

## Generic Security Service Application Program Interface, Version 2

### Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

### Abstract

The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API), as defined in RFC-1508, provides security services to callers in a generic fashion, supportable with a range of underlying mechanisms and technologies and hence allowing source-level portability of applications to different environments. This specification defines GSS-API services and primitives at a level independent of underlying mechanism and programming language environment, and is to be complemented by other, related specifications:

- documents defining specific parameter bindings for particular language environments

- documents defining token formats, protocols, and procedures to be implemented in order to realize GSS-API services atop particular security mechanisms

This memo revises RFC-1508, making specific, incremental changes in response to implementation experience and liaison requests. It is intended, therefore, that this memo or a successor version thereto will become the basis for subsequent progression of the GSS-API specification on the standards track.

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## 1: GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts

GSS-API operates in the following paradigm. A typical GSS-API caller is itself a communications protocol, calling on GSS-API in order to protect its communications with authentication, integrity, and/or confidentiality security services. A GSS-API caller accepts tokens provided to it by its local GSS-API implementation and transfers the tokens to a peer on a remote system; that peer passes the received tokens to its local GSS-API implementation for processing. The security services available through GSS-API in this fashion are implementable (and have been implemented) over a range of underlying mechanisms based on secret-key and public-key cryptographic technologies.

The GSS-API separates the operations of initializing a security context between peers, achieving peer entity authentication (This security service definition, and other definitions used in this document, corresponds to that provided in International Standard ISO 7498-2-1988(E), Security Architecture.) (GSS\_Init\_sec\_context() and GSS\_Accept\_sec\_context() calls), from the operations of providing per-message data origin authentication and data integrity protection (GSS\_GetMIC() and GSS\_VerifyMIC() calls) for messages subsequently transferred in conjunction with that context. When establishing a

security context, the GSS-API enables a context initiator to optionally permit its credentials to be delegated, meaning that the context acceptor may initiate further security contexts on behalf of the initiating caller. Per-message GSS\_Wrap() and GSS\_Unwrap() calls provide the data origin authentication and data integrity services which GSS\_GetMIC() and GSS\_VerifyMIC() offer, and also support selection of confidentiality services as a caller option. Additional calls provide supportive functions to the GSS-API's users.

The following paragraphs provide an example illustrating the dataflows involved in use of the GSS-API by a client and server in a mechanism-independent fashion, establishing a security context and transferring a protected message. The example assumes that credential acquisition has already been completed. The example assumes that the underlying authentication technology is capable of authenticating a client to a server using elements carried within a single token, and of authenticating the server to the client (mutual authentication) with a single returned token; this assumption holds for presently-documented CAT mechanisms but is not necessarily true for other cryptographic technologies and associated protocols.

The client calls GSS\_Init\_sec\_context() to establish a security context to the server identified by targ\_name, and elects to set the mutual\_req\_flag so that mutual authentication is performed in the course of context establishment. GSS\_Init\_sec\_context() returns an output\_token to be passed to the server, and indicates GSS\_S\_CONTINUE\_NEEDED status pending completion of the mutual authentication sequence. Had mutual\_req\_flag not been set, the initial call to GSS\_Init\_sec\_context() would have returned GSS\_S\_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output\_token to the server.

The server passes the received token as the input\_token parameter to GSS\_Accept\_sec\_context(). GSS\_Accept\_sec\_context indicates GSS\_S\_COMPLETE status, provides the client's authenticated identity in the src\_name result, and provides an output\_token to be passed to the client. The server sends the output\_token to the client.

The client passes the received token as the input\_token parameter to a successor call to GSS\_Init\_sec\_context(), which processes data included in the token in order to achieve mutual authentication from the client's viewpoint. This call to GSS\_Init\_sec\_context() returns GSS\_S\_COMPLETE status, indicating successful mutual authentication and the completion of context establishment for this example.

The client generates a data message and passes it to GSS\_Wrap(). GSS\_Wrap() performs data origin authentication, data integrity, and (optionally) confidentiality processing on the message and

encapsulates the result into `output_message`, indicating `GSS_S_COMPLETE` status. The client sends the `output_message` to the server.

The server passes the received message to `GSS_Unwrap()`. `GSS_Unwrap()` inverts the encapsulation performed by `GSS_Wrap()`, decipheres the message if the optional confidentiality feature was applied, and validates the data origin authentication and data integrity checking quantities. `GSS_Unwrap()` indicates successful validation by returning `GSS_S_COMPLETE` status along with the resultant `output_message`.

For purposes of this example, we assume that the server knows by out-of-band means that this context will have no further use after one protected message is transferred from client to server. Given this premise, the server now calls `GSS_Delete_sec_context()` to flush context-level information. Optionally, the server-side application may provide a token buffer to `GSS_Delete_sec_context()`, to receive a context token to be transferred to the client in order to request that client-side context-level information be deleted.

If a context token is transferred, the client passes the context token to `GSS_Process_context_token()`, which returns `GSS_S_COMPLETE` status after deleting context-level information at the client system.

The GSS-API design assumes and addresses several basic goals, including:

**Mechanism independence:** The GSS-API defines an interface to cryptographically implemented strong authentication and other security services at a generic level which is independent of particular underlying mechanisms. For example, GSS-API-provided services can be implemented by secret-key technologies (e.g., Kerberos) or public-key approaches (e.g., X.509).

**Protocol environment independence:** The GSS-API is independent of the communications protocol suites with which it is employed, permitting use in a broad range of protocol environments. In appropriate environments, an intermediate implementation "veneer" which is oriented to a particular communication protocol (e.g., Remote Procedure Call (RPC)) may be interposed between applications which call that protocol and the GSS-API, thereby invoking GSS-API facilities in conjunction with that protocol's communications invocations.

**Protocol association independence:** The GSS-API's security context construct is independent of communications protocol association

constructs. This characteristic allows a single GSS-API implementation to be utilized by a variety of invoking protocol modules on behalf of those modules' calling applications. GSS-API services can also be invoked directly by applications, wholly independent of protocol associations.

Suitability to a range of implementation placements: GSS-API clients are not constrained to reside within any Trusted Computing Base (TCB) perimeter defined on a system where the GSS-API is implemented; security services are specified in a manner suitable to both intra-TCB and extra-TCB callers.

## 1.1: GSS-API Constructs

This section describes the basic elements comprising the GSS-API.

### 1.1.1: Credentials

#### 1.1.1.1: Credential Constructs and Concepts

Credentials provide the prerequisites which permit GSS-API peers to establish security contexts with each other. A caller may designate that the credential elements which are to be applied for context initiation or acceptance be selected by default. Alternately, those GSS-API callers which need to make explicit selection of particular credentials structures may make references to those credentials through GSS-API-provided credential handles ("cred\_handles"). In all cases, callers' credential references are indirect, mediated by GSS-API implementations and not requiring callers to access the selected credential elements.

A single credential structure may be used to initiate outbound contexts and to accept inbound contexts. Callers needing to operate in only one of these modes may designate this fact when credentials are acquired for use, allowing underlying mechanisms to optimize their processing and storage requirements. The credential elements defined by a particular mechanism may contain multiple cryptographic keys, e.g., to enable authentication and message encryption to be performed with different algorithms.

A GSS-API credential structure may contain multiple credential elements, each containing mechanism-specific information for a particular underlying mechanism (mech\_type), but the set of elements within a given credential structure represent a common entity. A credential structure's contents will vary depending on the set of mech\_types supported by a particular GSS-API implementation. Each credential element identifies the data needed by its mechanism in order to establish contexts on behalf of a particular principal, and

may contain separate credential references for use in context initiation and context acceptance. Multiple credential elements within a given credential having overlapping combinations of mechanism, usage mode, and validity period are not permitted.

Commonly, a single mech\_type will be used for all security contexts established by a particular initiator to a particular target. A major motivation for supporting credential sets representing multiple mech\_types is to allow initiators on systems which are equipped to handle multiple types to initiate contexts to targets on other systems which can accommodate only a subset of the set supported at the initiator's system.

#### 1.1.1.2: Credential Management

It is the responsibility of underlying system-specific mechanisms and OS functions below the GSS-API to ensure that the ability to acquire and use credentials associated with a given identity is constrained to appropriate processes within a system. This responsibility should be taken seriously by implementors, as the ability for an entity to utilize a principal's credentials is equivalent to the entity's ability to successfully assert that principal's identity.

Once a set of GSS-API credentials is established, the transferability of that credentials set to other processes or analogous constructs within a system is a local matter, not defined by the GSS-API. An example local policy would be one in which any credentials received as a result of login to a given user account, or of delegation of rights to that account, are accessible by, or transferable to, processes running under that account.

The credential establishment process (particularly when performed on behalf of users rather than server processes) is likely to require access to passwords or other quantities which should be protected locally and exposed for the shortest time possible. As a result, it will often be appropriate for preliminary credential establishment to be performed through local means at user login time, with the result(s) cached for subsequent reference. These preliminary credentials would be set aside (in a system-specific fashion) for subsequent use, either:

- to be accessed by an invocation of the GSS-API GSS\_Acquire\_cred() call, returning an explicit handle to reference that credential

- to comprise default credential elements to be installed, and to be used when default credential behavior is requested on behalf of a process

### 1.1.1.3: Default Credential Resolution

The `gss_init_sec_context` and `gss_accept_sec_context` routines allow the value `GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL` to be specified as their credential handle parameter. This special credential-handle indicates a desire by the application to act as a default principal. While individual GSS-API implementations are free to determine such default behavior as appropriate to the mechanism, the following default behavior by these routines is recommended for portability:

#### `GSS_Init_sec_context:`

- (i) If there is only a single principal capable of initiating security contexts that the application is authorized to act on behalf of, then that principal shall be used, otherwise
- (ii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default network-identity, and if the application is authorized to act on behalf of that identity for the purpose of initiating security contexts, then the principal corresponding to that identity shall be used, otherwise
- (iii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default local identity, and provides a means to map local identities into network-identities, and if the application is authorized to act on behalf of the network-identity image of the default local identity for the purpose of initiating security contexts, then the principal corresponding to that identity shall be used, otherwise
- (iv) A user-configurable default identity should be used.

#### `GSS_Accept_sec_context:`

- (i) If there is only a single authorized principal identity capable of accepting security contexts, then that principal shall be used, otherwise
- (ii) If the mechanism can determine the identity of the target principal by examining the context-establishment token, and if the accepting application is authorized to act as that principal for the purpose of accepting security contexts, then that principal identity shall be used, otherwise
- (iii) If the mechanism supports context acceptance by any principal, and mutual authentication was not requested, any principal that the application is authorized to accept security contexts under may be used, otherwise



(iv) A user-configurable default identity shall be used.

The purpose of the above rules is to allow security contexts to be established by both initiator and acceptor using the default behavior wherever possible. Applications requesting default behavior are likely to be more portable across mechanisms and platforms than ones that use GSS\_Acquire\_cred to request a specific identity.

#### 1.1.2: Tokens

Tokens are data elements transferred between GSS-API callers, and are divided into two classes. Context-level tokens are exchanged in order to establish and manage a security context between peers. Per-message tokens relate to an established context and are exchanged to provide protective security services (i.e., data origin authentication, integrity, and optional confidentiality) for corresponding data messages.

The first context-level token obtained from GSS\_Init\_sec\_context() is required to indicate at its very beginning a globally-interpretable mechanism identifier, i.e., an Object Identifier (OID) of the security mechanism. The remaining part of this token as well as the whole content of all other tokens are specific to the particular underlying mechanism used to support the GSS-API. Section 3 of this document provides, for designers of GSS-API support mechanisms, the description of the header of the first context-level token which is then followed by mechanism-specific information.

Tokens' contents are opaque from the viewpoint of GSS-API callers. They are generated within the GSS-API implementation at an end system, provided to a GSS-API caller to be transferred to the peer GSS-API caller at a remote end system, and processed by the GSS-API implementation at that remote end system. Tokens may be output by GSS-API calls (and should be transferred to GSS-API peers) whether or not the calls' status indicators indicate successful completion. Token transfer may take place in an in-band manner, integrated into the same protocol stream used by the GSS-API callers for other data transfers, or in an out-of-band manner across a logically separate channel.

Different GSS-API tokens are used for different purposes (e.g., context initiation, context acceptance, protected message data on an established context), and it is the responsibility of a GSS-API caller receiving tokens to distinguish their types, associate them with corresponding security contexts, and pass them to appropriate GSS-API processing routines. Depending on the caller protocol environment, this distinction may be accomplished in several ways.

The following examples illustrate means through which tokens' types may be distinguished:

- implicit tagging based on state information (e.g., all tokens on a new association are considered to be context establishment tokens until context establishment is completed, at which point all tokens are considered to be wrapped data objects for that context),
- explicit tagging at the caller protocol level,
- a hybrid of these approaches.

Commonly, the encapsulated data within a token includes internal mechanism-specific tagging information, enabling mechanism-level processing modules to distinguish tokens used within the mechanism for different purposes. Such internal mechanism-level tagging is recommended to mechanism designers, and enables mechanisms to determine whether a caller has passed a particular token for processing by an inappropriate GSS-API routine.

Development of GSS-API support primitives based on a particular underlying cryptographic technique and protocol (i.e., conformant to a specific GSS-API mechanism definition) does not necessarily imply that GSS-API callers using that GSS-API mechanism will be able to interoperate with peers invoking the same technique and protocol outside the GSS-API paradigm, or with peers implementing a different GSS-API mechanism based on the same underlying technology. The format of GSS-API tokens defined in conjunction with a particular mechanism, and the techniques used to integrate those tokens into callers' protocols, may not be interoperable with the tokens used by non-GSS-API callers of the same underlying technique.

### 1.1.3: Security Contexts

Security contexts are established between peers, using credentials established locally in conjunction with each peer or received by peers via delegation. Multiple contexts may exist simultaneously between a pair of peers, using the same or different sets of credentials. Coexistence of multiple contexts using different credentials allows graceful rollover when credentials expire. Distinction among multiple contexts based on the same credentials serves applications by distinguishing different message streams in a security sense.

