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Moral Development: The Social Domain Theory View

Judith G. Smetana

Abstract

This chapter describes moral judgment development through the lens of social domain theory. Morality, or individuals' concepts of justice, welfare, and rights, is seen as a distinct system or organized domain of social knowledge that develops separately from concepts of social conventions and personal issues; these concepts are constructed from children's differentiated social interactions and social experiences. In this chapter, basic theoretical propositions of social domain theory and methods used to test those propositions are described, and then relevant empirical research is reviewed. The chapter highlights how children's understanding and interpretation of their social worlds are elaborated and change from infancy through adolescence. The complexity and diversity of social life is described as entailing a consideration of moral concepts as informed by informational assumptions and knowledge of regularities in the affective consequences of different events. It is also considered in terms of the coexistence of and coordination with other social knowledge domains.

Key Words: morality; moral judgments; moral development; rights; social conventions; personal choices; autonomy; culture

Key Points

1. Across cultures, children's thinking about the social world is differentiated and entails the coexistence of moral, social-conventional, and personal concepts.
2. Moral, conventional, and personal concepts form distinct domains or developmental systems of social knowledge.
3. Concepts within each domain follow different developmental trajectories.
4. During early childhood, moral concepts focus primarily on concrete physical harm and concerns with welfare; concepts of fairness develop from an understanding of equality and equal treatment during middle childhood to notions of equity in early adolescence.
5. Although children and adolescents differentiate moral, conventional, and personal concepts in their judgments, evaluations of events or situations can entail overlapping concerns from different domains, either in conflict or in synchrony with one another.
6. Apparent differences in moral evaluations may be due to differences in children's descriptive understanding of the nature of reality (i.e., their informational assumptions).
7. Children take into account both moral and factual beliefs when making moral judgments.
8. Affective knowledge and affective responses to situations are an integral part of and influence the development of moral and social judgments.
9. Moral, conventional, and personal concepts are constructed from children's varied social experiences and regularities in the social environment.
10. How individuals weigh and coordinate moral and nonmoral considerations in their judgments may vary across contexts, cultures, and development.

Introduction

Morality is centrally concerned with how individuals ought to interact and get along with others and thus has been an enduring topic of interest to psychologists and laypersons alike. However, the term "morality" has many different meanings, both in public discourse and in psychological theorizing and research. In public discourse, morality is often employed as an evaluative term (for instance, that someone behaved "morally" or "immorally"), with little attention to defining precisely what that means or the behaviors to which those evaluations ought to apply. Psychologists, on the other hand, have devoted a great deal of attention to definitional concerns and have staked out many different positions on morality. These different approaches can be categorized on several different dimensions. For instance, although most psychological perspectives agree that morality is multifaceted and includes affective, cognitive, and behavioral components, different theoretical approaches have varied as to which of these components are prioritized. In addition, approaches differ as to whether moral norms or values are considered to be situationally, contextually, or culturally relative, or alternatively, whether moral principles or values can be seen to have broader, more universal applicability.

This chapter addresses these issues through the theoretical lens of social domain theory. Researchers from the social domain perspective (hereafter referred to as social domain theory) propose that moral development is best understood through psychological analyses of moral judgments but also considers the influence of affect on judgments and describes behavior in terms of individuals' interpretations of situations. Social domain theory embeds the study of moral development in a broader view of the social world, as it posits that children's thinking about the social world entails heterogeneity and the coexistence of different social orientations, motivations, and goals. Thus, morality is described as one of several strands of children's developing social knowledge.

According to social domain theory, concerns with morality, which pertains to concepts of justice, welfare, and rights, coexist with matters of authority, tradition, and social norms (referred to as social conventions), as well as personal issues, which pertain to privacy, bodily integrity and control, and a delimited set of choices and preferences. Morality, social conventions, and personal issues are seen as each constituting an organized system or distinct domain of social knowledge that develops

from children's experiences of different types of regularities in the social environment (Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2006). The domain view differs from other structural-developmental stage models of moral judgment development, which have described the process of moral development as entailing the gradual differentiation of principles of justice or rights from nonmoral concerns with conventions, pragmatics, and prudence (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1932). In the view elaborated here, social knowledge domains are seen as distinct systems that follow different developmental trajectories.

The basic theoretical propositions of social domain theory and the methods used to test those propositions are elaborated in the following sections, and then relevant empirical research addressing these propositions is described in subsequent sections. The review of research is organized chronologically in terms of ontogenetic development, beginning with infancy and moving through the preschool years, middle childhood, and then adolescence. This review highlights how children's understanding and interpretation of their social worlds is elaborated and changes with age. Because a full understanding and appreciation of the complexity and diversity of social life entails a consideration of moral knowledge as distinct from, and sometimes coordinated with, other types of social knowledge, theorizing and research on social conventions and personal issues are considered to some extent as well. Research on domain theory has expanded considerably over the past 30 years, and all of the different research directions cannot be adequately summarized in a single chapter. However, the interested reader is referred to other comprehensive reviews of the theory (see Nucci, 2001; Nucci & Gingo, 2010; Smetana, 2006, 2011; Turiel, 2002, 2006) as well as detailed descriptions of specific programs of research (see Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006; Helwig, 2006; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Wainryb, 2006).

Theoretical Framework and Associated Research Methods

Morality as a Distinct Domain of Social Knowledge

DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

The definition of morality as elaborated in social domain theory is drawn from philosophical theorizing (Dworkin, 1978; Gewirth, 1978; Nussbaum, 1999; Rawls, 1971) and extensive psychological research. Morality regulates the social interactions and social relationships of individuals within

societies and pertains to individuals' prescriptive understanding of how individuals ought to behave toward each other. These moral prescriptions are based on concepts of welfare (harm), fairness, and rights (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Nucci & Gingo, 2010; Smetana, 2006, 2011; Turiel, 1983, 2006). Based on philosophical writing and psychological research, Turiel (1983) identified a set of criteria for distinguishing morality from other types of social knowledge. Moral concepts are hypothesized to be obligatory, universally applicable (in that they apply to everyone in individual circumstances), impersonal (in that they are not based on personal preferences), and determined by criteria other than agreement, consensus, or institutional convention. Thus, the wrongness of moral transgressions is seen as stemming from their intrinsic features, such as their consequences for others' rights and welfare. Furthermore, morality is seen as "normatively binding," and thus, moral rules are hypothesized to be unalterable.

Children's prescriptive understanding of their social relationships differs from their descriptive understanding of social systems, social organization, and social conventions. Thus, another central proposition is that morality is conceptually and developmentally distinct from other types of social knowledge. Consistent with philosophical perspectives on convention (Lewis, 1969; Searle, 1969), social conventions are defined as part of constitutive systems and as contextually relative, shared uniformities and norms (like etiquette or manners) that coordinate individuals' interactions in social systems. Social conventions provide individuals with expectations regarding appropriate behavior in different social contexts and facilitate the smooth and efficient functioning of the social system. Thus, social-conventional concepts are hypothesized to be contextually relative, consensually agreed on, contingent on specific rules or authority commands, and alterable.

Morality and social conventions have been further differentiated conceptually from individuals' descriptive understanding of persons as psychological systems, including their understanding of and attributions for their own and others' behavior and their knowledge of self, personality, and identity. Psychological knowledge pertains to individuals' attempts to understand psychological causes and to infer meaning that is not given in social interactions. Although the psychological domain is a distinct conceptual and developmental system, Nucci (1996, 2001) has argued that it bears on the scope

and nature of morality in that concepts of rights are grounded in notions of the self and personal agency (Dworkin, 1978; Gewirth, 1978).

Personal issues include preferences and choices regarding issues such as control over one's body, privacy, and choice of friends or activities (Nucci, 1996, 2001, 2008). Because personal issues pertain only to the actor and the private aspects of one's life, they are considered to be outside the realm of conventional regulation and moral concern. Nucci (1996, 2001) has proposed that individuals exercise personal agency by asserting control over personal issues. Claims to personal jurisdiction help to establish individuals' autonomy or distinctiveness from others, and the right to make autonomous decisions forms the boundary between the self and the social world. Children and adolescents typically categorize personal issues as up to the individual (rather than as acts that are right or wrong), based on justifications that the act's consequences affect only the actor or that the acts are personal matters and should be the actor's own business (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Weber, 1995; Smetana, 2011; Smetana & Asquith, 1994).

Morality also has been distinguished from prudential issues, defined as nonsocial acts pertaining to safety, harm to the self, comfort, and health (Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Tisak, 1993; Tisak & Turiel, 1984). Moral and prudential rules regulate acts that have physical consequences to persons. Whereas morality pertains to interactions among people, prudence pertains to acts that have immediate, directly perceptible negative consequences to the self. Therefore, prudential issues typically are judged to be under personal jurisdiction (Nucci, Guerra, & Lee, 1991; Smetana, 2011; Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Tisak, 1993).

METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING MORAL AND SOCIAL DOMAINS

A considerable body of research, particularly early social domain research, has focused on examining the proposition that children distinguish morality from social convention in their judgments and justifications. These studies typically examine children's judgments about hypothetical situations that are considered prototypical of the domains. Moral events, rules, or transgressions are presented in story vignettes or pictures that depict straightforward events (in that the acts are not depicted as being in conflict with other types of goals, motivations, or events); acts are usually depicted as intentional and voluntary and as having consequences for others' welfare or rights.

Research has examined whether children differentiate morality from other types of social knowledge in their *criterion judgments*, which are the theoretical criteria hypothesized to distinguish the domains. Children have evaluated whether moral rules are alterable or not (*alterability*). They also have evaluated their *generalizability*—that is, whether moral events or transgressions are wrong in different social contexts, such as at home, in another school, or in other countries. Moral *obligation* has been operationalized in terms of children's judgments as to whether individuals are obligated to perform requested actions or obey rules or to desist from engaging in particular actions. Judgments of the *rule* and *authority independence* of moral events (vs. the contingency of conventional events on rules or authority) have been operationalized in terms of children's evaluations of whether acts or transgressions would be wrong in the absence of rules (independent from rules) or if the authority (teacher, parent, etc.) did not know about (or see) the rule violation (independent from authority).

In addition, judgments of the permissibility of different transgressions, quantitative ratings of the seriousness and amount of punishment deserved for different transgressions, and evaluations of the importance of different types of rules also have been assessed. While moral transgressions typically are treated as less permissible, more serious, and more deserving of punishment than conventional transgressions, and moral rules typically are rated as more important than conventional rules, these dimensions are seen as correlated with, rather than as formal criteria for distinguishing, the domains (see Tisak & Turiel, 1988, discussed in a later section, for an example of how seriousness can be disentangled from event domain).

Children's justifications for their judgments, or the types of reasons individuals provide to explain their evaluations of social actions, also have been used as criteria for domain distinctions. Moral justifications pertain to the intrinsic consequences of acts for others, including concerns with others' harm or welfare, fairness or rights, and obligations, whereas social-conventional justifications pertain to authority (including concerns with punishment, rules, or authority commands), social expectations and social regularities (e.g., social and cultural norms), and social organization or social order (e.g., the need to maintain social order, avoid disorder, or coordinate social interactions). Personal justifications pertain to personal preferences or choices, assertions that the acts are inconsequential, do not affect others,

or are the individual's own business, or that they are associated with one's identity.

The interview protocol for examining distinctions in judgments has been employed with a wide age range of children, including, in a modified form, very young children. For instance, to minimize the verbal demands on young participants, children are typically shown pictures of events or transgressions rather than told stories; criterion judgments may be assessed using simple (yes/no) responses, and particularly with younger preschoolers, justifications are not assessed.

Coordinations and Overlaps in Moral and Social Concepts and Informational Assumptions

THEORETICAL CONCERNs

Although individuals make distinct moral and social judgments, this does not imply that all events and social situations can be simply or cleanly separated into moral, conventional, or personal components (Helwig, 2006; Neff & Helwig, 2002; Nucci, 2001; Nucci & Ging, 2010; Smetana, 1983, 2006, 2011; Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2006). Events or situations can entail overlapping concerns from different domains. These overlaps may reflect conflicts or coordinations among different components or subordination of one set of concerns to another. More formally, it has been proposed (Smetana, 1983; Turiel, 1983) that multifaceted situations may take three forms: those in which components of more than one domain *overlap*, as for instance when conventional concerns for social organization entail injustices (such as in a caste system); *second-order events*, in which a violation of a convention results in psychological or physical harm to others; and *ambiguously multidimensional events*, where individuals make different domain attributions about the same event.

