly hinder the attainment of liberation.

The imprints of the apprehension of true existence and all factors of mistaken dualistic appearances that arise through the force of those are posited as knowledge obscurations and as mainly hindering the attainment of omniscience.

[3.4.3.2.7.2 Actual presentation of grounds and paths]

There is no difference in the view that is the object of cultivation for the persons of all three vehicles because all three similarly take the selflessness of persons and the subtle selflessness of phenomena as their main object of cultivation.

There is a difference in their main objects of abandonment because:

- Hearers and Solitary Realisers take the two apprehensions of self together with their seeds as their main objects of abandonment; whereas
- Bodhisattvas take the imprints of those as their main objects of abandonment.

The suchness distinguished by the abandonment of the two apprehensions of self together with their seeds in the continua of Hearer and Solitary Realiser Foe-Destroyers in meditative equipoise is Nirvana with remainder; such a suchness in the continua of Hearer and Solitary Realiser Foe-Destroyers in subsequent attainment is Nirvana with remainder.

For Mahāyāna lineage-bearers who are of definite lineage from the start:

- The abandonment of the afflictive obscurations and the attainment of the eighth ground are simultaneous; and
- The abandonment of the knowledge obscurations and the actualisation of the four bodies are simultaneous.

OM SVASTI

Precious Garland of Tenets

By Künkhyen Jigmé Wangpo

People who do not concern themselves with this life's gain, veneration, and entertainments, but earnestly strive for liberation should make effort in the method for understanding the pure view of selflessness. This is because without the subtle view, regardless of how much one has familiarised with love, compassion, and the mind of enlightenment, one will not be able to completely uproot the root of suffering.

Likewise, Jetsün Tsongkhapa [in the *Three Principal Aspects of the Path*] says:

If one does not possess the wisdom realising the mode of abiding,
Then despite having familiarised with renunciation and bodhicitta
One is unable to cut the root of samsara;
Therefore, make effort in the methods for realising dependent-arising.

As such, in order to eliminate deviations from the view and ascertain the stages of coarse and subtle selflessness, I will briefly summarise the presentation of our own and others' tenets.

This has two sections:

1. General indication
2. Individual explanations

1. [General indication]

The term “tenets”⁴ is not my own invention because it was taught in Buddhist scriptures. It is as was stated in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sutra*:

The way of my Dharma is of two types:
Teachings and tenets.
To the childish I explained the teachings;
To the yogis, tenets.

Moreover, when people are divided, there are:

1. Those whose minds have not been affected by tenets and
2. Those whose minds have been affected by tenets.

The first are those who are untrained in textual systems and strive for the happiness of just this life with an innate mind that is not investigative or analytical.

The second are those who have trained in textual systems and thus propound a presentation of the basis, path and result through logic and scriptures, in accordance with having established it from their own perspective.

⁴ Tib: 'grub mtha'; lit. “established conclusions”.

Moreover, in terms of the etymology of “tenets”, [Dharmamitra’s] *Clear Words: Explanatory Commentary* says:

Established conclusions: one’s own **established** assertions thoroughly indicated through reasoning and scriptures; since one does not proceed further from that, it is the **conclusion**.

Accordingly, they are referred to as “established conclusions” because in dependence upon scriptures and reasoning one decides upon and establishes an assertion, and one’s mental perspective will not pass beyond the meaning of that [assertion] to a different one.

When those are divided, there are two:

1. Outsiders
2. Insiders

There is a difference between Insiders and Outsiders⁵ because people who sincerely go for refuge in the three jewels are Insiders and people who sincerely go for refuge in worldly gods, without trusting in the three jewels, are Outsiders.

There is also a difference between Insider and Outsider proponents of tenets because they are differentiated by way of the three: the teacher, teachings, and view.

This is because Insiders possess the three distinguishing features of:

1. The teacher: one who has exhausted all faults and perfected all qualities;
2. The teachings: non-violence towards sentient beings;
3. The view: asserting the emptiness of a permanent, unitary, independent self.

And Outsiders possess the three distinguishing features that are opposites of those:

1. The teacher: possessing faults and has not perfected all qualities;
2. The teachings: harm and violence towards sentient beings;
3. The view: asserting the existence of a permanent, unitary, independent self.

2. Individual explanations

1. Brief explanation of Outsider tenets
2. A more elaborate explanation of Insider tenets

2.1 [Brief explanation of Outsider tenets]

The **definition of an Outsider proponent of tenets** is:

A person who 1) is included within the divisions of proponents of tenets and 2) does not go for refuge to the three jewels but instead asserts the existence of a different teacher.

⁵ i.e. Buddhists and Non-Buddhists

When those are divided, there are limitless; but if summarised, there are the five known as the Five Philosophical Systems:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. The Vaishnava | [<i>khyab 'jug pa</i>] |
| 2. Followers of Īśvara | [<i>dbang phyugs pa</i>] |
| 3. The Jaina | [<i>rgyal ba pa</i>] |
| 4. Followers of Kapila [Sāṃkhya] | [<i>ser skya pa</i>] |
| 5. The Bārhaspatya [Cārvāka] | [<i>phur bu pa</i>] |

They are also explained as the Six Root [Philosophical Systems]:

- | | |
|---------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Vaiśeṣika | [<i>bye brag pa</i>] |
| 2. Nyāya | [<i>rig pa can</i>] |
| 3. Sāṃkhya | [<i>grangs can pa</i>] |
| 4. Mīmāṃsā | [<i>dpyod pa ba</i>] |
| 5. Nirgrantha | [<i>gcer bu pa</i>] |
| 6. Cārvāka | [<i>rgyang 'phen pa</i>] |

The first five of these are views of permanence and the last is a view of annihilation.

Explanation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tenets

The Vaiśeṣikas and Nyāyas follow the Sage Kaṇāda and the Brahmin Akṣapāda, respectively.

Although there are some discordant features to their individual assertions, there is no difference in their established conclusions in general.

Moreover, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika assert that all objects of knowledge are included within nine substances. They assert ablutions, empowerments, fasting, making sacrifices, fire pujas, and so forth as paths to liberation.

Through having cultivated yogas based on the guru's instructions, one understands the self to be a separate category from the sense-faculties and so forth, thereby perceiving suchness and understanding the nature of the six categories.⁶

At that time, one understands that although the self is pervasive by nature, it is not an agent; whereby one does not act to accumulate actions that [accord with] Dharma or Non-Dharma. Due to not accumulating new actions and exhausting the old, the self is separated from the previously appropriated body, sense-faculties, awareness, happiness and suffering, attachment and aversion, and so forth; and due to not appropriating a new body, sense-faculties, and so forth, the continuum of births is severed, like a fire that has run out of kindling, the self is alone and that is called the attainment of liberation.

⁶ Skt. Padārtha (lit. "meaning of words"): 1. Substance 2. Quality 3. Karma 4. Generality 5. Particularity 6. Inherence.

Explanation of Sāṃkhya tenets

Sāṃkhyas follow the Sage Kapila.

They assert that objects of knowledge are definite in number as twenty-five; the twenty-five are:

- Self [Puruṣa]
- Principal [Prakṛti]
- The Great [Mahat / Intellect, buddhi]
- Ego [Ahaṁkāra]
- The Five Sense Objects [Tanmātra]
- The Eleven Faculties [Indriya]
- The Five Elements [Bhūta]

The Five Sense Objects are form, sound, smell, taste, and tactile.

The Eleven Faculties are:

- The Five Faculties of Awareness [Buddhīndriya]
- The Five Faculties of the Body [Karmendriya]
- The Mental Faculty [Manas]

The Five Faculties of Awareness are the faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body.

The Five Faculties of the Body are speech, arms, legs, anus, and genitalia.

The Five Elements are earth, water, fire, air, and space.

Among these, the Being [Puruṣa] is consciousness and the remaining twenty-four are asserted as matter due to being collections and aggregations.

The Principal and Being are asserted as ultimate truths, whereas the others are conventional truths.

Moreover, there are four possibilities:

1. Those that are causes but not effects;
2. Those that are both causes and effects;
3. Those that are effects but not causes;
4. Those that are neither causes nor effects.

The first is the General Principal. The second are the seven: Intellect, Ego, and the Five Sense Objects.

The third are the remaining sixteen. The fourth is the Being.

Moreover, the *Tantra of Black Īśvara* says:

The Fundamental Nature is non-manifest;
The seven, the Great and so forth, are manifestations of the Nature;
The sixteen are manifestations;
The Being is not the Nature and non-manifest.

Moreover, Fundamental Nature, Generality, and Principal are mutually inclusive and are objects of knowledge possessing six distinguishing features. The Being, Self, Consciousness, and Knower are mutually inclusive and synonymous.

The mode of arising of the remaining twenty-three is that when the Being generates a desire to utilise objects, the Fundamental Nature emanates manifestations such as sounds and so forth.

Moreover, the Great arises from the Principal; Intellect and the Great are synonyms and are asserted to be like a two-sided mirror in which the reflections of objects dawn from outside and the Being dawns from inside. From that arises Ego; when Ego is divided there are three:

1. Activity [Rajas] dominated Ego
2. Lightness [Sattva] dominated Ego
3. Darkness [Tamas] dominated Ego

From the first arise the Five Sense Objects and from those the Five Elements.

From the second arise the Eleven Faculties.

