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## GOST Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

### Abstract

The purpose of this document is to make the Russian cryptographic standards available to the Internet community for their implementation in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3.

This document defines the cipher suites, signature schemes, and key exchange mechanisms for using Russian cryptographic standards, called GOST algorithms, with TLS Version 1.3. Additionally, this document specifies a profile of TLS 1.3 with GOST algorithms to facilitate interoperable implementations. The IETF has not endorsed the cipher suites, signature schemes, or key exchange mechanisms described in this document.

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## 1. Introduction

This document defines four new cipher suites (the TLS13\_GOST cipher suites) and seven new signature schemes (the TLS13\_GOST signature schemes) for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 that are based on Russian cryptographic standards GOST R 34.12-2015 [RFC7801], GOST R 34.11-2012 [RFC6986], and GOST R 34.10-2012 [RFC7091].

The TLS13\_GOST cipher suites (see Section 4) have the following values:

`TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L = {0xC1, 0x03}`

`TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L = {0xC1, 0x04}`

`TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S = {0xC1, 0x05}`

`TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S = {0xC1, 0x06}`

Each TLS13\_GOST cipher suite specifies a pair (record protection algorithm, hash algorithm) such that:

- \* The record protection algorithm is the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm (see Section 4.1.1) based on the GOST R 34.12-2015 block cipher [RFC7801] in the Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) [RFC9058] and the external re-keying approach (see [RFC8645]) intended for increasing the lifetime of symmetric keys used to protect records.
- \* The hash algorithm is the GOST R 34.11-2012 algorithm [RFC6986].

Note: The TLS13\_GOST cipher suites are divided into two types: the "S" (strong) cipher suites and the "L" (light) cipher suites (depending on the key lifetime limitations, see Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3).

The TLS13\_GOST signature schemes have the following values:

`gostr34102012_256a = 0x0709`

`gostr34102012_256b = 0x070A`

`gostr34102012_256c = 0x070B`

`gostr34102012_256d = 0x070C`

`gostr34102012_512a = 0x070D`

`gostr34102012_512b = 0x070E`

`gostr34102012_512c = 0x070F`

Each TLS13\_GOST signature scheme specifies a pair (signature algorithm, elliptic curve) such that:

- \* The signature algorithm is the GOST R 34.10-2012 algorithm [RFC7091].
- \* The elliptic curve is one of the curves defined in Section 5.2.

This document also specifies the key exchange mechanism with GOST algorithms for the TLS 1.3 protocol (see Section 6.1).

Additionally, this document specifies a TLS13\_GOST profile of the TLS 1.3 protocol with GOST algorithms so that implementers can produce interoperable implementations. It uses TLS13\_GOST cipher suites, TLS13\_GOST signature schemes, and key exchange mechanisms that are defined in this document.

## 2. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 3. Basic Terms and Definitions

This document follows the terminology from [RFC8446BIS] for "main secret".

This document uses the following terms and definitions for the sets and operations on the elements of these sets:

$B_t$	The set of byte strings of length $t$ , $t \geq 0$ ; for $t = 0$ , the $B_t$ set consists of a single empty string of zero length. If $A$ is an element in $B_t$ , then $A = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t)$ , where $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t$ are in $\{0, \dots, 255\}$ .
$B^*$	The set of all byte strings of a finite length (hereinafter referred to as strings) including the empty string.
$A[i..j]$	The string $A[i..j] = (a_i, a_{i+1}, \dots, a_j)$ in $B_{j-i+1}$ , where $A = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t)$ in $B_t$ and $1 \leq i \leq j \leq t$ .
$A[i]$	The integer $a_i$ in $\{0, \dots, 255\}$ , where $A = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t)$ in $B_t$ and $1 \leq i \leq t$ .
$ A $	The length of the byte string $A$ in bytes.
$A \mid C$	The concatenation of strings $A$ and $C$ both belonging to $B^*$ ; i.e., a string in $B_{ A + C }$ , where the left substring in $B_{ A }$ is equal to $A$ and the right substring in $B_{ C }$ is equal to $C$ .
$i \& j$	Bitwise AND of integers $i$ and $j$ .
$STR_t$	The transformation that maps an integer $i = 256^{(t-1)} * i_1 + \dots + 256 * i_{t-1} + i_t$ into the byte string $STR_t(i) = (i_1, \dots, i_t)$ in $B_t$ (the interpretation of the integer as a byte string in big-endian format).
$str_t$	The transformation that maps an integer $i = 256^{(t-1)} * i_t + \dots + 256 * i_2 + i_1$ into the byte string $str_t(i) = (i_1, \dots, i_t)$ in $B_t$ (the interpretation of the integer as a byte string in little-endian format).
$k$	The length of the block cipher key in bytes.

<b>n</b>	The length of the block cipher block in bytes.
<b>IVlen</b>	The length of the initialization vector in bytes.
<b>S</b>	The length of the authentication tag in bytes.
<b>E<sub>i</sub></b>	The elliptic curve indicated by the client in "supported_groups" extension.
<b>O<sub>i</sub></b>	The zero point of the elliptic curve E <sub>i</sub> .
<b>m<sub>i</sub></b>	The order of the group of points belonging to the elliptic curve E <sub>i</sub> .
<b>q<sub>i</sub></b>	The order of the cyclic subgroup of the group of points belonging to the elliptic curve E <sub>i</sub> .
<b>h<sub>i</sub></b>	The cofactor of the cyclic subgroup that is equal to m <sub>i</sub> / q <sub>i</sub> .
<b>Q<sub>sign</sub></b>	The public key stored in the endpoint's certificate.
<b>d<sub>sign</sub></b>	The private key that corresponds to the Q <sub>sign</sub> key.
<b>P<sub>i</sub></b>	The point of the elliptic curve E <sub>i</sub> of the order q <sub>i</sub> .
<b>(d<sub>C</sub><sup>i</sup>, Q<sub>C</sub><sup>i</sup>)</b>	The client's ephemeral key pair that consists of the private key and the public key corresponding to the elliptic curve E <sub>i</sub> .
<b>(d<sub>S</sub><sup>i</sup>, Q<sub>S</sub><sup>i</sup>)</b>	The server's ephemeral key pair that consists of the private key and the public key corresponding to the elliptic curve E <sub>i</sub> .

#### 4. Cipher Suite Definition

This section defines the following four TLS13\_GOST cipher suites:

- \* CipherSuite TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_KUZNYECHIK\_MGM\_L = {0xC1, 0x03};
- \* CipherSuite TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_MAGMA\_MGM\_L = {0xC1, 0x04};
- \* CipherSuite TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_KUZNYECHIK\_MGM\_S = {0xC1, 0x05};
- \* CipherSuite TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_MAGMA\_MGM\_S = {0xC1, 0x06}.

Each cipher suite specifies a pair consisting of a record protection algorithm (see Section 4.1) and a hash algorithm (Section 4.2).

##### 4.1. Record Protection Algorithm

In accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446], the record protection algorithm translates a TLSPlaintext structure into a TLSCiphertext

structure. If the TLS13\_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the encrypted\_record field of the TLSCiphertext structure MUST be set to the AEADEncrypted value computed as follows:

```
AEADEncrypted = AEAD-Encrypt(sender_record_write_key, nonce,  
    additional_data, plaintext),
```

where

- \* the AEAD-Encrypt function is defined in Section 4.1.1;
- \* the sender\_record\_write\_key is a key derived from sender\_write\_key (see Section 7.3 of [RFC8446]) using the TLSTREE function defined in Section 4.1.2 and sequence number seqnum as follows:

```
sender_record_write_key = TLSTREE(sender_write_key, seqnum);
```

- \* the nonce is a value derived from sequence number seqnum and sender\_write\_iv (see Section 7.3 of [RFC8446]) in accordance with Section 5.3 of [RFC8446];
- \* the additional\_data value is a record header that is generated in accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446];
- \* the plaintext value is the TLSInnerPlaintext structure encoded in accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446].

Note 1: The AEAD-Encrypt function is exactly the same as the AEAD-Encrypt function defined in [RFC8446], such that the key (the first argument) is calculated from sender\_write\_key and sequence number seqnum for each message separately to support the external re-keying approach according to [RFC8645].

Note 2: Sequence number is a value in the range 0-SNMAX, where the SNMAX value is defined in Section 4.1.3. The SNMAX parameter is specified by a particular TLS13\_GOST cipher suite to limit an amount of data that can be encrypted under the same traffic key material (sender\_write\_key, sender\_write\_iv).

The record deprotection algorithm reverses the process of the record protection. In order to decrypt and verify a protected record with sequence number seqnum, the algorithm takes sender\_record\_write\_key as an input, which is derived from sender\_write\_key, nonce, additional\_data, and the AEADEncrypted value. The algorithm outputs the res value that is either plaintext or an error indicating that the decryption failed. If a TLS13\_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the res value MUST be computed as follows:

```
res = AEAD-Decrypt(sender_record_write_key, nonce,  
    additional_data, AEADEncrypted),
```

where the AEAD-Decrypt function is as defined in Section 4.1.1.

Note: The AEAD-Decrypt function is exactly the same as the AEAD-Decrypt function defined in [RFC8446], such that the key (the first argument) is calculated from sender\_write\_key and sequence number

seqnum for each message separately to support the external re-keying approach according to [RFC8645].

#### 4.1.1. AEAD Algorithm

The AEAD-Encrypt and AEAD-Decrypt functions are defined as follows:

<div>AEAD-Encrypt(K, nonce, A, P)</div> <div>Input:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- encryption key K in <math>B_k</math>,</li><li>- unique vector nonce in <math>B_{IVlen}</math>,</li><li>- additional authenticated data A in <math>B_r</math>, <math>r \geq 0</math>,</li><li>- plaintext P in <math>B_t</math>, <math>t \geq 0</math>.</li></ul>Output:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- ciphertext C in <math>B_{\{ P \}}</math>,</li><li>- authentication tag T in <math>B_S</math>.</li></ul></div> <div><ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. <math>MGMnonce = STR\_1(nonce[1] \&amp; 0x7f) \parallel nonce[2..IVlen]</math>;</li><li>2. <math>(MGMnonce, A, C, T) = MGM\text{-}Encrypt(K, MGMnonce, A, P)</math>;</li><li>3. Return <math>C \parallel T</math>.</li></ol></div>
<div>AEAD-Decrypt(K, nonce, A, C   T)</div> <div>Input:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- encryption key K in <math>B_k</math>,</li><li>- unique vector nonce in <math>B_{IVlen}</math>,</li><li>- additional authenticated data A in <math>B_r</math>, <math>r \geq 0</math>,</li><li>- ciphertext C in <math>B_t</math>, <math>t \geq 0</math>,</li><li>- authentication tag T in <math>B_S</math>.</li></ul>Output:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- plaintext P in <math>B_{\{ C \}}</math> or FAIL.</li></ul></div> <div><ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. <math>MGMnonce = STR\_1(nonce[1] \&amp; 0x7f) \parallel nonce[2..IVlen]</math>;</li><li>2. <math>res' = MGM\text{-}Decrypt(K, MGMnonce, A, C, T)</math>;</li><li>3. IF <math>res' = FAIL</math> then return FAIL;</li><li>4. IF <math>res' = (A, P)</math> then return P.</li></ol></div>

where

- \* the MGM-Encrypt and MGM-Decrypt functions are defined in [RFC9058];
- \* the length of authentication tag T is equal to n bytes ( $S = n$ );
- \* the length of the nonce parameter is equal to n bytes ( $IVlen = n$ ).

Cipher suites TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_KUZNYECHIK\_MGM\_L and TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_KUZNYECHIK\_MGM\_S MUST use Kuznyechik [RFC7801] as a base block cipher for the AEAD algorithm. The block length n is 16 bytes ( $n = 16$ ) and the key length k is 32 bytes ( $k = 32$ ).

Cipher suites TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_MAGMA\_MGM\_L and TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_MAGMA\_MGM\_S MUST use Magma [RFC8891] as a base block cipher for the AEAD algorithm. The block length  $n$  is 8 bytes ( $n = 8$ ) and the key length  $k$  is 32 bytes ( $k = 32$ ).

#### 4.1.2. TLSTREE

The TLS13\_GOST cipher suites use the TLSTREE function to support the external re-keying approach (see [RFC8645]). The TLSTREE function is defined as follows:

$$\text{TLSTREE}(K_{\text{root}}, i) = \text{KDF}_3(\text{KDF}_2(\text{KDF}_1(K_{\text{root}}, \text{STR}_8(i \& C_1)), \text{STR}_8(i \& C_2)), \text{STR}_8(i \& C_3)),$$

where

- \*  $K_{\text{root}}$  in  $B_{32}$ ;
- \*  $i$  in  $\{0, 1, \dots, 2^{64} - 1\}$ ;
- \*  $\text{KDF}_j(K, D)$ ,  $j = 1, 2, 3$ , is the key derivation function defined as follows:
  - $\text{KDF}_1(K, D) = \text{KDF\_GOSTR3411\_2012\_256}(K, \text{"level1"}, D)$ ,
  - $\text{KDF}_2(K, D) = \text{KDF\_GOSTR3411\_2012\_256}(K, \text{"level2"}, D)$ ,
  - $\text{KDF}_3(K, D) = \text{KDF\_GOSTR3411\_2012\_256}(K, \text{"level3"}, D)$ ,
 where the  $\text{KDF\_GOSTR3411\_2012\_256}$  function is defined in [RFC7836],  $K$  in  $B_{32}$ ,  $D$  in  $B_8$ ;
- \*  $C_1, C_2, C_3$  are the constants defined by each cipher suite as follows:

CipherSuites	$C_1, C_2, C_3$
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L	$C_1 = 0xf800000000000000$ $C_2 = 0xffffffff00000000$ $C_3 = 0xfffffffffffffffe000$
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L	$C_1 = 0xffe0000000000000$ $C_2 = 0xffffffffffc0000000$ $C_3 = 0xffffffffffffffff80$
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S	$C_1 = 0xfffffffffe0000000$ $C_2 = 0xffffffffffffff0000$ $C_3 = 0xffffffffffffffff8$



TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S	C_1=0xffffffffffc000000
	C_2=0xffffffffffffe000
	C_3=0xffffffffffffffff

Table 1

#### 4.1.3. SNMAX Parameter

The SNMAX parameter is the maximum number of records encrypted under the same traffic key material (sender\_write\_key and sender\_write\_iv) and is defined by each cipher suite as follows:

CipherSuites	SNMAX
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L	SNMAX = $2^{64} - 1$
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L	SNMAX = $2^{64} - 1$
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S	SNMAX = $2^{42} - 1$
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S	SNMAX = $2^{39} - 1$

Table 2

#### 4.2. Hash Algorithm

The Hash algorithm is used for the key derivation process (see Section 7.1 of [RFC8446]), Finished message calculation (see Section 4.4.4 of [RFC8446]), Transcript-Hash function computation (see Section 4.4.1 of [RFC8446]), Pre-Shared Key (PSK) binder value calculation (see Section 4.2.11.2 of [RFC8446]), external re-keying approach (see Section 4.1.2), and other purposes.

If a TLS13\_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the Hash algorithm MUST be the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash algorithm [RFC6986] with a 32-byte (256-bit) hash value.

#### 5. Signature Scheme Definition

This section defines the following seven TLS13\_GOST signature schemes:

```
enum {
    gostr34102012_256a(0x0709),
    gostr34102012_256b(0x070A),
    gostr34102012_256c(0x070B),
    gostr34102012_256d(0x070C),
    gostr34102012_512a(0x070D),
    gostr34102012_512b(0x070E),
    gostr34102012_512c(0x070F)
```

```
} SignatureScheme;
```

One of the TLS13\_GOST signature schemes listed above SHOULD be used with the TLS13\_GOST profile.

Each signature scheme specifies a pair consisting of the signature algorithm (see Section 5.1) and the elliptic curve (see Section 5.2). The procedure to calculate the signature value using TLS13\_GOST signature schemes is defined in Section 5.3.

## 5.1. Signature Algorithm

Signature algorithms corresponding to the TLS13\_GOST signature schemes are defined as follows:

SignatureScheme Value	Signature Algorithm	References
gostr34102012_256a	GOST R 34.10-2012, 32-byte key length	RFC 7091
gostr34102012_256b	GOST R 34.10-2012, 32-byte key length	RFC 7091
gostr34102012_256c	GOST R 34.10-2012, 32-byte key length	RFC 7091
gostr34102012_256d	GOST R 34.10-2012, 32-byte key length	RFC 7091
gostr34102012_512a	GOST R 34.10-2012, 64-byte key length	RFC 7091
gostr34102012_512b	GOST R 34.10-2012, 64-byte key length	RFC 7091
gostr34102012_512c	GOST R 34.10-2012, 64-byte key length	RFC 7091

Table 3

## 5.2. Elliptic Curve

Elliptic curves corresponding to the TLS13\_GOST signature schemes are defined as follows:

SignatureScheme Value	Curve Identifier Value	References
gostr34102012_256a	id-tc26-gost- 3410-2012-256-paramSetA	RFC 7836
gostr34102012_256b	id-GostR3410-2001- CryptoPro-A-ParamSet	RFC 4357

gostr34102012_256c	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet	RFC 4357
gostr34102012_256d	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet	RFC 4357
gostr34102012_512a	id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA	RFC 7836
gostr34102012_512b	id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB	RFC 7836
gostr34102012_512c	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC	RFC 7836

Table 4

### 5.3. SIGN Function

If the TLS13\_GOST signature scheme is used, the signature value in the CertificateVerify message (see Section 6.3.4) MUST be calculated using the SIGN function defined as follows:

SIGN(d_sign, M)
Input: - the sign key d_sign: $0 < d\_sign < q$ ; - the byte string M in $B^*$ . Output: - signature value sgn in $B_{\{2 \times l\}}$ .
1. $(r, s) = \text{SIGNGOST}(d\_sign, M)$ 2. Return $\text{str}_l(r) \parallel \text{str}_l(s)$ .

where

- \*  $q$  is the subgroup order of the group of points of the elliptic curve;
- \*  $l$  is defined as follows:
  - $l = 32$  for the gostr34102012\_256a, gostr34102012\_256b, gostr34102012\_256c, and gostr34102012\_256d signature schemes;
  - $l = 64$  for the gostr34102012\_512a, gostr34102012\_512b, and gostr34102012\_512c signature schemes;
- \* SIGNGOST is an algorithm that takes a private key d\_sign and a message M as an input and returns a pair of integers (r, s) that is calculated during the signature generation process in accordance with the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm (see Section 6.1 of [RFC7091]).

**Note:** The signature value `sgn` is the concatenation of two strings that are byte representations of `r` and `s` values in the little-endian format.