Much research has focused on these "mixed domain" or multifaceted events. A few studies have focused on identifying forms of coordination, but most studies have examined domain coordinations as a method for understanding complex social concepts (like peer exclusion) that are hypothesized to entail overlapping concerns from different domains (or in some cases, such as with rights, overlapping moral concerns). The multifaceted nature of many social events is seen as the source of much developmental and contextual variability and inconsistency in judgments. The way individuals weigh and coordinate moral and nonmoral considerations in their judgments may vary across contexts, cultures, and

development. Indeed, Turiel (1983, 2002, 2006) has claimed that an adequate explanation of development must include analyses of how individuals coordinate moral and nonmoral issues in their thinking.

INFORMATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

Social domain theory researchers also have drawn distinctions between factual beliefs and moral evaluations (Turiel, 2002, 2006; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Wainryb, 1991, 2000; see Hatch, 1983, for an extensive discussion from an anthropological perspective). The basic proposition is that apparent differences in moral evaluations may be due to differences in children's descriptive understanding of the nature of reality (referred to as informational assumptions), rather than in moral concepts or principles, and that children consistently take into account both moral and factual beliefs when making moral judgments. As an example, intentionally cutting a person's arm and letting him or her bleed copiously was considered a lifesaving, "state-of-the-art" medical intervention centuries ago. If one believes in its efficacy, bloodletting is an intentional act but not a moral violation. Today, these beliefs most likely would be rejected; slashing someone to make her bleed would be seen as causing harm and hence a moral violation. Informational assumptions or beliefs thus may bear on how individuals construe social practices and act on their beliefs. As the foregoing example suggests, informational assumptions come from a variety of sources, including science and religion, and may change, as when scientific knowledge advances (e.g., discovering that bloodletting might be deleterious to health). Different groups within a culture also may disagree about informational assumptions (e.g., different religious beliefs about when a fetus becomes a person, different theories about the causes of HIV/AIDS, or different lay theories about effective child-rearing practices).

METHODS FOR EXAMINING DOMAIN OVERLAPS AND INFORMATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

In research examining judgments about multifaceted situations, participants typically evaluate hypothetical situations where different types of concerns conflict or overlap. Sometimes, researchers have examined children's judgments about different situations that are hypothesized to entail components of different domains. Researchers also have compared judgments about straightforward (single-domain) events presented in a decontextualized and abstract

manner with judgments about the same issues presented in contextualized situations where there are no other competing moral concerns (unconflicted but contextualized applications). One or both of these types of assessments also may be compared with judgments about mixed-domain or multifaceted situations, which are similar events presented as in conflict with other moral concerns or concerns in other domains. Analyses focus on identifying the different justifications and judgments employed. In addition, some studies have explicitly categorized the way that domains are coordinated, including subordinating one domain to another (either because one type of concern is explicitly considered but rejected as less salient or less valid or because the competing concerns are not recognized), coordinations between or among different social concepts, or conflict between domains. These studies are useful because they demonstrate the salience of different concerns in multifaceted situations and also can illuminate individual differences in children's moral and social judgments.

Similar methods have been employed to investigate the role of informational assumptions in children's judgments. To examine whether apparent differences in moral evaluations are due to differences in relevant informational assumptions, informational assumptions have been manipulated and compared to judgments about prototypical transgressions. As an example, a prototypical moral event (a father spanking his son) might be compared to a similar goal-directed act but performed in the context of goals that are potentially legitimate from a moral viewpoint (a father who spans his son for repeatedly misbehaving) and the same event described along with different informational assumptions (the claim that experts have shown that corporal punishment is ineffective). Act evaluations under these different conditions are compared. Studies also have examined how differences in actual informational assumptions affect individuals' evaluations of controversial social issues.

Affective Dimensions of Children's Moral and Social Judgments

THEORETICAL CONCERN

Arsenio and his colleagues (Arsenio, 2010; Arsenio et al., 2006; Arsenio & Lover, 1995) have provided a detailed account of hypothesized connections between affect and moral and conventional (or what they refer to as sociomoral) judgments. They have focused on children's conceptions of or attributions for the emotional consequences of moral and

social events and the links between affective information and moral reasoning and behavior.

Arsenio and colleagues' (2006) account draws on Damasio's (1994, 2003) biologically based formulation of affect-behavior linkages. Based on his work with brain-damaged patients, Damasio (1994) has hypothesized that specific behaviors become associated with positive or negative outcomes, and these associations result in gut feelings or "somatic markers." Somatic markers are knowledge structures that may be used in many situations without further cognitive processing. Damasio views this quick processing of primary emotions (e.g., in situations of threat) as evolutionarily adaptive, because it allows for very rapid processing of action choices in situations where survival may be at stake. Gut feelings also allow individuals to narrow the choice of options to allow for more efficient cognitive processing. This notion of "gut feelings" is a central component of Haidt's (2001, 2007) social intuitionist account of morality, which emphasizes the primacy of quick ("intuitive") emotional processing.

Damasio (2003), however, has elaborated a further evolutionary step (ignored in Haidt's 2001, 2007 account), which Arsenio and colleagues (2006) claim may be even more important in adaptive human functioning. Humans also make connections between the feeling of the emotion in relation to specific objects or events, and this awareness allows for greater planning and decision making, and ultimately, greater behavioral flexibility.

Arsenio and colleagues (2006; Arsenio & Lover, 1995) have outlined a four-step developmental sequence in the role of affective information in morality. First, children have experiences (as witnesses and participants) in different (affectively laden) moral and conventional events, and then, in the second step, different emotions become associated with events in different domains. Although sociomoral events are diverse, Arsenio and his colleagues proposed that children's affective experiences are highly differentiated by domain, leading to affective regularities in their cognitive event representations. For instance, differences in the tendency of moral and conventional events to elicit emotional arousal promote differential encoding of these events; highly arousing moral events are considered "immoral" partly because they are more affectively salient than less arousing events. Arsenio and Lover (1995) also proposed that children would agree about the expected emotional consequences associated with moral versus other events. Third, children are seen as using information about the affective

consequences of different events to anticipate the likely outcomes of different alternative behaviors. Finally, affective knowledge is employed to form more generalized moral judgments. Arsenio and his colleagues propose that there may be individual variability as well as potential distortions and biases at these last two steps, due to mood states or individual histories. Indeed, Arsenio (2010) has articulated how these individual differences might lead to proactive aggression and forms of victimization. In light of current debates about the primacy of emotions versus cognition in moral development, it is interesting to note that Arsenio and Lover's account involves a complex integration of both.

METHODS

In keeping with the focus on affective information (rather than emotional responses *per se*), children's attributions, or their knowledge of emotional responses to different transgressions, has been assessed. Thus, children are shown pictures of faces expressing different emotions (happy, sad, fearful, angry, or neutral) and asked to select the emotion that best describes how victims or violators of depicted transgressions would feel.

Children's Social Experiences as a Basis for Differentiating Moral and Social Judgments

THEORETICAL CONCERNS

Another central proposition is that moral, conventional, and personal concepts are constructed out of regularities in the social environment (Turiel, 1983, 2002). Individuals are seen as having varied social experiences, leading to the development of different types of social knowledge systems. Thus, conventional concepts are hypothesized to arise from social interactions that highlight the rules, sanctions, and regularities appropriate in different social contexts. Interactions regarding personal issues are hypothesized to emphasize the opportunities for children's preferences and choices (Nucci & Weber, 1995).

In contrast, children's experiences as victims and observers of transgressions, and particularly their experiences of the consequences of transgressions for others' rights and welfare, are hypothesized to facilitate the development of prescriptive moral judgments. This latter hypothesis is in keeping with Piaget (1932) and others (Damon, 1977; Youniss, 1980), who proposed that the reciprocal nature of peer relationships allows for experiences of conflict, cooperation, and negotiation that may facilitate moral judgment development. Further, Dunn

(2006) has reminded us that although interactions with peers and siblings can facilitate more mature moral judgment development, these advances can be put to good as well as more devious ends. Siblings and friends provide a context for moral experience and interactions where children can learn moral behavior (such as empathy), but also, and particularly with siblings, immoral behavior, including experiences of teasing, hurting, and upsetting others.

The emphasis on the role of reciprocity in peer moral interactions also has led to the view, initially propounded by Piaget (1932) and later adopted by others (Kohlberg, 1984), that because of the hierarchical nature of parent-child relationships and hence the power differences in the relationship, adults are not an important source of influence and may even constrain moral judgment development. In contrast, social domain theorists have proposed that interactions with parents (and, more broadly, with other adults) can contribute meaningfully and positively to moral development (Smetana, 1997). Parents' domain-specific explanations and reasoning (sometimes referred to as inductive discipline) and responses and reactions (both verbal and emotional) to children's behavior provide a complementary source of information to children's more direct experiences of the intrinsic consequences of actions for others. Parents' comments, reactions, and responses to the child's behavior ("Look what you did—you hurt her and made her cry!") can facilitate children's moral development by providing information about the nature of acts and by stimulating children to think reflectively about their actions. This view that parenting practices and disciplinary situations are an important context for moral judgment development differs from earlier socialization perspectives in viewing the process of discipline as interactive (but see Grusec & Davidov, 2007, 2010; Kuczynski & Navara, 2006, for reformulations of the classic socialization perspective).

Piaget's (1932) notion that the power asymmetries of the parent-child relationship constrain development is somewhat at odds with a constructivist account of moral judgment development because it implies that (at least young) children accept adult authority and have unilateral respect for adult rules. In contrast, the domain theory proposition that discipline situations are interactive also implies that children or adolescents evaluate the legitimacy of adults' authority to make rules or request compliance. Therefore, researchers have examined children and adolescents' conceptions of legitimate adult (parental and teacher) authority.

METHODS

Domain researchers have tested hypotheses about the experiential origins of moral and social judgments by examining systematic patterns of differentiated social interactions that parallel hypothesized distinctions in social concepts. Correspondences between social interactions and social judgments are seen as demonstrating that social interactions provide the experiential basis for the construction of social knowledge (Turiel, Smetana, & Killen, 1991). Nucci and Turiel (1978) pioneered a standard observational protocol that has been used in a number of studies of naturalistic interactions. Observers use behavioral definitions (e.g., object conflicts or aggression) to reliably identify and classify observed transgressions as moral, conventional, or, in a few cases, prudential or personal, and then observers code who responded to the transgressions (the victim, other peers, or adults) and the type of response. Responses also are coded using a category system that includes behavioral responses (e.g., physical retaliation), emotional reactions, ridicule, commands, and different types of statements (e.g., disorder vs. rights statements).

Domain researchers also have tested hypotheses about the experiential origins of moral and social judgments by employing experimental designs that vary the features of moral and conventional acts and then examining children's judgments and justifications under these different conditions. For instance, studies have used stimuli that describe different features of moral and conventional events but where the events themselves are unspecified (e.g., using nonsense words; Smetana, 1985), or they have described events in canonical and noncanonical situations (e.g., where moral events are described as causing harm vs. pleasure; Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) or prototypical versus nonprototypical responses to transgressions (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). These studies provide some insights into the cues children use to evaluate events as moral or nonmoral. A third approach is to examine the evaluations of children with varied social experiences, such as different daycare experiences or studies of atypically developing children.

Coordinations, Domain Overlaps, and Informational Assumptions: Social Life in Cultures

THEORETICAL CONCERN

The concerns articulated in the previous sections with the development of distinct domains of social knowledge, their application in multifaceted

situations, the role of informational assumptions, and the influence of differing social experiences in the development of moral and social concepts all come together in the study of cultural diversity. Domain theorists have had a longstanding concern with the cross-cultural application of moral and social reasoning (see Killen & Wainryb, 2000; Smetana, 2002, 2011; Turiel, 2002, 2006; Wainryb, 1997, 2006; Wainryb & Recchia, *in press*); thus, this is a vast topic that is only briefly considered here.

