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## Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes

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Although military rule disappeared in Latin America after 1990, other forms of authoritarianism persisted. Competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents, emerged in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the post-Cold War period. This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. It argues that populism – the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters with an anti-establishment appeal – is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Lacking experience with representative democratic institutions, possessing an electoral mandate to destroy the existing elite, and facing institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by that elite, populists have an incentive to launch plebiscitary attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability. Where they succeed, weak democracies almost invariably slide into competitive authoritarianism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.

**Keywords:** populism; competitive authoritarianism; democracy; Latin America

### Introduction

Military rule disappeared throughout Latin America after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent dominance of the West, together with unprecedented Western democracy promotion, raised the cost of dictatorship and created strong incentives to adopt formal democratic institutions. Yet the demise of dictatorship did not always bring stable democracy. In Peru under Alberto Fujimori, Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, and, to a lesser degree, Bolivia under Evo Morales and Ecuador under Lucio Gutiérrez and Rafael Correa, fragile democracies slid into competitive authoritarianism, or electoral regimes in which widespread incumbent abuse skewed the playing field against opponents.<sup>1</sup>

This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. In their study of post-Cold War competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way provide an explanation for regimes' divergent trajectories,<sup>2</sup> but they do

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not explain their emergence. We argue that the primary catalyst behind competitive authoritarian emergence in contemporary Latin America is populism, or the election of personalistic outsiders who mobilize mass constituencies via anti-establishment appeals. Although populism is commonly viewed as a threat to liberal democracy,<sup>3</sup> the causal mechanisms linking populism to democratic breakdown remain poorly understood. We argue that populist governments push weak democracies into competitive authoritarianism for at least three reasons. First, populists are political outsiders who lack experience with institutions of representative democracy. Second, due to the anti-establishment nature of their appeal, successful populists earn an electoral mandate to bury the existing elite and its institutions. Third, populist presidents usually confront institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by established parties. Lacking experience, facing hostile legislatures and courts, and armed with a mandate to depose the old elite, newly elected populists often assault institutions of horizontal accountability, triggering a constitutional crisis. Presidents who prevail in these showdowns gain unchecked control over state institutions, which allows them to skew the playing field against opponents.

The article demonstrates this argument through a comparative analysis of all 14 presidents elected in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010. Although these case analyses do not constitute a definitive test of our theory, they highlight the causal mechanisms underlying the theory and establish some initial plausibility for it.

### **Explaining the rise of competitive authoritarianism**

Competitive authoritarian regimes are hybrid regimes in which formal democratic institutions are viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbent abuse skews the playing field to such an extent that the opposition's ability to compete is seriously compromised.<sup>4</sup> Such regimes are competitive in that opposition forces use elections to contest seriously (and on occasion, successfully) for power. Yet competition is markedly unfair. Incumbents politicize state institutions – such as the judiciary, security forces, tax agencies, and electoral authorities – and deploy them against opponents. Thus, although government critics are not violently repressed as they were under many Latin American dictatorships during the 1970s, they face various forms of harassment, including: surveillance and blackmail; “legal” persecution for defamation, tax violations, or corruption; attacks by government-sponsored mobs; and occasional arrest or exile. In addition, incumbent abuse of state resources and co-optation of private media skews access to finance and major media. In such a context, elections – even if technically clean – are invariably unfair. In the words of Jorge Castañeda, they are like a “soccer match where the goalposts [are] of different heights and breadths and where one team include[s] 11 players plus the umpire and the other a mere six or seven players”.<sup>5</sup>

Competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated in the post-Cold War era.<sup>6</sup> Whereas in other regions (for example Sub-Saharan Africa and the former

Soviet Union) competitive authoritarianism emerged out of single-party rule, in Latin America it was usually a product of democratic decay, in which elected presidents used plebiscitarian means to concentrate power and skew the playing field. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori's 1992 "self-coup" allowed him to systematically corrupt state institutions and deploy them against opponents. In Venezuela, Chávez used a series of elections and referenda to gain unchecked control over the state, which he then used – together with vast oil resources – to skew the playing field. In Bolivia and Ecuador, Presidents Morales, Gutiérrez, and Correa employed similar strategies to concentrate power and weaken opponents.

What explains transitions from democracy to competitive authoritarianism? One potential cause is economic crisis.<sup>7</sup> Crises may encourage presidential power grabs, soften public resistance to such power grabs, and weaken parties and interest associations that might otherwise mobilize against them.<sup>8</sup> However, crisis alone is insufficient to explain competitive authoritarianism. Many Latin American democracies faced severe economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s without collapsing; and although competitive authoritarianism emerged amid crises in Peru and Venezuela, it emerged in the context of growing economies in Bolivia and Ecuador.

Another explanation centres on mineral rents. Where fuel or mineral exports generate massive state revenue, state-society resource asymmetries may enable governments to co-opt civil society and starve opponents of resources.<sup>9</sup> Scholars of Latin America have argued that the post-2002 mineral boom facilitated hegemonic turns in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.<sup>10</sup> Yet rentier approaches also have limited explanatory power. Chávez's hegemonic turn began in 1999, when oil prices were low. Likewise, Peru descended into competitive authoritarianism in the 1990s, when commodity prices were low, and remained democratic in the 2000s during the mineral boom.

A third explanation centres on economic statism. Scholars have argued that authoritarian outcomes are more likely where state control of the economy is extensive.<sup>11</sup> By enhancing governments' capacity to affect people's livelihood, state control over the economy facilitates the co-optation of opposition groups, inhibits the growth of civil society, and discourages public criticism or protest. Such arguments are compelling at high levels of statism, but they are less useful in Latin America, where mixed economies coexisted with a diversity of regimes in the twentieth century. Thus, Venezuela was as statist in the 1970s – a period of stable democracy – as it was when Chávez became president, and Bolivia and Ecuador were considerably *more* statist in the (democratic) 1980s than they were when Morales and Correa took office.

Two factors may be considered permissive conditions for competitive authoritarianism. The first is institutional weakness. Competitive authoritarianism is most likely to emerge in a context of weak state and democratic institutions, where constitutional rules are unstable or contested, judiciaries lack independence, and state agencies are highly politicized. Second, competitive authoritarianism is more likely to emerge where political parties are weak. Party system collapse facilitates

the emergence of personalistic outsiders, who, unencumbered by party structures, take advantage of weak oppositions to concentrate power.<sup>12</sup> Yet weak democratic institutions and party system collapse are by themselves insufficient in explaining the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Not all democracies with weak institutions and parties decay into competitive authoritarianism. Some additional factor must trigger such transitions; that trigger, we argue, is populism.

### The role of populism

Populism is a notoriously contested concept.<sup>13</sup> Drawing on Barr's excellent synthesis,<sup>14</sup> we define populism in terms of three characteristics. First, populists mobilize mass support via anti-establishment appeals, positioning themselves in opposition to the entire elite.<sup>15</sup> Second, populists are outsiders, or individuals who rise to political prominence from outside the national party system.<sup>16</sup> Third, populists establish a personalistic linkage to voters,<sup>17</sup> circumventing parties and other forms of institutional mediation by "vest[ing] a single individual with the task of representing 'the people'".<sup>18</sup>

Full populism combines these three characteristics. Nevertheless, populism may be viewed as a semi-radial category (see Figure 1).<sup>19</sup> Although an anti-establishment appeal is arguably the *sine qua non* of populism,<sup>20</sup> cases that combine such an appeal with one, but not both, of the other characteristics may be considered diminished subtypes. Following Barr, for example, political insiders who abandon established parties and make personalistic, anti-establishment appeals (for example Rafael Caldera and Fernando Collor) may be classified as *maverick populists*.<sup>21</sup> Alternatively, anti-establishment outsiders who emerge from social movements and maintain grassroots, rather than personalistic, linkages (for example Evo Morales) might be labelled *movement populists*.<sup>22</sup>