The third is said to engage the other two Egos.

Moreover, the two – the Nature that is like an abled blind person and the Being that is like a disabled sighted person – are mistaken for being one; it is asserted that we cycle through the force of not knowing the way in which the manifestations are emanated by the Fundamental Nature.

When, in dependence upon listening to instructions taught by a guru, one has produced a superior consciousness ascertaining that these manifestations are nothing more than the emanations of the Nature, one gradually separates from attachment to objects.

At that time, one generates the clairvoyance of the Divine Eye in dependence upon concentration and when that clairvoyance observes the Principal, the Principal is filled with embarrassment, like another's wife; the manifestations gather and the Nature abides alone. At that time, all conventional appearances have been eliminated from the perspective of the yogi's awareness; there is no utilisation of objects by the Being and it abides without activity. At the time, liberation has been attained.

Explanation of Mīmāṃsā tenets

Mīmāṃsās follow Jaimini.

Through superimpositions, saying that whatever appears in the Vedas is self-arisen and suchness, they assert that states of higher realms are attained solely by means of sacrifices and so forth and that is asserted as mere liberation from the lower realms.

However, they propound that a liberation that is the pacification of suffering does not exist because stains abide in the nature of mind and that omniscience does not exist because objects of knowledge are limitless. In that way, true speech is also non-existent.

Explanation of Nirgrantha tenets

Nirgranthas follow the Holy Jina.

They assert that all objects of knowledge are included within nine objects: life, contaminations, vows, definite decay, bondage, karma, negativity, merit, and liberation.

Regarding those, life is the self and it is an existent the size of the being's body; it is permanent by nature but occasionally possesses an impermanent nature.

Contaminations are virtuous and non-virtuous actions because in samsara, one is contaminated through the force of those.

Vows function to cease contaminations because of not accumulating new actions.

Definite decay is the exhaustion of previously accumulated karma by way of asceticism such as not quenching one's thirst, beating the body, and so forth.

Bondage is wrong views.

Karma is of four types: those that will be experienced later [vedanīya], name [nāma], lineage [gotra], and lifespan [āyu].

Negativities are non-Dharma. Merit is Dharma.

Liberation: In dependence upon ascetic practices such as being naked, not speaking, practicing the five fires and so forth, one exhausts all previously done karma and does not accumulate new karma. Due to that, one proceeds to an abode called "Siddhaśīlā" that sits atop all world-systems, like a white umbrella hoisted up; it is white like yogurt or a night-lily, its measure is 4.5 million yojanas, since it has life it is a thing, since it is liberated from samsara it is also a non-thing. That abode is referred to as liberation.

This is as was said by the Holy Jina:

Smelling of Chinese incense flowers,
The colour of yogurt, frost, and pearls,
Shape like an upheld white umbrella –
[That] was explained by the Jina as liberation.

Explanation of Cārvāka tenets

Cārvākas [assert that] there is no coming to this life from the previous birth because no one has seen that called "a previous birth".

Temporary minds are established from temporary bodies; just like a temporarily existing light from a temporarily existing butter-lamp.

There is also no going from this birth to a future one because the body and mind are one substance and therefore when the body disintegrates, awareness also disintegrates; just like a stone carving disintegrates when the stone disintegrates.

As such, they assert that objects of comprehension are pervaded by being individually characterised phenomena and that valid cognition are pervaded by only direct valid cognition; this is because they do not assert generally characterised phenomena and inferential valid cognition.

Some Cārvākas assert that all functioning things are naturally arisen without causes. This is because all phenomena such as the sun rising, water flowing downwards, the roundness of peas, thorns being pointy and sharp, the colours of a peacock, and so forth were not created by anyone but arise naturally.

A bridging verse:

Properly understanding without exception
Outsider tenets that create a pathway down to wrong views,
They are abandoned;
That is the stairway leading to the city of liberation.

2.2 A more elaborate explanation of Buddhist tenets

This has two sections:

1. General indication
2. Particular explanation

2.2.1 [General indication]

The Peerless Teacher King of the Śākya first generated the mind of supreme enlightenment, then accumulated merit over three countless eons, and finally proceeded to Bodhgaya and [attained] perfectly complete enlightenment.

Then, in Varanasi, he turned the Dharma Wheel of the Four Truths for the Five Excellent Disciples. Then, in Vultures Peak, he turned the Dharma Wheel of No Characteristics, the middle Turning. Then, in Vaiśālī and so forth, he turned the Dharma Wheel of Correct Differentiation. Outshining all bad proponents, the six teachers of the Forders and so forth, he spread and expanded the precious Buddhist Teachings that are the source of happiness and benefit.

Later, in dependence upon the individual interpretations of the intention behind the Three Turnings by commentators, four proponents of tenets arose. Among these, the two Proponents of Objects followed the First Turning, the Proponents of Non-Nature followed the Middle Turning, and the Yogācāra followed the Final Turning in forming their assertions regarding the presentation of basis, path, and result.

The proponents of tenets that follow our Teacher are definite in number as four:

- The two: Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika
- The two: Cittamātra and Madhyamaka

This is because it was said that there is no fifth tenet other than those and no fourth vehicle other than the three vehicles. This is in accordance with the *Commentary on the Vajra Essence*:

Regarding the Buddhists, a fifth
And a fourth are not the Muni's intention.

Although the Buddhist tenets of Svātantrika and below, as understood by Prāsaṅgika, fall into the extremes of both permanence and annihilation, each system asserts itself as the Middle Way due to conceitedly asserting a middle free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation.

Moreover, the four proponents of tenets each have different ways of abandoning the extremes of permanence and annihilation:

1. The Vaibhāṣikas say that the extreme of permanence is abandoned due to causes ceasing at the time of the arising of their effects and that the extreme of annihilation is abandoned due to results arising immediately after their causes.
2. The Sautrāntikas assert that the extreme of annihilation is abandoned due to compounded phenomena operating continuously and that they are free from the extreme of permanence due to those momentarily disintegrating.
3. The Cittamātrins say that the extreme of permanence is abandoned since imputational natures are not truly established and that the extreme of annihilation is abandoned since other-powered phenomena are truly established.

4. The Mādhyamikas assert that they are free from the extreme of annihilation since all phenomena exist conventionally and that they are free from the extreme of permanence since they do not exist ultimately.

Although each tenet system refutes the uncommon [assertions] of lower tenets, understanding the lower views seems to be the best method for understanding higher views. Therefore, we should not hold higher tenets as supreme and dislike lower ones.

As such, the **definition of a proponent of Buddhist tenets** is posited as:

A person that asserts the Four Seals of the Buddhist View.

There are Four Seals:

1. All compounded phenomena are impermanent
2. All contaminated phenomena are suffering
3. All phenomena are selfless
4. Nirvāṇa is peace.

Since the Vātsīputrīyas assert a self of persons, does that make them not proponents of Buddhist tenets?

There is no such fault because the self they assert is the self-sufficient substantially existent self and the “selfless” mentioned in the Four Seals refers to the selflessness of a permanent unitary autonomous self. That is also asserted by the five Saṃmittīya schools.

2.2.2 Particular explanation

This has four sections:

1. Vaibhāṣika
2. Sautrāntika
3. Cittamātra
4. Madhyamaka (Proponents of Non-Nature)

2.2.2.1 [Vaibhāṣika]

This has four sections:

1. Definition
2. Divisions
3. Etymology
4. Assertions

2.2.2.1.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Vaibhāṣika** is:

A person that propounds Hīnayāna tenets, does not assert self-knowers, and asserts external objects as truly established.

2.2.2.1.2 [Divisions]

When divided, there are three:

1. Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas
2. Western Vaibhāṣikas
3. Central Vaibhāṣikas

2.2.2.1.3 [Etymology]

The subject – Ācārya Vasubandhu – there is a reason for calling him a Vaibhāṣika: he is called a Vaibhāṣika due to propounding tenets following the [Abhidharma] Mahāvibhāṣā or due to propounding the three times as particular substances.

2.2.2.1.4 [Assertions]

1. Assertions regarding the basis
2. Assertions regarding the path
3. Assertions regarding the result

2.2.2.1.4.1 [Assertions regarding the basis]

1. Assertions regarding objects
2. Assertions regarding object-possessors

2.2.2.1.4.1.1 [Assertions regarding objects]

This system asserts that all objects of knowledge are included within five bases:

1. Basis of appearing forms
2. Basis of main minds
3. Basis of retinue mental factors
4. Basis of non-concomitant compositional factors
5. Basis of the uncompounded

However, all five of these bases are asserted as functioning things.

The **definition of functioning thing** is: That able to perform a function.

Existent, object of knowledge, and functioning thing are mutually inclusive.

Uncompounded phenomena are asserted as permanent functioning things and the three – form, consciousness, and non-concomitant compositional factors – are asserted as impermanent functioning things.

Functioning things are pervaded by being substantially established, but are not pervaded by being substantially existent. This is because ultimate truth and substantial existent are asserted as mutually inclusive and conventional truth and imputed existent are asserted as mutually inclusive.

When [functioning things] are divided, there are:

1. Division into the two truths
2. Contaminated and uncontaminated
3. Indication of other related topics

2.2.2.1.4.1.1.1 [Division into the two truths]

The **definition of a conventional truth** is:

That observed as a phenomenon whose apprehending awareness is suitable to be lost when it is destroyed or mentally separated into parts.