The GSS-API is independent of underlying protocols and addressing structure, and depends on its callers to transport GSS-API-provided data elements. As a result of these factors, it is a caller

responsibility to parse communicated messages, separating GSS-API-related data elements from caller-provided data. The GSS-API is independent of connection vs. connectionless orientation of the underlying communications service.

No correlation between security context and communications protocol association is dictated. (The optional channel binding facility, discussed in Section 1.1.6 of this document, represents an intentional exception to this rule, supporting additional protection features within GSS-API supporting mechanisms.) This separation allows the GSS-API to be used in a wide range of communications environments, and also simplifies the calling sequences of the individual calls. In many cases (depending on underlying security protocol, associated mechanism, and availability of cached information), the state information required for context setup can be sent concurrently with initial signed user data, without interposing additional message exchanges.

#### 1.1.4: Mechanism Types

In order to successfully establish a security context with a target peer, it is necessary to identify an appropriate underlying mechanism type (`mech_type`) which both initiator and target peers support. The definition of a mechanism embodies not only the use of a particular cryptographic technology (or a hybrid or choice among alternative cryptographic technologies), but also definition of the syntax and semantics of data element exchanges which that mechanism will employ in order to support security services.

It is recommended that callers initiating contexts specify the "default" `mech_type` value, allowing system-specific functions within or invoked by the GSS-API implementation to select the appropriate `mech_type`, but callers may direct that a particular `mech_type` be employed when necessary.

The means for identifying a shared `mech_type` to establish a security context with a peer will vary in different environments and circumstances; examples include (but are not limited to):

- use of a fixed `mech_type`, defined by configuration, within an environment

- syntactic convention on a target-specific basis, through examination of a target's name

- lookup of a target's name in a naming service or other database in order to identify `mech_types` supported by that target

explicit negotiation between GSS-API callers in advance of security context setup

When transferred between GSS-API peers, mech\_type specifiers (per Section 3, represented as Object Identifiers (OIDs)) serve to qualify the interpretation of associated tokens. (The structure and encoding of Object Identifiers is defined in ISO/IEC 8824, "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)" and in ISO/IEC 8825, "Specification of Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)".) Use of hierarchically structured OIDs serves to preclude ambiguous interpretation of mech\_type specifiers. The OID representing the DASS MechType, for example, is 1.3.12.2.1011.7.5, and that of the Kerberos V5 mechanism, once advanced to the level of Proposed Standard, will be 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2.

#### 1.1.5: Naming

The GSS-API avoids prescribing naming structures, treating the names which are transferred across the interface in order to initiate and accept security contexts as opaque objects. This approach supports the GSS-API's goal of implementability atop a range of underlying security mechanisms, recognizing the fact that different mechanisms process and authenticate names which are presented in different forms. Generalized services offering translation functions among arbitrary sets of naming environments are outside the scope of the GSS-API; availability and use of local conversion functions to translate among the naming formats supported within a given end system is anticipated.

Different classes of name representations are used in conjunction with different GSS-API parameters:

- Internal form (denoted in this document by INTERNAL NAME), opaque to callers and defined by individual GSS-API implementations. GSS-API implementations supporting multiple namespace types must maintain internal tags to disambiguate the interpretation of particular names. A Mechanism Name (MN) is a special case of INTERNAL NAME, guaranteed to contain elements corresponding to one and only one mechanism; calls which are guaranteed to emit MNs or which require MNs as input are so identified within this specification.
- Contiguous string ("flat") form (denoted in this document by OCTET STRING); accompanied by OID tags identifying the namespace to which they correspond. Depending on tag value, flat names may or may not be printable strings for direct acceptance from and presentation to users. Tagging of flat names allows GSS-API callers and underlying GSS-API mechanisms to disambiguate name

types and to determine whether an associated name's type is one which they are capable of processing, avoiding aliasing problems which could result from misinterpreting a name of one type as a name of another type.


- The GSS-API Exported Name Object, a special case of flat name designated by a reserved OID value, carries a canonicalized form of a name suitable for binary comparisons.

In addition to providing means for names to be tagged with types, this specification defines primitives to support a level of naming environment independence for certain calling applications. To provide basic services oriented towards the requirements of callers which need not themselves interpret the internal syntax and semantics of names, GSS-API calls for name comparison (`GSS_Compare_name()`), human-readable display (`GSS_Display_name()`), input conversion (`GSS_Import_name()`), internal name deallocation (`GSS_Release_name()`), and internal name duplication (`GSS_Duplicate_name()`) functions are defined. (It is anticipated that these proposed GSS-API calls will be implemented in many end systems based on system-specific name manipulation primitives already extant within those end systems; inclusion within the GSS-API is intended to offer GSS-API callers a portable means to perform specific operations, supportive of authorization and audit requirements, on authenticated names.)

`GSS_Import_name()` implementations can, where appropriate, support more than one printable syntax corresponding to a given namespace (e.g., alternative printable representations for X.500 Distinguished Names), allowing flexibility for their callers to select among alternative representations. `GSS_Display_name()` implementations output a printable syntax selected as appropriate to their operational environments; this selection is a local matter. Callers desiring portability across alternative printable syntaxes should refrain from implementing comparisons based on printable name forms and should instead use the `GSS_Compare_name()` call to determine whether or not one internal-format name matches another.

The `GSS_Canonicalize_name()` and `GSS_Export_name()` calls enable callers to acquire and process Exported Name Objects, canonicalized and translated in accordance with the procedures of a particular GSS-API mechanism. Exported Name Objects can, in turn, be input to `GSS_Import_name()`, yielding equivalent MNs. These facilities are designed specifically to enable efficient storage and comparison of names (e.g., for use in access control lists).

The following diagram illustrates the intended dataflow among name-related GSS-API processing routines.



#### 1.1.6: Channel Bindings

The GSS-API accommodates the concept of caller-provided channel binding ("chan\_binding") information. Channel bindings are used to strengthen the quality with which peer entity authentication is provided during context establishment, by limiting the scope within which an intercepted context establishment token can be reused by an attacker. Specifically, they enable GSS-API callers to bind the establishment of a security context to relevant characteristics (e.g., addresses, transformed representations of encryption keys) of the underlying communications channel, of protection mechanisms applied to that communications channel, and to application-specific data.

The caller initiating a security context must determine the appropriate channel binding values to provide as input to the `GSS_Init_sec_context()` call, and consistent values must be provided to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` by the context's target, in order for both peers' GSS-API mechanisms to validate that received tokens possess correct channel-related characteristics. Use or non-use of

the GSS-API channel binding facility is a caller option. GSS-API mechanisms can operate in an environment where NULL channel bindings are presented; mechanism implementors are encouraged, but not required, to make use of caller-provided channel binding data within their mechanisms. Callers should not assume that underlying mechanisms provide confidentiality protection for channel binding information.

When non-NULL channel bindings are provided by callers, certain mechanisms can offer enhanced security value by interpreting the bindings' content (rather than simply representing those bindings, or integrity check values computed on them, within tokens) and will therefore depend on presentation of specific data in a defined format. To this end, agreements among mechanism implementors are defining conventional interpretations for the contents of channel binding arguments, including address specifiers (with content dependent on communications protocol environment) for context initiators and acceptors. (These conventions are being incorporated in GSS-API mechanism specifications and into the GSS-API C language bindings specification.) In order for GSS-API callers to be portable across multiple mechanisms and achieve the full security functionality which each mechanism can provide, it is strongly recommended that GSS-API callers provide channel bindings consistent with these conventions and those of the networking environment in which they operate.

## 1.2: GSS-API Features and Issues

This section describes aspects of GSS-API operations, of the security services which the GSS-API provides, and provides commentary on design issues.

### 1.2.1: Status Reporting

Each GSS-API call provides two status return values. Major\_status values provide a mechanism-independent indication of call status (e.g., GSS\_S\_COMPLETE, GSS\_S\_FAILURE, GSS\_S\_CONTINUE\_NEEDED), sufficient to drive normal control flow within the caller in a generic fashion. Table 1 summarizes the defined major\_status return codes in tabular fashion.

Table 1: GSS-API Major Status Codes

**FATAL ERROR CODES**

<b>GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS</b>	channel binding mismatch
<b>GSS_S_BAD_MECH</b>	unsupported mechanism requested
<b>GSS_S_BAD_NAME</b>	invalid name provided
<b>GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE</b>	name of unsupported type provided
<b>GSS_S_BAD_STATUS</b>	invalid input status selector
<b>GSS_S_BAD_SIG</b>	token had invalid integrity check
<b>GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED</b>	specified security context expired
<b>GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED</b>	expired credentials detected
<b>GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL</b>	defective credential detected
<b>GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN</b>	defective token detected
<b>GSS_S_FAILURE</b>	failure, unspecified at GSS-API level
<b>GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT</b>	no valid security context specified
<b>GSS_S_NO_CRED</b>	no valid credentials provided
<b>GSS_S_BAD_QOP</b>	unsupported QOP value
<b>GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED</b>	operation unauthorized
<b>GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE</b>	operation unavailable
<b>GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT</b>	duplicate credential element requested
<b>GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN</b>	name contains multi-mechanism elements

**INFORMATORY STATUS CODES**

<b>GSS_S_COMPLETE</b>	normal completion
<b>GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED</b>	continuation call to routine required
<b>GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN</b>	duplicate per-message token detected
<b>GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN</b>	timed-out per-message token detected
<b>GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN</b>	reordered (early) per-message token detected
<b>GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN</b>	skipped predecessor token(s) detected

Minor\_status provides more detailed status information which may include status codes specific to the underlying security mechanism. Minor\_status values are not specified in this document.

GSS\_S\_CONTINUE\_NEEDED major\_status returns, and optional message outputs, are provided in GSS\_Init\_sec\_context() and GSS\_Accept\_sec\_context() calls so that different mechanisms' employment of different numbers of messages within their authentication sequences need not be reflected in separate code paths within calling applications. Instead, such cases are accommodated



with sequences of continuation calls to `GSS_Init_sec_context()` and `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`. The same mechanism is used to encapsulate mutual authentication within the GSS-API's context initiation calls.

For `mech_types` which require interactions with third-party servers in order to establish a security context, GSS-API context establishment calls may block pending completion of such third-party interactions.

On the other hand, no GSS-API calls pend on serialized interactions with GSS-API peer entities. As a result, local GSS-API status returns cannot reflect unpredictable or asynchronous exceptions occurring at remote peers, and reflection of such status information is a caller responsibility outside the GSS-API.

### 1.2.2: Per-Message Security Service Availability

When a context is established, two flags are returned to indicate the set of per-message protection security services which will be available on the context:

- the `integ_avail` flag indicates whether per-message integrity and data origin authentication services are available

- the `conf_avail` flag indicates whether per-message confidentiality services are available, and will never be returned TRUE unless the `integ_avail` flag is also returned TRUE

GSS-API callers desiring per-message security services should check the values of these flags at context establishment time, and must be aware that a returned FALSE value for `integ_avail` means that invocation of `GSS_GetMIC()` or `GSS_Wrap()` primitives on the associated context will apply no cryptographic protection to user data messages.

The GSS-API per-message integrity and data origin authentication services provide assurance to a receiving caller that protection was applied to a message by the caller's peer on the security context, corresponding to the entity named at context initiation. The GSS-API per-message confidentiality service provides assurance to a sending caller that the message's content is protected from access by entities other than the context's named peer.

The GSS-API per-message protection service primitives, as the category name implies, are oriented to operation at the granularity of protocol data units. They perform cryptographic operations on the data units, transfer cryptographic control information in tokens, and, in the case of GSS\_Wrap(), encapsulate the protected data unit. As such, these primitives are not oriented to efficient data protection for stream-paradigm protocols (e.g., Telnet) if cryptography must be applied on an octet-by-octet basis.

### 1.2.3: Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing

Certain underlying mech\_types offer support for replay detection and/or sequencing of messages transferred on the contexts they support. These optionally-selectable protection features are distinct from replay detection and sequencing features applied to the context establishment operation itself; the presence or absence of context-level replay or sequencing features is wholly a function of the underlying mech\_type's capabilities, and is not selected or omitted as a caller option.

The caller initiating a context provides flags (replay\_det\_req\_flag and sequence\_req\_flag) to specify whether the use of per-message replay detection and sequencing features is desired on the context being established. The GSS-API implementation at the initiator system can determine whether these features are supported (and whether they are optionally selectable) as a function of mech\_type, without need for bilateral negotiation with the target. When enabled, these features provide recipients with indicators as a result of GSS-API processing of incoming messages, identifying whether those messages were detected as duplicates or out-of-sequence. Detection of such events does not prevent a suspect message from being provided to a recipient; the appropriate course of action on a suspect message is a matter of caller policy.

The semantics of the replay detection and sequencing services applied to received messages, as visible across the interface which the GSS-API provides to its clients, are as follows:

When replay\_det\_state is TRUE, the possible major\_status returns for well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows:

1. GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, and that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed message within that window.

2. GSS\_S\_DUPLICATE\_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on the received message was correct, but that the message was recognized as a duplicate of a previously-processed message.

3. GSS\_S\_OLD\_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on the received message was correct, but that the message is too old to be checked for duplication.

When sequence\_state is TRUE, the possible major\_status returns for well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows:

1. GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed message within that window, and that no predecessor sequenced messages are missing relative to the last received message (if any) processed on the context with a correct cryptographic checkvalue.

2. GSS\_S\_DUPLICATE\_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check value on the received message was correct, but that the message was recognized as a duplicate of a previously-processed message.

3. GSS\_S\_OLD\_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check value on the received message was correct, but that the token is too old to be checked for duplication.

4. GSS\_S\_UNSEQ\_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on the received message was correct, but that it is earlier in a sequenced stream than a message already processed on the context. [Note: Mechanisms can be architected to provide a stricter form of sequencing service, delivering particular messages to recipients only after all predecessor messages in an ordered stream have been delivered. This type of support is incompatible with the GSS-API paradigm in which recipients receive all messages, whether in order or not, and provide them (one at a time, without intra-GSS-API message buffering) to GSS-API routines for validation. GSS-API facilities provide supportive functions, aiding clients to achieve strict message stream integrity in an efficient manner in conjunction with sequencing provisions in communications protocols, but the GSS-API does not offer this level of message stream integrity service by itself.]

