

VI: THE CATEGORIES

1. THE STOIC CATEGORIES

The Stoics recognize four kinds of beings instead of Aristotle's ten categories.

Simp. CATG. 66.32 = 2/369 But the Stoics think the number of the primary genera should be contracted to even fewer. And they take over some things moved into these fewer genera. For they make the division into four - subjects, qualia, things in some condition (POS ECHONTA) and things in some condition relative to something (PROSTI POS ECHONTA). And it is clear that they leave very many things out; for altogether they omit quantity and the things in time and place. For suppose that they think condition embraces these things too, because what was last year or is in the Lyceum or sitting or wearing shoes is in some state in one of these respects. In that case (i) first of all, when there is so much difference in these, the common feature of conditions is presented as unarticulated because of it; (ii) besides, this common condition will apply to subject and quality most - for they are also in some state.

It is normally supposed that the Stoics identify these four with the things called 'predicates', KATEGOREMATA, in other sources (DL vii 63) - though there is no definite evidence linking the use of the term KATEGOREMA to the group of four. This is an important question, and will affect our view of the nature of the categories. If they are KATEGOREMATA, the things signified by words, they are types of lekta, and so incorporeal. If they are types of beings, they must, on the Stoic view, be bodies. One familiar question about Aristotle's categories is about what he is classifying - types of utterances, or different meanings of utterances, or things referred to by them? The Stoics are much more insistent than Aristotle in distinguishing a class of things signified, the lekta, from the things in the world corresponding to words; and since they are clearer about this, they ought to say unambiguously where the categories belong. Unfortunately the sources are not unambiguous about this, and the Stoics may not have been either.

The categories seem to be correlated fairly closely with the parts of speech; and Diogenes suggests that each of them signifies one of the categories, i.e. an item that is in one of the categories. An appellation signifies a common quality, a name a peculiar quality, a verb an uncompounded predicate or 'something combinable into one thing or more than one' (DL vii 57 ff). Since at least the first two significates mentioned have the names normally given to a category, the categories seem to be significates, therefore lekta, and therefore incorporeal. Some Stoics or their supporters criticize the Aristotelian categories because they do not correspond properly to all the parts of speech (Simp. in Catg. 64.13 ff); this criticism seems to assume that each category ought to be the significate of a distinct part of speech. This association between categories and parts of speech requires them to be lekta.

2. SUBJECTS

Aristotle closely associates (1) substance, *ousia*, (2) primary subject, *prōton hupokeimenon*, (3) this, *tode ti*, and (4) form, *eidos*. The Stoics, by contrast, associate *ousia*, *prōton hupokeimenon*, and *tode* with matter, and indeed with primary matter, which is said to be 'unqualified', *apoios* (Stob, Ecl. i 132.26). They never seem to apply '*ousia*' to qualities. Plutarch's use in CN 1085e ff is probably just his inference from the fact that the Stoics call qualities bodies.

The first category - subject, HUPOKEIMENON, or substance, OUSIA - is the material substrate.

DL vii 150 = 1/87 They say that primary matter, PROTE HULE, is the substance, OUSIA, of all beings, as Chrysippus says in PHYSICS Book i, and Zeno. Matter is that out of which anything whatever comes to be. Substance and matter are spoken of in two ways - that of everything and that of particular things. The substance and matter of the whole becomes neither more nor less, while particular matter does become more and less.

Stobaeus, 132.26W = 1/87 Zeno: Primary matter is the substance of all beings. All of this is eternal and becomes neither more nor less. But the parts of this do not always remain the same but are divided and combined. Through this runs the reason of everything, which some call fate, like the seed in the womb.

The Stoics seem to tidy up Aristotle's scheme and remove some of its hesitation. Aristotle sometimes associates subject and substance with form, sometimes with matter; sometimes he contrasts the particular subject with the universal form. The Stoics are decisive. They identify subject and substance, and identify these with matter, the basic unqualified, APOIOS, substrate of the universe.

DL vii 134 They think there are two principles, ARCHAI, of the whole, the active and the passive. The passive is unqualified substance that is matter, and the active is the reason in it, that is God - this is eternal and fashions, DEMIOURGEIN, each thing throughout the matter.

Plu. CN 1085e = 2/380 Further they say that substance and matter underlies, HUPHISTANAI, qualities, so as practically to define them this way, and again they make qualities substances and bodies. This involves much confusion. For if the qualities have their peculiar substance according to which they are called, and are, bodies, they do not need another substance; for they have their own. But if only this common (thing) underlies them, which the Stoics call substance and matter, it is clear that they partake of body, but are not bodies. For the underlying and receiving thing must necessarily differ from the things it receives and underlies. But the Stoics see only the half of it. For they call matter unqualified, but they refuse to go on and call qualities matterless. And yet how is it possible to think of body without quality, if you cannot think of quality without body? For the argument that involves a body with every quality does not allow the mind to grasp, HAPTESTHAI, any body without some quality; and so the argument seems either by opposing quality without body to oppose matter without quality too, or by separating body from quality to sever both from each other. Some adduce this argument: They call matter unqualified, not because it lacks every quality, but because it has all qualities. This is most of all against the common conceptions. For no one thinks of something as unqualified that lacks a share in no quality, or as unaffected that is naturally always affected in every way, or as unmoved that is moved in every way. But that point is not refuted, that matter is conceived as other than and different from quality, even if it is always thought of with quality.

This basic subject can be spoken of in two ways, as a whole and as a part (DL vii 150) - either as 'matter', the whole matter of the universe, or as 'this matter', the particular bit of matter that we might identify with Socrates or with this table. This subject is the sort of thing that Aristotle seems to recognize as 'prime matter' in GEN ET CORR. ii.¹

Why do the Stoics insist on unqualified prime matter? Part of the reason is no doubt to be found in Stoic physics; the matter has to be absolutely passive, waiting to be worked on by the active cause. But there may be another reason, connected with Stoic views on language and demonstratives. We have seen that the Stoics think it important to distinguish the descriptive and the demonstrative functions of language, and assign these functions to different words. Names and appellations signify qualities (e.g. 'Dion', 'horse'); it is not their task to refer to items in the world. The demonstrative function belongs to explicit demonstrative pronouns and adjectives, HODE, HOUTOS, and so on. (The Greek demonstratives have genders, so that 'this' often refers clearly to a man (e.g.) without the addition of 'man'; hence I will often translate HOUTOS by 'he'.) Now do these signify something? Have they a corresponding lekton? Or do they simply refer, signifying nothing? (Russell conceived of demonstratives as lacking sense; Mill conceived of proper names the same way.) The Stoics might say that they do signify a lekton- the category of subject. They seem to signify the subject independently of any properties that belong, or are thought to belong to it. Whitehead gives an example:

Suppose that the expositor . . . is speaking in the college hall and he says "This college building is commodious". The phrase "this college building" is a demonstrative phrase. Now suppose the recipient answers, "This is not a college building, it is the lion-house at the Zoo." The expositor sticks to his initial proposition when he replies, "Anyhow, it is commodious" . . . The "it" of this final statement presupposes that thought has seized on the entity as a bare subject for consideration. (CONCEPT OF NATURE, 7 ff.)

Even though the 'this' is normally associated with an expressed or implied description, it refers to the actual subject ostended, even if those descriptions are false of it. This may be the Stoics' reason for insisting that the basic subject, the sort of thing signified by 'this', is pure qualityless matter, all of it or the particular part of it ostended on a particular occasion. It does not follow that what is referred to is only a bare subject; what I refer to with 'This man' may in fact be a tree or a statue, but I am still referring to the tree or statue, not to something that fits the description.

¹ No clear pre-Stoic use of APOIOS is attested. Stob. Ecl. i 149.11 W (= Diels DG 314) says that Democritus made the elements APOIA, but it is not clear that Democritus actually used the term.

The Stoics' interest in demonstratives and personal pronouns as making definite, purely ostensive reference leads them to use some grammatical terms in non-standard ways.

Priscian, INST. xi 1 (GRAMMATICI LATINI ii 548). For since the Stoics treated the article and the pronoun as one part of speech, they called 'indefinite article' what grammarians call the article, and join to it indefinite names and relatives. Didymus does this in his work on Latinity. For the Stoics called 'definite article' what we now call a definite pronoun (e.g. 'he').

Apoll. Dysc. DE PRON. (GRAMMATICI GRAECI i 1, p. 5.13). The Stoics also call pronouns articles, different from our articles; for the Stoics' articles are definite, and ours are indefinite.

Apoll. Dysc. DE PRON. 6.30 (Apollonius argues that the article 'the' is definite) The Stoics' calling the articles indefinite is controversial; for 'man' came to be undefined (AHORISTA). (They are wrong.) For every anaphora (reference backwards) signifies some previously-subsisting knowledge, and what is known is defined. How then can articles be indefinite, when they indicate anaphora? But suppose one also says (as the Stoics do) that they are undefined in 'The walker is moved' and similar things; we will say that they will rather be called defined from the things signifying anaphora. Perhaps the Stoics called articles indefinite by comparison with pronouns, which are always definite.

Dion. Thrax 63.1. A pronoun is an utterance substituted for a name, revealing a definite person.

Galen, HIPP. ET. PLAT. ii 2, p. 172 M (One of Chrysippus' arguments for regarding the heart as the seat of the leading part of the soul.) So also we say 'ego' according to this, ostending ourselves . . . (text uncertain) . . . our ostension naturally and appropriately, OIKEIOS, tending there. Even without any such ostension with the hand, we nod toward ourselves in saying 'ego', when the sound 'ego' is of such a sort and expressed according to the ostension indicated in order. For we pronounce 'ego' by moving down the lower lip ostensively towards ourselves at the first syllable, and following on the movement of the chin and the nodding towards the chest and such ostension the next syllable follows, suggesting nothing distant, as happens with EKEINOS ('he' - pronoun for a more remote subject).

We have some reason, then, to see a connexion between being a subject and being available for ostension. Sextus also suggests a connexion in his discussion of definite and intermediate assertions; see M viii 97; DL vii 70. The utterance of an intermediate assertion contains a proper name, which signifies a 'direct case' (*ptōsis orthē*) or 'form' (*eidos*). We will return later to this use of 'eidos' to signify a uniquely instantiated quality cf. DL vii 60). It seems clear that the quality is *not* what is ostended in the utterance of a definite assertion. And so it seems plausible to claim that what is ostended in a definite assertion is a subject.

It is important to see the connexion between ostension and the first category, if we are to understand why the first category is described as *unqualified* matter. Some reasons for this can be derived from Stoic physics, and in particular from the Stoic view of causes. But some reasons can also be found in the Stoics' semantics, and especially in their view of demonstratives.

What is meant by calling matter 'unqualified'? Plutarch CN 1076 cd, 1086a says matter has all qualities and that it receives different qualities. And so it seems reasonable to say of it (as of Aristotle's prime matter) that at any time it has qualities, but these qualities are not essential to it. This claim might be connected with claims about ostension. If 'this is white' is to be true, all that is needed is that the thing ostended be white. I am not asserting that this F and G thing is white. If I were asserting that, then my utterance would be false in cases where the object is not really F and G; in fact, however, the utterance 'this is white' is true as long as the thing is white. This, according to the Stoics, is an important difference between the use of demonstratives and the use of proper names (which they take to signify qualities).

3. TYPES OF MATTER

In speaking of matter, the Stoics distinguish (a) the whole, which allows neither increase nor decrease, from (b) the part, which does allow these (DL vii 150). The part cannot be conceived as a quantity; for this does not allow increase or decrease.² It must be conceived as something like a lump or heap, which can remain the same while it grows or decreases

² See Cartwright 'Quantities' *Phil Rev* 1970

or changes shape.

The Stoics do not habitually use 'matter' for bronze, wood, and the other sorts of things that Aristotle calls matter. They speak of 'first' matter, *prōtē hulē*. (See 1/87, 2/317.) But they do not normally draw Aristotle's contrast between this and other types of matter. They seem to believe that Aristotle is being arbitrary in drawing the distinction between form and matter in just one place. According to Aristotle, we have different levels of matter all the way up from prime matter to the proximate matter of an organism (the organic parts), and only at that level can we say that the functional arrangement of the matter is the form. The Stoics believe that this is arbitrary, because we can also think of stuffs as form in matter (to describe water as H₂O gives us the form). We have no reason, then, to draw a distinction between form and matter at the highest level, and at no lower level.

Sometimes Aristotle recognizes something like this point: (1) In GC 321b21, 322a34, he speaks of flesh and wine as including form and matter. (2) In Met 1042b15 he recognizes various *differentiae*, *diaphorai* of matter - arrangement, position, etc. - that result in different actualizations, *energeiai*. But at 1043a3 he says these are analogous to substance, not cases of substance.

In the Stoics' view, Aristotle has things the wrong way round. In their view, he should regard any case in which matter is arranged or organized or qualified as a case in which matter acquires form. The results of different kinds of arrangements are the Stoic qualities. In Plu. SR 1053f 'form-making', *eidopoein*, is associated with quality. Hence the Stoics believe that Aristotle confuses the issue when he speaks of matter without form at the different levels below the level of organisms.

The Stoics believe that matter stays the same through all alterations, since alterations are simply rearrangements of bits of it.

Aetius i 15.6 = 1/91 Zeno the Stoic said that colours are the primary arrangements of matter.

The stuff in front of me is first a gold coin and then a ring, say; I can still say that this same stuff is present.

Stob. ECL. 178.10 W = LS 28D (Poseidonius.) Substance is neither increased nor decreased by addition or subtraction, but is only altered, ALLOIOUSTHAI, as happens with numbers and measures. But with peculiar qualia, such as Dion and Theon, increase and decrease happens. Hence the quality of each remains from genesis to destruction, as in the case of animals and plants and things like them that admit destruction. In the case of peculiar qualia there are two receptive parts, the one according to the subsistence of substance, the other according to the subsistence of the quale. For the latter, as we have often said, admits growth and diminution. The peculiar quale and the substance out of which this is are not the same thing, nor yet are they different, HETERON, but only not the same. For the peculiar quale is a part of substance and has the same place; but things said to be different from things must be both separated in place and not viewed in a part (of the thing they are different from). Mnesarchus says it is clear that the thing according to the peculiar quality and the thing according to the substance are not the same; for it is necessary for the same thing to belong (or 'happen'; SUMBAINEIN) to the same things. For suppose, for the sake of argument, someone made a horse and then broke it up and made a dog (from the same stuff); it would be reasonable for us to say when we had seen it that this previously was not and now is. And so the this (i.e. the particular thing) spoken of in the case of the quale is different from the this spoken of in the case of substance.³ In general to suppose that we are the same as our substance seems to be unpersuasive. For it often happens that the substance obtains, HUPARCHEIN, before the coming to be, e.g., of Socrates, when Socrates does not yet obtain, and after the death of Socrates the substance remains, but he no longer is.⁴

Why should Poseidonius have said that matter cannot itself increase or decrease,

³ This does not seem to use 'different' and 'not the same' according to the distinction drawn above.

⁴ Poseidonius is sometimes taken to deviate from orthodox Stoicism in allowing substance to alter; see Rist, SP 159. But the argument against the orthodoxy of his view is not clear, especially in the light of Aetius i 15.6 = 1/91, cited by Rist himself, 158.

and compared it to numbers and measures?⁵ The point might be that a number cannot be the same number, nor a measure the same measure, if it grows or diminishes; if matter is like this, the matter I am ostending must be defined quantitatively.

Plu. CN 1083b = LS 28A (The Academics argue against the possibility of growth.) The Stoics concede the premise. All particular substances, they agree, are in flux, RHEIN, and carried off, PHIERESTHAI, sending some things off from themselves and receiving other things coming to be from somewhere. The numbers or quantities that gain and lose do not remain the same, but become different acquiring transformation of substance by these additions and subtractions. We are overcome by custom in wrongly calling these things growths and decays. It is more appropriate to call them generation and destruction because they expel something from what was there into something different (i.e. they cause another substance to exist), while growth and decay are affections of a body that underlies and persists. When these sorts of things are said and put forward, what do the Stoics think, these defenders of clarity, ENARGEIA, and standards of the (common) conceptions? They say that each of us is twins, biform and double - not as the poets think the Molionidai are, united in some parts and divided in others (i.e. Siamese twins), but two bodies with the same colour, shape, weight and place, but still double, though never noticed by anyone before. Only the Stoics noticed this combination and duplication and duality, that each of us is two subjects, HUPOKEIMENA. One is substance, the other quality. The first is always in flux and being carried off, neither increased nor decreased nor remaining such as it is at all; the second remains and increases and decreases, and is affected in every way opposite to the first subject, though it is coalesced and conjoined and commingled, and never allows perception to grasp the difference.

Dexippus, in CATG. 23.25 (tr. Dillon, p. 50) = 2/374 In reply to this difficulty this should be said, that the subject is double, according to the Stoics and according to the older philosophers (i.e. Peripatetics). For one is what is called the primary subject, unqualified matter, which Aristotle says is potentially a body (in GEN & CORR. ii?). The second subject is the qualified, subsisting either in common or peculiarly. For bronze and Socrates are subjects for the things coming to be in them or predicated of them. For the subject seemed to be spoken of according to the relative - for it is a subject for something (or 'underlies something') - either simpliciter, as the subject of the things coming to be in it and predicated of it, or peculiarly. Primary matter is the subject simpliciter for everything coming to be and predicated; but bronze and Socrates are the subject for some things coming to be in them and predicated of them. And so there are two subjects, and many of the things coming to be in something, towards the first subject they are in the subject, towards the second they are not in the subject but parts of it.⁶

In pointing to you I will be pointing to that contiguous quantity of stuff that constitutes you; if I add more to that quantity I will have a different quantity, and hence a different subject. Mnesarchos' distinction between the peculiar quality and the substance suggests the same conception of substance; the substance of Socrates can precede and survive Socrates, but his peculiar quality cannot. The substance here is identified with the stuff Socrates comes to be from (presumably not all in one place) and the stuff that remains after his death. This view seems to face a difficulty. The OUSIA of Socrates will apparently be different stuff at different periods of his life, so that his OUSIA will not last as long as he does. This is no doubt why the Stoics find the criterion of identity for Socrates in his peculiar quality. But isn't this view of the substance of Socrates paradoxical in general, not just for an Aristotelian?