Populism's impact on democracy is double-edged.<sup>23</sup> On the one hand, populists are usually inclusionary, in the sense that they open up the political establishment to previously marginalized groups. In Latin America, for example, populist governments have created new channels of access to the state, appointed representatives of marginalized groups to influential positions, and advanced a range of policies to benefit those groups.<sup>24</sup>

At the same time, however, populism tends to push weak democracies into competitive authoritarianism, for at least three reasons. First, because populists are outsiders, they have little experience with institutions of representative democracy. Most career politicians spend years working within legislatures or local governments, during which they acquire the skills, such as negotiation and coalition-building, needed to make those institutions work. Moreover, because the institutions of representative democracy are their livelihood, professional politicians have a stake in their survival. Outsiders, by contrast, are political amateurs: Fujimori, Chávez, Gutiérrez, and Correa had never held elected office before winning the presidency. Without experience in the workaday politics of Congress, the judiciary, or local government, outsiders often lack the skill, patience, and




Figure 1. Populism and subtypes of populism.

commitment to pursue their goals within existing democratic institutions. Indeed, every Latin American president who closed Congress between 1990 and 2010 – Chávez, Fujimori, Jorge Serrano, and Correa – was an outsider.

Second, successful populists earn an electoral mandate to bury the existing political system. The core message of populist campaigns is that the established elite is corrupt and exclusionary, and that existing regime institutions are therefore not really democratic. Fujimori, Chávez, Morales, and Correa all claimed that their countries were “partyarchies” (that is “rule by the parties” rather than by “the people”) and pledged to replace the old elite and its institutions with an “authentic” democracy. Presidential candidates who win on the basis of such appeals earn a mandate to “re-found” the political system. However, the “system” that populists campaign against is representative democracy, and the “corrupt” or “oligarchic” institutions that they pledge to destroy are parties, legislatures, and judiciaries. It is difficult to dismantle such institutions without threatening the democratic regime.

Third, newly elected populists generally face hostile institutions of horizontal accountability. Because they lack strong parties, populists usually fail to translate their electoral victories into legislative majorities. Likewise, most have had no influence over appointments to the Supreme Court, the electoral authorities, and other state agencies. Thus, after winning the presidency with a promise to bury the “traditional” parties, populists usually confront a Congress, judiciary, and other institutions controlled by those very parties. In theory, they could respond

to this challenge by negotiating and sharing power with established parties, as Lula – a non-populist – did in Brazil. After being elected on an anti-establishment appeal, however, such a move would likely be viewed as a betrayal of their mandate, which, as the case of Lucio Gutiérrez suggests (see below), can be politically costly. Populists thus have an incentive to assault existing democratic institutions: to attempt to close Congress, pack the courts, or rewrite the constitution.

The election of a populist president is thus a recipe for institutional crisis – a showdown between an outsider with a mandate to sweep away the existing elite and regime institutions and an elite that views those institutions as its last bastion of defence. Having won power via a personalistic appeal, populist presidents frequently respond to such conflicts with plebiscitarian strategies, such as the use of referenda to circumvent Congress and convoke a constituent assembly aimed at creating a new institutional order. Although such plebiscitarian strategies occasionally fail (for example Serrano in 1993), they often succeed, for two reasons. First, because populist appeals generally succeed only in the context of broad discontent over the status quo,<sup>25</sup> public opinion tends to favour the president. Chávez and Correa, for example, both enjoyed approval ratings above 70% when they assaulted Congress and the judiciary, and Fujimori's public approval soared to 80% following his 1992 coup. Second, because populist victories generally occur in the context of inchoate or collapsing party systems, the opposition tends to be weak. Indeed, the election of an outsider often accelerates party system collapse by signalling to politicians that abandoning "traditional" parties is an effective electoral strategy.<sup>26</sup> In such a context, oppositions fragment and lose their capacity to act collectively or mobilize in the face of incumbent abuse.

Where such plebiscitary strategies succeed, the result is likely to be competitive authoritarianism. Backed by referendum victories and majorities in newly-elected constituent assemblies, populist presidents may liquidate Congress, purge the judiciary, appoint loyalists to head the electoral authorities and other key institutions, and impose new constitutional rules of the game. With unchecked control over the state apparatus, populists have little difficulty skewing the playing field against opponents.

The relationship between populism and competitive authoritarianism should be strongest in cases of full-blown populism. Maverick populists may pose less of a threat to democracy, since they have more experience with (and perhaps commitment to) institutions of representative democracy. In the case of movement populists, greater accountability to the movement-party could prevent the concentration and abuse of executive power. However, if allied social movements are themselves composed of anti-establishment outsiders, grassroots linkages may do little to prevent executive attacks on established parties.

Two caveats are in order before undertaking the case analyses. First, populism is a proximate cause of competitive authoritarianism. This raises the question of whether the relationship is spurious, that is, whether some additional factor explains both populism and competitive authoritarianism. For example, if populist success is rooted in public discontent with existing institutions,<sup>27</sup> which in turn is

rooted in state weakness,<sup>28</sup> might these factors not also contribute to the emergence of competitive authoritarianism? They almost certainly do. However, these underlying factors are ultimately insufficient to explain transitions to competitive authoritarianism. As our case analyses show, broader crisis-generating conditions existed in all four countries between 1990 and 2010, yet only when those conditions were combined with the election of a populist president did competitive authoritarianism emerge.

Second, we do not claim that populism is the only cause of democratic erosion in Latin America. Nor do we claim that non-populist presidents are inherently more democratic than populist presidents. Indeed, some non-populist governments (for example Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia, Uribe in Colombia) were responsible for human rights violations that exceeded anything seen under Morales or Correa. For a regime to be competitive authoritarian, however, abuse must be frequent rather than episodic, and it must skew the playing field against the political opposition. Thus, although Bolivia under Sánchez de Lozada and Colombia under Uribe could each be considered some form of hybrid regime, they do not fall in the competitive authoritarian category.

### Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes

This section compares the 14 governments elected in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.<sup>29</sup> The cases are summarized in Table 1. The

Table 1. Scoring the cases.

	Populism	Economic crisis <sup>a</sup>	Rentier potential <sup>b</sup>	Level of statism <sup>c</sup>	Regime outcome
<i>Peru</i>					
Fujimori (1990–2000)	Yes	Yes	Low (5.3%)	Mixed (59.6)	Competitive authoritarian
Toledo (2001–2006)	No	No	Low (5.0%)	Liberal (69.6)	Democratic
García (2006–2011)	No	No	Medium (13.4%)	Liberal (60.5)	Democratic
<i>Ecuador</i>					
Durán Ballén (1992–1996)	No	Yes	Low (9.8%)	Mixed (57.7)	Democratic
Bucaram (1996–1997)	Maverick populist	No	Low (8.1%)	Liberal (60.1)	Democratic/ overthrown
Mahuad (1998–2000)	No	Yes	Low (9.0%)	Liberal (62.8)	Democratic/ overthrown
Gutiérrez (2003–2005)	Yes	No	Medium (12.5%)	Mixed (54.1)	Competitive authoritarian
Correa (2006–)	Yes	No	High (20.3%)	Mixed (54.6)	Competitive authoritarian

(Continued)



Table 1. Continued.