5. `GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN` indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on the received message was correct, but that one or more predecessor sequenced messages have not been successfully processed relative to the last received message (if any) processed on the context with a correct cryptographic checkvalue.

As the message stream integrity features (especially sequencing) may interfere with certain applications' intended communications paradigms, and since support for such features is likely to be resource intensive, it is highly recommended that `mech_types` supporting these features allow them to be activated selectively on initiator request when a context is established. A context initiator and target are provided with corresponding indicators (`replay_det_state` and `sequence_state`), signifying whether these features are active on a given context.

An example `mech_type` supporting per-message replay detection could (when `replay_det_state` is `TRUE`) implement the feature as follows: The underlying mechanism would insert timestamps in data elements output by `GSS_GetMIC()` and `GSS_Wrap()`, and would maintain (within a time-limited window) a cache (qualified by originator-recipient pair) identifying received data elements processed by `GSS_VerifyMIC()` and `GSS_Unwrap()`. When this feature is active, exception status returns (`GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN`, `GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN`) will be provided when `GSS_VerifyMIC()` or `GSS_Unwrap()` is presented with a message which is either a detected duplicate of a prior message or which is too old to validate against a cache of recently received messages.

#### 1.2.4: Quality of Protection

Some `mech_types` provide their users with fine granularity control over the means used to provide per-message protection, allowing callers to trade off security processing overhead dynamically against the protection requirements of particular messages. A per-message quality-of-protection parameter (analogous to quality-of-service, or QOS) selects among different QOP options supported by that mechanism. On context establishment for a multi-QOP `mech_type`, context-level data provides the prerequisite data for a range of protection qualities.

It is expected that the majority of callers will not wish to exert explicit mechanism-specific QOP control and will therefore request selection of a default QOP. Definitions of, and choices among, non-default QOP values are mechanism-specific, and no ordered sequences of QOP values can be assumed equivalent across different mechanisms. Meaningful use of non-default QOP values demands that callers be familiar with the QOP definitions of an underlying mechanism or mechanisms, and is therefore a non-portable construct. The

GSS\_S\_BAD\_QOP major\_status value is defined in order to indicate that a provided QOP value is unsupported for a security context, most likely because that value is unrecognized by the underlying mechanism.

### 1.2.5: Anonymity Support

In certain situations or environments, an application may wish to authenticate a peer and/or protect communications using GSS-API per-message services without revealing its own identity. For example, consider an application which provides read access to a research database, and which permits queries by arbitrary requestors. A client of such a service might wish to authenticate the service, to establish trust in the information received from it, but might not wish to disclose its identity to the service for privacy reasons.

In ordinary GSS-API usage, a context initiator's identity is made available to the context acceptor as part of the context establishment process. To provide for anonymity support, a facility (input anon\_req\_flag to GSS\_Init\_sec\_context()) is provided through which context initiators may request that their identity not be provided to the context acceptor. Mechanisms are not required to honor this request, but a caller will be informed (via returned anon\_state indicator from GSS\_Init\_sec\_context()) whether or not the request is honored. Note that authentication as the anonymous principal does not necessarily imply that credentials are not required in order to establish a context.

The following Object Identifier value is provided as a means to identify anonymous names, and can be compared against in order to determine, in a mechanism-independent fashion, whether a name refers to an anonymous principal:

```
{1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes),  
3(gss-anonymous-name)}
```

The recommended symbolic name corresponding to this definition is GSS\_C\_NT\_ANONYMOUS.

Four possible combinations of anon\_state and mutual\_state are possible, with the following results:

anon\_state == FALSE, mutual\_state == FALSE: initiator  
authenticated to target.

anon\_state == FALSE, mutual\_state == TRUE: initiator authenticated  
to target, target authenticated to initiator.

`anon_state == TRUE, mutual_state == FALSE`: initiator authenticated as anonymous principal to target.

`anon_state == TRUE, mutual_state == TRUE`: initiator authenticated as anonymous principal to target, target authenticated to initiator.

#### 1.2.6: Initialization

No initialization calls (i.e., calls which must be invoked prior to invocation of other facilities in the interface) are defined in GSS-API. As an implication of this fact, GSS-API implementations must themselves be self-initializing.

#### 1.2.7: Per-Message Protection During Context Establishment

A facility is defined in GSS-V2 to enable protection and buffering of data messages for later transfer while a security context's establishment is in `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` status, to be used in cases where the caller side already possesses the necessary session key to enable this processing. Specifically, a new state Boolean, called `prot_ready_state`, is added to the set of information returned by `GSS_Init_sec_context()`, `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`, and `GSS_Inquire_context()`.

For context establishment calls, this state Boolean is valid and interpretable when the associated major status is either `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED`, or `GSS_S_COMPLETE`. Callers of GSS-API (both initiators and acceptors) can assume that per-message protection (via `GSS_Wrap()`, `GSS_Unwrap()`, `GSS_GetMIC()` and `GSS_VerifyMIC()`) is available and ready for use if either: `prot_ready_state == TRUE`, or `major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE`, though mutual authentication (if requested) cannot be guaranteed until `GSS_S_COMPLETE` is returned.

This achieves full, transparent backward compatibility for GSS-API V1 callers, who need not even know of the existence of `prot_ready_state`, and who will get the expected behavior from `GSS_S_COMPLETE`, but who will not be able to use per-message protection before `GSS_S_COMPLETE` is returned.

It is not a requirement that GSS-V2 mechanisms ever return `TRUE` `prot_ready_state` before completion of context establishment (indeed, some mechanisms will not evolve usable message protection keys, especially at the context acceptor, before context establishment is complete). It is expected but not required that GSS-V2 mechanisms will return `TRUE` `prot_ready_state` upon completion of context establishment if they support per-message protection at all (however GSS-V2 applications should not assume that `TRUE` `prot_ready_state` will

always be returned together with the GSS\_S\_COMPLETE major\_status, since GSS-V2 implementations may continue to support GSS-V1 mechanism code, which will never return TRUE prot\_ready\_state).

When prot\_ready\_state is returned TRUE, mechanisms shall also set those context service indicator flags (deleg\_state, mutual\_state, replay\_det\_state, sequence\_state, anon\_state, trans\_state, conf\_avail, integ\_avail) which represent facilities confirmed, at that time, to be available on the context being established. In situations where prot\_ready\_state is returned before GSS\_S\_COMPLETE, it is possible that additional facilities may be confirmed and subsequently indicated when GSS\_S\_COMPLETE is returned.

### 1.2.8: Implementation Robustness

This section recommends aspects of GSS-API implementation behavior in the interests of overall robustness.

If a token is presented for processing on a GSS-API security context and that token is determined to be invalid for that context, the context's state should not be disrupted for purposes of processing subsequent valid tokens.

Certain local conditions at a GSS-API implementation (e.g., unavailability of memory) may preclude, temporarily or permanently, the successful processing of tokens on a GSS-API security context, typically generating GSS\_S\_FAILURE major\_status returns along with locally-significant minor\_status. For robust operation under such conditions, the following recommendations are made:

Failing calls should free any memory they allocate, so that callers may retry without causing further loss of resources.

Failure of an individual call on an established context should not preclude subsequent calls from succeeding on the same context.

Whenever possible, it should be possible for GSS\_Delete\_sec\_context() calls to be successfully processed even if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related resources to be released.

## 2: Interface Descriptions

This section describes the GSS-API's service interface, dividing the set of calls offered into four groups. Credential management calls are related to the acquisition and release of credentials by principals. Context-level calls are related to the management of security contexts between principals. Per-message calls are related

to the protection of individual messages on established security contexts. Support calls provide ancillary functions useful to GSS-API callers. Table 2 groups and summarizes the calls in tabular fashion.

Table 2: GSS-API Calls

#### CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT

GSS_Acquire_cred	acquire credentials for use
GSS_Release_cred	release credentials after use
GSS_Inquire_cred	display information about credentials
GSS_Add_cred	construct credentials incrementally
GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech	display per-mechanism credential information

#### CONTEXT-LEVEL CALLS

GSS_Init_sec_context	initiate outbound security context
GSS_Accept_sec_context	accept inbound security context
GSS_Delete_sec_context	flush context when no longer needed
GSS_Process_context_token	process received control token on context
GSS_Context_time	indicate validity time remaining on context
GSS_Inquire_context	display information about context
GSS_Wrap_size_limit	determine GSS_Wrap token size limit
GSS_Export_sec_context	transfer context to other process
GSS_Import_sec_context	import transferred context

#### PER-MESSAGE CALLS

GSS_GetMIC	apply integrity check, receive as token separate from message
GSS_VerifyMIC	validate integrity check token along with message
GSS_Wrap	sign, optionally encrypt, encapsulate
GSS_Unwrap	decapsulate, decrypt if needed, validate integrity check



**SUPPORT CALLS**

<b>GSS_Display_status</b>	translate status codes to printable form
<b>GSS_Indicate_mechs</b>	indicate mech_types supported on local system
<b>GSS_Compare_name</b>	compare two names for equality
<b>GSS_Display_name</b>	translate name to printable form
<b>GSS_Import_name</b>	convert printable name to normalized form
<b>GSS_Release_name</b>	free storage of normalized-form name
<b>GSS_Release_buffer</b>	free storage of printable name
<b>GSS_Release_OID</b>	free storage of OID object
<b>GSS_Release_OID_set</b>	free storage of OID set object
<b>GSS_Create_empty_OID_set</b>	create empty OID set
<b>GSS_Add_OID_set_member</b>	add member to OID set
<b>GSS_Test_OID_set_member</b>	test if OID is member of OID set
<b>GSS_OID_to_str</b>	display OID as string
<b>GSS_Str_to_OID</b>	construct OID from string
<b>GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech</b>	indicate name types supported by mechanism
<b>GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name</b>	indicates mechanisms supporting name type
<b>GSS_Canonicalize_name</b>	translate name to per-mechanism form
<b>GSS_Export_name</b>	externalize per-mechanism name
<b>GSS_Duplicate_name</b>	duplicate name object

**2.1: Credential management calls**

These GSS-API calls provide functions related to the management of credentials. Their characterization with regard to whether or not they may block pending exchanges with other network entities (e.g., directories or authentication servers) depends in part on OS-specific (extra-GSS-API) issues, so is not specified in this document.

The GSS\_Acquire\_cred() call is defined within the GSS-API in support of application portability, with a particular orientation towards support of portable server applications. It is recognized that (for certain systems and mechanisms) credentials for interactive users may be managed differently from credentials for server processes; in such environments, it is the GSS-API implementation's responsibility to distinguish these cases and the procedures for making this distinction are a local matter. The GSS\_Release\_cred() call provides a means for callers to indicate to the GSS-API that use of a credentials structure is no longer required. The GSS\_Inquire\_cred() call allows callers to determine information about a credentials structure. The GSS\_Add\_cred() call enables callers to append

elements to an existing credential structure, allowing iterative construction of a multi-mechanism credential. The `GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech()` call enables callers to extract per-mechanism information describing a credentials structure.

### 2.1.1: `GSS_Acquire_cred` call

#### Inputs:

- o `desired_name` INTERNAL NAME, -NULL requests locally-determined default
- o `lifetime_req` INTEGER, -in seconds; 0 requests default
- o `desired_mechs` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -empty set requests system-selected default
- o `cred_usage` INTEGER -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, 2=ACCEPT-ONLY

#### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `output_cred_handle` CREDENTIAL HANDLE,
- o `actual_mechs` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- o `lifetime_rec` INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE

#### Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that requested credentials were successfully established, for the duration indicated in `lifetime_rec`, suitable for the usage requested in `cred_usage`, for the set of `mech_types` indicated in `actual_mechs`, and that those credentials can be referenced for subsequent use with the handle returned in `output_cred_handle`.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_MECH` indicates that a `mech_type` unsupported by the GSS-API implementation type was requested, causing the credential establishment operation to fail.

- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_NAME\_TYPE indicates that the provided `desired_name` is uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so no credentials could be established for the accompanying `desired_name`.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_NAME indicates that the provided `desired_name` is inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier information, so no credentials could be established for the accompanying `desired_name`.
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that credential establishment failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, including lack of authorization to establish and use credentials associated with the identity named in the input `desired_name` argument.

GSS\_Acquire\_cred() is used to acquire credentials so that a principal can (as a function of the input `cred_usage` parameter) initiate and/or accept security contexts under the identity represented by the `desired_name` input argument. On successful completion, the returned `output_cred_handle` result provides a handle for subsequent references to the acquired credentials. Typically, single-user client processes requesting that default credential behavior be applied for context establishment purposes will have no need to invoke this call.

A caller may provide the value NULL for `desired_name`, signifying a request for credentials corresponding to a principal identity selected by default for the caller. The procedures used by GSS-API implementations to select the appropriate principal identity in response to such a request are local matters. It is possible that multiple pre-established credentials may exist for the same principal identity (for example, as a result of multiple user login sessions) when GSS\_Acquire\_cred() is called; the means used in such cases to select a specific credential are local matters. The input `lifetime_req` argument to GSS\_Acquire\_cred() may provide useful information for local GSS-API implementations to employ in making this disambiguation in a manner which will best satisfy a caller's intent.

The `lifetime_rec` result indicates the length of time for which the acquired credentials will be valid, as an offset from the present. A mechanism may return a reserved value indicating INDEFINITE if no constraints on credential lifetime are imposed. A caller of GSS\_Acquire\_cred() can request a length of time for which acquired credentials are to be valid (`lifetime_req` argument), beginning at the present, or can request credentials with a default validity interval. (Requests for postdated credentials are not supported within the GSS-API.) Certain mechanisms and implementations may bind in

credential validity period specifiers at a point preliminary to invocation of the `GSS_Acquire_cred()` call (e.g., in conjunction with user login procedures). As a result, callers requesting non-default values for `lifetime_req` must recognize that such requests cannot always be honored and must be prepared to accommodate the use of returned credentials with different lifetimes as indicated in `lifetime_rec`.

