

ON THE LEGITIMACY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS

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List of Abbreviations

CPO Compulsory Purchase Order

CPR Common Pool Resource

ECHR European Convention of Human Rights

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

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EEA	European Economic Area
EFTA Court . .	Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association States
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
LAD	Land Assembly District
NVE	Norges Vassdrags- og Energidirektorat (Norwegian Water and Energy Directorate)
P1(1)	Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights

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1 Introduction and Summary of Main Themes

Thieves respect property. They merely wish the property to become their property that they may more perfectly respect it.¹

[Granting] a takings power, then, may not be viewed as an act that wrenches away property rights and places an asset outside the world of property protection. Rather, it may be seen as an act within the larger super-structure of property.²

Property can be an elusive concept, especially to property lawyers.³ Indeed, in legal language, the word itself often only functions as a metaphor – an imprecise shorthand that refers to a complex and diverse web of doctrines, rules, and practices, each pertaining to different “sticks” in a bundle of rights.⁴ Should we conclude that property as a unifying term is lost to the law? It certainly seems hard to pin it down. In the words of Kevin Gray, when a close scrutiny of property law gets

¹ GK Chesterton, *The Man Who Was Thursday: A Nightmare* (Dodd, Mead and Company 1908) 58.

² Abraham Bell, ‘Private Takings’ (2009) 76(2) *The University of Chicago Law Review* 517, 583.

³ See, e.g., Emma JL Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (PhD Thesis, 2009) 225-226 (“It is a testament to the elasticity of the concept of property that it is able to represent all things to all people, and to accommodate so many conflicting calls.”); Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50(2) *The Cambridge Law Journal* 252, 252 (“But then, just as the desired object comes finally within reach, just as the notion of property seems reassuringly three-dimensional, the phantom figure dances away through our fingers and dissolves into a formless void.”).

⁴ See generally Thomas C Grey, ‘The Disintegration of Property’ in James Roland Pennock and John W Chapman (eds), *Nomos XXII, Property* (New York University Press 1980); Daniel B Klein and John Robinson, ‘Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium’ (2011) 8(3) *Econ Journal Watch* 193.

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under way, property itself seems like it “vanishes into thin air”.⁵

Arguably, however, property never truly disappears.⁶ Indeed, there is empirical evidence to suggest that humans come to the world with an innate concept of property, one which pre-exists any particular arrangements used to distribute it or mould it as a legal category.⁷ Specifically, humans and a seemingly select group of other animals appear to have an intuitive ability to recognise *thievery*, the taking of property (not necessarily one’s own) by someone who is not entitled to do so.⁸

Taken in this light, Proudhon’s famous dictum, “property is theft”, might be more than a seemingly contradictory comment on the origins of inequality.⁹ It might point to a deeply rooted aspect of property itself, namely its role as an anchor for the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate acts of taking.

In this thesis, I will study takings of a special kind, namely those that are sanctioned by a government in the pursuit of some public use or interest. Specifically, the word *taking* will be used to refer to an exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain.¹⁰ In legal language, especially in the US, takings by eminent domain are often referred to as takings *simpliciter*, while talk of other kinds of “takings” require further qualification, e.g., in case of “takings” based on

⁵ See Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (n 3) 306-307. See also Grey, ‘The Disintegration of Property’ (n 4) 81 (arguing that the eventual consequence of the bundle view is that property will cease to be an important category for legal and political reasoning).

⁶ See Kevin Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (1994) 47(2) Current Legal Problems 157, 159 (“We are continually prompted by stringent, albeit intuitive, perceptions of ‘belonging’.”).

⁷ See Jeffrey Stake, ‘The Property “Instinct”’ in Semir Zeki and Oliver Goodenough (eds), *Law and the Brain* (Oxford University Press 2006).

⁸ See Sarah F Brosnan, ‘Property in nonhuman primates’ [2011] (132) New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development 9, 11-13; Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (n 6) 159.

⁹ For Proudhon’s theory of property generally, distinguishing between *de facto* possession and *de jure* property (regarded as theft), see Derek Strong, ‘Proudhon and the Labour Theory of Property’ (2014) 22(1) Anarchist Studies 52.

¹⁰ See generally William B Stoebuck, ‘A General Theory of Eminent Domain’ (1972) 47 Washington Law Review 553 (clarifying the status of eminent domain from a US perspective, tracing its roots back to early civil law writers such as Grotius and Bynkershoek). Takings will also be referred to as expropriations, especially in the context of Norwegian law. In England and Wales, the corresponding notion is that of compulsory purchase.

contract, taxation, or adverse possession. The US terminology is intuitive and helps bring the issue of legitimacy to the forefront, so I will adopt it throughout this thesis.¹¹

When guided by eminent domain, the taking of private property without the owners' consent is not theft. But it is not necessarily that far removed from it either; the default assumption is that takings are legitimate, but if they are not, one may well be permitted to call them by a different name.¹²

More generally, the idea that the government's power to take is not unlimited seems fundamental. Indeed, the expectation that an owner might find occasion to resist an act of taking, and may or may not have good grounds for doing so, appears deeply rooted in pre-legal intuitions.¹³ This raises the question of how to approach the legitimacy of takings in legal reasoning and what conceptual categories we can benefit from when doing so. This is the key question that is addressed in this thesis, for the special case of so-called *economic development takings*.¹⁴

Such takings occur when a government uses the power of eminent domain to stimulate economic growth, typically by providing property to for-profit companies for use in a concrete development project. The canonical US example is *Kelo v City of New London*, which resulted in great controversy and a surge of academic work on the legitimacy of takings.¹⁵

¹¹ Sometimes it is convenient to draw up the notion of a taking more widely than I do in this thesis, e.g., to include adverse possession, see Waring, 'Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings' (n 3) 19-21. However, such a broader notion will not be used in this thesis. This choice appears natural in light of how the thesis focuses specifically on takings motivated by a government's desire to facilitate concrete economic development projects.

¹² See Kevin Gray, 'Recreational Property' in Susan Bright (ed), *Modern studies in property law: Volume 6* (Hart Publishing 2011) 8-10 (discussing case law from the US, with state judges describing illegitimate takings as "plunder", "rapine", and "robbery").

¹³ See, e.g., Gray, 'Equitable Property' (n 6) 159.

¹⁴ For a sample of scholarship based on this term, see Charles E Cohen, 'Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings' (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 491; Ilya Somin, 'Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo' English (2007) 15(1) Supreme Court Economic Review 183; Michael Paul Wilt, 'Intermediate scrutiny for economic development takings: proposing a new test based on Justice Kennedy's Kelo concurrence' (2009) 31(2) Thomas Jefferson Law Review 431; David S Yellin, 'Masters of Their Own Eminent Domain: The Case for a Reliance Interest Associated with Economic Development Takings' (2011) 99 Georgetown Law Journal 651.

¹⁵ *Kelo v City of New London* 545 US 469 (2005).

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The *Kelo* case concerned several homes that were taken by the government in order to accommodate private enterprise, namely the construction of new research facilities for Pfizer, the multi-national pharmaceutical company. Several home-owners, among them Suzanne Kelo, protested the taking on the basis that it served no public use and was therefore illegitimate under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. The Supreme Court eventually rejected their arguments, but this decision created a backlash that appears to be unique in the history of US jurisprudence.¹⁶

In their mutual condemnation of the *Kelo* decision, commentators from very different ideological backgrounds came together in a shared scepticism towards the legitimacy of economic development takings.¹⁷ Interestingly, their scepticism lacked a clear foundation in US law at the time, as the *Kelo* decision did not appear particularly controversial in light of established eminent domain doctrines.¹⁸ Hence, when the response was overwhelmingly negative, from both sides of the political spectrum, it seems that people were responding to a deeper notion of what counts as legitimate.

If the law is meant to deliver justice, widely shared intuitions about legitimacy deserve attention from legal scholars. In the US, legitimacy intuitions pertaining to economic development takings have indeed received plenty of attention after *Kelo*. Despite the outcome of the case, it is now hard to deny that cases such as *Kelo* belong to a separate category of takings that raises special legal questions.¹⁹ As this change in the narrative was largely the result of a popular movement, there is reason to think that the category of economic development takings is in itself a powerful addition to the discourse on legitimacy, potentially relevant also outside of the US.

¹⁶ See generally Ilya Somin, ‘The Politics of Economic Development Takings’ (2008) 58 Case Western Reserve University Law Review 1185.

¹⁷ See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’ (2006) 106(6) Columbia Law Review 1412, 1413-1415 (‘Everyone hates *Kelo*’, commenting on how criticism was harsh from across the political spectrum).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Bell and Parchomovsky, ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’ (n 17) 1418 (‘The most astounding feature of *Kelo*, as even the case’s harshest critics agree, is that from a legal standpoint, the ruling broke no new ground.’).

¹⁹ See, e.g., Cohen, ‘Eminent Domain After *Kelo v. City of New London*: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings’ (n 14); Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after *Kelo*’ (n 14).

1.1. PROPERTY THEORY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS

To explore this further, it should first be acknowledged that there is a *risk* that takings for economic development can be improperly influenced by commercial, rather than public, interests. This risk is clearly higher in economic development situations than in cases when takings take place to benefit a concretely identified public interest, such as the building of a new school or a public road. Hence, it is already intuitively reasonable to single out economic development takings for special attention at the political and normative level. However, should the categorisation also be recognised as a basis for justiciable restrictions on the takings power?

This is not obvious, as it conflicts with the prevalent idea that governments enjoy a “wide margin of appreciation” when it comes to their use of eminent domain.²⁰ However, as the US debate shows, it might be hard to deny judicial review as soon as the special features of economic development takings are brought into focus. This points to the first main theme of this thesis: an analysis of economic development takings as a conceptual category for legal reasoning about property protection.

1.1 Property Theory and Economic Development Takings

In Part I, this thesis will argue that economic development takings should be recognised as a distinct category of takings at the theoretical level, with respect to fundamental rules that protect private property. This claim will be made on the basis of a theory of property that is broader than typical approaches found in the law and in legal scholarship. Specifically, the thesis rejects the view that private property should be understood as a form of entitlement protection.²¹

Instead, chapter 2 will argue for a social function understanding, with an emphasis on human

²⁰ This expression has been used by the European Court of Human Rights, see *James and others v United Kingdom* (1986) Series A no 98, para 54. In the US, the same attitude was clearly a factor motivating the majority in *Kelo* (n 15).

²¹ For a famous entitlements-based view of private property, see Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review 1089.

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flourishing as the normative foundation for private property.²² In short, property should be protected because it can help people flourish, as members of a democratic society.²³ Moreover, property is meant to serve this function not only for the owners themselves, but also for the other members of their communities.²⁴

Such an ambitious take on property must necessarily also give rise to a broader assessment of legitimacy when the state interferes with it.²⁵ This is what inspires my initial discussion on economic development takings in chapter 2. There I will present the basic definition of the notion and discuss the *Kelo* case in some more detail. Specifically, I will argue that Justice O'Connor's strongly worded dissent – finding that the taking should be rescinded – is consistent with, and subtly conducive to, a social function perspective on property.²⁶

It should be emphasised that the focus will be on the question of when a taking is legitimate as such, not the question of how much compensation should be paid to the owners. Of course, the two questions are related; the amount of compensation offered can influence the degree of legitimacy of the interference. Some scholars go further and argue that the legitimacy question is primarily about finding the appropriate mechanism for awarding compensation.²⁷ With the theoretical approach to property adopted in this thesis, this view must be rejected; the social functions of property are not reducible to financial entitlements. Moreover, the aim of this thesis is to discuss precisely those aspects of legitimacy that *cannot* be addressed through compensation. The link to compensation

²² For human flourishing theories of property generally, see Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver, *Community and Property* (Oxford University Press 2010) chapter 5.

²³ See also Colin Crawford, 'The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish' (2011) 80(3) *Fordham Law Review* 1089, 1089.

²⁴ See generally Gray, 'Equitable Property' (n 6); Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo M Peñalver, 'Properties of Community' (2009) 10 *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 127; Gregory S Alexander, 'Property's Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values' (2014) 99(3) *Iowa Law Review* 1257.

²⁵ See also Laura S Underkuffler, 'Kelo's moral failure' (2006) 15(2) *William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 377.

²⁶ See *Kelo* (n 15) 494-505.

²⁷ See generally Lee Anne Fennell, 'Taking Eminent Domain Apart' (2004) 2004 *Michigan State Law Review* 957; Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, 'Taking Compensation Private' (2007) 59(4) *Stanford Law Review* 871; Amnon Lehari and Amir N Licht, 'Eminent Domain, Inc.' (2007) 107(7) *Columbia Law Review* 1704.

1.1. PROPERTY THEORY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS

will be mentioned when it seems relevant, but the compensation issues that arise for economic development takings will not be analysed in any depth.²⁸

While I will advocate for a broad approach to the question of legitimacy of economic development takings, this thesis will remain focused on private property. Other potential consequences of economic development, such as effects on the environment and social welfare impacts, will be considered as they arise in disputes about takings, not as issues in their own right. These aspects of economic development will therefore receive less attention here than they would in a thesis focusing specifically on environmental law or social and economic rights. That said, one of the main arguments made in chapter 2 is that the social function perspective on property implies that we should take broader societal and environmental effects into account also when assessing the legitimacy of interfering with private property. The thesis argues for this coming from property theory, and in so doing will also touch on the conservation and social justice dimensions of economic development. In addition, chapter 2 will argue that if the social functions of private property support egalitarianism and equity at the local level, then private property can serve as an anchor for justice also with respect to the environment and the social and economic rights of non-owners. This point will also be made in Part II of the thesis, when discussing the issue of hydropower development in Norway. In future work, I hope to develop the idea further, to embark on research that will connect the social function account of property even more closely with environmental law and social and economic rights.

Chapter 3 builds on the property theory developed in chapter 2 by giving a more in-depth presentation of the legitimacy question, leading to a proposal for a justiciable legitimacy standard that makes judicial intervention possible. To make the discussion concrete, the chapter first offers a brief review and comparison of jurisprudential developments in the US, the UK, and at the

²⁸ For such an analysis, see Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘On the compensatory approach to economic development takings’ in Björn Hoops and others (eds), *The Context, Criteria, and Consequences of Expropriation* (forthcoming, Ius Commune 2015).

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European Court of Human Rights. These jurisdictions are chosen specifically for their many close connections with the Norwegian system, making them a natural reference point also for the case study in Part II of the thesis. Moreover, all the countries discussed are in comparable socio-economic situations, with property having a similar social function across the jurisdictions studied. This permits a comparative discussion that focuses specifically on the issue of takings, reducing the risk that the analysis will be distorted by significant differences in the social and economic context of takings law across different jurisdictions. The broader insights gained from the work done in this thesis might still be highly relevant to jurisdictions that have not been explicitly discussed. But a further treatment of this issue, for instance with respect to jurisdictions from the developing world, raises additional questions that must be left for future work.

Based on the choice of jurisdictions justified above, the thesis reviews several approaches to judicial review, culminating in a recommendation for a perspective based on institutional fairness that I trace to recent developments at the European Court of Human Rights. Specifically, the Court in Strasbourg has begun to look more actively at the systemic reasons why violations of human rights occur, in order to address structural weaknesses at the institutional level in the signatory states.²⁹ This approach is arguably one that fits very well with the sort of analysis carried out by Justice O'Connor in *Kelo*, perhaps more so than the approach induced by the Fifth Amendment.

Importantly, the institutional perspective appears to be a sensible middle ground between procedural and substantive approaches to legitimacy, directing us to focus on decision-making processes without giving up on substantive fairness assessments. To ensure fairness, in particular, is not just about making good decisions, but also about how those decisions came about, and how likely it is that the system will have disproportionate effects at the societal level. This way of thinking about legitimacy brings me to the second main theme of this thesis, concerning the

²⁹ See generally P Leach and others, *Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of 'Pilot Judgments' of the European Court of Human Rights and Their Impact at National Level* (Intersentia 2010).

question of *democratic merit*.

1.2 A Democratic Deficit in Takings Law?

As discussed in chapter 2, two of the key social functions of property is to promote social justice and to facilitate democratic decision-making.³⁰ In addition, property is meant to serve as a bridge between individual needs, community interests, and policy making at the national and the international stage. Through the law of property, societal priorities can be communicated to owners and communities without depriving them of their right to self-governance.³¹

These functions of property are easily undermined if there is an excessive concentration of power and wealth among the elites of society. As indicated by Justice O'Connor's dissent in *Kelo*, this is one of the key reasons why economic development takings should be looked at with suspicion. In short, the concern is that economic development takings can both reflect and exacerbate a *democratic deficit*.

There are many symptoms that can suggest a lack of democratic legitimacy, and to make the discussion more concrete, chapter 3 proposes a legitimacy test consisting of nine indicators of eminent domain abuse. The first six points are due to Kevin Gray, while the final three are additions I propose on the basis of the work done in this thesis.³² I call the resulting list the Gray test, a heuristic for inquiring into the legitimacy of an economic development taking.

Arguably, the most important indicator is the one pertaining to the overall democratic merit of the taking (one of my additions). When taken together with the other points, this indicator should induce an assessment of legitimacy against the decision-making process as a whole. Hence,

³⁰ See also, with further references, Carol M Rose, 'Property as the keystone right?' (1996) 71(3) Notre Dame Law Review 329; Janet Jackson, 'What is Property? Property is Theft: The Lack of Social Justice in US Eminent Domain Law' (2010) 84(1) St. John's Law Review 63.

³¹ This is discussed in depth in chapter 2, sections 2.4 and 2.5.

³² For Gray's original points see Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 12).

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it emphasises the institutional fairness perspective. If a taking fails the legitimacy test on this point, it might indicate an existing weakness of the system or a trend towards deterioration of the institutional framework surrounding eminent domain. This problem, moreover, might not be noticeable unless one considers an aggregated view of all the indicators of the Gray test, to shed light on what they tell us about the democratic legitimacy of existing practices.

Admittedly, asking courts to test for legitimacy is an incomplete response to the worry that economic development takings might result from, and give rise to, a democratic deficit at the societal level. This point has been argued by some US scholars, who claim that increased judicial scrutiny is neither a necessary nor a sufficient response to concerns about the institutional legitimacy of takings such as *Kelo*.³³ Instead, these scholars try to come up with institutional innovations that can restore legitimacy in cases when the government wishes to ensure economic development on private property.

The most notable work in this direction so far is that of Heller and Hills, proposing what they call Land Assembly Districts (LADs) as possible alternatives to the use of eminent domain.³⁴ The idea is that LADs will be set up to replace the traditional takings procedure in cases where property rights are fragmented and the potential takers have commercial incentives. The basic mechanism is one of self-governance; the owners themselves should be allowed to decide whether or not development takes place, by some sort of collective choice mechanism (possibly as simple as a majority vote). In this way, the holdout problem can be solved (individual owners cannot threaten to block development to inflate the value of their properties). At the same time, the local community's right to manage its own property is recognised and respected.

The LAD proposal is closely linked to more general ideas about self-governance and sustainable

³³ See generally Lehari and Licht (n 27); Michael Heller and Rick Hills, 'Land Assembly Districts' (2008) 121(6) Harvard Law Review 1465.

³⁴ See Heller and Hills (n 33).

resource management, particularly the theories developed by Elinor Ostrom and others.³⁵ On the basis of a large body of empirical work, these scholars have formulated and refined a range of design principles for institutions that can promote good self-governance at the local level.³⁶

At the end of chapter 3, I argue that this work can be used to address the legitimacy of takings in a principled way, to arrive at refinements or alternatives to the proposal made by Heller and Hills. Specifically, it seems that alternatives to expropriation based on self-governance can be a powerful way to address the worry that economic development takings might otherwise be associated with a democratic deficit. At the same time, the context-dependence of solutions along these lines make sweeping reform proposals unlikely to succeed. Rather, it is important that the institutions that are used are appropriately matched to local conditions.³⁷ This sets the stage for the second part of the thesis, consisting of a case study of takings for Norwegian hydropower development.