Illustrations are a clay pot and a mala:

- Because when the clay pot is destroyed with a hammer, the awareness apprehending it as a clay pot is lost and
- Because when the mala's beads are separated, the awareness apprehending it as a mala is lost.

The **definition of an ultimate truth** is:

That observed as a phenomenon whose apprehending awareness is not suitable to be lost when it is destroyed or mentally separated into parts.

Illustrations are partless particles, partless moments of consciousness, and uncompounded space.

This is because [Vasubandhu's] *Abhidharmakośa* says:

That which when destroyed or mentally
Separated, awareness does not engage it,
Like a water-pot, exists conventionally;
Ultimate existents are the others.

As such, although conventional truths are not ultimately established, they are asserted as truly established because this system asserts that functioning things are pervaded by being truly established.

2.2.2.1.4.1.1.2 [Contaminated and uncontaminated]

The **definition of contaminated** is:

A phenomenon that is suitable to increase contamination by way of either observation or concomitance.

Illustrations: the five aggregates.

The **definition of uncontaminated** is:

A phenomenon that is not suitable to increase contamination by way of either observation or concomitance.

Illustrations: true paths and uncompounded phenomena.

This is because [Vasubandhu's] *Abhidharmakośa* says:

Compounded phenomena not included in paths
Are contaminated.

And:

Uncontaminated phenomena are true paths and
Uncompounded phenomena, of which there are three:

Contaminated are pervaded by being objects of abandonment because the paths of accumulation and preparation are objects of abandonment. The path of seeing is exclusively uncontaminated, whereas the paths of meditation and no more learning have both.

If it is an Ārya path, it is pervaded by being uncontaminated; however, if it is a path in an Ārya's continuum it is not pervaded by being uncontaminated because the path possessing the aspects of coarseness and peacefulness in the continuum of someone on the path of meditation is contaminated.

2.2.2.1.4.1.3 Indication of other related topics

The three times are asserted as substances because of asserting that the pot exists at the time of the pot's past and that pot also exists at the time of the pot's future.

Although they assert positive phenomena and negations, they do not assert non-implicative negations because they assert that if it is a negation, it is pervaded by being an implicative negation.

The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas, in accordance with the Sautrāntikas, assert the mental continuum as the support for the connection between actions and their effects; other Vaibhāṣikas assert an attainment (a non-concomitant compositional factor called "non-wastage", which is similar to a deposit receipt) as the support for the connection between actions and their effects.

Both in the Prāsaṅgika and this system, actions of body and speech are asserted as form.

Compounded phenomena are pervaded by being impermanent; however, they are not pervaded by disintegrating momentarily because they assert that after having been produced, there is the activity of abiding and after that, the activity of disintegrating.

2.2.2.1.4.1.2 Assertions regarding object-possessors

There are three:

1. Persons
2. Consciousness
3. Expressive sound

2.2.2.1.4.1.2.1 [Persons]

They assert the mere collection of the five aggregates (the basis of designation) as the illustration of the person. Some Saṃmittīyas assert all five aggregates as the illustration of the person and the Avantakas assert just the mind as the illustration of the person.

2.2.2.1.4.1.2.2 [Consciousness]

There are two types of consciousness: valid cognition and non-valid awareness.

The first is of two types: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

The first of those has three:

1. Sense direct perception
2. Mental direct perception
3. Yogic direct perception

They do not assert self-knowing direct perception.

Sense direct valid cognition is not pervaded by being consciousness because the physical eye-faculty is a common locus of the three: matter, view, and valid cognition.

They assert that sense consciousnesses nakedly apprehend their objects without an aspect and that the supporting physical eye-faculty also perceives forms because if only the consciousness perceived those, then they would also perceive forms obstructed by walls and so forth.

They assert that minds and mental factors are different substances.

2.2.2.1.4.1.2.3 [Expressive sound]

In general, if mere sound is divided, there are two:

1. Conjoined sound
2. Unconjoined sound

The first is sound that is a being's speech, for example.

The second is the sound of water, for example.

Moreover, both conjoined and unconjoined have two types: sound indicated and not indicated to sentient beings.

Sound indicated to sentient beings, sound of perceptible-speech, and expressive sound are mutually inclusive.

Sound not indicated to sentient beings, sound that is not perceptible-speech, and non-expressive sound are mutually inclusive.

Since they assert that Words and Treatises are sound-generalities, the nature of the collections of sentences, words, and syllables, are non-concomitant compositional factors; I wonder if matter and non-concomitant compositional factors are not mutually exclusive in this system.

2.2.2.1.4.2 [Assertions regarding the path]

Regarding the presentation of the path, there are three:

1. Objects of observation of the path
2. Objects of abandonment of the path
3. Nature of the path

2.2.2.1.4.2.1 [Objects of observation of the path]

These are the sixteen aspects of the four truths, impermanence and so forth.

They assert subtle selflessness to be mutually inclusive with the subtle selflessness of persons and assert the subtle selflessness of persons as the emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent self.

From among the eighteen sub-schools, the five Sammittīya schools do not assert the emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent self as the subtle selflessness of persons because they assert that a self-sufficient substantially existent self exists.

They do not assert a presentation of the coarse or subtle selflessness of phenomena because they assert that if it is an established base, then it is pervaded by being a self of phenomena.

2.2.2.1.4.2.2 Objects of abandonment of the path

There are two: afflicted and unafflicted unknowing.

The first mainly acts as an obstacle to liberation; its illustrations are grasping to the self of persons and the three poisons that arise from that together with their seeds.

The second mainly acts as an obstacle to omniscience; its illustrations are the four causes of not knowing, such as the unafflicted obscuration of not knowing the profound and subtle dharma of the Tathāgatas.

Regarding obscurations, apart from the above two, they do not assert the term “knowledge obscurations”.

2.2.2.1.4.2.3 Nature of the path

Despite asserting the presentation of the five paths (the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, and no more learning), with respect to the paths of the three vehicles, they do not assert the exalted wisdom of the ten grounds.

They assert that the first fifteen instances of the sixteen instances of forbearance and knowledge are the path of seeing, the sixteenth instant (the subsequent knowledge in relation to paths) is the path of meditation, and that they are exclusively produced sequentially, like goats crossing a bridge.

True paths are not pervaded by being consciousness because the uncontaminated five aggregates are asserted as true paths.

2.2.2.1.4.3 [Assertions regarding the result]

The Hearer lineage-bearers, having familiarised with the sixteen aspects (impermanence and so forth) for up to three lifetimes and so forth, finally abandon (by way of eliminating the attainment) the afflicted obscurations in dependence upon the vajra-like concentration of the Hearer’s path of meditation and thereby actualise the result of Foe-Destroyer.

The Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realisers combine their view realising the emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent self with a collection of merit of a hundred eons and so forth; having practiced everything up to the great path of accumulation, they actualise everything from the heat level of the path of preparation and up to the path of no more learning in a single sitting.

Since inferior Foe-Destroyers can degenerate from their realisations and abandonments and become Stream-Enterers, they assert those possessing the attribute of degeneration and so forth.

They enumerate a presentation of the Twenty Sangha and the Eight Approachers and Abiders with respect to Hearers; however, they do not assert Simultaneous Abandoners and they assert that all eight Approachers and Abiders are pervaded by being Āryas.

Bodhisattvas complete their accumulation of three countless eons’ worth of merit on the occasion of the path of accumulation; then, having established the causes for the marks and signs over a hundred eons, in their final existence, under the Bodhi tree, they tame the Mara of Devaputra in the evening, they actualise the paths of preparation, seeing, and meditation during meditative equipoise at midnight, and actualise the path of no more learning at dawn.

Therefore, they assert that up to and including taming the Mara of Devaputra in the evening is on the occasion of being an ordinary being and that the bodhisattva paths of preparation, seeing, and meditation are pervaded by exclusively being meditative equipoise.

They assert that the first nine of the twelve enlightened deeds are deeds of the bodhisattva and the other three are deeds of the Buddha.

They assert that the Dharma Wheel of realisation is pervaded by being the path of seeing and that the Dharma Wheel of scripture is pervaded by being the Dharma Wheel of the Four Truths.

They assert that the Seven Treatises on Abhidharma are pervaded by being Words spoken by the Buddha and that Words are pervaded by being literal.

They only assert eighty thousand bundles of dharma (not eighty-four thousand) because [Vasubandhu's] *Abhidharmakośa* says:

The eighty thousand bundles of dharma,
Those which were spoken by the Muni.

The abode for actualising enlightenment by bodhisattvas in their final existence is definite as only the desire realm. Therefore, they do not assert the presentation of the Heavily Adorned Akaniṣṭha and the Enjoyment Body; moreover, they also do not assert omniscience.

The Foe-Destroyers of the three vehicles are pervaded by being with remainder because they assert that at the time of passing beyond sorrow without remainder, the continuum of awareness is severed like a butter-lamp going out. Therefore, they assert three final vehicles.

Some who say that the Teacher's Parinirvāṇa was merely the gathering of the manifestation of the Form Body from the disciples' perspective when actually passing beyond sorrow does not exist have mixed up fish with turnips!

Although an Ārya Buddha has abandoned sufferings and origins without exception, this does not contradict the existence of true sufferings in their continuum because they posit that when afflictions observing true sufferings have been abandoned without exception, then true sufferings have been abandoned.