	Populism	Economic crisis <sup>a</sup>	Rentier potential <sup>b</sup>	Level of statism <sup>c</sup>	Regime outcome
<i>Bolivia</i>					
Sánchez de Lozada (1993–1997)	No	No	Low (7.4%)	Mixed (56.8)	Democratic
Banzer (1997–2001)	No	No	Low (5.2%)	Liberal (65.1)	Democratic(*)
Sánchez de Lozada (2001–2003)	No	No	Low (8.0%)	Liberal (68.0)	Democratic(*)/overthrown
Morales (2005–)	Movement populist	No	High (24.3%)	Mixed (58.4)	Competitive authoritarian
<i>Venezuela</i>					
Caldera (1994–1999)	Maverick populist	Yes	High (24.4%)	Mixed (59.8)	Democratic
Chávez (1999–)	Yes	Yes	Medium (19.6%)	Mixed (56.1)	Competitive authoritarian

Notes: <sup>a</sup>Crisis is operationalized as two consecutive years of GDP per capita decline, one year of 5% or more decline, or monthly inflation surpassing 50% during the period spanning from one year before to one year after the president assumed office. Data from World Bank (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG/countries/1W-XQ-EG-SY-MA-IR-SA?page=4&display=default>). <sup>b</sup>Rentier potential is scored as “high” when fuel and mineral exports constitute, on average, more than 20% of GDP during the president’s first three years in office; it is scored as “medium” when fuel and mineral exports constitute, on average, between 10% and 20% of GDP during president’s first three years in office; and it is scored as “low” when fuel and mineral exports constitute less than 10% of GDP during the president’s first three years in office. Based on data from CEPAL (<http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/deype/noticias/noticias/6/41046/P41046.xml&xsl=/deype/tpl/p1f.xsl&base=/deype/tpl/top-bottom.xslt>). <sup>c</sup>Based on Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, which scores countries from 0 (statist) to 100 (liberal). We score each administration based on the country score in the year the president took office. No data is available before 1995, so we use 1995 scores for governments that took office between 1990 and 1994. We classify cases with scores of 60 or higher as liberal, cases with scores of 50–60 as mixed, and cases with scores below 50 as statist. (\*) Government engaged in episodic repression, resulting in serious human rights violations

case comparisons allow us to hold several factors more or less constant. For example, all four countries shared broadly similar levels of development (although Venezuela was somewhat wealthier). They were also broadly similar in terms of economic statism, measured in terms of countries’ score on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom in the president’s first year in office. On a range from 0 (most statist) to 100 (most liberal), our cases range from 54.1 (Ecuador, 2003) to 69.6 (Peru, 2001), all mid-range scores that are comparable, for example, to those of Brazil, Greece, Italy, and India. Finally, all four countries had weak democratic institutions. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru had long histories of democratic instability and remained crisis-ridden during the 1980s.<sup>30</sup> Although Venezuelan democracy was traditionally stronger, it deconsolidated in the 1980s and early 1990s (as made manifest by two coup attempts in 1992). Moreover, all

four countries score relatively low on comparative indices of institutional strength, such as judicial independence and bureaucratic capacity.<sup>31</sup> At the same time, the four cases exhibit considerable variation – across countries and over time – on several other dimensions, including level of economic crisis, rentier potential, and populist versus non-populist government (see Table 1).

To avoid any risk of tautology, we measure populism only during politicians' ascent to power, that is, *before* they took office. Presidents' subsequent behaviour, which is closely related to regime outcomes, has no bearing on whether they are classified as populist. We operationalize populism in terms of the three dimensions discussed above. First, a candidate is scored as anti-establishment if a Manichean, anti-elite appeal is central to his or her presidential campaign.<sup>32</sup> Second, a candidate is considered an outsider if he or she rose to national political prominence outside the existing party system. We add the caveat that politicians cease to be outsiders if they have governed previously, served as long-term cabinet ministers, or participated in national elections for 10 years or more.<sup>33</sup> Finally, following Madrid, we score politicians as personalistic if they run for president with parties that they "founded and dominated".<sup>34</sup> By these measures, four of our 14 cases are full-blown populists (Fujimori, Chávez, Gutiérrez, and Correa), two are maverick populists (Caldera and Bucaram), and one is a movement populist (Morales).

We operationalize competitive authoritarianism along the lines proposed by Levitsky and Way.<sup>35</sup> Regimes are scored as competitive authoritarian if opposition parties compete seriously for power in elections, but elections are unfair due to fraud, harassment of opposition, or highly unequal access to media or finance; the government frequently violates civil liberties;<sup>36</sup> or incumbents skew the playing field by politicizing state institutions and employing them against opponents, or deny the opposition reasonably fair access to media and/or finance. By this operationalization, five of the 14 governments that we examine were competitive authoritarian (see Table 1): Peru under Fujimori, Venezuela under Chávez, Bolivia under Morales, and Ecuador under Gutiérrez and Correa.

## **Bolivia**

Between 1990 and 2005, Bolivia evolved, under a series of non-populist presidents, into an increasingly unstable and crisis-ridden democracy. In 2005, the election of Evo Morales, a movement populist, ushered in a period of competitive authoritarianism.

### ***Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993–1997)***

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was not a populist.<sup>37</sup> A scion of one of Bolivia's most prominent families, Sánchez de Lozada was a consummate political insider. He was a long-time member of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), Bolivia's oldest party and a pillar of the three-party system that dominated the

country's post-1985 "pacted democracy", and he served as deputy, senator, and "de facto prime minister" before winning the presidency.<sup>38</sup> Far from campaigning as an anti-establishment outsider, Sánchez de Lozada's 1993 campaign focused on his status as an insider with a reputation for competent economic stewardship.<sup>39</sup> As president, Sánchez de Lozada lacked a legislative majority and faced hostility – including calls for his impeachment – from the main opposition parties.<sup>40</sup> Rather than attacking Congress, however, he negotiated a "governability pact" with two smaller parties, which provided him with a stable legislative majority.<sup>41</sup> Sánchez de Lozada finished his term and left office with democracy intact.

### ***Hugo Banzer (1997–2001) and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2002–2003)***

During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Bolivia entered a period of increased social conflict and political instability. The first president to govern in this context was ex-dictator Hugo Banzer. Banzer was not a populist. Although he rose to national prominence via a *coup d'état* rather than an established party, he served as (military) president from 1971 until 1978. When Bolivia began to democratize in the late 1970s, he created a party, Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN), and launched a new political career. Seeking to shake the stigma of former dictator, Banzer played by the rules of the democratic game and became "a pillar of the civilian political system".<sup>42</sup> Far from being anti-system actors, Banzer and the ADN were central players in the post-1985 democratic system, participating in coalition governments in 1985–1989 and 1989–1993.

Banzer took office in 1997 amid a deepening social and economic crisis. Although he lacked a legislative majority, he continued his predecessors' coalition-building practices, forging a "megacoalition" of parties, representing more than two-thirds of Congress.<sup>43</sup> The coalition eventually broke down, and the government was subsequently "overwhelmed by [...] economic and social crisis", particularly the 2000 "Water War".<sup>44</sup> Banzer cracked down violently on these protests,<sup>45</sup> but his government made no attempt to undermine political competition and skew the playing field.<sup>46</sup>

In 2002, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada returned to the presidency, this time in the context of deepening polarization and crisis. Bolivia's three major parties – the MNR, ADN, and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) – won only 42% of the vote, and outsider Evo Morales emerged as a major presidential contender. In this context, Sánchez de Lozada was viewed by Bolivia's elite as a bulwark against populism. After winning a narrow plurality of the popular vote, the election went to Congress, where the established parties closed ranks and elected him president.<sup>47</sup>

In office, Sánchez de Lozada forged a multiparty coalition that eventually included all the mainstream parties.<sup>48</sup> However, the main challenge to his government emanated not from Congress but from the streets. Violent social conflict, culminating in the October 2003 "Gas War" (in which state repression left 60

people dead), forced him to resign, plunging Bolivia into two years of political instability,<sup>49</sup> and contributing to Morales' election in December 2005.