If the Stoics associate the first category with the demonstrable subject and hence with matter, it seems to follow that the category includes only existents. For though you may be able to say what is not, you cannot point to it. (This is a different question from the question whether the category itself is a lekton or an external, bodily object.) However, that claim causes some trouble. For is the present time not the time we point to when we say 'now'? Time, however, including the present, is not a being, and is certainly not matter. Perhaps the Stoics will have to say that I indirectly ostend the present time by directly

⁵ For the distinction see Plu. CN 1083b, d, where growth and diminution are again denied to the subject. See also Aristotle, MET. 1010a23.

⁶ Cf. Simplicius, CATG. 48.11 ff for the same argument.

ostending something else, presumably some body in motion; it is not clear that this answer will provide the sort of non-circular account that they want.

4. QUALITIES

Qualities seem to be identified by the Stoics with something material, more especially with bodies that can be totally mixed with each other.

Galen, in Hipp. DE NAT. HOM. xv. p.32 K = 2/463 Some have claimed that only the four qualities (hot, cold, dry, wet) are totally mixed with each other; some have claimed this about substances. The Peripatetics defend the first view, the Stoics the second.⁷

Plutarch says that the Stoics make the air holding bodies together responsible for their having qualities.

Plutarch, SR 1053f = 2/449 In the books ON STATES (HEXEIS) Chrysippus says that states are nothing other than (quantities of) air: 'For by these bodies are held together (SUNECHETAI, cognate with HEXIS); and for each of the things held together by a state the air holding it together is responsible, AITIOS, for its being qualified; in iron we call the air hardness, in stone solidity, in silver paleness.' These claims are full of absurdity and conflict. For if air remains what it is by nature, how does the dark in the non-pale become paleness, and the soft in the non-hard become hardness and the fluid in the non-solid become solidity? But if by being mixed in these things it changes (from what it was) and becomes like them, how is it the state or power or cause, AITIA, of the things that dominate it? For such a change, according to which it loses its own qualities, belongs to something affected, not to something active, and not to something holding together, but to something weakly yielding. And yet everywhere they claim that matter is inactive and unmoved from itself and underlies qualities, and that qualities, being spirits (PNEUMATA) and airy tensions, produce form (EIDOPOIEIN) and shape (SCHEMATIZEIN) in whatever parts of matter they come to be in.⁸

Simp. CATG. CAG viii 217.32 = 2/389 The Stoics say that the qualities of bodies are bodily, and of non-bodily things are non-bodily. They go wrong because they think that causes are of the same substance, HOMOOUSIOS, as the things produced by them, and set down a common account of cause for bodies and for non-bodily things. But how will the substance of bodily qualities be pneumatic? For puma itself is compound, compounded out of several things; it is divisible, and the unity it has is acquired, so that it does not have its unification according to its substance (or 'essence'), nor primarily from itself. How then can it provide this cohesion (holding together; SUNECHESTHAI) to other things?

Simp. CATG. 214.24 = 2/391 = LS 28M And the Stoics according to their own assumptions would bring forward the same difficulty for the argument that says all qualified things are spoken of according to a quality (Ar. CATG. 8b25). For they say that qualities are cohesive things (HEKTA), and they allow these only to unified things. In the case of things according to contact, e.g. a ship, and those according to dispersion, e.g. an army, there is nothing cohesive, nor is any one pneumatic thing found in them, nor anything having a single account, LOGOS, so as to arrive at the substance of one state, HEXIS. But the qualified is seen in things made of things in contact, and in things made of dispersed things. For just as a single grammarian from some repetition and training remains stable according to difference, so a chorus from a certain sort of practice is stable according to difference. And so they are qualified because of arrangement and cooperation towards a single end; but they are qualified without quality. For there is no state in them; for there is no quality or state in substances that are dispersed and have nothing coalescent with each other. But if there is something qualified with no quality, then, they say, these two things do not correspond with each other, and it is not possible to find the quality through the qualified. Against this we can say that the form, being incorporeal, extends as one and the same over the many, being everywhere whole and the same (cf. Plato, PARMENIDES 131ab). If this is so, there will also be one quality pervading the qualified things that are dispersed and the ones in contact. If, however, someone were to reject this assumption as foreign to the Stoic doctrine, it is possible to fight back strongly . . .

5. QUALITY AND UNITY

In identifying substance with unqualified matter, the Stoics might easily seem to be abandoning a central element in Aristotle's position. For part of Aristotle's reason for

⁷ Here Galen is using 'substance' in a Peripatetic, not a Stoic, way.

⁸ Cf. 2/377, 388, 410.

saying that form, and not only matter, is substance is his view that formally identified things, and especially organisms, are irreducible realities; there are truths about them that cannot simply be expressed as truths about their constituent, non-formally identified, matter. The Stoics might appear to be reacting against Aristotle in the direction of a more reductive position. This seems to be part of the force of Plotinus' criticism (vi 1.30).

A reply to this criticism rests on the Stoics' reasons for saying that quality is the principle of unity. They retain Aristotle's belief in the connexions between form and the criteria of unity and identity. They say, for instance, that something has a quality in so far as it holds together in some sort of unity (Galen in Hipp. de Nat. Hom. xv. p.32). If there is insufficient unity, as in a heap, then there is no quality (Simp. in Catg. 214.34; on *hexis*, *phusis*, and *psuche* see SM ix 81). Their reply to Plotinus, then, is this: We do not simply treat these of ways of speaking about matter with certain modifications. The things that have qualities are organized wholes to different degrees; certain physical laws are true of them in their own right, and so they are realities in their own right.

Aristotle implies something like this when he emphasizes that form is the principle of unity. But the force of his observation is a bit obscure, since (it might be argued) he does not make it sufficiently general. He speaks of form which (in the case of natural organisms) he more or less identifies with soul, and does not speak of form in the case of other unities. The Stoics, by contrast, recognize three grades of unity corresponding to different types of qualities.

Aristotle's restrictive conception of form helps to explain why he has to attribute soul to plants; since they have unity, they must have form, and since form is to be identified with soul, they must have soul. The Stoics reject this line of argument, by attributing nature (*phusis*), but not soul, to plants. We can perhaps give a similar explanation for Aristotle's refusal (not invariable, and not very well defended) for denying that non-organic compounds (including artifacts) are substances at all. He forces this conclusion on himself by insisting that substance is form, and that form is soul. The Stoics might claim to have preserved Aristotle's most important point while avoiding some of his less plausible claims; for they define a more general conception of form and unity that is realized to different degrees; in their view, Aristotle does not properly distinguish this general conception from the specific type of form and unity that he attributes to a soul. The Stoics might claim to have clarified this issue by defining the more general conception of form and unity.

6. PECULIAR QUALITIES

Among qualities Stoics distinguish common from peculiar qualities. An appellation such as 'man' or 'horse' signifies a common quality, while a proper name such as 'Dion' signifies a peculiar quality (DL vii 58). This view is associated, whether as cause or as effect, with the Stoic belief in the identity of indiscernibles; each distinct thing has its own peculiar quality distinguishing it from everything else.

Plu. CN 1077c = LS 28O Moreover they can be heard and found in many writings quarrelling with the Academics. They cry that the Academics confuse everything with their indistinguishabilities (APARALLAXIA), insisting on one quality in two things. And yet there is not a man who does not think this. On the contrary, everyone thinks it is amazing and paradoxical if in the whole of time no two doves or two bees or two grains or the proverbial figs have ever been indistinguishable. But this is truly contrary to the (common) conceptions, which they affirm and fabricate, that there should be two peculiar qualia in one substance, and that the same substance, having one peculiar quale, should receive another when it approaches, and should retain both alike. For if two, there could also be three, four, five and more than could be told in a particular substance - I mean, not in different parts, but an infinite number all alike in the whole substance. At least Chrysippus (this is meant to be the evidence for Plu's claims) says that Zeus and the universe are like the human being, and forethought (or 'providence', PRONOIA) is like the soul. When the conflagration comes, Zeus, the only god who is indestructible, withdraws to forethought, and then when they have come together, both persist in the single substance of the aether.

The Stoics regard qualities as further subjects besides matter. Their reason is given by Dexippus (in Catg. 23.25 ff). We can speak of a subject without qualification - the ultimate subject - or of a subject relative to a given change - it is bronze that melts, and Socrates that grows older. When we say 'Socrates' we are not speaking of the ultimate

subject that we speak of when we say 'this' - for that could exist without Socrates - but of a man distinct from other men; and so the Stoics recognize a second subject. The first category also included a distinction between the ultimate subject as a whole and the particular bits of it that we point to. Similarly, the second category includes the common quality and the peculiar quality that manifests it in a peculiar way. And so we can find four subjects of different sorts that may be attributed in different ways to particular men such as Socrates. This may be the explanation of a remark by Plutarch:

Plu. CN 1083e (Plu has been describing the doctrine of peculiar qualities, saying that it makes two subjects for everything.) I am making my account over-simple, since in fact they make four subjects for each of us, or rather, make each of us four.

The common and the peculiar quality provide what an Aristotelian might regard as the essence of each thing. Its common quality places it in its natural kind, while its peculiar quality does what Aristotle's particular form (if he believes in it) does. Simp. in DE AN. CAG xi 217.36 . . . if indeed the undivided form belongs to compound things, according to which the Stoics speak of the peculiar qualities. This comes to be all together, and again departs all together, and remains the same in the whole life of the compound thing, though different parts (of the compound) come to be and are destroyed at different times.

Other sources too recognize the peculiar quality as the source of Socrates' identity through time; one of our subjects, as Plutarch puts it, is always in flux, while the other remains the same from beginning to end. The same contrast is implied in the non-identity of the substance and the peculiar quality (Stob, Ecl. 178.10). No one substance or material substrate, the Stoics seem to think, lasts just as long as Socrates does; to believe this they should believe that particular bits of matter are to be quantitatively identified, so that the addition or subtraction of any matter makes a new bit of matter, and hence a new substance. The demand for a peculiar quality to individuate each distinct particular leads to some apparent paradoxes, and Chrysippus seems to have discovered at least one of them.

Philo, AET. MUNDI 48 (Loeb ix p.528) = 2/397 = LS 28P The Stoics do not notice that from their inconsistent philosophy they impose destruction on providence, which is the soul of the world. At least Chrysippus, the most renowned of them, writes something remarkable of this sort in his ON INCREASE. Laying down that it is impossible for two peculiar qualia to belong to the same substance he says, Let us suppose for the sake of argument that one man is complete and that another lacks one foot, and let us call the complete one Dion, and the incomplete one Theon. Then suppose that Dion has one of his feet cut off. If we ask which has perished, it is more appropriate to say that Theon has perished. This sounds more like a paradox-monger than someone speaking the truth. For how has Theon, the one who has lost no part been destroyed, and Dion, the one with his foot cut off, not been destroyed: Necessarily, he says; for when Dion had his foot cut off, he retreated to the incomplete substance of Theon, and there cannot be two peculiar qualia in the same subject. Hence it is necessary that Dion remain and that Theon has been destroyed.

This argument must assume that Theon's peculiar quality is being one-footed and that Dion's is something that does not require having two feet - for if this were a part of Dion's peculiar quality, Dion would perish when he lost a foot. If Theon exists when Dion loses a foot, then his peculiar quality is either having one foot or something else. But it cannot be having one foot, since Dion now has this property. Nor can it be some other property; for in that case Theon would have had to have that second peculiar quality all along, and no one subject can have two peculiar qualities. The argument is valid. But would a Stoic accept the premises? It would surely be implausible to make Theon's identity consist in having a property that something else could easily come to share. Indeed, one point of the paradox might be to suggest caution about what sorts of properties make suitable peculiar qualities - it is hard to see, for instance, how being one-legged could have the unifying character ascribed to a peculiar quality (cf. Simp. in Catg. 214.24 = 2/391). The paradox should not necessarily be taken to be a genuine consequence, even a reduction to absurdity, of the Stoic conception of the peculiar quality. It may instead be intended as a reductio of one attempt to identify a peculiar quality, an attempt which fails because it does not mark out the owner of the quality from beginning to end.⁹

⁹ A different treatment of the example of Dion and Theon is given by Sedley, *Phronesis*

7. QUALITY AND FORM

If we compare the Stoic with the Aristotelian category of quality, perhaps the most striking point is parallel to a point about the category of substance; the Stoics are consistent and clear in pursuing a line that Aristotle suggests but does not exploit, and so remove some of his ambiguities and ambivalences. In the *Categories* Aristotle distinguishes the category of quality from the category of substance, though he allows us to see how the term 'qualis' ('what-like?') might be further extended to secondary substance (CATG. 3b20). In *METAPHYSICS* v Aristotle recognizes two types of quality, one that is the differentia of substance, and the second that is only the differentia of substance qua changeable in various ways (MET. 1020a33-b18). The first type of quality is in the category of substance, since substance is, or includes, form, while the second type is an accident of substance. In Aristotle's schema the same thing - the form - can be regarded both as subject and as quality, since substance is required to include both. The Stoics think they can explain things more clearly than Aristotle did if they rigorously confine substance to the pure material substrate, and associate form with quality, in contrast to substance. It is not surprising that many of the roles of the Aristotelian formal substance are taken over by the Stoic quality. The species - in Aristotelian terms, the secondary substance or the universal form - is the Stoic common quality, while the particular form is the peculiar quality. Indeed, it is striking how many functions of Aristotelian form are represented in the vocabulary applied to qualities- 'form-making' (EIDOPOION) is a good sign of their character.¹⁰ The Stoics agree with Aristotle in saying that the sorts of things he calls substances are composed of form and matter.

Alex. DA CAG Supp. ii 1, 18.10 = 2/793 They say that the parts of the body must have parts that are bodies - just as the parts of a surface and line and time are surfaces and lines and times - and that the parts of an animal, which is a body, are form and matter, so that they are bodies this is mistaken. For these are not parts of the body in such a way that the body is divided into them.

The Stoics apparently argue that since the whole composite thing is a body the parts must be bodies too, and so they regard the form as a special kind of body. It has the function that Aristotle ascribes in MET vii 17 to the form, of unifying the matter so that it constitutes a single thing (cf. MET. 1047b16-17). The Stoics understand 'unifying' in purely material terms - given their principle about parts - and require the unifying quality to be the air that holds things in tension (Plu. SR 1053f). They recognize the Aristotelian distinction between mere heaps or aggregates and unified things, by marking the closeness and firmness of the cohesion, with the firmest cohesion belonging to things with souls. Achilles, ISAGOGE 14, p.134 = 2/368. (What is a star? What is a cluster of stars?) Those things are called unified bodies that are dominated by one state, such as a stone or log. A state (or 'holding', HEXIS) is pneuma holding a body together. Those things are combined that are not bound by one state, such as a boat and a house; for the boat is composed of many planks, the house of many stones. There are dispersed things, such as a chorus. Of these there are two varieties. Some of them are out of definite bodies taken in a certain number, such as a chorus (standardly of twelve or twenty-four or some other fixed number), some out of indefinite, such as a crowd. And so a star would be a unified body, but a cluster out of dispersed things that are definite; for a particular number of stars is shown in each cluster.¹¹

Indeed if something is not unified enough, the Stoics refuse to say it has a genuine quality (Simp. in Catg. 214.24 ff = 2/391).

Here Stoic corporealism raises a difficult question. When we speak of a man, Aristotle and the Stoics agree that we are speaking of a form, and the Stoics insist that we are speaking of a sort of quality. Aristotle believes that the form can be identified with the substance because it is simply the substance described in formal rather than

1982, and LS #28.

¹⁰ See Plu. CN 1054b; cf. 2/378, 393 (p.130.8, 13), 1044. Cf. Ar. TOP. 143b7, EN 1174b5.

¹¹ Cf. SM ix 78.

compositional terms. For Aristotle this means that we cannot speak of the form as still another material or quasi-material component, just as we cannot think of the syllable as another letter besides the letters that compose it. However, the Stoics do think of the form as a literal, corporeal part of the object, and the Aristotelian commentators attack them for falling into the trap that Aristotle tried to avoid. Alexander suggests that if the Stoics make the form into a body, it will have to be composed of form and matter too, so that there will be an infinite regress.

Alexander, in DE AN. CAG Supp. ii 1, 19.2 = 2/793 Indeed, if the soul is a body, and body not just as matter, it will be out of matter and form, if every body is such, according to them, apart from matter. Simplicius wonders how spirit can be identified with the substance (in the Aristotelian sense) of bodies. The substance is supposed to be their unifying aspect; but spirit is composite and does not have its unity in itself, but has to get it from something else (Simp. in Catg. 217.32 ff).

These are reasonable objections to the Stoics' corporeal treatment of form. For they suggest that in speaking of an object as unified we are speaking of one material constituent of it, not of how all the material constituents fit together. It is easy to see why the Stoics want to identify form with a body. They think that different sorts of things with different forms are really different, and that something's form is a real feature of it - they are not atomist reductionists. But their corporealism about reality requires anything real to be a body; and so forms have to be bodies too. But the sort of body that they conceive cannot easily take on the role of form, as Aristotle conceives it.

The Stoics need peculiar qualities for metaphysical reasons of their own too. We may believe that Aristotle recognizes particular forms; but if he does, he does not do it clearly. The Stoics do it clearly. They recognize the peculiar quality as the most species-like of species with no further species, such as Socrates.

DL vii 60 The species, EIDOS, is what is included in the genus, as man is included in animal. The most generic is the thing that being a genus has no genus, such as being.¹² The most specific is the thing which being a species has no species, such as Socrates.

Sextus is justified in saying that in an utterance of an intermediate assertion a term such as 'Socrates' defines the form or species (SM viii 97). They regard the peculiar form as an infima species. It is easy to see why they do this if we consider the other possibilities. Aristotle may have been less definite about particular forms because he saw no difficulty in saying that two individuals differ in their spatio-temporal careers alone. The Stoics cannot say this; for in their view place and time are not beings, and hence are not bodies. If different individual bodies are really different, the difference between them cannot be purely spatio-temporal; it must be explicable in purely bodily terms; and so it must consist in some qualitative difference, which will itself be bodily. That is why the peculiar quality must be described in purely qualitative terms, as an infima species is, with no spatio-temporal reference.