In contrast to a popular approach to culture, which describes cultures as varying on global dimensions like individualism and collectivism (Shweder, Goodnow, Hatano, LeVine, Markus, & Miller, 2006), domain theory adopts a more differentiated view that takes into consideration the diversity of orientations within cultures and the varying social experiences of different individuals in different contexts within cultures. The central proposition is that individuals across cultures develop heterogeneous orientations that entail the coexistence of different kinds of concerns, including concerns for others' rights and welfare (moral), the importance of maintaining traditions and group goals (social conventions), and concerns with personal choice, personal entitlements, and autonomy (personal issues). Thus, like other structural developmental theories (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1984), domain theorists claim that moral concepts are universally applicable, but so are concepts of social convention and personal jurisdiction. Social conventions serve the same function of structuring and facilitating social interactions in all cultures, although their form is expected to vary cross-culturally. Notions of the personal domain also are grounded in underlying psychological realities that are cross-culturally applicable (Killen & Wainryb, 2000; Neff & Helwig, 2002; Nucci, 1996, 2001; Smetana, 2002, 2011; Wainryb, 2006), and therefore, all cultures are hypothesized to treat some issues as fundamentally within the boundaries of the self and personal agency, although cultures may vary in both the scope and content of the personal domain (Nucci, 1996; Smetana, 2002, 2011). Although individuals in diverse cultures develop these different orientations to their social world, diversity in reasoning stems from the varying ways that concepts of morality, social convention, and personal issues come into conflict with each other and are coordinated in development.

In addition, there has been a growing interest (discussed extensively in Turiel, 2002) in examining

moral and social judgments as a function of individuals' position in the social hierarchy. That is, notions of fairness may differ in different social and societal arrangements and may be potent sources of both within- and between-culture variation in moral and social judgments (Turiel, 2002, 2005). Individuals in more subordinate roles (e.g., females, children, individuals living in poverty) may experience greater restrictions in their choices and freedoms as a function of their social position, as well as inequalities in the distribution of power, the way resources are allocated, and their available opportunities. Thus, consistent with some anthropological approaches that argue against the "essentializing" of cultures (Abu-Lughod, 1993; Holloway, 1999; Strauss, 2000), research from the social domain theory perspective has considered how individuals in subordinate positions sometimes contest, resist, and subvert social practices (see Smetana, 2011; Turiel, 2002).

A chapter on moral development would not be complete without mention of gender, as the issue of sex differences in moral development has been a source of longstanding controversy. For instance, Gilligan (1982) claimed that boys and girls develop different moral orientations. She argued that boys' morality is oriented toward rules, rights, and the self as an autonomous agent, whereas girls' morality is structured by care, responsibility, and the need to avoid harm. As described by Walker (2006), these claims have been extensively debated and researched. Despite the controversies, few sex differences have emerged in social domain research. Boys and girls do not appear to differ systematically in their ability to apply moral criteria to situations or use moral reasoning. Whether boys and girls give greater priority to maintaining interpersonal obligations or justice appears to depend more on the features of the situations than on gender. However, Turiel (2002, 2006) has called attention to the way that gender differences and inequalities in the distribution of power and resources in the family may influence children's moral understanding as well as social roles and relationships. This has led to research on how gendered social interactions and inequalities (particularly in different cultures) inform children's moral and social evaluations.

METHODS

The methods discussed in previous sections all have been applied in the study of culture. Domain distinctions have been examined using criterion judgments and justifications, employing culturally appropriate conventions and personal issues.

Overlaps and coordinations in moral and social reasoning have been studied by separating different components in individuals' reasoning. Informational assumptions have been examined within cultures and also, to understand individuals' evaluations of culturally different social practices, by presenting different cultural beliefs and practices as hypothetical stimuli. We turn now to a consideration of how these different theoretical propositions and empirical methods have been applied in studies of children at different ages.

Ontogenetic Origins of Children's Moral and Social Judgments: Infancy and Toddlerhood

As discussed previously, a central proposition of social domain theory is that differentiations between morality and other social concepts develop early in ontogenesis. Research with nonhuman primates has suggested that the roots of morality, including sympathy, social norms, reciprocity, and getting along, are evident in other species (Killen & de Waal, 2000), and preferences for prosocial over antisocial characters have been observed in (human) infants (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Although these studies focus on behavior, not judgments, the results are consistent with the idea that humans have a biological predisposition to develop moral concepts. Beginning in infancy, and particularly once children begin to locomote and actively explore their social (and nonsocial) worlds, social interactions and experiences lead to the emergence of qualitatively distinct moral and social concepts. Thus, we would expect to find some differences in infants' and toddlers' social interactions that could account for this early emergence.

Research indicates that children begin to be concerned about adult standards during the end of the second year of life. Judy Dunn's extensive program of research (reviewed in Dunn, 2006) has examined how toddlers' understanding of social rules develops in the family context. Dunn (2006) reviews studies of 14- to 36-month-old infants' interactions with their mothers and siblings; these studies show that mothers of 14-month-olds do not explicitly refer to social rules other than referring to acts as "naughty" or "good." However, observations of children's nonverbal reactions to their siblings' rule violations (e.g., looking and smiling while transgressions were being carried out, or drawing the mother's or the sibling's attention to these events) suggests that children were aware of social rule violations by 16 to 18 months of age. Between 18 and 24 months

of age, the number of conflict incidents in which mothers referred to social rules and the sophistication of both mothers' justifications to their children and children's explanations of their misbehavior to mothers all increased significantly.

Two longitudinal studies examining mothers' expectations for infants' and toddlers' behavior (Gralinski & Kopp, 1993; Smetana, Kochanska, & Chuang, 2000) likewise have indicated that the social rules of concern to mothers change during the second and third years of life. Reflecting children's developing competencies, the majority of rules described by mothers of 13- or 14-month-olds focused on issues of safety (not touching dangerous things, not going into the street), property (not tearing up books, not coloring on the walls or furniture), preventing harm to others ("don't bite"), and, less frequently, delay (waiting when Mom is on the telephone, not interrupting others' conversation). Furthermore, analyses of mothers' justifications for these rules indicated that interpersonal rules were seen as moral, safety and property rules were seen as prudential, and conventional rules were seen as conventional and psychological (Smetana et al., 2000). Mothers of young toddlers communicated few standards or made few requests regarding personal issues (like choice of clothes, food, and playmates), because they did not view such requests as developmentally appropriate (Smetana et al., 2000).

The mother's network of rules expands in both number and type over the child's second year of life. With age, the focus shifts from ensuring safety (for self and others) to a greater concern with communicating family norms, routines, cultural standards, and self-care; mothers increasingly regulated personal issues for prudential and less often pragmatic reasons (Smetana et al., 2000). In addition, children who were rated by parents as temperamentally more active and more positive received more rules for their behavior at 14 months than infants low on this temperamental pattern (Smetana et al., 2000), suggesting that mothers considered both the characteristics of the acts and their child's individuality in setting expectations. Thus, mothers of infants appear to be concerned first with safety and survival, then with regulating interpersonal interactions (moral concerns), and later, with appropriate conventional behavior.

This conclusion is consistent with the results of a naturalistic observational study of 2- and 3-year-old toddlers' interactions with mothers and familiar peers (Smetana, 1989). Toddlers' interactions with peers were primarily over moral issues, such as issues of

possession, rights, taking turns, hurting, aggression, and unkindness, whereas conventional conflicts—primarily over issues of manners and politeness, rules of the house, and cultural conventions—occurred primarily with mothers. More conventional transgressions were observed among 3- than 2-year-olds, most likely reflecting mothers' increasing demands for conventionally appropriate behavior (Gralinski & Kopp, 1993; Smetana et al., 2000).

Smetana (1989) found that both adults and children (primarily the victims) responded to moral transgressions in ways that provided feedback about the effects of acts for others' rights or welfare (e.g., requests by adults to take the victim's perspective, attempts by both children and adults to evaluate rights, victims' emotional reactions, or claims of injury or loss). Mothers more frequently responded to conventional than moral transgressions with commands or sanctions to cease the behavior without explanations for why the acts were wrong (Smetana, 1989). Mothers also responded to children's conventional violations with statements about the disorder the acts caused and rule statements. Thus, children appeared to obtain information about the intrinsic consequences of their moral violations for others' rights and welfare from both directly experienced or observed negative reactions from the victims of moral transgressions, as well as adult explanations regarding why the acts were wrong. The results for moral transgressions were consistent with another study, which indicated that mothers' interventions in 20- and 30-month-old toddler-peer conflicts over possessions consistently focused on issues of rights and entitlements, although they were inconsistent in whether they endorsed principles of their child's ownership or other children's entitlements (Ross, Tesla, Kenyon, & Lollis, 1990). Infants' conventional and moral interactions are affectively laden, providing the types of affect–event associations seen by Arsenio and Lover (1995) as facilitating children's understanding of distinct moral and conventional judgments.

Furthermore, parents' emotional expressions that accompany their prohibitions in interactions with their toddlers potentially may facilitate children's understanding of their transgressions. Dahl, Campos, and Witherspoon (2011) have suggested that the quality of anger (e.g., more serious anger as opposed to annoyance) may be associated with moral transgressions, whereas disgust may most often be associated with social-conventional violations, and fear may be a potent signal of prudential transgressions.

Moral and Social Development During the Preschool Years *Development of Moral Concepts*

Differences in preschool children's evaluations of different types of moral events, including physical harm (e.g., hitting or kicking), psychological harm or distress (e.g., teasing, calling a child names, or being mean), and fairness (not sharing or taking turns) have been examined. Young children more consistently apply moral criteria to events entailing physical harm at earlier ages than unfairness (Smetana, 1981a; Smetana, Kelly, & Twentyman, 1984), and they are inconsistent in applying moral criteria to sharing. Differences among the studies may be due to ambiguity in the depiction of sharing and resource distribution, as the stimuli in these studies do not always clearly indicate whether the objects are personal possessions (where rights of ownership dictate that sharing may be more discretionary) or communal property, where rights of possession may dominate (e.g., Ross et al., 1990). Wainryb, Brehl, and Matwin (2005) found, however, that preschoolers' narratives of previous moral conflicts, obtained from the perspective of both the victimizer and the victim, focused on physical harm more than did older children's narratives. Thus, physical harm is very salient to preschoolers, even though young children's conflicts more often focus on object conflicts than aggression.

Smetana, Rote, and colleagues (2012) examined change over one year in 2.5- to 4-year-olds' judgments regarding hypothetical, prototypical moral transgressions. Children's understanding of moral transgressions as wrong independent of authority increased over time, and girls grew faster than boys in their understanding of moral rules as not alterable. There was little normative change in their judgments of generalizability, nonalterability, and authority independence, as these judgments were at nearly ceiling levels when the study began, but there were individual differences due to temperament (effortful control and surgency/extraversion) in their initial moral judgments and in how fast their moral understanding grew.

Morality as Differentiated from Other Social Concepts

DISTINCTIONS IN MORAL AND SOCIAL CONCEPTS

Numerous studies have examined preschool children's evaluations of straightforward and prototypical moral events (e.g., hitting, teasing, or taking another child's toys) and conventional events (e.g.,

not sitting in a circle during story time, wearing pajamas to daycare, not putting toys away in the appropriate place, or not saying "please"). These studies provide robust evidence that by about 3 years of age and more consistently by age 4, young children distinguish morality and social convention using different theoretical criteria (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci & Weber, 1995; Sanderson & Siegal, 1988; Siegal & Storey, 1985; Smetana, 1981a, 1985; Smetana et al., 1984; Smetana, Rote, et al., 2012; Smetana, Schlagman, & Adams, 1993).