Since the Form Body is included within the same life as the physical-support of the preceding bodhisattva on the path of preparation, it is asserted as Buddha but not a Buddha Jewel. The Buddha Jewel is asserted as the exalted wisdom of exhaustion and non-arising in their continuum.

Similarly, since Learner Āryas are contaminated, they are asserted as Sangha but not Sangha Jewels. The Sangha Jewel is asserted as the true paths in their continuum.

There is something to posit as the Dharma Jewel because that is Nirvāṇa and true cessations in the continua of Buddhas and both Hearers and Solitary Realisers.

A bridging verse:

With the golden vase of my analysing intelligence,
Taking from the ocean of sport of the Vaibhāṣika system,
The nectar of good explanations; spreading joy
To the host of the clear-minded at the festival.

2.2.2.2 [Sautrāntika]

The presentation of the Sautrāntika tenets has four sections:

1. Definition
2. Divisions
3. Etymology
4. Assertions

2.2.2.2.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Sautrāntika** is:

A person that propounds Hīnayāna tenets and asserts both self-knowers and external objects through adherence to true existence.

Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntika are mutually inclusive.

2.2.2.2.2 [Divisions]

When divided, there are two:

1. Sautrāntikas that are followers of scripture
2. Sautrāntikas that are followers of reasoning

The first are Sautrāntikas that follow the Abhidharmakośa, for example.

The second are Sautrāntikas that follows the Seven Treatises on Pramāṇa, for example.

2.2.2.2.3 [Etymology]

There is a reason for calling them Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntika:

- They are called Sautrāntika due to propounding tenets mainly in dependence upon the Bhagavān's sutras, without following the [Abhidharma] Mahāvibhāṣā;
- They are called Dārṣṭāntika due to indicating all phenomena by way of examples.

2.2.2.2.4 [Assertions]

1. Assertions regarding the basis
2. Assertions regarding the path
3. Assertions regarding the result

2.2.2.2.4.1 [Assertions regarding the basis]

1. Assertions regarding objects
2. Assertions regarding object-possessors

2.2.2.2.4.1.1 [Assertions regarding objects]

The **definition of object** is: That which is known by awareness.

The **definition of object of knowledge** is: That suitable as an object of awareness.

Object, existent, object of knowledge, and established base are mutually inclusive.

When that is divided, there are:

1. Division into the two truths
2. Division into specifically and generally characterised phenomena
3. Division into positive phenomena and negations
4. Division into manifest and hidden phenomena
5. Division into the three times
6. Division into one and different

2.2.2.2.4.1.1.1 [Division into the two truths]

The **definition of ultimate truth** is:

A phenomenon established as withstanding analysis through reasoning from the perspective of its mode of abiding, without relying upon designation by terms and conceptuality.

Things, ultimate truths, specifically characterised phenomena, impermanent phenomena, compounded phenomena, and truly established phenomena are mutually inclusive.

The **definition of conventional truth** is:

A phenomenon established as merely imputed by conceptuality.

Non-things, conventional truths, generally characterised phenomena, permanent phenomena, uncompounded phenomena, and falsely established phenomena are mutually inclusive.

The etymology of the two truths is as follows. Taking the subject – uncompounded space – it is called a conventional truth because it is true from the perspective of a conventional awareness.

“Obscured”⁷ here refers to conceptuality; since it is obscured with respect to directly perceiving specifically characterised phenomena, it is called obscured.

This is just an etymology; if it is true from the perspective of a conventional awareness (i.e. conceptuality), there is no pervasion that it is a conventional truth because an illustration of ultimate truth such as a pot, for example, is also true from the perspective of a conventional awareness (i.e. conceptuality).

The self of persons and permanent sound, for example, are also true from the perspective of a conventional awareness (i.e. conceptuality) but are not established even conventionally.

Taking the subject – a pot – it is called an ultimate truth because of being true from the perspective of an ultimate awareness.

“Ultimate awareness” here refers to a consciousness that is non-mistaken with respect to its appearing object.

This way of positing the two truths is the system of the Sautrāntikas that are followers of reasoning; the Sautrāntikas that are followers of scriptures assert the presentation of the two truths in accordance with the Vaibhāṣikas.

⁷ Tib: *kun rdzob*; lit. “completely obscured”; same term translated as “conventional” in “conventional truth / awareness”.

2.2.2.2.4.1.1.2 [Division into specifically and generally characterised phenomena]

The **definition of a specifically characterised phenomenon** is:

A phenomenon that is ultimately able to perform a function.

Illustration: a pot.

The **definition of a generally characterised phenomenon** is:

A phenomenon that is not ultimately able to perform a function.

Illustration: uncompounded space.

Although superimposed phenomena such as generality and particularity, one and many, contradiction and relation, and so forth are generally characterised phenomena, it is necessary to distinguish that if it is those, then it is not necessarily a generally characterised phenomenon.

2.2.2.2.4.1.1.3 [Division into positive phenomena and negations]

The **definition of a negation** is:

That which is realised by way of the explicit negation of an object of negation.

This and other-exclusion are mutually inclusive.

When divided, there are two:

1. Implicative
2. Non-implicative

The **definition of a non-implicative negation** is:

That which is realised as the mere negation of its object of negation by the awareness explicitly realising it.

For example, Brahmins do not drink alcohol.

The **definition of an implicative negation** is:

A different phenomenon (either an implicative negation or a positive phenomenon) that is implied upon the negation of the object of negation by the awareness explicitly realising it.

For example, fat Devadatta does not eat food during the day.

The **definition of a positive phenomenon** is:

A phenomenon that is not realised through the explicit negation of an object of negation by the awareness explicitly realising it.

For example, a pot.

2.2.2.2.4.1.1.4 [Division into manifest and hidden phenomena]

The **definition of a manifest phenomenon** is:

That which is explicitly realised by direct valid cognition.

This and functioning thing are mutually inclusive.

The **definition of a hidden phenomenon** is:

That which is explicitly realised by inferential valid cognition.

This and object of knowledge are mutually inclusive.

2.2.2.2.4.1.1.5 [Division into the three times]

The **definition of past** is:

The factor of another phenomenon having disintegrated in the second moment after its establishment.

The **definition of future** is:

The factor of another phenomenon not being produced at some place and time due to incomplete conditions, despite the cause for its production existing.

The **definition of present** is:

That which has been produced and has not ceased.

They assert that past and future are permanent, whereas present and functioning thing are mutually inclusive.

However, one should understand the difference regarding a past functioning thing arising subsequent to that functioning thing and a future functioning thing existing prior to that functioning thing.

2.2.2.2.4.1.1.6 [Division into one and different]

The **definition of one** is:

A phenomenon that is not diverse.

For example, a pot.

The **definition of different** is:

Diverse phenomena.

For example, the two: pot and pillar.

Different entities are pervaded by being different isolates, but different isolates are not pervaded by being different entities because product and impermanent are one entity but different isolates.

[Other assertions regarding objects]

Their assertions regarding partless particles and partless moments of consciousness accord with the Vaibhāṣika.

However, they are not completely similar because:

- Vaibhāṣikas assert them as existent and thereby substantially established, whereas Sautrāntikas do not assert them as such;
- Also, imperceptible forms are asserted as fully-qualified forms by the Vaibhāṣika and Prāsaṅgika, but are asserted as not being fully-qualified forms by the Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Svātantrika.
- Moreover, Vaibhāṣikas assert cause and effect as simultaneous, whereas the Sautrāntikas and above do not assert as such.

2.2.2.2.4.1.2 [Assertions regarding object-possessors]

There are three:

1. Persons
2. Consciousness
3. Expressive sound

2.2.2.2.4.1.2.1 [Persons]

The followers of scriptures assert the continuum of the aggregates as the illustration of the person and the followers of reasoning assert the mental consciousness as the illustration of the person.

2.2.2.2.4.1.2.2 [Consciousness]

There are two: valid cognition and non-valid awarenesses.

There are two valid cognitions: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

There are four direct valid cognitions:

1. Sense direct perception
2. Mental direct perception
3. Self-knowing direct perception
4. Yogic direct perception

Physical faculties are not suitable as valid cognition because they are empty of being clear and knowing and they are unable to apprehend their objects.

There are five non-valid awarenesses:

1. Subsequent cognition
2. Wrong consciousness
3. Doubt
4. Correct Assumption
5. Appearance without ascertainment

Among these [seven], direct perception and appearance without ascertainment are pervaded by being non-mistaken and free from conceptuality, while inferential cognition, correct assumption, and doubt are exclusively conceptual.

When consciousness apprehends an object, it realises it together with an aspect.

Mind and mental factors are the same substance.

2.2.2.2.4.1.2.3 [Expressive sound]

The **definition of expressive sound** is:

An object of hearing that creates understanding of the expressed meaning.

When that is divided by way of the expressed meaning, there are two:

1. Sounds expressing a class
2. Sounds expressing a collection

The first is the sound expressing “form”, for example.

The second is the sound expressing “pot”, for example.

Moreover, when divided by way of the mode of expression, there are two:

1. Sounds expressing an attribute
2. Sounds expressing an attribute-possessor

The first is the sound expressing “sound’s impermanence”, for example.

The second is the sound expressing “impermanent sound”, for example.