Simp. CATG. 222.30. The Stoics say that the common (feature) of quality is its being for bodies a differentia of substance, not separable by itself, but ending in a notion (ENNOEMA) and a peculiarity, being formed neither by time nor by force, but by its own suchness, according to which the becoming of something qualified subsists. Moreover, if it is not possible according to their account for bodies and incorporeals to have a common feature, quality will no longer be one genus, but it subsists one way in bodies, and in a different way in incorporeals, and because of this will be placed in two different genera.¹³

The peculiar quality of each individual tree or man must be describable without any spatio-temporal reference.

Just as the first category was the area of demonstration and pure ostension, the second is the area of pure description with no demonstration. The Stoics may well think Aristotle went wrong when he combined subject and form in the characteristically Aristotelian compromise that is an Aristotelian substance. His view may seem to them an

¹² Why not something rather than being? Cf. Alex. in Top. 301.19 ff; 352.12 ff.

¹³ Cf. also 238.12.

unfortunate confusion of demonstrative and descriptive elements. But do the Stoics justify their attempt to mark this distinction between demonstration and description by a sharp distinction between categories? They seem to expose some basic questions about their views:

1. How can we understand demonstratives without the use of some description? Must we not ostend something, as Aristotle might have said, as a 'this-such', under some form?
2. Is it simply an apparent paradox that the truth-conditions for all types of assertions depend on the truth-conditions for definite assertions, which depend on irreducibly spatio-temporal ostensions, which depend on non-real features of the world?
3. Do the Stoics not make the mistake corresponding to demonstration without description when they require individuation without demonstration, and demand something, a purely qualitative peculiar quality, which we cannot find and do not need? While the primacy of definite assertions seems to require the priority of spatio-temporal points of view in knowledge, the demand for purely qualitative individuation seems to reflect a demand for completely atemporal, non-localized expressions of knowledge.

Perhaps the Stoics can answer these questions. Perhaps their different claims are concerned with different issues, and do not conflict with each other. But these seem to be reasonable questions.

8. THE PECULIAR QUALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

What is the relation between Socrates and his substance? This question is quite different for the Stoics and for Aristotle. In Aristotle's view, substance and essence go together. For the Stoics, substance and matter go together. We might, then, expect quite a different view about the nature of material individuals such as Socrates.

But when the Stoics say that matter is substance, what sort of thing are they thinking of? We might conceive the matter of an organism (or artifact) in several different ways:

1. If we consider Socrates at a particular time, we can identify the quantity of matter that constitutes him just now, and say that this is his material subject. If we define this as a quantity, then we must say that many different subjects constitute Socrates at different times, since many different quantities constitute him. His material subject, so conceived, is constantly dispersing and being replaced by another.
2. We could consider a different quantity of matter, however, by considering these constituents that constitute Socrates at different times, and then thinking of them all together. In that case we have a quantity that will never be all together at one time. Socrates' matter, so conceived, cannot all be constituting Socrates at any one time.
3. We might try to combine quantity with contiguity, to give us a stricter notion of the continuity of a body. When Socrates loses an atom, the quantity he had does not perish; it simply becomes more dispersed. But if both quantity and contiguity are necessary for a subject, we can say that when he loses an atom his subject perishes. This is Locke's notion of a 'body' or 'mass' (Essay ii 27.4-5). On this view (a) as in (1) we get many different subjects for Socrates, but (b) contrary to (1), the material subject (the mass) perishes when different ones constitute Socrates, unless the whole mass remains contiguous and ceases to constitute Socrates.
4. We might form a less strict conception of a lump (or bit, or piece), which is not a quantity and does not satisfy Locke's strict conditions for a mass. The important point is that we conceive it as a continuant allowing some material replacement. One way to think of it would be to say that it requires the continuity of most of its constituents; though we can replace some without making a new lump, replacement of most of them destroys the old lump and makes a new one. If a material subject is understood in this way, then Socrates has fewer material subjects than he has Lockean masses in his lifetime, but he still has many of them over his lifetime.
5. Again, we might take the identity of a lump to depend on something else besides its constituents. We might say that the identity of a heap depends on its spatial position, the function it performs, and so on. Similarly, we might say that Socrates has the same lump of matter all his life, even though its constituents are being constantly replaced.

Aristotle probably conceives the matter of an organism in the fifth way. But he does not recognize the different possible ways of understanding the continuity of matter. Some

of these different possibilities appear more clearly in the Stoics, but it is not easy to say whether they take a consistent view about them in their different arguments.

Different Stoic views that seem to raise difficulties are these:

1. In DL vii 150, Stob. 132.6, they seem to treat universal matter as a quantity or mass. But particular matter cannot be either of these, since neither a quantity nor a mass can grow.
2. In CN 1083b Plutarch is considering Academic arguments about growth, which challenge the possibility of persistence through time, by reference to change. Some of these arguments are derived from Heraclitus and from the ultra-essentialism ascribed to Protagoras in Plato's *Theaetetus* (158e ff). It is easiest to make this sort of argument work if we begin with a mass since the principle that any change of constitution involves destruction is true of a mass. This principle will be true for anything else to the extent that it can be treated in the same way as a mass.
3. What is the Stoic reply? In CN 1083b Plutarch says the Stoics concede a large part of it. They allow that particular substances are in flux and carried off, and that numbers or pluralities (*arithmoi* or *plēthē*) that 'undergo' addition or subtraction do not undergo growth or diminution, but go out of existence. Then 1083d seems to concede that substance behaves this way (*mēt' auxanomenon mēte meioumenon, mēt' holōs hoion esti diamanenon*). Here, then, it seems that the material subject must be treated as a Locken material mass, as something that does not persist when Socrates persists.
4. We seem to see a different view, however, in Poseidonius ap Stob. 178.10.¹⁴ (a) Poseidonius says that substance does not grow or decrease, but only alters. this is the standard view about universal substance (DL vii 150, Stob. 132.28), but is it applied here to particular substance? It seems to be, in some way; for the impossibility of growth or decrease in the subject is taken as an argument for distinguishing the peculiar quality from the subject, which is therefore presumably the particular subject. Is Poseidonius, then, making the same point as Plutarch, that addition or subtraction of matter always causes the particular subject to perish? Is he, in other words, taking it to be a mass? We need not draw this conclusion; another possible view would be that he is treating it as a quantity. The quantity does not perish when particular bits of the mass are replaced; it simply becomes more dispersed. Nothing is said about flux (which would indicate reference to a mass¹⁵) in this passage.
- (b) A reason for thinking that Poseidonius is thinking of a mass might be found in his remark that 'the peculiar quale and the substance out of which this is are not the same thing, nor yet are they different, *heteron*, but only not the same, *ou tauton*'. If we think of matter as a quantity, then it has the same place as Socrates only for a time; it sometimes differs in place (when it becomes more dispersed). The mass, however, has the same place as Socrates as long as it exists. A further difficulty arises, however. For surely there is no one mass that is always in the same place as Socrates? Socrates seems to be in a different place, as soon as a constituent of the mass is replaced (so that the mass goes out of existence). Perhaps, then, it is best to suppose that Poseidonius thinks of matter as a lump - the sort of thing that could be in the same place as Socrates. An answer to this question depends on how we understand the distinction between 'not the same' and 'different', and in particular on what is required for something to be a part. (See SM xi 24, SP iii 170.) If, for instance, x constitutes y for only part of y's career, is that enough to make x 'not different' from y? Or are x and y not different just in case the existence of one is necessary and sufficient for the existence of the other? That would be a reasonable way to understand SP iii 70.
- (c) The solution given by Mnesarchus seems to be different from that given by Plutarch. For he says that Socrates' substance pre-exists and outlasts Socrates. We could take this in two ways: (i) There is something that is Socrates' substance that exists before Socrates exists and there is something that is Socrates' substance that exists after he exists; (ii)

¹⁴ For discussion see Kidd *Poseidonius* II i, p. 384 ff. sedley on stob 179.3

¹⁵ this clear?

there is something that exists both before and after Socrates and that is Socrates' substance. On either view, Mnesarchus is apparently not thinking of matter as a mass; this is the way of thinking of it that exposes it to Academic arguments about perishing. If he thinks the same matter both precedes and survives Socrates, then he cannot think of it as the quantity of matter that constitutes Socrates when he is born; for that is not the quantity that constitutes him when he dies. He is probably thinking of it as a lump (continuous, but allowing replacement, throughout Socrates' lifetime and after it).

Out of all this evidence we can perhaps distinguish these possibilities:

1. Plutarch seems to think of perishing masses.
2. Mnesarchus does not think of perishing masses, and seems to treat matter as a lump.
3. Poseidonius does not seem to be thinking of perishing masses either, and perhaps treats it as a lump.

The evidence suggests that the Stoics make some effort to give a clearer and more rigorous account than Aristotle offers of the relation between matter, substance, and quality. The different claims about matter can all be understood so as to be consistent, since we can take them to apply to different things. The different answers show us the importance of distinguishing quantities, masses, and lumps, and the different ways each of these can be conceived. When we reflect on these distinctions, we ought to agree with the Stoics in believing that when Socrates exists, more non-identical things than Aristotle recognizes actually coincide.

One claim that we cannot find represented in the Stoic views is one that seems plausibly attributed to Aristotle, that form and matter are identical. No Stoic account of matter supports this claim. We might say that this reflects an error in Aristotle, and in particular that he fails to draw the distinction that the Stoics draw between 'not the same' and 'different'. Once this distinction is drawn, we might think, it will not seem plausible to say that form and matter are the same, though it might be reasonable to say they are 'not different'.¹⁶

We need not draw this conclusion, however. For there is a kind of matter, unmentioned by the Stoics, that has just the same conditions of existence as Socrates. This is not the lump of matter that can precede and survive Socrates, but the one that is defined by its capacities for the life of an organism. This is the one that lasts only as long as Socrates; and so this one necessarily has the same historical properties. In order to pick out this lump of matter, we have to rely on Aristotle's distinction between remote and proximate matter. Since the Stoics do not mark this distinction, they lack the resources to capture Aristotle's belief in the identity of form and matter. And so they fail to point out a possibility that Aristotle is entitled to exploit. A true picture of the possibilities requires us to combine the Aristotelian and the Stoic positions.

The Stoics might mislead us on another point as well. It is possible that they neglect ways in which reference to the form provides criteria for the identity of the matter. This is possibly, but not certainly, something they overlook. If we confine remarks about matter to quantities or masses, we need not refer to form to identify matter. If, however, we refer to a lump of matter that precedes and survives Socrates, then apparently we cannot avoid referring to the form; this is the basis of the continuity between the different stages of the history of the lump of matter. If, then, the Stoics want to say that there is some lump of matter that precedes and survives Socrates, they must recognize that some matter is identified by reference to form.¹⁷

9. INDIVIDUATION

So far we have seen¹⁸ that the Stoics identify Socrates or Callicles with a peculiar quality.

¹⁶ can it be compared with a's conception of 'the same but different in being'? explore further.

¹⁷ On 'indeterminate particulars' see Wiggins SS 205f. On form and unity see Leibniz NE iii 6.24 (dualism), 42.

¹⁸ not very clearly?

not with a subject. The subject (or subjects) of Socrates is matter, and this has a different history from Socrates' (according to the various ways the Stoics conceive matter). The peculiar quality, however, is supposed to persist just as long as Socrates does, and it is the real subject of growth and decay (Simp. in DA 217.36).

What sort of thing, then, is a peculiar quality? The Stoics seem to intend it to do two things: (1) The persistence of the peculiar quality is the persistence of Socrates. (2) The difference between Socrates' peculiar quality and Callias' peculiar quality is the difference between Socrates and Callias.¹⁹ Hence (2) must apply to different individuals at the same time, and (1) to the same individual across different times. An answer to the first question requires some answer to the second question, since we can hardly say which individual's persistence is being traced through time unless we can distinguish it from other individuals at the same time.

Now the Stoics rule out certain candidates for being peculiar qualities. When we see why they rule out these candidates, we can see more about the purposes that peculiar qualities are meant to serve. In particular we can see some of the connexions they see between distinctness and persistence.

The best evidence is provided by the example of Dion and Theon in Philo, AET. MUND. 48.²⁰ The main features of the example are these:

1. We begin with two apparently distinct individuals, and with an apparently obvious qualitative distinction between them. Dion is complete and Theon lacks one foot. And so we might say we can distinguish them because Theon is the one-footed one.
2. Then Dion has one foot cut off, and nothing happens to Theon. The result is that they do not differ in the respect that was initially cited as the ground of distinction between them.
3. Hence, according to the Stoic views on identity, since there is no differentiating quality, we have just one individual and not two. Hence one of them must have perished.
4. Which one? We might say it is the one who has suffered the injury, Dion. But Chrysippus thinks this cannot be the right answer. Dion has now taken on the alleged peculiar quality of Theon, being one-footed. Hence Theon has lost his peculiar quality (since it is no longer peculiar to him to be one-footed); hence Theon must have perished.
5. An odd result, then, is the fact that someone to whom nothing has happened has perished. Theon might have been in Australia and Dion in Norway when Dion had his foot cut off, and yet Theon would have perished. Merely Cambridge change has fatal results.

What is this paradox meant to show? Does Chrysippus intend it to be a genuine objection to the Stoic conception of identity and individuation? Or does he mention it to show that the Stoic conception is not vulnerable to it, and thereby to show something about the Stoic doctrine of peculiar qualities?

It might be taken to show the untenability of a purely qualitative principle of individuation. For whatever the individuating feature is, we need only imagine the production of a replica; the result will be that the replicated thing perishes.

This does not seem to be the conclusion that the Stoics draw, however. They can rule out the sort of peculiar quality that is envisaged in the story of Dion and Theon by appealing to another function of a peculiar quality (see Simp. Catg. 244.24). A peculiar quality is supposed to unify the subject that has it. The peculiar quality is the property of a given lump of matter that makes it a single thing capable of sustaining growth, alteration, and so on. Being one-footed is clearly not such a quality; and one purpose of the example of Dion and Theon may be to point this out.

The peculiar quality of Socrates, then, will be some feature of his soul, and especially of his rational soul; for that, in the Stoics' view, is what gives him his unity. The peculiarly 'Socratic' feature of this piece of matter is its domination by the special sort of practical reason that is Socrates' soul. The Stoics claim that the peculiar quality is an *infima species* that has no further species. See DL vii 60; the *eidikōtaton eidos* is the one

¹⁹ On these two questions see Woods, 'Identity and individuation' in *Analytical Philosophy* ed. R.J. Butler, 2nd series.

²⁰ See Sedley *Phron* 1982.

that has no further *eidē*. See also SM viii 97, where Socrates is said to be an *eidos*.

If this is the Stoics' view, they still seem to face the problem of replication; if a replica of Socrates is created, then apparently Socrates perishes, even though he still has all the qualities he had. It is difficult to see how the Stoics can rule out this logical possibility. For their conception of a peculiar quality seems to make a peculiar quality logically repeatable, since it contains no spatio-temporal aspects. They might, then, offer the peculiar quality as something that is logically, but not naturally, repeatable, so that it is sufficient for individuation in the actual world, but not in all logically possible worlds.

This would be an unsatisfactory conclusion, however, since it would miss one interesting aspect of the Stoic claims about peculiar qualities. If they take the line just described, then they are still committed to the view that my persistence depends on the absence of any replicas. In fact, however, the point of their view seems to be to make my persistence depend on many fewer spatio-temporal and relational properties than would be required on other views.

In their view, indeed, it is possible for Socrates to have come into existence at a different time from when he did and to have been made of different stuff; for it is the characteristics of Socrates' rational soul that make him Socrates. Hence the Stoics ought also to be willing to allow the existence of two Socrateses, in cases of replication.

According to this view, 'being the person you are' is not a fully individuating property; it does not contain enough to ensure that only one individual satisfies it. In fact, it is a sort of universal, in so far as it is logically repeatable. Apparently, then, the possibility that is rejected in the example of Dion and Theon - that there could be two Dions in the case of replication - is one that the Stoics ought to accept as an acceptable consequence of their views.²¹

10. COMPARISON WITH ARISTOTLE

The Stoics, then, seem to give up Aristotle's view that form can individuate. Aristotelian particular forms - on some conceptions of them at least²² - have the spatio-temporal properties that are needed to distinguish different individuals. The Stoics have a different view. According to them, we need not appeal to different spatio-temporal properties to distinguish the person Socrates is from the person Callias is; for Socrates and Callias have different peculiar qualities belonging to their qualitatively different rational souls.

If Aristotle thought of particular forms in this way, then he would have to admit that they are not sufficient for individuation - if being sufficient for individuation requires exclusion of the possibility of replication. The appeal to a peculiar quality answers one question about identity and individuation - what it is to be Socrates or Callias. But it solves them by making the relevant property (being Socrates etc.) a property that allows replication of individuals.

Hence the Stoic theory might be used to question Aristotle's apparent confidence that Socrates is a particular, and that therefore there can be only one of him.

11. A CONFLICT IN THE STOIC VIEW?

SM viii 97 seems to imply that the proper name signifies a peculiar quality and a demonstrative signifies something else. We saw that it was plausible to suppose that the demonstrative signifies a subject, not a quality. The definite assertion 'This is white' could be true even if we were wrong about all the other qualities of the object being ostended. Hence the definite assertion says 'He (= this one²³) is walking' rather than 'Socrates is walking'.

Now consider the situation in which the Stoics say that the definite assertion perishes (Alex. in APr. 177.17). 'He is dead' perishes when Dion, the subject ostended by 'he', perishes, even though 'Dion is dead' does not perish. This, then, seems to be a case

²¹ Do the Stoics have some idea like a Lbzn individual concept that will show how Socrates is a unique individual? Role of determinism in working out this idea?

²² Frede? Heinaman?