Few studies have examined age differences in preschoolers' evaluations, but in the longitudinal study just discussed (Smetana, Rote, et al., 2012), children who were 2.5 to 3.5 and 3.5 to 4.25 years old when the study commenced made distinct judgments of moral and conventional transgressions on each of the criteria, although only 3.5- to 4-year-olds did so when rating deserved punishment. However, a cross-sectional study of primarily white, middle-class children ranging from 2 years, 2 months to 3.5 years of age showed clear evidence of age-related differences in preschoolers' judgments of moral and conventional transgressions (Smetana & Braege, 1990). The youngest children did not distinguish moral and conventional transgressions on any of the dimensions studied. Generalizability was the earliest-developing criterion for distinguishing social rules; by nearly 3 years of age, children judged moral transgressions to be more generalizable wrong than conventional transgressions, but they did not make distinctions on any of the other dimensions examined. In contrast, 3.5-year-olds judged moral events to be more independent of rules and authority, more generalizable wrong, and more serious than conventional transgressions. (Interestingly, Smetana, 1981a found that younger children were more relativistic about all transgressions than were older preschool children.) Children with better language skills distinguished moral from conventional rule violations at earlier ages than did children whose language development was less advanced (at 2 years of age for generalizability vs. nearly 3 years of age for the sample as a whole, and at nearly 3 years of age on the basis of authority contingency vs. 3.5 years of age for the sample as a whole). Thus, distinctions in children's judgments appeared to become more firmly established during the third and fourth years of life, but the findings for language development, as well as Dunn's (2006) naturalistic observational studies, suggest that young children may "know more than they can say," at least as assessed in verbal interviews.

By 3 years of age, children also distinguish moral and conventional issues in their judgments of personal issues in both home and preschool contexts (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci & Weber, 1995; Weber, 1999; Yau & Smetana, 2003). Children typically categorized personal issues as up to the individual (rather than as acts that are right or wrong), based on justifications that the consequences affect only the actor or that the acts are personal matters and should be the actor's own business (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Weber, 1995). Moreover, age-related increases in personal judgments and personal justifications have been observed during the preschool years (Ardila-Rey & Killen, 2001; Killen & Smetana, 1999; Yau & Smetana, 2003). Nevertheless, Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, and Lewis (2004) found that only about one third of 5-year-olds (but most older children) judged that it is permissible to have multiple perspectives when it comes to disagreements pertaining to personal taste. That is, only a minority of preschoolers (but most older children) believed that two conflicting beliefs about personal tastes (e.g., that chocolate ice cream tastes yucky or yummy) could be right, whereas across ages, children rejected the notion that there is more than one right belief about moral and factual matters.

In addition, preschool children distinguished moral situations involving (moral) harm to others (such as when a child pushes another child off a swing) from prudential harm to the self (such as when a child purposely jumps off a swing), even when violations are depicted as having similar consequences (e.g., a child getting hurt; Tisak, 1993). Furthermore, young children judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than prudential transgressions, even when the consequences were depicted as more severe for the prudential than the moral rule violations or when the consequences of moral violations were depicted as minor. Thus, children's judgments reflect a concern with the type of harm more than its severity.

Preschoolers also distinguish between naturally occurring moral and conventional transgressions. One study comparing children's judgments about hypothetical, prototypical events with evaluations of actual transgressions witnessed in preschool classrooms (Smetana et al., 1993) found few consistent differences between these judgments. Another study examined preschoolers' judgments regarding prototypical, hypothetical moral transgressions and naturally occurring transgressions in which they participated as victims and perpetrators (Smetana,

Toth, Cicchetti, Bruce, Kane, & Daddis, 1999). Hypothetical transgressions were seen as more deserving of punishment than actual transgressions, but there were no differences in ratings of their severity. Young children also focused more on the intrinsic features of acts when justifying hypothetical transgressions than when justifying actual transgressions, whereas they more often indicated that they did not know why actual than hypothetical violations were wrong. Thus, young children judged actual moral transgressions using moral criteria, but the hypothetical events appeared to elicit more clear-cut moral evaluations.

Several studies have suggested that preschool children's judgments differ according to their perspective on the event and their relationship to the transgressor. Although most children viewed hypothetical moral transgressions as wrong, preschool children also viewed moral transgressions as more permissible when they involved a friend than a non-friend (Slomkowski & Killen, 1992). Thus, when events involve friends, children may be more willing to consider situational circumstances that may mitigate the wrongness of the acts. Not surprisingly, hypothetical moral and conventional transgressions described as committed by the self are seen as more permissible than the same transgressions described as committed by others (Slomkowski & Killen, 1992; Smetana et al., 1984). In addition, in the study by Smetana, Toth, and colleagues (1999), children's judgments also differed as a function of whether they were victims or perpetrators of the transgressions. In real-life situations, preschool victims judged actual moral transgressions to be more serious and more deserving of punishment than did (actual) violators, whereas transgressors viewed their behavior to be more justified than did victims (Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999). Finally, in their detailed narrative study, Wainryb and colleagues (2005) found that children's descriptions of experiences of being victims and violators differed. Victims tended to focus on the harm inflicted on them, whereas the same children, narrating experiences as a perpetrator, focused on a broader range of concerns and emotions. Perspective differences were stable across ages, although all narratives became more coherent with age.

Differences between moral and conventional concepts (and, in some studies, personal concepts) have been obtained among preschoolers in other cultures, including Colombia (Ardila-Rey & Killen, 2001) and Hong Kong (Yau & Smetana, 2003; Yau, Smetana, & Metzger, 2009).

MORAL CONCEPTS AND THEORY OF MIND

Studies have drawn on the burgeoning research on theory of mind and children's understanding of false beliefs to illuminate the limitations of young children's moral reasoning. Research indicates that before the age of 4 or 5, children do not understand that others may have beliefs different than their own or different representations about the same reality, although they do have some awareness that individuals' mental lives and emotional reactions to the same event may differ from their own (see the chapter by Astington & Hughes in this handbook for a review of theory of mind). At around age 4 or 5, children's understanding shifts to an awareness that individuals may have different beliefs about the same event. Consistent with this, Wainryb and colleagues (2005) found that preschoolers' narratives regarding conflict situations frequently referred to their own wants and desires but rarely referred to mental states, intentions, and either their own or others' emotions. Thus, compared to older children, their narratives were lacking in psychological elements.

The research reviewed in this section indicates that young children distinguish moral and conventional transgressions and apply moral criteria to moral events well before they are presumed to have an understanding of diverse or false beliefs. Changes in young children's understanding of false beliefs may have little bearing on moral judgments regarding hypothetical prototypical moral transgressions as assessed in the standard interview, because information about diverse or false beliefs typically is not relevant or manipulated, and actors' behavior is depicted as entailing intentional harm. Nevertheless, a recent study suggested that there are reciprocal, bidirectional associations between children's developing understanding of theory of mind and moral concepts (Smetana, Jambon, Conry-Murray, & Sturge-Apple, 2012). More advanced understanding of others' minds, as assessed using standard theory-of-mind tasks, led to ratings of prototypical moral transgressions as less deserving of punishment and less independent of authority over 1 year. At the same time, moral judgments of permissibility and authority independence also led to a more advanced understanding of theory of mind over time. Social interactions facilitate both the development of others' minds and more nuanced, flexible moral evaluations.

Although having a mature understanding of others' minds is not necessary to make rudimentary moral judgments, an understanding of false beliefs

does lead to an understanding that individuals can have diverse moral beliefs. Flavell, Mumme, Green, and Flavell (1992) found that 3-year-olds who failed the standard theory-of-mind false-belief tasks (which focus on factual beliefs) also were unable to understand that others might have divergent moral beliefs. By 5 years of age, children understood that others might have different factual and moral beliefs. Wainryb and Ford (1998) have noted that accurately attributing false moral beliefs alone does not predict how individuals judge the permissibility of others' social practices. Therefore, these investigators examined young children's evaluations of divergent social practices. Like Flavell and colleagues (1992), Wainryb and Ford (1998) found that 3-year-olds, who did not understand the representational nature of beliefs, did not understand that other people have beliefs different than their own and thus were intolerant of different social practices. As Wainryb and Brehl (2006) noted, their moral judgments are based on a "copy" theory of mind that takes the world as is and views their own beliefs as what is true and right. Wainryb and Ford (1998) further found that by 5 years of age, children more positively evaluated potentially immoral (harmful or unfair) practices when they disagreed with the informational beliefs than the moral beliefs. Young children were more tolerant when they used informational beliefs different from their own to reconceptualize the meaning of the acts. Even when children were aware that characters were behaving on the basis of different moral beliefs, most 5- (and 7-) year-olds evaluated behaviors based on nonnormative moral beliefs to be wrong and based on ignorance or mistaken or false information (Wainryb & Ford, 1998). When children develop an interpretive theory of mind in middle childhood and become aware that information and experiences are actively construed and subjectively organized (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996), they become better able to recognize that individuals may act on the basis of different beliefs.

The influence of false-belief understanding also has been examined in terms of children's understanding of morally relevant false beliefs (e.g., an "accidental transgressor" who mistakenly throws another character's property away on the basis of a mistaken belief; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011). Children who did not understand false beliefs, as assessed on standard tasks, also were unable to correctly pass the morally relevant false-belief task and did not understand that the accidental transgressor's actions were unintentional. By 5 years of age, children had a more

positive evaluation of the accidental transgressor's intentions, but they still judged the act as unacceptable. By age 7, children offered more forgiving judgments of the harmful act.

Associations between moral judgments and theory of mind have been examined in terms of the moral judgments of autistic children, who have difficulty with theory-of-mind tasks. Autistic children of varying ages who either passed or failed a standard theory-of-mind false-belief task were compared to normally developing children and children with moderate learning difficulties (Blair, 1996). Contrary to expectations, all children distinguished between moral and conventional issues in their judgments; children's performance on the false-belief tasks was not associated with their ability to make moral and conventional distinctions. This may be because Blair (1996) did not assess false beliefs about moral issues.

Coordinations and Overlaps in Children's Moral and Social Concepts

Although children's coordination of moral and social concepts has been extensively studied, very little research has focused on preschool children. An exception to this are two studies investigating whether preschool children give priority to fairness or to gender-stereotypic (conventional) expectations when making decisions about inclusion in gender-stereotypic play situations (Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey, 2001; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). Killen and colleagues (2001) found that nearly all of the 4.5- and 5.5-year-old children in their primarily white, middle-class sample judged straightforward exclusion to be wrong based on moral justifications. However, 4.5-year-olds more often chose to include the gender-stereotypic child and used more social-conventional justifications than did 5.5-year-olds. Furthermore, changes in young children's inclusion judgments also were examined by using probes focused on the competing considerations (e.g., children who gave conventional justifications were probed about the moral aspects of the situations or vice versa). Children changed their decisions about whom to include more when they initially focused on the conventional aspects of inclusion and moral concerns with fairness were probed than when they initially focused on the moral aspects of the situations and gender-stereotypic conventional expectations were probed. Young children were not always able to simultaneously consider the competing demands of a situation, but they were able to weigh multiple

considerations (and give priority to morality) when different perspectives were introduced. Thus, children did not simply change their judgments in response to the counterprobes; the results depended on whether a moral point of view was suggested.

Children's Social Experiences as a Basis for Differentiating Moral and Social Judgments

NATURALISTIC STUDIES OF PRESCHOOLERS' SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

Several observational studies have examined adults' and preschoolers' responses to naturally occurring moral and conventional transgressions in daycare centers and nursery schools (Much & Shweder, 1978; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1984). The results of these studies are highly similar to Smetana's (1989) home observations of mothers and toddlers. Both adults (teachers) and children (primarily the victims) responded to moral transgressions in ways that provided feedback about the effects of acts for others' rights or welfare. These responses are consistent with the notion that children's moral understanding can be derived from the acts themselves rather than from the rules that regulate the acts.

In Dunn's observational study in the home, children's "other-oriented" responses emerged between 33 and 47 months of age and were more frequent during arguments with peers than with mothers or siblings (Dunn, Slomkowski, Donelan, & Herrera, 1995). Although parental requests and prohibitions regarding moral issues increase between the second and third years of life (Gralinski & Kopp, 1993), adult intervention decreased from early to middle childhood and differed markedly according to setting. Observational research has shown that 4-year-olds showed a greater understanding of others' mental states in naturally occurring conversations with siblings and friends than with mothers, and children who used more mental-state terms engaged in more cooperative interactions (Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996). Thus, social interactions between equals and near-equals provide contexts for acquiring a psychological understanding of others, which may facilitate moral judgment development.