## 6. Key Exchange and Authentication

The key exchange and authentication process for using the TLS13\_GOST profile is defined in Sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.

### 6.1. Key Exchange

The TLS13\_GOST profile supports three basic key exchange modes that are defined in [RFC8446]: Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE), PSK-only, and PSK with ECDHE.

**Note:** In accordance with [RFC8446], TLS 1.3 also supports key exchange modes based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol over finite fields. However, the TLS13\_GOST profile **MUST** use modes based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves.

In accordance with [RFC8446], PSKs can be divided into two types:

- \* internal PSKs that can be established during the previous connection;
- \* external PSKs that can be established out of band.

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, PSK-only key exchange mode **SHOULD** be established via the internal PSKs, and external PSKs **SHOULD** be used only in PSK with ECDHE mode (see more in Section 9).

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used and ECDHE or PSK with ECDHE key exchange mode is used, the ECDHE shared secret **SHOULD** be calculated in accordance with Section 6.1.1 on the basis of one of the elliptic curves defined in Section 6.1.2.

#### 6.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, the ECDHE shared secret **SHOULD** be calculated in accordance with Sections 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2. The public ephemeral keys used to obtain the ECDHE shared secret **SHOULD** be represented in the format described in Section 6.1.1.3.

##### 6.1.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on the Client Side

The client calculates the ECDHE shared secret in accordance with the following steps:

- Step 1. The client chooses from all supported curves  $E_1, \dots, E_R$  the set of curves  $E_{\{i_1\}}, \dots, E_{\{i_r\}}$ ,  $1 \leq i_1 \leq i_r \leq R$ , where
- \*  $r \geq 1$  in the case of the first ClientHello message;
  - \*  $r = 1$  in the case of responding to the HelloRetryRequest message;  $E_{\{i_1\}}$  corresponds to the curve indicated in

the "key\_share" extension in the HelloRetryRequest message.

Step 2. The client generates ephemeral key pairs  $(d_C^{\{i_1\}}, Q_C^{\{i_1\}}), \dots, (d_C^{\{i_r\}}, Q_C^{\{i_r\}})$  corresponding to the curves  $E_{\{i_1\}}, \dots, E_{\{i_r\}}$ , where for each  $i$  in  $\{i_1, \dots, i_r\}$ :

- \*  $d_C^i$  is chosen from  $\{1, \dots, q_i - 1\}$  at random;
- \*  $Q_C^i = d_C^i * P_i$ .

Step 3. The client sends the ClientHello message specified in accordance with Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446] and Section 6.3.1 that contains:

- \* "key\_share" extension with public ephemeral keys  $Q_C^{\{i_1\}}, \dots, Q_C^{\{i_r\}}$  built in accordance with Section 4.2.8 of [RFC8446];
- \* "supported\_groups" extension with supported curves  $E_1, \dots, E_R$  built in accordance with Section 4.2.7 of [RFC8446].

Note: The client MAY send an empty "key\_share" extension in the first ClientHello message to request a group selection from the server in the HelloRetryRequest message and to generate an ephemeral key for the selected group only. The ECDHE shared secret may be calculated without sending HelloRetryRequest message if the "key\_share" extension in the first ClientHello message contains the value corresponding to the curve that is selected by the server.

Step 4. If the HelloRetryRequest message is received, the client MUST return to Step 1 and choose correct parameters in accordance with Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446]. If the ServerHello message is received, the client proceeds to the next step. In other cases, the client MUST terminate the connection with the "unexpected\_message" alert.

Step 5. The client extracts curve  $E_{res}$  and ephemeral key  $Q_S^{res}$ ,  $res$  in  $\{1, \dots, R\}$ , from the ServerHello message and checks whether  $Q_S^{res}$  belongs to  $E_{res}$ . If this check fails, the client MUST terminate the connection with "handshake\_failure" alert.

Step 6. The client generates  $Q^{ECDHE}$ :

$$Q^{ECDHE} = (X^{ECDHE}, Y^{ECDHE}) = (h_{res} * d_C^{res}) * Q_S^{res}.$$

Step 7. The client MUST check whether the calculated shared secret  $Q^{ECDHE}$  is not equal to the zero point  $0_{res}$ . If this check fails, the client MUST terminate the connection with "handshake\_failure" alert.

Step 8. The ECDHE shared secret is the byte representation of the coordinate  $X^{ECDHE}$  of the point  $Q^{ECDHE}$  in the little-endian format:

$ECDHE = \text{str}_{\{\text{coordinate\_length}\}}(X^{ECDHE}),$

where the `coordinate_length` value is defined by the particular elliptic curve (see Section 6.1.2).

#### 6.1.1.2. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on Server Side

Upon receiving the `ClientHello` message, the server calculates the ECDHE shared secret in accordance with the following steps:

Step 1. The server chooses the curve  $E_{res}$ ,  $res$  in  $\{1, \dots, R\}$ , from the list of the curves  $E_1, \dots, E_R$  indicated in the "supported\_groups" extension in the `ClientHello` message and the corresponding public ephemeral key  $Q_C^{res}$  from the list  $Q_C^{\{i_1\}}, \dots, Q_C^{\{i_r\}}$ ,  $1 \leq i_1 \leq i_r \leq R$ , indicated in the "key\_share" extension. If the corresponding public ephemeral key is not found ( $res$  in  $\{1, \dots, R\} \setminus \{i_1, \dots, i_r\}$ ), the server MUST send the `HelloRetryRequest` message with the "key\_share" extension indicating the selected elliptic curve  $E_{res}$  and wait for the new `ClientHello` message.

Step 2. The server checks whether  $Q_C^{res}$  belongs to  $E_{res}$ . If this check fails, the server MUST terminate the connection with "handshake\_failure" alert.

Step 3. The server generates ephemeral key pair  $(d_S^{res}, Q_S^{res})$  corresponding to  $E_{res}$ :

\*  $d_S^{res}$  is chosen from  $\{1, \dots, q_{res} - 1\}$  at random;

\*  $Q_S^{res} = d_S^{res} * P_{res}$ .

Step 4. The server sends the `ServerHello` message generated in accordance with Section 4.1.3 of [RFC8446] and Section 6.3.1 with the "key\_share" extension that contains public ephemeral key  $Q_S^{res}$  corresponding to  $E_{res}$ .

Step 5. The server generates  $Q^{ECDHE}$ :

$Q^{ECDHE} = (X^{ECDHE}, Y^{ECDHE}) = (h_{res} * d_S^{res}) * Q_C^{res}.$

Step 6. The server MUST check whether the calculated shared secret  $Q^{ECDHE}$  is not equal to the zero point  $O_{res}$ . If this check fails, the server MUST abort the handshake with "handshake\_failure" alert.

Step 7. The ECDHE shared secret is the byte representation of the coordinate  $X^{ECDHE}$  of the point  $Q^{ECDHE}$  in the little-endian format:

`ECDHE = str_{coordinate_length}(X^ECDHE),`

where the `coordinate_length` value is defined by the particular elliptic curve (see Section 6.1.2).

### 6.1.1.3. Public Ephemeral Key Representation

This section defines the representation format of the public ephemeral keys generated during the ECDHE shared secret calculation (see Sections 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2).

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used and ECDHE or PSK with ECDHE key exchange mode is used, the public ephemeral key `Q` indicated in the `KeyShareEntry.key_exchange` field MUST contain the data defined by the following structure:

```
struct {  
    opaque X[coordinate_length];  
    opaque Y[coordinate_length];  
} PlainPointRepresentation;
```

where `X` and `Y`, respectively, contain the byte representations of `x` and `y` values of the point `Q` ( $Q = (x, y)$ ) in the little-endian format and are specified as follows:

\* `X = str_{coordinate_length}(x);`

\* `Y = str_{coordinate_length}(y).`

The `coordinate_length` value is defined by the particular elliptic curve (see Section 6.1.2).

### 6.1.2. Values for the TLS Supported Groups Registry

The "supported\_groups" extension is used to indicate the set of the elliptic curves supported by an endpoint and is defined in Section 4.2.7 of [RFC8446]. This extension is always contained in the `ClientHello` message and optionally in the `EncryptedExtensions` message.

This section defines the following seven elliptic curves:

```
enum {  
    GC256A(0x22), GC256B(0x23), GC256C(0x24), GC256D(0x25),  
    GC512A(0x26), GC512B(0x27), GC512C(0x28)  
} NamedGroup;
```

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used and ECDHE or PSK with ECDHE key exchange mode is used, one of the elliptic curves listed above SHOULD be used.

Each curve corresponds to the particular identifier and specifies the value of `coordinate_length` parameter (see "cl" column) as follows:

+=====+=====+=====+=====+

Description	Curve Identifier Value	cl	Reference
GC256A	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA	32	RFC 7836
GC256B	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet	32	RFC 4357
GC256C	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet	32	RFC 4357
GC256D	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet	32	RFC 4357
GC512A	id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA	64	RFC 7836
GC512B	id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB	64	RFC 7836
GC512C	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC	64	RFC 7836

Table 5

Note: The identifier values and the corresponding elliptic curves are the same as in [RFC9189].

## 6.2. Authentication

In accordance with [RFC8446], authentication can be performed via a signature with a certificate or via a symmetric PSK. The server side is always authenticated; the client side is optionally authenticated.

PSK-based authentication is performed as a side effect of key exchange. If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, external PSKs SHOULD be combined only with mutual authentication (see Section 9).

Certificate-based authentication is performed via Authentication messages and an optional CertificateRequest message (sent if client authentication is required). If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, the signature schemes used for certificate-based authentication are defined in Section 5 and Authentication messages are specified in Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4. The CertificateRequest message is specified in Section 6.3.2.

## 6.3. Handshake Messages

The TLS13\_GOST profile specifies the ClientHello, ServerHello, CertificateRequest, Certificate and CertificateVerify handshake messages that are described in further detail below.

### 6.3.1. Hello Messages

The ClientHello message is sent when the client first connects to the server or responds to the HelloRetryRequest message and is specified in accordance with Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446].

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, the ClientHello message MUST meet the following requirements:

- \* The ClientHello.cipher\_suites field MUST contain the values



defined in Section 4.

- \* If server authentication via a certificate is required, the extension\_data field of the "signature\_algorithms" extension MUST contain the values defined in Section 5 that correspond to the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm.
- \* If server authentication via a certificate is required and the client uses optional "signature\_algorithms\_cert" extension, the extension\_data field of this extension SHOULD contain the values defined in Section 5 that correspond to the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm.
- \* If the client wants to establish a TLS 1.3 connection using the ECDHE shared secret, the extension\_data field of the "supported\_groups" extension MUST contain the elliptic curve identifiers defined in Section 6.1.2.

The ServerHello message is sent by the server in response to the ClientHello message to negotiate an acceptable set of handshake parameters based on the ClientHello message and is specified in accordance with Section 4.1.3 of [RFC8446].

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, the ServerHello message MUST meet the following requirements:

- \* The ServerHello.cipher\_suite field MUST contain one of the values defined in Section 4.
- \* If the server decides to establish a TLS 1.3 connection using the ECDHE shared secret, the extension\_data field of the "key\_share" extension MUST contain the elliptic curve identifier and the public ephemeral key that satisfy the following conditions:
  - The elliptic curve identifier corresponds to the value that was indicated in the "supported\_groups" and the "key\_share" extensions in the ClientHello message.
  - The elliptic curve identifier is one of the values defined in Section 6.1.2.
  - The public ephemeral key corresponds to the elliptic curve specified by the KeyShareEntry.group identifier.

#### 6.3.2. CertificateRequest

This message is sent when the server requests client authentication via a certificate and is specified in accordance with Section 4.3.2 of [RFC8446].

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, the CertificateRequest message MUST meet the following requirements:

- \* The extension\_data field of the "signature\_algorithms" extension MUST contain only the values defined in Section 5.

- \* If the server uses optional "signature\_algorithms\_cert" extension, the extension\_data field of this extension SHOULD contain only the values defined in Section 5.

### 6.3.3. Certificate

This message is sent to convey the endpoint's certificate chain to the peer and is specified in accordance with Section 4.4.2 of [RFC8446].

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, the Certificate message MUST meet the following requirements.

- \* Each endpoint's certificate provided to the peer MUST be signed using the algorithm that corresponds to a signature scheme indicated by the peer in its "signature\_algorithms\_cert" extension, if present (or in the "signature\_algorithms" extension, otherwise).
- \* The signature algorithm used for signing certificates SHOULD correspond to one of the signature schemes defined in Section 5.

### 6.3.4. CertificateVerify

This message is sent to provide explicit proof that the endpoint has the private key corresponding to the public key indicated in its certificate and is specified in accordance with Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446].

If the TLS13\_GOST profile is used, the CertificateVerify message MUST meet the following requirements:

- \* The CertificateVerify.algorithm field MUST contain the signature scheme identifier that corresponds to the value indicated in the peer's "signature\_algorithms" extension and is one of the values defined in Section 5.
- \* The CertificateVerify.signature field contains the sgn value that is computed as follows:

$$\text{sgn} = \text{SIGN}(\text{d\_sign}, M),$$

where

- the SIGN function is defined in Section 5.3;
- d\_sign is the sender's long-term private key that corresponds to the sender's long-term public key Q\_sign from the sender's certificate;
- the message M is defined in accordance with Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446].

## 7. IANA Considerations

IANA has added the following values to the "TLS Cipher Suites"

registry with a reference to this RFC:

Value	Description	DTLS-OK	Recommended
0xC1, 0x03	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L	N	N
0xC1, 0x04	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L	N	N
0xC1, 0x05	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S	N	N
0xC1, 0x06	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S	N	N

Table 6

IANA has added the following values to the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry with a reference to this RFC:

Value	Description	Recommended
0x0709	gostr34102012_256a	N
0x070A	gostr34102012_256b	N
0x070B	gostr34102012_256c	N
0x070C	gostr34102012_256d	N
0x070D	gostr34102012_512a	N
0x070E	gostr34102012_512b	N
0x070F	gostr34102012_512c	N

Table 7

## 8. Historical Considerations

In addition to the curve identifier values listed in Table 5, there are some additional identifier values that correspond to the signature schemes for historical reasons. They are as follows:

Description	Curve Identifier Value
gostr34102012_256b	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet, id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB
gostr34102012_256c	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC

gostr34102012_256d	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet, id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD
--------------------	--

Table 8

The client should be prepared to handle any of them correctly if the corresponding signature scheme is included in the "signature\_algorithms" or "signature\_algorithms\_cert" extensions.

## 9. Security Considerations

In order to create an efficient and side-channel resistant implementation while using the TLSTREE algorithm, the functions KDF\_j, j = 1, 2, 3, SHOULD be called only when necessary (when the record sequence number seqnum reaches such a value that seqnum & C\_j != (seqnum - 1) & C\_j). Otherwise, the previous value should be used.

## 10. References

### 10.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
- [RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012: Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August 2013, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>>.
- [RFC7091] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.10-2012: Digital Signature Algorithm", RFC 7091, DOI 10.17487/RFC7091, December 2013, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7091>>.
- [RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher "Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>>.
- [RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V., Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012", RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>>.
- [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>>.
- [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>>.

- [RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>>.
- [RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891, September 2020, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>>.
- [RFC9058] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Nozdrunov, V., Shishkin, V., and E. Griboedova, "Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)", RFC 9058, DOI 10.17487/RFC9058, June 2021, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9058>>.
- [RFC9189] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Belyavsky, D., and E. Alekseev, "GOST Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 9189, DOI 10.17487/RFC9189, March 2022, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9189>>.

## 10.2. Informative References

- [RFC8446BIS] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-05, 24 October 2022, <<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-05>>.

## Appendix A. Test Examples

### A.1. Example 1

#### A.1.1. Test Case

Test examples are given for the following instance of the TLS13\_GOST profile:

1. Full TLS Handshake is used.
2. ECDHE key exchange mode is used. The elliptic curve GC512C is used for ECDHE shared secret calculation.
3. Authentication is only used on the server side. The signature scheme gost34102012\_256b is used.
4. TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_KUZNYECHIK\_MGM\_S cipher suite is negotiated.
5. Application Data is sent by the server prior to receiving the Finished message from the client.
6. NewSessionTicket is sent after establishing a secure connection.
7. Nine Application Data records are sent during the operation of the Record protocol. The sequence numbers are selected to demonstrate the operation of the TLSTREE function.