²³ This is meant to represent '*houtos*', the masculine singular demonstrative pronoun.

where the subject ostended must be a man, not simply a bit of matter; for the bit of matter does not perish when Dion does, and there is still something to point to if we construe 'this' as pointing to matter.

Apparently, then, we must modify our view of what a definite assertion refers to. We must say that it refers to a subject under some generic description identifying a quality. If, for instance, you say 'He is red', if you are really pointing to a wax image, not a person, then the assertion is false even if the wax image really is red. But if the Stoics say this, then what description must support the demonstrative if it is to be used to say something true or false? What if, for instance, the subject ostended is not (as I believe) a dog, but a cat?

Nothing in the sources suggests where the Stoics draw the relevant line. Perhaps, indeed, it would be misguided to insist on finding just one place to draw the line. Since the understanding of a particular utterance using a demonstrative depends so much on contextual factors, it may be reasonable to say that in some cases, but not in others, a definite assertion is true only if the ostended subject has some other quality besides the one it is asserted to have.

This may be a further reason for supposing that the Stoics are wrong to build into the signification of definite assertions some features of demonstrative utterances that are better explained by reference to circumstances of particular utterances. Apparently, they cannot stick consistently to the claim that definite assertions signify a subject rather than a quality.

12. CONDITIONS

The third category, 'being in some condition (state)', POS ECHON, covers a very wide range of predicates - too wide, the Aristotelian commentators think. (See Dexippus, in CATG. CAG iv 2, 34.19-24 = 2/399; Simp. CATG. 373.7-12 = 2/401.) While the first two Stoic categories are closely and clearly related to Aristotle's first two, it seems harder to find an Aristotelian origin for the Stoic conditions. Some of the conditions, however, are counted by Aristotle in the category of quality. The Stoics regard virtue as a condition, while Aristotle regards it as a HEXIS (cognate with the Stoic term for conditions), a special sort of quality. They also regard soul as spirit in a certain condition.

Porph. ap. Eusebius, PRAEP. EVANG. xv p.813c = 2/806 And how is he not full of shame who says that the soul is pneuma in a certain condition, or that it is intelligent fire (PUR NOERON), fastened or hardened by the cooling and tempering of air? (Cf. 2/407.)

We can perhaps make some guesses about the Stoic view by considering some points about Aristotle together with previous Stoic modifications of the Aristotelian categories.

1. The Stoics cannot quite agree with Aristotle about the category of quality. Aristotle excludes differentiae, genera and species of primary substances from this category. But the Stoics regard all of these as qualities. It would not be surprising, then, if they refused to count Aristotelian qualities as qualities, since they are not essential or individuating properties.
2. On the other hand, the Stoics might well find Aristotle's qualities a rather mixed and arbitrary collection with no discernible unity. Aristotle himself remarks that qualities are spoken of in many ways (CATG. 8b26). And if we are to extend the category as widely as Aristotle wants to, why should it not also include some of his less prominent categories, such as having or acting or undergoing? When something is in any of these categories, surely we can say it is qualified in a certain way?

The result of these objections to the Aristotelian category of quality might lead the Stoics to reject the term 'poios' as a way of picking out the properties Aristotle tried to pick out. They use it in just one of Aristotle's two ways, to pick out the essential and form-producing (EIDOPOIOS) properties of particular things. To pick out the other things Aristotle calls poia they rely on the more general notion of condition. Once the subject has been identified, we can ask what condition it is in; and the answers will tell us about its different accidental properties. It is hard to say how widely the Stoics extend qualities or how many terms they regard as appellations signifying them.²⁴ But it is reasonable to

²⁴ Cf. Lloyd in PS 66f.

suppose that qualities and conditions are essential and accidental properties, respectively. Plotinus suggests that conditions are in some way subordinate to qualities. He criticizes the Stoics for their distinction between quality and condition, since, he says, their view makes all properties simply 'matter in some condition'.

Plot vi 1.30 = 2/400 Among conditions it is surely absurd to place conditions third, or wherever they come in the order (of categories), since all things are conditions of matter. But they will say there is a difference among conditions; matter is in a condition in one way here, and in another way in conditions (in a narrower sense of 'condition'). Moreover, they will say, qualia are conditions of matter, but conditions of the special sort are conditions of qualia. But if qualities themselves are nothing but matter in some condition, the conditions (in the narrow sense) revert back to matter on them, and are also conditions of matter. And how is (the category of) condition one, when there is so much difference within it? For how do the three cubits long and the pale belong to one kind when one is a quantity, the other a quale? How do when and where belong (to one kind)? How at all are yesterday and last year and in the Lyceum and in the Academy conditions? How at all is time a condition? Neither it nor the things in it nor place nor the things in it (can be conditions). And how is acting a condition? Perhaps condition would apply only to lying (KEISTHAI) and to having (two Aristotelian categories). But in the case of having it is not a condition, but having.

This criticism is partly justified; for all properties found in matter are incidental to it and to any bit of it - the substance of Socrates exists before Socrates and his properties exist, and after them. The Stoics combine this view with a desire to recognize and individuate the sorts of things that Aristotle calls substances; while being a rational animal is only a condition, not an essential property, of Socrates' substance, his underlying matter, it is an essential property of Socrates. Plotinus' criticism might suggest that the Stoics compromise uneasily between an atomist position - recognizing matter as the only real subject - and an Aristotelian position - recognizing trees and men as real subjects. The distinction between quality and condition can be recognized only if the Stoic compromise about trees and horses is accepted. In one direction we might try to reduce qualities to conditions. In another direction we might promote conditions to the status of qualities. For is walking not essential to some entity, walking-Socrates, something that is defined as essentially walking? If so, nothing will be a quality. To prevent this sort of confusion of the categories of quality and condition the Stoics must argue that there is an important difference between the ontological status of Socrates and of walking-Socrates, even though both of them are ultimately just conditions of matter - they must rely fairly heavily on Aristotelian arguments.

Qualities are signified by proper names and by appellations; what sorts of words signify conditions? It is unlikely to be any single grammatical class of words.²⁵ If the only appellations signifying qualities are those signifying essential properties, then many adjectives will signify conditions; while 'rational' signifies a differentia of man, and hence a quality, 'white' will signify a condition. Verbs such as 'runs', 'walks' etc. also seem to signify conditions, on these criteria. Perhaps, indeed, all condition-words can be treated as verbs, if 'is . . .' is assimilated to the predicate when the predicate does not signify an essential property. (Cf. Ar. Met. 1017a27.)

13. RELATIVE CONDITIONS

The fourth category is relative condition, which seems fairly easy to explain; it is a condition that something has relative to something else. We might suppose that any conditions that are relative, needing to be described by two-place or many-place predicates, are relative conditions. This view is encouraged by evidence suggesting that the Stoics associate the fourth category with the transitive verb.²⁶ But it is not so easy. For it seems clear from Plotinus' complaints (2/402) that not all relatives are included in one category. This is confirmed by Simplicius.

Simp. CATG. 165.32 = 2/403 = LS 29C The Stoics count two genera in this area (relatives) instead

²⁵ Cf. Lloyd in PS 67.

²⁶ Lloyd in PS 69.

of one, regarding some things as relatives, some as relative conditions. They divide relatives from things in their own right, KATH' HAUTA, and divide relative conditions from differential relatives ('relatives according to difference', KATA DIAPHORAN). They say that sweet and bitter and such things and such as are this way are (differential) relatives. Relative conditions are right (as opposed to left), father and such things. They say that differential relatives are those characterized according to some form. Just as there is one conception of things in their own right and another of differential things, so also (differential) relatives and relative conditions are different. But the following of the combinations is reversed (i.e. while in its own right implies differential, and not vice versa, relative condition implies relative and not vice versa). For the differential things belong to the things in their own right, since the things in their own right have differences too, such as pale and dark. However, the things in their own right do not belong to differential things. For the bitter and the sweet have differences, according to which they are characterized, but they are not such in their own right, but relative to something. And the relative conditions, which are opposed to differential relatives, are also relative. For right and father are both conditions and relatives. The sweet and bitter being relatives are differential; but relative conditions are opposed to differential relatives. For it is impossible for relative conditions to be in their own right or differential - for they depend solely on their dispositions (SCHESEIS) to each other. But (differential) relatives, though not in their own right - for they are not separable - are none the less differential - for we view them with some character. To put what has been said more clearly: They call those things (differential) relatives which being some way according to a character of their own (OIKEION) incline towards another thing; those things are relative conditions which naturally belong, SUMBAINEIN, and do not belong to something else without any change and alteration in themselves, always looking towards the outside. And so when something is a certain way differentially and inclines towards something else, this is only a relative, such as a state, HEXIS, and knowledge and perception. But when something is regarded, not according to a difference in it, but purely according to its disposition to another, that will be a relative condition. For son and right-hand (man) need something external for their subsistence. Hence, even when no change happens in themselves, the father becomes no longer a father when his son has died, and the right-hand man becomes no longer one when the man next to him has moved. But the sweet and bitter would not become different if their own power did not change too. If, then, they change being not at all themselves affected, according to the disposition of something else to them, it is clear that relative conditions have their being in the disposition alone, and not according to any difference.

The main interest of Simplicius' discussion is his account of the Stoic effort to distinguish relative conditions from other sorts of relatives. They recognize sweet and bitter as relatives 'according to difference', while right, father and so on are mere relative conditions. 'Being according to difference' distinguishes the first type of relative from beings in their own right, such as light and dark, which have differences, but are not beings according to difference.

What contrasts have the Stoics in mind here? In their view colours are arrangements of matter (Aetius i 15.6), and so intrinsic (i.e. non-relative) properties of it - instead of following Democritus and denying the real existence of colours they identify it with a state of the material subject; it presumably belongs in the category of condition. Though colours are arranged in a series of different and contrasting colours, the existence of one colour does not depend on the existence of the others - you could still find that material condition without any other. Moreover, something is coloured without reference to any perceiver; if the Stoics are right to identify colours entirely with arrangements of matter, they are present whether anyone perceives them or not.

When sweet and bitter are said to be relatives and contrasted with colours, and yet contrasted also with relative conditions such as father, what is the contrast? First it is not clear what the relevant relation is. We may say that something is sweet only relative to other things that are less sweet than it. Or we might say that it is sweet only if it affects sense-organs a certain way. The second contrast seems appropriate for the contrast between differential relatives and relative conditions. When we ascribe a differential relative to a subject we ascribe some condition to it, though perhaps different conditions in different comparisons. When we ascribe a purely relative condition, we are ascribing no condition to it. When we say that A is a father or on the right, we are not ascribing any intrinsic property to A, not even a different one in different comparisons. In differential relatives there is a real difference, a condition distinguishing sweet things, e.g., from

others, though not always the same one, but relative to something else. And perhaps the 'something else' is the sense-organ. Perhaps sweet things must affect a sense-organ some way, and which conditions affect it depends on the condition of the sense-organ. But there is always some condition of the object. It would be reasonable to ask what it is about a thorn that makes it painful or about an arrow that makes it penetrating, though its being painful or penetrating depends on its relation to something else. But it is foolish to ask what it is about a father or about something above or below or on the right what property makes it a father and so on; its contribution consists in nothing more than its relation to another thing.

The Stoics' view of sweetness and other differential relatives is complex. They seem to think that something is sweet only in so far as it affects the normal sense-organs a particular way. But something cannot cease to be sweet simply because sense-organs change, or creatures with sense-organs perish. The Stoics need to say that things are sweet if they affect normal sense-organs now the right way, and so can cease to be sweet only if they change in themselves. This is not a straightforwardly evident view of tertiary qualities, but it is not indefensible either. Its applications to apparent relatives such as 'cause' and 'good' will be worth considering.

If this is how the Stoics distinguish relative conditions from differential relatives, we can see why they think they are justified in revising Aristotle's criteria. Aristotle counts father as a relative, and the Stoics count it as a relative condition (cf. CATG. 6b29, where 'slave' is the example). But he also regards perception and knowledge as relatives, because they are 'of' their objects (6b2-6). The Stoics might well argue that the status of a property like being a father is quite different from the status of knowledge or perception; knowledge is indeed relative in so far as it is defined with reference to its object, but it is still a real condition of its subject. The Stoic criterion may reasonably appear to mark an important distinction that is overlooked in Aristotle's very generous criteria. Instead of recognizing one category of relatives, fixed by a rather superficial grammatical test, it is better to allow differential relatives their deserved status as conditions and to recognize a distinct category of relative conditions which are not real, intrinsic properties of their subjects.

Quite a few relatives will be spatial and temporal, and the Stoic disbelief in the reality of space and time is supported by their treatment of relative conditions. If temporal and local properties are to be understood as relative conditions of material subjects (changing earlier or later than one another; being to the right or the left of, etc.), they will not be real intrinsic properties, material conditions, of them. This will be another reason for saying that neither place nor time is a real being - indeed it may well be the Stoics' principal reason. Many are tempted to think of place and time as simply consisting in relations between objects; since the Stoics are materialists, relative conditions, expressing no real material conditions of their subjects, cannot be beings. We do not know that the Stoics draw this conclusion about relative conditions; but it is hard to see how they can consistently avoid it. If they do draw the conclusion, the categories cannot all be categories of being, as Aristotle understands them, since relative conditions are not ways of really being.

It is useful to consider one apparent omission from the Stoic list - the Aristotelian category of quantity. The Stoics do not recognize it as a separate category - how then do they understand it? The category of relative condition suggests itself as a natural place for quantities. Aristotle distinguished quantities such as 'four feet long' or 'three months' from relatives such as 'big' or 'equal' by his grammatical test for relatives. The Stoics might well argue that this distinction rests on only a superficial difference; determinate quantities are just as relative as any others, since what a quantity is consists essentially in its relation to other quantities. This claim might be defended by reference to number, since each number is defined as the successor of one number and the predecessor of another. If numbers are relatives, quantities will be relatives too. Will they be differential relatives or purely relative conditions? It is hard to give a single answer. If A is smaller than B and bigger than C, no intrinsic change in A itself is needed. But if A becomes bigger or smaller than it was some real change must have happened to it. Apparently the Stoics should treat some quantities as differential relatives and some as relative conditions. But we do not know if they draw this distinction between quantities.

The sceptics try to cause trouble for the Stoics' doctrine of relative conditions. Sextus suggests that the Stoics themselves do not regard relatives as real, because they define a relative as 'what is thought towards another' rather than 'what is the case, HUPARCHON, towards another' (SM viii 453-4). The polemical aim of Sextus' comment raises suspicions; for instance, he does not distinguish differential relatives from relative conditions in his account of the Stoic view.²⁷ He may be right in supposing that the Stoics mean to deny reality, HUPARXIS, to relative conditions - that would fit their corporeal criterion of reality. It does not follow that the Stoics must refuse to talk about them, or must deny that they are somethings.

The low ontological status of relative conditions reflects on the position of the first category again. The subject seems to the Stoics to be the basic reality that can be ostended without any description. But now two difficulties arise:

1. Some sources suggest that an individual subject cannot grow or diminish, presumably because the addition or subtraction brings a new subject into existence. If this is so, the criteria for the persistence of a subject are essentially quantitative, and so, if quantities are relative conditions, not real.
2. Ostension essentially involves place and time; we can take ourselves to be indicating or ostending something only if we apply spatial and temporal concepts, which in the Stoic view do not correspond to any reality.

The Stoics might meet the first objection by arguing that the quantities defining subjects are differential relatives corresponding to real features of the material universe. They are entitled to this answer if they regard some quantities as differential relatives - which we do not know. The second objection is more difficult. The Stoics might reply: 'We only say that relative conditions, and hence number, quantity, place and time, are not real, not real beings. We don't say that we can't talk about them. Indeed we allow that we must talk about them to talk about the basic subjects.' This defence shows how the Stoic position might be consistent. But it suggests something difficult about their criterion of being. If some thing is ineliminably necessary for the description of the world, why is it not a reality? The Stoics seem to refute their own restrictive attitude.

14. THE STATUS OF THE CATEGORIES

The evidence on the Stoic treatment of the categories does not allow us to settle one important question; are the categories types of lekta or types of beings correlated with lekta?²⁸ The evidence seems to be contradictory. On the one hand the categories are said to be signified by words, and different categories by different sorts of words; what is signified is a lekton; all lekta are incorporeal; hence categories are incorporeal lekta. On the other hand, qualities are said to belong to bodies as well as to incorporeal things (Simp. in Catg. 217.32), and the qualities of bodies are said to be bodies themselves. Equally the subject is said to be matter. The ontological status of conditions, and especially of relative conditions, is less clear. For the reasons given above, conditions are probably taken to be corporeal beings and relative conditions to be incorporeal non-beings. Anyhow, the Stoics seem to treat the same categories both as necessarily incorporeal, as signified lekta, and as possibly corporeal - features of corporeal reality.

We can perhaps remove, or at least explain, the appearance of contradiction, by ascribing to the Stoics some belief in a close correspondence between types of lekta and things in the world. If we say 'Socrates', the significate is the lekton #Socrates#; but the lekton is appropriately correlated with the real Socrates, and that is why the word refers to him. (The Stoics seem to attend rather less to the relation of correlation between the lekton and the actual object than to the relation between the word and the lekton.) Similarly we might say that categories are primarily lekta signified by different parts of speech, and correspondingly the parts of speech may be distinguished as 'subject-terms' (i.e. demonstratives) and so on. But equally these different lekta are different, in the Stoic view,

²⁷ Once in viii 453 he speaks of relative conditions, but the rest of his account speaks of relatives indifferently. Cf. e.g. P ii 117, 125, M viii 164, P iii 25, 27, 101, M ix 234, 357.

²⁸ Cf. Lloyd in PS 70f.

because they reflect different aspects of reality. The things that are, strictly speaking, the real correlates of subjects and qualities are called subjects and qualities themselves.

If the Stoics intend the categories to classify lekta primarily and real things secondarily, why is this? They reverse, or at least upset, the Aristotelian order. Aristotle's categories are primarily the summa genera of things, and secondarily can be correlated with words, in so far as the words manage to reflect the nature of things. Since Aristotle does not recognize lekta, he does not take the categories to be types of lekta. When the Stoics introduce lekta as the significates of words, why do they have to attach the categories to lekta too? Perhaps the relation between the categories and language would be obscured if the categories did not classify lekta. For words signify lekta, and their classification depends on the classification of lekta. If we want to explain how words reflect categorial distinctions, we should find these distinctions in lekta.