Some research has shown that because adults have a stake in maintaining conventional regularities, they respond to children's conventional transgressions, but preschool children rarely do (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1989). However, one study (Killen, 1989) suggested that even young children respond to conventional transgressions when the conventions

are child-generated. Other studies using the observational methods described previously indicate that preschool children respond to other children's breaches of cultural conventions but not to school regulations (Much & Shweder, 1978; Nucci, Turiel, & Gawrych, 1983). Adult responses to conventional transgressions generally focus on commands to cease the behavior and statements focusing on social organization, such as the disorder the act creates, rules, and sanctions. Furthermore, research has shown that although children's moral development may be of great concern to adults, many moral conflicts occur—and are resolved—in the absence of parents or other adults (Killen & Nucci, 1995).

Finally, observational studies in the home (Nucci & Weber, 1995) and preschool (Killen & Smetana, 1999) have shown that young children's interactions regarding personal issues differ from moral, conventional, or prudential interactions. Parental responses to moral (and conventional) transgressions are direct and explicit and typically do not entail negotiation, whereas responses to personal issues entail more tacit forms of communication, including greater negotiation and more opportunities for children to make choices (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci & Weber, 1995). Thus, adults responded differentially to events in the personal domain and recognized the need to grant the child an arena of personal discretion. However, children did not merely assimilate adults' tacit social messages about what is personal; they actively negotiated and challenged their mothers to gain more control and assert their perspectives on these issues. In contrast, they rarely challenged mothers over moral or prudential issues (Nucci & Weber, 1995).

Observational studies also have indicated that preschool children's social interactions in the context of moral and prudential events differ (Tisak, Nucci, & Jankowski, 1996). Adult responses to prudential rule violations typically focused on statements regarding the risks of the child's actions, rationales pertaining to safety or prudence, and, less frequently, commands to stop and statements of rules (Nucci & Weber, 1995; Tisak et al., 1996). Thus, adult responses focus young children on the consequences of their actions for their health or safety.

EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES

Smetana (1985) examined preschool children's evaluations of unspecified events, which were depicted by nonsense words and which varied in the consistency of the prohibitions and the types of responses to the actions. Preschool children

differentiated between familiar moral and conventional transgressions, but they also differentiated the unspecified events on the basis of their features. Children gave moral judgments in response to acts that were depicted as generalizable wrong and having consequences for others' welfare ("moral" acts), whereas they applied conventional criteria (e.g., acts were seen as more permissible, less serious, and less wrong elsewhere) to acts that were depicted as contextually relative and prohibited by adults but not causing harm or violations of rights ("conventional" acts). Thus, children evaluated the features of interactions independent of their knowledge of the content of specific events.

Preschoolers' moral judgments of psychological harm (Helwig et al., 2001) and physical harm (Zelazo et al., 1996) have been examined in different conditions that varied actors' intentions (intending or not intending to cause harm), as well as the relation between acts and their associated outcomes (causing harm, a normal or canonical causal relation, or pleasure, an unexpected or noncanonical causal relation). Young children had more difficulty with the unexpected than the normal causal relations, but children's judgments of act acceptability were primarily based on the outcomes (whether or not harm occurred) rather than on associations between the acts (e.g., hitting) and external factors, such as adult punishment or sanctions. However, Zelazo and colleagues (2001) also found that sensitivity to intention information increased with age. Thus, young children appear to understand different forms of harm and use the specific features of moral actions to construct generalizable moral judgments. At the same time, however, the results show that with age, children are able to use more complex rules to predict future behavior and to integrate information.

EFFECTS OF VARYING SOCIAL EXPERIENCE

Siegel and Storey (1985) found that more time in daycare did not affect preschool children's evaluations of familiar moral transgressions. However, new enrollees (who had attended the same daycare center for only the prior 3 months) judged conventional transgressions pertaining to the conventions of the daycare center to be naughtier, more deserving of punishment, and more wrong contingent on teachers' authority than did daycare veterans (who had been in daycare at least 18 months and on average 2.5 years). Thus, children's experience with the specific social rules influenced evaluations of daycare social conventions, but their understanding of moral rules transcended the specific context.

Sanderson and Siegal (1988) hypothesized that conceptions of moral and conventional rules would be more highly developed among more socially skilled 4- and 5-year-olds. They tested this hypothesis in a sample of controversial, popular, average, neglected, and rejected children, as assessed using peer group nominations. Some support for their hypothesis was obtained in that controversial children (who are more socially skilled) rated moral transgressions as more deserving of punishment than did their less popular peers, but contrary to expectations, popular children did not make more mature judgments than other children.

Finally, Smetana and her colleagues hypothesized that experiences of maltreatment may be reflected in young children's moral judgments (Smetana et al., 1984; Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999). Smetana and colleagues (1984) found that abused, neglected, and matched, nonmaltreated preschoolers all differentiated hypothetical moral and social-conventional transgressions and evaluated moral events according to hypothesized moral criteria. Compared to nonmaltreated children, however, abused and neglected children were *more* sensitive to the intrinsic wrongness of moral events most closely connected to their experiences of maltreatment than were nonmaltreated children. These findings were not replicated in a later study, however (Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999). In general, moral judgments did not differ as a function of maltreatment status (Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999).

Affective Consequences of Transgressions

Several studies have examined preschool children's understanding of the affective consequences of events and transgressions. Arsenio (1988) examined kindergartners' (as well as school-age children's) knowledge of the likely emotional consequences of different kinds of transgressions. He found that moral events were evaluated as affectively negative, whereas conventional transgressions were viewed as affectively neutral. Furthermore, all children used information about situational affective consequences (e.g., whether actors or victims were happy, sad, angry, fearful, or neutral) to infer whether initiating events were conventional, moral, or personal, although school-age children were significantly better at this task than the young children. These results provide support for Arsenio and Lover's (1995) claim that different emotions become associated with events in different domains and that children then use this information to anticipate the likely outcomes of different behaviors (Steps 2 and

3 in their four-step model). The results also indicate some reversibility in their thinking; young children could infer the type of events from associated affective information, as well as use information about the nature of the act to predict the associated affect.

Beginning in the preschool years, children consistently attribute negative emotions to the victims of transgressions (Arsenio, 1988). However, an intriguing finding, referred to as the "happy victimizer" effect, shows that until about age 7 years, young children attribute positive emotions (like happiness) to transgressors (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Keller, Lourenco, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003; Krettanauer, Malti, & Sokol, 2008; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). Despite various manipulations intended to highlight the moral salience of events, the happy victimizer effect has been consistently obtained in preschool children's judgments of hypothetical situations. In addition, in Smetana, Toth, and colleagues' (1999) study, maltreated and nonmaltreated preschoolers alike were found to be happy victimizers in both hypothetical and actual situations. Arsenio and his colleagues have concluded that young children are more "morally obtuse" than "morally resistant" (see Arsenio et al., 2006, for an extended discussion and interpretation of the happy victimizer effect). That is, despite young children's considerable moral understanding, as demonstrated by their ability to distinguish moral from other social concepts, young children do not regularly and consistently apply their moral understanding and concerns for the victim in situations where those concerns are in conflict with their own competing desires. This conclusion is consistent with Wainryb and colleagues (2005), who found that preschoolers' narratives were largely devoid of psychological content, except for mention of young children's preferences and desires.

Children's emotions during peer conflict situations also have been observed (Arsenio, Cooperman, & Lover, 2000; Arsenio & Killen, 1996; Arsenio & Lover, 1997) and provide observational support for the validity of the happy victimizer effect. The results show that initiators of conflicts showed proportionately more happiness than other emotions, whereas recipients showed more negative emotions, like anger, sadness, and surprise. Furthermore, in a 1-year longitudinal study, Arsenio and colleagues (2000) found that children with more negative emotion dispositions and lower levels of emotion knowledge displayed greater aggressive behavior and less peer acceptance over time.

Summary

The studies reviewed in this section highlight both the surprising competencies—but also the limitations—of young children's moral and social understanding. Research indicates that young children have extensive and differentiated social interactions with peers, siblings, parents, and other adults, and these appear to be associated with early moral knowledge. Young children demonstrate a rudimentary understanding of moral, conventional, and personal concepts, as assessed in interviews and evaluated using theoretical criteria. Moreover, several studies manipulating the features of moral and conventional transgressions indicate that moral evaluations are based on the consequences of acts for others' welfare, whereas conventional judgments are based on authority, rules, and sanctions. Among young American children, as well as children in other cultures, social understanding increases during the preschool years.

In addition, some evidence suggests that although children cannot yet coordinate their understanding of moral and nonmoral concepts, they do recognize different components of multi-faceted situations. They also are more likely to make moral judgments when moral components of situations are made salient than to make conventional judgments when conventional components of situations are emphasized. Children's moral concepts are applied more clearly to issues of physical harm than fairness, and young children's understanding appears limited to concrete situations describing the world as is. Research indicates that most preschool-age children have difficulty recognizing that individuals can have different interpretations of events or different beliefs, and although they are aware that victims of moral transgressions will feel sad or angry, children have difficulty coordinating competing claims and desires. Thus, in hypothetical and real-life situations, they expect that moral perpetrators will feel happy, and it is difficult to dislodge this perspective. They view their own (or transgressors') behavior as less morally accountable than when events are considered from victims' perspectives.

Moral Development During Middle Childhood

Development of Moral Concepts

During middle childhood, moral concepts are extended beyond the focus on familiar instances of concrete harm and others' welfare characteristic of younger children. Thus, development proceeds

from a reliance on specific personal experiences to the ability to apply the criteria to more abstract and unfamiliar social events (Davidson, Turiel, & Black, 1983). This is in accord with Wainryb and colleagues (2005); they found that elementary school children's retrospective narrative descriptions of moral transgressions focused much less on harmful physical behavior and much more on a broader range of moral conflicts (like exclusion, offensive behavior, or injustice). Narratives also became more coherent and complex with age.

During middle childhood, moral understanding expands to include an understanding of fairness, defined in terms of equality and equal treatment between persons (Damon, 1977; Davidson et al., 1983; Kahn, 1992; Nucci, 2001; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). However, fairness is still defined in terms of "tit-for-tat" direct reciprocity, and this does not become transformed to include notions of equality until preadolescence (Damon, 1977; Nucci, 2001; Nucci & Turiel, 2009).

To better understand the cues children use to evaluate transgressions, Shaw and Wainryb (2006) examined whether nonprototypical responses to transgressions (compliance or subversion rather than opposition or resistance in response to a hypothetical transgressor's demands) are associated with children's evaluations of moral transgressions. The youngest children (5-year-olds) judged compliance positively and resistance negatively, but contrary to expectations, children (and also adolescents) evaluated the transgressor's behavior as morally wrong, regardless of victims' responses. Children constructed an understanding of victimization and unfairness without explicit behavioral cues (like protests or cries from victims), suggesting that the participants brought information and judgments from their own experience to bear on their evaluations of the events. Even when the hypothetical victims complied or subverted the transgressor's demands, most study participants evaluated victims as having negative emotional responses to their victimization. Thus, in addition to their moral evaluations of the transgressors, school-age children had a sophisticated understanding that the victim's behavior may not accurately reflect his or her psychological states or internal feelings.

Yet during middle childhood, children's moral evaluations of hypothetical transgressions differ when notions of provocation are considered. Smetana, Campione-Barr, and Yell (2003) examined first-graders' (and some kindergartners') and fourth-graders' evaluations of hypothetical moral

situations (described in a straightforward way without any information about the actors' intentions) and moral situations entailing provocation and peer retaliation. Children reasoned more about (moral) concerns with others' welfare and judged hypothetical moral transgressions to be more deserving of punishment when evaluating prototypical than provoked transgressions and when retaliation involved hitting rather than teasing. Younger school-age children—but not fourth-graders—rated prototypical moral transgressions to be more serious than provoked transgressions, suggesting that young children viewed retaliation as morally justified. However, children's moral condemnation of retaliation increased with age. These findings are consistent with research indicating that children's subjective understanding of mind and reality increases during middle childhood (see the chapter by Astington & Hughes in this handbook). Children also judged that escalating the retaliatory response by hitting in response to being teased was more serious and more deserving of punishment than teasing in response to either teasing or hitting. Thus, "in kind" retaliation was more acceptable than retaliation that is greater in magnitude than the original offense. Astor (1994) further found that moral reasoning about provocation differed in aggressive and nonaggressive children. Although all children used moral reasoning in hypothetical provoked situations, aggressive children focused more on the immorality of provocation and viewed "hitting back" as morally justified, whereas non-violent children used moral reasoning to condemn retaliation.

