

## Syllabus

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**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

## Syllabus

LUXCIETY *v.* RAPSCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR  
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 09–52. Decided July 23, 2020

After Judge AcidRaps cited petitioner for contempt of court, the President’s authorized representative informed petitioner that the President had offered him a pardon. Petitioner accepted. After the fact, the President attempted to revoke the pardon. Petitioner filed this appeal challenging both the legality of the original citation and the President’s revocation of his pardon.

*Held:* Once a pardon has been offered and accepted, it cannot be revoked. Accepting a pardon, although it eliminates any court-ordered punishment, constitutes an admission of guilt. If the President could grant and then, subsequent to acceptance, revoke a pardon there would be substantial risk of unconstitutionally compelled self-incrimination, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. As such post-acceptance pardon revocations are unconstitutional.

PITNEY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Opinion of the Court

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**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

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No. 09–52

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LUXCIETY, PETITIONER *v.* ACIDRAPS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT  
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[July 23, 2020]

JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.

On the sixth of June 2020, Judge AcidRaps cited petitioner with “multiple contempt citations.” Later that same day the President’s pardon attorney notified petitioner that the President had offered a full pardon for these contempt citations. Petitioner accepted the pardon. President Technozo later attempted to withdraw this pardon, leading petitioner to seek relief in this Court. Petitioner asserts that once a pardon has been accepted it cannot be withdrawn. We agree.

There are a few fundamental rules intrinsic to a Presidential pardon; some set by the Constitution, others interpreted by this Court. Firstly, an acceptance of a pardon is an inherent acceptance of guilt “by confession of guilt implied in the acceptance of a pardon.” *Burdick v. United States*, 236 U. S. 79, 90–91, (1915). This is a logical conclusion as to be pardoned for a crime one must be guilty of that crime. Secondly, the President has the authority to issue conditions to a pardon; these conditions must be accepted by the “pardoned.” “A pardon may be conditional.” *Ibid*. Thirdly, a pardon is not coequal to an acquittal. “A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with

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the execution of the laws.” *United States v. Wilson*, 32 U. S. 150, 160 (1833). A pardon, simply, is a contract between citizen and Executive<sup>1</sup> to “turn a blind eye” to crimes committed. Finally, the Presidential Pardon is cemented in Constitutional law and is not available to judicial or legislative intervention: “[H]e shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 1.

With this in mind we may begin to probe at the controversy at hand. When the President’s Pardon Attorney offered petitioner an unconditional pardon, he was acting on the President’s behalf. Upon accepting the pardon, petitioner accepted both guilt and the terms of the pardon, the former being the keystone to this case. If President Technozo could constitutionally revoke a pardon then petitioner would find himself being compelled to admit guilt. This would be a clear contravention of the Constitution’s protections against self-incrimination. See Amdt. V. A system where a President could revoke a pardon would go against a foundational rule of the pardon system: “A pardon is an act of *grace*.” *Wilson, supra* (emphasis added). If pardons could be revoked, they would become malicious devices to snare difficult defendants into admitting guilt. We therefore find that, except in cases where agreed upon conditions are violated, pardons once accepted cannot be retracted.

Petitioner also asserts that respondent, Judge AcidRaps, issued an unlawful contempt citation. However, in accepting the President’s pardon, petitioner has admitted guilt and acceptance of the punishment handed down by Judge AcidRaps. Petitioner does not contend that he felt compelled into acceptance of this pardon, so appeal has been forfeited. We refuse to entertain petitioner’s questions on

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<sup>1</sup>The President is tasked with the execution of our laws, including execution of reprisals for violating it.

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the matter.

The pardon issued to petitioner stands as do the contempt citations issued by respondent. The judgment of the District Court is therefore vacated and the case is remanded with instructions to implement the pardon.

*It is so ordered.*