A rather more speculative reason may be offered for the Stoic attachment of the categories to lekta rather than to reality directly. Are they perhaps expressing the dependence of our view of the world on the necessary forms of thought?²⁹ Perhaps the categories express the necessary structure of thought, and hence of language; we must talk about something, individuate it, ascribe conditions and relations to it. The categories will not be somehow read directly off the face of reality, but derived from the requirements of thought and speech. This sort of argument is not foreign to Aristotle (especially in METAPHYSICS iv), and it is not hard to find in the Stoics. For why should the first category be so closely associated with ostension unless we are concerned with the circumstances of the speaker and thinker? For his thoughts to be about something he must indicate and ostend something; since bare ostension does not individuate or identify something through time, we must also have lekta to perform these other tasks. If this is the Stoics' argument for compiling the list of categories that they compile, it is easy to see why the categories are regarded primarily as types of lekta, and secondarily as types of things corresponding to the lekta.

But if this is so, what is the justification for thinking that the categories do correspond to features of reality? Must the Stoics adopt some form of quasi-Kantian idealism and maintain that we apply these categories to the world because we cannot think or speak about it if we do not apply them? They do not seem to face that question. But this is not too surprising if we compare the question about the categories with the questions about the kataleptic appearance. The Stoics could not seem to decide whether to claim that some appearances are just evidently kataleptic, or to argue on systematic grounds that some appearances must be treated as kataleptic. The same sort of question arises about the status of the categories, both for Aristotle and for the Stoics. The Stoics indicate some awareness of the question, perhaps, when they think of categories primarily as types of lekta.

15. THE STATUS OF UNIVERSALS³⁰

So far we have found no definite evidence on one of the main philosophical problems that might have been expected to concern the Stoics because it concerned Plato and Aristotle - about the nature and reality of universals. Plato and Aristotle were both realists about universals, but disagreed about their nature and their relation to particulars. Where do the Stoics stand? It is often supposed that they are nominalists. The reasons most often given are these:

1. They reject the Platonic Theory of Forms, and regard the Forms as neither beings nor somethings, but only quasi-somethings.
2. They are corporealists, allowing only bodies to be real beings.
3. They explain the truth-conditions of universally quantified lekta by reference to the truth-conditions for definite lekta. This analysis allows them to understand universal

²⁹ Cf. Lloyd in Long PS 71, against the 'Kantian' view of Watson.

³⁰ These notes need to be revised in the light of an important paper I have not fully assimilated: Brunschwig, 'La théorie stoicienne du genre supérieur', in *Matter and Metaphysics*. See also LS #30; Sedley, *Sthn Jl of Phil* 1985.

quantification, which Aristotle took to involve universals, to without universals. Is any of these a good reason for thinking that the Stoics are nominalists?

It is fairly clear that the Stoics, beginning with Zeno, criticize the Theory of Forms. Zeno says (Stob. Ecl. i 136.21) that notions, ennoemata, are neither somethings, nor suchlike, but quasi-somethings and quasi-suchlike; these are what some called Forms. Here Stoic technical terms are introduced to explain Zeno's view of the Forms. The Forms are just ennoemata, phantasms of the mind (see Aet. Plac. iv 12.3; DL vii 50; Cic. Ac. ii 49 ff; SM ix 355). An ennoema is the product of a phantasma in the way that an ennoia is the product of a phantasia (Aet. Plac. iv 11). Presumably I can think of a unicorn without imagining that I am seeing one; and then I am having an ennoema. Other evidence may suggest different Stoic explanations of a belief in Forms.

Syrianus in Ar. MET. CAG. vi 1, 105.21. 2/364 = LS 30H These divine men (Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, Parmenides) did not reduce the Forms to the accustomed use of words, which was the view of Chrysippus and Archedemus and most of the Stoics later - for Forms in their own right differ in many ways from those customarily spoken of. Nor do they depend on (PARHUPHISTANAI) the mind in a way similar to the notorious lekta, as Longinus chose to maintain. For nothing at all depends on the mind, if the dependent thing has no being (ANOUSION). And how could the same thing be intelligible (by the mind) and dependent on it? Nor yet do they think the Forms are notions, ENNOEMATA, as Cleanthes said later; nor are they dependent on the mind according to the forms found in notions (KATA TAS ENNOETIKAS IDEAS) as Antoninus thought, combining the views of Longinus and Cleanthes.

These remarks suggest the aspect of the Theory of Forms that concerns the Stoics. They are concerned especially with the sort of argument that Aristotle calls the 'argument from thought' (Alexander, in MET. 81.25 ff). There also the crucial assumption is that we can think of something when it is not present to the senses (cf. DL vii 61). The Platonists rely on this to argue for the existence of Forms as perfect particulars (e.g. we can think of a perfect circle even if we haven't seen one). Aristotle argues that this argument equally produces Forms of things that have perished. The Stoics seem to suggest that this argument for the reality of Forms would require Forms corresponding to all phantasmatata - this is an objection raised by Aristotle when he remarks that we can think of a hippocentaur or a chimera (Alexander 82.5-6). Instead, the Stoics argue, we should regard the Forms as nothing more than mere ennoemata - notions with no basis in reality.

If this is true, the Stoic criticism of the Forms is focussed on one special aspect of them - their character as perfect particulars. The Stoics argue that we have no good reason to concede the objective reality of these perfect particulars; they are as much mere notions as the centaurs and chimeras we can think of. This criticism of a special aspect of the Theory of Forms by no means commits the Stoics to nominalism, any more than Aristotle's criticisms commit him to nominalism. Refusal to recognize Forms as perfect particulars is quite consistent with recognizing the reality of universals. The criticisms of Plato do not even commit the Stoics to rejecting the independent reality of universals, as long as they are not conceived as perfect particulars. Simplicius, however, reports that they deny the independence of universals too.

Simpl. in CATG. 69.19 = 2/362.³¹ They remove the nature of the common things, and suppose that they subsist, HUPHISTASTHAI, only in the particulars, seeing them nowhere all by themselves. Simplicius' first comment here reflects his Platonism; the rest of his report does not show that the Stoics differ from Aristotle on the status of universals - for they seem to accept immanent universals depending on the existence of particulars. We must see why they might accept this view.

The Stoics believe that ennoemata are neither tina nor poia, but only quasi-tina and quasi-poia. It does not follow that they think all contents of thought fail to be tina.³² Origen, COMM. ON ST. JOHN ii 13.93 (GCS iv p. 68) (On John 1.3.) Some have supposed that

³¹ The context does not make it completely clear that he refers to Stoics here.

³² See Frede's use of this passage in 'Traditional grammar' 64, also citing Orig. in Jn. ii 13.93.

because evil is non-subsistent (ANHUPOSTATON) - it was not from the beginning and will not be for ever - that these are the 'Nothing' (when John says that 'without him was nothing made'). Similarly some of the Greeks say that the genera and species are among the non-somethings, OU TINA, such as animal and man; and so these people suppose that 'Nothing' refers to everything that achieved its apparent constitution not from God or from the Logos.

The Stoics seem to think that thoughts of such spurious objects as centaurs correspond to no something, and presumably, therefore, to no lekton, since a lekton is something. They need not take the same view about all thoughts.

16. CORPOREALISM

The Stoic doctrine that only bodies are real beings might seem to require them to deny that universals are beings. For surely universals are not bodies? In fact this is not so easy to decide. If we think of a particular as something that is spatially continuous and fairly unified, we can easily think of material stuffs as universals - for they are found in many places at once. It is not clear if the Stoics take this view of universals; but it would fit quite well with part of their doctrine of categories. We can think of the subject either as the whole of qualityless matter, which is the basic subject for everything, or as this bit of it that we point to here and now (see Stob, Ecl. 132.28). The same contrast would work well in the category of quality. Qualities are bodies; and we can distinguish universal qualities as the extent of that sort of body throughout the universe from the particular quality belonging just to Socrates. On one conception of universals Socrates' peculiar quality will be a universal like any other, which just happens to be instantiated only once; but another conception (relying on the spatial unity of particulars) will regard it as a particular. The Stoics speak of common and peculiar qualities, not of universal and particular; but they could easily express a conception of universals in these terms. (Cf. Ar. Met. 1040b25.)

We should not assume at once, then, that Stoic corporealism about beings prevents them from treating universals as beings. But even if universals are not beings, are the Stoics nominalists? Here it is hard to see the crucial issue. If nominalists simply deny the being of universals, then the Stoics are nominalists if they think universals are not bodies. But most nominalists want to go further than this. They normally believe that universals are unreal because we do not need to speak of them; we can say all that we need to say if we confine ourselves to speaking of words applied to particulars. The Stoics do not seem to endorse this extreme reductive treatment of universals simply by refusing to call them beings. For they do not think that lekta, place, time and the void, other somethings that are not beings, are dispensable or need not be mentioned in a true account of the world. If universals are no worse off than these other non-beings, then the Stoics need not accept the reductive or eliminative view normally associated with nominalism.

But why do we hear of only four somethings that are not beings? Why do universals not constitute a fifth set? If the sources are not careless or misleading, they suggest the possibility that universals are to be identified with one of the other four sorts of somethings; and the only plausible candidates here are lekta. Identification of lekta with universals would express a common approach to the status of universals. It is often supposed that a universal is the meaning of a general term, so that each general term with a different meaning expresses a different universal. The universal shared by this man and that man will be the lekton #man# expressed by the utterance of 'man'. While the two men and any utterance-token of the word are all particulars, what is expressed by the utterance is a universal. If this is the Stoic view, it leads them away from one type of realism. Universals will not be actual features of non-linguistic reality, of the physical world. They will be the contents expressed by thoughts and utterances. It does not follow that no universal can be a something without being thought; to decide that we must decide if unthought lekta are somethings.

It might be attractive for the Stoics to identify universals with lekta. For it seems reasonable to say, and the Stoics say, that when two speakers say 'man', or when you say it and I take you to mean it in the normal way, what we both grasp is one and the same thing, not similar things; we grasp the very same lekton #man#. The lekton is correlated with the individual men, and grasping it allows us to speak about them; nor would we grasp this universal if we were not aware of particular men. Hence we can say that the universal is dependent on particulars; this is the sort of dependent status that normally

seems to be ascribed to somethings (cf. Simp. Catg. 69.19). If the Stoics take this view, they need not find anything beyond particular bodies in the material world to be identified with universals, but they can claim that universals are just as necessary as lekta - since they are lekta.

It is interesting to find that universals might fit into Stoic ontology in two ways; (a) as material stuffs scattered around the world; (b) as lekta. It is equally interesting to find that these two possibilities are open for their doctrine of categories too, and that there we have evidence that they choose both positions. Might the same be true about all universals as about the categories? Might the dual status of the categories be just an instance of the dual status of universals? Perhaps we might argue in a similar way for the primacy of universals as lekta; primarily they express ways of thinking about and understanding the world rather than ways the world is without reference to any speaker or thinker. If this is the Stoic view, it is an important departure from Aristotelian realism - or, perhaps we should say, it reflects the recognition of a problem ignored by Aristotle.

Would it be reasonable for the Stoics to hold that universals are primarily lekta and secondarily the material stuffs correlated with these lekta? This view would raise some further questions for them.

1. What will be the status of peculiar qualities? If they are conceived as lekta, they will be universals no less than other lekta are; the sense of 'Socrates' is #Socrates#; and it is the same sense that you and I grasp when we mean or understand an utterance of 'Socrates' in the normal way. On the other hand, if we think of the peculiar quality as part of the material world, it may be regarded as a particular, not as a universal - for it is all in one place, belongs to one thing, and is not scattered over many in the way we expect a universal to be. And so one way of thinking of universals makes peculiar qualities universals, another way makes them particulars; for one way makes a peculiar quality a 'one in many' and the other does not. (This might usefully be compared with Aristotle's account of a universal in DE INT. 17a39, and with the questions raised in MET. 1040a27-b4.)

2. Will all lekta be universals correlated with material universals? This is not an easy question for the fourth Stoic category, relative conditions. Since this is one of the categories, it is a lekton, and so should be a universal. But what material feature of the world is it correlated with? We can find an answer for the other three categories. But the Stoic view of relative conditions seems to deny that they express any feature of real material bodies. Here, then, we seem to find a universal at the level of lekta correlated with nothing at the level of physical reality; and this treatment of relative conditions is potentially embarrassing for the Stoics. Sextus quite often tries to embarrass them here. One of his most interesting attacks displays the relativity of whole and part to force the Stoics to admit that neither a whole man nor his parts exist in the external world (SM ix 352-7. This argument rests on the assumption that relatives are in our consciousness, SUMMNEONEUSIS; cf. ix 356, vii 279.) But this seems to be a fair assumption about the Stoic view of relative conditions, as opposed to differential relatives. It follows, as Sextus remarks, that the whole or part of a man will simply be a notion, ENNOEMA (ix 355), a mental content with no corresponding external reality. The Stoics might say that while no external reality corresponds to the lekton #whole man#, a relative condition, an external reality does correspond to the lekton #man#, a common quality. Unfortunately they do not explain how a reality could correspond to the second lekton if none corresponds to the first. Here the Stoics do indeed seem to have overlooked some of the consequences of their doctrine, or failed to show how their doctrine could be understood so as to avoid the consequences.

The evidence on Stoic views on universals is rather thin, and can be explained in different ways, not all of them mutually exclusive. But any plausible account of it casts considerable doubt on the claim that they are nominalists. Either a 'corporeal' or a 'semantic' view of universals might reasonably be ascribed to them; and on either view talk of universals is indispensable for a true account of the world - if not as parts of the physical world, at least as parts of an account of it. The most plausible view is perhaps that the Stoics accept an uneasy compromise between the semantic and the corporeal view. The uneasiness of the compromise is not by itself a reason for denying that the Stoics

hold it, since the uneasiness reflects a pervasive tension in their views.

17. UNIVERSAL QUANTIFICATION

The third reason for ascribing nominalism to the Stoics rests on their account of the truth conditions of universally quantified assertions. The Peripatetics believe that sentences of the form 'Man is animal' refer to universals, and that their universally quantified form is 'Every man is an animal' (Ar. DE INT. 17b5), in which the 'every' does not signify the universal, but that something holds of it universally (17b12). In 'Some man is animal' something is said about the universal - the universal is still signified- but it signifies that something does not hold of it universally.

The main Stoic innovation (?) is the rejection of the Peripatetic quantifier 'every' and its replacement with the favourite Stoic form, the conditional. The Peripatetic 'Every F is G' or 'G belongs to every F' is replaced by 'If anything is F it is G'.

Epictetus ii 20.2. If someone were to contradict the view that something universal is true, it is clear that he must make the opposite statement - nothing universal is true. Slave, this is not true either. For what is this other than that if anything is universal it is false (and hence itself a universal statement)? Cic. AC ii 21 (On the growth of knowledge.) Then the rest of the series follows, combining with larger percepts, such as the following, which so to speak, embraces a complete grasp of things: 'If it is a man, it is a mortal rational animal'.³³

This differs in logical form from the Peripatetic form since the Stoics allow true universal statements about empty classes - for then the conditional will still be true. In Aristotle, on the other hand, the inference from 'every' to 'some' is held to be valid, and indicates that the sentences are supposed to mention only non-empty classes. The Stoic version is probably not the result simply of their fondness for the conditional and for the systematic presentation of the basic forms of inference. We have seen that they regard lekta as the things signified by words, and that lekta are not beings, but are still somethings. They might very well insist that we can talk about non-existents if we have the appropriate lekta; 'F is G' signifies something whether or not Fs are G, as long as #F# and #G# are lekta; and so the conditional signifies something even if it refers to no beings; and if it is a lekton it is true or false; why not say it is true?

Sometimes another motive for the Stoic analysis of universal quantification is suggested. Mates remarks that the Stoics make no explicit provision for sentences beginning with 'all'; and conjectures that this failure may reflect their nominalism.³⁴ If they intend the conditional form as an analysis of 'all' sentences, we might regard this as an eliminative paraphrase, showing that we do not need to recognize universals. If this is the Stoic view, it is a superficial reply to arguments for universals; for we still want to know how 'man' and 'animal' are to be understood. Some nominalists might say that this is easy; 'man' and 'animal' are linguistic predicates with no corresponding real properties. This is not the Stoic position. For they do not think that linguistic predicates are enough for understanding signification. They evidently think that lekta must be recognized too. It is unlikely that they will think they are proving anything about universals by offering this paraphrase.

We never find a Stoic claiming to have eliminated universals by paraphrasing sentences about them into conditional sentences. On the contrary, the paraphrase seems to be offered as a perspicuous way of showing what a sentence about a universal says, and so of showing how to determine when it is true. This is certainly the view of Epictetus - a late source, but not contradicted by any earlier source. Epictetus argues that a sceptic about universals refutes himself; he evidently assumes that the sceptic's negation commits him to a conditional which commits him to a universal statement.

The treatment of universal quantification, then, is no good reason for thinking the Stoics are nominalists. We have noticed that they may not always regard universals as beings, in so far as they identify them with lekta. But this is no reason for regarding them as complete nominalists. Many of their characteristic claims are hard to understand or

³³ See also SM xi 5, 8.

³⁴ Mates, SL 32, citing Zeller; cf. Hay, ARCHIV 1969, 162.

defend if the reality of universals is not admitted.

IV: STOICS AND SCEPTICS

1. CONCEPTIONS OF A CRITERION

We do not know much about the Stoics' responses to scepticism except from people who thought they were vulnerable to sceptical arguments. Sceptical sources are the least likely to point out that sceptical arguments rest on controversial epistemological premisses, and the least likely to point out that their opponents might not be committed to the premisses that the sceptics need to assume. This is not because sceptics are dishonest, but because their dialectical aims and strategies make it reasonable for them not to advertise the grounds for disputing their assumptions. In dialectical argument seeking to undermine an opponent's position it is reasonable to make the most damaging assumptions seem so clearly correct as to be not worth doubting. The sceptics follow this policy in their exposition and use of the Tropes. If, then, their arguments against the Stoics suggest that the Stoics will agree with particular foundationalist assumptions, this is not evidence that the Stoics will in fact agree with such assumptions.