2.2.2.2.4.2 [Assertions regarding the path]

Regarding the presentation of the path, there are three:

1. [Objects of observation of the path
2. Objects of abandonment of the path
3. Nature of the path]

2.2.2.2.4.2.1 Objects of observation of the path

These are the sixteen aspects of the four truths, impermanence and so forth.

They assert subtle selflessness to be mutually inclusive with the subtle selflessness of persons. They assert that coarse selflessness is the emptiness of a permanent, unitary, independent self and that subtle selflessness is the emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent self.

2.2.2.2.4.2.2 Objects of abandonment of the path

Similar to the Vaibhāṣikas; apart from the terms apprehension of a self of persons, afflicted and unafflicted unknowing, and so forth, they do not assert apprehension of a self of phenomena, knowledge obscurations, and so forth.

2.2.2.2.4.2.3 Nature of the path

They make a presentation of the five paths of the three vehicles but assert all sixteen instants of knowledge and forbearance as being the path of seeing.

Since the appearing object of direct perception is necessarily a specifically characterised phenomenon, they do not assert the subtle selflessness of persons as the object of the mode of apprehension of the uninterrupted path of the Hearer path of seeing. This is because they assert that it explicitly apprehends a compositional factor of separation from a self of persons and implicitly realises the subtle selflessness of persons.

2.2.2.2.4.3 [Assertions regarding the result]

Apart from asserting that it is not possible for Foe-Destroyers to degenerate from their realisations and abandonments and that the Buddha's form aggregate is Buddha, the way of actualising the results of the three vehicles and so forth is the same as the Vaibhāṣikas.

Although Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas do not assert the Mahāyāna basket as Words, it is explained that there are later thinkers who did.

A bridging verse:

Through the force of properly training in the logic texts,
This expression of the words of logic
Of the Exemplifiers who follow logic
Should manifest joy in proponents of logic.

2.2.2.3 [Cittamātra]

The presentation of the Cittamātra tenets has four sections:

1. Definition
2. Divisions
3. Etymology
4. Assertions

2.2.2.3.1 [Definition]

A person that propounds Buddhist tenets, does not assert external objects, and asserts other-powered natures as truly established.

2.2.2.3.2 [Divisions]

When those are divided, there are two:

1. Cittamātra True Aspectarians
2. Cittamātra False Aspectarians

There is a difference between these two. The aspect that is the basis of the debate between the True and False Aspectarians is the appearance of blue as blue to an eye consciousness apprehending blue:

- The True Aspectarians assert that it is established in accordance with the appearance of blue as blue to an eye consciousness apprehending blue;
- The False Aspectarians assert that it is not established in accordance with the appearance of blue as blue to an eye consciousness apprehending blue.

That follows because both the True and False Aspectarians are similar in asserting that to an eye consciousness apprehending blue:

- Blue appears as blue;
- Blue appears as coarse; and
- Blue appears as an external object.

However:

- The True Aspectarians assert that the appearance of blue as an external object to an eye consciousness apprehending blue is affected by ignorance, whereas the appearances of blue as blue and blue as coarse are not affected by ignorance.
- The False Aspectarians assert that not only the appearance of blue as an external object but also the appearances of blue as blue and blue as coarse are affected by ignorance.

Therefore, the **definition of a Cittamātra True Aspectarian** is:

Someone who 1) is a Cittamātra and 2) asserts that things appearing as coarse to a sense consciousness are established in accordance with that appearance.

The **definition of a Cittamātra False Aspectarian** is:

Someone who 1) is a Cittamātra and 2) asserts that things appearing as coarse to a sense consciousness are not established in accordance with that appearance.

When Cittamātra True Aspectarians are divided, there are three:

1. Those asserting equal number of apprehenders and apprehendeds
2. The half-eggists
3. The non-pluralists

Masters have discordant assertions regarding the differences between these three.

Güngru Gyältsen Sangpo's *Essential Meaning of the Middle Way* explains:

When an eye consciousness apprehending the pattern on a butterfly's wing apprehends that pattern: the individual aspects of the various [colours], blue and yellow and so forth, are cast from the side of the object, and from the side of the object-possessor the individual aspects of the various [colours], blue and yellow and so forth, arise as true aspects. Due to asserting as such, they are called those asserting equal number of apprehenders and apprehendeds.

When apprehending as such, the individual aspects of the various [colours], blue and yellow and so forth, are cast from the side of the object, and from the side of the object-possessor the individual aspects of the various [colours], blue and yellow and so forth, arise without an aspect. Due to asserting as such, they are called half-eggists.

When apprehending as such, the individual aspects of the various [colours], blue and yellow and so forth, are not cast from the side of the object but rather just the aspect of the pattern is cast; also, from the side of the object-possessor, the individual aspects of the various [colours], blue and yellow and so forth, do not arise without an aspect but rather just the aspect of the pattern arises without an aspect. Due to asserting as such, they are called non-pluralists.

Drüngchen Legpa Sango, Panchen Sönam Drakpa, and so forth explain:

Just as the blue and yellow that appear to the sense consciousness apprehending the pattern are different substances, there exist many eye consciousnesses of different substances on top of the eye consciousness apprehending the pattern. Due to asserting as such, they are called those asserting equal number of apprehenders and apprehendeds.

Although in general blue and the eye consciousness apprehending blue are the nature of consciousness, those two are of different substances. Due to asserting as such, they are called half-eggists.

Just as the blue and yellow of the pattern are of one substance, the two sense consciousnesses apprehending blue and yellow and so forth on the basis of the eye consciousness apprehending the pattern are of one substance. Due to asserting as such, they are called non-pluralists.

The *Great Presentation of Tenets* explains:

When the eye consciousness apprehending the pattern is looking at the pattern, consciousnesses of concordant class equal to the number of the pattern's [colours], blue and yellow and so forth, simultaneously arise. Due to asserting as such, they are called those asserting equal number of apprehenders and apprehendeds.

Although blue and the eye consciousness apprehending blue are sequential in relation to their time of establishment, they are of one substance in relation to their time of observation. Due to asserting as such, they are called half-eggists.

When the eye consciousness apprehending the pattern is looking at its object, consciousnesses of concordant class equal to the number of the object's [colours], blue and yellow and so forth, do not simultaneously arise; rather, the eye consciousness apprehending the pattern alone is the sense consciousness apprehending the object's [colours], blue and yellow and so forth. Due to asserting as such, they are called non-pluralists.

As such, choose which is most comfortable out of these three systems.

It is explained that among those asserting equal number of apprehenders and apprehendeds, there are those who assert eight types of consciousnesses and those who assert six types of consciousness, and that among the non-pluralists, there are proponents of six types of consciousness and proponents of a single consciousness.

When the False Aspectarians are divided, there are two:

1. Stained False Aspectarians
2. Stainless False Aspectarians

Due to asserting that the nature of the mind is polluted by the stains of the imprints of ignorance, they are called Stained.

Due to asserting that the nature of the mind is not polluted by the stains of the imprints of ignorance even in the slightest, they are called Stainless.

Alternatively, although there is no ignorance on the Buddha ground, there are mistaken appearances; due to asserting as such, they are called Stained.

Since there is no ignorance on the Buddha ground, there are also no mistaken appearances; due to asserting as such, they are called Stainless.

Also, when Cittamātrins are divided, there are two:

1. Followers of scriptures
2. Followers of reasoning

The first are those that follow [Asaṅga's] Five Treatises on the Grounds.

The second are those that follow [Dharmakīrti's] Seven Treatises on Pramāṇa.

2.2.2.3.3 [Etymology]

Why are they called Cittamātra? They are called Cittamātra or Vijñaptimātra due to propounding that all phenomena are merely in the nature of mind.

They are called Yogācāra due to yogis ascertaining the activities, i.e. practices, of the path by way of the basis.

2.2.2.3.4 [Assertions]

1. Assertions regarding the basis
2. Assertions regarding the path
3. Assertions regarding the result

2.2.2.3.4.1 [Assertions regarding the basis]

1. Assertions regarding objects
2. Assertions regarding object-possessors

2.2.2.3.4.1.1 [Assertions regarding objects]

They assert that all phenomena are included within the three natures because of asserting that:

1. Compounded phenomena are other-powered natures
2. All dharmatā are thoroughly-established natures
3. Phenomena other than those are imputational natures.

Although they assert that those three are established from their own side and inherently established, there is a difference in terms of being truly established or not because they assert that:

- Imputational natures lack true existence, whereas
- Other-powered and thoroughly-established natures are truly established.

The **definition of imputational natures** is:

That which is not ultimately established but is established from the perspective of conceptuality.

When divided, there are two:

1. Enumerated imputational natures
2. Imputational natures whose entity is negated

The first is object of knowledge, for example.

The second are the two types of self, for example.

The **definition of other-powered natures** is:

That which has arisen in dependence upon the power of other causes and conditions and which is the support for thoroughly-established natures.

When divided, there are two:

1. Pure other-powered natures
2. Impure other-powered natures

The first are an Ārya's exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment and the Buddha's marks and signs, for example.

The second are the contaminated appropriated aggregates, for example.

The **definition of thoroughly-established natures** is:

The suchness that is the emptiness of either of the two types of self.

When divided, there are two:

1. Unmistaken thoroughly-established natures
2. Unchanging thoroughly-established natures

The first is an Ārya's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, for example.