1.3 Putting The Theory to the Test

In Norwegian law, the legitimacy questions that arise with respect to takings usually begin and end with the issue of compensation.³⁸ If an owner has grievances about the act of taking as such, rather than the amount of money they receive, takings law has very little to offer. In fact, it does not appear to offer anything that does not already follow from general administrative law. The owner can argue that the taking decision was in breach of procedural rules, or grossly unreasonably, but

³⁵ See Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (Cambridge University Press 1990). For the connection with property theory generally, see Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, 'Private and Common Property' in Boudewijn Bouckaert (ed), *Property Law and Economics* (Edward Elgar 2010); Carol Rose, 'Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal academy' (2011) 5(1) *International Journal of the Commons* 28; LA Fennel, 'Ostrom's Law: Property Rights in the Commons' (2011) 5(1) *International Journal of the Commons* 9.

³⁶ For a more recent empirical assessment (and refinement), see M Cox, G Arnold and SV Tomas, 'A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management' (2010) 15(4) *Ecology And Society* 38.

³⁷ See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 35) 92.

³⁸ See generally Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, 'Norwegian Waterfalls: A Case Study of Commercial Expropriation in Light of Property as a Human Right' in Ann Apers and others (eds), *Property Law Perspectives III* (Ius Commune: European and Comparative Law Series, 2015) vol 132; Dyrkolbotn, 'On the compensatory approach to economic development takings' (n 28).

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the chance of succeeding is slim.³⁹

In cases involving hydropower development, the position of property owners is also strongly influenced by sector-specific legislation, as well as special administrative and market practices. Chapter 4 begins the case study by discussing this in more depth, setting the stage for the discussion on expropriation that follows in chapter 5. A first important observation is that the hydropower sector in Norway was liberalised in the early 1990s.⁴⁰ This means that the energy companies benefiting from eminent domain are now commercial enterprises, not public utilities.

A second important observation is that the right to harness the power of water is considered private property in Norway, typically owned in common by members of nearby rural communities.⁴¹ This does not mean that freely running water, as a substance, is subject to private property. What it means is that riparian owners have an additional stick in the bundle of rights that the law associates with being the owner of land over which water flows. A useful comparison can be made with fishing rights; the right to the hydropower in a river arises from landownership, but it is conceived of as a separate, transferable, right in property.⁴² It is referred to in Norwegian as a “fallrett”, which can be translated as a *waterfall right*. This thesis will therefore often refer to waterfalls and owners of waterfalls when discussing the right to harness the power of water in a river.⁴³

³⁹ See Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ in JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), *Expropriation Law in Europe* (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 384-386.

⁴⁰ The crucial legislative reform was the Energy Act 1990.

⁴¹ See Water Resources Act 2000, s 13. This arrangement has long historical roots and makes intuitive sense in a mountainous country with a very vast number of small and medium sized rivers coming down from steep outfield mountains. For the historical development of the law on this point, see Ernst Nordtveit, ‘History of Water Law in Scandinavia’ in Terje Tvedt, Owen McIntyre and Tadessa Kasse Woldesadik (eds), *A History of Water, Series III, Volume 2: Sovereignty and International Water Law* (IB Tauris 2015) 109-116.

⁴² Apart from this explicit recognition of water power as a separate right in property, the Norwegian system of riparian rights appears to be historically quite similar to the riparian common law, see generally William Howarth, ‘The History of Water Law in the Common Law Tradition’ in Terje Tvedt, Owen McIntyre and Tadessa Kasse Woldesadik (eds), *A History of Water, Series III, Volume 2: Sovereignty and International Water Law* (IB Tauris 2015).

⁴³ In some cases, especially historically, a waterfall right would be formally registered as a separate unit of real property to facilitate transfer to someone other than the owner of the surrounding agricultural land. However, waterfall rights can also be formally registered as rights of use attaching to the real properties from which they arise. In relation

1.3. PUTTING THE THEORY TO THE TEST

As discussed in Part II of this thesis, hydroelectric companies in Norway have traditionally had easy access to privately owned waterfalls, made possible through the government's power of eminent domain. However, since deregulation, local owners have begun to resist such takings. This has been motivated by the fact that owners can now undertake their own hydropower projects as a commercial pursuit; unlike the situation before liberalisation, owner-led development projects can demand access to the electricity grid as producers.⁴⁴ This has led to heightened tensions between takers and owners, tensions that the water authorities are now forced to grapple with on a regular basis.

Chapter 4 argues that despite their improved position following liberalisation, local owners remain marginalised under the regulatory framework. Specifically, despite political support for locally organised small-scale development, the large energy companies have continued to enjoy a privileged position in their dealings with the water authorities. Building on this observation, chapter 5 goes on to discuss eminent domain in more depth. The chapter tracks the position of owners under the law and administrative practices that relate to takings of waterfalls. The key finding is that expropriation is usually an *automatic consequence* of a large-scale development license.⁴⁵ That is, commercial companies that succeed in obtaining large-scale development licenses will almost always be granted the right to expropriate. This right will be granted, moreover, with little or no prior assessment as to the appropriateness of depriving local communities of their resources.

While the appropriateness of taking property from local people is rarely discussed, the issue of how hydropower affects the environment has received increased attention in recent decades. Sometimes, environmental impact assessments will uncover negative effects and the water author-

to Norwegian expropriation law, and for the purposes of this thesis, the distinction between these two ways of registering waterfall rights will not play an important role and will not be discussed further.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., *Agder Energi Produksjon AS v Møllen* Rt-2008-82 (Uleberg).

⁴⁵ In some cases, this follows explicitly from the water resource legislation, while in other cases it follows from administrative practice. For further details, see below in chapter 5, section 5.3.

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ities will reject development applications, also when the applicant is a large energy company. In general, the framework for management of hydropower in Norway has an important conservation dimension that is clearly recognised by the government. It should be noted that conservation issues are often orthogonal to the property question. In some cases, local owners of waterfalls will oppose large-scale development projects that damage the environment, while in other cases, environmental interests will block small-scale projects that the owners themselves would like to carry out. The important point made in this thesis is that while the Norwegian system has an elaborate framework in place to evaluate the environmental consequences of hydropower, the effect on local owners and communities receives little or no attention. This is also reflected in previous scholarship of the law of hydropower. For this reason, the present thesis focuses specifically on property, without giving a separate treatment of conservation issues. This means, for example, that the thesis will not discuss the special issues that arise when the property rights of local owners are restricted to conserve the local environment, a relatively common example of property interference in water law, but one that does not qualify as an economic development taking.

Although conservation issues in water law are not dealt with in any depth in this thesis, such issues will be discussed when they have a bearing on the legitimacy questions that arise when energy companies expropriate waterfalls. As I will demonstrate in chapter 5, environmental organisations and energy companies both enjoy a significantly stronger position within the regulatory framework than local owners and communities. Recently, there has been a tendency for these two power groups to reach compromises, such that large-scale development projects are allowed to go ahead while small-scale projects are stopped because of their environmental effects. Indeed, environmental groups and commercial companies now appear to be reaching a form of mutual understanding that large-scale development is *better* for the environment than small-scale projects. As discussed in chapter 5, this conclusion rests on what appears to be a very narrow and arguably misguided understanding of what sustainability and conservation should entail in the context of hydropower

1.3. PUTTING THE THEORY TO THE TEST

development. Moreover, when environmental groups and large energy companies unite in this way, it raises the worry that local owners and their communities will be marginalised further.

Indeed, as chapter 5 will demonstrate, the owners' position during the licensing assessment stage is highly precarious, contrasting both with the strong position of the development companies and the similarly influential role played by conservation interests.⁴⁶ The fact that expropriation tends to follow automatically from a license to develop has led the water authorities to focus their attention on the licensing question and associated procedures. No distinction appears to be made between cases involving expropriation and cases that do not. This has a significant effect on the level of procedural protection offered to local owners. For instance, according to written testimony during a recent Supreme Court case on legitimacy, the water authorities do not recognise any duty to give individual notice to local owners before processing applications that involve expropriation of their waterfalls.⁴⁷

In relation to the compensation issue, the owners' legal position initially grew stronger after liberalisation. Specifically, the lower courts started to compensate local owners for the lost opportunity to profit from hydropower.⁴⁸ This led to a dramatic increase in compensation payments compared to earlier practice.⁴⁹ However, a recent decision from the Supreme Court appears to largely reverse this development, since a large-scale license may now be considered proof that alternative development by owners is unforeseeable and therefore not compensable.⁵⁰

In light of this and other data discussed in chapter 5, my conclusion is that recent takings for hydropower do not in fact pass the Gray test. The current practices appear illegitimate with

⁴⁶ See especially the discussion in chapter 5, sections 5.6 and 5.7.

⁴⁷ The case in question was *Måland v Jörpeland Kraft AS* Rt-2011-1393.

⁴⁸ See *Uleberg* (n 44) (specifically, it was observed that waterfalls now had a market value, due to the increasing prevalence of owner-led hydropower).

⁴⁹ See especially the discussion in chapter 5, section 5.5.1.

⁵⁰ See *Bjørnara v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening* Rt-2013-612.

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respect to the theory of property developed in Part I of the thesis.

At the same time, Norwegian law offers a promising institutional path towards the restoration of legitimacy in economic development contexts. Specifically, the unique framework for land consolidation found in Norway can serve such a function. This has already been demonstrated in the context of hydropower development, where land consolidation courts have been able to successfully organise development projects on behalf of owners who wish to undertake development but disagree about how it should be done. This brings me to the fourth key theme of this thesis.

1.4 A Judicial Framework for Compulsory Participation

The fourth and final key theme, presented in chapter 6, consists of an assessment of the Norwegian land consolidation courts. These courts have the power to order owners to undertake or allow development projects (without depriving them of their property), as an alternative to expropriation. Moreover, they are presently used in this way in the context of hydropower development. The large energy companies almost never use consolidation, but local communities often do.⁵¹ In these cases, the land consolidation courts have proved themselves effective in making self-governance work, also in cases when some of the owners do not wish to undertake development.

The land consolidation alternative can make a great difference, especially since it strives to ensure legitimacy through participation. The potential democratic deficit associated with economic development takings is dealt with by mechanisms that seek to enable owners to take active part in the management of their property in the public interest. At the same time, the procedure can be quite effective, since participation is compulsory and the consolidation judge may intervene to settle conflicts and establish organisational order. Chapter 6 also addresses possible objections to the procedure, but concludes that the continued development of the land consolidation institution

⁵¹ According to the Court Administration, as of 2009, land consolidation proceedings had facilitated a total of 164 small-scale hydropower projects with a total annual energy output of about 2 TWh per year (enough electricity to supply a city of about 250 000 people), see *Gevinstbetraktninger ved Jordskifte* (Domstoladministrasjonen 2009).

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provides the best way forward for addressing problems associated with economic development takings in Norway.

If the integrity and efficiency of the procedure can be preserved, it appears to have great potential as an alternative to eminent domain in general, also in cases involving large-scale development and cooperation with external commercial actors. Moreover, while the system is designed to work in a setting of egalitarian property rights, it is interesting to consider whether key features of the procedure could inspire solutions to the takings problem in other jurisdictions.

It might well be, for instance, that a land consolidation approach coupled with a human flourishing understanding of property can be a good way of including non-owners in the process, in jurisdictions where property rights are not distributed as widely among the population as in Norway. This might make the procedure more complex and give rise to new risks of abuse by local elites, but it seems like an interesting idea to explore in future work.

In short, the consolidation alternative provides a starting point for an approach to legitimacy that takes a wider view of what property is, and what role it can and should play in a democratic society. In this way, the chapter on consolidation also returns to the conceptual premise discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, whereby the purpose of property is to promote human flourishing.

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Part I

Towards a Theory of Economic Development Takings

2 Property, Protection and Privilege

2.1 Introduction

The category of economic development takings makes intuitive sense; it targets situations when property is literally taken for economic development. In most cases considered in this thesis, economic development is even the explicitly stated aim used to justify the exercise of eminent domain. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the legal relevance of the category cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, a superficial look at typical approaches to takings in the law would seem to indicate that the nature of the project benefiting from a taking is not usually a major issue when assessing the legitimacy of interference.¹

This chapter challenges that idea, by offering an argument as to why the purpose and context of a taking matters, not only as a question of public policy but also with respect to property as a fundamental right. From the point of view of US law, providing such an argument might

¹ For instance, in Europe, the property jurisprudence at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deals almost exclusively with other aspects of legitimacy. The Court typically stresses that interference must be in the public interest, but then leaves this aspect of legitimacy behind after making clear that the member states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in relation to the public interest requirement. See, e.g., *James and others v United Kingdom* (1986) Series A no 98; *Lindheim and others v Norway* ECHR 2012 985 (however, the form and strength of the public interest is potentially relevant to the Court's fair balance assessment, as discussed in chapter 3). Similarly, in the US in the 1980s, Merrill claimed that most observers thought of the public use clause in the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution as nothing more than a "dead letter", see Thomas W Merrill, 'The Economics of Public Use' (1986) 72 Cornell Law Review 61, 61.

not be strictly required, since economic development takings have already gained recognition as an important category of legal reasoning.² However, a conceptual discussion of what exactly the category represents appears to be missing in the literature so far. In Europe, moreover, the category has so far not received much recognition as a legally relevant way to address the legitimacy of expropriation. Hence, in a comparative study, a conceptual investigation into the very idea of an economic development taking is a necessary first step.

This chapter argues that in order to make this step, we should broaden our theoretical outlook compared to traditional forms of legal reasoning about property. Moreover, it will be argued that a suitable conceptual reconfiguration is already implicit in recent strands of property theory, particularly those that focus on the *social function* of property.³ Indeed, the crux of the main argument presented in this chapter is that the social function view compels us to pay attention to the special dynamics of power that tend to manifest in cases when private property is taken by the state for economic development, especially in the context of commercial exploitation.

To make clear why such takings are special, this chapter abandons the traditional entitlements-based perspective on property in favour of a perspective that emphasises the ideal function of property as a guarantor of social justice and a building block of democracy and participatory decision-making, particularly at the local level. This allows us to shift attention away from the effect that a taking has on individuals one-by-one, towards the question of whether the purpose of the taking, and its broader societal effect, merits interfering with private property. When this

² See generally Charles E Cohen, 'Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings' (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 491; Ilya Somin, 'Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo' English (2007) 15(1) Supreme Court Economic Review 183; Robin Paul Malloy (ed), *Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain* (Ashgate 2008).

³ See generally Gregory S Alexander and others, 'A Statement of Progressive Property' (2009) 94(4) Cornell Law Review 743; Sheila R Foster and Daniel Bonilla, 'The Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective' (2011) 80 Fordham Law Review 1003; Joseph William Singer, *Entitlement: The paradoxes of property* (Yale University Press 2000); Laura S Underkuffler, *The Idea of Property: Its meaning and power* (Oxford University Press 2010); Gregory S Alexander, *The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence* (University of Chicago Press 2006); Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver, *Community and Property* (Oxford University Press 2010); Hanoch Dagan, *Property: Values and Institutions* (Oxford University Press 2011).

question is recognised as falling within the sphere of property law, it also provides a potential basis for judicial review rooted in property protection.

This chapter will also argue that private property is important because it gives owners a right to take part in decision-making processes concerning economic development, a right that also typically gives owners a duty to participate, not only on their own behalf, but also on behalf of broader community interests. In my view, this highlights how property rights can empower local communities in their interactions with powerful commercial and central government interests. Clearly, the use of eminent domain can undermine this function of property, thereby threatening the democratic legitimacy of the decision-making process, by depriving local communities of a potentially robust source of participatory competence. Moreover, when property interests are transferred away from the local community on a permanent basis, this threatens to leave a lasting democratic deficit in the wake of economic development. Arguably, this is the key reason why we should recognise economic development takings as a separate conceptual category.

To motivate the theoretical work, I start by considering the Balmedie controversy, pertaining to Donald Trump's plans for a golf resort in Scotland. I use this concrete example to highlight tensions between property's different functions in the context of economic development, to motivate the theoretical arguments that follow.

2.2 Donald Trump in Scotland

On the 10th of July 2010, the property magnate Donald Trump opened his first golf-course in Scotland, proudly announcing that it would be the "best golf-course in the world".⁴ Impressed with the unspoilt and dramatic seaside landscape of Scotland's east coast, the New Yorker, who made his fortune as a real estate entrepreneur, had decided he wanted to develop a golf course in

⁴ See Joe Passow, 'Trump Scotland is on its way to being one of the best courses in the world' (*Golf Magazine*, 13th July 2012) (<http://www.golf.com/courses-and-travel/donald-trump-scotland-golf-course-lives-hype>) accessed 16th April 2015.

the village of Balmedie, close to Aberdeen.

To realise his plans, Trump purchased the Menie estate in 2006, with the intention of turning it into a large resort with a five-star hotel, 950 timeshare flats, and two 18-hole golf-courses.⁵ The local authorities were divided on the issue of whether to grant planning permission, which was first denied by Aberdeenshire Council.⁶ One of the reasons for rejecting the plans was that the proposed site for the development had previously been declared to be of special scientific interest under conservation legislation.⁷ The frailty and richness of the sand dune ecosystem, it was argued, suggested that the land should be left unspoilt for future generations. Several members of the local population actively campaigned against the plans, with some also refusing to sell property that Trump wanted to include in his development project.⁸

Trump was not deterred, and in the end he was able to convince Scottish ministers that he should be given the go-ahead on the prospect of boosting the economy by creating some 6000 new jobs.⁹ Activists continued to fight the development, launching the “Tripping up Trump” campaign to back up local residents who refused to sell their properties.¹⁰ One of these, the farmer and quarry worker Michael Forbes, expressed his opposition in particularly clear terms, declaring at

⁵ See Haroon Siddique, ‘Trump triumphs in battle for Scottish golf resort’ (*The Guardian*, 3rd November 2008) (<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/03/donaldtrump-scotland>) accessed 26th August 2015.

⁶ See, e.g., ‘Trump’s £1bn golf plan rejected’ *BBC News* (London, 29th November 2007) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/north_east/7118105.stm) accessed 18th April 2015.

⁷ See ‘Trump’s golf submission swings in’ *BBC News* (London, 30th March 2007) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/north_east/6506923.stm) accessed 18th April 2015.

⁸ See ‘Donald Trump’s plea to homeowners on the Menie Estate’ (*The Scotsman*, Edinburgh, 12th November 2010) (<http://www.scotsman.com/news/donald-trump-s-plea-to-homeowners-on-the-menie-estate-1-1370270>) accessed 16th April 2015.

⁹ See Severin Carrell, ‘“World’s best golf course” approved - complete with 23-acre eyesore’ *The Guardian* (London, 4th November 2008) (<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/04/donald-trump-scottish-golf-course>) accessed 16th April 2015. Trump’s plans attracted significant public attention, and his interaction with Scottish decision-makers came under critical scrutiny by commentators, see, e.g., Simon Jenkins, ‘Scotland’s gullible politicians are the victims of a colossal Trump try-on’ (*The Guardian*, 13th June 2008) (<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/jun/13/donaldtrump.scotland>) accessed 16th April 2015. For a more general assessment from the point of view of conservation interests in the UK, see Arts Koen and Gina Maffrey, ‘Trump’s golf course – Society’s nature. The death and resurrection of nature conservation’ (2013) 34(1) *ECOS* 49.

¹⁰ See ‘Tripping up Trump’ (<http://www.trippinguptrump.co.uk>) accessed 16th April 2015.