### *Evo Morales (2005–present)*

Evo Morales is best characterized as a “movement populist”. He was an outsider, in that he rose to national prominence as a leader of the coca growers’ movement rather than via the established party system,<sup>50</sup> but he was not as complete an outsider as Fujimori or Chávez. After helping to create what eventually became the Movement toward Socialism (MAS), Morales was elected to Congress in 1997 and was the MAS presidential candidate in 2002. Nevertheless, because he had participated in national electoral politics for less than a decade when he was elected president, we score him as an outsider.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the MAS was an “anti-system” party composed of outsiders with “little stake in the existing political institutions”.<sup>52</sup> Morales and the MAS adopted a clear anti-establishment profile,<sup>53</sup> engaging in a relentless “demonization of the traditional political parties” during the 2005 campaign.<sup>54</sup>

Yet Morales differed from full populists in that his linkage to supporters was more participatory than personalistic.<sup>55</sup> Unlike the personalistic vehicles created by Fujimori and Chávez, the MAS was a grassroots party that emerged out of an autonomous social movement, and authority in the party was initially “dispersed among a variety of leaders”.<sup>56</sup> Although the MAS began to undergo a “personalization of power” in the 2000s,<sup>57</sup> it nevertheless maintained mechanisms of consultation and accountability to the rank-and-file that had no parallel in other populist cases.<sup>58</sup>

Morales won the 2005 election by a wide margin, and the MAS captured a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the party controlled neither the Senate nor Bolivia’s “traditionally conservative judiciary”.<sup>59</sup> Unlike his predecessors, Morales responded to divided government by attempting to neutralize, rather than negotiate with, the opposition. Thus, he began a purge of the judiciary and convoked elections for a Constituent Assembly to “refound” Bolivia.<sup>60</sup> Although the MAS failed to win the two-thirds majority needed to unilaterally rewrite the constitution, it pushed through its own draft by arbitrarily changing the rules of the game and mobilizing supporters to violently prevent opposition legislators from casting key votes.<sup>61</sup> The new constitution was approved via referendum in 2009 and, in elections held later that year, Morales was re-elected and the MAS won full control of Congress. Thus, by late 2009, institutional checks on executive power had been largely eliminated.

The MAS government encouraged popular participation and appears to have enhanced the public legitimacy of state and regime institutions.<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, it was competitive authoritarian. The government filed criminal charges against numerous opposition leaders, including all four previous presidents (Sánchez de Lozada, Jorge Quiroga, Carlos Mesa, and Eduardo Rodríguez) and several governors.<sup>63</sup> Other opposition politicians, including 2009 presidential runner-up

Manfred Reyes and Senator Roger Pinto, fled into exile to avoid prosecution. The MAS government also mobilized social movement allies to intimidate opponents.<sup>64</sup> In 2007, a pro-MAS mob set fire to the opposition governor's palace in Cochabamba, forcing him to flee,<sup>65</sup> and in 2009, former vice-president Victor Hugo Cárdenas was beaten by pro-government mobs.<sup>66</sup> The number of threats, physical attacks, and lawsuits against journalists and other critics clearly skewed the playing field.<sup>67</sup> Under Morales, then, Bolivia followed a path toward competitive authoritarianism that paralleled that of full-blown populist governments in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

## **Ecuador**

Ecuadorian politics were unstable between 1990 and 2010. Two of five elected presidents, Lucio Gutiérrez and Rafael Correa, were full populists, and a third, Abdalá Bucaram, was a maverick populist. Whereas Gutiérrez and Correa governed in a competitive authoritarian manner, two non-populist presidents, Sixto Durán Ballén and Jamil Mahuad, did not. Bucaram was forced out of office within six months.

### ***Sixto Durán Ballén (1992–1996)***

Sixto Durán was a political insider. A founder of the Social Christian Party (PSC), one of Ecuador's most established parties, he had been a cabinet minister, mayor of Quito, congressman, and two-time presidential candidate before being elected president in 1992. In 1991, Durán abandoned the PSC and created a personalistic vehicle, the Republican Union Party (PUR), evoking comparisons to Fujimori in Peru.<sup>68</sup> Yet Durán was hardly an anti-establishment candidate. He forged an alliance with Ecuador's oldest party, the Conservative Party (PCE), naming PCE leader Alberto Dahik – an ex-finance minister with close ties to the establishment – as his running mate, and his campaign centred on calls for fiscal austerity and state reform rather than attacks on the elite.<sup>69</sup>

When he took office in 1992, Durán faced both an economic crisis and an opposition-dominated legislature. Unlike Fujimori, however, he responded by forging an informal coalition with the PSC.<sup>70</sup> Although Durán toyed with plebiscitary tactics after this alliance broke down, he stopped short of attacking representative democratic institutions. In 1994, for example, he sought a referendum to pass a set of constitutional reforms aimed at enhancing executive power, but desisted after the Supreme Electoral Tribunal struck down the most significant proposals. During the second half of his term, Durán faced “extraordinary partisan opposition” in Congress.<sup>71</sup> However, despite speculation that he would attempt a Fujimori-style *autogolpe*,<sup>72</sup> Durán never launched an attack on representative institutions. He muddled through to the end of his term, leaving office with democracy intact.

***Abdalá Bucaram (1996–1997)***

Abdalá Bucaram is often viewed as a prototypical populist.<sup>73</sup> His party, the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE), was a personalistic vehicle,<sup>74</sup> and his discourse was thoroughly anti-establishment.<sup>75</sup> With campaign slogans such as “Only one ideology: against the oligarchy,”<sup>76</sup> Bucaram sought to “personify the dignity of common people and present the established elites [...] as the cause of all evils.”<sup>77</sup> Yet Bucaram was not a true outsider: he had spent his entire adult life in politics, had been elected mayor of Guayaquil in 1984, and was a major presidential candidate in 1988 and 1992. By our definition, then, he was a maverick populist. However, because Bucaram operated at the margins of (and was treated as a pariah by) the establishment,<sup>78</sup> he was, in effect, a “career outsider” who could be interpreted as a full-blown populist.

Bucaram’s presidency was short-lived, in part because his “tendency to antagonize opposition politicians” made it difficult to forge legislative coalitions.<sup>79</sup> An informal alliance with the PSC lasted only three months, and opposition members of Congress, who were “uncomfortable with the idea that [Bucaram] was unwilling, or unable, to negotiate agreements with them”, formed a Patriotic Front to oppose him.<sup>80</sup> Meanwhile, unpopular neoliberal policies and massive corruption eroded public support and triggered mass protest.<sup>81</sup> In February 1997, Congress voted to remove Bucaram – after only six months in office – on the dubiously constitutional grounds of “mental incapacity”. Thus, populism did not lead to competitive authoritarianism under Bucaram, but it contributed to an institutional crisis that cut short his presidency.

***Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000)***

Jamil Mahuad was not a populist. When he became president in 1998, he had belonged to an established party, Popular Democracy, for nearly two decades, and had served as a cabinet minister, legislator, and two-term mayor of Quito. Described as the “polar opposite” of Ecuador’s populist politicians, Mahuad cultivated the image of a Harvard-educated technopol.<sup>82</sup> He ran a “cool, technocratic” campaign, highlighting his experience and negotiating skills.<sup>83</sup> In the runoff against populist business magnate Álvaro Noboa, Mahuad was backed by two of Ecuador’s largest established parties: the PSC and the Democratic Left (ID).

In office, Mahuad faced “Ecuador’s worst economic crisis in the twentieth century”.<sup>84</sup> Battered by the Asian financial crisis and a collapsing banking system, the economy contracted by more than 7% between 1998 and 2000.<sup>85</sup> Yet Mahuad governed democratically. Lacking a legislative majority, he forged a coalition with the PSC, and after that coalition collapsed, he pursued alliances with the ID and small leftist parties.<sup>86</sup> In January 2000, Mahuad was overthrown by a military-indigenous rebellion.<sup>87</sup> Thus, although Ecuador suffered a constitutional rupture under Mahuad, he was the victim, not the instigator, of that rupture.