The caller of `GSS_Acquire_cred()` can explicitly specify a set of `mech_types` which are to be accommodated in the returned credentials (`desired_mechs` argument), or can request credentials for a system-defined default set of `mech_types`. Selection of the system-specified default set is recommended in the interests of application portability. The actual `mechs` return value may be interrogated by the caller to determine the set of mechanisms with which the returned credentials may be used.

### 2.1.2: `GSS_Release_cred` call

Input:

- o `cred_handle` CREDENTIAL HANDLE - NULL specifies that the credential elements used when default credential behavior is requested be released.

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the credentials referenced by the input `cred_handle` were released for purposes of subsequent access by the caller. The effect on other processes which may be authorized shared access to such credentials is a local matter.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CRED` indicates that no release operation was performed, either because the input `cred_handle` was invalid or because the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the release operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Provides a means for a caller to explicitly request that credentials be released when their use is no longer required. Note that system-specific credential management functions are also likely to exist, for example to assure that credentials shared among processes are properly deleted when all affected processes terminate, even if no explicit release requests are issued by those processes. Given the fact that multiple callers are not precluded from gaining authorized access to the same credentials, invocation of `GSS_Release_cred()` cannot be assumed to delete a particular set of credentials on a system-wide basis.

### 2.1.3: GSS\_Inquire\_cred call

#### Input:

- o `cred_handle` CREDENTIAL HANDLE -NULL specifies that the credential elements used when default credential behavior is requested are to be queried

#### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `cred_name` INTERNAL NAME,
- o `lifetime_rec` INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE
- o `cred_usage` INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, 2=ACCEPT-ONLY
- o `mech_set` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

#### Return major\_status codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the credentials referenced by the input `cred_handle` argument were valid, and that the output `cred_name`, `lifetime_rec`, and `cred_usage` values represent, respectively, the credentials' associated principal name, remaining lifetime, suitable usage modes, and supported mechanism types.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CRED` indicates that no information could be returned about the referenced credentials, either because the input `cred_handle` was invalid or because the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials.

- o `GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL` indicates that the referenced credentials are invalid.
- o `GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED` indicates that the referenced credentials have expired.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

The `GSS_Inquire_cred()` call is defined primarily for the use of those callers which request use of default credential behavior rather than acquiring credentials explicitly with `GSS_Acquire_cred()`. It enables callers to determine a credential structure's associated principal name, remaining validity period, usability for security context initiation and/or acceptance, and supported mechanisms.

For a multi-mechanism credential, the returned "lifetime" specifier indicates the shortest lifetime of any of the mechanisms' elements in the credential (for either context initiation or acceptance purposes).

`GSS_Inquire_cred()` should indicate `INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT` for "cred\_usage" if both of the following conditions hold:

- (1) there exists in the credential an element which allows context initiation using some mechanism
- (2) there exists in the credential an element which allows context acceptance using some mechanism (allowably, but not necessarily, one of the same mechanism(s) qualifying for (1)).

If condition (1) holds but not condition (2), `GSS_Inquire_cred()` should indicate `INITIATE-ONLY` for "cred\_usage". If condition (2) holds but not condition (1), `GSS_Inquire_cred()` should indicate `ACCEPT-ONLY` for "cred\_usage".

Callers requiring finer disambiguation among available combinations of lifetimes, usage modes, and mechanisms should call the `GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech()` routine, passing that routine one of the mech OIDs returned by `GSS_Inquire_cred()`.

#### 2.1.4: GSS\_Add\_cred call

##### Inputs:

- o `input_cred_handle` CREDENTIAL HANDLE - handle to credential structure created with prior `GSS_Acquire_cred()` or `GSS_Add_cred()` call, or NULL to append elements to the set which are applied for the caller when default credential behavior is specified.
- o `desired_name` INTERNAL NAME - NULL requests locally-determined default
- o `initiator_time_req` INTEGER - in seconds; 0 requests default
- o `acceptor_time_req` INTEGER - in seconds; 0 requests default
- o `desired_mech` OBJECT IDENTIFIER
- o `cred_usage` INTEGER - 0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, 2=ACCEPT-ONLY

##### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `output_cred_handle` CREDENTIAL HANDLE, - NULL to request that credential elements be added "in place" to the credential structure identified by `input_cred_handle`, non-NULL pointer to request that a new credential structure and handle be created.
- o `actual_mechs` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- o `initiator_time_rec` INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE
- o `acceptor_time_rec` INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE
- o `cred_usage` INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, 2=ACCEPT-ONLY
- o `mech_set` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- full set of mechanisms supported by resulting credential.

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the credentials referenced by the `input_cred_handle` argument were valid, and that the resulting credential from `GSS_Add_cred()` is valid for the durations indicated in `initiator_time_rec` and `acceptor_time_rec`, suitable for the usage requested in `cred_usage`, and for the mechanisms indicated in `actual_mechs`.
- o `GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT` indicates that the input `desired_mech` specified a mechanism for which the referenced credential already contained a credential element with overlapping `cred_usage` and validity time specifiers.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_MECH` indicates that the input `desired_mech` specified a mechanism unsupported by the GSS-API implementation, causing the `GSS_Add_cred()` operation to fail.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE` indicates that the provided `desired_name` is uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so the `GSS_Add_cred()` operation could not be performed for that name.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that the provided `desired_name` is inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier information, so the `GSS_Add_cred()` operation could not be performed for that name.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CRED` indicates that the `input_cred_handle` referenced invalid or inaccessible credentials.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, including lack of authorization to establish or use credentials representing the requested identity.

`GSS_Add_cred()` enables callers to construct credentials iteratively by adding credential elements in successive operations, corresponding to different mechanisms. This offers particular value in multi-mechanism environments, as the `major_status` and `minor_status` values returned on each iteration are individually visible and can therefore be interpreted unambiguously on a per-mechanism basis.

The same input `desired_name`, or default reference, should be used on all `GSS_Acquire_cred()` and `GSS_Add_cred()` calls corresponding to a particular credential.



### 2.1.5: GSS\_Inquire\_cred\_by\_mech call

#### Inputs:

- o cred\_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -- NULL specifies that the credential elements used when default credential behavior is requested are to be queried
- o mech\_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- specific mechanism for which credentials are being queried

#### Outputs:

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o cred\_name INTERNAL NAME, -- guaranteed to be MN
- o lifetime\_rec\_initiate INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE
- o lifetime\_rec\_accept INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE
- o cred\_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, 2=ACCEPT-ONLY

#### Return major\_status codes:

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the input cred\_handle argument were valid, that the mechanism indicated by the input mech\_type was represented with elements within those credentials, and that the output cred\_name, lifetime\_rec\_initiate, lifetime\_rec\_accept, and cred\_usage values represent, respectively, the credentials' associated principal name, remaining lifetimes, and suitable usage modes.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CRED indicates that no information could be returned about the referenced credentials, either because the input cred\_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials.
- o GSS\_S\_DEFECTIVE\_CREDENTIAL indicates that the referenced credentials are invalid.
- o GSS\_S\_CREDENTIALS\_EXPIRED indicates that the referenced credentials have expired.

- o `GSS_S_BAD_MECH` indicates that the referenced credentials do not contain elements for the requested mechanism.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

The `GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech()` call enables callers in multi-mechanism environments to acquire specific data about available combinations of lifetimes, usage modes, and mechanisms within a credential structure. The `lifetime_rec_initiate` result indicates the available lifetime for context initiation purposes; the `lifetime_rec_accept` result indicates the available lifetime for context acceptance purposes.

## 2.2: Context-level calls

This group of calls is devoted to the establishment and management of security contexts between peers. A context's initiator calls `GSS_Init_sec_context()`, resulting in generation of a token which the caller passes to the target. At the target, that token is passed to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`. Depending on the underlying `mech_type` and specified options, additional token exchanges may be performed in the course of context establishment; such exchanges are accommodated by `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` status returns from `GSS_Init_sec_context()` and `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`.

Either party to an established context may invoke `GSS_Delete_sec_context()` to flush context information when a context is no longer required. `GSS_Process_context_token()` is used to process received tokens carrying context-level control information. `GSS_Context_time()` allows a caller to determine the length of time for which an established context will remain valid. `GSS_Inquire_context()` returns status information describing context characteristics. `GSS_Wrap_size_limit()` allows a caller to determine the size of a token which will be generated by a `GSS_Wrap()` operation. `GSS_Export_sec_context()` and `GSS_Import_sec_context()` enable transfer of active contexts between processes on an end system.

### 2.2.1: `GSS_Init_sec_context` call

Inputs:

- o `claimant_cred_handle` CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -NULL specifies "use default"
- o `input_context_handle` CONTEXT HANDLE, -0 specifies "none assigned yet"

- o targ\_name INTERNAL NAME,
- o mech\_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -NULL parameter specifies "use default"
- o deleg\_req\_flag BOOLEAN,
- o mutual\_req\_flag BOOLEAN,
- o replay\_det\_req\_flag BOOLEAN,
- o sequence\_req\_flag BOOLEAN,
- o anon\_req\_flag BOOLEAN,
- o lifetime\_req INTEGER, -0 specifies default lifetime
- o chan\_bindings OCTET STRING,
- o input\_token OCTET STRING-NULL or token received from target

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o output\_context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
- o mech\_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -actual mechanism always indicated, never NULL
- o output\_token OCTET STRING, -NULL or token to pass to context target
- o deleg\_state BOOLEAN,
- o mutual\_state BOOLEAN,
- o replay\_det\_state BOOLEAN,
- o sequence\_state BOOLEAN,
- o anon\_state BOOLEAN,
- o trans\_state BOOLEAN,
- o prot\_ready\_state BOOLEAN, -- see Section 1.2.7

- o `conf_avail` BOOLEAN,
- o `integ_avail` BOOLEAN,
- o `lifetime_rec` INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE

This call may block pending network interactions for those mech types in which an authentication server or other network entity must be consulted on behalf of a context initiator in order to generate an `output_token` suitable for presentation to a specified target.

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that context-level information was successfully initialized, and that the returned `output_token` will provide sufficient information for the target to perform per-message processing on the newly-established context.
- o `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` indicates that control information in the returned `output_token` must be sent to the target, and that a reply must be received and passed as the `input_token` argument to a continuation call to `GSS_Init_sec_context()`, before per-message processing can be performed in conjunction with this context.
- o `GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN` indicates that consistency checks performed on the `input_token` failed, preventing further processing from being performed based on that token.
- o `GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL` indicates that consistency checks performed on the credential structure referenced by `claimant_cred_handle` failed, preventing further processing from being performed using that credential structure.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_SIG` indicates that the received `input_token` contains an incorrect integrity check, so context setup cannot be accomplished.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CRED` indicates that no context was established, either because the `input_cred_handle` was invalid, because the referenced credentials are valid for context acceptor use only, or because the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials.
- o `GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED` indicates that the credentials provided through the `input_claimant_cred_handle` argument are no longer valid, so context establishment cannot be completed.

- o `GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS` indicates that a mismatch between the caller-provided `chan_bindings` and those extracted from the `input_token` was detected, signifying a security-relevant event and preventing context establishment. (This result will be returned by `GSS_Init_sec_context` only for contexts where `mutual_state` is `TRUE`.)
- o `GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN` indicates that the `input_token` is too old to be checked for integrity. This is a fatal error during context establishment.
- o `GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN` indicates that the input token has a correct integrity check, but is a duplicate of a token already processed. This is a fatal error during context establishment.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT` indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input `context_handle` provided; this major status will be returned only for successor calls following `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` status returns.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE` indicates that the provided `targ_name` is of a type uninterpretable or unsupported by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so context establishment cannot be completed.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that the provided `targ_name` is inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier information, so context establishment cannot be accomplished.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_MECH` indicates receipt of a context establishment token or of a caller request specifying a mechanism unsupported by the local system or with the caller's active credentials
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that context setup could not be accomplished for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and that no interface-defined recovery action is available.

This routine is used by a context initiator, and ordinarily emits one (or, for the case of a multi-step exchange, more than one) `output_token` suitable for use by the target within the selected `mech_type`'s protocol. Using information in the credentials structure referenced by `claimant_cred_handle`, `GSS_Init_sec_context()` initializes the data structures required to establish a security context with target `targ_name`. The `targ_name` may be any valid `INTERNAL NAME`; it need not be an `MN`. The `claimant_cred_handle` must correspond to the same valid credentials structure on the initial call to `GSS_Init_sec_context()` and on any successor calls resulting from `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` status returns; different protocol

sequences modeled by the GSS\_S\_CONTINUE\_NEEDED facility will require access to credentials at different points in the context establishment sequence.

The `input_context_handle` argument is 0, specifying "not yet assigned", on the first `GSS_Init_sec_context()` call relating to a given context. If successful (i.e., if accompanied by `major_status` GSS\_S\_COMPLETE or GSS\_S\_CONTINUE\_NEEDED), and only if successful, the initial `GSS_Init_sec_context()` call returns a non-zero `output_context_handle` for use in future references to this context. Once a non-zero `output_context_handle` has been returned, GSS-API callers should call `GSS_Delete_sec_context()` to release context-related resources if errors occur in later phases of context establishment, or when an established context is no longer required.

When continuation attempts to `GSS_Init_sec_context()` are needed to perform context establishment, the previously-returned non-zero handle value is entered into the `input_context_handle` argument and will be echoed in the returned `output_context_handle` argument. On such continuation attempts (and only on continuation attempts) the `input_token` value is used, to provide the token returned from the context's target.

The `chan_bindings` argument is used by the caller to provide information binding the security context to security-related characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document for more discussion of this argument's usage.

The `input_token` argument contains a message received from the target, and is significant only on a call to `GSS_Init_sec_context()` which follows a previous return indicating GSS\_S\_CONTINUE\_NEEDED `major_status`.

It is the caller's responsibility to establish a communications path to the target, and to transmit any returned `output_token` (independent of the accompanying returned `major_status` value) to the target over that path. The `output_token` can, however, be transmitted along with the first application-provided input message to be processed by `GSS_GetMIC()` or `GSS_Wrap()` in conjunction with a successfully-established context.