School-age children's narrative descriptions of moral conflicts (Wainryb et al., 2005) indicated that when narrating past experiences as a victim rather than a perpetrator, children (and particularly elementary school-age children) were more likely to describe harm as intentional and the perpetrator as wanting to harm or anger them. In contrast, perpetrators typically described their behavior as a response to provocation. With age, however, children more frequently referred to mitigating circumstances, misunderstandings, and negligence. Because most of these studies (Dunn, Cutting, & Demetriou, 2000; Smetana et al., 1999; Wainryb et al., 2005) used within-subjects designs, differences between victims' and perpetrators' responses were not due to individual differences in children but rather reflected consistent differences in understanding as a function of their role in the situation.

Morality as Distinct from Other Social, Logical, and Physical Concepts

Research reviewed in previous sections has shown that preschool children consistently differentiate morality from social convention when evaluating familiar, prototypical, hypothetical transgressions, as well as naturally occurring, observed transgressions. During middle childhood, however, children begin to apply their understanding to a broader range of events, including issues that are less concrete or familiar. In addition, children's understanding of different types of regularities expands to include distinctions among moral concepts, intellectual and social-conventional uniformities, physical regularities, and logical rules. Preschool children treat moral laws as more unalterable than conventions, but during middle childhood, children are increasingly able to distinguish conventional and physical regularities (such as gravity; Komatsu & Galotti, 1986; Lockhart, Abrahams, & Osherson, 1977). Komatsu and Galotti (1986) also manipulated whether the events were depicted in this world versus a presumably dissimilar world ("E.T.'s world"). By third grade, most children understood that conventions are alterable in both worlds, whereas physical facts were seen as unalterable in this world but increasingly alterable in another world. Thus, an understanding of different types of social and nonsocial regularities increases during middle childhood.

Distinctions also expand during these years to include intellectual conventions (like how to draw certain letters) and personal intellectual matters (like preferences for particular books; Nicholls & Thorkildsen, 1988), as well as logical problems (Laupa, 2000). Children judge intellectual conventions to be more alterable than physical and logical laws, and they view children as having autonomy over personal issues, whereas teachers are seen as having the legitimate authority to set standards over other types of issues (logic and conventions).

In a classic study, Tisak and Turiel (1988) disentangled the greater severity of most moral than conventional transgressions from the qualitative criteria that are proposed to differentiate the domains. First-, second-, and fifth-graders (who ranged in age from 6.5 to 12.5) compared a moral transgression that had minor consequences (stealing an eraser) with a moral transgression that had major consequences (hitting someone) and a major conventional transgression (wearing pajamas to school). (Pilot participants had viewed this as a very serious transgression that could result in ridicule and

disruption.) Most children indicated that a person would be more likely to commit the minor moral violation than the major conventional act. However, when asked what one should do, most children indicated that they would chose the major conventional transgression over either moral transgression and viewed the conventional event as less wrong than the moral transgressions, because the moral events would have negative consequences for others' welfare. These findings support the assertion that differences between morality and social convention are based on fundamental differences between the acts rather than based solely on quantitative differences in their seriousness.

Turiel (2008) also has provided a detailed examination of school-age children's judgments in hypothetical and actual situations, as obtained in extensive naturalistic observations in several contexts in different schools. Children of varying ages were interviewed about actual moral, conventional, and mixed-domain events shortly after they occurred; they also were administered standard interviews about hypothetical moral and conventional events about a month following the observations. Children of all ages distinguished actual moral from conventional events, but judgments about the hypothetical events were more clear-cut and uniform than judgments about the actual events (Turiel, 2008). As Wainryb and colleagues (2005) found in their retrospective narrative accounts, transgressors and victims disagreed over who instigated a moral transgression or why a transgression occurred, but victims and transgressors almost always both viewed such events as moral (whereas for conventional transgressions, transgressors viewed the acts less negatively than did observers). Thus, when children encounter straightforward moral transgressions in everyday life, the situations may be more ambiguous and the features of the events may not be as well specified and detailed as the situations that are presented in hypothetical interviews, leading to some variation in moral judgments. Children also may be more motivated in real-life situations to "figure things out" and try to understand others' motives and emotions. Wainryb and colleagues (2005) found that compared to younger children, fifth-graders' narratives regarding moral conflicts become increasingly psychological and mentalistic; they attempted to interpret and understand different motives, emotions, and intentions in the moral situations.

Finally, numerous studies have examined whether children in different cultures differentiate moral from social-conventional issues. These studies have

shown that children in a wide range of cultures—including North and South America, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Australia—evaluate moral and conventional events using theoretical criteria (see Wainryb, 2006, for a review and the chapters by Gauvain and Chen in this handbook for more general discussions of cultural issues), although some differences in justifications have been observed. For instance, Chinese preschoolers in Hong Kong were found to reason about moral transgressions with justifications pertaining to others' welfare (Yau & Smetana, 2003), whereas these concerns are not explicitly articulated until later ages in American children. In reasoning about conventional events, Korean children and adolescents commonly used justifications pertaining to social status, social roles, appropriate role behavior, and courtesy, concerns that are not very evident in American children's reasoning (Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987).

Coordinations in Children's Moral and Social Judgments

One of the few studies to explicitly examine domain coordinations in children's judgments was conducted by Killen (1990). In this study, 6- to 12-year-old children made judgments about prototypical moral situations pertaining to harm and distributive justice, such as one child hitting another, as well as multifaceted situations in which a moral component conflicted with a social-organizational concern or a personal consideration. For instance, children had to choose between preventing harm and continuing a task necessary to maintaining a group activity. In addition, in the multifaceted situations, children had to choose between preventing harm to a stranger or to a close personal relation. Consistent with the research examining prototypical moral events, across ages, all of the children viewed hitting as wrong, based on concerns with welfare and avoiding harm. However, there was considerably less agreement in children's judgments about the multifaceted situations.

Nearly a third of the children did not give priority to preventing harm over maintaining a team activity. Children also varied in their judgments as to whether they should give priority to preventing harm to a stranger or a close relative. In evaluating multifaceted situations, and in a clear advance over preschool children, most children at all ages took into account both moral and nonmoral considerations in making decisions, and only a small proportion of children focused solely on nonmoral features. Thus, moral concepts were relevant and

applied in decision making about multifaceted, contextualized situations.

Heterogeneity in social orientations also may reflect conflicts between various abstract concepts and principles applied in complex situations and how individuals weigh and coordinate different moral concerns. Helwig's research (see Helwig, 2006) has shown that there is heterogeneity in children's conceptions of rights, laws, civil liberties, and freedom of speech. Although much of the research has focused on adolescents and young adults, Helwig's studies with school-age children indicate that conceptions of rights and civil liberties develop by the early elementary school years. For instance, studies of Canadian school-age children's conceptions of freedom of speech and religion (Helwig, 1997) and fair government (Helwig, 1998) suggest that by age 6, children view freedom of religion and speech as universal rights that should be upheld in all cultures. Whereas young children's justifications for upholding civil liberties focused primarily on appeals to personal choice and freedom of expression, by middle childhood children focused on the broader cultural or societal implications of those rights. Importantly, however, across ages, children did not define civil liberties in terms of authority or existing societal laws. Rather, from early ages on, they viewed civil liberties as rights, which were initially connected to their developing notions of the personal domain.

Furthermore, age differences were found in how children applied rights in different social contexts (Helwig, 1997). During middle childhood, children made few distinctions between the rights of children and adults or between rights in different social contexts, like family, school, and/or society at large; children justified the application of rights across contexts and individuals with appeals to personal choice and autonomy. Furthermore, school-age children applied moral concepts of harm, rights, and justice to their evaluation of socially beneficial and unjust laws and considered these concerns in evaluating whether individuals must comply with laws (Helwig & Jasiobedzka, 2001).

Killen and her colleagues' research also has shown that judgments about peer and intergroup exclusion can be best understood in terms of children's coordination of moral, conventional, and psychological concepts (see Killen, 2007; Killen & Rutland, 2011, for reviews). As Killen (2007) noted and the studies of preschoolers' judgments of exclusion demonstrated, peer exclusion can involve moral notions of fairness, conventional concerns with group norms

and effective group functioning, and personal concerns with autonomy, personal choice, and identity. Across middle childhood, most children did not view it as acceptable to exclude a peer from a school group on the basis of race or gender, based on moral concerns with fairness (Killen & Stangor, 2001). However, when different qualifications for group membership were introduced, children coordinated and sometimes prioritized moral versus conventional aspects of the situations. With age, children increasingly focused on conventional reasons pertaining to effective group functioning.

Social Experiences Connected with Moral and Nonmoral Concepts

Several studies have examined school-age children's moral and social interactions, particularly in school contexts (Blumenfeld, Pintrich, & Hamilton, 1987; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b). In middle childhood, responses to moral and conventional transgressions are similar to the types of responses observed at younger ages, except that there is a shift reflecting increasing child involvement and response to conventional transgressions. By about age 7, children responded to other children's conventional transgressions with sanctions and statements of ridicule, whereas adults responded with statements regarding the disorder the act creates, rules, and sanctions (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b). Thus, with age, children become increasingly involved in maintaining the expected regularities in the social system.

Affective Dimensions of Moral and Social Judgments

In middle childhood, and consistent with Arsenio and Lover's (1995) model of event–emotion linkages, research shows that hypothetical moral events are evaluated as affectively negative, whereas conventional transgressions are viewed as affectively neutral. These ratings are highly correlated with judgments of obligatoriness and alterability (Arsenio & Ford, 1985). In addition, attributions of happiness for victimization decline in middle childhood, and children attribute conflicting emotions (happiness due to their gains as a result of the behavior as well as negative emotions due to their understanding of their victim's plight) to victimizers. Indeed, both the developing ability to understand mixed emotions during middle childhood and gains in theory of mind (Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & van den Ende, 1996) have been associated with declines in the happy victimizer effect toward a

more mixed view (Arsenio et al., 2006). With age and as a consequence of positive peer relationships, typically developing children shift from viewing victimizers as feeling strictly happy to focusing on the negative consequences for the victim. Malti, Gasser, and Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger (2010) have expanded on these findings by demonstrating that moral judgments (with judgments of rule and authority independence, generalizability, and transgression severity ratings combined) are associated with lower levels of neutral emotion attributions among 5-year-olds, fewer happy victimizer attributions among 7- and 9-year-olds, and greater feelings of guilt among 9-year-olds. Thus, these findings suggest that the affective meaning associated with moral judgments may change as children grow older.

Summary

There are substantial advances in children's moral understanding during middle childhood. Children apply moral criteria to a broader range of moral events, including more abstract and unfamiliar events, and moral concepts extend from a focus on concrete physical harm and concerns with welfare to a greater understanding of fairness. In real-life situations, moral perpetrators tend to view their behavior as intentional and as responses to provocation, but with age, children more negatively evaluate retaliation, especially responses to provocation that are more severe than the original offense.

Children's understanding of different kinds of regularities expands to include intellectual, physical, and logical regularities, and by middle childhood, children enforce and respond to different conventional transgressions. With age, children become increasingly able to coordinate different moral concepts (e.g., in judgments of civil liberties) and moral and nonmoral concepts (e.g., in evaluations of peer exclusion). Elementary school-age children uphold freedom of speech and religion and view them as universal rights, although younger children base these claims on personal reasons and only later in childhood consider their broader societal implications. As they grow older, children also coordinate the perspective of both the victim and the transgressor. By about age 7 or 8, the happy victimizer effect declines, in part due to children's increasingly mentalistic perspective, which leads them to understand and interpret different emotions, motives, and intentions in moral situations. Children shift from focusing on the gains achieved by victimization to the negative consequences (including sadness and guilt) of moral violations for victims.