8. Alert protocol is used for closure of the connection.

#### A.1.2. Test Examples

-----Client-----

ClientHello message:

```
msg_type:      01
length:        0000DE
body:
  legacy_version: 0303
  random:         03030303030303030303030303030303
                03030303030303030303030303030303

  legacy_session_id:
    length:      00
    vector:      --

  cipher_suites:
    length:      0002
    vector:
      CipherSuite: C105

  compression_methods:
    length:      01
    vector:
      CompressionMethod: 00

  extensions:
    length:      00B3
    vector:
      Extension: /* supported_groups */
        extension_type: 000A
        extension_data:
          length:      0004
          vector:
            named_group_list:
              length:    0002
              vector:
                /* GC512C */
                0028
      Extension: /* signature_algorithms */
        extension_type: 000D
        extension_data:
          length:      0010
          vector:
            supported_signature_algorithms:
              length:    000E
              vector:
                /* gost34102012256a */
                0709
                /* gost34102012256b */
                070A
                /* gost34102012256c */
                070B
                /* gost34102012256d */
                070C
                /* gost34102012512a */
                070D
```

```

        /* gost34102012512b */
        070E
        /* gost34102012512c */
        070F
Extension: /* supported_versions */
extension_type: 002B
extension_data:
    length: 0003
    vector:
        versions:
            length: 02
            vector:
                0304
Extension: /* psk_key_exchange_modes */
extension_type: 002D
extension_data:
    length: 0002
    vector:
        ke_modes:
            length: 01
            vector:
                /* psk_ke */
                00
Extension: /* key_share */
extension_type: 0033
extension_data:
    length: 0086
    vector:
        length: 0084
        vector:
            group: 0028
            key_exchange:
                length: 0080
                vector:
                    05EEBDF3DDC1D2F5F3822433241284E7
                    7641487938EA88721F26203E9792B5CB
                    97EB70EF02E8F72B7491D4F2CFDC332A
                    DF7F1778E854A88DDC2113FEC527A151
                    71A04CB0C573793A7AEF9BBCA486B6B0
                    46B2149B46F4332903E5B7C438ADD05E
                    185EFBF45557475A8CCBF6ACED1A2EB4
                    16F916729D7CEF9CBD8334989304AFAE

```

```

0000: 01 00 00 DE 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
0010: 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
0020: 03 03 03 03 03 03 00 00 02 C1 05 01 00 00 B3 00
0030: 0A 00 04 00 02 00 28 00 0D 00 10 00 0E 07 09 07
0040: 0A 07 0B 07 0C 07 0D 07 0E 07 0F 00 2B 00 03 02
0050: 03 04 00 2D 00 02 01 00 00 33 00 86 00 84 00 28
0060: 00 80 05 EE BD F3 DD C1 D2 F5 F3 82 24 33 24 12
0070: 84 E7 76 41 48 79 38 EA 88 72 1F 26 20 3E 97 92
0080: B5 CB 97 EB 70 EF 02 E8 F7 2B 74 91 D4 F2 CF DC
0090: 33 2A DF 7F 17 78 E8 54 A8 8D DC 21 13 FE C5 27
00A0: A1 51 71 A0 4C B0 C5 73 79 3A 7A EF 9B BC A4 86
00B0: B6 B0 46 B2 14 9B 46 F4 33 29 03 E5 B7 C4 38 AD
00C0: D0 5E 18 5E FB F4 55 57 47 5A 8C CB F6 AC ED 1A

```





```

extensions:
  length: 008E
  vector:
    Extension: /* supported_versions */
      extension_type: 002B
      extension_data:
        length: 0002
        vector:
          selected_version:
            0304
      Extension: /* key_share */
        extension_type: 0033
        extension_data:
          length: 0084
          vector:
            group: 0028
            key_exchange:
              length: 0080
              vector:
                2F3C663FE74735A1C421160DF0F43266
                185FD30B6E5D6E88FC4061FAEACAB338
                B10A1BD20CB0B4EE757E74A0027D409F
                E937F01633A1E3F9A5518DEFD0F89F9D
                3D9F6CC651413DEC2C74366D83C47EE1
                DE4E421F65CD1163E94EA0C2E19ED45D
                35558B937D9BFDC5ECC2B2A21B4EC3D5
                3B29579A8FD5E074811028FBCF17994F

```

00000:	02	00	00	B6	03	03	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
00010:	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
00020:	83	83	83	83	83	83	00	C1	05	00	00	8E	00	2B	00
00030:	03	04	00	33	00	84	00	28	00	80	2F	3C	66	3F	E7
00040:	35	A1	C4	21	16	0D	F0	F4	32	66	18	5F	D3	0B	6E
00050:	6E	88	FC	40	61	FA	EA	CA	B3	38	B1	0A	1B	D2	0C
00060:	B4	EE	75	7E	74	A0	02	7D	40	9F	E9	37	F0	16	33
00070:	E3	F9	A5	51	8D	EF	D0	F8	9F	9D	3D	9F	6C	C6	51
00080:	3D	EC	2C	74	36	6D	83	C4	7E	E1	DE	4E	42	1F	65
00090:	11	63	E9	4E	A0	C2	E1	9E	D4	5D	35	55	8B	93	7D
000A0:	FD	C5	EC	C2	B2	A2	1B	4E	C3	D5	3B	29	57	9A	8F
000B0:	E0	74	81	10	28	FB	CF	17	99	4F					

[illegible]

E074811028FBCF17994F

```
00000: 16 03 03 00 BA 02 00 00 B6 03 03 83 83 83 83 83
00010: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
00020: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 00 C1 05 00 00
00030: 8E 00 2B 00 02 03 04 00 33 00 84 00 28 00 80 2F
00040: 3C 66 3F E7 47 35 A1 C4 21 16 0D F0 F4 32 66 18
00050: 5F D3 0B 6E 5D 6E 88 FC 40 61 FA EA CA B3 38 B1
00060: 0A 1B D2 0C B0 B4 EE 75 7E 74 A0 02 7D 40 9F E9
00070: 37 F0 16 33 A1 E3 F9 A5 51 8D EF D0 F8 9F 9D 3D
00080: 9F 6C C6 51 41 3D EC 2C 74 36 6D 83 C4 7E E1 DE
00090: 4E 42 1F 65 CD 11 63 E9 4E A0 C2 E1 9E D4 5D 35
000A0: 55 8B 93 7D 9B FD C5 EC C2 B2 A2 1B 4E C3 D5 3B
000B0: 29 57 9A 8F D5 E0 74 81 10 28 FB CF 17 99 4F
```

-----Client-----

d\_C^res:

```
00000: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04
00010: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04
00020: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04
00030: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04
```

Q\_S^res:

```
00000: 2F 3C 66 3F E7 47 35 A1 C4 21 16 0D F0 F4 32 66
00010: 18 5F D3 0B 6E 5D 6E 88 FC 40 61 FA EA CA B3 38
00020: B1 0A 1B D2 0C B0 B4 EE 75 7E 74 A0 02 7D 40 9F
00030: E9 37 F0 16 33 A1 E3 F9 A5 51 8D EF D0 F8 9F 9D
00040: 3D 9F 6C C6 51 41 3D EC 2C 74 36 6D 83 C4 7E E1
00050: DE 4E 42 1F 65 CD 11 63 E9 4E A0 C2 E1 9E D4 5D
00060: 35 55 8B 93 7D 9B FD C5 EC C2 B2 A2 1B 4E C3 D5
00070: 3B 29 57 9A 8F D5 E0 74 81 10 28 FB CF 17 99 4F
```

ECDHE:

```
00000: 4D E6 0D 21 EA 8F B9 22 0D 14 64 23 B4 90 DA 40
00010: CC EB C4 3B C5 89 DB 79 B8 31 A4 7D 6B 06 30 07
00020: DD 03 40 5A 1B 79 76 B6 23 DC AA 69 B0 11 AE 10
00030: 6E 7E 41 74 38 5F 86 26 E1 21 B5 99 43 63 C9 9F
```

-----Server-----

d\_S^res:

```
00000: AA 3C A4 F4 A5 0A C0 5B 37 42 B1 35 B5 30 A9 F2
00010: 2A E4 F5 E1 85 30 1D EC 83 2E 77 BA 3B CD 6A F1
00020: 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
00030: 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 04
```

Q\_C^res:

```
00000: 05 EE BD F3 DD C1 D2 F5 F3 82 24 33 24 12 84 E7
00010: 76 41 48 79 38 EA 88 72 1F 26 20 3E 97 92 B5 CB
00020: 97 EB 70 EF 02 E8 F7 2B 74 91 D4 F2 CF DC 33 2A
00030: DF 7F 17 78 E8 54 A8 8D DC 21 13 FE C5 27 A1 51
00040: 71 A0 4C B0 C5 73 79 3A 7A EF 9B BC A4 86 B6 B0
00050: 46 B2 14 9B 46 F4 33 29 03 E5 B7 C4 38 AD D0 5E
00060: 18 5E FB F4 55 57 47 5A 8C CB F6 AC ED 1A 2E B4
00070: 16 F9 16 72 9D 7C EF 9C BD 83 34 98 93 04 AF AE
```

ECDHE:  
00000: 4D E6 0D 21 EA 8F B9 22 0D 14 64 23 B4 90 DA 40  
00010: CC EB C4 3B C5 89 DB 79 B8 31 A4 7D 6B 06 30 07  
00020: DD 03 40 5A 1B 79 76 B6 23 DC AA 69 B0 11 AE 10  
00030: 6E 7E 41 74 38 5F 86 26 E1 21 B5 99 43 63 C9 9F

-----Server-----

EncryptedExtensions message:

msg\_type: 08  
length: 000002  
body:  
  extensions:  
    length: 0000  
    vector: --

00000: 08 00 00 02 00 00

Record payload protection:

EarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0<sup>256</sup>, IKM: 0<sup>256</sup>):

00000: FB DE FB E5 27 FE EA 66 5A AB 92 77 A2 16 3B 83  
00010: 43 08 4F D1 91 C4 60 66 26 0F AC 6F D1 43 6C 72

Derived #0 = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "derived", "") =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "derived", "", 32):

00000: DB C3 C8 26 D8 77 A3 B7 D2 D2 45 3D BF DC 6C FB  
00010: FB 11 51 B3 E8 4F 0C 8F 26 01 1D 8D 5B F3 ED F7

HandshakeSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #0, IKM: ECDHE):

00000: 44 24 5E 2C 43 32 D1 F7 8B 0F 8D 16 F4 03 EB 69  
00010: ED 2A 40 53 84 7C DC 39 FA 8B 3D 29 74 F7 45 E7

HM1 = (ClientHello, ServerHello)

TH1 = Transcript-Hash(HM1):

00000: 99 3B A7 22 12 4A F3 CB FD 47 71 E7 FA E3 2A C1  
00010: D0 E9 27 8C F7 84 3F CB C6 20 E1 A0 08 5A 87 A1

server\_handshake\_traffic\_secret (SHTS):

SHTS = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "s hs traffic", HM1) =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "s hs traffic", TH1, 32):

00000: 70 A5 F2 46 3D F6 0D BA A2 36 8B 67 FD 45 AE FF  
00010: 7C 1A 0B A4 2D 8A BD 72 41 5E CD 1D 94 E9 EF 54

server\_write\_key\_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "key", "", 32):

00000: E1 37 64 B5 4B 9E 1B 47 D4 33 98 D6 D2 16 DF 24  
00010: C2 89 A3 96 AB 6C 5B 52 4B BB 9C 06 F3 9F EF 01

server\_write\_iv\_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "iv", "", 16):

00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0E

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_hs, 0):

00000: 56 EE 18 13 72 72 49 C9 DC DF 35 13 78 7E DB 93  
00010: DF 62 C6 1E E7 B1 26 C5 0F 26 C0 AA AF AE 00 E1

seqnum:  
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

nonce:  
00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0E

additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 17

TLSInnerPlaintext:  
00000: 08 00 00 02 00 00 16

TLSCiphertext:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 17 94 0E 5D 2C 75 3A E5 FE BD 20 01  
00010: 2C C9 E3 EB 24 A3 79 84 1E 02 AB BE

Record layer message:  
type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 0017  
encrypted\_record: 940E5D2C753AE5FEBD20012CC9E3EB24  
A379841E02ABBE

00000: 17 03 03 00 17 94 0E 5D 2C 75 3A E5 FE BD 20 01  
00010: 2C C9 E3 EB 24 A3 79 84 1E 02 AB BE

-----Server-----

Certificate message:  
msg\_type: 0B  
length: 000151  
body:  
  certificate\_request\_context:  
    length: 00  
    vector: --  
  certificate\_list:  
    length: 00014D  
    vector:  
      ASN.1Cert:  
        length: 000148  
        vector: 308201443081F2A00302010202023039  
                 300A06082A85030701010302301B3119  
                 301706035504031310676F73742E6578  
                 616D706C652E636F6D301E170D323030  
                 32323831313038333375A170D33303032  
                 323531313038333375A301B3119301706  
                 035504031310676F73742E6578616D70  
                 6C652E636F6D305E301706082A850307  
                 01010101300B06092A85030701020101  
                 020343000440F383CEE83048B4EB14C7  
                 1A7F6DE44A37CE11A6AC1750F1CFB8DA  
                 D8A38CCDD8FD06656F7CFC075F4083C3  
                 716221478F1EE24C6B1B70CCE3C72AFD  
                 2ACE65C775BCA321301F301D0603551D  
                 0E04160414F330FA7166DF095AF3A073

BC3B8EA356D7DFAC71300A06082A8503  
0701010302034100AB2EDA23F49B4862  
3B0CFF5906B7DD3C23B473570B296A08  
71DD15EF9A33201B97904A5CFA6C931C  
5473DC0C5A5F2FBB2E50CF587AE27C4D  
8E52EB80189DD08B

extensions:  
length: 0000  
vector: --

```
00000: 0B 00 01 51 00 00 01 4D 00 01 48 30 82 01 44 30
00010: 81 F2 A0 03 02 01 02 02 02 30 39 30 0A 06 08 2A
00020: 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55
00030: 04 03 13 10 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65
00040: 2E 63 6F 6D 30 1E 17 0D 32 30 30 32 32 38 31 31
00050: 30 38 33 37 5A 17 0D 33 30 30 32 32 35 31 31 30
00060: 38 33 37 5A 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 13
00070: 10 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 2E 63 6F
00080: 6D 30 5E 30 17 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30
00090: 0B 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 01 02 03 43 00 04
000A0: 40 F3 83 CE E8 30 48 B4 EB 14 C7 1A 7F 6D E4 4A
000B0: 37 CE 11 A6 AC 17 50 F1 CF B8 DA D8 A3 8C CD D8
000C0: FD 06 65 6F 7C FC 07 5F 40 83 C3 71 62 21 47 8F
000D0: 1E E2 4C 6B 1B 70 CC E3 C7 2A FD 2A CE 65 C7 75
000E0: BC A3 21 30 1F 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14
000F0: F3 30 FA 71 66 DF 09 5A F3 A0 73 BC 3B 8E A3 56
00100: D7 DF AC 71 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02
00110: 03 41 00 AB 2E DA 23 F4 9B 48 62 3B 0C FF 59 06
00120: B7 DD 3C 23 B4 73 57 0B 29 6A 08 71 DD 15 EF 9A
00130: 33 20 1B 97 90 4A 5C FA 6C 93 1C 54 73 DC 0C 5A
00140: 5F 2F BB 2E 50 CF 58 7A E2 7C 4D 8E 52 EB 80 18
00150: 9D D0 8B 00 00
```

Record payload protection:

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_hs, 1):

```
00000: 56 EE 18 13 72 72 49 C9 DC DF 35 13 78 7E DB 93
00010: DF 62 C6 1E E7 B1 26 C5 0F 26 C0 AA AF AE 00 E1
```

seqnum:

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
```

nonce:

```
00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0F
```

additional\_data:

```
00000: 17 03 03 01 66
```

TLSInnerPlaintext:

```
00000: 0B 00 01 51 00 00 01 4D 00 01 48 30 82 01 44 30
00010: 81 F2 A0 03 02 01 02 02 02 30 39 30 0A 06 08 2A
00020: 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55
00030: 04 03 13 10 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65
00040: 2E 63 6F 6D 30 1E 17 0D 32 30 30 32 32 38 31 31
00050: 30 38 33 37 5A 17 0D 33 30 30 32 32 35 31 31 30
00060: 38 33 37 5A 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 13
```

```

00070: 10 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 2E 63 6F
00080: 6D 30 5E 30 17 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30
00090: 0B 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 01 02 03 43 00 04
000A0: 40 F3 83 CE E8 30 48 B4 EB 14 C7 1A 7F 6D E4 4A
000B0: 37 CE 11 A6 AC 17 50 F1 CF B8 DA D8 A3 8C CD D8
000C0: FD 06 65 6F 7C FC 07 5F 40 83 C3 71 62 21 47 8F
000D0: 1E E2 4C 6B 1B 70 CC E3 C7 2A FD 2A CE 65 C7 75
000E0: BC A3 21 30 1F 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14
000F0: F3 30 FA 71 66 DF 09 5A F3 A0 73 BC 3B 8E A3 56
00100: D7 DF AC 71 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02
00110: 03 41 00 AB 2E DA 23 F4 9B 48 62 3B 0C FF 59 06
00120: B7 DD 3C 23 B4 73 57 0B 29 6A 08 71 DD 15 EF 9A
00130: 33 20 1B 97 90 4A 5C FA 6C 93 1C 54 73 DC 0C 5A
00140: 5F 2F BB 2E 50 CF 58 7A E2 7C 4D 8E 52 EB 80 18
00150: 9D D0 8B 00 00 16

```

Record layer message:

```

type: 17
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 0166
encrypted_record: F57944FE9A599A76E7FE9C26E3FCE5BB
AC4DDCF68EF2E77624E33E80B6743E39
10502EE419A219B3BB6A1712D15458BB
897D3DAC7A48769945C89237DFB86620
CC31C456B4374B075905E42AB5333742
3463819982DC6D76A067C4FD83BD3E47
9CD9B7FD2926A5A63B1E88B1525DB976
C7F409190F955AE9F0AC5F976A471F23
675DEB9B24E162D24F494ECDC483A070
7129F3BD17D0FAC4944F2B3BF140D616
D654709297495B23898893B211505856
EEC1A96BC4DCF78A016798E5500D662C
54A74BDF6A7F300AC9B72299B4F15F6F
449F396CE1D0C9243CBC1C86BEC5CAB
BFDF50197B7AFF4BE903D7E3311B729B
C32D09D2D0DCE06622985AE037DC2F87
CB0C492F2D5106B259CC86E227CC8338
C1DF6C63576B17DB9655FD255F156E1F
4F767FAFB74471731E4225256818DE94
64218263D7CF7B87EB5222E76DE6C951
E462CCCC53E06387BB4FEDEFD34B9C1
3AB4EE3D49057CD2672F852A5F692408
29B92341CDC9

```

TLSCiphertext:

```

00000: 17 03 03 01 66 F5 79 44 FE 9A 59 9A 76 E7 FE 9C
00010: 26 E3 FC E5 BB AC 4D DC F6 8E F2 E7 76 24 E3 3E
00020: 80 B6 74 3E 39 10 50 2E E4 19 A2 19 B3 BB 6A 17
00030: 12 D1 54 58 BB 89 7D 3D AC 7A 48 76 99 45 C8 92
00040: 37 DF B8 66 20 CC 31 C4 56 B4 37 4B 07 59 05 E4
00050: 2A B5 33 37 42 34 63 81 99 82 DC 6D 76 A0 67 C4
00060: FD 83 BD 3E 47 9C D9 B7 FD 29 26 A5 A6 3B 1E 88
00070: B1 52 5D B9 76 C7 F4 09 19 0F 95 5A E9 F0 AC 5F
00080: 97 6A 47 1F 23 67 5D EB 9B 24 E1 62 D2 4F 49 4E
00090: CD C4 83 A0 70 71 29 F3 BD 17 D0 FA C4 94 4F 2B
000A0: 3B F1 40 D6 16 D6 54 70 92 97 49 5B 23 89 88 93

```

```
000B0:  B2 11 50 58 56 EE C1 A9 6B C4 DC F7 8A 01 67 98
000C0:  E5 50 0D 66 2C 54 A7 4B DF 6A 7F 30 0A C9 B7 22
000D0:  99 B4 F1 5F 6F 44 9F 39 6C E1 D0 C9 24 3C BC 1C
000E0:  86 BE CD 5C AB BF DF 50 19 7B 7A FF 4B E9 03 D7
000F0:  E3 31 1B 72 9B C3 2D 09 D2 D0 DC E0 66 22 98 5A
00100:  E0 37 DC 2F 87 CB 0C 49 2F 2D 51 06 B2 59 CC 86
00110:  E2 27 CC 83 38 C1 DF 6C 63 57 6B 17 DB 96 55 FD
00120:  25 5F 15 6E 1F 4F 76 7F AF B7 44 71 73 1E 42 25
00130:  25 68 18 DE 94 64 21 82 63 D7 CF 7B 87 EB 52 22
00140:  E7 6D E6 C9 51 E4 62 CC CC C5 3E 06 38 7B B4 FE
00150:  DE FD 34 B9 C1 3A B4 EE 3D 49 05 7C D2 67 2F 85
00160:  2A 5F 69 24 08 29 B9 23 41 CD C9
```

-----Server-----