The second is dharmatā, for example.

Unmistaken thoroughly-established natures are set forth as a division of thoroughly-established natures but are not thoroughly-established natures because of not being that which is a final object of observation of a pure path that acts to exhaust contamination upon observation.

Also, when objects of knowledge are divided, there are two:

1. Conventional truths
2. Ultimate truths

The **definition of a conventional truth** is:

The object found by a valid cogniser that is a reasoning consciousness analysing the conventional.

Falsity, obscured truth, and conventional truth are mutually inclusive.

The **definition of an ultimate truth** is:

The object found by a valid cogniser that is a reasoning consciousness analysing the ultimate.

Dharmadhātu, thoroughly-established nature, ultimate truth, perfect end, and suchness are asserted as mutually inclusive.

If it is an ultimate truth, it is pervaded by being established by way of its own-characteristics; but if it is a conventional truth, it is not pervaded by being established by way of its own-characteristics because other-powered natures are established by way of their own-characteristics but imputational phenomena are not established by way of their own-characteristics.

If it is a falsity, it is not necessarily falsely established because other-powered natures are falsities but are not falsely established.

The way of asserting the three times and non-implicative negations is the same for Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Svātantrika.

The five sense-objects, forms and so forth, are not externally established because of arising upon the substance of the inner consciousness through the force of imprints deposited upon the Ālayavijñāna by unique actions.

According to the True Aspectarians, the five sense-objects, forms and so forth, are asserted to not be external objects but are coarsely established.

The False Aspectarians assert those as not coarsely established because if they were, they would necessarily be external objects.

2.2.2.3.4.1.2 [Assertions regarding object-possession]

The followers of scriptures, due to asserting eight types of consciousnesses, assert the Ālayavijñāna as the person; whereas the followers of reasoning assert the mental consciousness as the illustration of the person.

The Ālayavijñāna is asserted as that which is distinguished by being a stable main mental knower that observes the inner imprints, its aspect is impartial, its nature is a non-obscured unspecified, and it is concomitant only with its associated five omnipresent mental factors.

Moreover, between being obscured and non-obscured, it is a non-obscured unspecified; it is not virtue since it exists in the continua of those who have severed roots of virtue and it is also not non-virtue because of existing in the upper realms.

The afflicted consciousness is asserted as that which observes the Ālayavijñāna, possesses the aspect of thinking of it as the “I”, and its nature is an obscured unspecified; this accords with the general way of positing the six operating consciousnesses.

There are two valid cognitions: direct and inferential. They assert a presentation of four types of direct perception. Self-knowing and yogic direct perception are pervaded by being unmistaken consciousnesses.

The True Aspectarians assert that the eye consciousnesses apprehending blue in the continua of ordinary beings is an unmistaken consciousness; according to the False Aspectarians, sense direct perception in the continua of ordinary beings is pervaded by being mistaken consciousnesses, whereas mental direct perception in their continua can be both mistaken and non-mistaken.

2.2.2.3.4.2 [Assertions regarding the path]

Regarding the presentation of the path, there are three:

1. Objects of observation of the path
2. Objects of abandonment of the path
3. Nature of the path

2.2.2.3.4.2.1 [Objects of observation of the path]

The sixteen attributes of the four truths, impermanence and so forth, and the emptiness of a permanent, unitary, and independent self are asserted as the coarse selflessness of persons.

The emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent self is asserted as the subtle selflessness of persons.

Form and the valid cognition apprehending form being empty of being different substances and form's emptiness of being established by way of its own-characteristics as the basis for the conception apprehending form are asserted as the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

Both subtle selflessnesses of phenomena are asserted as emptiness but emptiness is not necessarily one of those because true cessations and Nirvāṇa are also asserted as emptinesses.

Compounded phenomena are asserted as being one substance with the valid cognition apprehending them, while un-compounded phenomena are asserted as being one entity with the valid cognition apprehending them.

2.2.2.3.4.2.2 [Objects of abandonment of the path]

There are two: afflictive obscurations and knowledge obscurations.

The first are the coarse and subtle apprehension of a self of persons together with their seeds, as well as the six root afflictions and the twenty secondary afflictions, for example.

The second is the apprehension of a self of phenomena together with its seeds, for example.

Moreover, bodhisattvas take the knowledge obscurations as their main objects of abandonment and do not take the afflictive obscurations as their main objects of abandonment. Hīnayāna learners take the afflictive obscurations as their main objects of abandonment and do not take the knowledge obscurations as their main objects of abandonment.

2.2.2.3.4.2.3 [Nature of the path]

They make a presentation of the five paths (accumulation and preparation, seeing and meditation, and no more learning) for each of the three vehicles and on top of that assert the presentation of the ten grounds for the Mahāyāna.

2.2.2.3.4.3 [Assertions regarding the result]

The way of actualising the results is as follows.

Hīnayānists of definite lineage take thoroughly-established natures relating to the selflessness of persons as their main objects of cultivation and when they complete their familiarisation with those, they abandon all afflictive obscurations without exception in dependence upon the vajra-like concentration of the Hīnayāna path of meditation and simultaneously actualise the result of Hīnayāna Foe-Destroyer.

Since there is no difference whatsoever between the Hearers and Solitary Realisers in relation to the selflessness that is their object of cultivation and the afflictions that are their objects of abandonment, the presentation of the Eight Approachers and Abiders is suitable for both Hearers and Solitary Realisers. However, since Solitary realisers are definite as possessing desire realm supports, they are not presented within the Twenty Sangha.

Nevertheless, it is not that there is no difference between Hearers and Solitary Realisers because they assert that through the force of prolonging their familiarisation with the collection of merit over a hundred eons or not, there is a superior and inferior result.

Followers of scriptures assert that Hīnayāna Foe-Destroyers that proceed only to pacification do not enter the Mahāyāna path, whereas Foe-Destroyers that will thoroughly transform to enlightenment do enter the Mahāyāna path. However, they will enter that from [Nirvāṇa] with remainder and not from [Nirvāṇa] without remainder because they assert three final vehicles.

Followers of reasoning assert that Hīnayāna Foe-Destroyers enter the Mahāyāna path because they assert one final vehicle.

Mahāyānist of definite lineage take thoroughly-established natures relating to the selflessness of phenomena as their main objects of cultivation and practice that in connection with an accumulation of three countless eons, thereby proceeding gradually through the five paths and ten grounds. Then, having completely abandoned the two obscurations by means of the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum, they actualise the Dharmakāya (the excellent realisation and abandonment that is one's own welfare) and Rūpakāya (the excellent enlightened activities that are others' welfare) in Akaniṣṭha.

According to some who follow [Asaṅga's] *Compendium of Knowledge*, enlightenment can also be [attained] upon a human support.

They assert a difference between the definitive and interpretative Words of the Buddha because they assert that the first two Turnings as explained in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* are interpretative meaning sutras, whereas the Final Turning is a definitive meaning sutra.

This is because they posit interpretative meaning sutras as sutras whose explicit teachings are not suitable to be asserted literally and definitive meaning sutras as sutras whose explicit teachings are suitable to be asserted literally.

Nirvāṇa is divided into three: with remainder, without remainder, and non-abiding.

The Buddha's Bodies are divided into three: the Dharmakāya, Saṃbhogakāya, and Nirmāṇakāya. There are two Dharmakāyas: the Svabhāvikakāya and Jñānadharmakāya. The Svabhāvikakāya is divided into two: that of natural purity and that of freedom from adventitious stains.

Due to asserting as such they are referred to as proponents of Mahāyāna tenets.

A bridging verse:

The followers of the Speech of the Guide, the Muni;
Their tenets propounding mind only
In accordance with the Speech of many masters is set forth here,
Suitable for the intelligent to engaged in with joy.

2.2.2.4 [Madhyamaka]

The presentation of the Madhyamaka tenets, the Proponents of Non-Nature, has four sections:

1. Definition
2. Etymology
3. Divisions
4. Explanation of the individual divisions

2.2.2.4.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Mādhyamika** is:

A person that propounds Buddhist tenets and asserts that not even an atom of a truly established phenomenon exists.

2.2.2.4.2 [Etymology]

Why are they called Mādhyamika? They are called Mādhyamika due to asserting the middle free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation; they are called Proponents of Non-Nature due to asserting that phenomena lack a truly established nature.

2.2.2.4.3 [Divisions]

When divided, there are two:

1. Madhyamaka Svātantrika
2. Madhyamaka Prāsaṅgika

2.2.2.4.4 [Explanation of the individual divisions]

This has two sections:

1. Explanation of the Svātantrika system
2. Explanation of the Prāsaṅgika system

2.2.2.4.4.1 [Explanation of the Svātantrika system]

1. Definition
2. Etymology
3. Divisions
4. Assertions

2.2.2.4.4.1.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Svātantrika** is:

A Proponent of Non-Nature that asserts existence by way of own-characteristics conventionally.

2.2.2.4.1.2 [Etymology]

Why are they called Madhyamaka Svātantrika? They are called as such due to refuting truly existent things in dependence upon a correct sign where the three modes are established from their own side.

2.2.2.4.1.3 [Divisions]

When divided, there are two:

1. Yogācāra Madhyamaka Svātantrika
2. Sautrāntika Madhyamaka Svātantrika

The **definition of the first** is:

A Mādhyamika that does not assert external objects and does assert self-knowers.