What questions or questions are the Stoics trying to answer when they offer a criterion? We know most about their views from Sextus, and he is asking the sceptic's question: 'How can we tell from features of an individual appearance that it is of something real?' A criterion, on this view, is supposed to give the Sceptic, someone who does not already believe, or does not already think he has reason to believe, that his experiences are veridical, a way to tell for sure that they are. We do not know if the Stoics originally asked this question, or how far, under Sceptic pressure, they were convinced they should try to answer it. The term 'criterion' is frequently used in reporting Stoic views as though they use it themselves (2/52, 53: SM vii 227, 105, 473). But we do not know if Sceptical challenges forced them to look for a criterion or they looked for it on their own initiative, or if they looked for the same sort of criterion on their own initiative that the Sceptics demanded.

An account of the criterion need not be meant to answer this question raised by the Sceptic. If we want to distinguish, in other terms, the true from the false appearances, we may well say that true appearances are those that grasp reality, and that grasp of reality consists in assent to these true and grasping appearances.

The definition of a KP might suggest what question it is meant to answer. The Stoics say a KP is from an actual thing, HUPARCHON, and according to the actual thing itself, such as would not come to be from something non-actual (SM vii 248). Sextus explains the various clauses of the definition (249 ff). The first refers to the causal origin of the appearance; this does not pick out a KP, since all appearances (in the narrow sense of PHANTASIA opposed to PHANTASMA) are from a real object. The distinctive feature of a KP is the second characteristic; it makes the object appear as it is, and that is why it can be said to grasp it. These two features of the KP need not imply anything more than an attempt to explain the relation between appearance and knowledge. And if this is all we want to do, we are not necessarily wrong to define an actual thing as what we grasp by a KP (SM viii 85-6). We may simply be clarifying one notion by reference to another, and need not want to answer the Sceptic's question.

It is the last clause in the definition that might suggest that the Stoics are offering a test to determine the truth of an appearance in a way that answers the Sceptic's question. 'Such as would not come to be from something non-actual' is taken by Sextus to imply that a KP is qualitatively different from any non-kataleptic appearance, just as a horned snake is from other snakes (vii 252). This insistence on a qualitative difference is important if we are looking for an empirical test. For then presumably we can tell if we are having a KP by noticing that it has the right feature.

The Academics said that kataleptic appearances need not differ qualitatively at all from non-kataleptic - that for every KP it is possible for another appearance to exist that is qualitatively identical to the first, but non-kataleptic. The Stoics deny this Academic claim. What does the denial mean? It is trivially true, if difference in causal origin and relation to other appearances is allowed to count as a qualitative difference. But if what the Academics mean by 'qualitative difference' is phenomenal difference - looking different - then the Stoic denial of the Academic objection is a rather bold and disputable empirical claim. For now the Stoics are offering an empirical test of the truth of individual appearances.

Another reason for thinking the Stoics accept the Academic challenge might be

drawn from an extra feature of the account of the criterion that some alter Stoics thought should be added to the reference to KP - it must have no objection (SM vii 253). Sextus says that this addition was needed to cope with a KP which does not gain assent because of external conditions. Admetus received a KP from Alcestis when she came back from the dead, but did not assent to it because he had strong grounds for believing that Alcestis was dead and therefore invisible. As Sextus says, he found his appearance incredible because of the circumstances (M vii 254).¹ Why does this sort of example show something wrong with the claim that KP is a sufficient criterion?

If the criterion is simply meant to state the actual distinction (let us call it an 'ontological criterion'), the objection seems to be irrelevant. For Admetus was indeed aware of reality when he had this KP, whether he realized he was or not; and so it is still true that a KP is sufficient for being aware of reality. But if the Stoics were looking for an empirical test that can be applied to appearances (call this a 'perceptual criterion'), the objection is relevant. For in these cases having a KP is not sufficient for me to tell that I am perceiving things as they are, and I need something more to serve as a perceptual criterion. If the Stoics modify their account of the criterion to eliminate cases like that of Admetus, they seem to be treating it as a perceptual, not an ontological, criterion.

However, this is not the only possible explanation. Though having a KP is sufficient for having a correct phantasia and so being aware of reality, it is not sufficient for 'grasping' reality, in the Stoics' technical sense, since grasping requires assent (SM viii 397). The criterion may be intended as the standard for grasping reality; if the Stoics mean this, they will be right to say that if there is anything that inhibits assent, we will not assent to the KP, and so the KP will not be sufficient for us to grasp reality. The Stoics could say this without saying that the KP is a perceptual criterion. They need not, as far as this goes, assume that there is some phenomenal difference between a KP and every other appearance.

P2

What is it that goes wrong with Admetus when he refuses to believe that he sees Alcestis? Surely he cannot have realized that he was having a KP and then refused to assent to it because of some objection. Presumably he thought it looked like a KP but couldn't be one, when there seemed to be these strong objections to its being true, and therefore to its being a KP. This seems to be the only reasonable account open to the Stoics. But how does this affect their claim about the qualitative distinctness of the KP?

Suppose that the KP has a distinctive feature K. Does Admetus perceive K or not? He surely cannot have perceived it as K; if he had, he would have known that he had a KP, but he does not know this. The other options are:

1. He does perceive K, but because of his objections he does not realize that it is K.
2. He does not perceive K, because of his objections.

The Stoic view is not clear. Admetus might say that it looks like a KP: it is clear enough to be one, though it isn't one. This might suggest that he notices K but misidentifies, thinking it is a feature rather like K. Similarly I might have an appearance that seems to be an ordinary perception of a red book, but wonder whether it isn't after all green, since there used to be a green book just there and I have seen people playing with coloured lights. In fact my suspicions are wrong and I have had a true appearance of red, but wrongly assumed that it was a false appearance and that the thing was green. Now is K this sort of feature of my appearances, one that I can perceive but misidentify? Or if I am aware of it at all, must I know that I am?

Is there any reason to ascribe either (1) or (2) to the Stoics? That depends on what they mean in speaking of an appearance as a KP; are they talking only about how it is, or also about how it seems? If they refer only to how it is, then they can allow that it is a KP even if it does not look any different to me from a non-KP. Perhaps I have failed to notice K. But if a KP must look qualitatively different from everything non-kataleptic, look different to the perceiver, then Admetus could not be wrong in thinking that his appearance is not

¹ 'Incredible' renders APISTOS. 'Unbelieved' or 'untrustworthy' would do as well. The Loeb translates PISTOS and PITHANOS ('persuasive') and their negations by 'probable' and 'improbable' - very misleadingly, especially in the account of Carneades, e.g. P i 226..

kataleptic. For it would be kataleptic only if it looked like it. And so there must be aqualitative feature of an appearance that some people overlook or misperceive because of objections created by the circumstances. Having a KP, then, fails as a perceptual criterion of truth. It does not fail because K is found in some false appearances. It fails because the presence of K does not always allow me to notice, it and therefore does not always allow me to know that I am perceiving things as they are.

The Stoics do not suggest some further test that Admetus could apply to convince himself that he had a KP. They seem to admit that in this case no perceptual criterion can be found, and restrict their claims about KP so as to rule out this sort of case. They say that when a KP meets no objection, it is a criterion of truth. This may mean that it is a perceptual criterion. Though K is not enough to produce our assent when we have background objections, it is enough, and it produces correct assent, when we have no objections. When we have no objections, no reason to think anyone is playing with the lights, we take our perceptions at face value. When we are aware of K, we take it to be K, and assent to the appearance at once, instead of wondering whether we have found a specious impostor instead of K.

This is what the Stoics have in mind, apparently, when they say that when there are no objections the KP is clear and striking and practically drags us off to assent (vii 257); and clarity and strikingness are held to be the hallmark of the perceptually criterial KP. (Cf. vii 403, 408.) If there is some objection, the KP does not have its normal compelling character, and does not provide a perceptual criterion; but in the absence of objections it is a perceptual criterion because we can in fact rely on it to reach true beliefs.

We might wonder whether the Stoics are altogether wise in so far as they fight within the rules laid down by the Sceptic. In particular what could be this feature K? And could we be wrong about whether an appearance has it or not? The Stoics ought surely to answer Yes to the second question. Many of the Sceptical objections to the Stoic criterion attack the claim that there can be KP that are qualitatively different from any possible false appearances (SM vii 252, 402 ff). The Sceptics observe, quite correctly, that we often cannot tell true appearances apart from false, because we are sometimes equally sure and convinced by an appearance that we later find to be false as we are by those that are confirmed as true. But this is not necessarily a fatal objection to the Stoics. The Sceptic's examples show that for some people two appearances may not be phenomenally different; they may look just the same. But the Stoics will reply that phenomenal indistinguishability for someone does not imply qualitative uniformity. If some people think an appearance has K it does not follow that it really has K.

Cic. AC ii 49 (Stoic reply to Sceptics.) And first this must be criticized, that they rely on a most captious kind of questioning, the kind that is normally approved least of all in philosophy - the addition and subtraction by minute steps. They call this kind of argument heaps (SORITAE) because they produce a heap by adding one grain. Clearly a flawed and captious kind of argument. For you mount up this way: 'If such an appearance is presented by the god that it is approvable (PROBABLE = PITHANON, 'persuasive'), why not also such an appearance that it is very like a true one? Why not one that is hard to tell apart from a true one? Why not one that cannot even be told apart? Finally, one that is not at all different from a true one?' if you get this far by my granting each premise, it will be my fault: but if you get there by yourself, your fault. For who will concede to you that the god can do everything, or that he would do this if he could? And how do you take for granted that if one thing is similar to another it follows that it will be hard to tell them apart, and next that they can't be told apart, and finally that they're the same? For instance, if wolves are similar to dogs, you'll end up saying they're the same ... And so there is only one way to fight off all the empty appearances, whether they are depicted in thought, which we allow frequently happens, or in sleep or through wine or through insanity. For we will say that all appearances of this sort lack clarity (PERSPICUITAS = ENARGEIA), to which we should hang on by our teeth. For who, when he imagines, FINGIT, something to himself and depicts it in thought, and then stirs himself and recalls himself to himself, doesn't notice at once the difference between clear and empty things? See also Cic AC ii 93-4; SM vii 415.

Cic. AC ii 54 They (Sceptics) harp in a puerile way on the similarity of twins or of imprints made by signet rings. For which of us denies that there are similarities, when these appear in so many things? If it is enough to abolish knowledge that many things are similar to many others, why aren't you

content with that, especially when we concede it? Why do you maintain instead something that the nature of things won't allow, when you deny that each thing is such as it is in its own kind, and that two or more things never have something in common that differs not at all? For instance, allowing that eggs are very similar to eggs and bees to bees, why are you fighting? Or what are you after with twins? We concede they are similar; you could have been content with that. But you want them to be altogether the same, not (merely) similar, which cannot happen by any way ... (57) Indeed I will allow that the wise man, whom all our discussion is about, when he meets similar things that he has not kept distinguished, will reserve assent, and will never assent to any appearance except one which is such as a false one could not be. He has a particular craft (ARS = TECHNE) for other things too by which he can distinguish true things from false; to these similarities his experience (USUS) must be applied; just as a mother tells twins apart when her eyes become used to them, you will tell them apart if you get used to it. Do you see that the similarity of eggs to each other is proverbial? Yet we have heard that in Delos during its prosperity there were many who used to breed hens for business; when they looked at an egg they used to say which hen had laid it. That is not a point against us. It is enough for us not to tell the eggs apart; for this is still not the same as agreeing that this one is that, as though there were no difference at all between them. For I have a rule (REGULA = KRITERION) so that I judge to be true those appearances which are such as false ones could not be; from this rule I am not able to diverge a finger's breadth, as they say, so that I don't confound everything.²

The Stoics, then, appeal to their doctrine requiring the qualitative difference or non-identicals. If two non-identical things are qualitatively different, it does not follow that the difference will be readily detectable, or that everyone who looks at either of them will be able to notice its distinguishing property (IDIOMA: SM vii 252). And so the Sceptic's objection is indecisive. The fact that some people are wrong about whether an appearance has K does not prove the non-existence of K. These people simply misperceive their appearances.

This reply assumes that some features of an appearance may be overlooked or misidentified, that its features are not constituted by how it looks to the subject. Does that assumption raise any further difficulties for the Stoics? Perhaps it raises some difficulty for the assumption that an appearance can be wholly specified as a propositional content, such as 'It appears to me that the wall is white'. If that is the appearance, then its clarity or unclarity depends on whether the propositional content includes 'clearly ...' or not. It is hard to see, on this view, how I could overlook some clarity in the appearance that is really there. For it looks as though I can overlook things only in what I observe; and if an appearance is just a propositional content, I do not observe it. So how can it have features that I don't notice? (It can have implications that I don't see. But how would that help the Stoics on our present point?) However, if having an appearance is something more like having a mental image, the claim that some people can overlook features of it is more plausible, since we can overlook features of our mental images, become more practiced and careful in studying them, and so on. These are the things the Stoic requires us to do in looking for a KP, and presumably the wise man studies his images most carefully of all until he recognizes K always and only when it occurs.

2. THE SORITES

This appeal to observing images would also support the Stoic reply to the Sceptic's use of the Sorites Paradox.³ This relies on special cases of apparently indistinguishable things (Cic Ac ii 49 SM vii 415. P ii 253). We do not make a few things into many simply by adding one, and we do not make a non-heap into a heap simply by adding one. If, then, we have a KP that three are few, we cannot refuse to say that our appearance that four are few is equally a KP, and the same is true as long as we keep adding one; the addition of one cannot make the difference between a KP and a non-KP. But when the number n is large enough, it is no longer true that n are few. And so it turns out that somewhere there will

² On the Stoic belief in identity of indiscernibles cf. AC. ii 85, Plu. CN 1077c (see 'Language & Thought' t44), Seneca, EP. II3.15-16, Stobaeus, ECL. i 20.7.

³ Barnes, 'Medicine, experience, and logic', in *Science and Speculation*; Burnyeat, 'Gods and heaps' in *Language and Logos*.

be a non-KP that is indistinguishable from a KP.

Chrysippus' answer is that we should stop assenting while we are still safely within the area of KPs. Before we reach the last KP, we should stop answering questions and just be silent. We recognize that there are KPs beyond the last one we recognize, but we do not know where they stop; hence we are silent while we are still within them: Cic Ac ii 93-4; SM vii 416⁴

This reply and Carneades' annoyance with it bring out an important feature of the Stoic strategy. They make it clear that the distinguishing feature of a KP is one that we can be mistaken about. The Stoic reply allows us to say that the sage will be right when she thinks appearances are kataleptic, not that she will assent to all appearances that are in fact kataleptic. This must be the result if the sage also falls silent while part of the soritical series of questions is being put to her.

Barnes⁵ attributes to Chrysippus the advice to stop either before or at the last 'clear' case. But is a reference to clarity any part of the Stoic solution? Barnes seems to be deriving it from the sceptical objection (*inlustribus rebus igitur insistis ... etiam a certis et inlustribus cohibus adsensum*; Cic Ac ii 94). He suggests that Chrysippus' actual advice may have been not simply (i) 'Stop assenting somewhere within the kataleptic cases, i.e. when you still have more kataleptic ones to go', but (ii) 'Stop at the first unclear case'. Is (ii) better than (i)?

Is (i) as bad as Barnes (54) says it is? Chrysippus is saying 'Stop before cases that - as far as you can tell - are kataleptic, and don't assent to them'. Given the voluntary character of assent, does this advice really have the 'contradictory air' alleged by Barnes?

Is (ii) as good as Barnes says it is? If the 'first unclear case' is the first case that looks unclear to you, i.e. the immediate successor of the last case that looks clear to you, then (ii) seems a bit dangerous. For suppose it is clear to me that n are few; how could it then be less clear to me that $n+1$ are few? Wherever we put the last clear case, the Sorites argument will apparently force us to say that its immediate successor looks just as clear. This perhaps makes it easier to see why (i) is preferable to (ii).

Burnyeat⁶ claims to see a difference between Ac ii 93-4 and SM vii 416. But does the Sextus passage warrant 'at the last quantity which is clearly few'? Once again it is difficult to see the warrant for bringing any claim about clarity into the Stoic formula; and it is not clear that they would be well advised to introduce any such claim.⁷

Is the Stoic answer to the Sorites really a solution, or just an evasion. The Sorites raises a problem because it seems that (a) there must be somewhere between '3 are few' (true) and '100 are few' (false) where we must stop assenting to ' n are few'; but (b) we cannot find the right place to stop; and hence (c) it seems that there is no place to stop. This is used to show that we can have two appearances identical in their KP-making qualities, but one true and one false. Chrysippus' answer is to accept (a) and (b) and to deny that (c) follows from (b). To prevent us (aspiring Stoics who are not sages) from being led by a Sorites into mistaking a non-KP for a KP (which we do somewhere or other if we keep assenting to the soritical questions), he advises us not to assent to all the cases that seem kataleptic to us; and surely he means not simply that we should not utter assent,

⁴ Burnyeat 'G&H' 235.

⁵ MEL 53 ff

⁶ 'G & H' 335n7

⁷ It is rather doubtful whether Burnyeat is right to suggest (336) that Chrysippus' view that everyone is either a sage or a fool is a response to the Sorites. The point being made in, e.g., Plutarch CN 1063a seems quite different from the point to which the Sorites is relevant. The Sorites is relevant to 'few' and 'many' because we must pass from 'few' to 'many' somewhere *before* 100. But we need not similarly pass from being vicious to being virtuous at some time *before* we become sages; we become virtuous (cease being vicious) and become sages (cease being fools) at the *same* time.

but that we should refrain from the assent that results in belief.

To decide whether this is a solution, we need to consider the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between few and many, even if we cannot see where it is. Is this assumption reasonable?