Moral Development During Adolescence

Development of Moral Concepts

During adolescence, concepts of fairness become more broadly comprehensive, universally applicable, and generalizable across situations. At the same time, however, adolescents are more able to take situational variations into account (Nucci, 2001). In an ongoing study, Nucci and Turiel (2009) examined the development of children and adolescents' reasoning about situations entailing moral concerns with either helping someone in need or refraining from engaging in harm (either direct or indirect) to the other person, as depicted in conflict with self-interest. The scenarios varied both the nature of the act and the characteristics of the child depicted in the situation (neutral, provoked, or vulnerable). The results of the study are complex, but generally, the researchers found that nearly all children and adolescents judged it to be wrong to harm another when harm was presented in a direct and unambiguous way (as studies of younger children have amply demonstrated). Concepts of fairness were found to shift in early adolescence from a focus on direct equality to a coordination of equality with equity and then a concern with equity, or an understanding that fair treatment entails a consideration of individual differences in needs and statuses. However, along with this developing understanding of fairness, adolescents also developed a greater capacity to incorporate ambiguous aspects of moral situations.

Nucci and Turiel (2009) found a U-shaped pattern of moral growth (rather than a linear progression of moral thinking) from late childhood to adolescence in the ability to integrate divergent aspects of situations. They observed periods of transition in which adolescents were more able to consider aspects of moral situations but where they applied moral criteria unevenly. In particular, early adolescents' attempts to establish boundaries of personal jurisdiction resulted in an overapplication of conceptions of rights in morally ambiguous contexts. Older adolescents were better able than younger teens to distinguish personal choices from conceptions of rights and to coordinate the moral, conventional, and personal aspects of multifaceted moral situations.

Distinctions Between Moral and Other Social Concepts

Nucci and Turiel (1993) examined conceptions of moral and religious rules in adolescents of different religious faiths, including Catholic,

Dutch Reform Calvinist Amish-Mennonite, and Orthodox and Conservative Jews. In addition to the usual domain assessments, the studies also examined whether the permissibility of a given act was contingent on the presence or absence of a specific command from God and whether God's commands could make moral violations like stealing acceptable. As expected, regardless of religious affiliation, most youth treated moral issues as wrong in the absence of a rule from God. In contrast, religious conventions, such as day of worship, expectations regarding appropriate dress (for Amish participants), and diet (for Jewish participants), were treated as acceptable. In addition, most teens rejected the notion that God's commands could make a moral violation morally right or that God would make such a commandment. Thus, adolescents of different religious faiths applied moral criteria to religious rules pertaining to fairness and rights and differentiated religious conventions from moral issues. Distinctions in evaluations of religious rules have not been examined in younger children.

Coordinations in Adolescents' Moral and Social Judgments

JUDGMENTS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND FAIR GOVERNMENT

In keeping with the findings on younger children, Helwig (1995) has found that most North American 12- and 16-year-olds and college students viewed freedom of speech and religion in both decontextualized and contextualized situations to be universally applicable rights that are not contingent on existing rules or laws. Adolescents were much less likely to affirm rights, however, when the same freedoms were presented as in conflict with other moral concerns with harm (particularly physical harm) and equality. Thus, adolescents subordinated rights to other moral concerns, such as preventing harm or promoting equality.

With age, adolescents increasingly coordinated different principles and concerns in their social judgments (Helwig, 1995). Early adolescents (12-year-olds) viewed issues of equality as overriding civil liberties more and upheld civil liberties less when they conflicted with a law than did older adolescents and college students. Although early adolescents could evaluate laws and social systems using abstract concepts of rights, they were more likely than older teens to use a purely legalistic perspective to evaluate the legitimacy of violating existing rules in situations where individuals' civil liberties were restricted. Thus, with age, teens become better able

to integrate and coordinate their understanding of laws restricting civil liberties and judgments of compliance with concepts of rights. Helwig (1997) found that with age, adolescents grounded rights more in evaluations of the agents' competencies (their maturity or mental or physical competence) and increasingly differentiated their judgments regarding the rights that should be accorded to children versus adults and the rights applicable in different social contexts.

Much of the research on adolescents' conceptions of rights and civil liberties has been conducted in Western cultures, which are often described as oriented toward rights and viewing individuals as autonomous agents (Shweder et al., 2006). Turiel and Wainryb (1998) examined these issues in a sample of Druze Arab early and late adolescents and adults. (The Druze are a small, hierarchically organized, patriarchal, and highly inbred Arab community in northern Israel.) When rights (freedom of religion, speech, and reproduction) were presented abstractly, participants overwhelmingly endorsed the freedoms for individuals in their own country (although less for reproduction than the other rights) and negatively evaluated laws that restricted these freedoms. Similar to Helwig's (1995) findings, Druze late adolescents and adults viewed it as more acceptable to violate unjust laws restricting civil liberties than did early adolescents. Also, in conflicting situations, the Druze sometimes subordinated those rights to other social and moral concerns and believed that rights can be legitimately restricted in some circumstances. Reflecting their society's hierarchical structure, rights were applied differently to males and females, with fewer restrictions placed on sons' than wives' or daughters' freedoms. Similar findings have been obtained in other cultures, including India (Neff, 2001; Neff & Helwig, 2002), China (reviewed in Helwig, 2006; Neff & Helwig, 2002), and Benin, West Africa (Conry-Murray, 2009).

Rather than examining coordinations in the moral judgments of individuals in other cultures, Wainryb (1993) examined whether American teens believe that moral judgments can be generalized to other cultures described as having different moral or informational beliefs. Regardless of age, most adolescents evaluated moral acts entailing harm or injustice in other cultures as wrong, based on concerns with harm, coercion, or injustice, even when the opposing moral belief was described as part of the culture or tradition. However, a considerable number of teenagers struggled to coordinate

nonrelativistic moral judgments with concerns about the need to respect other cultural traditions and beliefs. When individuals in other cultures were described as holding different informational beliefs (e.g., that children misbehave because they are possessed by evil spirits that can be exorcised only by spanking), the majority of adolescents changed their evaluation of the acts (viewing hitting as acceptable, for instance, because a father spanking his child in such a culture would have different intentions or that the consequences might be different, because children might believe that spanking is helping rid them of their evil spirits). Adolescents at all ages made both relativistic and nonrelativistic judgments and rarely displayed a consistent orientation.

JUDGMENTS OF PEER EXCLUSION

Consistent with findings for younger children (Killen & Stangor, 2001) and Helwig's (1995) research on rights, research on adolescents' reasoning about inclusion and exclusion (see Killen & Rutland, 2011) has shown that regardless of age, most participants evaluate peer exclusion as wrong based on moral concerns when no competing concerns are presented. When stereotype information is presented in conflict with threats to group functioning, however, early adolescents are more likely than younger children to coordinate moral and social-conventional concerns, with early adolescents emphasizing conventional concerns with group processes. These findings were replicated in a sample of Korean, Japanese, and American children and adolescents (Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2003), although some cultural variations were found in particular situations. Social judgments about exclusion varied according to the dilemma context, but with age, adolescents were increasingly able to coordinate moral and conventional concerns in conflicting situations.

There also were contextual differences in reasoning, with students also using personal reasons when evaluating friendship decisions and social-conventional (e.g., group functioning) reasons when evaluating exclusion from a school club. However, decisions about intimate relationships (e.g., dating) typically were seen as personal choices, based on personal preferences for romantic partners, and less often were seen as entailing moral concerns. Moreover, adolescents were more likely than children to view exclusion from friendships based on race as wrong.

Horn and her colleagues (Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999) have shown that stereotypes about

adolescent social reference groups or crowds (such as "jocks" or "techies") influence adolescents' judgments about ambiguous situations in which blame for a moral transgression is unclear. Adolescents used more social-conventional justifications when behavior was depicted as stereotype-consistent, but judgments also varied according to the social reference group. Horn (2003) has further demonstrated that adolescents treat exclusion from social groups as multifaceted and having moral and conventional components. She found that adolescents who belonged to high-status groups (cheerleaders, jocks, or preppies) judged exclusion from peer groups as less wrong than did adolescents who either did not belong to a group or who belonged to low-status groups (dirties, druggies, and goths). Thus, moral concepts of fairness or equal treatment were influenced both by the moral parameters of the situation as well as adolescents' position in the social hierarchy.

Adolescents' judgments about peer exclusion on the basis of homosexuality also have been examined (see Horn, 2008, for a review). Surveying two large samples of 10th- and 12th-grade and college students, Horn found that few of the participants in these samples believed that homosexuality was permissible, with half or more in both samples viewing it as wrong and many more evaluating it neutrally but not positively. Despite this, nearly all students in both samples viewed excluding, teasing, or harassing gay or lesbian peers as unacceptable based on the harmful or hurtful consequences or individuals' rights to be treated with respect. Thus, this research demonstrates that most adolescents are able to separate their attitudes toward homosexuality from their understanding of fair treatment and equality.

ADOLESCENT-PARENT RELATIONSHIPS

Research examining adolescents' and parents' reasoning about aspects of their relationships, including legitimate parental authority, conflict, disclosure of activities, and secrecy, indicates that domains of reasoning can be coordinated between as well as within individuals. A consistent finding from this research is that with age, adolescents claim increasing personal jurisdiction over areas of their lives (see Smetana, 2002, 2011, and Smetana & Villalobos, 2009, for reviews); these increases in claims to personal freedom, especially in middle to late adolescence, have been associated with better psychosocial adjustment (Smetana, Campione-Barr, & Daddis, 2004). Although parents agree that adolescents should be granted more autonomy as they

get older, they disagree about where the boundaries of legitimate parental authority should be drawn. Thus, issues that teenagers see as under their personal jurisdiction often are seen by parents as conventional or prudent, leading to conflict and negotiation in adolescent-parent relationships, as well as increases in nondisclosure and secrecy in the service of obtaining more autonomy (Smetana, 2002, 2011; Smetana & Villalobos, 2009).

Informational Assumptions

JUDGING AMBIGUOUS SOCIAL ISSUES

In the studies of domain coordination conducted with school-age children (Helwig, 1997, 1998; Killen, 1990), the different components of the situations were presented in clear opposition to each other. There are other situations where the moral components of the situations may be more ambiguous and not clearly classifiable as moral. For instance, many hotly debated social issues such as abortion or homosexual marriage are ambiguous in that some individuals (or subgroups) may view them as moral and categorically acceptable, whereas other individuals (or groups) may view them as nonmoral and impermissible.

In research examining adolescent and young adult women's reasoning and decision making about abortion, Smetana (1981b, 1982) interviewed young women facing unwanted pregnancies, as well as a matched comparison group of nonpregnant young women, about abortion as well as about other prototypical moral and personal issues. Some young women viewed abortion as permissible and under personal jurisdiction throughout the pregnancy, other young women viewed abortion as unequivocally wrong, and a third group of women coordinated personal and moral concepts, viewing abortion as a personal issue during the early stages of the pregnancy and as morally wrong later in the pregnancy (because it was viewed as taking human life). These judgments were informed by different informational assumptions, in the form of varying ideas about the personhood of the fetus. Women who ascribed full personhood to the fetus (based on religious or biological beliefs) described abortion as killing and a choice between two human lives; their judgments were similar to judgments about other prototypical moral issues. Women who viewed the fetus as not yet a person viewed abortion as an issue of personal choice; their judgments resembled judgments regarding other prototypical personal issues.

These conceptions about abortion were associated with young women's decision making about

unwanted pregnancies. Most of the women who viewed abortion as a personal issue decided to have abortions, whereas nearly all women who viewed abortion as a moral issue continued their pregnancies. Although changes in women's ideas of abortion in response to facing the dilemma of unwanted pregnancy were not assessed, similar modes of reasoning about abortion were found in comparison groups of never-pregnant young women and adolescent boys and girls (Smetana, 1982). Finally, although different beliefs about the personhood of the fetus were associated with religious background, domain orientation was a better predictor of decisions than either religious background or developmental level of moral reasoning as assessed using hypothetical moral judgment dilemmas. Therefore, this study demonstrates that factual or informational beliefs affect individuals' social judgments and real-life decisions through their effect in structuring judgments.