Illustration: Ācārya Śāntarakṣita, for example.

The **definition of the second** is:

A Mādhyamika that does not assert self-knowers and asserts external objects as being established by way of their own-characteristics.

Illustration: Ācārya Bhāvaviveka, for example.

There are also etymologies:

- They are called Yogācāra Madhyamaka due to asserting the presentation of the basis in accordance with the Cittamātra;
- They are called Sautrāntika Madhyamaka due to asserting external objects that are accumulations of subtle atoms in accordance with the Sautrāntika.

Moreover, Yogācāra Madhyamaka Svātantrika also has the two:

1. Mādhyamika that accord with the True Aspectarians
2. Mādhyamika that accord with the False Aspectarians

The first are Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Ārya Vimuktasena, for example.

The second are Ācārya Haribhadra, Jetari, and Lawapa; Jetari explains in accordance with the Stained False Aspectarians, while Lawapa explains in accordance with the Stainless False Aspectarians.

2.2.2.4.1.4 [Assertions]

This has two sections:

1. Yogācāra Madhyamaka Svātantrika
2. Sautrāntika Madhyamaka Svātantrika

2.2.2.4.1.4.1 [Yogācāra Madhyamaka Svātantrika]

1. Assertions regarding the basis
2. Assertions regarding the path
3. Assertions regarding the result

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.1.1 [Assertions regarding the basis]

1. Assertions regarding objects
2. Assertions regarding object-possessors

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.1.1.1 [Assertions regarding objects]

They assert that if it is an established base, then it is pervaded by being established by way of its own-characteristics because they assert that, for any phenomenon, if you search for the designated-object it is findable.

Therefore, they assert that inherent establishment, establishment by way of own-characteristics, establishment from the side of its mode of abiding, and establishment from its own side are mutually inclusive.

When objects of knowledge are divided, there are two:

1. Ultimate truths
2. Conventional truths

The **definition of the first** is:

That which is realised by way of the disappearance of dualistic appearances to the direct valid cognition that is directly realising it.

The **definition of the second** is:

That which is realised by way of possessing dualistic appearances to the direct valid cognition that is directly realising it.

An illustration of the first is a pot's emptiness of true existence, for example.

An illustration of the second is a pot.

When ultimate truths are extensively divided, there are sixteen emptinesses; when subsumed, there are four emptinesses.

When conventional truths are divided, there are two:

1. Real conventional truths
2. Unreal conventional truths

The first is water, for example.

The second is the water of a mirage, for example.

This system asserts that if it is an object of knowledge, then it is pervaded by being a real conventional truth.

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.1.1.2 [Assertions regarding object-possessors]

They assert the mental consciousness as the illustration of the person.

Both Svātantrika schools are the same in not asserting the Ālayavijñāna and afflicted mentality, but rather asserting six types of consciousness.

There are two types of awarenesses: valid cognition and non-valid awarenesses.

There are two valid cognitions: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

There are four direct valid cognitions:

1. Sense direct perception
2. Mental direct perception
3. Self-knowing direct perception
4. Yogic direct perception

They assert that the latter two direct perceptions are pervaded by being unmistakable consciousnesses.

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.1.2 [Assertions regarding the path]

[Regarding the presentation of the path, there are three:

1. Objects of observation of the path
2. Objects of abandonment of the path
3. Nature of the path]

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.1.2.1 [Objects of observation of the path]

The emptiness of a permanent unitary independent self is asserted as the coarse selflessness of persons.

The emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent self is asserted as the subtle selflessness of persons.

Form and the valid cognition apprehending form being empty of being different substances is asserted as the coarse selflessness of phenomena.

All phenomena being empty of true establishment is asserted as the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.1.2.2 [Objects of abandonment of the path]

They assert the apprehension of a self of persons as an afflictive obscuration and the apprehension of a self of phenomena as a knowledge obscuration.

Moreover, knowledge obscurations are asserted as two:

1. Coarse knowledge obscurations: the apprehension of apprehendeds and apprehenders as different substances
2. Subtle knowledge obscurations: the apprehension of phenomena (i.e. the aggregates and so forth) as truly established.

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.1.2.3 [Nature of the path]

They similarly assert the fifteen paths (five times three); the difference being that the Solitary Realisers' uninterrupted and liberated paths are asserted as necessarily possessing the aspect of the emptiness of duality.

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.1.3 [Assertions regarding the result]

Solitary Realisers are not presented among the Eight Approachers and Abiders due to taking the coarse knowledge obscurations as their main object of abandonment; however, Hearers are asserted as the Eight Persons.

Hearers of definite lineage take the view realising the selflessness of persons as their main object of cultivation and finally abandon all afflictive obscurations without exception in dependence upon the vajra-like concentration of the path of meditation and thereby actualise the result of Foe-Destroyer.

Solitary Realisers of definite lineage take the view of the emptiness of duality of apprehendeds and apprehenders as their main object of cultivation and finally abandon all the afflictive obscurations and coarse knowledge obscurations without exception in dependence upon the vajra-like concentration of the path of meditation and thereby actualise the result of Solitary Realiser Foe-Destroyer.

Hīnayāna Nirvāṇa is of two types:

1. Nirvāṇa with remainder
2. Nirvāṇa without remainder

The first is Nirvāṇa that is together with the remainder of the suffering aggregates that were projected by previous karma and affliction.

The second is asserted as the occasion of separating from the suffering aggregates.

If it is a Hearer or Solitary Realiser Foe-Destroyer, then it is pervaded by entering the Mahāyāna path because they assert one final vehicle.

Therefore, in this system, there are superior and inferior attained results due to the Hearers' and Solitary Realisers' different objects of abandonment and class of realisations.

Mahāyānists of definite lineage:

- Generate the mind of supreme enlightenment;
- Listen to instructions directly from the Supreme Emanation Body in dependence upon the dharma-stream concentration on the great path of accumulation;
- In dependence upon practicing their meaning, when they first give rise to an awareness arisen from meditation that observes emptiness, they transfer to the path of preparation;
- On the heat level, they suppress the manifest conceptions of thoroughly afflicted apprehendeds that are objects of abandonment of the path of seeing;
- When they attain the peak level, they suppress the manifest conceptions of completely pure apprehendeds that are objects of abandonment of the path of seeing;
- When they attain the forbearance level, they suppress the manifest conceptions of apprehenders of substantial existents that are objects of abandonment of the path of seeing;
- When they attain the supreme dharma level, they suppress the manifest conceptions of apprehenders of imputed existents that are objects of abandonment of the path of seeing.

- The levels of heat, peak, forbearance, and supreme dharma are respectively called the concentration of attaining appearance, the concentration of increasing appearance, the concentration one-sidedly engaging suchness, and the uninterrupted concentration.
- Just after that, they abandon the acquired afflictive obscurations and acquired knowledge obscurations together with their seeds by means of the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing and then actualise the liberated path and true cessation;
- By means of the nine rounds of the path of meditation they are said to gradually abandon the seeds of the sixteen afflictions that are objects of abandonment of the path of meditation and the seeds of the hundred and eight knowledge obscurations that are objects of abandonment of the path of meditation.
- Finally, in dependence upon the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum, they simultaneously abandon the innate afflictive and knowledge obscurations and in the next moment attain unsurpassed enlightenment.

They assert that Mahāyāna Nirvāṇa and non-abiding Nirvāṇa are mutually inclusive.

They assert that the Buddha Bodies are definite in number as four. Although Ārya Vimuktasena and Haribhadra disagree about their presentation, they do not disagree about their being definite in number.

They present the Buddha's Words in terms of sutras of interpretative meaning and sutras of definitive meaning:

- Interpretative meaning sutras are sutras that indicate their explicit teaching of conventional truth in terms of their main indicated-object;
- Definitive meaning sutras are sutras that indicate their explicit teaching of ultimate truth in terms of their main indicated-object.

They assert that the First Turning as explained in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* is of interpretative meaning, whereas the Middle and Final Turnings have both interpretative and definitive [sections.]

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.2 [Sautrāntika Madhyamaka Svātantrika]

1. Assertions regarding the basis
2. Assertions regarding the path
3. Assertions regarding the result

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.2.1 [Assertions regarding the basis]

Apart from this system asserting external objects and not asserting self-knowers, the presentation of the basis is mostly similar to the previous.

2.2.2.4.4.1.4.2.2 [Assertions regarding the path]

The differences regarding the path are that they assert that there are no Hearers and Solitary Realisers of definite lineage that realise the selflessness of phenomena, they do not assert a wisdom realising the emptiness of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances, and they also do not assert the conception apprehending external objects as a knowledge obscuration.

2.2.2.4.1.4.2.3 [Assertions regarding the result]

Since there is no difference among the Hearers' and Solitary Realisers' obscurations that are objects of abandonment and the coarseness and subtlety of the selflessness that is their object of realisation, there is no difference in the class of their realisations and the presentation of the Eight Approachers and Abiders is done for both.

They assert that Mahāyānists of definite lineage abandon the two obscurations gradually because the afflictive obscurations being completely abandoned at the time of attaining the eighth ground is explained in [Bhāvaviveka's] *Blaze of Reasoning*.

However, nor do they assert that the knowledge obscurations do not start being abandoned until the afflictive obscurations have been exhausted, like the Prāsaṅgikas.