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one point that Trump could “shove his money up his arse”.¹¹ Trump, on his part, had described Forbes as a “village idiot” that lived in a “slum”.¹² Moreover, he had suggested that Forbes was keeping his property in a state of disrepair on purpose, to coerce Trump to pay more for the land, to remove the blight.¹³ Forbes was offended and he proudly declared that he would never consider selling, as the issue had become personal.¹⁴

At the height of the tensions, Trump asked the local council to consider issuing compulsory purchase orders (CPOs) that would allow him to take property from Forbes and other recalcitrant locals against their will.¹⁵ These plans met with widespread outrage. The media coverage was wide, mostly negative, and an award-winning documentary was made which painted Trump’s activities in Balmedie in a highly negative light.¹⁶ The controversy also found its way into UK property scholarship. Kevin Gray, in particular, a leading expert in property law, expressed his opposition by making clear that he thought the proposed taking would be an act of “predation”.¹⁷

In fact, the case prompted Gray to formulate a number of key features that could be used

¹¹ See (n 8).

¹² See ‘Trump may pursue housing laws over golf ‘slum’ *BBC News* (London, 1st June 2010) (<http://www.bbc.com/news/10205781>) accessed 16th April 2015.

¹³ See ‘Fisherman bunkers Trump golf plan’ *CNN* (Atlanta, Georgia, 10th October 2007) (<http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/10/10/trump.golf/>) accessed 16th April 2015.

¹⁴ See Brian Ferguson, ‘Farmer who took on Trump triumphs in Spirit awards’ *The Scotsman* (Edinburgh, 29th November 2012) (<http://www.scotsman.com/news/scotland/top-stories/farmer-who-took-on-trump-triumphs-in-spirit-awards-1-2668649>) accessed 16th April 2015.

¹⁵ See Mark Macaskill, ‘Donald Trump accused of new clearance’ *The Sunday Times* (London, 6th September 2009) (http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article184090.ece) accessed 16th April 2015. It would not have been the first time Donald Trump benefited from eminent domain. In the 1990s, he famously succeeded in convincing Atlantic City to allow him to take the home of Vera Coking, to facilitate further development of his casino facilities. But in this instance, Trump did not get his way. Indeed, the taking of Vera’s home was eventually struck down by the New Jersey Superior Court, an influential result that was hailed as a milestone in the fight against “eminent domain abuse” in the US. See Stephen J Jones, ‘Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment’ (2000) 50 *Syracuse Law Review* 285, 297-301. See also Nick Gillespie, ‘Litigating for Liberty’ *Reason* (Los Angeles, 2008) (<http://reason.com/archives/2008/03/03/litigating-for-liberty/4>) accessed 16th April 2015. For the decision itself, consult *Casino Reinvestment DevAuth v Banin* 727 A2d 102 (NJ Super Ct Law Div 1998).

¹⁶ See Anthony Baxter, ‘You’ve been Trumped’ (3rd May 2011) (http://www.youvebeentrumped.com/youvebeentrumped.com/THE_MOVIE.html) accessed 16th April 2015.

¹⁷ Kevin Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ in Susan Bright (ed), *Modern studies in property law: Volume 6* (Hart Publishing 2011).

to identify situations where compulsory purchase would be likely to represent an abuse of power. Gray noted, moreover, that Trump's proposed takings would fall in line with a general tendency in the UK towards using compulsory purchase to benefit private enterprise, even in the absence of a clear and direct benefit to the public. In light of this, it seemed realistic that CPOs might be used in Balmedie.¹⁸ It would not be hard to argue that the public would benefit indirectly in terms of job-creation and increased tax revenues. Moreover, Scottish ministers had already gone far in expressing their support for the plans.

But then, in a surprise move, Trump announced he would not seek CPOs.¹⁹ Instead, he decided to pursue a different strategy, namely that of containment. He erected large fences, planted trees and created artificial sand dunes, all serving to prevent the properties he did not control from becoming a nuisance to his golfing guests. One local owner, Susan Monroe, was fenced in by a wall of sand some 8 meters high. "I used to be able to see all the way to the other side of Aberdeen", she said, "but now I just look into that mound of sand".²⁰ She also lamented the lack of support from the Scottish government, expressing surprise that nothing could be done to stop Trump.

There was little left to do. As soon as the decision was made to build around them, the neighbouring property owners found themselves marginalised. Trump, on his part, was declared a valuable job-creator whose activities would boost the economy in the region. He even received an honorary doctorate at Robert Gordon University, a move that prompted the previous vice-chancellor, Dr David Kennedy, to hand his own honorific back in protest.²¹

¹⁸ Moreover, a statutory authority is found in section 189 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997, stating that local authorities have a general power to acquire land compulsorily in order to "secure the carrying out of development, redevelopment or improvement".

¹⁹ See 'Scepticism as Donald Trump claims no evictions over Menie' *The Scotsman* (Edinburgh, 31st January 2011) (<http://www.scotsman.com/news/scepticism-as-donald-trump-claims-no-evictions-over-menie-1-1499167>) accessed 17th April 2015.

²⁰ See Robert Booth, 'Donald Trump opens £100m golf course' (*The Guardian*, 10th July 2012) (<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/10/donald-trump-100m-golf-course>) accessed 16th April 2015.

²¹ See 'Degree returned over Donald Trump's RGU award' *BBC News* (London, 28th September 2010) (<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-11421376>) accessed 17th April 2015.

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In the end, then, it was not by taking the land of others that Trump triumphed in Scotland. Rather, he succeeded by exercising “despotic dominion” over his own.²² This proved highly effective. After he fenced them in, his neighbours were hard to see and hard to hear. The Balmedie controversy went quiet, the golfers came, Trump got his way. As he declared during the grand opening: “Nothing will ever be built around this course because I own all the land around it. [...] It’s nice to own land.”²³

...

The tale of Trump coming to Scotland serves to illustrate the kind of scenario that I will be looking at in this thesis. In addition, it puts my work into perspective. For a while, it looked like Balmedie was about to become a canonical case of an economic development taking. But in the end, it became an illustration of something more subtle, namely that what it means to protect property depends on value judgements regarding opposing property interests. In particular, while Trump achieved his ends in Scotland by relying on his own property rights, he did so by undermining the property rights of others, even if he did not formally condemn those rights.

This was made possible by an exercise of regulatory and financial power. Hence, we are reminded that the function of property as such is deeply shaped by social, political and economic structures. For the powerful owner, property can be used offensively to oppress weaker parties. For the marginalised, it might well be the last line of defence against oppression. Indeed, Donald Trump’s ownership of the Menie estate has a vastly different meaning than does Michael Forbes’ ownership of his small farm. To many observers, the former kind of ownership will represent some combination of power, privilege and profit, while the latter will be regarded as imbued with a mix of defiance, community and sustenance. Different values are inherent in these two forms of

²² To quote Blackstone, see William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 2: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765–1769* (University of Chicago Press 1979) 2.

²³ See Booth (n 20).

ownership, and when Trump came to Balmedie, they clashed in a way that required the legal order to prioritise between them.

In Trump's narrative, upholding the sanctity of property in Balmedie entails allowing him to protect his golf resort plans from what he regards as backwards locals who attempt to fight progress. If this is one's starting point, property protection might even come to involve the use of compulsory purchase of rights that are seen as a hindrance to the full enjoyment of property by a more resourceful owner.

For Michael Forbes and the other local owners, protecting property has a completely different meaning. To them, it was paramount to protect the local community against what they saw as a disruptive and damaging plan, one that threatened to turn them and their properties into mere golfing props. Again, adequate protection might require an interference in property, to prevent Trump from using his land according to his own wishes, because this causes damage to his neighbours.

In the case of Balmedie, we are forced to recognise that protection implies interference and vice versa. Moreover, we see how both sides of that equation can involve the interests, ambitions, fears and aspirations of private individuals. This shows the conceptual inadequacy of the idea that property protection is all about weighing private against public interests, to strike a balance between the state's power to do good and owners' right to do as they please. In reality, matters are often more subtle, involving a number of additional dimensions. Importantly, how we assess concrete situations where property is under threat depends crucially on what we perceive as the "normal" state of property, the alignment of rights and responsibilities that we deem worthy of protection. Our stance in this regard clearly depends on our values. But values themselves are in turn influenced by the context of assessment within which they arise. An additional challenge is that our assessments are often influenced by our *perception* of the relevant context, rather than by facts.

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For example, property activists in the US tend to regard the value of autonomy as a fundamental aspect of property. But this must be understood in light of the idea that US society is founded on an egalitarian distribution of property, where ownership is meant to empower ordinary people by facilitating self-sufficiency and self-governance.²⁴ Hence, the autonomy inherent in property ownership is not thought of as being bestowed on the few, but on the many. Protecting autonomy of owners against state interference is not about protecting the privileges of the rich and powerful, but is embraced as a way to protect *against* abuse by the privileged classes.²⁵

This, however, is only an *idea* of property protection. It might not correspond to the reality surrounding the rules that have been moulded in its image. Indeed, it has been noted that despite the great pathos of the egalitarian property idea, egalitarianism has actually played a marginal role to the development of US property law.²⁶ More worryingly still, research indicates that land ownership in the US, which is hard to track due to the idiosyncrasies of the land registration system, is not actually all that egalitarian.²⁷ In this way, we are confronted with the danger of a dissociation of values, reality and the law.

In Scotland, a similar story unfolds. Here, the traditional concern is that land rights are mainly held by the elites.²⁸ As a result, Scottish property activists tend to focus on values such as equality and fairness, calling also on the state to regulate and implement measures to achieve more egalitarian control over the land. Indeed, reforms have been passed that sanction interference in

²⁴ See, e.g., James W Ely, *The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights* (Oxford University Press 2007) 173; Carol M Rose, 'Property as the keystone right?' (1996) 71(3) *Notre Dame Law Review* 329.

²⁵ This narrative is enthusiastically embraced by US activists who fight economic development takings, see, e.g., 'Castle Coalition' (2015) (<http://castlecoalition.org/>) accessed 18th April 2015.

²⁶ Joan Williams, 'The Rhetoric of Property' (1998) 83 *Iowa Law Review* 277, 361 ("Why does the egalitarian strain of republicanism have such a substantial presence in American property rhetoric outside the law but so little influence within it?")

²⁷ Harvey M Jacobs, *Who Owns America?: Social Conflict over Property Rights* (University of Wisconsin Press 1998) 246-247.

²⁸ See generally Andy Wightman, *Who owns Scotland?* (Canongate 1996); Andy Wightman, *The Poor Had No Lawyers: Who Owns Scotland and How They Got It* (Birlinn 2013).

established property rights on behalf of local communities.²⁹ At the same time, cases like Balmedie illustrate that the Scottish government, now with enhanced powers of land administration, may well choose to align themselves with the large landowners. Moreover, research indicates that recent reforms in Scottish planning law, which serve to enhance the power of the central government, have the effect of undermining local communities and their capacity for self-governance.³⁰ Again, the danger of a disconnect between influential property narratives and reality is brought into focus.

On the other hand, it seems that grass roots property activists in the US and Scotland may well be closer in spirit than they seem. Although their perception of the role of the state is very different, they appear to share many of the same concerns and aspirations. Arguably, differences arise mainly from the fact that they operate in different contexts and engage with different discourses of property. The challenge is to find categories of understanding that allow us to make sense of both their commonalities and their differences.

I think the example of Balmedie suggests a possible first step. It illustrates, in particular, the need for a framework that will allow us to recognise that opposing the use of compulsory purchase for economic development is perfectly consistent with supporting strict property regulation to prevent the establishment of golf resorts in fragile coastal communities. Both of these positions, moreover, should be viewed as efforts to protect property. To the classical debate about the limits of the state's authority over property, such a dual position can be hard to make sense of. But in my opinion, this only points to the vacuity of the conventional narrative.

In general, I think it is hard to make sense of many contemporary disputes over property if we do not have the conceptual tools to distinguish between (1) egalitarian property held under

²⁹ See generally John A Lovett, 'Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003' (2011) 89(4) *Nebraska Law Review* 739; Matthew Hoffman, 'Why community ownership? Understanding land reform in Scotland' (2013) 31 *Land Use Policy* 289.

³⁰ See generally Michael Pacione, 'Private profit, public interest and land use planning – A conflict interpretation of residential development pressure in Glasgow's rural-urban fringe' (2013) 32 *Land Use Policy* 61; Michael Pacione, 'The power of public participation in local planning in Scotland: The case of conflict over residential development in the metropolitan green belt' (2014) 79(1) *GeoJournal* 31.

a stewardship obligation by members of a local community, and (2) neo-liberal property held by large enterprises for investment. Moreover, there is no contradiction between promoting the value of autonomy for one of these, while emphasising the need for state control and redistribution when it comes to the other. The broader theme is the contextual nature of property and its implications for protection of property rights. In the coming sections, I will propose a theoretical basis that integrates this viewpoint into legal reasoning about interference in property rights.

2.3 Theories of Property

What is property? In common law jurisdictions, the standard answer is that property is a collection of individual rights, or more abstractly, a means of protecting *entitlements*.³¹ Being an owner, it is often said, amounts to being entitled to one or more among a bundle of sticks, floating on streams of protected benefits associated with, and thereby serving to legally define, the property in question.³² This point of view was first developed by legal realists in response to the natural law tradition, which conceptualised property in terms of the owner's dominion over the owned thing, particularly his right to exclude others from accessing it.³³ In civil law jurisdictions, rooted in Roman law, a dominion perspective is still often taken as the theoretical foundation of property, although it is of course recognised that the owner's dominion is never absolute in practice.³⁴

In modern society, the extent to which an owner may freely enjoy his property is highly sensitive

³¹ The idea that property rules are a form of entitlement protection was developed to great effect in the seminal article Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, 'Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral' (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review 1089.

³² See Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, 'What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?' (2001) 111(2) Yale Law Journal 357, 357-358. The "classical" references on the bundle of rights theory in the US and the UK respectively are Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710; Anthony M Honoré, 'Ownership' in AG Guest (ed), *Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence* (1961).

³³ Daniel B Klein and John Robinson, 'Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium' (2011) 8(3) Econ Journal Watch 193, 193-195.

³⁴ For a comparison between civil and common law understanding of property, see generally YC Chang and HE Smith, 'An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law Property' (2012) 88(1) Notre Dame Law Review 1.

to government's willingness to protect, as well as its desire to regulate. To dominion theorists, this sensitivity is typically thought of as giving rise to various restrictions on property, but for bundle theorists it is often thought of as *constitutive* of property itself.³⁵

The bundle of rights theory has long historical roots in common law. Arguably, it was distilled from the traditional estates system for real property, which was turned into a theoretical foundation for thinking about property in the abstract.³⁶ However, during the 18th and 19th century, natural law and dominion theorising was also influential in common law. This is evidenced, for instance, by the works of William Blackstone and James Kent.³⁷ Towards the end of the 19th century, it became increasingly hard to reconcile such an approach to property with the reality of increasing state regulation. Hence, the bundle metaphor that gained prominence in the early 1900s can be seen as a return to a more modest perspective.³⁸

On the bundle account, property rights are thought to be directed primarily towards other people, not things.³⁹ This underscores an important point about property in the real world, namely that the content of rights in property are necessarily relative to a social context as well as the totality of the legal order. For instance, when relying on a bundle metaphor it becomes easy to explain that a farmer's property rights protects him against trespassing tourists, but not against the neighbour who has an established right of way.⁴⁰

³⁵ Chang and Smih (n 34) 7.

³⁶ See Chang and Smih (n 34) 7 ("The "bundle of rights" is in a sense the theory implicit in the common law system taken to its extreme, with its inherently analytical tendency, in contrast to the dogged holism of the civil law.").

³⁷ See generally Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 2: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765–1769* (n 22); James Kent, *Commentaries on American law* (1st edn, Commentaries on American Law, vol 2, O Halsted 1827).

³⁸ See Klein and Robinson (n 33) 195.

³⁹ See Merrill and Smith, 'What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?' (n 32) 357-358 ("By and large, this view has become conventional wisdom among legal scholars: Property is a composite of legal relations that holds between persons and only secondarily or incidentally involves a "thing".").

⁴⁰ It has been argued that this way of thinking about property, as a web of (legal and social) normative relations between persons, does not entail the bundle of sticks idea, see Avihay Dorfman, 'Private Ownership' (2010) 16(1) Legal Theory 1, 23-25. I agree, and I also believe that endorsing the property-as-relations perspective is largely appropriate, even if one does not otherwise agree with the bundle perspective. Historically, however, the two ideas

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By contrast, the dominion theory suggests viewing such situations as exceptions to the general rule of ownership, which implies a right to exclusion at its core. In the case of property, exceptions no doubt make up the norm. But in civil law jurisdictions one lives happily with this. It takes the grandeur away from the dominion concept, but it retains a nice and simple structure to property law. In the civil law world, it is common to say that what the owner holds is the *remainder*, namely what is left after deducting all positive rights that restrict his dominion.⁴¹ Moreover, while there may be many limitations and additional benefits attached to property, they are all in principle carved out of one initial right, namely that of the owner. In this way, the civil law system can be more easy to navigate.

Some common law scholars have recently elaborated on this to develop a critique of the bundle theory, by suggesting that it should at least be complemented by a firm theory of *in rem* rights in property. This, they argue, would allow the law to operate more effectively, by relying on a simple and clear rule that, although defeasible, would generally suffice to inform people about their relevant rights and duties in relation to property.⁴²

In addition, some scholars point out that the bundle theory does not adequately reflect the sense in which property is a right to a *thing*, serving to create an attachment that is not easily reducible to a set of interpersonal legal relationships.⁴³ In the US, where the bundle theory has

have in fact been closely associated with one another, so presenting them together seems appropriate. Moreover, I will not actively enter into the theoretical debate on this point, since I believe that the *social function* account of property, discussed in more detail in section 2.4, takes us further than both bundle and dominion perspectives. However, as will hopefully become clear, the social function theory itself may be seen as a continuation of the property-as-relations idea, catering also to a more holistic perspective on social structures (although it otherwise manages to remain largely neutral on the bundle v dominion issue).

⁴¹ Chang and Smih (n 34) 25.

⁴² Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, 'The Property/Contract Interface' (2001) 101(4) Columbia Law Review 773, 793 ("The unique advantage of in rem rights – the strategy of exclusion – is that they conserve on information costs relative to in personam rights in situations where the number of potential claimants to resources is large, and the resource in question can be defined at relatively low cost."); Merrill and Smith, 'What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?' (n 32) 389 ("The right to exclude allows the owner to control, plan, and invest, and permits this to happen with a minimum of information costs to others."). See also RC Ellickson, 'Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill and Smith' (2011) 8(3) 215 (arguing that Merrill and Smith's analysis nicely complements and improves upon the bundle theory).

⁴³ Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, 'The morality of property' (2007) 48(5) William and Mary Law Review 1849,

traditionally been dominant, this critique seems to be gaining ground.⁴⁴

In this thesis, the efficiency and clarity of different property concepts will not be a primary concern, nor will personal attachments to things in themselves play a particularly important role.⁴⁵ Hence, I will remain largely agnostic about this aspect of the debate between dominion and bundle theorists. In particular, the differences between civil and common law traditions in this regard do not cause special problems for my analysis of economic development takings. For the purposes of this thesis, it is more important how different ways of looking at property can influence how we assess when interference is legitimate under constitutional and human rights law. Hence, I now turn to the question of whether or not there are any significant differences between dominion and bundle theories when it comes to the question of legitimacy of takings.