```
HMCertificateVerify = (ClientHello, ServerHello,
    EncryptedExtensions, Certificate)
```

```
Transcript-Hash(HMCertificateVerify):
```

```
00000:  E0 CC 4B C1 4B EC 5D 13 19 2C DC 66 22 B4 FD A9
00010:  67 6A 1B 50 E4 56 83 0B B5 F0 7E 01 21 22 73 06
```

```
k (random for signature algorithm):
```

```
00000:  85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
00010:  85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
```

```
sgn:
```

```
00000:  A0 AA 13 91 5C 5B 80 C6 02 E2 FD 85 80 4F 99 2C
00010:  77 15 97 AD 37 85 7A D6 BC 2A 9D 7B C5 FE BE C3
00020:  7C 72 94 BA A2 3C F6 9D 03 E4 71 0B D7 08 13 FD
00030:  AC 59 6B C1 58 E7 56 BD 37 1C 44 2E 95 22 DE 87
```

```
CertificateVerify message:
```

```
msg_type: 0F
length: 000044
body:
  algorithm: 070A
  signature:
    length: 0040
    vector:
```

```
A0AA13915C5B80C602E2FD85804F992C
771597AD37857AD6BC2A9D7BC5FEBEC3
7C7294BAA23CF69D03E4710BD70813FD
AC596BC158E756BD371C442E9522DE87
```

```
00000:  0F 00 00 44 07 0A 00 40 A0 AA 13 91 5C 5B 80 C6
00010:  02 E2 FD 85 80 4F 99 2C 77 15 97 AD 37 85 7A D6
00020:  BC 2A 9D 7B C5 FE BE C3 7C 72 94 BA A2 3C F6 9D
00030:  03 E4 71 0B D7 08 13 FD AC 59 6B C1 58 E7 56 BD
00040:  37 1C 44 2E 95 22 DE 87
```

```
Record payload protection:
```

```
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_hs, 2):
```

```
00000:  56 EE 18 13 72 72 49 C9 DC DF 35 13 78 7E DB 93
00010:  DF 62 C6 1E E7 B1 26 C5 0F 26 C0 AA AF AE 00 E1
```

seqnum:  
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02

nonce:  
00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0C

additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 59

TLSInnerPlaintext:  
00000: 0F 00 00 44 07 0A 00 40 A0 AA 13 91 5C 5B 80 C6  
00010: 02 E2 FD 85 80 4F 99 2C 77 15 97 AD 37 85 7A D6  
00020: BC 2A 9D 7B C5 FE BE C3 7C 72 94 BA A2 3C F6 9D  
00030: 03 E4 71 0B D7 08 13 FD AC 59 6B C1 58 E7 56 BD  
00040: 37 1C 44 2E 95 22 DE 87 16

Record layer message:  
type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 0059  
encrypted\_record: 52631D5BFDF48254BDFB5F9E02A6A527  
0163BCE1E0D818E8D74176535C6CDD25  
2DE065AE77984A65ADBA036D59CF45B9  
A0047BABCCD0B28044D34BCFD09E6E46  
27044B26FE5CA734FCB08607146F41A8  
71C3F95384B48ADABC

TLSCiphertext:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 59 52 63 1D 5B FD F4 82 54 BD FB 5F  
00010: 9E 02 A6 A5 27 01 63 BC E1 E0 D8 18 E8 D7 41 76  
00020: 53 5C 6C DD 25 2D E0 65 AE 77 98 4A 65 AD BA 03  
00030: 6D 59 CF 45 B9 A0 04 7B AB CC D0 B2 80 44 D3 4B  
00040: CF D0 9E 6E 46 27 04 4B 26 FE 5C A7 34 FC B0 86  
00050: 07 14 6F 41 A8 71 C3 F9 53 84 B4 8A DA BC

-----Server-----

server\_finished\_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "finished", "", 32):  
00000: 53 F1 C0 38 8F 8A 70 C0 BC A0 DD 21 A0 30 F2 38  
00010: 1C 34 37 CD 0E 7E C9 3D 0A 96 5E 25 63 2D D7 9A

HMFinished = (ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions  
Certificate, CertificateVerify)

Transcript-Hash(HMFinished):  
00000: 03 EC 9B 1D 0B 37 41 42 45 72 BA C9 DF 3A A5 2C  
00010: 03 EF E9 E9 58 07 69 43 AF D8 58 19 BC 60 2F 46

FinishedHash =  
HMAC(server\_finished\_key, Transcript-Hash(HMFinished)):  
00000: E0 BA A3 36 14 E0 69 69 7E 4D FA B0 71 B9 72 57  
00010: 73 F8 FE 1A 32 6A 66 2D 0F 52 30 9B 45 B6 E0 31

Finished message:  
msg\_type: 14



length: 000020  
body:  
verify\_data: E0BAA33614E069697E4DFAB071B97257  
73F8FE1A326A662D0F52309B45B6E031

00000: 14 00 00 20 E0 BA A3 36 14 E0 69 69 7E 4D FA B0  
00010: 71 B9 72 57 73 F8 FE 1A 32 6A 66 2D 0F 52 30 9B  
00020: 45 B6 E0 31

Record payload protection:

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_hs, 3):

00000: 56 EE 18 13 72 72 49 C9 DC DF 35 13 78 7E DB 93  
00010: DF 62 C6 1E E7 B1 26 C5 0F 26 C0 AA AF AE 00 E1

seqnum:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03

nonce:

00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0D

additional\_data:

00000: 17 03 03 00 35

TLSInnerPlaintext:

00000: 14 00 00 20 E0 BA A3 36 14 E0 69 69 7E 4D FA B0  
00010: 71 B9 72 57 73 F8 FE 1A 32 6A 66 2D 0F 52 30 9B  
00020: 45 B6 E0 31 16

Record layer message:

type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 0035  
encrypted\_record: 57B1706C4918F67EACCA457F7D5B537C  
CE5036B4004C778022B97EE802320398  
119404506680ADD7D6A6CD7C8153B755  
3C6E646AD6

TLSCiphertext:

00000: 17 03 03 00 35 57 B1 70 6C 49 18 F6 7E AC CA 45  
00010: 7F 7D 5B 53 7C CE 50 36 B4 00 4C 77 80 22 B9 7E  
00020: E8 02 32 03 98 11 94 04 50 66 80 AD D7 D6 A6 CD  
00030: 7C 81 53 B7 55 3C 6E 64 6A D6

-----Server-----

Application Data:

HELO gost.example.com\r\n

Record payload protection:

Derived #1 = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "") =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "", 32):

00000: EA 3C 54 BB D1 4E F9 D7 50 77 6F AB E3 95 BE 2A  
00010: BD DB BB B7 1C 13 C2 BD 60 9E 35 15 79 4A FA 02

MainSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #1, IKM: 0^256):

```
00000: 31 BB 1D 61 2C CD 53 32 68 8A 55 1A 48 CA 25 0F
00010: 24 78 3D 4A B0 B4 A7 6D 3F E5 06 7A 26 16 A4 A3
```

HM2 = (ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Certificate, CertificateVerify, Server Finished)

TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2):

```
00000: 9E BC 5F BE 32 D9 F4 0D 48 F8 EE CE BB 62 31 A5
00010: 33 C2 C0 EF 24 32 77 B9 6D 6F 7A D3 BB FD 14 94
```

server\_application\_traffic\_secret (SATS):

```
SATS = Derive-Secret(MainSecret, "s ap traffic", HM2) =
      HKDF-Expand-Label(MainSecret, "s ap traffic", TH2, 32):
00000: 87 73 4F 4B 4C FD 17 B9 7B 83 4D 82 2D 9D 73 79
00010: F6 F5 E0 3B 80 B5 2A EB 2A FF 51 0E DD 83 DB D2
```

server\_write\_key\_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(SATS, "key", "", 32):

```
00000: 47 5E 4C 51 4C C6 31 8C 3A 5F 00 0F 12 65 BD 1A
00010: B5 F0 DE 1A F3 57 ED 00 79 EC 5F F0 AF BD 03 0C
```

server\_write\_iv\_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(SATS, "iv", "", 16):

```
00000: AF E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B8
```

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_ap, 0):

```
00000: C8 FC 93 D7 C5 86 F2 B0 A3 10 1B AA 6A 97 9E 4E
00010: 38 86 70 65 51 E8 11 87 E9 78 80 40 9C 7E 8E E9
```

seqnum:

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

nonce:

```
00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B8
```

additional\_data:

```
00000: 17 03 03 00 28
```

TLSInnerPlaintext:

```
00000: 48 45 4C 4F 20 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C
00010: 65 2E 63 6F 6D 0D 0A 17
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 17
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 0028
encrypted_record: ABB8C372C79681DCE5C3C909DD039D59
                  8161FD3E6CE5D6F9CA5715BD6B5C1824
                  7FB26AC1AB396A4E
```

TLSCiphertext:

```
00000: 17 03 03 00 28 AB B8 C3 72 C7 96 81 DC E5 C3 C9
00010: 09 DD 03 9D 59 81 61 FD 3E 6C E5 D6 F9 CA 57 15
00020: BD 6B 5C 18 24 7F B2 6A C1 AB 39 6A 4E
```

-----Client-----

client\_finished\_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "finished", "", 32):

```
00000: 2F 21 54 8C F5 27 78 69 AE 49 0D E7 BC 15 AC E6
00010: 39 F6 57 E3 58 2A 5A 63 4B 0A 91 56 95 D5 4C 42
```

HM2 = (ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Certificate, CertificateVerify, Server Finished)

TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2):

```
00000: 9E BC 5F BE 32 D9 F4 0D 48 F8 EE CE BB 62 31 A5
00010: 33 C2 C0 EF 24 32 77 B9 6D 6F 7A D3 BB FD 14 94
```

FinishedHash =

HMAC(client\_finished\_key, TH2):

```
00000: 08 5F C7 FD 79 B6 D1 11 CD 8D 3F F6 B2 3A 06 5A
00010: 7A F7 A6 38 73 42 A5 F3 57 68 14 CD 00 47 19 D2
```

Finished message:

```
msg_type: 14
length: 000020
body:
  verify_data: 085FC7FD79B6D111CD8D3FF6B23A065A
               7AF7A6387342A5F3576814CD004719D2
```

```
00000: 14 00 00 20 08 5F C7 FD 79 B6 D1 11 CD 8D 3F F6
00010: B2 3A 06 5A 7A F7 A6 38 73 42 A5 F3 57 68 14 CD
00020: 00 47 19 D2
```

Record payload protection:

EarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0<sup>256</sup>, IKM: 0<sup>256</sup>):

```
00000: FB DE FB E5 27 FE EA 66 5A AB 92 77 A2 16 3B 83
00010: 43 08 4F D1 91 C4 60 66 26 0F AC 6F D1 43 6C 72
```

Derived #0 = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "derived", "") =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "derived", "", 32):

```
00000: DB C3 C8 26 D8 77 A3 B7 D2 D2 45 3D BF DC 6C FB
00010: FB 11 51 B3 E8 4F 0C 8F 26 01 1D 8D 5B F3 ED F7
```

HandshakeSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #0, IKM: ECDHE):

```
00000: 44 24 5E 2C 43 32 D1 F7 8B 0F 8D 16 F4 03 EB 69
00010: ED 2A 40 53 84 7C DC 39 FA 8B 3D 29 74 F7 45 E7
```

HM1 = (ClientHello, ServerHello)

TH1 = Transcript-Hash(HM1):

```
00000: 99 3B A7 22 12 4A F3 CB FD 47 71 E7 FA E3 2A C1
00010: D0 E9 27 8C F7 84 3F CB C6 20 E1 A0 08 5A 87 A1
```

client\_handshake\_traffic\_secret (CHTS):

CHTS = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "c hs traffic", HM1) =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "c hs traffic", TH1, 32):

```
00000: B3 F7 11 3D 35 26 55 4F E6 55 E5 6F AB 79 B1 A0
00010: 3D E3 35 96 E3 30 88 C7 78 37 19 A9 A4 B0 DC CD
```

client\_write\_key\_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "key", "", 32):

```
00000: 58 16 88 D7 6E FE 12 2B B5 5F 62 B3 8E F0 1B CC
00010: 8C 88 DB 83 E9 EA 4D 55 D3 89 8C 53 72 1F C3 84
```

```
client_write_iv_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "iv", "", 16):
00000: 43 9A 07 45 3D 0B EA 0C 1D 1B EB 73 8E B5 B8 DD
```

```
client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_hs, 0):
00000: E1 C5 9B 41 69 D8 96 10 7F 78 45 68 93 A3 75 1E
00010: 15 73 54 3D AD 8C B7 40 69 E6 81 4A 51 3B BB 1C
```

```
seqnum:
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

```
nonce:
00000: 43 9A 07 45 3D 0B EA 0C 1D 1B EB 73 8E B5 B8 DD
```

```
additional_data:
00000: 17 03 03 00 35
```

```
TLSInnerPlaintext:
00000: 14 00 00 20 08 5F C7 FD 79 B6 D1 11 CD 8D 3F F6
00010: B2 3A 06 5A 7A F7 A6 38 73 42 A5 F3 57 68 14 CD
00020: 00 47 19 D2 16
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 17
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 0035
encrypted_record: C9C65EAAB4A80E04849A122EB0CC26A9
CA6B5DD4DB7AD6813949F629FC09E052
2FF7ACDBBA93926C20008B8CCE865422
7B31D439F8
```

TLSCiphertext:

```
00000: 17 03 03 00 35 C9 C6 5E AA B4 A8 0E 04 84 9A 12
00010: 2E B0 CC 26 A9 CA 6B 5D D4 DB 7A D6 81 39 49 F6
00020: 29 FC 09 E0 52 2F F7 AC DB BA 93 92 6C 20 00 8B
00030: 8C CE 86 54 22 7B 31 D4 39 F8
```

-----Server-----

NewSessionTicket message:

```
msg_type: 04
length: 000035
body:
  ticket_lifetime: 00093A80
  ticket_age_add: 86868686
  ticket_nonce:
    length: 08
    vector: 0000000000000000
  ticket:
    length: 0020
    vector: 888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888
    extensions:
      length: 0000
      vector: --
```

```
00000: 04 00 00 35 00 09 3A 80 86 86 86 86 08 00 00 00
00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
00020: 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
00030: 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 00 00
```

Record payload protection:

```
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 1):
```

```
00000: C8 FC 93 D7 C5 86 F2 B0 A3 10 1B AA 6A 97 9E 4E
00010: 38 86 70 65 51 E8 11 87 E9 78 80 40 9C 7E 8E E9
```

```
seqnum:
```

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
```

```
nonce:
```

```
00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B9
```

```
additional_data:
```

```
00000: 17 03 03 00 4A
```

```
TLSInnerPlaintext:
```

```
00000: 04 00 00 35 00 09 3A 80 86 86 86 86 08 00 00 00
00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
00020: 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
00030: 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 00 00 16
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 17
```

```
legacy_record_version: 0303
```

```
length: 004A
```

```
encrypted_record: CA6688A5DC22208DC8A8DE7E597292E3
CB5D454945B8F06C7C50F1823D7B6BB0
021178AE3ADB2DE3994539FD696945CF
AA6919F3F1294CD41ED2A8EA75302869
ACB994F3920B09D67186
```

```
TLSCiphertext:
```

```
00000: 17 03 03 00 4A CA 66 88 A5 DC 22 20 8D C8 A8 DE
00010: 7E 59 72 92 E3 CB 5D 45 49 45 B8 F0 6C 7C 50 F1
00020: 82 3D 7B 6B B0 02 11 78 AE 3A DB 2D E3 99 45 39
00030: FD 69 69 45 CF AA 69 19 F3 F1 29 4C D4 1E D2 A8
00040: EA 75 30 28 69 AC B9 94 F3 92 0B 09 D6 71 86
```

-----Server-----

```
Application data:
```

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
```

```
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

```
Pad: 15360 bytes
```

Record payload protection:

```
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 2):
```

```
00000: C8 FC 93 D7 C5 86 F2 B0 A3 10 1B AA 6A 97 9E 4E
00010: 38 86 70 65 51 E8 11 87 E9 78 80 40 9C 7E 8E E9
```

seqnum:  
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02

nonce:  
00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 BA

additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 40 11

TLSInnerPlaintext:  
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
00004000: 00

Record layer message:  
type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 4011  
encrypted\_record: 9B3AD6939F05A403EEB1A636E13989D9  
1CCA6A45BE5B7CB5C980020627A1B2AD  
34AC4B5AAE5BD445C91C28325E4C7149  
188D55EF27016D80AF440704820BCE22  
CE501EA619A4FF7CD9F722A28391CE8B  
B86BF87D5A85555BEF59A9C9A1572F38  
114E64FD04A0DB2E1787A585EA51DCAB  
B95DAFB73D0B3FE3F0702C5E1AA01571  
17D884783E5E6113F6CA8352F6CF49F9  
DB3B3DAB380BFD7BE04B0A [...]  
64E7027D926E0F95AB7F133B5921F996  
A81EB67B78449DD32F4511E013206524  
AD4AFACF0B1C1622282CB20A965E670C  
C9A17E13F343AF3825AFD58B06915BDC  
9E49477F02830694F5AC7CC99C887F62  
CDAAEF0053766FB12BC9A082C157C347  
21C5400C376088A660EE4329ED645D7C  
07D4DA1ABDF6F9A1B9D51BF3E09CFCC1  
A59CD96F07FC9ACF004EA1B20E6BBDAD  
7BBF0C9E2A1B

TLSCiphertext:  
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 9B 3A D6 93 9F 05 A4 03 EE B1 A6  
00000010: 36 E1 39 89 D9 1C CA 6A 45 BE 5B 7C B5 C9 80 02  
00000020: 06 27 A1 B2 AD 34 AC 4B 5A AE 5B D4 45 C9 1C 28  
00000030: 32 5E 4C 71 49 18 8D 55 EF 27 01 6D 80 AF 44 07  
00000040: 04 82 0B CE 22 CE 50 1E A6 19 A4 FF 7C D9 F7 22  
00000050: A2 83 91 CE 8B B8 6B F8 7D 5A 85 55 5B EF 59 A9  
00000060: C9 A1 57 2F 38 11 4E 64 FD 04 A0 DB 2E 17 87 A5  
00000070: 85 EA 51 DC AB B9 5D AF B7 3D 0B 3F E3 F0 70 2C  
00000080: 5E 1A A0 15 71 17 D8 84 78 3E 5E 61 13 F6 CA 83  
00000090: 52 F6 CF 49 F9 DB 3B 3D AB 38 0B FD 7B E0 4B 0A  
[...]

