# SANCHUAN CHEN

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## Professional Experience

Auburn University

Aug. 2023 - Present

Tenure-track Assistant Professor

Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering

Fordham University

Sep. 2021 - Aug. 2023

Tenure-track Assistant Professor

Department of Computer and Information Sciences

#### Education

## The Ohio State University

Aug. 2014 - Aug. 2021

Ph.D. in Computer Science and Engineering

Thesis: Exploring Value Set Analysis for Binary Code Hardening and Vulnerability Detection

Advisors: Dr. Zhiqiang Lin and Dr. Yinqian Zhang

Committee: Dr. Zhiqiang Lin, Dr. Yinqian Zhang, Dr. Michael D. Bond, Dr. Atanas Rountev

## Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Aug. 2009 - Jan. 2014

M.E. in Computer Software and Theory

## University of Science and Technology of China

Aug. 2005 - June 2009

B.E. in Computer Software and Technology

#### Research Interests

Machine Learning Security Trusted Execution Environment Software Security

Programming Languages

## Research Publications

Robust Search of Program Clones Using Neutralized Values in Binary Code Sanchuan Chen, Zhiqiang Lin, Kevin Hamlen, Yinqian Zhang. In submission.

Controlled Data Races in Enclaves: Attacks and Detection Sanchuan Chen, Zhiqiang Lin, Yinqian Zhang.

USENIX Security'23, Anaheim, CA, USA, Aug. 2023.

Exploring Value Set Analysis for Binary Code Hardening and Vulnerability Detection Sanchuan Chen.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D. dissertation, 2021.

SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves via Speculative Execution Guoxing Chen, Sanchuan Chen, Yuan Xiao, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin, and Ten H. Lai. EuroS&P'19, Stockholm, Sweden, Jun. 2019. Cited 545 times.

SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves via Speculative Execution Guoxing Chen, Sanchuan Chen, Yuan Xiao, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin, and Ten H. Lai. IEEE Security & Privacy, 2020.

Leveraging Hardware Transactional Memory for Cache Side-Channel Defenses Sanchuan Chen, Fangfei Liu, Zeyu Mi, Yinqian Zhang, Ruby B. Lee, Haibo Chen and XiaoFeng Wang. AsiaCCS'18, Incheon, Korea, June 2018.

Racing in Hyperspace: Closing Hyper-Threading Side Channels on SGX with Contrived Data Races Guoxing Chen, Wenhao Wang, Tianyu Chen, Sanchuan Chen, Yinqian Zhang, XiaoFeng Wang, Ten-Hwang Lai, Dongdai Lin.

Oakland'18, San Francisco, USA, May. 2018. Cited 88 times.

Stacco: Differentially Analyzing Side-Channel Traces for Detecting SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities in Secure Enclaves

Yuan Xiao, Mengyuan Li, Sanchuan Chen, Yinqian Zhang .

CCS'17, Dallas, USA, Oct. 2017. Cited 76 times.

Detecting Privileged Side-Channel Attacks in Shielded Execution with DÉJÀ VU Sanchuan Chen, Xiaokuan Zhang, Michael K. Reiter, Yinqian Zhang. AsiaCCS'17, Abu Dhabi, UAE, Apr. 2017. Cited 248 times.

#### Research Experience

#### Detecting Vulnerable OSS Commits with Machine Learning

This ongoing project analyzes the modality of OSS commits and aims to match the commits with a specific vulnerability description.

## Improving Performance of Memory Sanitizers with Machine Learning

This ongoing project pretrains large machine learning models with programs to improve the performance of memory sanitizers.

#### Improving Correctness of Deep Learning Compilers

This ongoing project uses program testing and program analysis techniques to improve the correctness of deep learning compilers.

#### **Detecting Cross-Architecture Binary Similarity**

The project used architecture-neutralized and optimization-resilient value sets of each register and memory cell as a signature to capture the semantics of a binary code function for similarity comparison.

#### Detecting Controlled Data Races in Enclave Code

The project investigated a novel attack vector of Intel SGX, which is caused by non-reentrant enclave code that allows an attacker to trigger a controlled data race, and proposed a binary analysis detection tool.