2.3.1 Takings under Bundle and Dominion Accounts of Property

Bundle theorists might be expected to have a comparatively relaxed attitude towards state interference in property rights. Indeed, thinking about property as sticks in a bundle may lead one to think that property rights are intrinsically limited, so that subsequent changes to their content, made by a competent body, are reflections of their nature, not a cause for complaint. In particular, the theory conveys the impression that property is highly malleable.

For the theorists that developed the bundle of sticks metaphor in the late 19th and early 20th century, this aspect was undoubtedly very important. By providing a highly flexible concept of property, they helped the state gain conceptual authority to control and regulate.⁴⁶ The early

1862. For a slightly different take on attachment, highlighting how the ‘thingness’ of property marks its conditional nature and transferability, see JE Penner, ‘The “bundle of rights” picture of property’ 43(3) UCLA Law Review 711, 799-818.

⁴⁴ See generally Klein and Robinson (n 33).

⁴⁵ I mention, however, that the personhood aspects of property that are sometimes highlighted in this regard might be relevant to an analysis of economic development takings. The personhood account does not seem to depend on a rejection of the bundle theory, but might carry with it some implicit criticism of it, see, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, *Reinterpreting Property* (University of Chicago Press 1993) 127-130.

⁴⁶ Klein and Robinson (n 33) 195.

bundle theorists not only developed a theory to fit the law as they saw it, they also contributed to change.

In takings law, the bundle narrative has been particularly important in relation to the contentious issue of so-called regulatory takings.⁴⁷ Such takings occur when government regulates the use of property so severely that it may be classified as a taking in relation to the law of eminent domain.⁴⁸ In the US, the question of when regulation amounts to a regulatory taking is highly controversial.⁴⁹ The stakes are high because takings have to be compensated in accordance with the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution.⁵⁰ At the same time, the law is unclear, and the limited amount of statutory law on the issue means that cases tend to be adjudicated against the Constitution, often the relevant state Constitution in the first instance.⁵¹

If property is thought of as a malleable bundle of entitlements that exists only because it is recognised by the law, it becomes natural to argue that when government regulates the use of property, it does not deprive anyone of property rights. It merely restructures the bundle. In the case of *Andrus v Allard*, the Supreme Court adopted such an argument when it declared that “where an owner possesses a full “bundle” of property rights, the destruction of one “strand” of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety”.⁵²

Hence, with regards to the issue of regulatory takings, the bundle theory was actively used by

⁴⁷ See generally R. Alterman (ed), *Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights* (American Bar Association 2010) (a comparative study of regulatory takings in thirteen countries).

⁴⁸ See William A. Fischel, *Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics* (Harvard University Press 1995) 1. Regulatory takings proper arise when the (contested) right to compensation is inferred from a takings clause, such as in the US. However, the overarching question is how to deal with changes in property values caused by regulation, a question of universal importance across jurisdictions that may also be addressed by the legislator as a separate issue, see Alterman (n 47) 3-10.

⁴⁹ See generally Fischel, *Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics* (n 48).

⁵⁰ See Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution 1791.

⁵¹ See Alterman (n 47) 31-32. Indeed, the federal doctrine on regulatory takings appears to be marked by deference to state courts. See Fischel, *Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics* (n 48) 66.

⁵² *Andrus v Allard* 444 US 51, 65-66 (1979).

those who favour a less restrictive approach to interference with private property rights. However, it is wrong to conclude that the bundle theory *necessarily* implies a less restrictive stance on takings. Epstein, for instance, argues that as every stick in the property bundle represents a property right, government should not be permitted to remove any of them without paying compensation.⁵³

More generally, Epstein does not believe that the bundle theory is responsible for what he regards as a weakening of property rights in the US during the 20th century. Instead, he thinks this weakening resulted from a tendency among modern property scholars to adopt a “top-down” approach to property. According to Epstein, too many scholars view property rights as vested in, and arising from, the power of the state, not the possessions of individuals.⁵⁴

Epstein successfully shows that as a rhetorical device, the bundle of rights theory may be turned on its head compared to how it was used in *Andrus v Allard*. Moreover, his arguments illustrate that the bundle theory itself does not appear to dictate any particular position on the degree of protection that private property should enjoy against state interference.⁵⁵

In the civil law world, the relationship between property theorising and property protection is similarly hard to pin down at the conceptual level. Again, the issue of regulatory takings illustrates this. In some civil law countries, like Germany and the Netherlands, the owner’s right to compensation for burdensome land use regulation is strong, while in other civil law countries, such as France and Greece, it is very weak.⁵⁶ In particular, the exclusive dominion understanding of

⁵³ RA Epstein, ‘Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property’ (2011) 8(3) *Econ Journal Watch* 223, 232-233.

⁵⁴ Epstein, ‘Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property’ (n 53) 227-228 (“In my view, the nub of the difficulty with modern property law does not stem from the bundle-of-rights conception, but from the top-down view of property that treats all property as being granted by the state and therefore subject to whatever terms and conditions the state wishes to impose on its grantees.”).

⁵⁵ To further underscore this point, it may be mentioned that while US courts recognise that a regulation can amount to a taking, this is practically unheard of in several other common law jurisdictions, including England and Australia. This is despite the fact that these countries all paint property in a similar conceptual light. Moreover, while the issue of regulatory takings is considered central to constitutional property law in the US, it is considered a fairly marginal issue in England, see Michael Purdue, ‘United Kingdom’ in R Alterman (ed), *Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights* (American Bar Association 2010).

⁵⁶ See generally Alterman (n 47).

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property does not appear to commit one to any particular kind of policy on this point.

On the one hand, it cannot be denied that property rights are enforced, and limited, by the power of government. Hanging on to the idea of dominion, then, necessarily forces us to embrace also the idea that dominion is never absolute. In this way, the theory may serve as a conceptual basis for arguing in favour of a relaxed approach to state interference. If property rights are not absolute to start with, why worry about interfering in them for the common good? But, of course, this story too may be turned on its head. Indeed, a libertarian can use the image of limited dominion to argue that property is being ripped apart at its seams. If we want to maintain our grasp of what property is, such a person might argue, we better enhance the level of protection offered to property owners, to restore true dominion.

The upshot is that the differences between common law and civil law theorising about property do not appear to be very relevant to the question of legitimacy in the context of state interference. In particular, the differences between the bundle theory and the dominion idea do not appear to speak decisively in favour of any particular approach to economic development takings.

In terms of descriptive content, both theories appear oversimplified. They provide a manner of speech, but they do not really get us very far towards uncovering the reality of property rights in modern society. In particular, they do not provide a functional account of what role property plays in relation to the social, economic and political structures within which it resides.⁵⁷

In terms of normative content, on the other hand, both the bundle theory and the dominion theory appear rather bland. They simply do not offer much clear guidance as to what norms and values the institution of property is meant to promote. They give neat ways of presenting what property can look like, but do not tell us *why* it should be protected.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ A similar point is made in Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver, *An Introduction to Property Theory* (Cambridge University Press 2012) 2-6.

⁵⁸ For a similar criticism, see Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, 'A theory of property' (2005) 90(3) *Cornell Law Review* 531, 535-536 (proposing an instrumental theory of property, with both descriptive and normative implications, based on the idea that property exists to protect the value of stable ownership).

2.3.2 Broader Theories

Based on the discussion so far, it seems that in order to make progress towards a theory of economic development takings we need to start from a property theory with a wider scope than both the bundle account and the dominion theory. There are many candidates that could be considered. In a recent monograph on property, Alexander and Peñalver present five key theoretical branches:⁵⁹

- *Utilitarian* theories, focusing on property's role in helping to maximize utility or welfare with respect to individual preferences and desires.
- *Libertarian* theories, focusing on property's role in furthering individual autonomy and liberty, as well as the importance of protecting property against state interference, particularly attempts at redistribution.
- *Hegelian* theories, focusing on the importance of property to the development of personhood and self-realisation, particularly the expression and embodiment of free will through control and attachment to one's possessions.
- *Kantian* theories, focusing on how property arises to protect freedom and autonomy in a coordinated fashion so that *everyone* may potentially enjoy it, through the development of the state.
- *Human flourishing* theories, focusing on property's role in facilitating participation in a community, particularly as a template allowing the individual to develop as a moral agent in a world of normative plurality.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a detailed presentation and assessment of all these theoretical branches. Suffice it to say that the utilitarian approach has been by far the most

⁵⁹ See chapters 1 to 5 of Alexander and Peñalver, *An Introduction to Property Theory* (n 57).

influential.⁶⁰ The basic tenet of this paradigm is that means-end analysis on the basis of exogenous preferences and utility measures provide a sound foundation on which to reason about law and policy.

In this thesis, I will depart from this form of analysis, by regarding property instead as an integral part of social structures. On this view, property can no longer be seen neither as an end in itself nor as a means to maximise some utility measure. Instead, property is understood in light of how it functionally relates to other building blocks of life, such as sustenance, economic activity, social interaction, interpersonal responsibility, preference change, deliberation, and democratic decision-making.

With such a starting point, I believe the human flourishing theory has more to offer than any of the other theoretical branches mentioned above. In section 2.5 below, I will emphasise how this theory suggests a range of new policy recommendations regarding how the law *should* approach the question of economic development takings.

Before I get to this, I will explore descriptive aspects of property theory in some more depth. Indeed, a potential objection against all the theories summarised above is that they are overly normative; they are largely used to argue for particular values associated with property, not to clarify the descriptive core of the notion. This is a challenge, since one of my main aims in this thesis is to argue for a descriptive proposition, namely that economic development takings make sense as a conceptual category for legal reasoning. Hence, before I move on to consider normative aspects, I first need a theoretical framework that allows me to pinpoint what makes economic development takings unique. I would like to do so, moreover, without thereby committing myself to any particular stance on how to normatively assess such takings.

⁶⁰ See Alexander and Peñalver, *An Introduction to Property Theory* (n 57) 11 (noting that there are many varieties of utilitarianism, including some law-and-economics theories for which the appropriateness of that label is contentious).

To arrive at a suitable foundation in this regard, I will rely on the so-called *social function theory* of property.⁶¹ This theory is often thought of as a normative theory as well, in some sense a precursor to more overtly normative theories such as the human flourishing theory. However, I will argue that the social function theory has a descriptive core that can serve as a common ground for debate among scholars that do not necessarily share the same normative outlook. Crucially, the descriptive core of the social function theory also points towards a descriptive argument in favour of studying economic development takings.

2.4 The Social Function of Property

As an empirical observation, the fact that property has social functions is beyond doubt. For instance, it is clear that ownership of property gives rise to social obligations, not just rights. Hardly anyone would protest that in practical life, what an owner will do with their property is as much constrained by the expectations of others as it is by law. Moreover, the law of nuisance and rules relating to adverse possession both serve as simple examples that such expectations can also have a bearing on the legal status of property and its owners.⁶²

Still, many property scholars have surprisingly little regard for social functions when they theorise about ownership. According to Alexander, the classical theories of property convey the impression that “property owners are rights-holders first and foremost; obligations are, with some

⁶¹ See generally Foster and Bonilla (n 3); MC Mirow, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others’ (2010) 22 *Florida Journal of International Law* 191; Alexander and others (n 3). Be aware that some authors, particularly in the US, also speak of the *social obligation* theory, using it more or less as a synonym for the social function theory.

⁶² See Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is Private Property?’ (1985) 5(3) *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 313, 314 (invoking social obligations as well as the notion of nuisance to explain what ownership is, at the conceptual level); Peter M Gerhart, *Property Law and Social Morality* (Cambridge University Press 2013) 197-198 (proposing an abstract distinction between trespass and nuisance in US law based on the concept of duty, which, it is argued, is always symmetric in nuisance cases but not in case of trespass); Eduardo Moises Peñalver and Sonia K Katyal, ‘Property Outlaws’ (2007) 155(5) *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 1095, 1169-1172 (analysing adverse possession on the basis of a social functions understanding of property). See also *JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom* ECHR 2007 5559 (the ECtHR deciding to regard a UK case of adverse possession in bad faith as legitimate under the ECHR).

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few exceptions, assigned to non-owners”.⁶³ Theorists who emphasise property’s social function attempt to redress this conceptual imbalance. As Alexander explains, “social obligation theorists do not reverse this equation so much as they balance it. Of course property owners are rights-holders, but they are also duty-holders, and often more than minimally so”.⁶⁴

I remark that what Alexander and others sometimes refer to as the social obligation theory of property is covered by the social function theory as I understand it. However, the social function theory is broader in that it asks us to consider the legal relevance of social dependencies rooted in property more generally, not just obligations. Specifically, the social function theory as it is used in this thesis should be understood as a cross-jurisdictional reference point for a set of abstract ideas about property that includes the ideas of theorists such as Alexander, who also argue specifically for a social obligation norm in US property law.⁶⁵ As I discuss in the next subsection, the idea that property serves important social functions is not new. Moreover, it often plays an important implicit role in shaping how property is understood in the law, also in Europe.

2.4.1 Historical Roots and European Influence

The first expression of the social function theory has been attributed to León Duguit, a French jurist active early in the 20th century.⁶⁶ In a series of lectures he gave in Buenos Aires in 1911, Duguit challenged the classic liberal idea of property rights by pointing to their context dependence, adopting a line of argument strikingly similar to how recent scholars have criticized utilitarian discourses about property.⁶⁷ In particular, Duguit also pointed to the notion of obligation, stressing the fact that individual autonomy only makes sense in a social context where people are dependent

⁶³ Gregory S Alexander, ‘Pluralism and Property’ (2011) 80 Fordham Law Review 1017, 1023.

⁶⁴ Alexander, ‘Pluralism and Property’ (n 63) 1023.

⁶⁵ For a similar understanding of the social function theory, see Foster and Bonilla (n 3).

⁶⁶ See generally Foster and Bonilla (n 3).

⁶⁷ See Foster and Bonilla (n 3) 1004-1008. For more details about Duguit’s work and the contemporaries that inspired him, see generally Mirow, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others’ (n 61).

on each other as members of communities. Hence, depending on the social circumstances of the owner, their property could entail as many obligations as entitlements. This, according to Duguit, was not only the inescapable reality of property ownership, it was also a normatively sound arrangement that should inspire the law, more so than individualistic, ‘liberal’, visions of property as entitlement protection.⁶⁸ The social function perspective has since become widespread in Latin America, as reflected for instance in the property clause in Article 21 of the American Convention of Human Rights.⁶⁹

Related ideas have also been influential in Europe, particularly during the rebuilding period after the Second World War. For instance, the constitution of Germany – her *Basic Law* – contains a property clause stating explicitly that property entails obligations as well as rights.⁷⁰ As argued by Alexander, this has had a significant effect on German property jurisprudence, creating a clear and interesting contrast with US law.⁷¹

A social perspective on property was also influential during the debate among the European states that first drafted the property clause in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European

⁶⁸ See Foster and Bonilla (n 3) 1005 (“The idea of the social function of property is based on a description of social reality that recognizes solidarity as one of its primary foundations”, discussing Duguit’s work). It should also be noted that Duguit was particularly concerned with owners’ obligations to make productive use of their property, to benefit society as a whole. This raises the question of who exactly should be granted the power to determine what counts as “productive use”. In this way, Duguit’s work also serves to underscore one of the main challenges of regulatory frameworks that seek to incorporate and draw on property’s social dimension: how should decisions be made in such regimes?

⁶⁹ American Convention on Human Rights, Organization of American States [1978], 1144 UNTS 123. See Theo RG van Banning, *The Human Right to Property* (Intersentia 2002) 61-62. See also Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, ‘Social Function of Property in Brazilian Law’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1171; MC Mirow, ‘Origins of the Social Function of Property in Chile’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1183; Daniel Bonilla, ‘Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property as a Right and Property as a Social Function’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1135.

⁷⁰ See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany in the revised version published in the Federal Law Gazette Part III, classification number 100-1, as last amended by the Act of 21 July 2010 (Federal Law Gazette I p 944) 1949, art 14.

⁷¹ See Gregory S Alexander, ‘Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example’ (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733, 738 (“The German Constitutional Court has adopted an approach that is both purposive and contextual, while the U.S. Supreme Court has not.”). See also AJ van der Walt, *Constitutional Property Law* (3rd edn, Juta 2011) 476-483 (noting that the German property clause also imposes a strict public purpose requirement which has been used by the Constitutional Court to strike down illegitimate takings that benefit commercial enterprises).

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Convention of Human Rights (P1(1) of the ECHR).⁷² The article was eventually formulated as follows:

Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.

No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

I will return to this clause in more depth in section 3.4 of chapter 3. Here I note how it emphasises both the private right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions and the state's right to interfere with property in the general/public interest. Moreover, it does not explicitly introduce an absolute compensation requirement in case of expropriation by the state, setting it apart from many other property clauses, including that contained in the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. Arguably, this reflects a recognition of the social aspects of property.⁷³

⁷² See Tom Allen, 'Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human Rights' (2010) 59(04) *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 1055, 1063-1065. Allen argues that the liberal conception of property has since gained ground in Europe, as reflected in jurisprudential developments at the ECtHR.

⁷³ See generally Allen, 'Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human Rights' (n 72). For completeness, I mention that a human right to property is also included in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA (10th December 1948) UN Doc A/810 (1948). However, its inclusion was controversial and no corresponding right was included in either of the two subsequent covenants containing binding provisions, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Res 2200A (XXI) [1966]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNGA Res 2200A (XXI) [1966]. In light of this, the property clause in the UDHR appears to have limited practical significance. Similarly, a property clause is included in Article 14 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1520 UNTS 217, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 1986). However, this property clause has apparently not been given much attention from the African Court, see Walt, *Constitutional Property Law* (n 71) 83. However, it has been proposed that an internationally binding right to property should be introduced through a new international Covenant, a proposal that appears to be firmly based on a social function understanding of property, see generally Rhoda E Howard-Hassmann, 'Reconsidering the Right to Own Property' (2013) 12(2) *Journal of Human Rights* 180 (including a draft formulation of a property clause that states, among other things, that the human right to property does not apply to corporations).

However, it also fits within a traditional narrative of private property, where social responsibilities attaching to property are regarded as arising from state objectives and policies, not ownership as such. Indeed, the chosen formulation in P1(1) appears to suggest that social aspects are external to private property, vested in the regulatory power of the state.

This marks a possible tension with the social function theory, which asks us to recognise that social obligations are inherent in private property, attaching to owners directly. The importance of this in the present context is that a social function perspective can occasionally suggest stricter limits on state interference, not out of greater concern for individual entitlements, but out of concern for property's proper role as a building block of social and political life.

Despite the conventional formulation used in P1(1), such a perspective does in fact appear to play a role at the ECtHR. A series of cases involving hunting rights provide an example of this.⁷⁴ In these cases, the Court in Strasbourg has explicitly granted stronger property protection to owners who oppose hunting on ethical grounds, compared to owners who want to retain exclusive hunting rights for themselves.

For the former group of owners, it has been held that the state may not compulsorily transfer hunting rights to hunting associations for collective management.⁷⁵ For the latter group of owners, by contrast, the Court held in *Chabauty v France* that such transfers must be tolerated.⁷⁶

For owners opposing hunting on ethical grounds, an interference with their hunting right is an interference with their moral duty to act in accordance with their beliefs. The belief that hunting is unethical gives the owners a personal obligation to prevent their hunting rights from being used. If owners are deprived of their opportunity to fulfil this obligation, it changes the social function of their property because it severs the link between the owners' value system and the use that is

⁷⁴ See *Chassagnou and Others v France* ECHR 1999-III 22; *Hermann v Germany* ECHR 2010 1110; *Chabauty v France* ECHR 2012 1784.

⁷⁵ See *Chassagnou and Others v France* (n 74); *Hermann v Germany* (n 74).

⁷⁶ See *Chabauty v France* (n 74).

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made of their property.