```
00003F80: 64 E7 02 7D 92 6E 0F 95 AB 7F 13 3B 59 21 F9 96
00003F90: A8 1E B6 7B 78 44 9D D3 2F 45 11 E0 13 20 65 24
00003FA0: AD 4A FA CF 0B 1C 16 22 28 2C B2 0A 96 5E 67 0C
00003FB0: C9 A1 7E 13 F3 43 AF 38 25 AF D5 8B 06 91 5B DC
00003FC0: 9E 49 47 7F 02 83 06 94 F5 AC 7C C9 9C 88 7F 62
00003FD0: CD AA EF 00 53 76 6F B1 2B C9 A0 82 C1 57 C3 47
00003FE0: 21 C5 40 0C 37 60 88 A6 60 EE 43 29 ED 64 5D 7C
00003FF0: 07 D4 DA 1A BD F6 F9 A1 B9 D5 1B F3 E0 9C FC C1
00004000: A5 9C D9 6F 07 FC 9A CF 00 4E A1 B2 0E 6B BD AD
00004010: 7B BF 0C 9E 2A 1B
```

-----Server-----

Application data:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Pad: 15360 bytes
```

Record payload protection:

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_ap, 3):

```
00000: C8 FC 93 D7 C5 86 F2 B0 A3 10 1B AA 6A 97 9E 4E
00010: 38 86 70 65 51 E8 11 87 E9 78 80 40 9C 7E 8E E9
```

seqnum:

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
```

nonce:

```
00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 BB
```

additional\_data:

```
00000: 17 03 03 40 11
```

TLSTInnerPlaintext:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
00004000: 00
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 17
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 4011
encrypted_record: F06C5032F8A7AD58CED14D5383ED969E
628DE4F35CF9B6FCF5047D9B02261F56
F724DE961F8FF9C27AE76FBAC0A18E96
AA30CA7D8EBAD5B5135A0962515CC4F2
A16EBAB9A08886ED4EFD9DFAEC158F94
EFB0F90725C9114D9D8D904A18ABF184
E74B07150B2F2F27CB8032064943C957
11E480E4F4FCE8E9F020D5C90489E734
AEA10D91C7097AEC8CD6D5E3EEC764B0
```

```
CD447FC07735F0F8D9D490 [...]
3A79E7B3BCFD2B2478092911073A7CC9
6AC626C30DD0A5612DBBFF26E35AF0BB
5CEC24EED391100533FB999D4873ED5D
5E4693C5EEDC3ECC3C6EFF041B0A7F42
25A1092F4AADD9A508C7A56CB13A3F33
E844E28C8ADCD45250F4EE29834C5CAA
C50B5EBF94501785664E78AE9B5FDBFA
DF730DED97985D659135F5DABAD883FF
AC6046A0F629881F76147646D8E2A867
3B14295621F7
```

**TLSCiphertext:**

```
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 F0 6C 50 32 F8 A7 AD 58 CE D1 4D
00000010: 53 83 ED 96 9E 62 8D E4 F3 5C F9 B6 FC F5 04 7D
00000020: 9B 02 26 1F 56 F7 24 DE 96 1F 8F F9 C2 7A E7 6F
00000030: BA C0 A1 8E 96 AA 30 CA 7D 8E BA D5 B5 13 5A 09
00000040: 62 51 5C C4 F2 A1 6E BA B9 A0 88 86 ED 4E FD 9D
00000050: FA EC 15 8F 94 EF B0 F9 07 25 C9 11 4D 9D 8D 90
00000060: 4A 18 AB F1 84 E7 4B 07 15 0B 2F 2F 27 CB 80 32
00000070: 06 49 43 C9 57 11 E4 80 E4 F4 FC E8 E9 F0 20 D5
00000080: C9 04 89 E7 34 AE A1 0D 91 C7 09 7A EC 8C D6 D5
00000090: E3 EE C7 64 B0 CD 44 7F C0 77 35 F0 F8 D9 D4 90
[...]
00003F80: 3A 79 E7 B3 BC FD 2B 24 78 09 29 11 07 3A 7C C9
00003F90: 6A C6 26 C3 0D D0 A5 61 2D BB FF 26 E3 5A F0 BB
00003FA0: 5C EC 24 EE D3 91 10 05 33 FB 99 9D 48 73 ED 5D
00003FB0: 5E 46 93 C5 EE DC 3E CC 3C 6E FF 04 1B 0A 7F 42
00003FC0: 25 A1 09 2F 4A AD D9 A5 08 C7 A5 6C B1 3A 3F 33
00003FD0: E8 44 E2 8C 8A DC D4 52 50 F4 EE 29 83 4C 5C AA
00003FE0: C5 0B 5E BF 94 50 17 85 66 4E 78 AE 9B 5F DB FA
00003FF0: DF 73 0D ED 97 98 5D 65 91 35 F5 DA BA D8 83 FF
00004000: AC 60 46 A0 F6 29 88 1F 76 14 76 46 D8 E2 A8 67
00004010: 3B 14 29 56 21 F7
```

-----Server-----

**Application data:**

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

Pad: 15360 bytes

**Record payload protection:**

```
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 8):
```

```
00000: D3 CD 87 D5 68 74 07 82 39 78 34 4C 06 B9 28 A8
00010: 58 98 B7 39 A3 1D 3D E5 FF 2B 78 8E F3 91 96 ED
```

**seqnum:**

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08
```

**nonce:**

```
00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B0
```



additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 40 11

TLSInnerPlaintext:  
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
00004000: 00

Record layer message:  
type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 4011  
encrypted\_record: E3DF00F169A76FA19FE55FA304E0A552  
5A28FDBD3DD4CA654B89140EFD69E263  
28A65A77F5D8B2E2F73568F7A677E5DF  
8D225FAA8ED5FED98F09963FF1E82161  
81595E9FA6989CCABC2150CA668D70EA  
8CB6F62BCC528D26B52FB27AB70F194A  
30E5C9085D9323D38745093070D15650  
52468045F3398DC5BF93D6A983956E1D  
3077337B773DAF4B9A6BA5BC569A251D  
34FE23DF7B9343A0550094 [...]  
2B516EE4A4971FD26EFB9293981435E9  
FCC560B618B8ED0A52589E7342C25325  
11C3D7C145559B8119BC02CB22CBF1EB  
915578E8468806B2D0728C591B617354  
CC47D51FF2363197A559018AD3498846  
AD167DD086BD12EF52179D45ABF06C28  
97B0C1D8AAD49413E0CCC086586D537A  
296F9CEE7E7E1DD2537540232C6BD71  
619FC93BAE3FD8B0C95EA9915B6127B9  
9F87884541F7

TLSCiphertext:  
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 E3 DF 00 F1 69 A7 6F A1 9F E5 5F  
00000010: A3 04 E0 A5 52 5A 28 FD BD 3D D4 CA 65 4B 89 14  
00000020: 0E FD 69 E2 63 28 A6 5A 77 F5 D8 B2 E2 F7 35 68  
00000030: F7 A6 77 E5 DF 8D 22 5F AA 8E D5 FE D9 8F 09 96  
00000040: 3F F1 E8 21 61 81 59 5E 9F A6 98 9C CA BC 21 50  
00000050: CA 66 8D 70 EA 8C B6 F6 2B CC 52 8D 26 B5 2F B2  
00000060: 7A B7 0F 19 4A 30 E5 C9 08 5D 93 23 D3 87 45 09  
00000070: 30 70 D1 56 50 52 46 80 45 F3 39 8D C5 BF 93 D6  
00000080: A9 83 95 6E 1D 30 77 33 7B 77 3D AF 4B 9A 6B A5  
00000090: BC 56 9A 25 1D 34 FE 23 DF 7B 93 43 A0 55 00 94  
[...]  
00003F80: 2B 51 6E E4 A4 97 1F D2 6E FB 92 93 98 14 35 E9  
00003F90: FC C5 60 B6 18 B8 ED 0A 52 58 9E 73 42 C2 53 25  
00003FA0: 11 C3 D7 C1 45 55 9B 81 19 BC 02 CB 22 CB F1 EB  
00003FB0: 91 55 78 E8 46 88 06 B2 D0 72 8C 59 1B 61 73 54  
00003FC0: CC 47 D5 1F F2 36 31 97 A5 59 01 8A D3 49 88 46  
00003FD0: AD 16 7D D0 86 BD 12 EF 52 17 9D 45 AB F0 6C 28  
00003FE0: 97 B0 C1 D8 AA D4 94 13 E0 CC C0 86 58 6D 53 7A

```
00003FF0: 29 6F 9C EE B7 E7 E1 DD 25 37 54 02 32 C6 BD 71
00004000: 61 9F C9 3B AE 3F D8 B0 C9 5E A9 91 5B 61 27 B9
00004010: 9F 87 88 45 41 F7
```

-----Server-----

Application data:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Pad: 15360 bytes
```

Record payload protection:

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_ap, 9):

```
00000: D3 CD 87 D5 68 74 07 82 39 78 34 4C 06 B9 28 A8
00010: 58 98 B7 39 A3 1D 3D E5 FF 2B 78 8E F3 91 96 ED
```

seqnum:

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09
```

nonce:

```
00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B1
```

additional\_data:

```
00000: 17 03 03 40 11
```

TLSInnerPlaintext:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
00004000: 00
```

Record layer message:

type: 17

legacy\_record\_version: 0303

length: 4011

encrypted\_record: 4AFCD1257E2C8D4626BC0BFBB30F2F9C  
A57A9D0DEC090B4248CAADDFE7AA4AEB  
770F285384FEA308CADE2EEF318148C2  
BED4870ABEE1955CCA41CE8344C3EDA4  
7C2512CDD19FD54C7E0260BBC7BD8DD1  
EE9D4EBADD3D7915D0A029D7847CA05D  
078068CC8A792FED69A4E655A6E6D22D  
A134ECA2BDECA1E59D3AE7313E45E785  
AF89A8F1890BFCC59F03F39C4FB2337C  
326D94FA04F5548619D6DC [...]  
79B6F56B6EBF8B8860436EFF9D8F03CC  
73BDF446D30F918AF8FF8BA2D078D243  
1AC04657D7871203F15969F160820D7D  
FCA78F65FF954CE5549F2C78AA3A0885  
04527FC561B6AE06020A8772B75CE933  
6CAC35B536A50DB26930BFA21E9EB56E

A20E39CC2BBBA66D41C2E8720AA0143D  
298D8036D7B0090A0214F58C5B1890A7  
5B4783820395E39421F4357A49597EB0  
64123818EACE

TLSCiphertext:

```
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 4A FC D1 25 7E 2C 8D 46 26 BC 0B
00000010: FB B3 0F 2F 9C A5 7A 9D 0D EC 09 0B 42 48 CA AD
00000020: DF E7 AA 4A EB 77 0F 28 53 84 FE A3 08 CA DE 2E
00000030: EF 31 81 48 C2 BE D4 87 0A BE E1 95 5C CA 41 CE
00000040: 83 44 C3 ED A4 7C 25 12 CD D1 9F D5 4C 7E 02 60
00000050: BB C7 BD 8D D1 EE 9D 4E BA DD 3D 79 15 D0 A0 29
00000060: D7 84 7C A0 5D 07 80 68 CC 8A 79 2F ED 69 A4 E6
00000070: 55 A6 E6 D2 2D A1 34 EC A2 BD EC A1 E5 9D 3A E7
00000080: 31 3E 45 E7 85 AF 89 A8 F1 89 0B FC C5 9F 03 F3
00000090: 9C 4F B2 33 7C 32 6D 94 FA 04 F5 54 86 19 D6 DC
[...]
00003F80: 79 B6 F5 6B 6E BF 8B 88 60 43 6E FF 9D 8F 03 CC
00003F90: 73 BD F4 46 D3 0F 91 8A F8 FF 8B A2 D0 78 D2 43
00003FA0: 1A C0 46 57 D7 87 12 03 F1 59 69 F1 60 82 0D 7D
00003FB0: FC A7 8F 65 FF 95 4C E5 54 9F 2C 78 AA 3A 08 85
00003FC0: 04 52 7F C5 61 B6 AE 06 02 0A 87 72 B7 5C E9 33
00003FD0: 6C AC 35 B5 36 A5 0D B2 69 30 BF A2 1E 9E B5 6E
00003FE0: A2 0E 39 CC 2B BB A6 6D 41 C2 E8 72 0A A0 14 3D
00003FF0: 29 8D 80 36 D7 B0 09 0A 02 14 F5 8C 5B 18 90 A7
00004000: 5B 47 83 82 03 95 E3 94 21 F4 35 7A 49 59 7E B0
00004010: 64 12 38 18 EA CE
```

-----Client-----

Application data:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

Pad: 15360 bytes

Record payload protection:

```
Derived #1 = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "") =
  HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "", 32):
00000: EA 3C 54 BB D1 4E F9 D7 50 77 6F AB E3 95 BE 2A
00010: BD DB BB B7 1C 13 C2 BD 60 9E 35 15 79 4A FA 02
```

```
MainSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #1, IKM: 0^256):
00000: 31 BB 1D 61 2C CD 53 32 68 8A 55 1A 48 CA 25 0F
00010: 24 78 3D 4A B0 B4 A7 6D 3F E5 06 7A 26 16 A4 A3
```

```
HM2 = (ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Certificate,
  CertificateVerify, Server Finished)
```

```
TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2):
00000: 9E BC 5F BE 32 D9 F4 0D 48 F8 EE CE BB 62 31 A5
00010: 33 C2 C0 EF 24 32 77 B9 6D 6F 7A D3 BB FD 14 94
```

```
client_application_traffic_secret (CATS):
CATS = Derive-Secret(MainSecret, "c ap traffic", HM2) =
```

```
HKDF-Expand-Label(MainSecret, "c ap traffic", TH2, 32):
00000: 8A CF 74 6B EC 31 17 6C BD 14 2C 75 80 6C 27 0A
00010: 0A EF 6F C3 8E 0D 8F DC B5 A8 85 25 36 3A DE 81
```

```
client_write_key_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(CATS, "key", "", 32):
00000: 7B E6 4E 2C 12 78 7B 5B 8C 87 56 C4 3D 92 FA EF
00010: 64 F1 5A 3A 3C 10 81 AD 34 BC A5 06 F0 32 24 15
```

```
client_write_iv_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(CATS, "iv", "", 16):
00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 54
```

```
client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_ap, 0):
00000: D4 9A 57 15 49 E7 48 94 9F A2 4B 88 34 23 2C A8
00010: 75 D3 7A 26 C4 BB 5C 62 A2 61 DA B3 72 65 05 26
```

```
seqnum:
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

```
nonce:
00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 54
```

```
additional_data:
00000: 17 03 03 40 11
```

```
TLSTreePlaintext:
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
00004000: 00
```

Record layer message:

type: 17

legacy\_record\_version: 0303

length: 4011

encrypted\_record: EA6CB652C7CBE6B50560D0364DC94D90  
2560DFE55D8B83C8AA919F5A1E5492E7  
4CA5156F18BEC8EAB6971CAA2D2C1FF1  
46EA5FEF5D62682601868FFCD2688F34  
83899C31F6BA87538682E7F895F653C0  
9BFE95ABF3EEDF7EBB261CCC593DFCB0  
04F05119567148BB35F3C7B4F09713A6  
247A047EF29B05F7720E375A6E3264F4  
7922EAEBE3AA6D1E80832806D5F20E7C  
56662A7128B191829597DB [...]  
6A5184907D9FF8D3FC0994A3C850DDBC  
2D0420EB66EA177FCDD78F16246E2076  
039C525604F79A007F472AC7A20A4574  
1B9D96E38E565899D40A724B8A37FF68  
702BF9A645D04962BBC9C66A35FFD219  
A08A385FE4CDD0A1F3F080BECDF01E45  
68C338FAD2C850DFEAA98A7F1B95ECA1  
72BA7F7526E3BFF2EFF2395CE4561867  
DC9DE8FD10F38BCA1E44B0207AF4CCE8

**8155836330BC**

**TLSCiphertext:**

[illegible]

-----Client-----

**Application data:**

```
000000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
0000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

**Pad: 15360 bytes**

## Record payload protection:

```
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 1):
00000:  D4 9A 57 15 49 E7 48 94 9F A2 4B 88 34 23 2C A8
00010:  75 D3 7A 26 C4 BB 5C 62 A2 61 DA B3 72 65 05 26
```

**seqnum:**

```
000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
```

**nonce:**

```
00000:  31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 55
```

**additional data:**

00000: 17 03 03 40 11

**TLSInnerPlaintext:**

```
000000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
```

Record layer message:  
type:  
legacy\_record\_version:  
length:  
encrypted\_record:

17  
0303  
4011  
0D486A03D03A020296EA0AD1D684A9F4  
AE35824129141D3434CEE064FD5E966F  
88D6E8903913417658E46C49B18BB0CC  
B29B663D3F380A2CF9E5234BCD27F3A4  
E12EBF3A3C69DB7661B08FC1685FADDE  
50F68028A6E85EE12729D6F9CAD762FF  
A6BAB5FC94AC65BAA36885DAF85C9B27  
C68F9E97AB85ECFA760CDD22F9A8C0BA  
6097D7960587CA708834516D9588592D  
D1B8E05210BAA640FE6540 [...]   
55A9C5A6557D35B8F1A9804BFA0F2789  
3EDC6AA0350E9630AFF6C9B06C3CE01D  
5BE51E87EBFFAC58230D074BE121F077  
9D08F8177AFFFB36DCEFD0D0696873  
A772B9A1DA73C681B0F8359EC1C74B6E  
0452095C622C4C797F450CAA4F26975A  
311F41F31C6A617747298CC052A6376F  
A46191658FEE5BD8D7A998E7F12E8838  
7365BAAD4BA490114733FC15A58148E6  
186484821A94

TLSCiphertext:

00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 0D 48 6A 03 D0 3A 02 02 96 EA 0A  
00000010: D1 D6 84 A9 F4 AE 35 82 41 29 14 1D 34 34 CE E0  
00000020: 64 FD 5E 96 6F 88 D6 E8 90 39 13 41 76 58 E4 6C  
00000030: 49 B1 8B B0 CC B2 9B 66 3D 3F 38 0A 2C F9 E5 23  
00000040: 4B CD 27 F3 A4 E1 2E BF 3A 3C 69 DB 76 61 B0 8F  
00000050: C1 68 5F AD DE 50 F6 80 28 A6 E8 5E E1 27 29 D6  
00000060: F9 CA D7 62 FF A6 BA B5 FC 94 AC 65 BA A3 68 85  
00000070: DA F8 5C 9B 27 C6 8F 9E 97 AB 85 EC FA 76 0C DD  
00000080: 22 F9 A8 C0 BA 60 97 D7 96 05 87 CA 70 88 34 51  
00000090: 6D 95 88 59 2D D1 B8 E0 52 10 BA A6 40 FE 65 40  
[...]  
00003F80: 55 A9 C5 A6 55 7D 35 B8 F1 A9 80 4B FA 0F 27 89  
00003F90: 3E DC 6A A0 35 0E 96 30 AF F6 C9 B0 6C 3C E0 1D  
00003FA0: 5B E5 1E 87 EB FF AC 58 23 0D 07 4B E1 21 F0 77  
00003FB0: 9D 08 F8 17 7A FF FB B3 6D CE FD D0 D0 69 68 73  
00003FC0: A7 72 B9 A1 DA 73 C6 81 B0 F8 35 9E C1 C7 4B 6E  
00003FD0: 04 52 09 5C 62 2C 4C 79 7F 45 0C AA 4F 26 97 5A  
00003FE0: 31 1F 41 F3 1C 6A 61 77 47 29 8C C0 52 A6 37 6F  
00003FF0: A4 61 91 65 8F EE 5B D8 D7 A9 98 E7 F1 2E 88 38  
00004000: 73 65 BA AD 4B A4 90 11 47 33 FC 15 A5 81 48 E6  
00004010: 18 64 84 82 1A 94

-----Client-----

Application data:

00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Pad: 15360 bytes

## Record payload protection:

client\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(client\_write\_key\_ap, 8):

00000: B8 2D 78 25 D1 5F AE 18 A7 01 32 28 B3 1C B0 C5  
00010: 97 52 C6 40 9C 5F 78 99 EC C6 95 0F 74 63 C0 90

seqnum:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08

nonce:

00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 5C

additional\_data:

00000: 17 03 03 40 11

TLSInnerPlaintext:

00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

[...]