**Lucio Gutiérrez (2003–2005)**

Lucio Gutiérrez, who led the 2000 coup against Mahuad,<sup>88</sup> was elected as a populist in 2002. He was an outsider who rose to prominence as a military putschist, and his Patriotic Society Party (PSP) was a personalistic vehicle.<sup>89</sup> Gutiérrez's candidacy was thoroughly anti-establishment. Indeed, his "entire discursive arsenal [...] was directed against traditional politicians and bankers".<sup>90</sup> He railed against the "corrupt oligarchy" and the "putrefaction of the [traditional] parties", and called upon Ecuadorians to "rise up [...] against the ones who are always in power",<sup>91</sup> pledging to overhaul the constitution and replace Congress with a "technical body".<sup>92</sup>

Upon taking office in 2003, Gutiérrez did an about-turn, abandoning populism for a strategy of "negotiation and compromise".<sup>93</sup> Facing an opposition-dominated Congress in which his PSP held only seven of 100 seats, he jettisoned his leftist programme and forged a coalition with the conservative PSC.<sup>94</sup> When this coalition broke down in 2004, Gutiérrez reverted to populism. Describing himself as a "dictocrat" – because, as he put it, "to the oligarchy I am a dictator and to the people I am a democrat" – he declared that he would "destroy the corrupt oligarchy" or "die trying".<sup>95</sup> Thus, he threatened to dissolve Congress and call a referendum for a constituent assembly,<sup>96</sup> and in late 2004, he illegally purged the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and Supreme Electoral Court.<sup>97</sup> The government also harassed journalists, organized "shock troops" to confront protesters, and reportedly sponsored an espionage network and scattered attacks on opposition figures.<sup>98</sup> By 2005, then, Gutiérrez's presidency bore "resemblances to the government of Alberto Fujimori".<sup>99</sup>

Gutiérrez's power grab ultimately failed. In April 2005, in the face of massive protest, Congress voted to remove him from office.<sup>100</sup> This failure may have been rooted in the "intermittent" nature of Gutiérrez's populism.<sup>101</sup> Having campaigned on an anti-elite platform, Gutiérrez won a mandate to bury the political establishment. Yet his initial alliance with the PSC and turn to the right violated this mandate and eroded his support base. Without broad public support, Gutiérrez could not rely on plebiscitary tactics when he later reverted to populism, which left him in a weak position when he assaulted institutions of horizontal accountability.

**Rafael Correa (2006–present)**

Rafael Correa was also a populist. Although he briefly served as finance minister under interim President Alfredo Palacio in 2005, Correa was a "quintessential outsider, with no previous experience in electoral politics".<sup>102</sup> His party, the Proud and Sovereign Fatherland (PAIS), was a personalistic vehicle that did not even field candidates for Congress.<sup>103</sup> Correa's 2006 presidential campaign was clearly anti-establishment. Correa ran "against the system itself".<sup>104</sup> Framing the election as a "contest between good and evil: the honest citizenry [...] confronting the corrupt *clase política*",<sup>105</sup> he called for a constituent assembly that would dissolve Congress and end "the domination of the traditional parties".<sup>106</sup>



Correa's election triggered a crisis. Within hours of his inauguration, he called a referendum seeking a constituent assembly empowered to dissolve Congress and rewrite the constitution.<sup>107</sup> Congress balked, triggering an "interinstitutional war".<sup>108</sup> With polls showing 70% support for the president's agenda,<sup>109</sup> Correa was well-positioned to win this showdown. In March 2007, the pro-Correa electoral authorities stripped 57 of 100 legislators of their seats.<sup>110</sup> Legislators seeking entry to Congress were attacked by government-sponsored mobs, and when the Constitutional Tribunal ordered the deposed legislators' reinstatement, the rump Congress sacked a majority of the justices.<sup>111</sup> The referendum passed overwhelmingly, and PAIS won 70% of the vote in the 2007 constituent assembly election. The new assembly placed Congress "in recess" and allowed Correa to rewrite the constitution.<sup>112</sup> In mid-2008, the constitution was approved via referendum, and in April 2009, Correa was easily re-elected, this time with a legislative majority.

Correa's coup ushered in a competitive authoritarian regime. The government used its unchecked control of the state to attack and weaken opponents. Harassment of journalists increased,<sup>113</sup> and anti-terrorism laws were used to prosecute civil society leaders, including CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) president Marlon Santi.<sup>114</sup> Correa also used libel laws to punish independent media, most notably in a 2011 lawsuit against *El Universo* editor Emilio Palacio.<sup>115</sup> Finally, incumbent abuse of state institutions skewed access to media and resources.<sup>116</sup> In the 2007 constituent assembly election, for example, the government mobilized public resources and employees on behalf of PAIS candidates and, after prohibiting private purchases of radio and television airtime, used public advertising in a biased manner.<sup>117</sup> Although these abuses were less severe than those of Fujimori or Chávez, they clearly pushed Ecuador into competitive authoritarianism.

## Peru

Peru collapsed into competitive authoritarianism in 1992 under populist President Alberto Fujimori. Following re-democratization in 2000, two non-populists, Alejandro Toledo and Alan García, governed democratically, despite a mineral boom and a collapsed party system.

### *The Fujimori presidency (1990–2000)*

Alberto Fujimori is widely viewed as a prototypical case of neopopulism.<sup>118</sup> As a little-known university rector who had never held elected office, Fujimori was a true outsider. As a child of working-class Japanese immigrants, he could credibly present himself as outside the predominantly white-skinned elite. His party, Change 90, was a mere "personal platform".<sup>119</sup> In the 1990 election, Fujimori made a clear anti-establishment appeal, casting himself as a representative of Peru's *cholos*, or brown-skinned poor, in opposition to the *pitucos*, or "upper-class white creoles".<sup>120</sup> Frontrunner Mario Vargas Llosa was backed by virtually



the entire elite, and his legislative slate “read like a who’s who of the Peruvian political establishment”,<sup>121</sup> which allowed Fujimori to define the race as a “confrontation between the white elite [...] and the nonwhite common people”.<sup>122</sup> He won overwhelmingly.

Fujimori took office amid a severe crisis, marked by hyperinflation and a mounting guerrilla insurgency. Moreover, Congress and the judiciary were controlled by the established parties. Although opportunities existed for coalition-building, as much of Fujimori’s programme enjoyed legislative support,<sup>123</sup> Fujimori lacked experience with (or interest in) negotiating such coalitions. According to a former aide, he “couldn’t stand the idea of inviting the President of the Senate to lunch in the Presidential Palace every time he wanted to pass a law”.<sup>124</sup> Fujimori responded to divided government by launching a “systematic attack on Peru’s political elites and the establishment institutions they controlled”.<sup>125</sup> The result was a “chicken game”, in which Fujimori sought to rule by decree and Congress attempted to curb his power and even impeach him.<sup>126</sup> As one government official put it, the conflict reached a point “where either the Congress would kill the president, or the president would kill the Congress”.<sup>127</sup> In April 1992, Fujimori carried out a presidential coup, closing Congress, dissolving the constitution, and purging the judiciary. The coup had broad public support: surveys found 80% support for both Fujimori and the closure of Congress.<sup>128</sup> In this context, opposition efforts to mobilize resistance failed.