In *Chassagnou and others v France*, the Court regarded this as a particularly severe interference in property, which could not be upheld despite the fact that it had been carried out in the public interest to secure sustainable management of hunting rights. The Court concluded that “compelling small landowners to transfer hunting rights over their land so that others can make use of them in a way which is totally incompatible with their beliefs imposes a disproportionate burden which is not justified under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.⁷⁷

Clearly, the Court is not expressing an opinion on the ethical status of hunting. However, it is recognised that owners are entitled to have unconventional personal convictions in this regard. Moreover, managing one’s property in accordance with one’s convictions is recognised as part of what it means to be an owner. Protecting this aspect of ownership appears to be more important to the Court in Strasbourg than protecting the right of exclusion for owners who wish to keep the fruits of the land to themselves, as demonstrated by the ruling in *Chabauty*.

The hunting cases also demonstrate that even when the legal system does not explicitly recognise the value of a social function inherent in property, such a function can still come to play a role when the Court assesses the legitimacy of interference against P1(1). This is reassuring since, as I argue in the next section, the law of property invariably involves prioritising between different social functions, also in situations when this is not openly acknowledged by policy makers and judges.

⁷⁷ See *Chassagnou and Others v France* (n 74) para 85.

2.4.2 The Impossibility of a Socially Neutral Property Regime

Property both reflects and shapes relations of power among members of a society.⁷⁸ Moreover, it does not act uniformly in this way – the effect depends on the circumstances. Consider, for instance, a fairly typical scenario leading to depopulation of rural areas: first, impoverished farmers and other locals sell homes to holiday dwellers, causing house prices to soar. As a result, local people with agrarian-related incomes cannot afford local homes, causing even more people to sell their land to the urban middle class. In this way, a causal cycle is established, the social consequences of which can be vicious, particularly to the low-income people who are displaced.⁷⁹ This gives rise to the following theoretical contention: setting out to regulate property in a situation like this – when property rights pull in different directions depending on your vantage point – requires a principled stance on whose property, and which of property’s functions, one is aiming to prioritise. Should the law emphasise the property rights of local people who face displacement, or should it protect the property rights of outsiders wishing to invest in holiday homes?

Some may shy away from this way of posing the question, arguing instead that it would be better to rely on neutral rules that treat all owners the same way. In a gentrification scenario, for instance, such an appeal to neutrality could be the first step in an argument against regulating the property market to prevent the displacement of local people. But would that truly be a socially neutral approach to residential property? Presumably, it would threaten the property interests of

⁷⁸ This aspect of property’s social function was stressed in a recent “statement of purpose” made by leading property scholars in support of the social function theory, see Alexander and others (n 3). For a sociological perspective on this, see Bruce G Carruthers and Laura Ariovich, ‘The Sociology of Property Rights’ (2004) 30 Annual Review of Sociology 23, 23 (“The right to control, govern, and exploit things entails the power to influence, govern, and exploit people.”).

⁷⁹ The general mechanism described here is well-documented and known as *gentrification* in human geography (often qualified as rural gentrification when it happens outside urban areas). See generally Jan van Weesep, ‘Gentrification as a research frontier’ (1994) 18(1) Progress in Human Geography 74; Martin Phillips, ‘Rural gentrification and the processes of class colonisation’ (1993) 9(2) Journal of Rural Studies 123; Tom Slater, ‘The Eviction of Critical Perspectives from Gentrification Research’ (2006) 30(4) International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 737. For a case study demonstrating the role that state regulation can play (perhaps inadvertently) in causing rural gentrification, see Eliza Darling, ‘The city in the country: Wilderness gentrification and the rent gap’ (2005) 37(6) Environment and Planning A 1015, 1027-1030.

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local owners, particularly those not wishing to sell their properties.⁸⁰ Hence, if *their* property rights are to be protected, regulation should be put in place.

Importantly, both sides of a conflict like this are in a position to adopt a property narrative to argue for their interests. Hence, it is also inappropriate to think that the law of property can remain neutral. Moreover, a traditional narrative of property might fail to make sense of the ensuing tension. Consider, for instance, the conflict between Donald Trump and the Balmedie locals, as discussed in section 2.2.

As long as Trump threatened to use compulsory purchase, the local people could adopt a traditional “pro-property” stance against Trump. But as soon as Trump decided to fence them in by relying on his own property rights, they had to adopt a seemingly contradictory view on property, whereby Trump’s property rights should be limited out of concern for the community. A traditionally minded observer might use this as an opportunity to accuse the locals of having an unprincipled attitude towards private property. By contrast, the social function approach suggests a very different picture.

The locals sought to protect property, but not just any property. The property they wanted to protect was the property which served the social function of sustaining the existing community. The property they wanted to protect was the property that *meant* something to them.⁸¹

Trump and his supporters might well have entertained similar feelings about their property rights, and the development they wanted to carry out. Hence, in conflicts such as these the law will invariably have to take a stand regarding which property interests it wishes to promote. The social function theory asks us to be upfront about this, so that policy making and adjudication in

⁸⁰ The threat might be more or less direct. For instance, a weakened community could reduce the values that make the properties attractive to their current owners, while rising property prices could give rise to rising property taxes that render this ownership unaffordable as well.

⁸¹ This is more than merely observing that they wanted to protect *their* property. In their desire to regulate the use of Trump’s property, the locals also wanted to protect certain social functions inherent in that property, against Trump’s own actions.

hard cases can proceed on the basis of substantive arguments about social functions rather than unconvincing appeals to neutrality and deference.

While the law is forced to prioritise in case of conflict, social functions can also work together in a way that promotes certain property uses and decision-making structures for property management. This can even alleviate the pressure for top-down government regulation, with desirable consequences for both owners and the public interest.

Again, this function of property is highly dependent on context. Small business owners, by virtue of being members of the local community, might be socially discouraged from becoming a nuisance to their neighbours, with no need for state interventions through detailed legislation or planning.⁸² However, if local owners go out of business and a non-local commercial owner replaces them, the regulatory effect of property can change dramatically.

Indeed, if we imagine that the new owner hopes to raze the local community in order to build a new shopping center, we are at once reminded of the stark contrasts that can arise between various social functions of property. The property rights of small shop owners can be the lifeblood of a community, while the exact same rights in the hands of a large enterprise can give rise to its destruction.

Mechanisms like these can have important ramifications, not only for property, but also for the regulatory regime surrounding its use. For instance, it seems clear that if a new and more commercially aggressive owner is to be deterred from becoming a nuisance to neighbours, stricter forms of regulation might have to be put in place.⁸³ The social responsibility that was previously anchored in the community must now be protected more forcefully by the state. In turn, this can

⁸² See, e.g., Robert C Ellickson, *Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes* (Harvard University Press 1991) 282-283.

⁸³ It has been argued that such a mechanism explains the advent of zoning and land use planning in the US, particularly the Supreme Court's willingness to accept it even though it limited the freedom of property owners. See Nadav Shoked, 'The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of Property' (2011) 28(1) *Yale Journal on Regulation* 91, 99-100.

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cause the institution of property to weaken further, as the government assumes greater power to interfere.⁸⁴ A feedback effect might result, as increased regulation in turn threatens to make property ownership too burdensome or expensive for low-income, or even average-income, community members.⁸⁵ Hence, the most resourceful actors, those who are able to meet or influence the government's demands and/or protect themselves against interference, gain more property, while the government gains more regulatory power.

The social function theory tells us that mechanisms of this kind need to be taken seriously by legal theorists and practitioners. The broader point at stake here can also be brought out in relation to the famous "tragedy of the commons".⁸⁶ In his seminal article, Hardin describes how individually rational users of a commons can eventually cause the depletion of that resource. The problem arises, according to Hardin, because individuals have no proper incentive to refrain from over-exploitation; the damage will be distributed among all resource users, so it will not outweigh the benefit of individual over-use in the short term.

In response, it has been typical to regard either state management or stronger individual exclusion rights as the answer.⁸⁷ State management is supposed to prevent over-exploitation through

⁸⁴ For an early criticism of zoning in the US, pointing to the merits of a more flexible and highly decentralised approach based in large part on the law of nuisance, see Robert C Ellickson, 'Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls' (1973) 40(4) *The University of Chicago Law Review* 681.

⁸⁵ In the US, the term "exclusionary zoning" is used to describe such a mechanism when zoning contributes to pushing low-income people out of suburban, and increasingly also urban, areas. Since the zoning framework in the US is quite decentralised, the process is often pushed forward by locally based affluent home-owners who capture the zoning power of local governments to enhance their property values, e.g., by preventing intrusive development projects that could otherwise attract low-income people by increasing the demand for cheap labour and the supply of cheap housing. Due to this dynamic, the feedback mechanism is amplified: the standard proposals for reform to deal with exclusionary zoning involve further inflating the power of the government or the markets to impose large-scale development projects against the will of local communities. See, e.g., John Mangin, 'The new exclusionary zoning' (2014) 25(1) *Stanford Law & Policy Review* 91, 117-120 (referring favourably to the standard reform suggestion, but noting that it seems politically unrealistic to implement in the US). For a more subtle analysis, resulting in the proposal that home-value insurance should be introduced to make home-owners less likely to pursue exclusionary zoning, see William A Fischel, 'An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects' (2004) 41(2) *Urban Studies* 317.

⁸⁶ See Garrett Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (1968) 162(3859) *Science* 1243.

⁸⁷ See Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (Cambridge University Press 1990) 8-13.

regulation, while individual exclusion rights are supposed to make it more difficult for resource users to shift the cost of over-exploitation onto other individuals.

Both of these strategies can potentially result in the sort of feedback effect discussed above, where the inadequacies of states and markets combine to make it necessary for both of them to inflate their power at the expense of local communities. However, a cycle of dispossession is not the inevitable outcome of the tragedy of the commons. Indeed, as Elinor Ostrom and others have shown, the traditional narrative overlooks the fact that commons tend to come with community structures that provide appropriate checks and balances through locally grounded institutions or social arrangements.⁸⁸ As long as external forces do not threaten them, such arrangements can be more robust than either individual exclusion regimes or state control. Moreover, they can be anchored in the law of property.⁸⁹ I will return to this point in the next chapter, when I discuss possible alternatives to eminent domain in economic development situations.⁹⁰

2.4.3 The Descriptive Core of the Social Function Theory

Social function theorists have been criticised for making too far-reaching normative claims. Eric Claeys, in particular, argues forcefully against normative fundamentalism and what he regards as normative naivety among social function theorists.⁹¹ Indeed, some social function theorists have

⁸⁸ See generally Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 87).

⁸⁹ For the connection between property law and governance theories for common pool resources generally, see Carol Rose, 'Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal academy' (2011) 5(1) *International Journal of the Commons* 28; LA Fennel, 'Ostrom's Law: Property Rights in the Commons' (2011) 5(1) *International Journal of the Commons* 9. It is worth emphasising that this link is not only relevant in relation to *natural* resources. Indeed, common pool theories have been much discussed also in the context of intellectual property, see Rose, 'Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal academy' (n 89) 38-43. That being said, in this thesis the focus will be on property forms that are moulded out of land and related resources. The special questions that might arise when the theoretical framework is applied to other forms of property will not be addressed.

⁹⁰ See chapter 3, section 3.6.

⁹¹ Eric R Claeys, 'Virtues and Rights in American Property Law' (2009) 94(4) *Cornell Law Review* 889, 945. ("Judges might think they are doing what is equitable and prudent. In reality, however, maybe they are appealing to a perfectionist theory of politics to restructure the law, to redistribute property, and ultimately to dispense justice in a manner encouraging all parties to become dependent on them.")

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gone very far in presenting the social function account of property as a normative theory, attaching specific political commitments to it along the way.

Hanoch Dagan, for instance, is a self-confessed liberal who argues for a social function understanding on the basis that it is morally superior. “A theory of property that excludes social responsibility is unjust”, he writes, and goes on to argue that “erasing the social responsibility of ownership would undermine both the freedom-enhancing pluralism and the individuality-enhancing multiplicity that is crucial to the liberal ideal of justice”.⁹²

If this is true, then it is certainly a persuasive argument for those who believe in a “liberal idea of justice”. But for those who do not, or believe that property law is – or should be – as neutral as possible on this point, a normative argument along these lines can only discourage them from adopting a social function approach. Such a reader would be understandably suspicious that the *content* of the social function theory – as Dagan understands it – is biased towards a liberal world view. Such a reader might agree that property continuously interacts with social structures, but reject the theory on the basis that it seems to carry with it a normative commitment to promote liberalism.

Dagan is not alone in proposing highly normative social function theories. Indeed, most contemporary scholars endorsing a social function view on property base themselves on highly value-laden assessments of property institutions.⁹³ By contrast, the discussion in this chapter so far has aimed to demonstrate that the theory has significant merit already as a *descriptive* theory. In my opinion, this is also demonstrated by much of the normatively oriented work that has been done in the social function tradition. When this work focuses on making abstract normative assertions it

⁹² Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Social Responsibility of Ownership’ (2007) 92 Cornell Law Review 1255, 1259.

⁹³ See, e.g., Gregory S Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (2009) 94(4) Cornell Law Review 745; Colin Crawford, ‘The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1089; Nestor M Davidson, ‘Sketches for a Hamilton Vernacular as a Social Function of Property’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1053; Joseph William Singer, ‘Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society’ (2009) 94(4) Cornell Law Review 1009; Eduardo M Peñalver, ‘Land Virtues’ (2009) 94(4) Cornell Law Review 821.

threatens to overshadow what is arguably the most important insight, namely that considerations related to social functions *are* already important in many areas of property law, in many different jurisdictions.⁹⁴ Moreover, the social functions of property, and normative assertions about them, often play a role behind the scenes, where they do unacknowledged work among policy makers and judges alike. As Laura Underkuffler puts it:

Property rules, as they now exist, are contingent rules, complex rules, and normatively charged rules. They are crafted and applied in response to the politics of power, security, stability, greed, and a myriad of other aspects of human life.⁹⁵

Because it embraces this crucial insight, the core of the social function theory, rather than being “good, period” as Dagan suggests, is simply more accurate than other proposals, irrespective of one’s ethical or political inclinations.⁹⁶ The theory provides the foundation for a discussion where different values and norms can be presented in a way that is conducive to meaningful debate, on the basis of a minimal number of hidden assumptions and implied commitments. Thus, the first reason to accept the social function theory is epistemic, not deontic.

That is not to say that theories can ever be entirely value-neutral, nor that this should be a goal in itself. However, a good theory is one that can at least serve as a common ground for further discussion based on disagreement about values and priorities. Making room for normative divergences, moreover, can hopefully diminish the worry that a broader theoretical outlook is the first step towards unchecked state power and rule by “judicial philosopher-kings”, as Claeys puts it.⁹⁷ At the same time, the new descriptive dimensions uncovered by the social function view can

⁹⁴ See, e.g., Kevin Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (1994) 47(2) *Current Legal Problems* 157; Mirow, ‘Origins of the Social Function of Property in Chile’ (n 69); Santos Cunha (n 69); Bonilla (n 69).

⁹⁵ Laura S Underkuffler, ‘The Politics of Property and Need’ (2010) 20 *Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy* 363, 376.

⁹⁶ Dagan, ‘The Social Responsibility of Ownership’ (n 92) 1259.

⁹⁷ See Claeys, ‘Virtues and Rights in American Property Law’ (n 91) 944. There is further evidence to suggest that

also inspire novel normative perspectives, as explored in the next section.

2.5 Human Flourishing

Taking the social function theory seriously forces us to recognise that a person's relation to property can be partly constitutive of that person's social and personal capabilities, both in a political and an economic context.⁹⁸ Moreover, property influences people's preferences, as well as what paths lie open to them when they consider their life choices.⁹⁹ This effect is not limited to the owner, it comes into play for anyone who is socially or economically connected to property in some way, including a potentially large group of non-owners.¹⁰⁰

Hence, there is great potential for making wide-reaching socio-normative claims on the basis of the social function perspective on the meaning and content of property. But which such claims *should* we be making? According to some, we should adjust our moral compass by looking to the overriding norm of *human flourishing* as a guiding principle of property law. In a recent article, Alexander goes as far as to declare that human flourishing is the “moral foundation of private property”.¹⁰¹

Human flourishing has a good ring to it, but what does it mean? According to Alexander,

this is a real worry. Specifically, in a recent article, Anna di Robilant discusses how the Italian fascists were happy to embrace a social function perspective on property, because it helped them make the case that property should be made to answer to one core collective value: the interests of the state. As a form of resistance, many Italian property scholars agreed that the social function view was in order, but emphasised the plurality of values associated with this vision, values that have little or nothing to do with the interests of a Fascist state. See Anna di Robilant, ‘Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?’ (2013) 66(3) *Vanderbilt Law Review* 869.

⁹⁸ I will explore some specific capabilities in more depth later on, when discussing economic and social rights, and the value of participation in democracy. For the notion of a capability more generally, proposed as a foundational concept for economic theory, see Amartya Sen, *Commodities and Capabilities* (North-Holland 1985). For a discussion on the import of this work to property theory, see Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (n 93) 105.

⁹⁹ See generally Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (n 93).

¹⁰⁰ Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo M Peñalver, ‘Properties of Community’ (2009) 10 *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 127, 128-129.

¹⁰¹ Gregory S Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (2014) 99(3) *Iowa Law Review* 1257, 1261.

several values are implicated, both public and private.¹⁰² Importantly, Alexander stresses that human flourishing is *value pluralistic*.¹⁰³ There is not one core value that always guarantees a rewarding life. To flourish means to negotiate a range of different impulses, both internal and external. Importantly, these act together in a social context that influences their meaning and impact.¹⁰⁴

In the following, I consider some values that I regard as particularly important for the study of economic development takings. I start by the values enshrined in economic and social rights, which should arguably also inform our understanding and application of property law.

2.5.1 Property as an Anchor for Economic and Social Rights

The so-called “second generation” of human rights consists of basic economic, social and cultural rights that complement the better known civil and political rights.¹⁰⁵ This includes rights such as the right to housing, the right to food, and the right to work.¹⁰⁶ Economic and social rights of this kind often involve property. Specifically, they often involve interests in property that are not recognised as ownership, e.g., housing rights for squatters or rights to food and work for landless rural people.

If the notion of property is conceptualised in the traditional way, as an arrangement to protect individual entitlements, the relationship between private property and economic and social rights appears to be one filled with tension.¹⁰⁷ In particular, if economic and social rights require owners to

¹⁰² See generally Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (n 101); Alexander, ‘Pluralism and Property’ (n 63).

¹⁰³ Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (n 93) 750-751.

¹⁰⁴ Alexander, ‘Pluralism and Property’ (n 63) 1035-1052.

¹⁰⁵ See generally Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), *Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Action* (Oxford University Press 2007) 1-14 (arguing that the “second-generation” terminology is unfortunate since it can give rise to the misconception that ESC rights are second-class).

¹⁰⁶ See ICESCR (n 73) art 6.

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g., Namita Wahi, ‘The tension between property rights and social and economic rights: A case study of India’ in Alviar García, Karl Helena Klare and Lucy A Williams (eds), *Social and Economic Rights in Theory and*

give up some property entitlements, it becomes natural to portray property protection as standing in the way of social justice.

However, the human flourishing theory can be used to tell a very different story, namely one where economic and social rights are anchored in the notion of property itself. Importantly, the human flourishing theory compels us to take into account the interests and needs of property dependants other than owners. As Colin Crawford puts it, the purpose of property should be to “secure the goal of human flourishing for all citizens within any state”.¹⁰⁸ Consider, for instance, the right to housing. If the interests of a property owner come into conflict with the housing rights of a property dependant, the human flourishing theory encourages us to approach this as a tension *within* property, between different property functions.