000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

[...]

00004000: 00

## Record layer message:

type: 17

legacy\_record\_version: 0303

length: 4011

encrypted\_record: F8B5732A300C8EF05FB712A2972F4DB8  
4BE783A959090398E989516B6A54F333  
331049283186BD1C42EFD98003A476A2  
408EACE0D7047FB536979386C26B5523  
F933A4F5BD7048B094EC5F5627EDFA98  
99DE1AF8D9A493E481BA5DA0857BE15A  
3F21CA01E22092159BAA770569CFBE54  
F653BEFB4A8B32295DEFE992258F4581  
257E936AF549E82D54EA6C09EF0D987B  
F3A3E8453C1548CEF1C349 [...]  
0EF4E88899AA3481AEDAE0E257449F80  
A20CBDF070EC02211B6B9CBA9248B192  
CF75C88A085DBFF77ABCFB1D82DAA421  
1B487A48230350CBA4F338DD0BFD36D8  
AAC5EE709456B7E317C78E7198FB7264  
5B45EEFD3F93BF1C021F9E74A2ED2BCC  
1CF5D367B553C7E7E9D80DD2447C7D13  
D0345FEF2976696DFE579E5F71740C71  
3124CFBAD66C7BB5BC21AAAE2F1E0860  
5C248ADAF8BA

TLSCiphertext:

00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 F8 B5 73 2A 30 0C 8E F0 5F B7 12

00000010: A2 97 2F 4D B8 4B E7 83 A9 59 09 03 98 E9 89 51

00000020: 6B 6A 54 F3 33 33 10 49 28 31 86 BD 1C 42 EF D9

00000030: 80 03 A4 76 A2 40 8E AC E0 D7 04 7F B5 36 97 93

00000040: 86 C2 6B 55 23 F9 33 A4 F5 BD 70 48 B0 94 EC 5F

```
000000050: 56 27 ED FA 98 99 DE 1A F8 D9 A4 93 E4 81 BA 5D
000000060: A0 85 7B E1 5A 3F 21 CA 01 E2 20 92 15 9B AA 77
000000070: 05 69 CF BE 54 F6 53 BE FB 4A 8B 32 29 5D EF E9
000000080: 92 25 8F 45 81 25 7E 93 6A F5 49 E8 2D 54 EA 6C
000000090: 09 EF 0D 98 7B F3 A3 E8 45 3C 15 48 CE F1 C3 49
[...]
00003F80: 0E F4 E8 88 99 AA 34 81 AE DA E0 E2 57 44 9F 80
00003F90: A2 0C BD F0 70 EC 02 21 1B 6B 9C BA 92 48 B1 92
00003FA0: CF 75 C8 8A 08 5D BF F7 7A BC FB 1D 82 DA A4 21
00003FB0: 1B 48 7A 48 23 03 50 CB A4 F3 38 DD 0B FD 36 D8
00003FC0: AA C5 EE 70 94 56 B7 E3 17 C7 8E 71 98 FB 72 64
00003FD0: 5B 45 EE FD 3F 93 BF 1C 02 1F 9E 74 A2 ED 2B CC
00003FE0: 1C F5 D3 67 B5 53 C7 E7 E9 D8 0D D2 44 7C 7D 13
00003FF0: D0 34 5F EF 29 76 69 6D FE 57 9E 5F 71 74 0C 71
00004000: 31 24 CF BA D6 6C 7B B5 BC 21 AA AE 2F 1E 08 60
00004010: 5C 24 8A DA F8 BA
```

-----Client-----

Application data:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

Pad: 15360 bytes

Record payload protection:

client\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(client\_write\_key\_ap, 9):

```
00000: B8 2D 78 25 D1 5F AE 18 A7 01 32 28 B3 1C B0 C5
00010: 97 52 C6 40 9C 5F 78 99 EC C6 95 0F 74 63 C0 90
```

seqnum:

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09
```

nonce:

```
00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 5D
```

additional\_data:

```
00000: 17 03 03 40 11
```

TLSInnerPlaintext:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
00004000: 00
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 17
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 4011
encrypted_record: C1719B62D4F5E295AB8A4A2CBD6BBEF3
0F07297D96004EBABE315090247510A6
BEE6395676956B4249B16B52CE9FE171
```



B1F4693F48B3446D48A99B6224537FBB  
9BC8BF54AEA688D21E39F17840DB9F33  
632EA196922B7E15D6AE080F9F3B33F2  
FABE63BB66E21C590785EFAEBE75BB1E  
17C9E5F58A1B1D1101DE95F9BF346C62  
1C63CABEB6D7245DB75F18DA495F129A  
652CE6B7E0FE47FB210D6A [...]   
2AF9D515B26C3D8F37F9BF5F3A766D8B  
03189A78605069179FB9CF9B1A449DC0  
4F0FE37E67FDF9A0341B1F0D64AA2871  
D4DFEF10EC7DFE7475CFE364BB4D9453  
A9F176829887148F3E8C0EEE858F9C17  
C0B753C145D13BD2A96B23822F73DC6C  
FD623DE3CB70F8D507E436C20E393940  
F3A36C913C0BCDFE672C903C5522AA41  
0B318DD1268D035C59D3E11FF273B1D7  
715E2FBF3ACA

TLSCiphertext:

00000000:	17	03	03	40	11	C1	71	9B	62	D4	F5	E2	95	AB	8A	4A
00000010:	2C	BD	6B	BE	F3	0F	07	29	7D	96	00	4E	BA	BE	31	50
00000020:	90	24	75	10	A6	BE	E6	39	56	76	95	6B	42	49	B1	6B
00000030:	52	CE	9F	E1	71	B1	F4	69	3F	48	B3	44	6D	48	A9	9B
00000040:	62	24	53	7F	BB	9B	C8	BF	54	AE	A6	88	D2	1E	39	F1
00000050:	78	40	DB	9F	33	63	2E	A1	96	92	2B	7E	15	D6	AE	08
00000060:	0F	9F	3B	33	F2	FA	BE	63	BB	66	E2	1C	59	07	85	EF
00000070:	AE	BE	75	BB	1E	17	C9	E5	F5	8A	1B	1D	11	01	DE	95
00000080:	F9	BF	34	6C	62	1C	63	CA	BE	B6	D7	24	5D	B7	5F	18
00000090:	DA	49	5F	12	9A	65	2C	E6	B7	E0	FE	47	FB	21	0D	6A
[...]																
00003F80:	2A	F9	D5	15	B2	6C	3D	8F	37	F9	BF	5F	3A	76	6D	8B
00003F90:	03	18	9A	78	60	50	69	17	9F	B9	CF	9B	1A	44	9D	C0
00003FA0:	4F	0F	E3	7E	67	FD	F9	A0	34	1B	1F	0D	64	AA	28	71
00003FB0:	D4	DF	EF	10	EC	7D	FE	74	75	CF	E3	64	BB	4D	94	53
00003FC0:	A9	F1	76	82	98	87	14	8F	3E	8C	0E	EE	85	8F	9C	17
00003FD0:	C0	B7	53	C1	45	D1	3B	D2	A9	6B	23	82	2F	73	DC	6C
00003FE0:	FD	62	3D	E3	CB	70	F8	D5	07	E4	36	C2	0E	39	39	40
00003FF0:	F3	A3	6C	91	3C	0B	CD	FE	67	2C	90	3C	55	22	AA	41
00004000:	0B	31	8D	D1	26	8D	03	5C	59	D3	E1	1F	F2	73	B1	D7
00004010:	71	5E	2F	BF	3A	CA										

-----Server-----

Alert message:

level: 01  
description: 00

00000: 01 00

Record payload protection:

client\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(client\_write\_key\_ap, 10):

00000: D3 CD 87 D5 68 74 07 82 39 78 34 4C 06 B9 28 A8  
00010: 58 98 B7 39 A3 1D 3D E5 FF 2B 78 8E F3 91 96 ED

seqnum:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0A

nonce:  
00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B2

additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 13

TLSInnerPlaintext:  
00000: 01 00 15

Record layer message:  
type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 0013  
encrypted\_record: 7CBC00AD5D29E301739394D31942C6A1  
6658E9

TLSCiphertext:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 13 7C BC 00 AD 5D 29 E3 01 73 93 94  
00010: D3 19 42 C6 A1 66 58 E9

-----Client-----

Alert message:  
level: 01  
description: 00

00000: 01 00

Record payload protection:

client\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(client\_write\_key\_ap, 10):  
00000: B8 2D 78 25 D1 5F AE 18 A7 01 32 28 B3 1C B0 C5  
00010: 97 52 C6 40 9C 5F 78 99 EC C6 95 0F 74 63 C0 90

seqnum:  
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0A

nonce:  
00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 5E

additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 13

TLSInnerPlaintext:  
00000: 01 00 15

Record layer message:  
type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 0013  
encrypted\_record: CB19F306C3641754BE4FC95390DF06F9  
CD44AA

TLSCiphertext:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 13 CB 19 F3 06 C3 64 17 54 BE 4F C9

00010: 53 90 DF 06 F9 CD 44 AA

## A.2. Example 2

### A.2.1. Test Case

Test examples are given for the following instance of the TLS13\_GOST profile:

1. Full TLS Handshake is used.
2. PSK with ECDHE key exchange mode is used. The elliptic curve GC256B is used for ECDHE shared secret calculation.
3. Authentication is used on the server and client sides. The external PSK is used for the mutual authentication.
4. TLS\_GOSTR341112\_256\_WITH\_MAGMA\_MGM\_L cipher suite is negotiated.
5. Four Application Data records are sent during the operation of the Record protocol. The sequence numbers are selected to demonstrate the operation of the TLSTREE function.
6. Alert protocol is used for closure of the connection.

### A.2.2. Test Examples

ePSK:

```
00000: 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
00000: 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
```

-----Client-----

ClientHello1 message:

```
msg_type: 01
length: 00007B
body:
  legacy_version: 0303
  random: 01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101
  legacy_session_id: 0101010101010101010101010101010101
  length: 00
  vector: --
  cipher_suites:
    length: 0002
    vector:
      CipherSuite: C104
  compression_methods:
    length: 01
    vector:
      CompressionMethod: 00
  extensions:
    length: 0050
    vector:
      Extension: /* supported_groups */
```

```

extension_type: 000A
extension_data:
  length: 0006
  vector:
    named_group_list:
      length: 0004
      vector:
        /* GC256B */
        0023
        /* GC512C */
        0028
Extension: /* supported_versions */
extension_type: 002B
extension_data:
  length: 0003
  vector:
    versions:
      length: 02
      vector:
        0304
Extension: /* psk_key_exchange_modes */
extension_type: 002D
extension_data:
  length: 0002
  vector:
    ke_modes:
      length: 01
      vector:
        /* psk_dhe_ke */
        01
Extension: /* key_share */
extension_type: 0033
extension_data:
  length: 0002
  client_shares:
    length: 0000
    vector: --
Extension: /* pre_shared_key */
extension_type: 0029
extension_data:
  length: 002F
  vector:
    identities:
      length: 000A
      vector:
        identity:
          length: 0004
          vector: 6550534B
        obfuscated_ticket_age: 00000000
    binders:
      length: 0021
      vector:
        binder:
          length: 20
          vector: 6F3A0B91F2945EF7056DB74302BC34B6
          DF77A88E09C587508AB6287C6C0514AD

```

```
0000: 01 00 00 7B 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
0010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
0020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 01 00 00 50 00
0030: 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00 03 02 03 04
0040: 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 02 00 00 00 29 00 2F
0050: 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00 00
```

```
0000:  CC 9C A9 FC 18 DF 7A 2F 5F 63 27 D7 7B EA DC F1
0010:  A7 3D 80 97 7F EB EA B4 F0 D3 83 39 30 00 2B 8D
```

```
000000: 42 30 7A 99 68 18 34 0D D0 56 2F 7F EB E6 2A B5
000100: 70 F3 BC 88 9C A9 29 3A 89 0D F2 09 B9 1B BB F3
```

```
000000:  A4 37 62 C3 5E 75 54 1A 15 58 A0 8D 15 50 D3 29
000100:  4C C3 F9 0C 73 99 EC C0 50 B9 15 37 A2 4C D5 E4
```

```
000000: F5 6F 59 C2 E2 F8 E7 7C 69 80 1F B1 7D B4 C1 8B
000100: ED 96 EB 32 FC D7 AB 95 AD D6 B1 CF F1 73 E6 65
```

```
00000:  6F 3A 0B 91 F2 94 5E F7 05 6D B7 43 02 BC 34 B6
00010:  DF 77 A8 8E 09 C5 87 50 8A B6 28 7C 6C 05 14 AD
```

[illegible]

```
000000:  16 03 01 00 7F 01 00 00 7B 03 03 01 01 01 01 01
```

```

00010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
00020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04
00030: 01 00 00 50 00 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B
00040: 00 03 02 03 04 0A 07 0B 07 0C 07 0D 07 0E 07 0F
00050: 00 2B 00 03 02 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 02 00
00060: 00 00 29 00 2F 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00
00070: 00 00 21 20 6F 3A 0B 91 F2 94 5E F7 05 6D B7 43
00080: 02 BC 34 B6 DF 77 A8 8E 09 C5 87 50 8A B6 28 7C
00090: 6C 05 14 AD

```

-----Server-----

HelloRetryRequest message:

```

msg_type: 02
length: 000034
body:
  legacy_version: 0303
  random: CF21AD74E59A6111BE1D8C021E65B891
    C2A211167ABB8C5E079E09E2C8A8339C
  legacy_session_id:
    length: 00
    vector: --
  cipher_suite:
    CipherSuite: C104
  compression_method:
    CompressionMethod: 00
  extensions:
    length: 000C
    vector:
      Extension: /* supported_versions */
        extension_type: 002B
        extension_data:
          length: 0002
          vector:
            selected_version:
              0304
      Extension: /* key_share */
        extension_type: 0033
        extension_data:
          length: 0002
          selected_group: 0023

```

```

00000: 02 00 00 34 03 03 CF 21 AD 74 E5 9A 61 11 BE 1D
00010: 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91 C2 A2 11 16 7A BB 8C 5E 07 9E
00020: 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C 00 C1 04 00 00 0C 00 2B 00 02
00030: 03 04 00 33 00 02 00 23

```

Record layer message:

```

type: 16
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 0038
fragment: 020000340303CF21AD74E59A6111BE1D
  8C021E65B891C2A211167ABB8C5E079E
  09E2C8A8339C00C10400000C002B0002
  0304003300020023

```

```
00000: 16 03 03 00 38 02 00 00 34 03 03 CF 21 AD 74 E5
00010: 9A 61 11 BE 1D 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91 C2 A2 11 16 7A
00020: BB 8C 5E 07 9E 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C 00 C1 04 00 00
00030: 0C 00 2B 00 02 03 04 00 33 00 02 00 23
```

-----Client-----

ClientHello2 message:

```
msg_type: 01
length: 0000BF
body:
  legacy_version: 0303
  random: 01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101
  legacy_session_id:
    length: 00
    vector: --
  cipher_suites:
    length: 0002
    vector:
      CipherSuite: C104
  compression_methods:
    length: 01
    vector:
      CompressionMethod: 00
  extensions:
    length: 0094
    vector:
      Extension: /* supported_groups */
        extension_type: 000A
        extension_data:
          length: 0006
          vector:
            named_group_list:
              length: 0004
              vector:
                /* GC256B */
                0023
                /* GC512C */
                0028
      Extension: /* supported_versions */
        extension_type: 002B
        extension_data:
          length: 0003
          vector:
            versions:
              length: 02
              vector:
                0304
      Extension: /* psk_key_exchange_modes */
        extension_type: 002D
        extension_data:
          length: 0002
          vector:
            ke_modes:
```

```

length: 01
vector:
  /* psk_dhe_ke */
  01
Extension: /* key_share */
extension_type: 0033
extension_data:
length: 0046
client_shares:
length: 0044
vector:
group: 0023
key_exchange:
length: 0040
vector:
D35AA795C452450949591D60E7D5C076
056D6646F3B80708CDC2E7034DE85F68
D1122DC32A3B986D40FF910622A06C12
26D9EC3A7D3A52E0A37C282C47602A43
Extension: /* pre_shared_key */
extension_type: 0029
extension_data:
length: 002F
vector:
identities:
length: 000A
vector:
identity:
length: 0004
vector: 6550534B
obfuscated_ticket_age: 00000000
binders:
length: 0021
vector:
binder:
length: 20
vector: 0BF74AA3933B7D1A66961B6E2CFB6A28
04D696BB607710E3F56DDA91F56B57CB

```

Truncate(ClientHello2):

```

0000: 01 00 00 BF 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
0010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
0020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 01 00 00 94 00
0030: 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00 03 02 03 04
0040: 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 46 00 44 00 23 00 40
0050: D3 5A A7 95 C4 52 45 09 49 59 1D 60 E7 D5 C0 76
0060: 05 6D 66 46 F3 B8 07 08 CD C2 E7 03 4D E8 5F 68
0070: D1 12 2D C3 2A 3B 98 6D 40 FF 91 06 22 A0 6C 12
0080: 26 D9 EC 3A 7D 3A 52 E0 A3 7C 28 2C 47 60 2A 43
0090: 00 29 00 2F 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00 00