The 1992 *autogolpe* ushered in a competitive authoritarian regime. Although approval of a new constitution via referendum (1993) and presidential elections (1995) restored the appearance of democracy, the coup allowed Fujimori to “monopolize a level of power unheard of in Peru in decades”.<sup>129</sup> Fujimori and his intelligence adviser, Vladimiro Montesinos, used this power to systematically corrupt state institutions.<sup>130</sup> Judicial and tax authorities were transformed into “instruments of persecution”, targeting opposition politicians, businesspeople, and independent media.<sup>131</sup> Montesinos bribed and blackmailed hundreds of public officials, including four Supreme Court justices, three of five members of the Elections Board, and dozens of legislators and judges.<sup>132</sup> He also corrupted much of the media. In the late 1990s, four of five private television networks and more than a dozen tabloid newspapers were on the state payroll.<sup>133</sup>

The regime hardened during Fujimori’s second term. In 1996, Congress passed a dubiously constitutional law permitting Fujimori to seek a third term in 2000.<sup>134</sup> After the Constitutional Tribunal ruled the law “inapplicable”, Congress impeached three of its members, effectively disabling the institution.<sup>135</sup> The 2000 election was unfair. Media coverage was biased, the electoral authorities were corrupted, and millions of dollars in state funds were diverted to Fujimori’s campaign.<sup>136</sup> Opposition candidate Alejandro Toledo boycotted the runoff, allowing Fujimori to win unopposed. In late 2000, however, a leaked videotape revealing Montesinos’ corruption triggered the regime’s demise.

*Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) and Alan García (2006–2011)*

Presidents Toledo and García governed under conditions that were potentially favourable for competitive authoritarianism, including a mineral boom and full-scale party system collapse, which resulted in a persistently weak opposition.<sup>137</sup> Yet neither Toledo nor García was a populist, and both governed democratically.

Like Fujimori, Toledo was a political outsider who had never held elected office. His party, Possible Peru, was a personalistic vehicle.<sup>138</sup> Yet Toledo was not a populist. Notwithstanding his lower-class, indigenous background, he was a Stanford-educated technocrat with close ties to Peru's elite. Moreover, Toledo's 2001 campaign was hardly anti-establishment.<sup>139</sup> Indeed, he was supported by business leaders, established parties such as Popular Action, and prominent establishment figures such as Mario Vargas Llosa.<sup>140</sup> Toledo inherited a troubled economy and, like Fujimori, lacked a legislative majority. Nevertheless, he governed with Congress throughout his presidency. Although the Toledo government was considered ineffective, it respected democratic institutions.<sup>141</sup>

García, who succeeded Toledo in 2006, was a career politician (and ex-president) from an established party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). His presidential campaign was anything but populist. Competing against a conservative (Lourdes Flores) and a left-wing populist (Ollanta Humala), García positioned himself in the centre, promising "responsible change".<sup>142</sup> In the runoff against Humala, he became the "default candidate of the establishment",<sup>143</sup> gaining the support of the vast bulk of the economic, political, and media elite. This alliance endured throughout García's presidency, as the Lima elite viewed him as a bulwark against Humala. APRA easily forged a majority coalition in Congress, giving García few incentives to attack institutions of horizontal accountability. He left office with democratic institutions intact.

**Venezuela**

Due to a prolonged economic crisis and a collapsing party system, Venezuela was vulnerable to competitive authoritarianism throughout the 1990s. Yet, whereas Rafael Caldera, a maverick populist, governed democratically, Hugo Chávez, a full-blown populist, led a transition to competitive authoritarianism.

*Rafael Caldera (1994–1999)*

Rafael Caldera won the presidency in 1993 amid an acute economic and political crisis. Venezuela's oil-dependent economy had been in decline since the late 1970s,<sup>144</sup> and during the second presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989–1993) its once-stable democracy fell into crisis. In 1992, Hugo Chávez led a coup attempt against Pérez, and in a stunning manifestation of societal discontent, he and his fellow conspirators "became instant heroes for many Venezuelans".<sup>145</sup>

By 1993, then, Venezuelan voters were in an anti-establishment mood. The unlikely beneficiary was ex-President Caldera. As a “founding father” of Venezuela’s democracy and a founding leader of the Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI), one of its two establishment parties, Caldera was a clear political insider.<sup>146</sup> However, during the February 1992 coup attempt, he publicly sympathized with the plotters’ motives in a speech before Congress, which transformed him into “the principal spokesperson for the opposition” and paved the way for a maverick populist presidential bid in 1993.<sup>147</sup> Thus, Caldera abandoned COPEI and ran with Convergence, a “personalistic vehicle that never developed any appeal beyond his persona”.<sup>148</sup> He campaigned as an “anti-establishment figure”, repeatedly attacking COPEI and Democratic Action (AD), the parties that constituted Venezuela’s “partyarchy”.<sup>149</sup> This anti-establishment appeal allowed him to narrowly win the presidency.

Caldera assumed office in a context of economic crisis and incipient party system collapse, which might have facilitated an authoritarian turn. Moreover, AD and COPEI retained control of Congress, and Caldera, having won the presidency with an anti-establishment appeal, could not easily negotiate with them. Indeed, Caldera showed “signs of Caesarism” early in his presidency,<sup>150</sup> bypassing Congress via executive decrees and threatening to “turn to the people” if the Supreme Court did not rule in his favour.<sup>151</sup> Yet he never crossed the line into competitive authoritarianism. Despite public pressure, Caldera “steadfastly resisted calls for a Fujimorazo”.<sup>152</sup> Instead, he forged a legislative pact with AD,<sup>153</sup> which enabled him to muddle through to the end of his term with democratic institutions intact.

### ***Hugo Chávez (1999–present)***

Whereas Caldera was a maverick populist, Hugo Chávez was a full-blown populist. A “consummate political outsider” who rose to national prominence via his 1992 coup attempt, Chávez could portray himself as “untainted by the rampant corruption, political patronage, and collusive pactmaking” that characterized the post-1958 democratic regime.<sup>154</sup> After being pardoned by Caldera in 1994, Chávez created the Fifth Republic Movement, a personalistic vehicle, to run for president in 1998.<sup>155</sup> Chávez’s anti-establishment appeal was extreme.<sup>156</sup> Vowing to sweep the established parties “from the face of the earth”,<sup>157</sup> he promised that Venezuela’s “rotten elites” would “soon be consigned to the trashbin of history”.<sup>158</sup> Chávez won the election easily, in part because he represented “the most thorough break with the traditional order”.<sup>159</sup>

Like Caldera, Chávez lacked a legislative majority. Yet whereas Caldera opted to work within the existing institutional order, Chávez launched a plebiscitarian assault on it, immediately calling for a referendum to elect a constituent assembly. Despite opposition from AD and COPEI, the referendum passed with 85% of the vote. When constituent assembly elections were held in July 1999, *chavista* parties won an overwhelming majority. The new assembly carried out a “constituent”

coup d'état".<sup>160</sup> Declaring itself "legally omnipotent", the assembly closed Congress, purged the judiciary, and appointed new electoral authorities.<sup>161</sup> By the time the assembly had ceased its functions, "there was not a single national power, other than President Chávez himself, which [it] had not [...] appointed".<sup>162</sup> In December 1999, the constitution was approved via referendum, and Chávez was easily re-elected the following year, this time with a legislative majority.

After a period of intense polarization, during which Chávez survived a brief coup attempt (April 2002), a general strike (December 2002–February 2003), and a recall referendum (August 2004), the government took advantage of soaring oil prices and a weakened opposition to consolidate power. In May 2004, Chávez packed the Supreme Court, and thereafter the Court "rubber-stamped the positions of the [...] executive".<sup>163</sup> The opposition boycotted the 2005 legislative election, leaving Congress entirely in *chavista* hands, and Chávez was easily re-elected in 2006.

Unchecked control of the state allowed Chávez to politicize state institutions and deploy them repeatedly against opponents. In 2003, for example, the electoral authorities stalled the opposition's recall referendum drive for a year, giving Chávez time to regain public support.<sup>164</sup> After the referendum, *chavista* legislator Luis Tascón published a list of those who had signed the recall petition, which was then used for blacklisting.<sup>165</sup> The government also spent billions of dollars in oil revenue in a discretionary manner, rewarding supporters and punishing critics.<sup>166</sup> The result was a "state [that] is virtually impossible to defeat through voting, since that state can always heavily overmatch whatever resources the opposition can bring to bear".<sup>167</sup>

The regime grew increasingly authoritarian after 2006. Several leading opposition figures were arrested (for example ex-governor Oswaldo Álvarez Paz) or forced into exile (for example 2006 presidential candidate Manuel Rosales), numerous journalists and pro-democracy activists were prosecuted on defamation and other charges, and a major television station (Radio Caracas Television, RCTV) and dozens of radio stations were forced off the air.<sup>168</sup> By the decade's end, Venezuela was "the most pronounced case of competitive authoritarianism to emerge in Latin America at least since Alberto Fujimori".<sup>169</sup>

## Conclusion

This article has argued that populism was the primary catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in post-Cold War Latin America. Through an analysis of the 14 presidents elected in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010, it showed that populist presidents have both incentives and a distinctive capacity to assault institutions of horizontal accountability, and that when they succeed the result is almost always competitive authoritarianism.