With such a starting point, we should also acknowledge that the appropriate way to approach the rights of non-owners in relation to property might well depend on who the owner is and the choices they make in managing their property.¹⁰⁹ For instance, if owners live on their land and do not own much more than they need themselves, it becomes hard to maintain the criticism that their private property is somehow an affront to the housing rights of the landless. Moreover, from a practical point of view, squatting is unlikely to occur in these settings unless accompanied by severe trespass or dispossession. Similarly, the owner of a commercial building can discourage squatting by managing the property well. Arguably, this too can undercut potential criticism on the basis of housing rights, especially if the owner uses the building to engage in a commercial activity that contributes to sustaining the local community.

On the other hand, if owners mismanage their properties, for instance because they seek to obtain demolition licenses or simply wish to await an expected rise in land values, squatters might

Practice: A Critical Assessment (Routledge 2014) 138.

¹⁰⁸ Crawford (n 93) 1089.

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., Walt, *Constitutional Property Law* (n 71) 43 (commenting on the principle of “scaling” of social obligations in German property law, whereby what can be demanded of owners depends on the context).

take opportunity of this and feel encouraged to occupy the property. If private property is thought of merely as entitlement-protection, a property-protecting state might feel obliged to respond in a way that offends against the social and economic rights of the squatters. If this is considered an undesirable outcome, the government or its critics might in turn come to regard strong property protection as an affront to housing rights, even though the real problem is that property does not function as it should within society. Hence, the result can be that property structures are damaged further, as the state pursues policies of interference and centralised management, without addressing how private property as such can promote human flourishing.

By contrast, the human flourishing narrative suggests that both owners and non-owners might appropriately be viewed as victims if the state fails to protect property's proper functions. This perspective might even suggest itself when owners and non-owners would otherwise appear to be adversaries. For a concrete example, I mention the South African case of *Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd*.¹¹⁰

The case dealt with squatting on a massive scale: some 400 people had initially taken up residence on land owned by Modderklip Farm, apparently under the belief that it belonged to the city of Johannesburg.¹¹¹ The owner attempted to have them evicted and obtained an eviction order, but the local authorities refused to implement it. Eventually, the settlement grew to 40 000 people and Modderklip Farm complained that its constitutional property rights had not been respected.¹¹²

The Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that Modderklip's property rights had indeed been violated, but noted that the housing rights of the squatters were also (in danger of) being violated;

¹¹⁰ See *Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd* (2005) 5 SA 3 (CC). For two commentaries focusing specifically on its implications for property law and theory, see Alexander and Peñalver, 'Properties of Community' (n 100); AJ van der Walt, 'The state's duty to protect property owners v the state's duty to provide housing: thoughts on the Modderklip case' (2005) 21(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 144.

¹¹¹ See *Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd* (n 110) 4.

¹¹² See *Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd* (n 110) 8.

the squatters needed a place to go before they could be evicted.¹¹³ Hence, the appropriate response was not to evict the squatters, but to pay compensation to Modderklip, for an ongoing violation of its property rights, caused by the state's failure to protect housing rights.

This outcome is consistent with a social function understanding of property, but the rationale behind it builds on a narrative that takes the perceived tension between property and housing rights as its point of departure.¹¹⁴ The Constitutional Court, by contrast, chose to remain agnostic on the issue of the state's duties with respect to both property and housing rights, as well as the relation between them.¹¹⁵ Rather, the Constitutional Court focused on the state's failure to "assist Modderklip" in dealing with the "burden imposed on it to provide accommodation to such a large number of occupiers".¹¹⁶ This was a failure of governance, and the state was ordered to pay compensation, not for a violation of property, but as an appropriate form of assistance to Modderklip.¹¹⁷

This shift of perspective can arguably be understood as a reflection of the Court's willingness to regard the needs of the squatters as giving rise to a social obligation for Modderklip *qua* owner. Effectively, the circumstances of the case meant that Modderklip's ownership entailed an obligation to respect the housing needs of a community of 40 000 people. Moreover, the primary duty-bearer had become the owner, not the state.

¹¹³ See *Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd* (2004) 8 BCLR 821 (SCA) 21-26.

¹¹⁴ See Walt, 'The state's duty to protect property owners v the state's duty to provide housing: thoughts on the Modderklip case' (n 110) 152-156. However, as van der Walt notes, the Supreme Court of Appeal took the traditional narrative in an interesting direction when it held that the failure of the state to protect the housing rights of the squatters was the cause of its failure to protect property. As van der Walt notes, the conflict between rights then became less important than the observation that the state had failed in its duty to protect *both* rights. This is an improvement on a narrative focused on the question of which right to prioritise, but still arguably over-emphasises the role of the state.

¹¹⁵ See *Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd* (n 110) 25.

¹¹⁶ See *Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd* (n 110) 49.

¹¹⁷ For a more detailed presentation of the Court's decision, including references to the relevant governance provision of the South African constitution (guaranteeing access to court with suitable and efficient enforcement procedures), see Walt, 'The state's duty to protect property owners v the state's duty to provide housing: thoughts on the Modderklip case' (n 110) 156-158.

With such an approach, private property can be a potential source of justice for anyone, including squatters. The role of the state, meanwhile, becomes that of assisting those who are directly responsible for delivering justice on the ground, including owners such as Modderklip. In a detailed analysis of the case, Alexander and Peñalver also argue in this direction. They suggest, in particular, that *Modderklip* serves as an illustration of how property owners themselves can have responsibilities towards property dependants, obligations that endure as long as private property remains in place.¹¹⁸

This normative turn makes property owners addressees of obligations arising from the economic, social and cultural rights of non-owners, not by direct horizontal application of these rights, but through the law of property.¹¹⁹ In this way, the human flourishing theory points towards a novel way to address the rights of marginalised groups, for whom it often appears that neither neo-liberal property nor state management is capable of delivering basic justice.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Alexander and Peñalver, ‘Properties of Community’ (n 100) 157 (“The courts’ unwillingness to ratify Modderklip’s desire to remove the squatters from its land illustrates the courts’ willingness to take seriously the obligations of owners, not only as they concern owners’ direct relationship with the state but also in relation to the needs of other citizens.”). It should be noted, moreover, that Modderklip was eager to sell the land to the government. See *Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd* (n 110) 61.

¹¹⁹ In this way, it arguably strengthens such rights, while potentially circumventing problems and objections associated with the idea of making such rights directly justiciable in disputes among private parties. For the question of horizontal application more generally, see Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Non-State Actors and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), *Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Action* (Oxford University Press 2007). As the case of *Modderklip* demonstrates, embedding the duty of non-state actors in property will serve to ensure that the state is responsible for providing assistance in cases when the burdens of ownership become disproportionate. The duty of the state in these circumstances will be formally directed towards the owners, even if the beneficiaries of state action will be those property dependants with respect to whom the owners have obligations. This might prove conducive to more effective action also at the state level; presumably, the owners as a group would make a valuably ally for the landless squatters, in cases of failed governance.

¹²⁰ For instance, it has been noted that in India, the human right to water has at times been simultaneously frustrated both by a non-egalitarian distribution of riparian rights as well as a regulatory framework that grants the state almost limitless proprietary power over water resources. See Philippe Cullet, *Water Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector Reforms in India* (Oxford University Press 2009) 186. To address shortcomings of the current system for water management in India, Cullet recommends a conceptual approach that “leaves aside property rights altogether” (both private and public) and instead emphasises that water is a common heritage of humankind. A possible alternative, highlighted by the social function theory, is to embrace human flourishing as the core value of property, possibly in a manner that is mutually conducive to recognising water as a common heritage. On such an account, property might regulate some uses of water, such as economic development, without thereby resulting in anyone being granted ownership of water as a substance or a right to charge people for access to drinking water. As discussed in Part II of this thesis, the traditional property regime for water resources in Norway arguably reflects a framework along these lines, applied in a context marked by egalitarian property with no scarcity of water for basic human needs. The appropriateness of proposing similarly spirited (but adjusted) property-based frameworks for different contexts is a matter for future work, but in my view, the human flourishing theory at least suggests that this might be worth

Moreover, it strengthens the institution of property, highlighting why it might be appropriate to grant it extensive protection against interference. In particular, a human flourishing approach might serve as a bulwark against the idea that the ultimate expression of public interests can be found in the actions taken by the state. Instead, the theory directs attention at how public interests are expressed at their point of origin; values often associated with the public sphere, such as those pertaining to the economic and social rights of marginalised groups, are in fact legally relevant already at the level of private law.¹²¹ As a consequence, the human flourishing account bolsters the view that public interests and obligations can acquire some justiciable relevance even in the absence of explicit international treaties, legislation or equitable decision-making within (inter)national institutions.

Perhaps the most important structural aspect of this insight concerns the mechanisms used to resolve tensions between different property values. Importantly, it might not be necessary to introduce intermediaries between owners and other rights holders and property dependants. To introduce such intermediaries, whether they are state bodies, international institutions, NGOs, or commercial enterprises, carries with it the risk that the decision-making process can be captured by forces that either have ulterior motives or are simply too far removed from local conditions to deliver results on basic rights.¹²² It might be better, therefore, if basic rights are (also) anchored and implemented using private law solutions that target the local level, for instance by relying on the law of property.

exploring.

¹²¹ See also Alexander, 'Property's Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values' (n 101) 1295-1296.

¹²² See, e.g., Philippe Cullet, 'Governing the Environment without CoPs – The Case of Water' (2013) 15 *International Community Law Review* 123 (describing how non-state actors and developed countries increasingly seem to capture the agenda in international water policy, to the detriment of people and states in the developing part of the world); Michael Levien, 'Regimes of Dispossession: From Steel Towns to Special Economic Zones' (2013) 44(2) *Development and Change* 381 (analysing state-led processes of rural dispossession in India, arguing that states now often act as land brokers for private enterprises); Lyla Mehta and others, 'Global environmental justice and the right to water: The case of peri-urban Cochabamba and Delhi' (2014) 54 *Geoforum* 158 (two case studies, from India and Bolivia respectively, demonstrating that elite bias and other democratic deficits at the state level have frustrated efforts to deliver on water rights for marginalised groups in peri-urban areas).

2.5.2 Property as an Anchor for Democracy

It is often argued that property is a crucial building block of democracy, as it both empowers and encourages owners to participate in the political process.¹²³ However, the notion of participation at work here often seems to be drawn up rather narrowly, as pertaining primarily to individual owners, and only to their engagement with the formal affairs of the polity.¹²⁴ By contrast, the human flourishing theory gives participation a broader meaning, involving also the value of being included in a community. Alexander writes:

We can understand participation more broadly as an aspect of inclusion. In this sense participation means belonging or membership, in a robust respect. Whether or not one actively participates in the formal affairs of the polity, one nevertheless participates in the life of the community if one experiences a sense of belonging as a member of that community.¹²⁵

Participating in a community can have a crucial influence also on people's preferences and desires.¹²⁶ Therefore, for anyone adhering to welfarism, rational choice theory, or some other utilitarian dogma, neglecting the importance of communities is not only normatively undesirable, it is also unjustified in an epistemic sense. In particular, it should be recognised as a descriptive fact that the idea of community is highly relevant to *any* normative theory that attempts to take

¹²³ See generally Rose, 'Property as the keystone right?' (n 24) (critically examining common arguments to support the claim that property is the most fundamental right, including the argument that it gives rise to, facilitates, and protects democracy). For an exposition of the converse link, explaining how property law is constrained and determined by the values and principles associated with democracy, see Joseph William Singer, 'Property as the Law of Democracy' (2014) 63 Duke Law Journal 1287.

¹²⁴ Alexander, 'Property's Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values' (n 101) 1275.

¹²⁵ Alexander, 'Property's Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values' (n 101) 1275.

¹²⁶ For a more in depth discussion of this, see Alexander, 'The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law' (n 93) 140. Here, Alexander and Peñalver draw on the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, see generally Amartya Sen, *Resources, Values and Development* (Harvard University Press 1984); Sen, *Commodities and Capabilities* (n 98); Amartya Sen, *Development as freedom* (1st edn, Oxford University Press 1999); Martha C Nussbaum, *Women and human development: the capabilities approach* (Cambridge University Press 2000); Martha Nussbaum, 'Capabilities and Social Justice' (2002) 4(2) International Studies Review 123.

into account the preferences and desires of individuals. But Alexander and Peñalver go further, by arguing that participation in a community should also be seen as an irreducibly social value, not merely as a determinant of individual preferences and a precondition for rational choice. They write:

Beyond nurturing the individual capabilities necessary for flourishing, communities of all varieties serve another, equally important function. Community is necessary to create and foster a certain sort of society, one that is characterized above all by just social relations within it. By “just social relations”, we mean a society in which individuals can interact with each other in a manner consistent with norms of equality, dignity, respect, and justice as well as freedom and autonomy. Communities foster just relations with societies by shaping social norms, not simply individual interests.¹²⁷

This, I believe, is a crucial aspect of participation. Moreover, it is a notion that invariably leads us to recognise that other property dependants should also have a voice, as they form part of the “just social relations” within the community to which the owners belong. In addition, this is a notion of participation that it is hard, if at all possible, to incorporate in theories that take preferences and other attributes of individuals as the basis upon which to reason about their legal status. Instead, the human flourishing perspective asks us to consider how property serves as an anchor for participation that shapes and influences community norms and preferences.

Protecting the function that property plays in this regard can at times require protecting it also against the actions of owners and their communities. This can happen, for example, in a community where people have come under pressure to sell their homes and their land to make way for large enterprises. If owners are offered generous financial compensations, or if they are threatened by eminent domain, economic incentives might trump the value of social inclusion and participation.

¹²⁷ Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (n 93) 140.

As a consequence, the community might decide to sell.

Even so, in light of the value of community, it would be in order for planning authorities, maybe even the judiciary, to view such an agreement as an *attack on their property*. It is clear that by the sale of the land, the “just social relations” inhering in the community will come under pressure. Property rights that once contributed to sustaining these relations will be transformed into property rights that serve a very different purpose, namely that of aiding the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the commercially powerful. Such a change in the social function of property might have to be regarded – objectively speaking – as a threat to participation, community and democracy. Therefore, it is arguable that our property institutions should protect against it, even if this implies limiting the freedom of owners and communities to do as they please.

In Norway, a range of such rules are in place to protect agricultural property, by limiting the owners’ right to sell parcels of their land without local government consent, as well as by compelling them to reside on their property and to make use of it for agricultural production.¹²⁸ In addition, there are rules in place that guarantees certain principles of non-exclusion for outfield land; the owner of such land cannot prevent anyone from travelling over it, camping on it, and must even tolerate that visitors pick berries and roots for their own consumption.¹²⁹ This is the so-called “*allemannsretten*” – the right to roam – which has been recognised in Norway since ancient times.

When the law actively promotes egalitarian and equitable property using arrangements such as these, the natural counterpart is to limit direct state interference. The danger otherwise is that the limited power of each individual property owner – appropriate in a community of property owners – is exploited by the state or other powerful stakeholders who might wish to usurp control over local resources and impose their will on local populations.

¹²⁸ See Land Act 1995, s 8 and Land Concession Act 2003, s 4.

¹²⁹ See generally Inge Lorange Backer, ‘*Allemannsretten i dag*’ (2007) 46(08) *Lov og Rett* 451.

The broader issue at stake is highlighted by recent developments in South Africa, where rules resembling many of those in place for agricultural property in Norway have been proposed in a recent Act on land reform.¹³⁰ In South Africa, however, these rules have been proposed alongside a new framework of state “custodianship” of agricultural land, corresponding to a formulation recently introduced in the mineral and petroleum legislation.¹³¹ If the proposal passes, the proper functioning of agricultural property in South Africa would seem to depend quite strongly on the benevolence and capability of the state, which will significantly increase its own power to interfere with private property.¹³² Importantly, the human flourishing perspective suggests that even when provisions to promote egalitarian ownership and community commitment are appropriate, provisions that inflate the state’s authority might not be. The case study from Norway will illustrate that strict property rules to protect and promote self-governing agrarian communities can work well, but only as long as they are applied consistently and coupled with strong institutions of local democracy and strict limits on state power.¹³³

¹³⁰ See Annette Steyn, ‘More time needed for comment on state “custodianship” of agri land Bill’ (*Democratic Alliance*, 29th May 2015) (<http://www.da.org.za/2015/05/more-time-needed-for-comment-on-state-custodianship-of-agri-land-bill/>) accessed 12th July 2015.

¹³¹ See *Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy* 2013 (4) SA 1 (holding that introducing custodianship over mineral and petroleum is not expropriation, meaning that no compensation is payable to owners, not even when the rights taken may subsequently be transferred – in a different wrapping, under a new regulatory regime – to third parties). The decision was made under dissent on the basis of the conclusion that *acquisition* by the state – apparently not implied by “custodianship” — is required for a deprivation of property to count as expropriation. On an uncharitable reading, the decision therefore appears to open the floodgates for economic development takings, which can now even go uncompensated as long as they are embedded in a regulatory narrative based on custodianship. The academic community in South Africa appears to be divided on the issues raised by the case, see Walt, *Constitutional Property Law* (n 71) 428-451; Ernst Marais, ‘When does state interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition requirement (Part i)’ (2015) 18(1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 3032; Ernst Marais, ‘When does state interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition requirement (Part ii)’ (2015) 18(1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 3071.

¹³² Hence, the proposed land reform arguably demonstrates the appropriateness of Justice Froneman’s dissent in *Agri*, see *Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy* (n 131) 79-110 (warning against the precedent set by the majority, holding that state custodianship of the type in question amounted to expropriation, but finding that compensation was not required in the circumstances of the case, looking also to the value of social justice and the history of apartheid in South Africa).

¹³³ I discuss the role of agrarian property to the development of Norwegian democracy in more depth in chapter 4.

This raises the question of what kind of institutions we need to enable local communities and owners to flourish and make democratically legitimate decisions about how to use their properties. Arguably, there is no appropriate theoretical answer to this question, since institutions for participatory decision-making are successful only when they match local conditions.¹³⁴ In the final chapter of the thesis, I return to discuss this concretely by looking to the Norwegian institution of land consolidation.

In the next section, I apply the theory developed so far to economic development takings. Specifically, I introduce this category of takings in more depth and present *Kelo* in further detail, drawing on the social function theory to carry out an assessment of the controversy that resulted.

2.6 Economic Development Takings

The notion of an economic development taking is in some sense self-explanatory: it targets situations when property is taken for economic development. However, the obvious follow-up question is a difficult one: what is meant by “economic development”? In the literature on economic development takings, no clear answer has been provided.¹³⁵ Rather, one tends to rely on an intuitive understanding to classify takings as being for economic development, where typical cases are those where the decision-makers themselves emphasise the value of economic progress as a reason for authorising eminent domain.¹³⁶ The lack of clarity about what the category covers might seem like a theoretical challenge, possibly even a weakness. However, it can also be argued that the ambi-

¹³⁴ See also the discussion in chapter 2, section 2.6 (discussing the design principles for self-governance first presented by Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 87)).

¹³⁵ See, e.g., Cohen, ‘Eminent Domain After *Kelo v. City of New London*: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings’ (n 2) 558-567 (Cohen proposes a ban on economic development takings, comments on the difficulty of defining the notion precisely, before proceeding to pursue his stated aim indirectly, through a ban on takings benefiting private parties, with exceptions for certain non-profit undertakings).

¹³⁶ See, e.g., Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after *Kelo*’ (n 2); James W Ely, ‘Post-*Kelo* Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?’ (2009) 17(1) *Supreme Court Economic Review* 127 (both authors also discuss how economic development, or even commercial profit, can be an unacknowledged motive, for instance when property is taken on the pretext of combating “blight”).