Apart from just these dissimilarities, most of the presentation of the basis, path and result is in accordance with the Yogācāra Madhyamaka Svātantrika.

A bridging verse:

Asserting that specifically characterised phenomena exist but lack true existence
All these classifications of the Svātantrika tenets,
Free from my own making, are properly expressed;
Those wishing to master them, uphold them!

2.2.2.4.4.2 [Explanation of the Prāsaṅgika system]

1. Definition
2. Etymology
3. Assertions

2.2.2.4.4.2.1 [Definition]

The **definition of a Prāsaṅgika** is:

A Proponent of Non-Nature that does not assert existence by way of own-characteristics even conventionally.

Illustrations: Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva, for example.

2.2.2.4.4.2.2 [Etymology]

Why are they called Prāsaṅgikas? They are called as such due to asserting that an inferential cognition realising the thesis can arise in the opponent's continuum merely through consequences.

2.2.2.4.4.2.3 [Assertions]

1. Assertions regarding the basis
2. Assertions regarding the path
3. Assertions regarding the result

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.1 [Assertions regarding the basis]

1. Assertions regarding objects
2. Assertions regarding object-possessors

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.1.1 [Assertions regarding objects]

They assert that if it is an established base, then it is pervaded by not being established by way of its own-characteristics because 1) they assert that the measure of being an established base is pervaded by being merely imputed by conceptuality and 2) the word “merely” in that is asserted to eliminate establishment by way of own-characteristics.

Established base, object, and object of knowledge are mutually inclusive.

When divided, there are divisions into:

1. Manifest and hidden phenomena
2. The two truths

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.1.1.1 [Manifest and hidden phenomena]

The **definition of a manifest phenomenon** is:

A phenomenon that can be realised through the force of experience without relying upon a sign.

Perceptible-object (*mngon sum*), manifest phenomenon (*mngon gyur*), object of the senses, and non-hidden phenomenon are synonymous.

Illustrations: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch, for example.

The **definition of a hidden phenomenon** is:

A phenomenon that must be realised in dependence upon a reason or sign.

Hidden phenomenon, a phenomenon that is not directly-perceptible, and the object of comprehension of an inferential cognition are synonymous.

Illustrations: impermanent sound and sound that lacks a self of persons, for example.

Therefore, this system asserts that the two – manifest and hidden phenomena – and the three objects of comprehension are mutually exclusive.

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.1.1.2 [The two truths]

The **definition of being a conventional truth** is:

That 1) which is the object found by a valid cognition analysing the conventional and 2) for which the valid cognition analysing the conventional becomes a valid cognition analysing the conventional.

Illustrations: a pot, for example.

When divided, it is not divided into real conventional truths and unreal conventional truths because real conventional truths do not exist; because if it is a conventional truth, then it is necessarily unreal.

However, conventional truths are divided into real and unreal in relation to the perspective of worldly convention because:

- Form is real in relation to the perspective of worldly convention
- The reflection of a face in the mirror is unreal in relation to the perspective of worldly convention.

If it is real in relation to the perspective of worldly convention, then it is not pervaded by being an existent because truly existent form is that.

The **definition of being an ultimate truth** is:

That 1) which is the object found by a valid cognition analysing the ultimate and 2) for which the valid cognition analysing the ultimate becomes a valid cognition analysing the ultimate.

Illustration: a pot's lack of inherent existence, for example.

Divisions are similar to before.

Otherwise, they assert past, future, and disintegratedness as functioning things and also assert external objects because of asserting that apprehendeds and apprehenders are established as different entities.

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.1.2 [Assertions regarding object-possessors]

They assert the mere "I" designated in dependence upon the four or five aggregates that are its basis of designation as the illustration of the person.

Persons are pervaded by being non-concomitant compositional factors.

There are two types of awarenesses: valid cognition and non-valid awarenesses.

There are two valid cognitions: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

There are three direct valid cognitions:

1. Sense direct perception
2. Mental direct perception
3. Yogic direct perception

They do not assert self-knowing direct perception.

Sense consciousnesses in the continuum of sentient beings are pervaded by being mistaken consciousnesses.

There is both mistaken and unmitaken yogic direct perception because yogic direct perception that is in the entity of uncontaminated meditative equipoise is unmitaken, while yogic direct perception directly realising subtle impermanence in the continua of ordinary beings are mistaken consciousnesses. The latter follows because of being a consciousness in the continua of ordinary beings.

If it is subsequent cognition, then it is pervaded by not being a direct valid cognition because:

- The second moment of an inferential cognition realising sound as impermanent is a conceptual direct valid cognition; and
- The second moment of a sense direct perception apprehending form is a non-conceptual direct valid cognition.

When inferential cognition is divided, there are four:

1. Inferential cognition through the power of the fact
2. Inferential cognition of renown
3. Inferential cognition through analogy
4. Inferential cognition through conviction

Being mistaken with respect to an object is not contradictory with realising that object because an inferential cognition realising sound as impermanent is mistaken with respect to impermanent sound, but is asserted as realising it.

If it is a consciousness possessing dualistic appearances, then it is pervaded by being a direct valid cognition with respect to its appearance because the conception apprehending sound as permanent is a direct valid cognition with respect to its appearance.

If it is a consciousness, then it is pervaded by realising its object of comprehension because the meaning-generalities of rabbit horns and permanent sound are the objects of comprehension of the conception apprehending rabbit horns and permanent sound respectively.

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.2 [Assertions regarding the path]

[Regarding the presentation of the path, there are three:

1. Objects of observation of the path
2. Objects of abandonment of the path
3. Nature of the path]

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.2.1 [Objects of observation of the path]

The emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent self is asserted as the coarse selflessness of persons.

The person being empty of true existence is asserted as the subtle selflessness of persons.

The two subtle selflessnesses are differentiated by way of their bases of emptiness and not by way of the object of negation because:

- Refuting true establishment (object of negation) upon the person (basis) is the subtle selflessness of persons; whereas
- Refuting true establishment (object of negation) upon the aggregates and so forth (basis) is the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

There is no difference in coarseness and subtlety between the subtle selflessness of persons and the subtle selflessness of phenomena and they are asserted as the final mode of abiding.

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.2.2 [Objects of abandonment of the path]

They assert the afflictive obscurations as the coarse and subtle apprehensions of a self together with their seeds, as well as the three poisons that arise due to those together with their seeds. This is because they assert the apprehension of true existence as an afflictive obscuration.

They assert the knowledge obscurations as the imprints of the apprehension of true existence, the factors of mistaken dualistic appearances that arise due to that, and the stains of apprehending the two truths as different entities.

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.2.3 [Nature of the path]

They assert the presentation of the five paths for each of the three vehicles and present the ten grounds for the Mahāyāna in dependence upon the *Sutra of the Ten Grounds*.

There is no difference among the three vehicles with respect to the wisdom class of realisations because they assert that Āryas are pervaded by directly realising the selflessness of phenomena.

2.2.2.4.4.2.3.3 [Assertions regarding the result]

Hīnayānists of definite lineage cultivate the view of selflessness by means of just brief reasoning; in dependence upon that, they finally abandon the apprehension of true existence together with its seeds by means of the vajra-like concentration of the Hīnayāna path of meditation and actualise their enlightenment.

Although Svātantrika and below all assert that Nirvāṇa without remainder is necessarily attained [afterwards], this system asserts that it is necessarily attained prior to Nirvāṇa with remainder.

They assert the presentation of the Eight Approachers and Abiders for both Hearers and Solitary Realisers and that the Eight Approachers and Abiders are pervaded by being Āryas.

Bodhisattvas abandon the obscurations by extensively cultivating the view of selflessness by way of limitless types of reasoning. Moreover, they do not start abandoning the knowledge obscurations until they have completely abandoned the afflictive obscurations; abandonment of the knowledge obscurations starts from the eighth ground.

Bodhisattvas who have not proceeded through the Hīnayāna path completely abandon the afflictive obscurations when they attain the eighth ground; finally, they abandon all knowledge obscurations without exception in dependence upon the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum and actualise the state of the Four Bodies.

They assert that Nirvāṇa and true cessations are pervaded by being ultimate truths.

The First and Final of the Three Turnings as explained in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* are pervaded by being interpretative meaning sutras because there are no sutras explicitly indicating emptiness [in those]. The Middle Turning is asserted to be pervaded by being definitive meaning sutras because the Heart Sutra is a definitive meaning sutra.

The essential point of the Prāsaṅgika is this:

- Although all inner and outer phenomena without exception are refuted as being established by way of their own-characteristics in dependence upon reasonings of dependent-designation,
- One should know how to correctly posit bondage and liberation, cause and effect, objects of knowledge and knowers, and so forth conventionally as nominal mere imputed existents in one's own system, without leaning upon the perspective of others.

These days, some who are conceited with arrogance say that appearing phenomena are merely mistaken appearances and hold them to be completely non-existent, like the son of a barren woman; then, they hold the practice taking absolutely nothing to mind as supreme. They do not even smell a whiff of the Prāsaṅgika!

Therefore, those who see all the excellences of samsara as like a burning pit and seek liberation should abandon all wrong views that are dharma-like fabrications and revere the Prāsaṅgika system (the pinnacle of all tenets) as supreme.

SARVA MANGALAM