Instructions

Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to participate in today's study.

When you came in, you signed a consent form stating that you agree to participate in today's session. Please remember that your participation is completely voluntary. If you choose to leave before the session is completed, you will receive your show-up fee but forfeit any additional amount you may have earned. You must be at least 18 to participate in this session. The experiment will take about two hours, during which you will make a series of decisions. The session will consist of four tasks and a survey. You will be paid in cash and in private at the end of today's session according to the instructions, which will be explained in a moment. From now until the end of the session, please do not speak to anyone except the experimenters. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and someone will be with you momentarily. Please silence your cell phones and put them away.

If at any point you have questions please raise your hand, and one of us will come to answer you individually.

Before we begin, we ask that you do not speak to each other, or communicate in any other way during the sessions. We also ask that you do not discuss the procedures and details of the session with others (including your group members) outside this room.

Your name will never be revealed during the course of the session. We will use the number at your computer station as your ID number. Your group letter along with your ID number are the identifier we use when paying for your participation in the session.

At the end of the session, you will be called up one at a time and paid in cash the total amount that you earned for all periods in the session plus a $10 show-up fee. The card with your ID number on it should be returned at that time.

For each Task you will be randomly placed in a group of 4 people. There are two groups in the room: A and B. Each group will consist of the same people for the duration of the period.

The experiment consists of a number of four tasks consisting of 10 rounds. In each round, you will be randomly matched with another participant in your group. The decisions that you and the other participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. To determine your payment, a single round from the tasks completed today will be chosen at random to determine your payoff.

Task 1

In this task, you and another person from your randomly assigned group will separately make decisions that determine the earnings for both of you. You will be randomly matched with one other group member. The two of you will make a series of ten decisions. You will repeat this process until you have been matched with every member of your group for a total of 3 sets of 30 decisions.

If this task is selected for payment, one of these 30 decisions will be randomly selected to count. Since we do not know which decision will count, you should make each decision as if it will determine how much you will earn for this task.

Let's look at how you will make decisions. Below you will see an example.

Table 1: Example 1

	Left	*Right*
Up	2, 2	0, 3
Down	3, 0	1, 1

Example.

When you enter an answer the computer will tell you what the your partnered answered before proceeding. Remember that your identity and choices are anonymous. To submit an answer, simply click on the submit button with your mouse.

In this 2-player task, both players make a decision simultaneously. You choose between Up and Down and the other player chooses between Left and Right. Each decision has a pair of payoff options.

Table 2: Your Payoffs

	Left	*Right*
Up	$\underline{2}$, 2	$\underline{0}$, 3
Down	$\underline{3}$, 0	$\underline{1}$, 1

Table 3: Other player Payoffs

	Left	*Right*
Up	2, $\underline{2}$	0, $\underline{3}$
Down	3, $\underline{0}$	1, $\underline{1}$

If you chooses Down, you can either earn 3 or 1. If the other player chooses Left, they can earn either 2 or 0. The payoff earned is determined by the overlapping choice. Suppose you choose Down again. This time the other player chooses Right.

Table 4: Example 2

	Left	*Right*
Up	2, 2	0, $\underline{3}$
Down	$\underline{3}$, 0	$\underline{1}$, $\underline{1}$

Here, the overlapping choice is Down and Right. You earns 1 and the other player earns 1.
Further,

- If the you choose Up and the other player chooses Left, the payoffs are 2, 2.
- If the you choose Up and the other player chooses Right, the payoffs are 0, 3. Then you get 0 and the other player gets 3.

Example. In this example, you will be given the table and associated payoffs. You will be asked to determine the payoffs for two decisions.

Table 5: Example 2

	Left	*Right*
Up	5, 5	5, 3
Down	3, 5	6, 6

Question. Suppose the you choose Up and the other player chooses Left. What is the payoff for the you?

Question. Suppose the other player chooses Left and the you choose Down. What is the payoff for the other player?

Question. Suppose you choose Down and the other player chooses Right. What is the payoff for you?

Question. Suppose the other player chooses Right and the you choose Up. What is the payoff for the other player?

Other's Choice

Your Choice		Left	Right
	Up	2, 2	0, 3
	Down	3, 0	1, 1

Figure 1: Decision Screen

Your actions from the previous match:

	Round 1 / 10
Your Choice	1
Other's Choice	3

Figure 2: Feedback Screen

Survey

Once everyone answers the question on your screen, we will move on to the next part.

Question. How easy or difficult was making these decisions with your partner?

Very Easy	Easy	Difficult	Very Difficult
☐	☐	☐	☐

Question. How would you describe your sense of belonging to your group of 4?

Very weak	Somewhat weak	Uncertain	Somewhat strong	Very strong
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Question. How much do you agree with the following statement: My partners behaved similarly to myself.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Task 2

Now, you and the other members of your same group will each have the opportunity to donate to a public fund specific your group. This task has 10 rounds. If this task is selected for payment, one round will be randomly selected to count. Since we do not know which round will count, you should make each decision as if it will determine how much you will earn for this task.

For every round, you will decide whether to contribute your entire endowment of \$10 to the public account, or keep it in the private account. You will keep all of the money placed in the private account. Your earnings from the public account will depend on your decision, the decisions made by others, and chance as described below: Your earnings are determined as follows:

Case 1. When less than 3 members contribute to the public account, then each member (including yourself) receives nothing from the public account. Any money allocated to the public account is not refunded.

Case 2. When three or more members allocate to the public account, then each member (including yourself) receives a 25% return from twice the investment value. All group members receive the same amount from the public account, no matter how much they allocated to it. This is further illustrated in an example below.

Example. You choose to contribute your funds to the public account. Only one other group member contributes to the public account. Then your group has *not* met the threshold and you will earn:

$$\text{Earnings} = \text{Private Account}$$

That is, your return is \$0 and the amount earned from the public account is \$0.

Example. You contribute to the public account. All other members contribute to the public account. Then your group's allocation to the public account is \$40. You will earn:

$$\text{Earnings} = \text{Private Account} + \$10$$

The amount in the public account, \$40, is doubled (to \$80) and then divided equally amongst your group:

$$\text{Public Account Return} = \frac{1}{4}(\$80)$$

The following two questions are designed to make sure you understand the task.

Question. You have \$10 and choose to contribute to the public account. No one contributes to the public account. How much is in your private account?

Question. You have \$10 and choose to contribute to the public account. You observe that only one of the other members of your group also contributed 10 the public account. What are your *total* earnings?

Are there any questions? If so, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you in person shortly.

Part 2

This concludes the first half of the experiment. Now, we will rearrange the groups into new randomly assigned groups of 4. Your new group letter, A or B, will appear on your screen.

Repeat Part 1 as Task 3 and 4.

Note to IRB

On the decision screen, the real payoff matrices will be the following:

Table 9: Game L

	X	Y
X	12, 10	0, 0
Y	0, 0	3, 5

Table 10: Game H

	X	Y
X	10, 7	0, 0
Y	0, 0	7, 9