

The Indispensability Argument

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- (P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
- (P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
- (C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.



**NO
OTHER
OPTION**

“Put up or shut up”

- Suppose $P \supset Q$. It follows that $\neg Q \supset \neg P$. Suppose you believe P . You cannot then consistently reject Q . Alternatively put, if you reject Q , you must also reject P .
- We can present the indispensability argument as resting on the claim that a) we must accept the implications of what we believe, and b) a belief in many mathematical truths entails the existence of mathematical objects. So, c) if you reject the existence of mathematical objects, you **must** deny obvious mathematical truths.
- Consider: (1) Distance travelled = Speed x Time. If you deny the existence of mathematical objects, you must deny (1).