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guity of the notion of economic development forms part of the reason why economic development takings merit special attention in the first place.¹³⁷

Some scholars still prefer not to use the notion, choosing instead to speak of “private takings” when they discuss the legitimacy issues that arise in cases such as *Kelo*.¹³⁸ The notion of a private taking is very easy to define: such a taking occurs when the legal person taking title to the property is a non-governmental actor.¹³⁹ Arguably, however, this categorisation is quite unhelpful when the aim is to get at the legitimacy issues that arise specifically in economic development situations. For instance, it might well be that a private organisation, say a tightly regulated charity, functionally mimics a quintessential “public” taker. A public body, on the other hand, can well be functionally equivalent to a private enterprise, particularly if there is a lack of political oversight and democratic accountability. Imagine, for instance, a case involving a publicly owned limited liability company. According to the simple definition of a private taking, a taking by such a company would not meet the definition. This would be the conclusion even if the company’s interests are completely or predominantly commercial, directed at maximising profit for the shareholders, not at providing a public service.¹⁴⁰

By contrast, the notion of an economic development taking points to the purpose of the taking, not the outward legal appearance of the taker. As such, it provides a less sharp distinction between different kinds of takings, but also seems more relevant to the question of legitimacy. Specifically,

¹³⁷ See Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after *Kelo*’ (n 2) (arguing for a complete ban on the “economic development rationale”, citing its vagueness as a reason why it should *never* be used to justify a taking).

¹³⁸ See, e.g., Abraham Bell, ‘Private Takings’ (2009) 76(2) The University of Chicago Law Review 517.

¹³⁹ See Bell (n 138) 519.

¹⁴⁰ Some might argue that the distinction between private and public ownership is still significant. However, such an argument seems difficult to make independently of the social context. If a public company operates for profit and is insulated from political decision-making and principles of administrative law, it is hard to see why takings to benefit such a company should be regarded as *a priori* different from other kinds of economic development takings. In particular, it is hard to see why it should matter in such cases whether the associated public benefit is ensured through the payment of dividends, taxes, or some other mechanism. In any event, the public benefit will be indirect in these cases, arising from ordinary commercial activity.

the category performs an important function in that it directs attention at the fact that there might be inappropriate motives influencing the decision to take private property. Moreover, the main reason for paying particular attention to economic development takings is clear enough: the presence of strong economic incentives, often of a commercial nature, appears to increase the risk of eminent domain abuse.

The benefit of using a comparatively neutral and open-ended designation seems especially clear in mixed economies, where the influence of public-private partnerships can cause a general blurring of lines between private and public sectors.¹⁴¹ In such contexts, it seems particularly appropriate to devote special attention to cases where commercial interests stand to benefit – directly or indirectly – from a taking of private property. The presence of commercial incentives among the beneficiaries or their partners might contrast with the public spirited rationale provided to legitimise the taking. An important advantage of a categorisation based on the notion of economic development is that it can be used to flag cases where this contrast is present, suggesting that we should further scrutinize the legitimacy of the undertaking as a whole.

If we broaden our perspective even further and consider commercially motivated changes in property structures on the global stage, this perspective suggests itself with even greater force. In fact, it seems appropriate to speak of a crisis of confidence in property, particularly in relation to land rights, arising from how powerful commercial interests usurp proprietary power over an increasingly large share of the world's resources. This is the phenomenon known as *land grabbing*, which has received much critical attention in recent years.¹⁴²

So far, most research on land grabbing has looked at how commercial interests, often cooperating with nation states, exploit weaknesses of local property institutions, to acquire land voluntarily, or

¹⁴¹ For the growing importance of public-private partnerships to the world economic order, see generally Stéphane Saussier, 'Public-private partnerships' (2013) 89 *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 143.

¹⁴² See generally Saturnino M Borrás and others, 'Towards a better understanding of global land grabbing: an editorial introduction' (2011) 38(2) *Journal of Peasant Studies* 209.

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from those who lack formal title. However, the similarity between economic development takings and state-aided land grabbings in favour of large commercial companies is striking. Specifically, it has been noted that the purported public interest in economic development can be used to justify massive land grabs that would otherwise appear unjustifiable. In a recent article, Smita Narula cites *Kelo* directly and warns that procedural safeguards alone might not provide sufficient protection against abuse. She writes:

Procedural safeguards, however, can all too easily be co-opted by a state because its claims about what constitutes a public purpose may not be easy to contest. Particularly within the context of land investments, states could use the very general and under-scrutinized language of “economic development” to justify takings in the public interest.¹⁴³

This underscores the broader relevance of the study of economic development takings. In addition, it asks us to keep in mind that the question of what can be justified in the name of “economic development” is a general one, not confined to particular systems for organizing property rights.¹⁴⁴

In India, for example, people have been displaced and dispossessed on a massive scale in the name of economic development.¹⁴⁵ The idea that the state enjoys eminent domain has been used to enable such processes. In fact, the language of eminent domain has been used to justify controversial

¹⁴³ Smita Narula, ‘The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food’ [2013] (1) Stanford Journal of International Law 140, 157.

¹⁴⁴ To address this, and to restore confidence in the institution of property more generally, some academics and policy makers have proposed a novel concept of property as a human right. It has been argued, in particular, that a human right to land should be recognised on the international stage, a right that would apply even when those affected by a land grab lack formal title. If successful, this approach promises to deliver basic protection against interference in established patterns of property use independently of how particular jurisdictions approach property. Specifically, it would establish an important link needed to make the kinds of property protections discussed in this thesis justiciable in the context of land grabbing when those adversely affected lack formal title. See generally Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Emerging Human Right to Land’ 12(3) International Community Law Review 303; Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Green Rush: the Global Race for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users’ (2011) 52(2) Harvard International Law Journal 503; Rolf Künemann and Sofia Monsalve Suárez, ‘International Human Rights and Governing Land Grabbing: A View from Global Civil Society’ (2013) 10(1) Globalizations 123.

¹⁴⁵ See generally Levien (n 122).

policy decisions also with respect to land that is not privately owned, but already under forms of state ownership/custodianship.¹⁴⁶ The notion of eminent domain is apparently so powerful that it can be used to silence opposition of all kinds, including that arising with respect to social and economic rights for the poor and the landless when they face displacement or loss of livelihoods.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, it has been argued that the scope of eminent domain in India has become so wide that it allows for a “complete assertion of power” by the state.¹⁴⁸ This power, moreover, is apparently often used to “disempower people and redistribute rights and benefits”, in a way that favours people who are already better-off than those negatively affected.¹⁴⁹ Paradoxically, the power of eminent domain has expanded alongside a judicial re-creation of property as a fundamental right (the right to property was removed from the Constitution in 1978).¹⁵⁰ However, as argued by Allen, “the Supreme Court’s emphasis on liberal entitlement, rather than solidarity or social obligation, is likely to deny the new right to property of relevance in cases where social justice is paramount.”¹⁵¹

This underscores the broader relevance of the questions studied in this thesis. Moreover, while I generally assume that those adversely affected by the use of eminent domain do have recognised property interests, the social function perspective makes it natural to emphasise the wider societal effects of takings, including effects on non-owners.

¹⁴⁶ See Usha Ramanathan, ‘A word on eminent domain’ in Lyla Mehta (ed), *Displaced by Development: Confronting Marginalisation and Gender Injustice* (Sage 2009) 141.

¹⁴⁷ See Ramanathan (n 146) 143-144 (“the power of eminent domain has been interpreted as being close to absolute power of the State over all land and interests in land within its territory. The effect of this has been that those without access to land and rights over land (including the landless, artisans, women as a composite group), those who may have use rights but no titles, communities holding common rights and others with inchoate interests, have had to bear the burden heaved on to them by eminent domain.”).

¹⁴⁸ See Cullet, *Water Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector Reforms in India* (n 120) 43. For a concrete example of a case involving displacement on a very large scale, see Philippe Cullet, ‘Human Rights and Displacement: The Indian Supreme Court Decision on Sardar Sarovar in International Perspective’ (2001) 50(4) *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 973.

¹⁴⁹ See Cullet, *Water Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector Reforms in India* (n 120) 33.

¹⁵⁰ See generally Tom Allen, ‘The Revival of the Right to Property in India’ [2015] *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 1 (forthcoming).

¹⁵¹ See Allen, ‘The Revival of the Right to Property in India’ (n 150) 30.

In the next section, I consider *Kelo* in more depth, to argue that strict judicial deference to legislative and executive decision-makers is inappropriate in this regard. I focus especially on Justice O'Connor's dissent, which I believe suggests a stricter standard of judicial review for economic development takings, without unduly undermining the value of deference to political decision-makers and the executive branch.

2.6.1 *Kelo*: Casting Doubts on the Narrow Approach to Judicial Review

In many jurisdictions, constitutional property rules indicate, with varying degrees of clarity, that eminent domain should only be used to take property either for "public use", in the "public interest", or for a "public purpose".¹⁵² Such a restriction can be regarded as an unwritten rule of constitutional law, as in the UK, or it can be explicitly stated, as in the basic law of Germany.¹⁵³ In some jurisdictions, for instance in the US and in Norway, explicit takings clauses exist, but do not provide much information about the intended scope of protection.¹⁵⁴

The question arises to what extent these clauses give the judiciary a duty and a right to restrict the state's power to take property. In the US, most scholars agree that some judicial review based on the public use requirement is warranted, but there is great disagreement about its extent.¹⁵⁵ In Norway, on the other hand, a consensus has developed whereby the notion of public use is interpreted so widely that it hardly amounts to a justiciable restriction at all.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, the courts defer almost completely to the assessments made by the executive branch regarding the purposes

¹⁵² For instance, a rather unclear "public use" formulation is used in the takings clause of the US constitution, as well as in the Norwegian constitution, while both the "public interest" and the "public purpose" formulations (but not "public use") are used in the South African Constitution. See Walt, *Constitutional Property Law* (n 71) 462 (arguing that while "public purpose" would traditionally have been understood more narrowly, there is no generally observed difference between the two notions as they are now understood in South African law).

¹⁵³ See JAMA Shuysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), *Expropriation Law in Europe* (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 3-4.

¹⁵⁴ See chapter 3, section 3.3 and chapter 5, section 5.2.

¹⁵⁵ Lawrence Berger, 'The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain' (1978) 57 *Oregon Law Review* 203, 205.

¹⁵⁶ See, e.g., Eirik Holmøyvik and Jørgen Aall, 'Grunnlovsfesting av menneskerettane' (2010) 123(2) *Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett* 327, 368.

that may be used to justify a taking.¹⁵⁷

Some US scholars adopt a similar stance, but others argue that the public use restriction should be read as a stricter requirement, forbidding the use of eminent domain unless the public will make actual use of the property that is taken.¹⁵⁸ Most scholars fall in between these two extremes. They regard the public use restriction as an important limitation, but they also emphasise that the courts should normally defer to the legislature's assessment of what counts as a public use.¹⁵⁹

As I discuss in more depth in chapter 3, section 3.3, the debate in the US has its roots in case law developed by state courts – the federal property clause was for a long time not applied to state takings. This has changed, and today the Supreme Court has a leading role in this area of US law. It has developed a largely deferential doctrine, resembling the understanding of the public use limitation under Norwegian law.¹⁶⁰ The difference is that in the US, cases raising the issue still regularly arise and prove controversial. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the most important such case in recent times was *Kelo*, decided by the Supreme Court in 2005.¹⁶¹ This case saw the public use question reach new heights of controversy in the US.¹⁶²

As mentioned in the introduction, *Kelo* centred on the legitimacy of taking property to implement a redevelopment plan that involved the construction of research facilities for the drug company Pfizer. The homes of Suzanne Kelo and eight other home-owners stood in the way of this plan and the city decided to use the power of eminent domain to condemn them. *Kelo* and

¹⁵⁷ Holmøyvik and Aall (n 156) 368.

¹⁵⁸ Compare Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, 'The Uselessness of Public Use' (2006) 106(6) *Columbia Law Review* 1412; Bell (n 138); Eric R Claey's, 'Public-use limitations and natural property rights' [2004] (4) *Michigan State Law Review* 877; Timothy Sandefur, 'Mine and Thine Distinct: What *Kelo* Says About Our Path' (2006) 10 *Chapman Law Review* 1.

¹⁵⁹ See, e.g., Merrill (n 1); Gregory S Alexander, 'Eminent Domain and Secondary Rent-Seeking' (2005) 1(3) *New York University Journal of Law & Liberty* 958.

¹⁶⁰ See *Berman v Parker* 348 US 26; *Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff* 467 US 229 (1984); *Kelo v City of New London* 545 US 469 (2005).

¹⁶¹ *Kelo* (n 160).

¹⁶² See, e.g., Ilya Somin, 'The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to *Kelo*' (2009) 93 *Minnesota Law Review* 2100.

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the other owners protested, arguing that making room for a private research facility was not a permissible “public use”. The owners were represented by the libertarian legal firm *Institute for Justice*, which had previously succeeded in overturning similar instances of eminent domain at the state level.¹⁶³ *Kelo* and the other owners lost the case before the state courts, but the Supreme Court decided to hear it and assessed its merits in great detail.

The precedent set by earlier federal cases such as *Berman* and *Midkiff* was clear: as long as the decision to condemn was “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”, it was to be regarded as consistent with the public use restriction.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, the role of the judiciary in determining whether a taking was for a public purpose was regarded as “extremely narrow”.¹⁶⁵ It had even been held that deference to the legislature’s public use determination was required “unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation” or involved an “impossibility”.¹⁶⁶

Despite this, in the case of *Kelo*, the court hesitated. Part of the reason was no doubt that takings similar to *Kelo* had been heavily criticised at state level, with an impression taking hold across the US that eminent domain abuse was becoming a real problem.¹⁶⁷ A symbolic case that had contributed to this worry was the infamous case of *Poletown*.¹⁶⁸ In this case, General Motors had been allowed to raze a town to build a car factory, a decision that provoked outrage across the political spectrum.¹⁶⁹ The case was similar to *Kelo* in that the taker was a powerful commercial actor who wanted to take homes. This, in particular, served to set the case apart from *Midkiff*, which involved a taking in favour of tenants, and to some extent also *Berman*, which involved a

¹⁶³ See ‘Institute of Justice’ (<https://www.ij.org/cases/privateproperty>) accessed 10th September 2015.

¹⁶⁴ See *Midkiff* (n 160) 241; *Berman v Parker* (n 160).

¹⁶⁵ *Berman v Parker* (n 160) 32.

¹⁶⁶ See *Old Dominion Land Co v US* 269 US 55, 66 (1925); *US v Gettysburg Electric R Co* 160 US 668, 680 (1896).

¹⁶⁷ See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, ‘A gleeful obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit’ (2005) 28(2) *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 651, 667-669.

¹⁶⁸ *Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit* 410 Mich 616 (1981).

¹⁶⁹ See generally Sandefur, ‘A gleeful obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit’ (n 167).

taking of businesses (and homes) in the interest of removing blight.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court had recently decided to overturn *Poletown* in the case of *Hatchcock*.¹⁷¹ Hence, it seemed that the time had come for the Supreme Court to re-examine the public use question.¹⁷²

Eventually, in a 5-4 vote, the court decided to apply existing precedent, leading it to uphold the taking of Kelo's home. The majority also made clear that economic development takings were indeed permitted under the public use restriction, also when the public benefit was indirect and a private company would benefit commercially.¹⁷³ This resulted in great political controversy in the US. According to Ilya Somin, the *Kelo* case ranks among the most disliked decisions in the history of the Supreme Court.¹⁷⁴

Importantly, many commentators emphasised that *Kelo* was an economic development taking.¹⁷⁵ This category had no clear basis in the property discourse before *Kelo*. Indeed, in terms of established legal doctrine, it would be more appropriate to say that the case revolved entirely around the notion of "public use". However, when considering the most common reasons given for condemning the outcome in *Kelo*, it becomes clear why many felt it was natural to classify the case along additional dimensions. A survey of the literature shows that many made use of a combination of substantive and procedural arguments to paint a bleak picture of the *context* surrounding the decision to take Kelo's home. Important aspects of this include the imbalance of power between the commercial company and the owners, the incommensurable nature of the opposing interests, the close relationship between the company and the government, and the feeling that the public bene-

¹⁷⁰ *Berman v Parker* (n 160); *Midkiff* (n 160).

¹⁷¹ *Wayne County v Hatchcock* 684 NW2d 765 (Michigan Supreme Court 2004).

¹⁷² See, e.g., Sandefur, 'A gleeful obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit' (n 167); Claey's, 'Public-use limitations and natural property rights' (n 158).

¹⁷³ *Kelo* (n 160) 469-470.

¹⁷⁴ Ilya Somin, 'The judicial reaction to Kelo' (2011) 4(1) Albany Government Law Review 1, 2.

¹⁷⁵ See, e.g., Somin, 'Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo' (n 2); Cohen, 'Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings' (n 2).

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fit – while perhaps not insignificant – was made conditional on, and rendered subservient to, the commercial benefit that would be bestowed on a commercial beneficiary.¹⁷⁶ Plainly, the decision to condemn in *Kelo* appeared to suffer from what I will refer to here as a *democratic deficit*.

The social function theory of property makes it natural to emphasise the worry that economic development takings can lack democratic merit. Moreover, the theory inspires reasoning that can justify a departure from the established doctrine of extreme deference, in favour of more substantial judicial review. It seems to me that such a perspective was indeed adopted by the minority of the Supreme Court in *Kelo*, particularly Justice O'Connor.¹⁷⁷ She wrote a strongly worded dissent, characterising the majority's decision as follows:

Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result.¹⁷⁸

As demonstrated by this quote, the overarching concern raised by Justice O'Connor was that allowing takings such as *Kelo* could legitimise a form of governmental interference in property that would systematically favour the rich and powerful to the detriment of the less resourceful. In this way, the power of eminent domain could become a tool for establishing and sustaining patterns of inequality, under the pretence of providing an economic benefit. Hardly anyone would openly

¹⁷⁶ See, for instance, Laura S Underkuffler, 'Kelo's moral failure' (2006) 15(2) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 377; Somin, 'Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo' (n 2); Sandefur, 'Mine and Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says About Our Path' (n 158); Cohen, 'Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings' (n 2); Daniel S Hafetz, 'Ferreting out favoritism: Bringing pretext claims after Kelo' (2009) 77(6) Fordham Law Review 3095; Zachary D Hudson, 'Eminent domain due process' (2010) 119(6) Yale Law Journal 1280.

¹⁷⁷ *Kelo* (n 160) 494-505.

¹⁷⁸ *Kelo* (n 160) 505.

regard this as desirable. Indeed, one of the justices who voted with the majority, Justice Kennedy, formulated a separate concurring opinion to emphasise that detailed, albeit deferential, judicial scrutiny is appropriate in cases like *Kelo*. According to Justice Kennedy, this is needed to rule out that the public interest in economic development is used merely as a pretext to bestow benefits on private companies.¹⁷⁹

The main difference between his opinion and that of Justice O'Connor does not appear to hinge on how they interpret the meaning of public use. Rather, the crucial difference seems to arise from the fact that Justice O'Connor is more willing to address injustices associated with economic development takings at the systemic level. Her perspective is clearly a powerful one, at least partially responsible also for the wide disapproval of *Kelo* among the public. Indeed, if Justice O'Connor's predictions about the systemic fallout of *Kelo* are correct, most would probably agree that the result would be "perverse".

The crucial question therefore becomes whether her predictions are warranted. In fact, the main importance of her dissent might be that it flags this issue as a crucial one in relation to very typical uses of eminent domain in the modern world. In light of its high level of generality, Justice O'Connor's dissent becomes a call for empirical work, to shed light on how economic development takings actually come about, and how they affect political, social and bureaucratic processes. In addition, her dissent raises the question of how to *avoid* negative effects, that is, how to design rules and procedures that can help bring about desirable economic development without creating a democratic deficit. These will be the main themes that I discuss in the remainder of this thesis.