It does not seem to matter if we abandon bivalence (or, more precisely, the view that every sentence has just one of two truth values - true and false), and say that there is a grey area within which it is neither true nor false that n are many. For now the soritical question will be: when do we pass from 'true' to 'grey' in answering 'Are n few?'? Soritical techniques will make it just as difficult to find this point as to find the point where we should pass from 'true' to 'false'. It is not clear, then, that we would make things easier if we disagreed with the Stoics and rejected bivalence.

3. DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE CRITERION

What do we learn from this criticism of the Stoics?

1. The criticism is unjustified, in so far as the critics fail to recognize that, in the Stoic view, appearances have features that not everyone notices and that become obvious only on reflexion.
2. Still a question arises: how do we notice that a KP has these features? (a) Do we just need to look more closely, so that everyone can in principle have the same KPs and the same sort of access to them? (b) Or must we rely on some background information and theoretical assumptions that we have only if we accept Stoicism?

We seem to have conflicting evidence on the line that the Stoics take here:

1. They claim that some features of appearances are 'evident' and 'striking' (*enarges* and *plēktikon*). These are cases in which the KP is the criterion of truth. See SM vii 253. Apparently, then, we can trust those cases in which we have no reason to believe that anything has gone wrong. It is dangerous for the Stoics to go in this direction, since it is possible for cases like this to result in false beliefs.
2. Arguments relying on soritic cases push the Stoics in a different direction. Instead of supposing we can directly recognize a KP by noticing hitherto unnoticed observable features of an appearance, the Stoics suggest that it takes a good deal of training to find the right features that make a KP. If this is so, then the foundation of knowledge can't be a set of KPs that are recognized and selected as such in advance of any theory. Judgments about which appearances are KPs can't be self-justifying, but need some further defence.

The Stoics must apparently pursue the second strategy if they are to avoid sceptical criticism about the difficulty of identifying a KP. But the sceptics also raise objections to the second strategy, arguing that it involves us in an infinite regress or in circular argument. The Stoics do not seem to raise clear or explicit objections to the assumptions underlying these sceptical arguments. See SP iii 114, M vii 445; SVF 2/23⁸

If the Stoics look for a distinguishing mark of a KP to provide a perceptual criterion of truth, their position is consistent, if they develop it in the way we have described. But it is plausible? It is a weaker sort of criterion that we find that we might have sought. The most reassuring sort of perceptual criterion would be a feature which (a) could not be misperceived; (b) could not be overlooked; (c) could not be thought to be present when it is not; in short (d) appears to be present if and only if it is present in an appearance. If the Stoics seek a criterion satisfying condition (d), they are open to Sceptical objections. For clearly many people think appearances are veridical when they are not, and if K satisfies (d), K will belong to non-veridical appearances, contrary to the Stoic definition of KP.

It sometimes looks very much as though the Stoics do intend K to satisfy (d), to be self-disclosing. For the nearest they come to describing K is to say that when there is no objection a KP is 'evident' and 'striking', and drags us off to assent (SM vii 257). This certainly suggests that an appearance is a KP when it is as clear and striking as an ordinary appearance of the pen in front of me. If this is what the Stoics mean, they are wide open to Sceptical attack - for this sort of clarity and strikingness can be found in non-veridical appearances too (vii 403, 408). The Stoics might say that K is a feature that we correctly take to be present only in veridical appearances, and incorrectly take to be

⁸ See also Mates SL 66

present in some non-veridical appearances.

However, they try another line (Cic. AC ii 52). They argue that there is a difference in clarity (PERSPICUITAS = ENARGEIA; cf. SM vii 257, 403).⁹ A wise man will reflect carefully on the degree of clarity to be found in an appearance; and the Stoic claims that he can tell that all the Sceptic's alleged counter-examples mention appearances that really lack the appropriate clarity. We are supposed to see on reflection that dream-appearances or appearances in darkness are not clear; and our judgments about which appearances are clear, when carefully made, will pick out only true appearances. (Cf. 2/62 = Cic. DIV ii 126.) The Stoics are right to claim that we will find something wrong with dream-appearances when we reflect on them. But what is this 'clarity' they are supposed to lack? Is it some intrinsic, phenomenal, self-disclosing feature of an appearance? It is hard to agree that it is. But if it is not, it is hardly the sort of criterion that will answer the Sceptic's challenge.

Perhaps, then, the Stoics ought not to promise to find a perceptual criterion of the strongest sort - a self-disclosing feature of appearances. If they accept this, they cannot claim to offer a certain and infallible perceptual criterion, one that I could never be mistaken in taking to be present. They must agree that I would be wrong in thinking that an appearance has K. Now if we started looking for K because we noticed that we could be wrong in thinking an appearance is veridical, and wanted a criterion to ensure that we would be right, then the Stoics do not remove all our troubles. They may have removed some of them. For it may be easier to notice that an appearance has K than to decide directly whether it is veridical. But if there is reasonable doubt about whether K is present, how do we remove that doubt? must we appeal to some other criterion for the presence of K? That seems to threaten an infinite regress. If we must decide without any further criterion whether K is present or not, could we not decide without appeal to K whether an appearance is veridical?

Is K in fact likely to make things any easier for us? What sort of connexion will we find between K and the truth of appearances? Must it be verified by appearances? If so, we already need some reliable views about when appearances are true that must have been reached without the benefit of K. This does not prove that K is useless for everything; but it proves that K alone cannot answer a general Sceptical doubt about the truth of appearances. If, on the other hand, K is some logically necessary feature of a KP, it is hard to see how it can provide a perceptual criterion.

If K is not self-disclosing, what sort of property of appearances could it be? It is hard to think of any plausible answer that would both provide a perceptual criterion, and avoid Sceptical objections relying on apparent similarity of some true and some false appearances. At least, it is hard to find any feature of an appearance taken by itself that would do what is required. But perhaps the Stoics are better off if they follow their own suggestion and consider the relation of an appearance to other appearances. They regard a KP as a criterion when it meets no objection. here they recognize that our background of beliefs may cause us to reject an appearance; they imply that we consider how an appearance fits into our beliefs before we decide whether it is true or not. If we alter 'having no objection' to make clear its positive aspect, we will say that a KP is the criterion of truth when it fits appropriately with our other beliefs. Coherence may provide us with some sort of criterion. But it has two defects. For apparently it is fallible. We may accept a false but coherent appearance, and reject a true but incoherent one. Second, this criterion cannot be self-sufficient in forming beliefs; for it assumes that we already have beliefs about external reality, and so these cannot depend on the use of the criterion.

The clause about no objection shows more generally how the Stoics must modify any claim to offer a perceptual criterion applicable to individual appearances. For the Sceptic reasonably urges that if 'any objection' means 'any tendency to think the appearance false' it is easy to find some objection to any appearance (SM vii 424-5); we can always think of something that might have gone wrong. Surely we may be entitled to rely on an appearance even if we can think of some objection, as long as we correctly believe

⁹ See Sandbach in PS 32.

that the objection does not apply in this case? Now here we must appeal again to coherence and to our background beliefs, though these by themselves do not provide an infallible criterion. If the implications of the Stoic position are explored in this direction, they seem to be committed to something like the view that Carneades developed in opposition to them (cf. SP i 226 ff; M vii 166 ff).

Much of our evidence about Stoic views on the criterion is derived from Sceptical critics. We must allow for the possibility that the Sceptics distort the Stoic position because they force it to answer questions formulated in the Sceptic way. However, it looks as though the Stoics do indeed accept the Sceptical challenge, and rather uncritically accept the Sceptical view of how their question should be answered. For the Sceptics demand a self-disclosing criterion to persuade them out of Scepticism; and if the Stoics unwisely agree that such a criterion must be found, it is not surprising that their efforts to answer the Sceptics seem to fail. These failures, however, suggest a more plausible direction for the Stoics to pursue.

The doctrine of the KP seems to raise a question about the Stoic doctrine of assent. For the Stoics insist that assent is voluntary and up to us, while appearance is purely passive. And yet, they claim that a KP without objection practically grabs us by the hair and drags us off to assent. Now perhaps this metaphor should not be taken too seriously. But it is rather inept if it does not suggest compulsion and non-voluntariness. Perhaps the sort of compulsion that is involved need not exclude voluntary assent; but this is hard to see without further explanation. Perhaps this claim about the compulsive character of some KP explains why some Stoics differ in their account of the criterion. Some of them say it is katalepsis by a KP; for others it is the KP itself. This might not be a significant difference; for if KP immediately produces assent, it immediately produces katalepsis, since katalepsis just is assent to a KP. But the difference might be more significant. For someone who does not believe in the compulsive character of KP, further judgment and reasoning will be needed to assent to any appearance, even to a KP. For someone who believes that a KP is compulsive, nothing further will be needed for assent. This second view makes the grasp of reality largely a passive process, not requiring reasoning and judgment. For the special feature of the KP just forces itself on us and compels assent. For the first view, however, the process does not become purely passive; for it still requires judgment and reasoning to decide that an appearance is a KP and to assent to it. The first view fits better with the Stoic emphasis on activity and reason as essential elements of knowledge; the second view fits better with a desire to find a perceptual criterion.

Do the Stoics who introduce the clause about absence of obstacles into the definition of the criterion (SM vii 253 ff) show that they recognize a gap between appearance and assent? (i) We might say they do; for though Admetus has a KP he does not assent to it (255), because of his other beliefs; he must satisfy himself that it has no obstacle before he assents to it, and so the KP itself cannot compel assent. (ii) But perhaps this is not the point. If Admetus is already predisposed to doubt any appearance of Alcestis, he will not assent even to a KP of her. But if he has no such predisposition to doubt, in these cases the KP will compel assent. (That seems to be the suggestion in vii 257.) These two ways of understanding the point leave the relation between KP and assent ambiguous.

4. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STOIC VIEW

Students of the debate about the criterion have sometimes been quite properly puzzled about what the parties to the debate think it is about.¹⁰ I am puzzled about this myself, but I bring up the issue because it may be connected with questions about the Stoic strategy, and the extent to which it is reconstructive. It suits a sceptic very well to assume that our claims to knowledge require a criterion of a rather specific sort - one that autonomously and infallibly assures us of the truth of a given belief. Descartes (in his sceptical phase) complains that 'being awake can never be distinguished from being asleep by certain signs (*certis indiciis*)', and he is looking for this sort of criterion.¹¹ The criterion

¹⁰ This difficulty is pointed out forcefully by Annas, 'Truth and knowledge' in *Doubt & Dogmatism*, 103.

¹¹ *Med.* i; tr. Cottingham et al, ii 13.

will be autonomous, in so far as I won't have to appeal to any other beliefs to know that the criterial feature is present in this belief; and it will be infallible, in so far as I won't have to correct it on any occasions by appeal to my other beliefs. It is quite natural to think our beliefs must rest on some criterion of this sort. For some of them seem to be rather basic, not needing to be certified by elaborate inference; and if we have some reason for trusting them, must they not display their trustworthiness by some immediately striking feature that we can immediately recognize?

None the less, this conception of a criterion is an easy target for the sceptic. If we face the sceptic with it, we walk straight into Agrippa's trilemma, and the horn we must embrace is the appeal to assumptions. If, then, the Stoics agree with the sceptics about the sort of criterion we should be looking for, then they must apparently appeal, as Aristotle does in the *Analytics*, to some doctrine of self-evidence, and must face all the resultant difficulties.

To some critics it seems obvious that this is the route the Stoics must take. If we attempt to check one appearance or presentation by appeal to others, then 'those presentations must themselves be cognitive. And how are we to know that? We shall find ourselves in an endless regress, as is pointed out by Sextus, M vii 428-9. There must be a point to call a halt. There must be some presentations that are immediately acceptable, that are self-evidently true. That is what constitutes a cognitive presentation.'¹² This argument about the Stoics evidently appeals to Agrippa's trilemma, and assumes that infinite regresses are all vicious, and that circles are so bad as to be not even worth mentioning. Can we be sure that the Stoics make all these assumptions?

We must admit that some accounts of the Stoic appeal to the cataleptic appearance naturally suggest that they accept the third horn of Agrippa's trilemma, and seek to appeal to something self-evident. Such a criterion offers to settle the sorts of disputes that the sceptics appeal to when they adduce conflicting appearances. Perhaps the Stoics think that conflicts and disputes are settled by appeal to appearances that are so clear and unambiguous that our judgments on them will be self-evidently correct and indisputable. If this is what the Stoics mean, they will ascribe to judgments about cataleptic appearances the sort of epistemic status that Aristotle ascribes to first principles of demonstration.¹³ Such a judgment will meet the Stoic conditions for being 'evident' (*enarges*) - 'grasped from itself and needing nothing else to establish it' (S, M vii 364). The sceptic can reasonably ask to be shown the sort of appearance that infallibly produces such a self-evidently correct judgment.

The Stoics define the cataleptic appearance as one that comes from something that obtains, accurately presents it to the perceiver, and is 'of a sort that would not come from something not obtaining' (vii 248). They claim that the perceiver with the cataleptic appearance 'fastens in an expert way on the underlying difference in the things, since such an appearance has some distinguishing property (*idiōma*) setting it apart from the other appearances, just as horned snakes <have a distinguishing property> setting them apart from the other snakes' (vii 252). Some of the argument about the criterion turns on disputes about this distinguishing property.

The Academics argue against the Stoic criterion that for every true appearance we can think of a false appearance indistinguishable (*aparallakton*, vii 252) from it, and that therefore no distinguishing property such as the Stoics assume could belong to only true appearances. The Academics' examples and arguments show that 'indistinguishable' must mean 'phenomenally indistinguishable at a time', so that two appearances count as indistinguishable if at some time their subject does not notice any qualitative difference between them. But if this is what the Academics mean, their objection is indecisive. In order to refute the Stoics they must show that for every true appearance there is a false appearance that is qualitatively identical, that really differs in no other property (besides truth or falsity). But phenomenal indistinguishability is a most imperfect sign of qualitative identity. For it is a property of particular people's appearances in particular epistemic

¹² Sandbach, in *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. Long), 19.

¹³ The process of discovery will evidently be quite different, since judgments about cataleptic appearances are singular perceptual judgments.

situations; and the fact that some people's true and false appearances have this property in some situations at some times does not prove the Stoics wrong. I may think a genuine Rembrandt and a good fake look just the same; but if I find that one appeals to me or interests me in some way that the other doesn't, I may come to realize that they can't have looked the same after all.¹⁴ In this case I come to believe that my appearance had a property that I didn't notice it had. Alternatively, the two paintings may affect me the same way, until I find out which one is the genuine Rembrandt, and then I may come to notice appealing features of it that I didn't notice before. In this case also I seem to have found out about previously unnoticed features of my appearance.

If we are willing to concede the possibility of appearances with unnoticed but detectable features, then the Academic arguments appealing to phenomenal indistinguishability will fail. The Stoics are quite right to challenge them (Cic. Ac. ii 54-8). When we think we have a cataleptic appearance, and then find a false appearance that is phenomenally indistinguishable from it, we will just say that we have failed to notice the difference between the two appearances.¹⁵ An appearance that is actually cataleptic does not always have the phenomenal features of 'evidence' and 'strikingness' that it has when it serves us as a criterion (SM vii 257), and these phenomenal features are not sufficient for a cataleptic appearance (403). A cataleptic appearance is criterial only when its evidence and strikingness is a result of my actual recognition of the property that distinguishes it from false appearances.

But while this reply deals adequately with sceptical attempts to undermine the Stoic belief in the distinguishing property, it may seem simply to expose the Stoics to a more damaging objection. For to answer the objection about indistinguishability the Stoics must admit that the cataleptic character of an appearance cannot be secured by its phenomenal features. To notice that an appearance has the distinguishing property suitable for a cataleptic appearance I need some expertise and trained judgment; but how do I train my judgment, and how do I know I am training it to look for the right thing? We might say that past success in distinguishing veridical from non-veridical appearances makes me good at identifying the features of appearances that make them veridical; but if I can claim to have had such success, I must already be able to distinguish the veridical from the non-veridical appearances, and therefore must know when I have been perceiving external reality and when I have not. But what assures me about when I have been perceiving external reality, apart from my belief that some of my past appearances have seemed cataleptic?

This mutual dependence of beliefs about external reality and beliefs about the cataleptic character of appearances exposes the circular character of our argument. Sextus assumes that any resort to such an argument must be a mistake; and he is not slow to accuse the Stoics of making this mistake (vii 426).

If the Stoics agree that this is a mistake, and want to avoid it, they must find some

¹⁴ The Stoic appeal to the perceptions of the artist, Ac. ii 19, 86 (adding an important point to SM vii 258) seems to imply that appearances can have unnoticed features that the more practised and informed perceiver can detect.

¹⁵ This leaves aside the question raised by Frede (in *Essays* 167) about whether my *recognition of the truth depends on my recognition of the distinguishing feature of the cataleptic appearance*. Even if it doesn't, the Stoics are committed to the existence of an introspectively discriminable distinguishing feature (as Frede agrees, 169). But one (not the only) reason Frede gives for denying that an introspective feature could play the role in recognition that he rejects is worth noticing: 'If they had taken this view, they would have opened themselves to the charge of an infinite regress. For we would have to ask what is supposed to guarantee the truth of the impression that a given impression has this distinctive feature. Quite generally, the criterion will only fulfil its role if it does not require the judgment that an impression is of a certain kind. For this will always raise the question how this judgment is to be certified.' Frede, on the Stoics' behalf, concedes a good deal to Agrippa here. In reply it is fair to ask (i) if the infinite regress is necessarily vicious, and (ii) why in any case a non-vicious circular argument can't be offered. Frede's own defence of the Stoics, 173-5, seems to assume the possibility of non-vicious circles.

way of identifying the cataleptic appearance independently of beliefs about external objects, or some way of assuring us that we perceive external objects apart from any previous assumptions about which appearances are cataleptic. In each case they will be providing us with some new criterion apart from the alleged initial cataleptic appearance. But then we can ask how we know that new criterion ever obtains, and we will appeal to a further criterion, and we have begun an infinite regress. Sextus uses this Agrippian trope as well (428-9). Unless some type of judgment is self-verifying in a way that is hard to see, the sceptic can always ask to be convinced that the favoured criterion is indeed the criterion; when a further criterion is introduced to support the first criterion, he can ask the same question about the second criterion, and so on in an infinite regress. Sextus reasonably excludes mere unsupported 'assertion' (*phasis*)¹⁶ as an adequate defence of an alleged criterion, and argues that an infinite regress or a circle are the only options left (339-42).