## Improving Performance of Data Flow Tracking

The project proposed the first framework leveraging value set analysis to selectively instrument data flow tracking into binary code with static binary instrumentation instead of dynamic binary instrumentation.

## Detecting Privileged Side Channel Attacks in Shielded Execution

The project presented a software framework that enables a shielded execution to detect privileged sidechannel attacks and builds into shielded execution the ability to check its own basic block execution time.

## Research Grant Experience

Software Security with Natural Language Processing

May 2024

Requested budget: \$5,000 Google Cloud Research Credits

Using Program Analysis for Blockchain System Education

Mar. 2022

Requested budget: \$5,000 + \$2,000 summer student fees

Fordham University Faculty Research Grant

Type-aware recovery of symbol names in binary code: a machine learning

Mar. 2021

based approach

Requested budget: \$80,000 + \$20,000 credits Amazon Research Award, Compilation Associate

## Research Mentoring Experience

Mentored the research of four graduate students and five undergraduate students:

Yidi Kao (MS, Auburn)

Xueqing Zhang, Arna Sadia, Ujjwal Samanta (MS, Fordham)

Chen Ling, Shurav Nandy, Tianshi Zhang (BS, Fordham)

Andrew Haberlandt, Bo Lu (BS, OSU)

#### Teaching Experience

Instructor, Auburn University

Comp 5700/6700: Secure Software Process

Autumn 2023, Spring 2024

80 students, 2 terms

Instructor, Fordham University CISC 4090: Theory of Computation Spring 2022, Spring 2023 30 students, 2 terms

Instructor, Fordham University

CISC 3500: Database Systems

Autumn 2021, Spring 2022, Autumn 2022, Spring 2023

30 students, 4 terms

Lab Instructor, OSU Aug. 2015 - May 2017

CSE 2111: Modeling and Problem Solving with Spreadsheets and Databases 200 students, 6 terms

Graduate Teaching Assistant, OSU Aug. 2014 - May 2015

40 students, 2 terms

CSE 5331: Foundations II: Data structures and algorithms

## Service Experience

#### Organizing Committee

Sponsorship and Exhibits Chair, International Conference on Edge Computing and IoT (EAI ICECI)

2024

## Program Committee

ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security) IEEE International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS) EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks(SecureComm) 202 International Conference on Mobility, Sensing and Networking (MSN) IEEE International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS) International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt) EAI International Conference on Security & Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems & Smart Vehicles (SmartSP	2024 2024 2024 2, 2023 2023 2022 2022 2) 2024
Artifact Evaluation Committee Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC)	2020
Shadow Program Committee IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland)	2021
Reviewer IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC) Journal of Computer Science and Technology (JCST) Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy (JCP) Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation Cybersecurity Applied Sciences Future Internet PLOS ONE 202	2020 2021 2022 2021 2023 2022 2021 1, 2022
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS)  Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC)  ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS)  International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)  2018, 201  202	0, 2022 1, 2022 9, 2020 2021

# Media Coverage

Received wide media coverage and selected pieces are:

"New Spectre attack variant can pry secrets from Intel's SGX protected enclaves" by Liam Tung, ZDNet, March 2, 2018.(Link)

"Spectre-like attack exposes entire contents of Intel's SGX secure enclave" by James Sanders, TechRepublic, March 5, 2018.(Link)

<sup>&</sup>quot;New Spectre derivative bug haunts Intel processors"

by Andy Patrizio, Network World, March 7, 2018.(Link)

"Spectre haunts Intel's SGX defense: CPU flaws can be exploited to snoop on enclaves" by Richard Chirgwin, The Register, March 1, 2018.(Link)

"If there's somethin' stored in a secure enclave, who ya gonna call? Membuster!" by Thomas Claburn, The Register, December 5, 2019.(Link)

## Awards

Faculty Research Grant, Fordham University	2022
Student Travel Grant, AsiaCCS 2018	2018
Excellent Volunteer of 50th Anniversary of USTC, USTC	2008
Outstanding Student Scholarship Grade 2, USTC	2008
Outstanding Student Scholarship Grade 2, USTC	2007
Outstanding Student Scholarship Grade 3, USTC	2006
Outstanding Freshman Scholarship Grade 3, USTC	2005