The initiator may request various context-level functions through input flags: the `deleg_req_flag` requests delegation of access rights, the `mutual_req_flag` requests mutual authentication, the `replay_det_req_flag` requests that replay detection features be applied to messages transferred on the established context, and the `sequence_req_flag` requests that sequencing be enforced. (See Section

1.2.3 for more information on replay detection and sequencing features.) The `anon_req_flag` requests that the initiator's identity not be transferred within tokens to be sent to the acceptor.

Not all of the optionally-requestable features will be available in all underlying `mech_types`. The corresponding return state values `deleg_state`, `mutual_state`, `replay_det_state`, and `sequence_state` indicate, as a function of `mech_type` processing capabilities and initiator-provided input flags, the set of features which will be active on the context. The returned `trans_state` value indicates whether the context is transferable to other processes through use of `GSS_Export_sec_context()`. These state indicators' values are undefined unless either the routine's `major_status` indicates `GSS_S_COMPLETE`, or `TRUE` `prot_ready_state` is returned along with `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` `major_status`; for the latter case, it is possible that additional features, not confirmed or indicated along with `TRUE` `prot_ready_state`, will be confirmed and indicated when `GSS_S_COMPLETE` is subsequently returned.

The returned `anon_state` and `prot_ready_state` values are significant for both `GSS_S_COMPLETE` and `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` `major_status` returns from `GSS_Init_sec_context()`. When `anon_state` is returned `TRUE`, this indicates that neither the current token nor its predecessors delivers or has delivered the initiator's identity. Callers wishing to perform context establishment only if anonymity support is provided should transfer a returned token from `GSS_Init_sec_context()` to the peer only if it is accompanied by a `TRUE` `anon_state` indicator. When `prot_ready_state` is returned `TRUE` in conjunction with `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` `major_status`, this indicates that per-message protection operations may be applied on the context: see Section 1.2.7 for further discussion of this facility.

Failure to provide the precise set of features requested by the caller does not cause context establishment to fail; it is the caller's prerogative to delete the context if the feature set provided is unsuitable for the caller's use.

The returned `mech_type` value indicates the specific mechanism employed on the context, is valid only along with `major_status` `GSS_S_COMPLETE`, and will never indicate the value for "default". Note that, for the case of certain mechanisms which themselves perform negotiation, the returned `mech_type` result may indicate selection of a mechanism identified by an OID different than that passed in the input `mech_type` argument.

The `conf_avail` return value indicates whether the context supports per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller whether or not a request for encryption through the `conf_req_flag`

input to `GSS_Wrap()` can be honored. In similar fashion, the `integ_avail` return value indicates whether per-message integrity services are available (through either `GSS_GetMIC()` or `GSS_Wrap()`) on the established context. These state indicators' values are undefined unless either the routine's `major_status` indicates `GSS_S_COMPLETE`, or `TRUE` `prot_ready_state` is returned along with `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` `major_status`.

The `lifetime_req` input specifies a desired upper bound for the lifetime of the context to be established, with a value of 0 used to request a default lifetime. The `lifetime_rec` return value indicates the length of time for which the context will be valid, expressed as an offset from the present; depending on mechanism capabilities, credential lifetimes, and local policy, it may not correspond to the value requested in `lifetime_req`. If no constraints on context lifetime are imposed, this may be indicated by returning a reserved value representing INDEFINITE `lifetime_req`. The value of `lifetime_rec` is undefined unless the routine's `major_status` indicates `GSS_S_COMPLETE`.

If the `mutual_state` is `TRUE`, this fact will be reflected within the `output_token`. A call to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` at the target in conjunction with such a context will return a token, to be processed by a continuation call to `GSS_Init_sec_context()`, in order to achieve mutual authentication.

### 2.2.2: `GSS_Accept_sec_context` call

#### Inputs:

- o `acceptor_cred_handle` CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -- NULL specifies "use default"
- o `input_context_handle` CONTEXT HANDLE, -- 0 specifies "not yet assigned"
- o `chan_bindings` OCTET STRING,
- o `input_token` OCTET STRING

#### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `src_name` INTERNAL NAME, -- guaranteed to be MN



- o mech\_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- o output\_context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
- o deleg\_state BOOLEAN,
- o mutual\_state BOOLEAN,
- o replay\_det\_state BOOLEAN,
- o sequence\_state BOOLEAN,
- o anon\_state BOOLEAN,
- o trans\_state BOOLEAN,
- o prot\_ready\_state BOOLEAN, -- see Section 1.2.7 for discussion
- o conf\_avail BOOLEAN,
- o integ\_avail BOOLEAN,
- o lifetime\_rec INTEGER, - in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE
- o delegated\_cred\_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE,
- o output\_token OCTET STRING -NULL or token to pass to context initiator

This call may block pending network interactions for those mech\_types in which a directory service or other network entity must be consulted on behalf of a context acceptor in order to validate a received input\_token.

Return major\_status codes:

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that context-level data structures were successfully initialized, and that per-message processing can now be performed in conjunction with this context.
- o GSS\_S\_CONTINUE\_NEEDED indicates that control information in the returned output\_token must be sent to the initiator, and that a response must be received and passed as the input\_token argument to a continuation call to GSS\_Accept\_sec\_context(), before per-message processing can be performed in conjunction with this context.

- o GSS\_S\_DEFECTIVE\_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on the input\_token failed, preventing further processing from being performed based on that token.
- o GSS\_S\_DEFECTIVE\_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks performed on the credential structure referenced by acceptor\_cred\_handle failed, preventing further processing from being performed using that credential structure.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_SIG indicates that the received input\_token contains an incorrect integrity check, so context setup cannot be accomplished.
- o GSS\_S\_DUPLICATE\_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check on the received input\_token was correct, but that the input\_token was recognized as a duplicate of an input\_token already processed. No new context is established.
- o GSS\_S\_OLD\_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check on the received input\_token was correct, but that the input\_token is too old to be checked for duplication against previously-processed input\_tokens. No new context is established.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CRED indicates that no context was established, either because the input\_cred\_handle was invalid, because the referenced credentials are valid for context initiator use only, or because the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials.
- o GSS\_S\_CREDENTIALS\_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided through the input\_acceptor\_cred\_handle argument are no longer valid, so context establishment cannot be completed.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the caller-provided chan\_bindings and those extracted from the input\_token was detected, signifying a security-relevant event and preventing context establishment.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input\_context\_handle provided; this major status will be returned only for successor calls following GSS\_S\_CONTINUE\_NEEDED status returns.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_MECH indicates receipt of a context establishment token specifying a mechanism unsupported by the local system or with the caller's active credentials.

- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that context setup could not be accomplished for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and that no interface-defined recovery action is available.

The `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` routine is used by a context target. Using information in the credentials structure referenced by the input `acceptor_cred_handle`, it verifies the incoming input token and (following the successful completion of a context establishment sequence) returns the authenticated `src_name` and the `mech_type` used. The returned `src_name` is guaranteed to be an MN, processed by the mechanism under which the context was established. The `acceptor_cred_handle` must correspond to the same valid credentials structure on the initial call to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` and on any successor calls resulting from `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` status returns; different protocol sequences modeled by the `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` mechanism will require access to credentials at different points in the context establishment sequence.

The `input_context_handle` argument is 0, specifying "not yet assigned", on the first `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` call relating to a given context. If successful (i.e., if accompanied by major status `GSS_S_COMPLETE` or `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED`), and only if successful, the initial `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` call returns a non-zero `output_context_handle` for use in future references to this context. Once a non-zero `output_context_handle` has been returned, GSS-API callers should call `GSS_Delete_sec_context()` to release context-related resources if errors occur in later phases of context establishment, or when an established context is no longer required.

The `chan_bindings` argument is used by the caller to provide information binding the security context to security-related characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document for more discussion of this argument's usage.

The returned state results (`deleg_state`, `mutual_state`, `replay_det_state`, `sequence_state`, `anon_state`, `trans_state`, and `prot_ready_state`) reflect the same information as described for `GSS_Init_sec_context()`, and their values are significant under the same return state conditions.

The `conf_avail` return value indicates whether the context supports per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller whether or not a request for encryption through the `conf_req_flag` input to `GSS_Wrap()` can be honored. In similar fashion, the `integ_avail` return value indicates whether per-message integrity services are available (through either `GSS_GetMIC()` or `GSS_Wrap()`) on the established context. These values are significant under the same return state conditions as described under `GSS_Init_sec_context()`.

The `lifetime_rec` return value is significant only in conjunction with `GSS_S_COMPLETE` major status, and indicates the length of time for which the context will be valid, expressed as an offset from the present.

The `mech_type` return value indicates the specific mechanism employed on the context, is valid only along with major status `GSS_S_COMPLETE`, and will never indicate the value for "default".

The `delegated_cred_handle` result is significant only when `deleg_state` is `TRUE`, and provides a means for the target to reference the delegated credentials. The `output_token` result, when non-NULL, provides a context-level token to be returned to the context initiator to continue a multi-step context establishment sequence. As noted with `GSS_Init_sec_context()`, any returned token should be transferred to the context's peer (in this case, the context initiator), independent of the value of the accompanying returned major status.

Note: A target must be able to distinguish a context-level `input_token`, which is passed to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`, from the per-message data elements passed to `GSS_VerifyMIC()` or `GSS_Unwrap()`. These data elements may arrive in a single application message, and `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` must be performed before per-message processing can be performed successfully.

### 2.2.3: `GSS_Delete_sec_context` call

Input:

- o `context_handle` CONTEXT HANDLE

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,

- o `output_context_token` OCTET STRING

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the context was recognized, and that relevant context-specific information was flushed. If the caller provides a non-null buffer to receive an `output_context_token`, and the mechanism returns a non-NULL token into that buffer, the returned `output_context_token` is ready for transfer to the context's peer.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT` indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input `context_handle` provided, so no deletion was performed.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the context is recognized, but that the `GSS_Delete_sec_context()` operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

This call may block pending network interactions for `mech_types` in which active notification must be made to a central server when a security context is to be deleted.

This call can be made by either peer in a security context, to flush context-specific information. If a non-null `output_context_token` parameter is provided by the caller, an `output_context_token` may be returned to the caller. If an `output_context_token` is provided to the caller, it can be passed to the context's peer to inform the peer's GSS-API implementation that the peer's corresponding context information can also be flushed. (Once a context is established, the peers involved are expected to retain cached credential and context-related information until the information's expiration time is reached or until a `GSS_Delete_sec_context()` call is made.)

The facility for context token usage to signal context deletion is retained for compatibility with GSS-API Version 1. For current usage, it is recommended that both peers to a context invoke `GSS_Delete_sec_context()` independently, passing a null `output_context_token` buffer to indicate that no context token is required. Implementations of `GSS_Delete_sec_context()` should delete relevant locally-stored context information.

Attempts to perform per-message processing on a deleted context will result in error returns.

#### 2.2.4: GSS\_Process\_context\_token call

**Inputs:**

- o context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
- o input\_context\_token OCTET STRING

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,

**Return major\_status codes:**

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that the input\_context\_token was successfully processed in conjunction with the context referenced by context\_handle.
- o GSS\_S\_DEFECTIVE\_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on the received context\_token failed, preventing further processing from being performed with that token.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input context\_handle provided.
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the GSS\_Process\_context\_token() operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

This call is used to process context\_tokens received from a peer once a context has been established, with corresponding impact on context-level state information. One use for this facility is processing of the context\_tokens generated by GSS\_Delete\_sec\_context(); GSS\_Process\_context\_token() will not block pending network interactions for that purpose. Another use is to process tokens indicating remote-peer context establishment failures after the point where the local GSS-API implementation has already indicated GSS\_S\_COMPLETE status.

### 2.2.5: GSS\_Context\_time call

**Input:**

- o context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o lifetime\_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for INDEFINITE

**Return major\_status codes:**

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid, and will remain valid for the amount of time indicated in lifetime\_rec.
- o GSS\_S\_CONTEXT\_EXPIRED indicates that data items related to the referenced context have expired.
- o GSS\_S\_CREDENTIALS\_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, but that its associated credentials have expired.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input context\_handle provided.
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

This call is used to determine the amount of time for which a currently established context will remain valid.

### 2.2.6: GSS\_Inquire\_context call

**Input:**

- o context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,

- o `src_name` INTERNAL NAME, -- name of context initiator,  
-- guaranteed to be MN
- o `targ_name` INTERNAL NAME, -- name of context target,  
-- guaranteed to be MN
- o `lifetime_rec` INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for  
INDEFINITE,
- o `mech_type` OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- the mechanism supporting this  
security context
- o `deleg_state` BOOLEAN,
- o `mutual_state` BOOLEAN,
- o `replay_det_state` BOOLEAN,
- o `sequence_state` BOOLEAN,
- o `anon_state` BOOLEAN,
- o `trans_state` BOOLEAN,
- o `prot_ready_state` BOOLEAN,
- o `conf_avail` BOOLEAN,
- o `integ_avail` BOOLEAN,
- o `locally_initiated` BOOLEAN, -- TRUE if initiator, FALSE if acceptor

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the referenced context is valid and that `src_name`, `targ_name`, `lifetime_rec`, `mech_type`, `deleg_state`, `mutual_state`, `replay_det_state`, `sequence_state`, `anon_state`, `trans_state`, `prot_ready_state`, `conf_avail`, `integ_avail`, and `locally_initiated` return values describe the corresponding characteristics of the context.
- o `GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED` indicates that the provided input `context_handle` is recognized, but that the referenced context has expired. Return values other than `major_status` and `minor_status` are undefined.



- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input context\_handle provided. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.

This call is used to extract information describing characteristics of a security context.

#### 2.2.7: GSS\_Wrap\_size\_limit call

Inputs:

- o context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
- o qop INTEGER,
- o output\_size INTEGER

Outputs:

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o max\_input\_size INTEGER

Return major\_status codes:

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates a successful token size determination: an input message with a length in octets equal to the returned max\_input\_size value will, when passed to GSS\_Wrap() for processing on the context identified by the context\_handle parameter and with the quality of protection specifier provided in the qop parameter, yield an output token no larger than the value of the provided output\_size parameter.
- o GSS\_S\_CONTEXT\_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input context\_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context has expired. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input context\_handle provided. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.

