
## Imperfect Information in Health Care Markets Exercise Session 2 - Introduction

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## Exercise 1

 $f(x) = x^{2} \qquad \text{if } k^{1} = 2x$  $= 7 \qquad f(u(3)) = f(2\cdot3) = f(6)$ Assume that the utility function  $u_i$  represents *i*'s preferences over a

set of alternatives  $X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$ . Show that  $(f \circ u; )(k) = f(u; (k))$ 

- 1. *i*'s preferences are transitive:
- 2. the function  $v_i$  defined by  $v_i(x) = f(u_i(x))$  also represents *i*'s preferences if f is a strictly increasing function.
- Assume now that there are only 2 alternatives, i.e.  $X = \{x_1, x_2\}$ . Assume that there are 2 people in the society and person 1 prefers  $x_1$  over  $x_2$  while person 2 prefers  $x_2$  over  $x_1$ . Choose some utility functions  $u_1$  and  $u_2$  to represent their preferences. Assume that society chooses the alternative xmaximizing  $u_1(x) + u_2(x)$ . - Which alternative does society choose with the utility functions you chose? - Show that a transformation as in the previous subquestion can change society's choice. What is the problem and how does it come about?

EXC. 1

Refinition : utility function 11; represents individual i's preferences means the following:  $X_1 \gtrsim X_2 \iff U_i(X_1) \ge U_i(X_2)$ for all the the in t "weakly preferred over" is a number in R Definition 2: i's preprences are fransitive, if for all X, y, z in X.  $(X \gtrsim_i y \text{ and } y \gtrsim_i z) => X \gtrsim_i z$ then the preferences 1.1 Want to show: If i's preferences can be represented by a utility function, are transitive. Proof: Let us assume that  $X \gtrsim y$  and  $y \gtrsim z$  for some arbitrary X, y, z in X. Sufficient to show: X Z; Z. As the preferences are represended by u; we know that u; (x) > u; (y) and u; (y) = u; (z). Hence, U; (x) = u; (y) = u; (z) and is particular u; (x) = u; (z) as the z-relation on the real number is (naturally) fransitive (Real numbers are ordered: 0 4 10 But this implies that I 2; 2.

You know from the lecture: Preferences over a finite set of objects can be represented by a a whility function if the preferences are complete and transitive. Exc. 1.2 Know: U: represents i's preferences Want to show: f(u;) also represent i's preferences, for f being a shickly increasing function (f'(x)>0 for all x).  $= \left(X_1 \succeq X_2 \iff f(u;(K_1)) \equiv f(u;(K_2)) \text{ for all } X_1, X_2 \text{ in } K\right)$ "=>" We have so once both in plications:  $\begin{array}{c} f^{-1} \\ f^{-1}$ proof: We have to olion both inplications: But this implies  $f(u_i(x_n)) \ge f(u_i(x_2))$  as f is strictly increasing.  $F(u_i(x_n)) \ge f(u_i(x_2))$ . To this inequality, let us apply the " (=" We know that  $f(u_i(x_1)) \ge f(u_i(x_2))$ . To this inequality, let us apply the inverse function  $f^{-1} \circ f f$ .  $= f^{-1}(f(u;(k_1))) \geq f^{-1}(f(u;(k_2))) \text{ (as } f^{-1} \text{ is also strictly } f^{-1})$  $(=) \begin{array}{c} U_{i}(K_{n}) \geq U_{i}(K_{2}) \\ as u_{i} represents \geq_{i} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (=) \begin{array}{c} V_{n} \geq_{i} K_{2} \\ \vdots \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (K_{n}) \geq U_{i}(K_{2}) \\ \vdots \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (=) \begin{array}{c} V_{n} \geq_{i} K_{2} \\ \vdots \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (K_{n}) \geq U_{i}(K_{2}) \\ \vdots \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (=) \begin{array}{c} V_{n} \geq_{i} K_{2} \\ \vdots \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (K_{n}) \geq U_{i}(K_{2}) \\ \vdots \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (K_{n}) \geq U_{i}(K_{2}) \\ \vdots \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (K_{n}) \geq_{i} K_{2} \\ \vdots \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (K_{n}) \geq U_{i}(K_{n}) \end{array} \begin{array}{c} (K_{n}) = U_{i}(K_{n}) \\ \vdots \end{array} \end{array}$ 

f(x)=a.++b

U(x)= 529.354. X - 278.113

 $\frac{1}{27} \frac{1}{1} = \frac{1}{278.00}$ 

Exc. 1.3

Assume  $u_{A}(k_{A}) = 1$ ,  $u_{A}(k_{Z}) = 0$  (Person 1 prefers  $k_{A}$ )  $u_{Z}(k_{A}) = 0$ ,  $u_{Z}(k_{Z}) = 0$ , 1 (Person 2 profers  $k_{Z}$ )  $\sim$  Society would chese  $k_{A}$ , since  $u_{A}(k_{A}) + u_{Z}(k_{A}) = 1 + 0 = 1 > 0, 1 = u_{A}(k_{Z}) + u_{Z}(k_{Z})$ But now, assume that person 2 reports the ubility function  $\hat{u}_{Z}$  with  $\hat{u}_{Z}(k_{A}) = 0$ ,  $\hat{u}_{Z}(k_{Z}) = 10$ (Person 2 still prefers  $k_{Z}$ )

What happens? Society will choose  $K_2$ , since  $u_1(K_1) + \hat{u_2}(K_1) = 1 \subset 10 = u_1(K_2) + \hat{u_2}(K_2)$ .

=> Utility is an ordinal concept !