5. STOIC REPLIES

These features of sceptical argument against the Stoic criterion show the importance of Agrippa's Tropes. The Stoics win the first round of the encounter with scepticism once they show that they have no reason to accept the argument from phenomenal indistinguishability. But this is only a temporary victory if it exposes them to the further sceptical arguments relying on Agrippa's Tropes. And if the sceptics are right in their account of what an adequate criterion would have to be like, then the Stoics cannot find a criterion; for the sceptic's conditions for a criterion preclude any resort to infinitely regressive or circular argument.

One way out that has been offered to the Stoics requires them to change the terms of the discussion. We suppose that the sceptics challenge the Stoics to produce a justification of their belief that some of their appearances give them knowledge of the world. Sceptical attacks claim that the Stoics cannot point to anything accessible to them in particular appearances that allows them to distinguish kataleptic from non-kataleptic appearances. It might be argued that this sceptical attack misses its target altogether; for (it is suggested) the Stoics are offering to find any feature that is accessible to them in particular appearances. They are claiming that they are justified in accepting a favoured subset of their appearances (the kataleptic ones) because this favoured subset reliably reveal the truth. This reply involves an externalist and reliabilist view of justification. It claims that a particular believer's beliefs are justified provided that they have the right sort of connexion with the truth, whether or not the believer is actually aware of the connexion. On this view, even if I have forgotten when and how I learnt arithmetic, my arithmetical beliefs are largely justified provided that I actually acquired them from a reliable source.¹⁷

Are the Stoics in a position to claim that we acquire our kataleptic appearances from a reliable source? It is plausible to appeal to other aspects of Stoic philosophy. The Stoics believe in a strong form of natural teleology, claiming that nature has given us the cognitive faculties we need to form the true beliefs about the world that are necessary for us to live according to knowledge. These doctrines of Stoic physics provide some basis for the claim that our cognitive faculties are reliably connected with the truth.

If the Stoics go this far in explaining their conviction about the reliability of our appearances, do they open themselves to sceptical challenge again? The sceptic may apparently ask why we should believe the natural philosophy that supports these claims about the senses? The Stoics are firm empiricists, in so far as they believe that the senses play an indispensable part in the acquisition of knowledge; if we find we have no reason, apart from natural philosophy, to trust our senses, then apparently we also undermine our reasons for accepting the natural philosophy that tells us about the reliability of the senses.

It might be argued that this sort of sceptical challenge rests on a misunderstanding

¹⁶ Barnes, *Toils*, 97, remarks that Sextus often uses this or a similar phrase when he refers to Agrippa's attack on assumptions.

¹⁷ Externalism applied to the Stoics: see Frede 'Clear', = *Essays*, 167f; Barnes, *Toils*, 128-37. Objections to this interpretation: Annas, in Everson.

of what the Stoics are trying to do. They do not suppose that natural philosophy is supposed to justify my belief that I am now looking at a brown table; I do not consider natural philosophy in considering whether I should trust my current appearance. Natural philosophy (we might say) has an explanatory role; it does not give me something I can cite to answer an objection to my current appearance, but it explains why I am reliably right in not seeking arguments to answer objections to my current appearances. It does not show that what is taken to be immediately evident in perception should not be taken to be immediately evident after all; it shows why we are right (reliably connected with the truth) in taking it to be immediately evident.

Does this reply show that the Stoics need not be concerned about the sceptical challenge? The sceptic still seems entitled to point out that, despite the indirect and explanatory role accorded to natural philosophy in the Stoic argument, it still has a justificatory role; if we came to be convinced of the falsity of Stoic natural philosophy, then we would no longer be rationally entitled to rely as we do on our appearances (assuming that we replaced it with nothing else that did the same for our appearances). We would still be justified in the externalist sense as long as Stoic natural philosophy (or something else establishing the right link between perceptions and the truth) remained true; but once we had lost our belief, we would no longer be justified in the internalist sense. If the sceptics could show that we are not justified in the internalist sense in accepting Stoic natural philosophy, then they could show that we are not rationally entitled to rely on our perceptions. And if we have no reason, apart from Stoic natural philosophy, to believe that some of our appearances are accurate and that we can tell which ones are accurate, we have no reason to accept Stoic natural philosophy.

It does not seem, then, that an appeal to externalism disarms the sceptic's doubts altogether. It disarms them only if the only sense of justification is the one that is employed in externalist claims about justification and reliability. But answering the externalist question raises the further question about our rational entitlement to rely on the theory that answers the externalist question; and when we come to this, the sceptical questions return. Once again the Stoics must face Agrippa's trilemma. In that case, one reason for attributing an externalist answer turns out to be a bad one. Some critics assume that if the Stoics are not externalists, their attempts to answer the sceptics are bound to fail, and the Stoics must have seen this. But this assumption is correct only if every option offered by Agrippa's trilemma is disastrous and the Stoics must have supposed so.

If the Stoics have no reason to agree with Agrippa, they need not accept the assumption that we need the sort of criterion that the sceptic challenges us to find. Indeed, they will be free to use a reconstructive argument; since the search for an autonomous and infallible criterion leads to scepticism, and scepticism is false, that can't be the kind of criterion we need to justify our claims to knowledge. It will not be surprising, then, if the sort of criterion that the Stoics seem to provide is different from the one that the sceptics seem to ask for. If we reject Agrippa, we will not be disturbed by these sceptical arguments.

I know of no Stoic discussion of the issues raised by Agrippa that is as explicit as Aristotle's in the *Analytics*. One very brief fragment says they recognize circular reasoning as a kind of undemonstrated argument; but unfortunately the fragment does not say whether they think such argument is legitimate or illegitimate (SVF ii 273). It is clear, however, that they reject the demand for demonstration of everything, and they probably agree that such a demand betrays, as Aristotle says, lack of education in analytics (*Met.* 1005b2-5, 1006a5-11). For they recognize basic forms of valid argument that they call undemonstrated because 'they need no demonstration, because it is evident at once (*autothen*) in their case that they are conclusive' (S M viii 223; cf. DL vii 79, *tō(i) mē chrēzein apodeixeōs*).¹⁸ Apuleius says these arguments 'are called indemonstrable, not because they cannot be demonstrated ... but because they are so simple and clear that they do not need demonstration, to such an extent that they themselves generate others and transmit credibility to them from themselves' (*De Int.* 188.6-11, ed. Thomas).¹⁹

¹⁸ Undemonstrated arguments: Mates, *Stoic Logic*, 63f; Frede, *Die Stoische Logik*, 127-9.

¹⁹ Frede glosses this passage: 'der Versuch es zu beweisen, etwas voraussetzte, was

It is far less clear how we are supposed to tell that these arguments are valid. One account might claim that their validity is just self-evident, completely immune to doubt, and not to be explained by appeal to any further feature of the arguments themselves or their relation to other arguments. But an alternative account, while insisting that they are clear in themselves and open to no reasonable doubt, might try to explain why this is so; and to explain this we might point to the basic status of the undemonstrated arguments in the composition of all arguments that we recognize as valid (cf. DL vii 79, *di hōn pas logos pleketai*). In that case we will rely on our belief that the composite arguments are valid, if we want to explain why we take it for granted that the elementary arguments are valid. On this view, the use of the undemonstrated arguments in other arguments will not simply be a consequence of the basic status we see they have, but will also be a reason for believing we are right to accord them this basic status. The Stoics' belief in undemonstrated arguments does not show that they accept the foundationalist reply to Agrippa's Tropes.

If we were to try to demonstrate the validity of an undemonstrated argument, we might try to argue from the truth of the corresponding conditional (the one whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premisses of the argument and whose consequent is the conclusion). Sextus complains that any such argument will be circular. We cannot be convinced that an argument is valid by being antecedently convinced that the corresponding conditional is true, or the other way round; our grounds for each claim will depend on our acceptance of the other, and hence we must argue in a circle (P ii 114-5). This complaint will apply with particular force to the undemonstrated arguments. The Stoics might reply by arguing that our intuition of the truth of the conditional is self-evident, and prior to our intuition of the validity of the argument, or the other way round. It is hard to see why they should favour one answer over the other; and I see no reason to think they must have preferred one. The more sensible reply would be to concede Sextus's claim that a circle is involved, and simply to deny that the circle is vicious. Appeal to the truth of the corresponding conditional may not make us any more confident of the validity of the argument; but it may still quite appropriately confirm our belief that the argument is valid, by appeal to our belief about the conditional. The fact that neither belief is independent of the other need not imply that neither can confirm the other.

Since the Stoics' treatment of the undemonstrated arguments need not imply a foundationalist attitude to them, it creates no presumption that they will accept a foundationalist account of the cataleptic appearance. Nor do their remarks about the cataleptic appearance itself suggest such an account of it.²⁰ We saw that their first reply to the sceptic denies that the distinguishing feature of the cataleptic appearance must be phenomenally distinguishable whenever it is present. The Stoics argue that we will get better at identifying the distinguishing feature the more we study appearances in the light of our other beliefs about the world. We will improve the closer we come to the condition of the sage; while you do not have to be a sage to have a cataleptic appearance, the sage is the one who is best able to detect the distinguishing feature that marks out the true from the false appearances.

Such an account of how we find the distinguishing feature of true appearances implies that the cataleptic appearance cannot be the sort of criterion that the sceptics demand. But we have seen that the Stoics have no reason to accept the legitimacy of the sceptics' demand; even if it seems legitimate at first, a reconstructive strategy suggests that once we see where the demand leads us, we should decide that it is illegitimate. The lack of a criterion that meets the sceptics' demand will concern us only if we accept a foundationalist view of justification in the first place. But if the Stoics think we can get better at identifying true appearances, and that we rely on our other beliefs about the world to do this, their defence must assume the legitimacy of some circular argument. We make far more sense of the Stoic claims if we suppose that they disagree with Agrippa on

weniger evident ist al das, was beweisen werden soll' (*Die Stoische Logik*, 128). This is a fair inference from what Apuleius says, except in so far as Frede's remark might suggest that an attempted demonstration would fail, which Apuleius does not clearly imply.

²⁰ This aspect of Stoic doctrine is helpfully discussed by Annas, 'T&K'. I'm inclined to see less tension and conflict than she sees in the Stoic position.

this issue.

If other beliefs are required to identify true appearances, it is not surprising that some sources give different accounts of what different Stoics take the criterion to be. The alleged criteria include perception, desire, knowledge, understanding, and preconception (DL vii 54). None of these is really inconsistent with acceptance of cataleptic appearance as the criterion; indeed, the Stoics might properly insist that the cataleptic appearance plays a criterial role only in so far as it rests on these other sources of true and reliable belief. Sensible Stoics will not concede that anything should play all the roles that a criterion satisfying a sceptic's demands would play; different roles will appropriately be distributed among different cognitive states. In particular, the other so-called criteria will be relevant for deciding whether an appearance has the distinguishing mark of a true appearance or not. The other criteria are useful for our purpose, because they show that intelligent perceivers will rely on the rest of their beliefs about the world in deciding whether this appearance has the right features. When Epictetus looks for a standard (*kanôn*) to resolve conflicts among appearances, he appeals to 'articulated preconceptions' (ii 11.13-18), some system of beliefs that will form our judgment about the truth of a particular appearance. Whether or not Epictetus states the actual doctrine of the early Stoa, his appeal to preconceptions to form judgments about appearances is perfectly appropriate for Stoicism in general.

In so far as the Stoics are willing to explain their doctrine of the criterion in these terms, they must accept the infinite regress or the circle. But they should not regard this as an objection; for nothing in their epistemology seems to require them to accept the epistemological assumptions underlying Agrippa's Tropes.

I would be more confident about the nature and explicitness of the Stoic position if I were sure I understood the claim about the criterion that Sextus introduces in the context of Agrippa's Tropes. For the Stoics seem to be answering the complaint about regresses, circles, and assumptions, by claiming that there is nothing wrong with something's being a criterion of itself and of other things (M vii 430-2, 441-2, 445). They offer analogies of a straight ruler, a balance, and light, which show something about themselves (that the ruler is straight, the balance is true, and the light is shining) and about something else (that the thing measured against the ruler is straight, that the thing on the balance really has this weight, that visible objects are present in my environment). These analogies are clearly important to the Stoics, apart from this particular reply to scepticism. The comparison with light actually provides Chrysippus with his fanciful etymology of *phantasia*, which he derives from *phôs* (SVF ii 54; SM vii 163). A comparison with the measure underlies the Stoic view of logic (including epistemology) as the study of the measuring-instrument before we use it to measure things (Epct. i 17.6-8; DL vii 49).

The analogies might be interpreted in different ways, and I'm not sure how to decide what the Stoics make of them. It doesn't seem very convincing, however, to understand them in a foundationalist way, as though we're just supposed to be able to tell that the ruler is straight independently of any of our other beliefs. The whole point of mentioning a thing like a ruler seems to be to suggest that we determine that it is an accurate measure by comparison with what is measured by it - edges that we have some other reason to believe to be straight (cf. Ar. Met. 1021a26-b3). If the comparison is meant to support a foundationalist account of the criterion, it is remarkably inept.

If the claim about the measure is taken as a foundationalist claim, then Sextus seems to offer a fair objection to it (SM vii 430-2). He argues that the Stoic claim that the appearance is the criterion of itself and of the object appearing is no more plausible than the converse claim, that the object is the criterion both of itself and of the appearance. The point of picking an appearance as criterion is to settle a dispute among appearances; but if we simply claim that it validates itself, without any further reason for preferring it above the appearances that conflict with it (*kaiper asumphônos ousa*, 431). Our claim is merely an arbitrary assumption. It will then be no more arbitrary to make the converse assumption, that this object really exists with these properties, and to infer from that the veracity of the appearance that makes the appear to have the properties we take to be its real properties (*estai kai to phantaston ...*, 431). But this latter assumption clearly is arbitrary and useless (*ē eiper touto parhoson ...* 432); so, therefore, is the former. This argument against the

Stoics works against the view that we grasp the criterion without further inferential warrant and derive our warrant for other beliefs from it. But the Stoic claim need not be taken to imply this view.

A conventionalist account of the criterion would perhaps better fit the comparison with a measure. The reference to measures and balances might make us think of Wittgenstein's remarks on the length of the standard metre - if we interpret those as making a conventionalist point. Perhaps the Stoics agree with Wittgenstein, and argue that to say some sort of appearance can't be false 'is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language game...'²¹ But if this is the line the Stoics want to take, they are adopting a highly concessive strategy against sceptical objections; indeed they are selling out to Protagoras and Berkeley (not to mention Wittgenstein).

The fact that the Stoics add the example of light to the examples of the measure and the balance might suggest that they probably intend neither the foundationalist nor the conventionalist doctrine. For while conventionalism might appear to be illustrated by measuring-devices, it doesn't seem to fit the example of light. In fact this example seems to illustrate two mutually dependent beliefs quite well. It would be foolish to pretend that our belief that it is daylight is independent of our belief that we can see the things we think we see in daylight, and equally foolish to pretend that our belief about how things are is independent of the belief that sometimes we look at them in normal daylight. We believe that when the light shines, it shows us both itself and the things we see in it; but we believe this because of further interdependent beliefs about the light and the visible things. We can say the same about measures; the ruler shows us that it is straight and that the thing it measures is straight, but we believe this because of our beliefs about rulers and about straight edges.

The sceptics who agree with Agrippa will certainly protest against this explanation of the analogy between the cataleptic appearance, the measure, and the light; they will argue that if this is how we show that something is a criterion, we are guilty of circular reasoning. The Stoics ought to concede that their reasoning is circular, but deny that they are guilty of any error when they rely on this sort of circle.

If this is the right account of the claims about the criterion revealing itself and other things, then these Stoic claims need not rest on any foundationalist conception of the criterion. It follows that Sextus's objections to the self-revealing criterion may fail against the Stoic version of it, since his objections rest on foundationalist principles that the Stoics are free to reject, and indeed do reject, if we have given the right account of the doctrine of the self-revealing criterion. If the Stoics understand their claims about the criterion in the way we have suggested, then they follow the anti-sceptical line that Aristotle suggests in *Met.* iv, not the one he explicitly defends in the *Analytics*. If this is right, then they show good judgment.²²

I conclude, then, that the Stoics need not be disturbed by Agrippa's Tropes. They have no antecedent reason to prohibit circular argument; and they are given no good reason to change their epistemological views. I have examined their views about undemonstrated arguments, about the distinguishing features of true appearances, and about the self-revealing criterion, to see if the Stoics make any foundationalist assumptions that would oblige them to accept the epistemological assumptions of the Five Tropes. So far I have found no sufficient reason to attribute foundationalist assumptions to them. The Tropes should, therefore, fail as a dialectical move against Stoics who are clear about the structure and assumptions of their own position. The Stoics should be free to use a reconstructive strategy to defend the positions that seem to be undermined by sceptical arguments; they have good reason to reject some of the sceptic's premisses before they admit that they are forced into the sceptic's conclusion.

To say that the Stoics need not be disturbed by Agrippa's Tropes is not to say that they realize this themselves. The Tropes make a fairly plausible case for rejecting circles

²¹ *Phil. Inv.* □50, tr. Anscombe.

²² I don't mean to take a position on whether this is a conscious Stoic judgment about Aristotle, though I am quite tempted to believe it is.

and infinite regresses; and it is not immediately obvious that the sceptic describes each of the options unfairly, in ways that leave out their essential justificatory functions. Stoic doctrines make it reasonable to suppose that they reject Agrippa's Tropes at least implicitly. We don't know, however, that the Stoics ever explained to themselves exactly why they need not fear Agrippa's Tropes; if they had done so, they would have learnt something useful about their own position.²³

²³ This draft does not attempt any full acknowledgement of my use of other discussions of these problems. Apart from published sources, I am conscious of being indebted to remarks by David Brink, Gail Fine, and Paula Gottlieb.