- o `GSS_S_BAD_QOP` indicates that the provided QOP value is not recognized or supported for the context.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than `major_status` and `minor_status` are undefined.

This call is used to determine the largest input datum which may be passed to `GSS_Wrap()` without yielding an output token larger than a caller-specified value.

#### 2.2.8: `GSS_Export_sec_context` call

##### Inputs:

- o `context_handle` CONTEXT HANDLE

##### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `interprocess_token` OCTET STRING

##### Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the referenced context has been successfully exported to a representation in the `interprocess_token`, and is no longer available for use by the caller.
- o `GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE` indicates that the context export facility is not available for use on the referenced context. (This status should occur only for contexts for which the `trans_state` value is FALSE.) Return values other than `major_status` and `minor_status` are undefined.
- o `GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED` indicates that the provided input `context_handle` is recognized, but that the referenced context has expired. Return values other than `major_status` and `minor_status` are undefined.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT` indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input `context_handle` provided. Return values other than `major_status` and `minor_status` are undefined.

- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than `major_status` and `minor_status` are undefined.

This call generates an interprocess token for transfer to another process within an end system, in order to transfer control of a security context to that process. The recipient of the interprocess token will call `GSS_Import_sec_context()` to accept the transfer. The `GSS_Export_sec_context()` operation is defined for use only with security contexts which are fully and successfully established (i.e., those for which `GSS_Init_sec_context()` and `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` have returned `GSS_S_COMPLETE` `major_status`).

To ensure portability, a caller of `GSS_Export_sec_context()` must not assume that a context may continue to be used once it has been exported; following export, the context referenced by the `context_handle` cannot be assumed to remain valid. Further, portable callers must not assume that a given interprocess token can be imported by `GSS_Import_sec_context()` more than once, thereby creating multiple instantiations of a single context. GSS-API implementations may detect and reject attempted multiple imports, but are not required to do so.

The internal representation contained within the interprocess token is an implementation-defined local matter. Interprocess tokens cannot be assumed to be transferable across different GSS-API implementations.

It is recommended that GSS-API implementations adopt policies suited to their operational environments in order to define the set of processes eligible to import a context, but specific constraints in this area are local matters. Candidate examples include transfers between processes operating on behalf of the same user identity, or processes comprising a common job. However, it may be impossible to enforce such policies in some implementations.

In support of the above goals, implementations may protect the transferred context data by using cryptography to protect data within the interprocess token, or by using interprocess tokens as a means to reference local interprocess communication facilities (protected by other means) rather than storing the context data directly within the tokens.

Transfer of an open context may, for certain mechanisms and implementations, reveal data about the credential which was used to establish the context. Callers should, therefore, be cautious about the trustworthiness of processes to which they transfer contexts. Although the GSS-API implementation may provide its own set of

protections over the exported context, the caller is responsible for protecting the interprocess token from disclosure, and for taking care that the context is transferred to an appropriate destination process.

#### 2.2.9: GSS\_Import\_sec\_context call

##### Inputs:

- o interprocess\_token OCTET STRING

##### Outputs:

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE

##### Return major\_status codes:

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that the context represented by the input interprocess\_token has been successfully transferred to the caller, and is available for future use via the output context\_handle.
- o GSS\_S\_CONTEXT\_EXPIRED indicates that the context represented by the input interprocess\_token has expired. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CONTEXT indicates that the context represented by the input interprocess\_token was invalid. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.
- o GSS\_S\_DEFECTIVE\_TOKEN indicates that the input interprocess\_token was defective. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.
- o GSS\_S\_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the context import facility is not available for use on the referenced context. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.
- o GSS\_S\_UNAUTHORIZED indicates that the context represented by the input interprocess\_token is unauthorized for transfer to the caller. Return values other than major\_status and minor\_status are undefined.

- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than `major_status` and `minor_status` are undefined.

This call processes an interprocess token generated by `GSS_Export_sec_context()`, making the transferred context available for use by the caller. After a successful `GSS_Import_sec_context()` operation, the imported context is available for use by the importing process.

For further discussion of the security and authorization issues regarding this call, please see the discussion in Section 2.2.8.

### 2.3: Per-message calls

This group of calls is used to perform per-message protection processing on an established security context. None of these calls block pending network interactions. These calls may be invoked by a context's initiator or by the context's target. The four members of this group should be considered as two pairs; the output from `GSS_GetMIC()` is properly input to `GSS_VerifyMIC()`, and the output from `GSS_Wrap()` is properly input to `GSS_Unwrap()`.

`GSS_GetMIC()` and `GSS_VerifyMIC()` support data origin authentication and data integrity services. When `GSS_GetMIC()` is invoked on an input message, it yields a per-message token containing data items which allow underlying mechanisms to provide the specified security services. The original message, along with the generated per-message token, is passed to the remote peer; these two data elements are processed by `GSS_VerifyMIC()`, which validates the message in conjunction with the separate token.

`GSS_Wrap()` and `GSS_Unwrap()` support caller-requested confidentiality in addition to the data origin authentication and data integrity services offered by `GSS_GetMIC()` and `GSS_VerifyMIC()`. `GSS_Wrap()` outputs a single data element, encapsulating optionally enciphered user data as well as associated token data items. The data element output from `GSS_Wrap()` is passed to the remote peer and processed by `GSS_Unwrap()` at that system. `GSS_Unwrap()` combines decipherment (as required) with validation of data items related to authentication and integrity.

### 2.3.1: GSS\_GetMIC call

**Note:** This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS\_Sign call as defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations support this function under both names for the present; future references to this function as GSS\_Sign are deprecated.

**Inputs:**

- o context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
- o qop\_req INTEGER, -0 specifies default QOP
- o message OCTET STRING

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o per\_msg\_token OCTET STRING

**Return major\_status codes:**

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that an integrity check, suitable for an established security context, was successfully applied and that the message and corresponding per\_msg\_token are ready for transmission.
- o GSS\_S\_CONTEXT\_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed.
- o GSS\_S\_CREDENTIALS\_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input context\_handle provided.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not recognized or supported for the context.
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Using the security context referenced by `context_handle`, apply an integrity check to the input message (along with timestamps and/or other data included in support of `mech_type`-specific mechanisms) and return the result in `per_msg_token`. The `qop_req` parameter, interpretation of which is discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows quality-of-protection control. The caller passes the message and the `per_msg_token` to the target.

The `GSS_GetMIC()` function completes before the message and `per_msg_token` is sent to the peer; successful application of `GSS_GetMIC()` does not guarantee that a corresponding `GSS_VerifyMIC()` has been (or can necessarily be) performed successfully when the message arrives at the destination.

Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services should return `GSS_S_FAILURE` if this routine is called.

### 2.3.2: `GSS_VerifyMIC` call

Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the `GSS_Verify` call as defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations support this function under both names for the present; future references to this function as `GSS_Verify` are deprecated.

#### Inputs:

- o `context_handle` CONTEXT HANDLE,
- o `message` OCTET STRING,
- o `per_msg_token` OCTET STRING

#### Outputs:

- o `qop_state` INTEGER,
- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,

#### Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the message was successfully verified.

- o `GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN` indicates that consistency checks performed on the received `per_msg_token` failed, preventing further processing from being performed with that token.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_SIG` indicates that the received `per_msg_token` contains an incorrect integrity check for the message.
- o `GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN`, `GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN`, `GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN`, and `GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN` values appear in conjunction with the optional per-message replay detection features described in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are described in that section.
- o `GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED` indicates that context-related data items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed.
- o `GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED` indicates that the context is recognized, but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT` indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input `context_handle` provided.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the context is recognized, but that the `GSS_VerifyMIC()` operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Using the security context referenced by `context_handle`, verify that the input `per_msg_token` contains an appropriate integrity check for the input message, and apply any active replay detection or sequencing features. Return an indication of the quality-of-protection applied to the processed message in the `qop_state` result. Since the `GSS_VerifyMIC()` routine never provides a confidentiality service, its implementations should not return non-zero values in the confidentiality fields of the output `qop_state`.

Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services should return `GSS_S_FAILURE` if this routine is called.

### 2.3.3: `GSS_Wrap` call

Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the `GSS_Seal` call as defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations support this function under both names for the present; future references to this function as `GSS_Seal` are deprecated.



**Inputs:**

- o context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
- o conf\_req\_flag BOOLEAN,
- o qop\_req INTEGER, -0 specifies default QOP
- o input\_message OCTET STRING

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o conf\_state BOOLEAN,
- o output\_message OCTET STRING

**Return major\_status codes:**

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that the input\_message was successfully processed and that the output\_message is ready for transmission.
- o GSS\_S\_CONTEXT\_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed.
- o GSS\_S\_CREDENTIALS\_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed.
- o GSS\_S\_NO\_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input context\_handle provided.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not recognized or supported for the context.
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the GSS\_Wrap() operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Performs the data origin authentication and data integrity functions of GSS\_GetMIC(). If the input conf\_req\_flag is TRUE, requests that confidentiality be applied to the input\_message. Confidentiality may

not be supported in all mech\_types or by all implementations; the returned conf\_state flag indicates whether confidentiality was provided for the input\_message. The qop\_req parameter, interpretation of which is discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows quality-of-protection control.

In all cases, the GSS\_Wrap() call yields a single output\_message data element containing (optionally enciphered) user data as well as control information.

Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services should return GSS\_S\_FAILURE if this routine is called.

#### 2.3.4: GSS\_Unwrap call

Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS\_Unseal call as defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations support this function under both names for the present; future references to this function as GSS\_Unseal are deprecated.

Inputs:

- o context\_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
- o input\_message OCTET STRING

Outputs:

- o conf\_state BOOLEAN,
- o qop\_state INTEGER,
- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o output\_message OCTET STRING

Return major\_status codes:

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that the input\_message was successfully processed and that the resulting output\_message is available.
- o GSS\_S\_DEFECTIVE\_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on the per\_msg\_token extracted from the input\_message failed, preventing further processing from being performed.

- o `GSS_S_BAD_SIG` indicates that an incorrect integrity check was detected for the message.
- o `GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN`, `GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN`, `GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN`, and `GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN` values appear in conjunction with the optional per-message replay detection features described in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are described in that section.
- o `GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED` indicates that context-related data items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed.
- o `GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED` indicates that the context is recognized, but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed.
- o `GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT` indicates that no valid context was recognized for the input context\_handle provided.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the context is recognized, but that the `GSS_Unwrap()` operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Processes a data element generated (and optionally enciphered) by `GSS_Wrap()`, provided as input\_message. The returned conf\_state value indicates whether confidentiality was applied to the input\_message. If conf\_state is TRUE, `GSS_Unwrap()` deciphers the input\_message. Returns an indication of the quality-of-protection applied to the processed message in the qop\_state result. `GSS_Wrap()` performs the data integrity and data origin authentication checking functions of `GSS_VerifyMIC()` on the plaintext data. Plaintext data is returned in output\_message.

Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services should return `GSS_S_FAILURE` if this routine is called.

## 2.4: Support calls

This group of calls provides support functions useful to GSS-API callers, independent of the state of established contexts. Their characterization with regard to blocking or non-blocking status in terms of network interactions is unspecified.

### 2.4.1: GSS\_Display\_status call

#### Inputs:

- o `status_value` INTEGER, -GSS-API `major_status` or `minor_status` return value
- o `status_type` INTEGER, -1 if `major_status`, 2 if `minor_status`
- o `mech_type` OBJECT IDENTIFIER-mech\_type to be used for `minor_status` translation

#### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `status_string_set` SET OF OCTET STRING

#### Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that a valid printable status representation (possibly representing more than one status event encoded within the `status_value`) is available in the returned `status_string_set`.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_MECH` indicates that translation in accordance with an unsupported `mech_type` was requested, so translation could not be performed.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_STATUS` indicates that the input `status_value` was invalid, or that the input `status_type` carried a value other than 1 or 2, so translation could not be performed.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Provides a means for callers to translate GSS-API-returned major and minor status codes into printable string representations.

### 2.4.2: GSS\_Indicate\_mechs call

#### Input:

- o (none)

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o mech\_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

**Return major\_status codes:**

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that a set of available mechanisms has been returned in mech\_set.
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to determine the set of mechanism types available on the local system. This call is intended for support of specialized callers who need to request non-default mech\_type sets from GSS\_Acquire\_cred(), and should not be needed by other callers.

**2.4.3: GSS\_Compare\_name call****Inputs:**

- o name1 INTERNAL NAME,
- o name2 INTERNAL NAME

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o name\_equal BOOLEAN

**Return major\_status codes:**

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that name1 and name2 were comparable, and that the name\_equal result indicates whether name1 and name2 represent the same entity.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_NAME\_TYPE indicates that one or both of name1 and name2 contained internal type specifiers uninterpretable by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), or that the two names' types are different and incomparable, so that the comparison operation could not be completed.

- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that one or both of the input names was ill-formed in terms of its internal type specifier, so the comparison operation could not be completed.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the call's operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to compare two internal name representations to determine whether they refer to the same entity. If either name presented to `GSS_Compare_name()` denotes an anonymous principal, `GSS_Compare_name()` shall indicate `FALSE`. It is not required that either or both inputs `name1` and `name2` be MNs; for some implementations and cases, `GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE` may be returned, indicating name incomparability, for the case where neither input name is an MN.

#### 2.4.4: `GSS_Display_name` call

##### Inputs:

- o `name` INTERNAL NAME

##### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `name_string` OCTET STRING,
- o `name_type` OBJECT IDENTIFIER

##### Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that a valid printable name representation is available in the returned `name_string`.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE` indicates that the provided name was of a type uninterpretable by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so no printable representation could be generated.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that the contents of the provided name were inconsistent with the internally-indicated name type, so no printable representation could be generated.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to translate an internal name representation into a printable form with associated namespace type descriptor. The syntax of the printable form is a local matter.

If the input name represents an anonymous identity, a reserved value (GSS\_C\_NT\_ANONYMOUS) shall be returned for name\_type.