```

finished\_binder\_key:

```

00000: F5 6F 59 C2 E2 F8 E7 7C 69 80 1F B1 7D B4 C1 8B
00010: ED 96 EB 32 FC D7 AB 95 AD D6 B1 CF F1 73 E6 65

```

BinderMsg = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,



Truncate(ClientHello2))

Hash(BinderMsg) =

73 7C 63 74 1B 3A EA DF C8 73 DF 6E EA 81 19 32  
BF CE 93 4F AA 85 84 F1 44 F8 77 13 E0 D0 CA 32

binder = HMAC(finished\_binder\_key, Hash(BinderMsg)) =

0B F7 4A A3 93 3B 7D 1A 66 96 1B 6E 2C FB 6A 28  
04 D6 96 BB 60 77 10 E3 F5 6D DA 91 F5 6B 57 CB

0000: 01 00 00 BF 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01  
0010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01  
0020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 01 00 00 94 00  
0030: 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00 03 02 03 04  
0040: 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 46 00 44 00 23 00 40  
0050: D3 5A A7 95 C4 52 45 09 49 59 1D 60 E7 D5 C0 76  
0060: 05 6D 66 46 F3 B8 07 08 CD C2 E7 03 4D E8 5F 68  
0070: D1 12 2D C3 2A 3B 98 6D 40 FF 91 06 22 A0 6C 12  
0080: 26 D9 EC 3A 7D 3A 52 E0 A3 7C 28 2C 47 60 2A 43  
0090: 00 29 00 2F 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00 00  
00A0: 00 21 20 0B F7 4A A3 93 3B 7D 1A 66 96 1B 6E 2C  
00B0: FB 6A 28 04 D6 96 BB 60 77 10 E3 F5 6D DA 91 F5  
00C0: 6B 57 CB

Record layer message:

type:

16

legacy\_record\_version:

0303

length:

00C3

fragment:

010000BF030301010101010101010101010101  
010101010101010101010101010101010101  
010101010101000002C1040100009400  
0A0006000400230028002B0003020304  
002D0002010100330046004400230040  
D35AA795C452450949591D60E7D5C076  
056D6646F3B80708CDC2E7034DE85F68  
D1122DC32A3B986D40FF910622A06C12  
26D9EC3A7D3A52E0A37C282C47602A43  
0029002F000A00046550534B00000000  
0021200BF74AA3933B7D1A66961B6E2C  
FB6A2804D696BB607710E3F56DDA91F5  
6B57CB

00000: 16 03 03 00 C3 01 00 00 BF 03 03 01 01 01 01 01  
00010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01  
00020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04  
00030: 01 00 00 94 00 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B  
00040: 00 03 02 03 04 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 46 00  
00050: 44 00 23 00 40 D3 5A A7 95 C4 52 45 09 49 59 1D  
00060: 60 E7 D5 C0 76 05 6D 66 46 F3 B8 07 08 CD C2 E7  
00070: 03 4D E8 5F 68 D1 12 2D C3 2A 3B 98 6D 40 FF 91  
00080: 06 22 A0 6C 12 26 D9 EC 3A 7D 3A 52 E0 A3 7C 28  
00090: 2C 47 60 2A 43 00 29 00 2F 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53  
000A0: 4B 00 00 00 00 00 00 21 20 0B F7 4A A3 93 3B 7D 1A  
000B0: 66 96 1B 6E 2C FB 6A 28 04 D6 96 BB 60 77 10 E3

-----Server-----

```
00000: 02 00 00 7C 03 03 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
00010: 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
00020: 82 82 82 82 82 82 00 C1 04 00 00 54 00 2B 00 02
00030: 03 04 00 33 00 44 00 23 00 40 3D 2F B0 67 E1 06
00040: CC 99 80 FB 88 42 81 11 64 BA 70 8B BB 50 38 D5
00050: ED FB EE 1D 5E 5D FB E6 F7 4F 19 31 21 7C 67 C2
00060: BD F4 62 53 DB 9C E3 48 72 41 F2 DB D8 4E 2D AB
```

00070: DF 65 45 58 51 B0 B1 9A EF EC 00 29 00 02 00 00

Record layer message:

type: 16  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 0080  
fragment: 0200000410303933EA21E49C31BC3A345  
6165889684CAA5576CE7924A24F58113  
808DBD9EF85610C3802A561550EC78D6  
ED51AC2439D7E7C101000009FF010001  
0000170000

00000: 16 03 03 00 80 02 00 00 7C 03 03 82 82 82 82 82  
00010: 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82  
00020: 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 00 C1 04 00 00  
00030: 54 00 2B 00 02 03 04 00 33 00 44 00 23 00 40 3D  
00040: 2F B0 67 E1 06 CC 99 80 FB 88 42 81 11 64 BA 70  
00050: 8B BB 50 38 D5 ED FB EE 1D 5E 5D FB E6 F7 4F 19  
00060: 31 21 7C 67 C2 BD F4 62 53 DB 9C E3 48 72 41 F2  
00070: DB D8 4E 2D AB DF 65 45 58 51 B0 B1 9A EF EC 00  
00080: 29 00 02 00 00

-----Client-----

d\_C^res:

00000: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02  
00010: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02

Q\_S^res:

00000: 3D 2F B0 67 E1 06 CC 99 80 FB 88 42 81 11 64 BA  
00010: 70 8B BB 50 38 D5 ED FB EE 1D 5E 5D FB E6 F7 4F  
00020: 19 31 21 7C 67 C2 BD F4 62 53 DB 9C E3 48 72 41  
00030: F2 DB D8 4E 2D AB DF 65 45 58 51 B0 B1 9A EF EC

ECDHE:

00000: 98 5A 86 59 D5 5A 8D 48 E0 E6 77 13 96 58 0B 2C  
00010: DC DA 37 E9 2A EE 18 14 D1 0E 1B F2 A4 4F 0D 24

-----Server-----

d\_S^res:

00000: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83  
00010: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83

Q\_C^res:

00000: D3 5A A7 95 C4 52 45 09 49 59 1D 60 E7 D5 C0 76  
00010: 05 6D 66 46 F3 B8 07 08 CD C2 E7 03 4D E8 5F 68  
00020: D1 12 2D C3 2A 3B 98 6D 40 FF 91 06 22 A0 6C 12  
00030: 26 D9 EC 3A 7D 3A 52 E0 A3 7C 28 2C 47 60 2A 43

```
ECDHE:
00000:  98 5A 86 59 D5 5A 8D 48 E0 E6 77 13 96 58 0B 2C
00010:  DC DA 37 E9 2A EE 18 14 D1 0E 1B F2 A4 4F 0D 24
```

-----Server-----

```
EncryptedExtensions message:
msg_type: 08
length: 000002
body:
  extensions:
    length: 0000
    vector: --
```

```
00000:  08 00 00 02 00 00
```

Record payload protection:

```
EarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0^256, IKM: ePSK):
00000:  42 30 7A 99 68 18 34 0D D0 56 2F 7F EB E6 2A B5
00010:  70 F3 BC 88 9C A9 29 3A 89 0D F2 09 B9 1B BB F3
```

```
Derived #0 = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "derived", "") =
HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "derived", "", 32):
00000:  6B 4E 9C 49 C5 C6 F1 7F 60 B2 B8 4B 55 0A 16 38
00010:  14 09 5B 80 88 8E C0 B0 CA 52 E4 09 0C B3 F8 BE
```

```
HandshakeSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #0, IKM: ECDHE):
00000:  A9 CB E6 58 50 2F 3F D1 18 66 51 5F D6 15 E9 88
00010:  0D 1E 61 B5 28 34 BB FD 5F 19 C2 4C 53 C8 79 7F
```

```
HM1 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,
ClientHello2, ServerHello)
```

```
TH1 = Transcript-Hash(HM1):
00000:  88 8D 5D 1E 15 98 65 05 97 3E F2 0F 9A FA F5 71
00010:  20 A3 66 C2 D2 19 91 D1 5E 25 07 0C 3D 07 D5 E9
```

```
server_handshake_traffic_secret (SHTS):
SHTS = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "s hs traffic", HM1) =
HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "s hs traffic", TH1, 32):
00000:  4E F8 68 E5 5B 27 F8 88 8A 6F 82 DA A7 0B 01 1B
00010:  DA B1 77 95 10 F0 88 78 A0 22 2B 3E 2C 76 E6 83
```

```
server_write_key_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "key", "", 32):
00000:  DB 61 9B 58 F4 41 1E 33 4F 07 EA C7 7C EF EF CA
00010:  78 41 F5 40 88 B8 D0 D5 CE 6A 62 C9 82 85 C6 81
```

```
server_write_iv_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "iv", "", 16):
00000:  FC 9E 2A C6 63 04 C2 5B
```

```
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_hs, 0):
```

00000: 3C 7D F3 5E AC F4 FE 71 EA 6A DC E0 DC 44 5D D3  
00010: A9 29 EF CD 08 3F 18 2F BD 51 42 BA 68 6D 38 84

seqnum:  
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

nonce:  
00000: 7C 9E 2A C6 63 04 C2 5B

additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 0F

TLSInnerPlaintext:  
00000: 08 00 00 02 00 00 16

TLSCiphertext:  
00000: 17 03 03 00 0F 49 67 A7 E1 AE 7B FB 37 5A 0F 4B  
00010: 25 45 91 17

Record layer message:  
type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 000F  
encrypted\_record: 4967A7E1AE7BFB375A0F4B  
25459117

00000: 17 03 03 00 0F 49 67 A7 E1 AE 7B FB 37 5A 0F 4B  
00010: 25 45 91 17

-----Server-----

server\_finished\_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "finished", "", 32):  
00000: AF 41 F7 7A CB 18 B4 C5 9D E0 F7 8D 46 D5 AE 95  
00010: 7A A4 92 A7 D8 D8 2A 36 F4 B2 09 B8 20 7C 79 03

HMFinished = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,  
ClientHello2, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions)

Transcript-Hash(HMFinished):  
00000: E0 5D D6 C9 DE BA 09 3D 72 AD 6F 4A 7D 0E 11 95  
00010: FC E7 AE 31 93 F2 FF 5B 2D 0B F6 14 8E CB E7 B9

FinishedHash =  
HMAC(server\_finished\_key, Transcript-Hash(HMFinished)):  
00000: 96 14 5B 61 68 E0 1C 4C F2 99 50 96 EE 12 C8 6B  
00010: 1F 53 1F 96 0A 48 9D E9 C3 44 2A 24 33 E9 AE EE

Finished message:  
msg\_type: 14  
length: 000020  
body:  
verify\_data: 96145B6168E01C4CF2995096EE12C86B  
1F531F960A489DE9C3442A2433E9AE EE

00000: 14 00 00 20 96 14 5B 61 68 E0 1C 4C F2 99 50 96  
00010: EE 12 C8 6B 1F 53 1F 96 0A 48 9D E9 C3 44 2A 24

00020: 33 E9 AE EE

Record payload protection:

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_hs, 1):

00000: 3C 7D F3 5E AC F4 FE 71 EA 6A DC E0 DC 44 5D D3

00010: A9 29 EF CD 08 3F 18 2F BD 51 42 BA 68 6D 38 84

seqnum:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01

nonce:

00000: 7C 9E 2A C6 63 04 C2 5A

additional\_data:

00000: 17 03 03 00 2D

TLSInnerPlaintext:

00000: 14 00 00 20 96 14 5B 61 68 E0 1C 4C F2 99 50 96

00010: EE 12 C8 6B 1F 53 1F 96 0A 48 9D E9 C3 44 2A 24

00020: 33 E9 AE EE 16

Record layer message:

type: 17

legacy\_record\_version: 0303

length: 002D

encrypted\_record: 3BFB2AEADBC349FD89AFB8E481F8426B  
CC6B7F5D975FE05E5B28755C00BF353F  
CA6A48E9F0145993C40CE06F37

TLS\_CIPHERTEXT:

00000: 17 03 03 00 2D 3B FB 2A EA DB C3 49 FD 89 AF B8

00010: E4 81 F8 42 6B CC 6B 7F 5D 97 5F E0 5E 5B 28 75

00020: 5C 00 BF 35 3F CA 6A 48 E9 F0 14 59 93 C4 0C E0

00030: 6F 37

-----Client-----

EarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0<sup>256</sup>, IKM: ePSK):

00000: 42 30 7A 99 68 18 34 0D D0 56 2F 7F EB E6 2A B5

00010: 70 F3 BC 88 9C A9 29 3A 89 0D F2 09 B9 1B BB F3

Derived #0 = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "derived", "") =

HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "derived", "", 32):

00000: 6B 4E 9C 49 C5 C6 F1 7F 60 B2 B8 4B 55 0A 16 38

00010: 14 09 5B 80 88 8E C0 B0 CA 52 E4 09 0C B3 F8 BE

HandshakeSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #0, IKM: ECDHE):

00000: A9 CB E6 58 50 2F 3F D1 18 66 51 5F D6 15 E9 88

00010: 0D 1E 61 B5 28 34 BB FD 5F 19 C2 4C 53 C8 79 7F

HM1 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,  
ClientHello2, ServerHello)

TH1 = Transcript-Hash(HM1):

```
00000: 88 8D 5D 1E 15 98 65 05 97 3E F2 0F 9A FA F5 71
00010: 20 A3 66 C2 D2 19 91 D1 5E 25 07 0C 3D 07 D5 E9
```

client\_handshake\_traffic\_secret (CHTS):

CHTS = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "c hs traffic", HM1) =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "c hs traffic", TH1, 32):

```
00000: DF 00 4B 79 A1 D3 51 55 97 1B 0E 84 C8 91 99 7F
00010: FE E6 D0 1B 27 04 23 CC 74 64 4B 25 47 3E 78 60
```

client\_finished\_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "finished", "", 32):

```
00000: 1F A6 7D 28 9F F2 A6 85 C7 BE 13 FD F5 60 A6 D5
00010: A9 F5 EA 85 63 AD 6C C7 B4 85 30 76 59 A5 55 81
```

HM2 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,  
ClientHello2, ServerHello,  
EncryptedExtensions, Server Finished)

TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2):

```
00000: 53 06 24 EE 07 6F FF E1 04 DC 15 EB B4 2D 78 8F
00010: 1E 4F EB 3E 8C 2D CF A5 CB 85 D7 2F 81 D0 6D 15
```

FinishedHash = HMAC(client\_finished\_key, TH2):

```
00000: BB 83 09 94 BE 38 A9 8F FC A3 BF D2 35 CD 80 7E
00010: 81 82 1E 67 37 AB 98 31 43 DC A9 7B 9E E0 23 25
```

Finished message:

```
msg_type: 14
length: 000020
body:
  verify_data: BB830994BE38A98FFCA3BFD235CD807E
               81821E6737AB983143DCA97B9EE02325
```

```
00000: 14 00 00 20 BB 83 09 94 BE 38 A9 8F FC A3 BF D2
00010: 35 CD 80 7E 81 82 1E 67 37 AB 98 31 43 DC A9 7B
00020: 9E E0 23 25
```

Record payload protection:

client\_write\_key\_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "key", "", 32):

```
00000: DF 66 60 1E DD D6 4E 96 1D FC 7D D0 21 2E F2 25
00010: C0 05 33 E6 DA A4 AD 24 18 5E BE B2 24 B5 46 B8
```

client\_write\_iv\_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "iv", "", 16):

```
00000: E8 94 3C 9F A2 88 56 A1
```

client\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(client\_write\_key\_hs, 0):

```
00000: BD 00 9F FC 04 A0 52 9E 60 78 EB A5 A0 7A DE 74
00010: 93 7F F3 A1 AB 75 F7 AE 05 19 04 78 51 9B 6D F3
```

seqnum:

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

nonce:

```
00000: 68 94 3C 9F A2 88 56 A1
```

additional\_data:

00000: 17 03 03 00 2D

TLSInnerPlaintext:

00000: 14 00 00 20 BB 83 09 94 BE 38 A9 8F FC A3 BF D2  
00010: 35 CD 80 7E 81 82 1E 67 37 AB 98 31 43 DC A9 7B  
00020: 9E E0 23 25 16

Record layer message:

type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 002D  
encrypted\_record: 14254CA6B9EBCC4A951A3D1F1040B0B1  
45446DF131946CEECBDB6A8EC534F194  
223281B56532A703C492160E2C

TLSCiphertext:

00000: 17 03 03 00 2D 14 25 4C A6 B9 EB CC 4A 95 1A 3D  
00010: 1F 10 40 B0 B1 45 44 6D F1 31 94 6C EE CB DB 6A  
00020: 8E C5 34 F1 94 22 32 81 B5 65 32 A7 03 C4 92 16  
00030: 0E 2C

-----Server-----

Application data:

00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Record payload protection:

Derived #1 = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "") =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "", 32):  
00000: BC 4D 6F E3 D9 43 78 21 1D 3D 64 1C 75 92 EB AA  
00010: 7A A2 96 47 9C 57 BD D1 E1 4C 7B 04 9F 6D F1 CD

MainSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #1, IKM: 0<sup>256</sup>):  
00000: DB FF 82 86 2E 54 A1 41 3E 6C 2E D8 2C 6D A5 AF  
00010: FD BF DE 12 30 2E 49 75 5B 61 F2 06 32 E1 0A 42

HM2 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,  
ClientHello2, ServerHello,  
EncryptedExtensions, Server Finished)

TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2):

00000: 53 06 24 EE 07 6F FF E1 04 DC 15 EB B4 2D 78 8F  
00010: 1E 4F EB 3E 8C 2D CF A5 CB 85 D7 2F 81 D0 6D 15

SATS = Derive-Secret(MainSecret, "s ap traffic", HM2) =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(MainSecret, "s ap traffic", TH2, 32):  
00000: 52 91 26 2B EC B5 22 69 34 3A E8 27 9B 43 54 B1  
00010: 89 22 D5 15 04 60 8B A7 21 C4 72 46 7E EE E8 78

server\_write\_key\_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(SATS, "key", "", 32):

00000: 15 D9 2C 51 47 B2 13 10 ED ED F5 5B 3D 7A B7 76  
00000: 81 7D 6F E2 FC F2 30 D7 E3 F2 92 75 F6 E2 41 EC



```
server_write_iv_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(SATS, "iv", "", 8):
00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E B9
```

```
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 0):
00000: 7B B8 81 55 35 98 DE F5 34 FC AF 9B 77 A3 35 5B
00010: C3 BC A3 87 4D 67 40 F6 CB F5 C1 B6 D3 5C 65 ED
```

```
seqnum:
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