The cases are summarized in Table 1. All four full populists (Correa, Gutiérrez, Fujimori, and Chávez) governed in a competitive authoritarian manner, as did

Morales, a movement populist. The Bolivian outcome may have been the result of the increasing personalization of the MAS, in which a “cult of Evismo” eroded participatory linkages.<sup>170</sup> However, it also suggests that even “bottom-up” anti-establishment outsiders pose a threat to representative democracy. In contrast, maverick populists may be less threatening to democratic institutions. Caldera, an experienced politician, governed democratically, despite economic crisis, party system collapse, and a populist mandate. None of the non-populist presidents triggered a transition to competitive authoritarianism.

Alternative theories do less well in explaining Andean regime outcomes. For example, economic crisis may have contributed to competitive authoritarianism in Peru and Venezuela, but it cannot explain competitive authoritarian outcomes in Bolivia and Ecuador, where economies were growing. Moreover, Presidents Durán, Mahuad, and Caldera governed democratically despite severe economic crises. A rentier approach may help explain competitive authoritarianism in Bolivia and Ecuador, but in Peru, competitive authoritarianism emerged prior to the mineral boom, and governments elected during the boom remained democratic. Likewise, Venezuela’s authoritarian turn began in 1999, *before* the oil boom. Thus, although oil rents may have helped Chávez consolidate power, it was mass support, not oil revenue, that allowed him to dismantle representative democracy. Finally, party system collapse is insufficient to explain competitive authoritarian turns. Although all five competitive authoritarian governments emerged in a context of inchoate (Gutiérrez) or collapsing (Morales, Fujimori, Correa, Chávez) party systems, other presidents (Toledo, García, Caldera) were elected in similar contexts but governed democratically.

How durable are competitive authoritarian regimes in the Andes? According to Levitsky and Way,<sup>171</sup> competitive authoritarian durability is rooted in the strength of state and ruling party structures. If they are correct, then Andean regimes are unlikely to consolidate. State institutions in Bolivia and Ecuador are notoriously weak, and they have weakened in Venezuela. With the partial exception of Bolivia, ruling parties were also weak in all three cases. Where state and party institutions are weak, regimes tend to be unstable. Indeed, competitive authoritarianism lasted only eight years under Fujimori and less than a year under Gutiérrez. Although regimes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela benefited from the post-2002 mineral boom, their institutional bases are no more solid. Paradoxically, then, the very conditions that contributed to the rise of populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes – namely, state and party weakness – may ultimately prevent those regimes from consolidating.

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# Notes

1. Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.
2. Ibid.
3. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*; Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*; Mudde and Rovira, *Populism in Europe and the Americas*.
4. A substantial literature on competitive authoritarianism and other hybrid regimes emerged in the 2000s. See Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes"; Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation"; Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism*; Howard and Roessler, "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes."
5. Castañeda, *Mexican Shock*, 131.
6. Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.
7. Haggard and Kaufman, *Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*.
8. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*; O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy."
9. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?"
10. Weyland, "Rise of Latin America's Two Lefts"; Weyland et al., *Leftist Governments in Latin America*.
11. Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia*; Greene, *Why Dominant Parties Lose*.
12. Flores-Macias, "Statist vs. Pro-Market"; Madrid, "Perils of Personalism."
13. Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept."
14. Barr, "Anti-Establishment Politics."
15. Ibid., 30–2.
16. Ibid., 33–4. See also Kenney, "Outsider and Anti-Party Politicians," 59.
17. Barr uses the term "plebiscitarian linkage", but because plebiscitarianism is often understood as a strategy of governing rather than a type of political appeal, we follow the example of other scholars who use the term "personalism". See, for example, Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept"; Roberts, "Latin America's Populist Revival."
18. Barr, "Anti-Establishment Politics," 35–6.
19. On radial categories and diminished subtypes, see Collier and Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives." On populism as a radial category, see Roberts, "Transformation of Populism."
20. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*; Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*; Mudde and Rovira, *Populism in Europe and the Americas*.
21. See Barr, "Anti-Establishment Politics."
22. This conceptualization helps to resolve scholarly disagreement over the Bolivian case. Whereas many scholars describe Evo Morales as a populist, given his anti-establishment appeal (for example Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*), others describe him as "the very antithesis of populism", given the bottom-up nature of the social movement that brought him to power (Roberts, "Latin America's Populist Revival," 14).
23. Mudde and Rovira, *Populism in Europe and the Americas*.
24. On the inclusionary effects of classical populism in Latin America, see Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*.
25. Doyle, "Legitimacy of Political Institutions."
26. Levitsky and Cameron, "Democracy Without Parties?"
27. Doyle, "Legitimacy of Political Institutions."
28. Mainwaring, "Crisis of Representation in the Andes."
29. Although we exclude Colombia from the analysis, it is worth noting that the country experienced neither populism nor competitive authoritarianism during the 1990–2010 period. Álvaro Uribe is sometimes labelled a populist, but he was a career politician whose electoral appeal – though personalistic – was not anti-establishment.

- See Dugas, "Emergence of Neopopulism in Colombia?"; Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*, 76.
30. Prior to the 1980s, no democracy had survived for more than 12 years in Bolivia, Ecuador, or Peru.
  31. Stein et al., *Politics of Policies*, 68–9, 88.
  32. Where possible, we draw on Hawkins' index of populist discourse. See Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*.
  33. Thus, Hugo Banzer ceased to be an outsider after governing as a dictator, as did Lucio Gutiérrez and Alejandro Toledo after their presidencies.
  34. Madrid, "Perils of Personalism," 15.
  35. Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 5–16, 365–8.
  36. Civil liberties violations include attacks on independent media, opposition politicians or activists, or other government critics, as well as significant restrictions on freedom of speech or association. Violations must affect the partisan opposition. Other abuse, such as police violence against civilians and human rights violations committed during counterinsurgency, may be considered undemocratic, but they are not indicators of competitive authoritarianism.
  37. In his comparative analysis of populist discourse, Hawkins describes Sánchez de Lozada as "by all accounts not populist." See Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*, 112.
  38. Gamarra and Malloy, "Patrimonial Dynamics," 415, 420.
  39. Gamarra, "Bolivia: Managing Democracy," 76–9.
  40. *Ibid.*, 90.
  41. *Ibid.*, 80; Mayorga, "Bolivia's Democracy," 164.
  42. Klein, *Concise History of Bolivia*, 240.
  43. Mayorga, "Bolivia's Democracy," 173.
  44. *Ibid.*, 173, 171.
  45. Dozens of people were killed and hundreds were injured or illegally detained. See Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion," 769–70.
  46. Banzer resigned in 2001 and was succeeded by Vice President Jorge Quiroga.
  47. Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion," 758. Under Bolivia's system of "parliamentarized presidentialism," presidents were chosen by Congress when no candidate won a majority of the popular vote. See Mayorga, "Bolivia's Democracy," 153.
  48. Buitrago, "Civil Society, Social Protest," 103.
  49. Sánchez de Lozada was succeeded by Vice-president Carlos Mesa, who governed until 2005, when he, too, was forced to resign amid mass protest. He was replaced by Eduardo Rodríguez.
  50. Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion," 762–63.
  51. Morales was expelled from Congress in 2002 for allegedly inciting violence against the government. See Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion," 772.
  52. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 256.
  53. Madrid, *Rise of Ethnic Politics*, 66.
  54. Gamarra, "Evo Morales and Democracy," 129. On Hawkins' index of populist discourse, Morales received a score of 1.6 out of a possible 2.0, which is higher, for example, than that of Perón. See Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*, 76.
  55. See Roberts, "Latin America's Populist Revival."
  56. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 241.
  57. *Ibid.*, 241–42.
  58. Dunkerley, "Evo Morales," 165–6.
  59. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 252.
  60. Lehoucq, "Bolivia's Constitutional Breakdown"; Madrid, *Rise of Ethnic Politics*, 182.
  61. Lehoucq, "Bolivia's Constitutional Breakdown," 119; Gamarra, "Evo Morales and Democracy," 150.



62. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 254–5.
63. Madrid, *Rise of Ethnic Politics*, 179–180.
64. Gamarra, "Evo Morales and Democracy," 150.
65. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 252.
66. Human Rights Watch, "Unequivocally Condemn Mob Violence." March 12, 2009. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/12/bolivia-unequivocally-condemn-mob-violence>
67. See Freedom House, "Bolivia". *Freedom of the Press 2011*. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/bolivia>; Human Rights Watch, "Bolivia." *World Report 2012*. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/bolivia>
68. Conaghan and Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft*, 229.
69. Hey and Klak, "From Protectionism Towards Neoliberalism," 78.
70. Mejía Acosta, "Crafting Legislative Ghost Coalitions," 81–2.
71. Hey and Klak, "From Protectionism Towards Neoliberalism," 77–8.
72. Conaghan and Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft*, 229.
73. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*.
74. Freidenberg, *Jama, caleta y camello*.
75. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*.
76. Quoted in Sosa-Bucholz, "Strange Career of Populism," 153.
77. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*, 81.
78. Ibid.
79. Pérez-Liñán, *Presidential Impeachment*, 25.
80. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, "Parliamentary Solutions," 81.
81. Pérez-Liñán, *Presidential Impeachment*, 107.
82. Andrade, "'Culture' as Stereotype," 244–6. See also Lucero, "Crisis and Contention in Ecuador," 63.
83. "Ecuador: Bucaram II?," *The Economist*, June 4, 1998. <http://www.economist.com/node/132482>
84. Pachano, "Ecuador," 268–9.
85. Lucero, "Crisis and Contention in Ecuador," 60.
86. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, "Parliamentary Solutions," 82–3.
87. Lucero, "Crisis and Contention in Ecuador."
88. Gutiérrez was imprisoned after the coup, but later pardoned.
89. Ray, "'Anti-Establishment' Party Organization," 17–20.
90. Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 274.
91. Quoted in Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 272–7.
92. Quoted in Gutiérrez Sanín, "Fragile Democracy," 126.
93. Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 280.
94. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, "Parliamentary Solutions," 83–4.
95. Quoted in Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 279, 295.
96. Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 279, 288.
97. Conaghan, "Bucaram en Panamá," 257–60.
98. Mejía Acosta, "Ecuador," 5–7.
99. Ramírez Gallegos, *La insurrección de abril*, 19.
100. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, "Parliamentary Solutions," 84.
101. Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente."
102. Conaghan and de la Torre, "Permanent Campaign," 271.
103. Conaghan, "Ecuador: Correa's Plebiscitary Presidency," 48–50.
104. Conaghan and de la Torre, "Permanent Campaign," 271.
105. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*, 179.
106. Conaghan and de la Torre, "Permanent Campaign," 271.
107. Conaghan, "Ecuador: Correa's Plebiscitary Presidency," 51.
108. Mejía Acosta, "Ecuador," 2.



109. Conaghan, "Ecuador: Correa's Plebiscitary Presidency," 51–2.
110. Ibid., 51–2.
111. Ibid., 52.
112. Ibid., 57.
113. See Freedom House, "Ecuador." *Freedom in the World 2010*. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/ecuador?page=22&year=2010&country=7815>
114. See Human Rights Watch, "Ecuador." *World Report 2011*. <http://www.hrw.org/es/world-report-2011/ecuador>
115. Human Rights Watch, "Ecuador: Don't Prosecute President's Critics." March 31, 2011. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/31/ecuador-don-t-prosecute-president-s-critics>. Correa won more than \$30 million in compensation, although he eventually withdrew the charges.
116. Conaghan and de la Torre, "Permanent Campaign," 277.
117. European Union, "Ecuador 2007: Final Report."
118. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism"; Weyland, "Neopopulism and Neoliberalism."
119. Planas, *La democracia volátil*, 350.
120. Degregori and Grompone, *Demonios y redentores*, 96–7.
121. Cameron, "Political and Economic Origins," 43.
122. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*, 124.
123. Cotler, *Política y sociedad*, 206–208; Kenney, *Fujimori's Coup*, 129, 136.
124. Quoted in McClintock, "La voluntad política presidencial," 65. See also Cameron, "Political and Economic Origins," 54–5.
125. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism," 97–8.
126. Tanaka, *Los espejismos de la democracia*, 212–213. See also Kenney, *Fujimori's Coup*, 177–191.
127. Quoted in Cameron, "Political and Economic Origins," 56.
128. Kenney, *Fujimori's Coup*, 228.
129. Degregori, "Vanishing of a Regime," 220.
130. Rospigliosi, *Montesinos y las fuerzas armadas*.
131. Durand, *Riqueza económica y pobreza política*, 459–63.
132. Conaghan, *Fujimori's Peru*; Cameron, "Endogenous Regime Breakdown."
133. Fowks, *Suma y resta de la realidad*, 68–72.
134. Conaghan, *Fujimori's Peru*, 121–2.
135. Ibid., 126–30.
136. Ibid., 92–3, 168.
137. Tanaka, *Democracia sin partidos*.
138. Vera, "Toledo."
139. On Hawkins' comparative index, Toledo's populism score is 0.3 out of a possible 2.0, which is equal to Vicente Fox and Lula. See Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*, 76.
140. Degregori, "Peru: A Missed Opportunity," 264.
141. Degregori, "Peru: A Missed Opportunity."
142. Vergara, *Ni amnésicos ni irracionales*.
143. Cameron, "The Left Turn that Wasn't," 377.
144. Karl, *Paradox of Plenty*.
145. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*, 17.
146. Crisp, Levine, and Molina, "Rise and Decline of COPEL," 288.
147. Coppedge, "Prospects for Democratic Governability," 52–3.
148. Morgan, *Bankrupt Representation*, 138.
149. Coppedge, "Prospects for Democratic Governability," 53.
150. Schuyler, "Perspectives on Venezuelan Democracy," 17–8.
151. Crisp, "Presidential Behavior," 195–97.

152. Crisp, Levine, and Molina, "Rise and Decline of COPEI," 278.
153. Corrales, *Presidents Without Parties*, 223.
154. Roberts, "Social Correlates," 36.
155. *Ibid.*, 53.
156. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*, 50–86.
157. Quoted in López Maya, *Del viernes negro al referendo revocatorio*, 222.
158. Quoted in Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo*, 55.
159. Roberts, "Social Correlates," 52.
160. Brewer-Carías, *Dismantling Democracy*, 15.
161. Coppedge, "Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy," 187–8.
162. *Ibid.*, 188.
163. Corrales and Penfold, *Dragon in the Tropics*, 78.
164. Hsieh et al., "Price of Political Opposition," 202.
165. See Hsieh et al., "Price of Political Opposition."
166. See Corrales and Penfold, *Dragon in the Tropics*.
167. Corrales and Penfold, "Crowding Out the Opposition," 106.
168. Corrales, "Setback for Chávez," 127–9.
169. *Ibid.*, 122.
170. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 241–2.
171. Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

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