#### 2.4.5: GSS\_Import\_name call

##### Inputs:

- o input\_name\_string OCTET STRING,
- o input\_name\_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER

##### Outputs:

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o output\_name INTERNAL NAME

##### Return major\_status codes:

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates that a valid name representation is output in output\_name and described by the type value in output\_name\_type.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_NAME\_TYPE indicates that the input\_name\_type is unsupported by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so the import operation could not be completed.
- o GSS\_S\_BAD\_NAME indicates that the provided input\_name\_string is ill-formed in terms of the input\_name\_type, so the import operation could not be completed.
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to provide a name representation as a contiguous octet string, designate the type of namespace in conjunction with which it should be parsed, and convert that representation to an internal form suitable for input to other GSS-API routines. The syntax of the input\_name\_string is defined in conjunction with its associated name type; depending on the input\_name\_type, the associated input\_name\_string may or may not be a printable string. Note: The input\_name\_type argument serves to describe and qualify the

interpretation of the associated `input_name_string`; it does not specify the data type of the returned `output_name`.

If a mechanism claims support for a particular name type, its `GSS_Import_name()` operation shall be able to accept all possible values conformant to the external name syntax as defined for that name type. These imported values may correspond to:

- (1) locally registered entities (for which credentials may be acquired),
- (2) non-local entities (for which local credentials cannot be acquired, but which may be referenced as targets of initiated security contexts or initiators of accepted security contexts), or to
- (3) neither of the above.

Determination of whether a particular name belongs to class (1), (2), or (3) as described above is not guaranteed to be performed by the `GSS_Import_name()` function.

The internal name generated by a `GSS_Import_name()` operation may be a single-mechanism MN, and is likely to be an MN within a single-mechanism implementation, but portable callers must not depend on this property (and must not, therefore, assume that the output from `GSS_Import_name()` can be passed directly to `GSS_Export_name()` without first being processed through `GSS_Canonicalize_name()`).

#### 2.4.6: `GSS_Release_name` call

Inputs:

- o name INTERNAL NAME

Outputs:

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER

Return major\_status codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the storage associated with the input name was successfully released.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that the input name argument did not contain a valid name.



- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to release the storage associated with an internal name representation. This call's specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, this call may be superfluous within bindings where memory management is automatic.

#### 2.4.7: `GSS_Release_buffer` call

Inputs:

- o `buffer` OCTET STRING

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the storage associated with the `input_buffer` was successfully released.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to release the storage associated with an OCTET STRING buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, this call may be superfluous within bindings where memory management is automatic.

#### 2.4.8: `GSS_Release_OID_set` call

Inputs:

- o `buffer` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,

- o `minor_status` INTEGER

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the storage associated with the input object identifier set was successfully released.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to release the storage associated with an object identifier set object allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, this call may be superfluous within bindings where memory management is automatic.

#### 2.4.9: `GSS_Create_empty_OID_set` call

Inputs:

- o (none)

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `oid_set` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates successful completion
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the operation failed

Creates an object identifier set containing no object identifiers, to which members may be subsequently added using the `GSS_Add_OID_set_member()` routine. These routines are intended to be used to construct sets of mechanism object identifiers, for input to `GSS_Acquire_cred()`.

**2.4.10: GSS\_Add\_OID\_set\_member call****Inputs:**

- o member\_oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- o oid\_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,

**Return major\_status codes:**

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates successful completion
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed

Adds an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set. This routine is intended for use in conjunction with GSS\_Create\_empty\_OID\_set() when constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to GSS\_Acquire\_cred().

**2.4.11: GSS\_Test\_OID\_set\_member call****Inputs:**

- o member OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- o set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

**Outputs:**

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o present BOOLEAN

**Return major\_status codes:**

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates successful completion
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed

Interrogates an Object Identifier set to determine whether a specified Object Identifier is a member. This routine is intended to be used with OID sets returned by `GSS_Indicate_mechs()`, `GSS_Acquire_cred()`, and `GSS_Inquire_cred()`.

#### 2.4.12: `GSS_Release_OID` call

Inputs:

- o `oid` OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates successful completion
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the operation failed

Allows the caller to release the storage associated with an OBJECT IDENTIFIER buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, this call may be superfluous within bindings where memory management is automatic.

#### 2.4.13: `GSS_OID_to_str` call

Inputs:

- o `oid` OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `oid_str` OCTET STRING

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates successful completion

- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed

The function GSS\_OID\_to\_str() returns a string representing the input OID in numeric ASN.1 syntax format (curly-brace enclosed, space-delimited, e.g., "{2 16 840 1 113687 1 2 1}"). The string is releasable using GSS\_Release\_buffer(). If the input "oid" does not represent a syntactically valid object identifier, GSS\_S\_FAILURE status is returned and the returned oid\_str result is NULL.

#### 2.4.14: GSS\_Str\_to\_OID call

Inputs:

- o oid\_str OCTET STRING

Outputs:

- o major\_status INTEGER,
- o minor\_status INTEGER,
- o oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Return major\_status codes:

- o GSS\_S\_COMPLETE indicates successful completion
- o GSS\_S\_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed

The function GSS\_Str\_to\_OID() constructs and returns an OID from its printable form; implementations should be able to accept the numeric ASN.1 syntax form as described for GSS\_OID\_to\_str(), and this form should be used for portability, but implementations of this routine may also accept other formats (e.g., "1.2.3.3"). The OID is suitable for release using the function GSS\_Release\_OID(). If the input oid\_str cannot be translated into an OID, GSS\_S\_FAILURE status is returned and the "oid" result is NULL.

#### 2.4.15: GSS\_Inquire\_names\_for\_mech call

Input:

- o input\_mech\_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- mechanism type

Outputs:

- o major\_status INTEGER,

- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `name_type_set` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that the output `name_type_set` contains a list of name types which are supported by the locally available mechanism identified by `input_mech_type`.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_MECH` indicates that the mechanism identified by `input_mech_type` was unsupported within the local implementation, causing the query to fail.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to determine the set of name types which are supportable by a specific locally-available mechanism.

#### 2.4.16: `GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name` call

Inputs:

- o `input_name` INTERNAL NAME,

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `mech_types` SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that a set of object identifiers, corresponding to the set of mechanisms suitable for processing the `input_name`, is available in `mech_types`.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that the `input_name` could not be processed.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE` indicates that the type of the `input_name` is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

This routine returns the mechanism set with which the `input_name` may be processed. After use, the `mech_types` object should be freed by the caller via the `GSS_Release_OID_set()` call. Note: it is anticipated that implementations of `GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name()` will commonly operate based on type information describing the capabilities of available mechanisms; it is not guaranteed that all identified mechanisms will necessarily be able to canonicalize (via `GSS_Canonicalize_name()`) a particular name.

#### 2.4.17: `GSS_Canonicalize_name` call

##### Inputs:

- o `input_name` INTERNAL NAME,
- o `mech_type` OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- must be explicit mechanism, not "default" specifier

##### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `output_name` INTERNAL NAME

##### Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that a mechanism-specific reduction of the `input_name`, as processed by the mechanism identified by `mech_type`, is available in `output_name`.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_MECH` indicates that the identified mechanism is unsupported.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE` indicates that the input name does not contain an element with suitable type for processing by the identified mechanism.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that the input name contains an element with suitable type for processing by the identified mechanism, but that this element could not be processed successfully.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

This routine reduces a GSS-API internal name, which may in general contain elements corresponding to multiple mechanisms, to a mechanism-specific Mechanism Name (MN) by applying the translations corresponding to the mechanism identified by `mech_type`.

#### 2.4.18: GSS\_Export\_name call

##### Inputs:

- o `input_name` INTERNAL NAME, -- required to be MN

##### Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `output_name` OCTET STRING

##### Return major\_status codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that a flat representation of the `input_name` is available in `output_name`.
- o `GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN` indicates that the input name contained elements corresponding to multiple mechanisms, so cannot be exported into a single-mechanism flat form.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that the input name was an MN, but could not be processed.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE` indicates that the input name was an MN, but that its type is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

This routine creates a flat name representation, suitable for bitwise comparison or for input to `GSS_Import_name()` in conjunction with the reserved GSS-API Exported Name Object OID, from a internal-form Mechanism Name (MN) as emitted, e.g., by `GSS_Canonicalize_name()` or `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`.

The emitted GSS-API Exported Name Object is self-describing; no associated parameter-level OID need be emitted by this call. This flat representation consists of a mechanism-independent wrapper layer, defined in Section 3.2 of this document, enclosing a mechanism-defined name representation.



In all cases, the flat name output by `GSS_Export_name()` to correspond to a particular input MN must be invariant over time within a particular installation.

The `GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN` status code is provided to enable implementations to reject input names which are not MNs. It is not, however, required for purposes of conformance to this specification that all non-MN input names must necessarily be rejected.

#### 2.4.19: `GSS_Duplicate_name` call

Inputs:

- o `src_name` INTERNAL NAME

Outputs:

- o `major_status` INTEGER,
- o `minor_status` INTEGER,
- o `dest_name` INTERNAL NAME

Return `major_status` codes:

- o `GSS_S_COMPLETE` indicates that `dest_name` references an internal name object containing the same name as passed to `src_name`.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME` indicates that the input name was invalid.
- o `GSS_S_BAD_NAME_TYPE` indicates that the input name's type is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation.
- o `GSS_S_FAILURE` indicates that the requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

This routine takes input internal name `src_name`, and returns another reference (`dest_name`) to that name which can be used even if `src_name` is later freed. (Note: This may be implemented by copying or through use of reference counts.)

### 3: Data Structure Definitions for GSS-V2 Usage

Subsections of this section define, for interoperability and portability purposes, certain data structures for use with GSS-V2.

### 3.1: Mechanism-Independent Token Format

This section specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating representation for the initial token of a GSS-API context establishment sequence, incorporating an identifier of the mechanism type to be used on that context and enabling tokens to be interpreted unambiguously at GSS-API peers. Use of this format is required for initial context establishment tokens of Internet standards-track GSS-API mechanisms; use in non-initial tokens is optional.

The encoding format for the token tag is derived from ASN.1 and DER (per illustrative ASN.1 syntax included later within this subsection), but its concrete representation is defined directly in terms of octets rather than at the ASN.1 level in order to facilitate interoperable implementation without use of general ASN.1 processing code. The token tag consists of the following elements, in order:

1. 0x60 -- Tag for [APPLICATION 0] SEQUENCE; indicates that constructed form, definite length encoding follows.
2. Token length octets, specifying length of subsequent data (i.e., the summed lengths of elements 3-5 in this list, and of the mechanism-defined token object following the tag). This element comprises a variable number of octets:
  - 2a. If the indicated value is less than 128, it shall be represented in a single octet with bit 8 (high order) set to "0" and the remaining bits representing the value.
  - 2b. If the indicated value is 128 or more, it shall be represented in two or more octets, with bit 8 of the first octet set to "1" and the remaining bits of the first octet specifying the number of additional octets. The subsequent octets carry the value, 8 bits per octet, most significant digit first. The minimum number of octets shall be used to encode the length (i.e., no octets representing leading zeros shall be included within the length encoding).
3. 0x06 -- Tag for OBJECT IDENTIFIER
4. Object identifier length -- length (number of octets) of the encoded object identifier contained in element 5, encoded per rules as described in 2a. and 2b. above.
5. Object identifier octets -- variable number of octets, encoded per ASN.1 BER rules:

5a. The first octet contains the sum of two values: (1) the top-level object identifier component, multiplied by 40 (decimal), and (2) the second-level object identifier component. This special case is the only point within an object identifier encoding where a single octet represents contents of more than one component.

5b. Subsequent octets, if required, encode successively-lower components in the represented object identifier. A component's encoding may span multiple octets, encoding 7 bits per octet (most significant bits first) and with bit 8 set to "1" on all but the final octet in the component's encoding. The minimum number of octets shall be used to encode each component (i.e., no octets representing leading zeros shall be included within a component's encoding).

(Note: In many implementations, elements 3-5 may be stored and referenced as a contiguous string constant.)

The token tag is immediately followed by a mechanism-defined token object. Note that no independent size specifier intervenes following the object identifier value to indicate the size of the mechanism-defined token object. While ASN.1 usage within mechanism-defined tokens is permitted, there is no requirement that the mechanism-specific `innerContextToken`, `innerMsgToken`, and `sealedUserData` data elements must employ ASN.1 BER/DER encoding conventions.

The following ASN.1 syntax is included for descriptive purposes only, to illustrate structural relationships among token and tag objects. For interoperability purposes, token and tag encoding shall be performed using the concrete encoding procedures described earlier in this subsection.

GSS-API DEFINITIONS ::=

BEGIN

MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

-- data structure definitions

-- callers must be able to distinguish among  
-- InitialContextToken, SubsequentContextToken,  
-- PerMsgToken, and SealedMessage data elements  
-- based on the usage in which they occur

InitialContextToken ::=

-- option indication (delegation, etc.) indicated within  
-- mechanism-specific token

[APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE {  
    thisMech MechType,  
    innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech  
        -- contents mechanism-specific  
        -- ASN.1 structure not required  
}

SubsequentContextToken ::= innerContextToken ANY

-- interpretation based on predecessor InitialContextToken  
-- ASN.1 structure not required

PerMsgToken ::=

-- as emitted by GSS\_GetMIC and processed by GSS\_VerifyMIC  
-- ASN.1 structure not required  
    innerMsgToken ANY

SealedMessage ::=

-- as emitted by GSS\_Wrap and processed by GSS\_Unwrap  
-- includes internal, mechanism-defined indicator  
-- of whether or not encrypted  
-- ASN.1 structure not required  
    sealedUserData ANY

END

### 3.2: Mechanism-Independent Exported Name Object Format

This section specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating representation for names exported via the `GSS_Export_name()` call, including an object identifier representing the exporting mechanism. The format of names encapsulated via this representation shall be defined within individual mechanism drafts. Name objects of this type will be identified with the following Object Identifier:

```
{1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes),
4(gss-api-exported-name)}
```

No name type OID is included in this mechanism-independent level of format definition, since (depending on individual mechanism specifications) the enclosed name may be implicitly typed or may be explicitly typed using a means other than OID encoding.