```
nonce:
00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E B9
```

```
additional_data:
00000: 17 03 03 04 09
```

```
TLSInnerPlaintext:
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000400: 17
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 17
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 0409
encrypted_record: 7CAA82039F67326C2D735EE809B57750
945F5CE2B0C47B8EF1ECADA3D3F1AD9E
3FBA5926FDB2B61197D08B8B1399167B
6C249C90C0A3101452FD72078FBFB057
31E06215019395DDCF44AA763DCB1ACA
8B3F47D033FBA12E7C0FBB4DFBDABD8B
97E996E8E36231BE8015412B90CCCFBB
E2BC967E597FC2E7B251A9BBEBA0245B
63139387203DB90BD1BF5300A5B577BF
46793DB1AA30FEDFD1E6A5
[...]
E1D55816BFD6BFFBF6E6FB23D86117D2
47441BC211D078199C1F8340BE808BA6
E5BE092B9E081E95D4A57672A07970A6
1FEF2F4B12A0F401FA30B813FE7CD1BF
881485157381B8489EC36296C6EE7538
0FB1DAA1B1473358FD87AA41D5DBA089
F528BD5F3B41B34002D945D7E0C49EFA
54A4EFB0DA4049F5F248B3F7D46FEC05
A25BBE0A5120106BC21C1EA25EFF3125
E079CA0F7FFA56FD89C1A80DA0A3
```

```
TLSCiphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 04 09 7C AA 82 03 9F 67 32 6C 2D 73 5E
00000010: E8 09 B5 77 50 94 5F 5C E2 B0 C4 7B 8E F1 EC AD
00000020: A3 D3 F1 AD 9E 3F BA 59 26 FD B2 B6 11 97 D0 8B
00000030: 8B 13 99 16 7B 6C 24 9C 90 C0 A3 10 14 52 FD 72
00000040: 07 8F BF B0 57 31 E0 62 15 01 93 95 DD CF 44 AA
00000050: 76 3D CB 1A CA 8B 3F 47 D0 33 FB A1 2E 7C 0F BB
```

```
00000060: 4D FB DA BD 8B 97 E9 96 E8 E3 62 31 BE 80 15 41
00000070: 2B 90 CC CF BB E2 BC 96 7E 59 7F C2 E7 B2 51 A9
00000080: BB EB AA 24 5B 63 13 93 87 20 3D B9 0B D1 BF 53
00000090: 00 A5 B5 77 BF 46 79 3D B1 AA 30 FE DF D1 E6 A5
[...]
00000370: E1 D5 58 16 BF D6 BF FB F6 E6 FB 23 D8 61 17 D2
00000380: 47 44 1B C2 11 D0 78 19 9C 1F 83 40 BE 80 8B A6
00000390: E5 BE 09 2B 9E 08 1E 95 D4 A5 76 72 A0 79 70 A6
000003A0: 1F EF 2F 4B 12 A0 F4 01 FA 30 B8 13 FE 7C D1 BF
000003B0: 88 14 85 15 73 81 B8 48 9E C3 62 96 C6 EE 75 38
000003C0: 0F B1 DA A1 B1 47 33 58 FD 87 AA 41 D5 DB A0 89
000003D0: F5 28 BD 5F 3B 41 B3 40 02 D9 45 D7 E0 C4 9E FA
000003E0: 54 A4 EF B0 DA 40 49 F5F2 48 B3 F7 D4 6F EC 05
000003F0: A2 5B BE 0A 51 20 10 6B C2 1C 1E A2 5E FF 31 25
00000400: E0 79 CA 0F 7F FA 56 FD 89 C1 A8 0D A0 A3
```

-----Server-----

Application data:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

Record payload protection:

```
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 1):
00000: 7B B8 81 55 35 98 DE F5 34 FC AF 9B 77 A3 35 5B
00010: C3 BC A3 87 4D 67 40 F6 CB F5 C1 B6 D3 5C 65 ED
```

seqnum:

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
```

nonce:

```
00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E B8
```

additional\_data:

```
00000: 17 03 03 04 09
```

TLSInnerPlaintext:

```
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[...]
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000400: 17
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 17
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 0409
encrypted_record: DC593FC6FAFC5191242B632E144504A2
61AEF332970FF8316FA4DE507BFB471E
A83C713FF950791078FD9A3178D02682
66E12BC970FFB1EE4A56600DF32ABF9F
A318FF45C91CDEF42E1C1D450059729B
1BB6925F773A1E8F304E7AB143F0FC16
EF16BC4E0DF60D76DE43390F9CD257DE
```

D256209B1675378FE6822CBB19A53620  
BD5B240282CF4977F1C572AB3B1DD6CF  
497F2757286B7E49CF80C7 [...]  
EE2E29D3F79640D9CA3C35181B9CE939  
CA16A862AC460424B6AEF6B89D533406  
7724CCF2466A804F09FAB3EBE737F99C  
6498EFF2379CAD6596C3C352F4426876  
95ACBC4FB44B5D069FB66605E47945FE  
2F11509FF7B5961BE8AB43EC2060D822  
A994D97C59C8058C951708029AE0BEDA  
8045ECA025FE02E6D2EFAF13202012E9  
E34358DE79E561CCEC8F549E70073EE6  
938F4A1AAE97465970D65260604C

TLSCiphertext:

00000000: 17 03 03 04 09 DC 59 3F C6 FA FC 51 91 24 2B 63  
00000010: 2E 14 45 04 A2 61 AE F3 32 97 0F F8 31 6F A4 DE  
00000020: 50 7B FB 47 1E A8 3C 71 3F F9 50 79 10 78 FD 9A  
00000030: 31 78 D0 26 82 66 E1 2B C9 70 FF B1 EE 4A 56 60  
00000040: 0D F3 2A BF 9F A3 18 FF 45 C9 1C DE F4 2E 1C 1D  
00000050: 45 00 59 72 9B 1B B6 92 5F 77 3A 1E 8F 30 4E 7A  
00000060: B1 43 F0 FC 16 EF 16 BC 4E 0D F6 0D 76 DE 43 39  
00000070: 0F 9C D2 57 DE D2 56 20 9B 16 75 37 8F E6 82 2C  
00000080: BB 19 A5 36 20 BD 5B 24 02 82 CF 49 77 F1 C5 72  
00000090: AB 3B 1D D6 CF 49 7F 27 57 28 6B 7E 49 CF 80 C7  
[...]  
00000370: EE 2E 29 D3 F7 96 40 D9 CA 3C 35 18 1B 9C E9 39  
00000380: CA 16 A8 62 AC 46 04 24 B6 AE F6 B8 9D 53 34 06  
00000390: 77 24 CC F2 46 6A 80 4F 09 FA B3 EB E7 37 F9 9C  
000003A0: 64 98 EF F2 37 9C AD 65 96 C3 C3 52 F4 42 68 76  
000003B0: 95 AC BC 4F B4 4B 5D 06 9F B6 66 05 E4 79 45 FE  
000003C0: 2F 11 50 9F F7 B5 96 1B E8 AB 43 EC 20 60 D8 22  
000003D0: A9 94 D9 7C 59 C8 05 8C 95 17 08 02 9A E0 BE DA  
000003E0: 80 45 EC A0 25 FE 02 E6 D2 EF AF 13 20 20 12 E9  
000003F0: E3 43 58 DE 79 E5 61 CC EC 8F 54 9E 70 07 3E E6  
00000400: 93 8F 4A 1A AE 97 46 59 70 D6 52 60 60 4C

-----Server-----

Application data:

00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Record payload protection:

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_ap, 128):

00000: 93 D5 D6 E1 03 6F DF B3 EF BF 31 E6 DA 5E EC E6  
00010: 85 17 1C 97 7F F9 CD 6C 3A 3F 67 C0 22 4A B6 EB

seqnum:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80

nonce:

00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E 39

additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 04 09

TLSTInnerPlaintext:  
000000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
00000400: 17

Record layer message:  
type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 0409  
encrypted\_record: 56A7E2F32541DB0EE1563F8CA79EB129  
3192E2122BA8A89A6CF05B151D205AEC  
EB60321D0F637A98880814BEF639FC08  
A1E8222D95A54E5593F8BB9CF520D3FA  
7D38D960E00665BB736A7AFF49D7A7BA  
D092DDB1714655EDF1A9A24F4727DA7E  
873135F2A0534FAF7825EA99401FE1F0  
1E8C4246D2B55CEBE768FA205B3F7890  
9827B912C6AA9FDDE3CFCA47F2D9E2E2  
0FBEE9606D0E0105A7C97A [...]  
A72D5F8E43ABC13984593F16DCECBE7B  
26AF73FDC82D7BE1F913B846D2612531  
BA0F05FF0C52DEFC8674AF3A1AE27393  
FC092D45DCD0F71E2B54B60EC618C2A4  
5BE72EC19B5FB263C2DC780FF3093FD5  
D2F75185E437BE8BB3E5C26F9E0E71B3  
C5D6CCA2E0D2F44BB1ACDA17B189F21E  
C97C748502A2155E3ADC3CCC1BA14EEB  
7CDAA018253FCB57D53A12F548C5456C  
DDA00385EE1C0826AB58E964007C

TLSCiphertext:  
000000000: 17 03 03 04 09 56 A7 E2 F3 25 41 DB 0E E1 56 3F  
000000010: 8C A7 9E B1 29 31 92 E2 12 2B A8 A8 9A 6C F0 5B  
000000020: 15 1D 20 5A EC EB 60 32 1D 0F 63 7A 98 88 08 14  
000000030: BE F6 39 FC 08 A1 E8 22 2D 95 A5 4E 55 93 F8 BB  
000000040: 9C F5 20 D3 FA 7D 38 D9 60 E0 06 65 BB 73 6A 7A  
000000050: FF 49 D7 A7 BA D0 92 DD B1 71 46 55 ED F1 A9 A2  
000000060: 4F 47 27 DA 7E 87 31 35 F2 A0 53 4F AF 78 25 EA  
000000070: 99 40 1F E1 F0 1E 8C 42 46 D2 B5 5C EB E7 68 FA  
000000080: 20 5B 3F 78 90 98 27 B9 12 C6 AA 9F DD E3 CF CA  
000000090: 47 F2 D9 E2 E2 0F BE E9 60 6D 0E 01 05 A7 C9 7A  
[...]  
00000370: A7 2D 5F 8E 43 AB C1 39 84 59 3F 16 DC EC BE 7B  
00000380: 26 AF 73 FD C8 2D 7B E1 F9 13 B8 46 D2 61 25 31  
00000390: BA 0F 05 FF 0C 52 DE FC 86 74 AF 3A 1A E2 73 93  
000003A0: FC 09 2D 45 DC D0 F7 1E 2B 54 B6 0E C6 18 C2 A4  
000003B0: 5B E7 2E C1 9B 5F B2 63 C2 DC 78 0F F3 09 3F D5  
000003C0: D2 F7 51 85 E4 37 BE 8B B3 E5 C2 6F 9E 0E 71 B3  
000003D0: C5 D6 CC A2 E0 D2 F4 4B B1 AC DA 17 B1 89 F2 1E  
000003E0: C9 7C 74 85 02 A2 15 5E 3A DC 3C CC 1B A1 4E EB  
000003F0: 7C DA A0 18 25 3F CB 57 D5 3A 12 F5 48 C5 45 6C

00000400: DD A0 03 85 EE 1C 08 26 AB 58 E9 64 00 7C

-----Server-----

Application data:

00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Record payload protection:

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_ap, 129):  
00000: 93 D5 D6 E1 03 6F DF B3 EF BF 31 E6 DA 5E EC E6  
00010: 85 17 1C 97 7F F9 CD 6C 3A 3F 67 C0 22 4A B6 EB

seqnum:  
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81

nonce:  
00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E 38

additional\_data:  
00000: 17 03 03 04 09

TLSInnerPlaintext:  
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
[...]  
000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
00000400: 17

Record layer message:

type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 0409  
encrypted\_record: EE73C4CAE69FD30BC4B3A66CA571CD9F  
3C7AA2C2BA9F428A82249720F717738F  
8C35AC7745B701F3B0CEE993EB2CFDAB  
4468B22297A8286C2572DE366AC38B70  
471B26A1EC4F19D68E7EDA0A231C3BD1  
98013FA05BAC92E774A370EB10C0CBD9  
15BACD0117A885804B9A475B44A6F3E8  
7D7BCA40F3F52EF4AB624B6EDD3094F9  
86269E409F8BB76CEB4BE26D4B1AF54C  
0A14D41C291EB8E181F79A [...]  
10C401A9423D02804B51DDBFE5925294  
ADEE0067193FED8F66CBEED9475873B8  
8A730496487E8E7F45FC05EEE9C628AF  
E9236696F41A1505AA7392BF71C7EED3  
78035013ADE1EF07DE5A0230669E133E  
0D18B6C977A7FE94F4D22AB29CBAA6B5  
CDDBF4B35598C0007F3BA69D3FA2730D  
F51D867E1E47CFDE22CAEACD4C5AFD97  
088AEB92D12CE3C685C4E517730B8339  
4FC8514264E2F15E51CE439DED1D

TLSCiphertext:

```
00000000: 17 03 03 04 09 EE 73 C4 CA E6 9F D3 0B C4 B3 A6
00000010: 6C A5 71 CD 9F 3C 7A A2 C2 BA 9F 42 8A 82 24 97
00000020: 20 F7 17 73 8F 8C 35 AC 77 45 B7 01 F3 B0 CE E9
00000030: 93 EB 2C FD AB 44 68 B2 22 97 A8 28 6C 25 72 DE
00000040: 36 6A C3 8B 70 47 1B 26 A1 EC 4F 19 D6 8E 7E DA
00000050: 0A 23 1C 3B D1 98 01 3F A0 5B AC 92 E7 74 A3 70
00000060: EB 10 C0 CB D9 15 BA CD 01 17 A8 85 80 4B 9A 47
00000070: 5B 44 A6 F3 E8 7D 7B CA 40 F3 F5 2E F4 AB 62 4B
00000080: 6E DD 30 94 F9 86 26 9E 40 9F 8B B7 6C EB 4B E2
00000090: 6D 4B 1A F5 4C 0A 14 D4 1C 29 1E B8 E1 81 F7 9A
[...]
```

```
00000370: 10 C4 01 A9 42 3D 02 80 4B 51 DD BF E5 92 52 94
00000380: AD EE 00 67 19 3F ED 8F 66 CB EE D9 47 58 73 B8
00000390: 8A 73 04 96 48 7E 8E 7F 45 FC 05 EE E9 C6 28 AF
000003A0: E9 23 66 96 F4 1A 15 05 AA 73 92 BF 71 C7 EE D3
000003B0: 78 03 50 13 AD E1 EF 07 DE 5A 02 30 66 9E 13 3E
000003C0: 0D 18 B6 C9 77 A7 FE 94 F4 D2 2A B2 9C BA A6 B5
000003D0: CD DB F4 B3 55 98 C0 00 7F 3B A6 9D 3F A2 73 0D
000003E0: F5 1D 86 7E 1E 47 CF DE 22 CA EA CD 4C 5A FD 97
000003F0: 08 8A EB 92 D1 2C E3 C6 85 C4 E5 17 73 0B 83 39
00000400: 4F C8 51 42 64 E2 F1 5E 51 CE 43 9D ED 1D
```

-----Server-----

Alert message:

```
level: 01
description: 00
```

00000: 01 00

Record payload protection:

server\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(server\_write\_key\_ap, 130):

```
00000: 93 D5 D6 E1 03 6F DF B3 EF BF 31 E6 DA 5E EC E6
00010: 85 17 1C 97 7F F9 CD 6C 3A 3F 67 C0 22 4A B6 EB
```

seqnum:

```
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82
```

nonce:

```
00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E 3B
```

additional\_data:

```
00000: 17 03 03 00 0B
```

TLSTInnerPlaintext:

```
00000: 01 00 15
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 17
legacy_record_version: 0303
length: 000B
encrypted_record: 447A3FAE8F86C135189B10
```

TLSCiphertext:

```
00000: 17 03 03 00 0B 44 7A 3F AE 8F 86 C1 35 18 9B 10
```

-----Client-----

Alert message:

level: 01

description: 00

00000: 01 00

Record payload protection:

Derived #1 = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "") =  
HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "", 32):

00000: BC 4D 6F E3 D9 43 78 21 1D 3D 64 1C 75 92 EB AA

00010: 7A A2 96 47 9C 57 BD D1 E1 4C 7B 04 9F 6D F1 CD

MainSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #1, IKM: 0<sup>256</sup>):

00000: DB FF 82 86 2E 54 A1 41 3E 6C 2E D8 2C 6D A5 AF

00010: FD BF DE 12 30 2E 49 75 5B 61 F2 06 32 E1 0A 42

HM2 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,  
ClientHello2, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions,  
Server Finished)

TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2):

00000: 53 06 24 EE 07 6F FF E1 04 DC 15 EB B4 2D 78 8F

00010: 1E 4F EB 3E 8C 2D CF A5 CB 85 D7 2F 81 D0 6D 15

client\_application\_traffic\_secret (CATS):

CATS = Derive-Secret(MainSecret, "c ap traffic", HM2) =

HKDF-Expand-Label(MainSecret, "c ap traffic", TH2, 32):

20 D9 85 D5 B8 4D 9D 8D 4E 5E CF CD BC DD 67 41

55 F1 82 F7 28 7B 18 4D A5 53 42 5C 6C 64 57 83

client\_write\_key\_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(CATS, "key", "", 32):

00000: EB D2 71 DE 19 FE E1 8B B1 99 8F 69 AF 5B 6A E1

00010: 89 58 E8 D3 70 2F 12 FB B5 B0 3F 6F D6 91 FE FA

client\_write\_iv\_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(CATS, "iv", "", 8):

00000: 18 FB 03 8D BF 72 41 E6

client\_record\_write\_key = TLSTREE(client\_write\_key\_ap, 0):

00000: 86 2A 74 18 0B 4A E4 C2 D1 5F 4A 62 ED 8A 4A 75

00010: B0 8D 72 B0 46 AF DE CB 3A 8E F0 C2 67 F4 56 BD

seqnum:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

nonce:

00000: 18 FB 03 8D BF 72 41 E6

additional\_data:

00000: 17 03 03 00 0B

TLSInnerPlaintext:

00000: 01 00 15

**Record layer message:**

type: 17  
legacy\_record\_version: 0303  
length: 000B  
encrypted\_record: 464AEEAD391D97987169F3

**TLSCiphertext:**

00000: 17 03 03 00 0B 46 4A EE AD 39 1D 97 98 71 69 F3

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