Turiel, Hildebrandt, and Wainryb (1991) followed up this study by examining high school and university students' judgments about several highly charged social issues that also are ambiguously multifaceted, including abortion, homosexuality, incest, and pornography. These researchers compared reasoning about these issues with reasoning about prototypically moral events (in this study, rape and unprovoked killing). As expected, judgments entailed the coexistence of different domains of social thought. As in previous studies, almost all teens viewed prototypically moral events as categorically and generalizably wrong and as legitimately subject to societal and legal control. However, they varied in their judgments about the multidimensional events. Some evaluated the acts as permissible and beyond the bounds of societal jurisdiction, and others evaluated the acts as wrong. Variations in judgments were found to be associated with different and often contradictory informational assumptions (biological, psychological, sociological, or religious beliefs). Prescriptive judgments of right and wrong were derived from justifications based on "laws of nature," deviation from natural biological functions, or assumptions about deviancy and normality.

Finally, participants who viewed the ambiguous events as wrong were nearly unanimous in evaluating the moral issues as categorically and generalizably wrong and legitimately regulated by society. Unlike their judgments about other moral issues, however, they judged the ambiguous issues to be contingent on legal status and to lack generalizability to other

social contexts. Concerns with welfare and rights predominated in reasoning for the prototypical moral issues but were much less evident in reasoning about the ambiguous issues.

Along with Turiel and colleagues (1991), Horn and Nucci (2003) have found that older adolescents' and young adults' reasoning about sexuality and homosexuality also is multifaceted. Adolescents' reasoning includes concerns with rights and fairness, social conventions and norms, and personal issues, as well as informational assumptions about the natural order of the world. That is, some viewed homosexuality as a natural or normal form of sexual expression, but others did not, and this was mediated by religious or ideological beliefs. Thus, these findings suggest that the inconsistent and sometimes contradictory evaluations about "ambiguous" social issues stem, in part, from individuals' factual beliefs or assumptions about the natural and social world.

JUDGING SOCIAL PRACTICES

Wainryb (1991, 2000) also has examined the role of informational assumptions in adolescents' and college students' moral judgments about harm. Wainryb (1991) found that although adolescent and college-age students had similar moral beliefs about the wrongness of inflicting harm on others, their evaluations of particular situations varied due to differences in informational assumptions, and hence, disagreements about what they believed to be true. Differences in factual beliefs were found to inform moral evaluations of particular situations. Moreover, manipulating the informational assumptions led to changes in individuals' moral evaluations of the acts.

Shaw and Wainryb (1999) had college students evaluate social practices that entailed harm but that were described as typically practiced by most members of another culture. Most participants stated that individuals in this other culture must have factual beliefs that make these practices beneficial rather than harmful. Moreover, when the type of belief (moral vs. factual) and the degree of societal consensus about the belief were manipulated, the researchers found that the practice was evaluated positively only when members of the society were said to hold the same factual beliefs (e.g., that the practice has beneficial consequences) and to have consensual agreement about the practice. When members of the society were described as disagreeing about the underlying facts or whether the behavior was immoral

or agreeing that the practice was immoral, it was assessed negatively as having unfair or harmful consequences. Thus, individuals judge acts that they view as harmful or unfair to be acceptable if they appear to be based on divergent factual beliefs. Adolescents understand that beliefs are matters of interpretation and that individuals may interpret the facts differently, leading to tolerance of other people and their behavior (Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998).

This study, along with several others, has shown that adolescents are more tolerant of free speech and the public expression of dissenting beliefs than of actual practices. But the opposite was found in a study of tolerance of practices of Muslim actors among Dutch adolescents in the Netherlands (Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010). These researchers found that Dutch adolescents distinguished among different cultural practices and treated wearing a headscarf in school as a personal choice, not shaking hands with opposite-sex students and the founding of Muslim schools as conventional violations, and an imam endorsing antihomosexual speech as a moral offense. Tolerance varied according to the issue domain, students' age, and their educational level (whether they were in a vocational vs. university preparatory track). Tolerance was greatest for personal issues and lowest for moral issues, greater among older than younger adolescents, and greater among students at higher educational levels, particularly regarding the moral issue of the imam's speech. Contrary to past research, tolerance was also greater for particular practices than for campaigns of public support for those practices. The authors connected these findings to intergroup relationships.

Different Experiences and Moral Judgments

As reviewed extensively elsewhere (Killen, 2007; Killen & Rutland 2011), research also has focused on associations between adolescents' experiences of either peer exclusion or intergroup contact and their moral reasoning about exclusion. Both majority (European American) and minority American adolescents (from African, Latino, and Asian backgrounds) evaluated race-based exclusion as wrong based on moral concerns with unfairness. However, minority adolescents were more likely than majority adolescents to believe that racial exclusion occurs (Killen, Henning, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, 2007), and greater personal experience with peer exclusion (both race-based and otherwise) was associated with minority but not majority youths' reasoning about exclusion from interracial friendships (Margie,

Brenick, Killen, Crystal, & Ruck, 2006). Minority students with more experience of exclusion were more likely to view race-based exclusion as morally wrong. Furthermore, among majority and minority students alike, more intergroup contact was associated with stronger views that race-based exclusion is morally wrong (Crystal, Killen, & Ruck, 2008). Similarly, Heinze and Horn (2009) found that having a lesbian or gay friend was associated with more positive attitudes toward homosexuality and homosexuals and less tolerance toward unfair treatment of lesbian and gay youth.

Affective Dimensions of Moral and Social Judgments

Happy victimizer judgments typically decline in middle childhood, so when they persist into adolescence, they are most often associated with poor social competence or problematic adjustment (Arsenio et al., 2006). Therefore, studies of teenagers' conceptions of the emotional consequences of transgressions have focused on conduct-disordered youth or on adolescents' evaluations of different forms of aggression (Arsenio, Adams, & Gold, 2009; Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2004). As Arsenio and Lover (1995) predicted, one study showed that happy victimizer responses were greater among conduct-disordered than matched control adolescents (Arsenio et al., 2004), and youth also attributed different emotions to different types of aggressive acts. When proactive (unprovoked) aggression was seen as intentional, teens reported more anger than for other acts. Another study of urban, low-income African American and Latino teenagers found that proactive (but not reactive) aggression was associated with expectations of more positive outcomes associated with aggression (Arsenio et al., 2009), whereas hostile attribution biases were associated with reactive (but not proactive) aggression.

Summary

With age, adolescents' moral judgments become more broadly comprehensive, universally applicable, and generalizable, but at the same time, adolescents also are increasingly able to take situational variations into account. Adolescents, like younger children, evaluate straightforward moral violations as wrong, based on moral concerns. However, research focusing on different topics, including rights, exclusion, peer relationships, and judgments of diverse social practices, indicates that adolescents struggle to coordinate divergent aspects of multifaceted and ambiguous situations. An increased ability to

coordinate different moral and nonmoral concerns does not appear to develop in a straightforward and linear fashion. Rather, the developmental path includes confusions and overapplications of rights in ambiguous situations. By late adolescence, the personal domain expands to consider a broader range of personal freedoms, adolescents maintain clearer boundaries between morality and personal choice, and they have more nuanced views of rights. Morality is seen as overriding conventional concerns in many instances, but situational and informational assumptions are considered. Individual differences in moral evaluations, particularly regarding complex and ambiguous social issues, may reflect differing beliefs about the nature of reality.

Conclusions

The social domain model provides a sophisticated approach to conceptualizing the complex intersection of concerns with justice, welfare, rights, social conventions, traditions, authority, personal choice, and personal entitlements that occur among individuals in different cultures. These different concerns are all aspects of social life and coexist in individuals' reasoning, yet they may be coordinated in different ways depending on individual development, social contexts, and particular cultural arrangements.

As this chapter demonstrates, preschool children have been found to make distinctions among hypothetical and actual moral judgments (particularly regarding concrete, familiar instances of harm), judgments regarding social conventions, and evaluations of personal issues, yet young children's judgments are limited in various ways. As children's understanding of mind and reality develops, moral judgments are applied to more abstract, unfamiliar, and complex situations, and children become more able to understand conflicting claims and intentions and to separate facts and values in their judgments. Development during adolescence entails further advances in coordinating different social judgments; adolescents' rights claims become more generalizable and yet more contextually sensitive. The social domain approach has provided a powerful model for understanding individuals' evaluations of social life, social arrangements, and social practices.

Future Directions

Over the past 30 years, social domain theory has expanded in its focus and reach, and considerable progress has been made in understanding morality as one strand of children's developing social

reasoning. Yet gaps in our knowledge remain. The qualitative, normative developmental shifts in children's moral reasoning and differentiations among domains that have emerged from cross-sectional studies need to be further examined with longitudinal designs. Research also is needed to better understand how developmental changes in moral and social knowledge intersect with children's coordination of moral and nonmoral concepts, and more generally, whether coordinations in moral and social concepts change with age.

Research shows that by the third year of life, children have rudimentary moral concepts and distinguish morality from other social concepts. Yet children have diverse social experiences that are evident in the first year of life, and they demonstrate awareness of morally relevant information (e.g., through teasing, humor, provoking others, and interest in others' moral violations) shortly thereafter. Because research on young children's judgments is constrained by language development, other methods (e.g., drawn from studies of infants' physical and social concept formation) should be adapted to examine the early origins of children's moral judgments as defined within social domain theory. In addition, because social domain research developed in response to concerns about the limitations of differentiation models of moral development (Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1932), most of the research on young children's moral and conventional judgments has focused on demonstrating young children's moral competencies. Now that these have been amply documented, attention should be turned to better understand the limits of young children's moral understanding (e.g., in terms of their failure to understand false beliefs) and how these limitations are overcome with increasing age. More research should examine how moral reasoning is informed by children's developing theory of mind and other important developmental changes (e.g., in executive function; see the chapter by Carlson et al. in this handbook).

In addition, there has been increasing interest in the biological substrates of moral judgment development, and advances in moral neurosciences could be used to further illuminate children's developing moral and social knowledge (see the chapter by Flynn and Blair in this handbook). Studies that clarify the complex intersections between affective responses and cognitive processes are needed, particularly as some current perspectives provide potentially oversimplified accounts of these associations (see Killen & Smetana, 2007; Turiel, 2010, for

a discussion of the uses and abuses of moral neuroscience methods). In addition, current research on morality focusing on the role of intuitive processing in social decision making (Haidt, 2001, 2007) typically lacks a developmental focus. Social domain research suggests that with development, some moral judgments in straightforward situations may become more automatic and that the need for cognitive "heavy lifting" shifts to evaluations of more complex issues, including judgments about ambiguous situations or coordinations of moral and non-moral aspects of situations. More research injecting a developmental focus into the discussion of intuitive processes is needed.

For many years, social domain research has focused on normative shifts in children's moral and social judgments and reasoning, but recent research has begun to inform our understanding of individual differences in moral reasoning. This research can usefully contribute to our understanding of problematic or atypical development, as well as normative development in different contexts. Future research should examine how children at different ages evaluate provocation and coordinate the perspectives of victims and transgressors in their moral judgments in hypothetical and actual situations and in their understanding of and attributions for emotions.

Finally, recent research has examined the role of resistance and subversion in developmental processes (e.g., in adolescent-parent relationships) and in social life in cultures (e.g., how those lower in the social hierarchy get their way). More research is needed on how experiences in hierarchical structures and different social arrangements lead to variations in moral and social judgments. Domain research has shown that individuals are active participants in cultures and evaluate the moral, conventional, and personal aspects of their lives as lived, as they ought to be, and as they would like them to be.

Questions for Future Research

1. What are the developmental origins of moral and social judgments in infancy?
2. How do children's developing theory of mind and changes in executive function influence the development of their moral reasoning?
3. How do changes in emotion regulation and processing influence children's moral reasoning and ability to differentiate social knowledge domains?

4. How do children at different ages evaluate provocation and coordinate the perspectives of victims and transgressors in their moral judgments?
5. How does children's coordination of moral and social concepts change with age?
6. In making judgments, what factors influence the salience of different features of situations?
7. How do individual differences in peer relationships influence moral judgments?
8. How do individual differences in moral judgments and emotions influence the development of aggressive behavior and conduct problems?
9. What factors influence changes in moral reasoning?
10. How do experiences in hierarchical structures and different social arrangements lead to variations in moral and social judgments?

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