


## Section 1

### Recap



## What does personal identity consist in? Three Options

### Same Body Theory

A person A at one time is identical to a person B at a later time iff the body of A is identical to the body of B.

### Same Soul Theory

A person A at one time is identical to a person B at a later time iff the soul of A is identical to the soul of B.

### Psychological Continuity Theory

A person A at one time is identical to a person B at a later time iff B is psychologically continuous with A.

## Further Clarification of our Question



## Appropriate Connection: Example



## Section 2

### Version 1

## Memory Continuity

A person A at one time is identical to a person B at a later time iff B *remembers the experiences* that A has.

## Memory

### Factual Memories

Memories that a particular event occurred. They can be shared by several people, e.g., many of us remember President Obama's inauguration.

### Personal Memories

Memories of having the experience of an event. They cannot be shared, e.g., only President Obama has the memory of *being inaugurated* at his inauguration.



## Objection

- Allow 'Rike' to be the 7 year old who will grow up to be Riker.
  - P1 Riker = Rike only if Riker remembers everything that Rike experienced.
  - P2 Riker does not remember what Rike ate for breakfast on the second day after his 7th birthday, though Rike certainly had the experience of eating something
  - C Riker  $\neq$  Rike

## Section 3

### Version 2


## Psychological Continuity-Version 2

A person A at one time is identical to a person B at a later time iff B is psychologically continuous with A.

### Psychological Continuity

There is a chain of person-stages connected by episodic memory.

## Psychological Continuity




- F remembers what E experienced.
- E remembers what D experienced.
- D remembers what C experienced.
- C remembers what B experienced.
- B remembers what A experienced.
- Thus, A, B, C, D, E, and F are psychologically continuous with each other.
- Hence, they are all stages of the one very same person.

## River Objection



## Problem: Apparent vs Real Memory

# Memory




### I really remember X iff

- I have an experience as though I remember experiencing X.
- I did experience X.

### I apparently remember X iff

- I have an experience as though I remember experiencing X.
- I did not experience X.

### Distinguishing Real vs. Apparent Memories: Attempt 1



### Internal Differences

- P1 If I could perceive a qualitative difference between a real and an apparent memory of X, then this qualitative difference would distinguish the real and apparent memory of X.
- P2 I can perceive no qualitative difference between a real and an apparent memory of X.
- C No qualitative difference distinguishes real and apparent memories of X.

### Distinguishing Real vs. Apparent Memories: Attempt 2


#### Suggestion:

If two persons A and B both have an experience as though they remember the experiences of some person P, then the memory of A (or B) is real and not apparent only if A (or B) is identical to P.

The problems is that it is circular to make both claims:

1.  $A = P$  only if A really remembers what P experiences.
2. A really remembers what P experiences only if  $A = P$ .

## Circular Reasoning



## Distinguishing Real vs. Apparent Memories: Attempt 3

### Suggestion

- A real memory is one that was caused in the right way.
- An apparent memory is one that was not caused in the right way, e.g. hypnosis, implantation, etc.

### Problem-Duplicates!

- P1 Two persons A and B both have memories of what P experienced that were caused in the right way.
- P2  $A \neq B$ .
- C Having memories caused in the right way is not sufficient for personal identity.

## Riker Objection