Length	Name	Description
2	TOK_ID	Token Identifier For exported name objects, this must be hex 04 01.
2	MECH_OID_LEN	Length of the Mechanism OID
MECH_OID_LEN	MECH_OID	Mechanism OID, in DER
4	NAME_LEN	Length of name
NAME_LEN	NAME	Exported name; format defined in applicable mechanism draft.

### 4: Name Type Definitions

This section includes definitions for name types and associated syntaxes which are defined in a mechanism-independent fashion at the GSS-API level rather than being defined in individual mechanism specifications.

#### 4.1: Host-Based Service Name Form

The following Object Identifier value is provided as a means to identify this name form:

```
{1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes),
2(gss-host-based-services)}
```

The recommended symbolic name for this type is "GSS\_C\_NT\_HOSTBASED\_SERVICE".

This name type is used to represent services associated with host computers. This name form is constructed using two elements, "service" and "hostname", as follows:

service@hostname

When a reference to a name of this type is resolved, the "hostname" is canonicalized by attempting a DNS lookup and using the fully-qualified domain name which is returned, or by using the "hostname" as provided if the DNS lookup fails. The canonicalization operation also maps the host's name into lower-case characters.

The "hostname" element may be omitted. If no "@" separator is included, the entire name is interpreted as the service specifier, with the "hostname" defaulted to the canonicalized name of the local host.

Values for the "service" element are registered with the IANA.

#### 4.2: User Name Form

This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) user\_name(1)}. The recommended mechanism-independent symbolic name for this type is "GSS\_C\_NT\_USER\_NAME". (Note: the same name form and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the symbolic name recommended there begins with a "GSS\_KRB5\_NT\_" prefix.)

This name type is used to indicate a named user on a local system. Its interpretation is OS-specific. This name form is constructed as:

username

#### 4.3: Machine UID Form

This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) machine\_uid\_name(2)}. The recommended mechanism-independent symbolic name for this type is "GSS\_C\_NT\_MACHINE\_UID\_NAME". (Note: the same name form and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the symbolic name recommended there begins with a "GSS\_KRB5\_NT\_" prefix.)

This name type is used to indicate a numeric user identifier corresponding to a user on a local system. Its interpretation is OS-specific. The gss\_buffer\_desc representing a name of this type should contain a locally-significant uid\_t, represented in host byte

order. The `GSS_Import_name()` operation resolves this uid into a username, which is then treated as the User Name Form.

#### 4.4: String UID Form

This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) string\_uid\_name(3)}. The recommended symbolic name for this type is "GSS\_C\_NT\_STRING\_UID\_NAME". (Note: the same name form and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the symbolic name recommended there begins with a "GSS\_KRB5\_NT\_" prefix.)

This name type is used to indicate a string of digits representing the numeric user identifier of a user on a local system. Its interpretation is OS-specific. This name type is similar to the Machine UID Form, except that the buffer contains a string representing the uid\_t.

### 5: Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios

This section provides illustrative overviews of the use of various candidate mechanism types to support the GSS-API. These discussions are intended primarily for readers familiar with specific security technologies, demonstrating how GSS-API functions can be used and implemented by candidate underlying mechanisms. They should not be regarded as constrictive to implementations or as defining the only means through which GSS-API functions can be realized with a particular underlying technology, and do not demonstrate all GSS-API features with each technology.

#### 5.1: Kerberos V5, single-TGT

OS-specific login functions yield a TGT to the local realm Kerberos server; TGT is placed in a credentials structure for the client. Client calls `GSS_Acquire_cred()` to acquire a cred\_handle in order to reference the credentials for use in establishing security contexts.

Client calls `GSS_Init_sec_context()`. If the requested service is located in a different realm, `GSS_Init_sec_context()` gets the necessary TGT/key pairs needed to traverse the path from local to target realm; these data are placed in the owner's TGT cache. After any needed remote realm resolution, `GSS_Init_sec_context()` yields a service ticket to the requested service with a corresponding session key; these data are stored in conjunction with the context. GSS-API code sends KRB\_TGS\_REQ request(s) and receives KRB\_TGS\_REP response(s) (in the successful case) or KRB\_ERROR.

Assuming success, `GSS_Init_sec_context()` builds a Kerberos-formatted `KRB_AP_REQ` message, and returns it in `output_token`. The client sends the `output_token` to the service.

The service passes the received token as the `input_token` argument to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`, which verifies the authenticator, provides the service with the client's authenticated name, and returns an `output_context_handle`.

Both parties now hold the session key associated with the service ticket, and can use this key in subsequent `GSS_GetMIC()`, `GSS_VerifyMIC()`, `GSS_Wrap()`, and `GSS_Unwrap()` operations.

## 5.2: Kerberos V5, double-TGT

TGT acquisition as above.

Note: To avoid unnecessary frequent invocations of error paths when implementing the GSS-API atop Kerberos V5, it seems appropriate to represent "single-TGT K-V5" and "double-TGT K-V5" with separate `mech_types`, and this discussion makes that assumption.

Based on the (specified or defaulted) `mech_type`, `GSS_Init_sec_context()` determines that the double-TGT protocol should be employed for the specified target. `GSS_Init_sec_context()` returns `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` `major_status`, and its returned `output_token` contains a request to the service for the service's TGT. (If a service TGT with suitably long remaining lifetime already exists in a cache, it may be usable, obviating the need for this step.) The client passes the `output_token` to the service. Note: this scenario illustrates a different use for the `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` status return facility than for support of mutual authentication; note that both uses can coexist as successive operations within a single context establishment operation.

The service passes the received token as the `input_token` argument to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`, which recognizes it as a request for TGT. (Note that current Kerberos V5 defines no intra-protocol mechanism to represent such a request.) `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` returns `GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED` `major_status` and provides the service's TGT in its `output_token`. The service sends the `output_token` to the client.

The client passes the received token as the `input_token` argument to a continuation of `GSS_Init_sec_context()`. `GSS_Init_sec_context()` caches the received service TGT and uses it as part of a service ticket request to the Kerberos authentication server, storing the returned service ticket and session key in conjunction with the context. `GSS_Init_sec_context()` builds a Kerberos-formatted authenticator,



and returns it in `output_token` along with `GSS_S_COMPLETE` return `major_status`. The client sends the `output_token` to the service.

Service passes the received token as the `input_token` argument to a continuation call to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`. `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` verifies the authenticator, provides the service with the client's authenticated name, and returns `major_status GSS_S_COMPLETE`.

`GSS_GetMIC()`, `GSS_VerifyMIC()`, `GSS_Wrap()`, and `GSS_Unwrap()` as above.

### 5.3: X.509 Authentication Framework

This example illustrates use of the GSS-API in conjunction with public-key mechanisms, consistent with the X.509 Directory Authentication Framework.

The `GSS_Acquire_cred()` call establishes a credentials structure, making the client's private key accessible for use on behalf of the client.

The client calls `GSS_Init_sec_context()`, which interrogates the Directory to acquire (and validate) a chain of public-key certificates, thereby collecting the public key of the service. The certificate validation operation determines that suitable integrity checks were applied by trusted authorities and that those certificates have not expired. `GSS_Init_sec_context()` generates a secret key for use in per-message protection operations on the context, and enciphers that secret key under the service's public key.

The enciphered secret key, along with an authenticator quantity signed with the client's private key, is included in the `output_token` from `GSS_Init_sec_context()`. The `output_token` also carries a certification path, consisting of a certificate chain leading from the service to the client; a variant approach would defer this path resolution to be performed by the service instead of being asserted by the client. The client application sends the `output_token` to the service.

The service passes the received token as the `input_token` argument to `GSS_Accept_sec_context()`. `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` validates the certification path, and as a result determines a certified binding between the client's distinguished name and the client's public key. Given that public key, `GSS_Accept_sec_context()` can process the `input_token`'s authenticator quantity and verify that the client's private key was used to sign the `input_token`. At this point, the

client is authenticated to the service. The service uses its private key to decipher the enciphered secret key provided to it for per-message protection operations on the context.

The client calls `GSS_GetMIC()` or `GSS_Wrap()` on a data message, which causes per-message authentication, integrity, and (optional) confidentiality facilities to be applied to that message. The service uses the context's shared secret key to perform corresponding `GSS_VerifyMIC()` and `GSS_Unwrap()` calls.

## 6: Security Considerations

Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.

## 7: Related Activities

In order to implement the GSS-API atop existing, emerging, and future security mechanisms:

- object identifiers must be assigned to candidate GSS-API mechanisms and the name types which they support

- concrete data element formats and processing procedures must be defined for candidate mechanisms

Calling applications must implement formatting conventions which will enable them to distinguish GSS-API tokens from other data carried in their application protocols.

Concrete language bindings are required for the programming environments in which the GSS-API is to be employed, as RFC-1509 defines for the C programming language and GSS-V1.

## APPENDIX A

### MECHANISM DESIGN CONSTRAINTS

The following constraints on GSS-API mechanism designs are adopted in response to observed caller protocol requirements, and adherence thereto is anticipated in subsequent descriptions of GSS-API mechanisms to be documented in standards-track Internet specifications.

It is strongly recommended that mechanisms offering per-message protection services also offer at least one of the replay detection and sequencing services, as mechanisms offering neither of the latter will fail to satisfy recognized requirements of certain candidate caller protocols.

## APPENDIX B

### COMPATIBILITY WITH GSS-V1

It is the intent of this document to define an interface and procedures which preserve compatibility between GSS-V1 (RFC-1508) callers and GSS-V2 providers. All calls defined in GSS-V1 are preserved, and it has been a goal that GSS-V1 callers should be able to operate atop GSS-V2 provider implementations. Certain detailed changes, summarized in this section, have been made in order to resolve omissions identified in GSS-V1.

The following GSS-V1 constructs, while supported within GSS-V2, are deprecated:

Names for per-message processing routines: GSS\_Seal() deprecated in favor of GSS\_Wrap(); GSS\_Sign() deprecated in favor of GSS\_GetMIC(); GSS\_Unseal() deprecated in favor of GSS\_Unwrap(); GSS\_Verify() deprecated in favor of GSS\_VerifyMIC().

GSS\_Delete\_sec\_context() facility for context\_token usage, allowing mechanisms to signal context deletion, is retained for compatibility with GSS-V1. For current usage, it is recommended that both peers to a context invoke GSS\_Delete\_sec\_context() independently, passing a null output\_context\_token buffer to indicate that no context\_token is required. Implementations of GSS\_Delete\_sec\_context() should delete relevant locally-stored context information.

This GSS-V2 specification adds the following calls which are not present in GSS-V1:

Credential management calls: `GSS_Add_cred()`,  
`GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech()`.

Context-level calls: `GSS_Inquire_context()`, `GSS_Wrap_size_limit()`,  
`GSS_Export_sec_context()`, `GSS_Import_sec_context()`.

Per-message calls: No new calls. Existing calls have been renamed.

Support calls: `GSS_Create_empty_OID_set()`,  
`GSS_Add_OID_set_member()`, `GSS_Test_OID_set_member()`,  
`GSS_Release_OID()`, `GSS_OID_to_str()`, `GSS_Str_to_OID()`,  
`GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech()`, `GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name()`,  
`GSS_Canonicalize_name()`, `GSS_Export_name()`, `GSS_Duplicate_name()`.

This GSS-V2 specification introduces three new facilities applicable to security contexts, indicated using the following context state values which are not present in GSS-V1:

`anon_state`, set TRUE to indicate that a context's initiator is anonymous from the viewpoint of the target; Section 1.2.5 of this specification provides a summary description of the GSS-V2 anonymity support facility, support and use of which is optional.

`prot_ready_state`, set TRUE to indicate that a context may be used for per-message protection before final completion of context establishment; Section 1.2.7 of this specification provides a summary description of the GSS-V2 facility enabling mechanisms to selectively permit per-message protection during context establishment, support and use of which is optional.

`trans_state`, set TRUE to indicate that a context is transferable to another process using the GSS-V2 `GSS_Export_sec_context()` facility.

These state values are represented (at the C bindings level) in positions within a bit vector which are unused in GSS-V1, and may be safely ignored by GSS-V1 callers.

Relative to GSS-V1, GSS-V2 provides additional guidance to GSS-API implementors in the following areas: implementation robustness, credential management, behavior in multi-mechanism configurations, naming support, and inclusion of optional sequencing services. The token tagging facility as defined in GSS-V2, Section 3.1, is now described directly in terms of octets to facilitate interoperable implementation without general ASN.1 processing code; the corresponding ASN.1 syntax, included for descriptive purposes, is

unchanged from that in GSS-V1. For use in conjunction with added naming support facilities, a new Exported Name Object construct is added. Additional name types are introduced in Section 4.

This GSS-V2 specification adds the following major\_status values which are not defined in GSS-V1:

GSS_S_BAD_QOP	unsupported QOP value
GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED	operation unauthorized
GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE	operation unavailable
GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT	duplicate credential element requested
GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN	name contains multi-mechanism elements
GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN	skipped predecessor token(s) detected

Of these added status codes, only two values are defined to be returnable by calls existing in GSS-V1: GSS\_S\_BAD\_QOP (returnable by GSS\_GetMIC() and GSS\_Wrap()), and GSS\_S\_GAP\_TOKEN (returnable by GSS\_VerifyMIC() and GSS\_Unwrap()).

Additionally, GSS-V2 descriptions of certain calls present in GSS-V1 have been updated to allow return of additional major\_status values from the set as defined in GSS-V1: GSS\_Inquire\_cred() has GSS\_S\_DEFECTIVE\_CREDENTIAL and GSS\_S\_CREDENTIALS\_EXPIRED defined as returnable, GSS\_Init\_sec\_context() has GSS\_S\_OLD\_TOKEN, GSS\_S\_DUPLICATE\_TOKEN, and GSS\_S\_BAD\_MECH defined as returnable, and GSS\_Accept\_sec\_context() has GSS\_S\_BAD\_MECH defined as returnable.

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