that *all* populist forces are at odds with the creation and maintenance of institutional apparatuses (Hawkins 2010a: 169–75). Accordingly, further studies on populism and democracy should devote more attention to the *type of organization* promoted by populist leaders and the impact that these organizations do have on the quality of democracy.

Although it seems that populism tends to foster a kind of 'Macho' politics, little has been written about the relationship between populism and gender. This is a third research agenda. After all, there are good reasons to think that specific regional or historical manifestations of populism develop different approaches towards gender. Indeed, Kampwirth's (2011) recent edited volume shows that in Latin America there has been a variety of populist projects defending particular models of masculinity and femininity. For instance, Evo Morales represents a case of populism from below, in which several grassroots organizations – including women's rights associations – play an important role in terms of the policy agenda of the government (Rousseau 2011). By contrast, Hugo Chávez comes closer to a case of populism from above, in which the government has developed several policies in favour of women, such as the introduction of a college-level work-study programme that aims to improve the qualification of women, and the creation of soup kitchens run by women, where needy children and single mothers from the shanty towns receive one free meal a day (Fernandes 2007: 108–12). As these examples reveal, the government of Chávez does promote policies for *poor* women rather than for women as such, and in consequence, it does not defend a feminist agenda.

Fourth, there is little in-depth research on the complex links between populism and the media. Particularly within the European context, many authors have argued that the increasing importance and commercialization of the mass media is one of the main drivers of the growing rise of populism (e.g. Mazzoleni 2003; Meyer 2006; Peri 2004; Puhle 2003). However, there are no comparative studies that empirically and/or theoretically explicate the ways in which different media landscapes favour or hinder the emergence of populism. There are some interesting country studies though, that develop new insights into the relationship between populism and the media, and which contribute to the generation of hypotheses that can be tested in future studies. For instance, Art (2006) explains the different levels of success of populist radical right parties in Austria and Germany in part by the collective memory of each of these countries and their impact on the public debate and the media. Another interesting example is a recent article written by Bale, Taggart, and Van Kessel (2011), which examines the vernacular understandings of populism. Based on an empirical analysis of the main print media

in the United Kingdom the authors demonstrate that populism tends to receive a negative connotation in the media and that the adjective 'populist' is often used as a synonym for 'popular.'

Within the Latin American context, populists in power do not only attack the media for its defence of the status quo and the interests of the elites, but they also push for political reforms that aim to create new media companies in tune with the populist ideology. In essence, populism does not believe in the existence of independent media, but rather perceives the media landscape through the Manichean distinction between 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite': On the hand, there is the honest and legitimate media that expresses the 'will of the people,' and on the other hand, there is a fraudulent and anti-democratic media that defends the interests of the elite (Waisbord 2011: 100). Not by coincidence, as Kitzberger (2010) has analysed in detail, the level of media activism of the current leftist administrations in Latin America seems to be related to their proximity to the populist ideology: The more the leftist government adheres to populism, the greater its critique of the media and the greater the state's intervention to ensure the 'democratization' of access and voice in the media sphere.

A fifth topic for future analysis is the development of a genuine comparative approach to populism in general and to the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy in particular. While we have focused on contemporary populism in this volume, further studies can provide new insights by undertaking cross-temporal comparisons either within regions (e.g. Latin America) or across regions (e.g. South America and North America). From a historical point of view, it would be interesting to analyse whether populist forces, such as Peronism in Argentina and/or the Populist Party in the United States, have triggered episodes of institutional change that promoted democratization or de-democratization. This implies, as Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010) have suggested, that the institutional building blocks of democracy usually emerge asynchronically. Consequently, it is relevant to examine if, and in which ways, the emergence of populism has affected the historical development of single democratic institutions (e.g. the extension of suffrage, anti-electoral fraud rules, the approval of a new constitution, etc.). Furthermore, it would be interesting to reconsider the 'transitology' literature in order to study the impact of populism on the three stages of democratization: liberalization, transition, and consolidation (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2010).

With regard to contemporary cross-regional comparisons, future research could study different types or sub-families of populism or compare them explicitly. We think particularly about the more inclusionary