¹⁷⁹ See *Kelo* (n 160) 490-493. The form of judicial review Justice Kennedy proposes is rather weak, admitting only that the courts have a role to play in cases when the government decision does not appear to be rationally related to a legitimate purpose (known as rational basis review in US constitutional law).

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have proposed a theoretical foundation for approaching the question of economic development takings. Specifically, I suggested that a social function perspective on property is an appropriate starting point for an analysis of such takings. Furthermore, I argued that the notion of human flourishing provides a good template for carrying out a normative analysis of when economic development takings are legitimate. This approach, in turn, led to an argument in favour of a broader style of judicial review of such takings, namely one that embraces considerations based on social justice and the ideal of democracy.

On this basis, I went on to give a preliminary analysis of economic development takings. To make the discussion concrete, I considered the case of *Kelo*, which propelled the notion of an economic development taking to the front of the takings debate in the US. I focused particularly on the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor, and I argued that she approached the issue in a way that is consistent with the theoretical basis proposed in this chapter.

In the next chapter, I will continue my analysis of economic development takings, by considering the legitimacy question in more depth. Specifically, I ask what role the law can and should play in ensuring that the state's power to take property is not used improperly in the context of economic development. This will lead to two sets of broad policy recommendations for dealing with the ills of economic development takings, targeting the diagnosis and the cure respectively.

3 Possible Approaches to the Legitimacy Question

3.1 Introduction

There are many ways of thinking about the legitimacy of takings. Moreover, how one chooses to think about it is likely to depend not only on legal training, but also on more overarching visions of society. Specifically, it seems that one's approach to the legitimacy question will invariably depend also on a view of the relationship between the government, the law, and the institution of private property in a democratic system. To ask what imbues an act of taking with legitimacy, is to ask how this relationship should be regulated.

This chapter considers the question of legitimacy of economic development takings on the basis of a social function understanding of property inspired by the norm of human flourishing. To move towards a justiciable legitimacy standard on this basis, the chapter first consider a rough outline of existing approaches to judicial review, based on evidence from England and Wales, the United States, and the European Court of Human Rights.

Specifically, the chapter starts by considering the idea that the legislature itself imbues each instance of a taking with legitimacy, as the result of a decision made in a legitimate manner within a democracy. This narrative has long held sway in England and Wales, giving rise to a focus on procedural aspects, leaving little room for substantive judicial scrutiny of takings. The doctrine of

deference, in particular, has developed as an overarching norm that guide the courts when faced with controversial takings.

The sheer size and complexity of the modern state, with its ever growing presence in the private sphere, puts this perspective on legitimacy under strain. To some extent, it can be upheld by a well-organised executive, compelled to remain faithful to Parliament and the ideas of democracy. However, a threat to the stability and success of such a procedural approach can arise from the lack of clear safeguards to protect against institutional failure and substantive abuse. If property as an institution begins to falter, for instance because takings for profit become too prevalent, the courts might find themselves unable to intervene on behalf of those democratic ideals that motivate the principle of deference in the first place. This chapter will argue that recent cases of economic development takings in England illustrate this worry, suggesting the need for substantive approaches to legitimacy in the law.

Following up on this, the chapter goes on to consider the US, where the public use restriction is considered to be an important substantive limitation on the government's power to take property. I argue that a contextual approach to the public use requirement, sensitive to local conditions and social functions, was prevalent among the state courts in early public use cases. Moreover, I note that there has been a resurgence of more extensive public use scrutiny after *Kelo*, particularly at the state level. However, this change appears to have been largely ineffective at curbing dubious uses of eminent domain. Specifically, it has been argued that recent reforms, and broad substantive standards such as the public use requirement, tend to become only symbolic nods to the danger of abuse: hidden within the complex arrangements of modern government, business can go on more or less as before.¹

This in turn raises the issue of how to combine the procedural and the substantive perspective

¹ See generally Ilya Somin, 'The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to *Kelo*' (2009) 93 Minnesota Law Review 2100.

on legitimacy, to ensure that quality standards translate into effective protection. This brings me to the third approach to legitimacy, which I call the institutional fairness approach. I argue that this approach has been adopted recently by the ECtHR in Strasbourg, as the Court has developed a system of pilot judgements to deal with its vastly increasing case load. The idea of such judgements is that they will give the Court an opportunity to address systemic problems, to determine whether it should order the state to take general measures to improve national institutions.

Quite apart from the practical motivation behind this development, I argue that the institutional perspective on fairness that it conditions is the way forward towards better testing for legitimacy in takings cases. It should work well because it allows courts to adopt a middle ground between the procedural and the substantive approach. The chapter elaborates on this claim by giving a more detailed presentation of the case of *Hutten-Czapska v Poland*.²

Following up on this, the chapter considers the question of how the courts should proceed to assess the legitimacy of economic development takings against a standard of institutional fairness. Building on a list of conditions due to Kevin Gray, I propose a concrete heuristic for this purpose. In addition to the original points made by Gray, I add three of my own, inspired by the discussion in this and the previous chapter.

Admittedly, a legitimacy test can never provide more than a partial solution to the legitimacy problem. Specifically, if the desire for economic development is a genuine reflection of democratic decision-making, the follow-up question should be how to better enable the collective to communicate this desire to private owners, preferably without resorting to eminent domain. This chapter addresses that question by looking to the theories of governance of common pool resources, developed by Elinor Ostrom and others. It is argued that the connection between their theories and property law suggests a need for new institutions that will allow the collective to push for economic development without negating the communities' right to self-governance.

² See *Hutten-Czapska v Poland* ECHR 2006–VIII 628.

Such a proposal has already been made by Heller and Hills, who recommends that so-called *Land Assembly Districts* should be used to replace eminent domain in many economic development scenarios.³ I analyse the proposal in some depth and argue that Land Assembly Districts are not the final answer to the legitimacy question for economic development takings. Specifically, I note the underlying tension between the ideal of self-governance and the fear of abuse by local elites, highlighting the need for institutions that are more closely matched to local conditions.

3.2 England and Wales: Legitimacy through Parliament

In England and Wales, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the lack of a written constitutional property clause has led to expropriation being discussed mostly as a matter of administrative law and property law, not as a constitutional issue.⁴ Moreover, the use of compulsory purchase – the term used to denote takings in the UK – is not restricted to particular purposes as a matter of principle.⁵ The uses that can justify taking property by compulsion are those uses that Parliament regard as worthy of such consideration.⁶ However, as private property has typically been held in high regard, the power of compulsory purchase has traditionally been exercised with caution.⁷

In his *Commentaries*, William Blackstone famously described property as the “third absolute

³ See Michael Heller and Rick Hills, ‘Land Assembly Districts’ (2008) 121(6) *Harvard Law Review* 1465.

⁴ See generally Michael Taggart, ‘Expropriation, Public Purpose and the Constitution: Essays on public law in honour of Sir William Wade’ in Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds), *The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord* (Oxford University Press 1998).

⁵ See Tom Allen, *The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions* (Cambridge University Press 2000) 201; Emma JL Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (PhD Thesis, 2009) 48-49.

⁶ According to Reynolds, the idea that Parliament (as opposed to various local authorities) was the key legitimising force behind takings gained ground in England from the 16th century onwards, see Susan Reynolds, *Before Eminent Domain: Toward a History of Expropriation of Land for the Common Good* (Studies in Legal History, University of North Carolina Press 2010) 41-42.

⁷ See Allen, *The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions* (n 5) 15; Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 47-48. However, there has never been anything like a complete aversion to expropriation, see Reynolds, *Before Eminent Domain* (n 6) 34-46; Julian Hoppit, ‘Compulsion, Compensation and Property Rights in Britain, 1688–1833’ (2011) 210(1) *Past & Present* 93, 126-128 (pointing out that compulsory purchase grew dramatically in scope after the glorious revolution in 1688).

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right, inherent in every Englishman”.⁸ Moreover, Blackstone expressed a very restrictive view on the appropriateness of expropriation, pointing out that it was only the legislature that could legitimately interfere with property rights. He warned against the dangers of allowing private individuals, or even public tribunals, to be the judge of whether or not the common good could justify takings. Blackstone went as far as to say that the public good was “in nothing more essentially invested” than the protection of private property.⁹

In terms of historical accuracy, Blackstone’s claims about the sanctity of property in England and Wales appear questionable. Specifically, it has been argued that his description of property might be shaped not so much by evidence as by political values gaining ground among the bourgeoisie after the decline of the feudal system.¹⁰ That said, it should not be forgotten that the conferral of compulsory purchase powers did require parliamentary involvement on a case-by-case basis, often through so-called *private* Acts, granting compulsory purchase powers to specific legal persons.¹¹ Arguably, this practice reflects that takings of private property, although far from unheard of, were indeed considered draconian.¹²

Interestingly, the procedure followed by Parliament in takings cases often resembled a judicial procedure; the interested parties were given an opportunity to present their case to Parliament committees that would then effectively decide whether or not compulsion was warranted.¹³ On

⁸ See William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 1: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765–1769* (University of Chicago Press 1979) 134-135. The first right, according to Blackstone, is security, while the second is liberty.

⁹ Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 1: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765–1769* (n 8) 134-135.

¹⁰ See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 34-35 (describing Blackstone’s account as giving rise to a “myth”); Hoppit (n 7) 121 (noting the tension in Blackstone’s own account of property, which also acknowledged that parliament frequently interfered with private property).

¹¹ See William D McNulty, ‘The Power of “Compulsory Purchase” under the Law of England’ (1912) 21(8) *The Yale Law Journal* 639, 43-46; Allen, *The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions* (n 5) 204; Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 104-116.

¹² Moreover, it is noteworthy how much weight was consistently placed on the right to compensation, also when Parliament sanctioned the taking, see Allen, *The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions* (n 5) 15.

¹³ See Allen, *The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions* (n 5) 13-16; Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The

the one hand, the direct involvement of Parliament in the decision-making arguably marks a fundamental, albeit conditional, respect for property rights.¹⁴ But at the same time, parliamentary sovereignty meant that the question of legitimacy was rendered mute as soon as compulsory purchase powers had been granted. The courts were not in a position to scrutinize takings at all, much less second-guess Parliament as to whether or not a taking was for a legitimate purpose.¹⁵

During the late 18th and early 19th century, as an industrial economy developed, private Acts grew massively in scope and importance.¹⁶ Railway companies, in particular, regularly benefited from such Acts.¹⁷ During this time, the expanding scope of private-to-private transfers for economic development led to high-level political debate and controversy.¹⁸ Often, it would attract particular opposition from the House of Lords. Interestingly, this opposition was not only based on a desire to protect individual property owners.¹⁹ It also often reflected concerns about the cultural and social consequences of changed patterns of land use.

Hence, the early *political* debate on economic development takings in the UK shows some reflection of a social function approach to property protection. At the same time, as society changed following increasing industrialisation, a more expansive approach to compulsory purchase would eventually emerge as the norm.²⁰ The idea that economic development could justify takings gradually became less controversial.

Impact of Private Takings' (n 5) 105-106.

¹⁴ See Hoppit (n 7) 103.

¹⁵ See, e.g., McNulty (n 11) 643; Waring, 'Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings' (n 5) 107.

¹⁶ See Waring, 'Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings' (n 5) 108-112; Hoppit (n 7) 100-101.

¹⁷ See RW Kostal, *Law and English Railway Capitalism* (Clarendon Press 1994) 144.

¹⁸ See Kostal (n 17) 144; Allen, *The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions* (n 5) 204.

¹⁹ Allen, *The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions* (n 5) 204-205.

²⁰ Arguably, the social function perspective helps explain why this happened. Indeed, the expanded use of private takings in England during the 19th century, particularly in connection with the railways, might have served a more easily justifiable social function than that commonly associated with economic development takings today. Waring, in particular, notes how railway takings tended to affect aristocratic landowners rather than marginalised groups ("unlike private takings today, the railway legislation was most likely to affect those who could best defend their property rights from attack"), see Waring, 'Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings' (n 5) 111.

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Today, the law on compulsory purchase in England is regulated in statute. Hence, Parliament rarely gets involved on a case-by-case basis, and the role of the courts is largely limited to the application and interpretation of statutory rules.²¹ Moreover, with respect to the question of legitimacy of takings more broadly, the starting point for English courts is that this is a matter of ordinary administrative law.²² More recently, the Human Rights Act 1998 adds to this picture, since it incorporates the property clause in P1(1) into English law. Even so, the usual approach in England is to judge objections against compulsory purchase orders on the basis of the statutes that warrant them, rather than constitutional principles or human rights provisions that protect property.²³ It is typical for statutory authorities to include standard reservations to the effect that some public benefit must be identified in order to justify a compulsory purchase order, but the scope of what constitutes a legitimate purpose can be very wide. For instance, to justify a taking under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, it will generally suffice to argue that it will “facilitate the carrying out of development, redevelopment or improvement on or in relation to the land”.²⁴

While various governmental bodies are authorised to issue compulsory purchase orders (CPOs), a CPO typically has to be confirmed by a government minister.²⁵ The affected owners are given a chance to comment, and if there are objections, a public inquiry is typically held. The inspector responsible for the inquiry then reports to the relevant government minister, who makes the final

²¹ See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 116-121. Some common law rules still play an important role, such as the *Pointe Gourde* rule, which stipulates that changes in value due to the compensation scheme itself should be disregarded when calculating compensation to the owner. The rule takes its name from the case of *Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad and Tobago)* [1947] UKPC 71. See also the discussion in chapter 5, section 5.5.3.

²² See Taggart (n 4).

²³ See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 121-132. The important statutes are the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, the Land Compensation Act 1961, the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004.

²⁴ Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 226.

²⁵ See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 48.

decision about whether or not it should be granted, and on what terms. The CPO may later be challenged in court, but then on the basis of the statute authorising it, not on the basis of whether or not the purpose mentioned in that statute is legitimate as such.²⁶

That said, the idea that property may only be compulsorily acquired when the public stands to benefit permeates the system. Indeed, this has also been regarded as a constitutional principle, for instance by Lord Denning in *Prest v Secretary of State for Wales*.²⁷ Moreover, in *R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p de Rothschild*, Slade LJ spoke of “a warning that, in cases where a compulsory purchase order is under challenge, the draconian nature of the order will itself render it more vulnerable to successful challenge”.²⁸

In keeping with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, this warning targets judicial review of administrative decision-making, not legislation. Despite this limitation, the English approach to legitimacy has traditionally proved quite effective in preventing controversy from arising with respect to the use of eminent domain.²⁹ An underlying respect for private property, superseded only by respect for the authority of Parliament, appears to have influenced the decision-making framework and the surrounding administrative practices. Specifically, legitimacy has been pursued through legislation, regulation, and administrative practice, leaving less room for substantive judicial scrutiny.³⁰

²⁶ See, e.g., Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 48-49. The typical way to launch an attack on a taking would be to argue that it serves a purpose that falls outside the scope of the statute authorising it, or, more subtly, that the administrative decision-maker took irrelevant purposes into account when granting the power. See, e.g., *R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council* [2010] UKSC 20, (2010) 1 AC 437.

²⁷ See *Prest v Secretary of State for Wales* (1982) 81 LGR 193, 198 (“I regard it as a principle of our constitutional law that no citizen is to be deprived of his land by any public authority against his will, unless it is expressly authorised by Parliament and the public interest decisively so demands.”).

²⁸ *R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p de Rothschild* (1989) 1 All ER 933 (CA) 938.

²⁹ See generally Tom Allen, ‘Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2010) 59(04) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1055.

³⁰ For a more detailed analysis of how this works, noting, among other things, that higher levels within the executive are also meant to act as safeguards of private property, filling – to some extent – the possible role of courts in this regard, see Tom Allen, ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative View’ in Robin Paul Malloy (ed) (Ashgate 2008) 85-100.

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However, England and Wales have also seen controversial economic development takings challenged in the courts. Indeed, such cases appear to have become more frequent.³¹ For instance, in the case of *Alliance*, many properties were taken in order to facilitate the construction of a new stadium for the football club Arsenal.³² Some owners who stood to lose their business premises protested on the basis that the purpose was dubious, pointing also to the fact that the inspector in charge of the public inquiry had recommended against the takings.³³ Their arguments also invoked P1(1) of the ECHR, to overcome the limitations of traditional judicial review in England and Wales. However, these arguments were all quite summarily rejected by the Court.³⁴

Arguably, the *Alliance* case reflects a weakness of the English approach to legitimacy. This weakness, moreover, appears to go beyond whatever doubts one might have about the principle of parliamentary sovereignty applied to property as a constitutional and human right. Specifically, if the framework laid down by Parliament greatly empowers the administrative branch, while failing to appropriately regulate administrative practices, the deference due to Parliament might effectively become undue deference to the executive branch. If the *practice* of using compulsory purchase continues to expand in relation to for-profit undertakings, there appears to be a significant risk of abuse associated with broad powers granted to the executive to take property for economic development. If there is also a change of perspective on the role of private property in society, departing further and further away from the reverent attitude expressed by Blackstone, there appears to be a lack of other sources for legitimacy in a system so reliant on a narrative of pure procedure.

To some extent, it would be possible for the Supreme Court to develop a more restrictive

³¹ See generally Kevin Gray, 'Recreational Property' in Susan Bright (ed), *Modern studies in property law: Volume 6* (Hart Publishing 2011).

³² *Alliance Spring Co Ltd v The First Secretary of State* [2005] EWHC 18 (Admin).

³³ *Alliance Spring Co Ltd v The First Secretary of State* (n 32) 6-7.

³⁴ See *Alliance Spring Co Ltd v The First Secretary of State* (n 32) 6-7. For a critical discussion, describing the Court's assessment against P1(1) as "worryingly brief", see Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 31) 26.

stance on compulsory purchase to address this, within the established constitutional order. In fact, there are some signs that this might be about to happen, specifically with respect to the broad powers granted under section 226 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. In the case of *R (Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council*, Lord Walker cited *Kelo* and went on to comment that “economic regeneration brought about by urban redevelopment is no doubt a public good, but “private to private” acquisitions by compulsory purchase may also produce large profits for powerful business interests, and courts rightly regard them as particularly sensitive”.³⁵

However, the outcome of the *Sainsbury* case arguably also underscores the weaknesses of an indirect approach to legitimacy through administrative law. Instead of relying on Lord Walker's observations about the sensitivity of economic development takings, the majority of the Court quashed the compulsory purchase order on the basis of a more conventional approach to statutory interpretation. Specifically, the majority found that the local government had erred when it took into account promises that the taker had made regarding a regeneration project in a different part of town. This was regarded as contravening section 226 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which only directs attention at the potential for improvements on or in relation to “the land”, i.e., the land that is subject to compulsory purchase. The reasoning behind the decision, therefore, rests largely on a technicality, not any substantive assessment of legitimacy.

On a more purposive assessment, the taking in *Sainsbury* should arguably even have been upheld: the owner and the taker were both large commercial companies, they already shared the ownership of the disputed development site, they both wanted to develop at the expense of the other party, and the taker appeared to have the best overall plan for the community. Ironically, the English approach resulted in such a taking being struck down as illegitimate, while the taking in *Alliance*, involving the displacement of local people in favour of a football club, received little or no scrutiny at all. In light of this, it seems that alternatives to the traditional idea of legitimacy should

³⁵ See *R (Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council* (n 26) 82.

be considered, at least if one agrees with Lord Walker’s characterisation of economic development takings as “particularly sensitive”.³⁶

3.3 The US: Legitimacy through Public Use

By contrast to the situation in England and Wales, the US Constitution is a basis for judicial review also with respect to the federal and state legislatures. Considering its status as a basis for potentially extensive review, the Constitution is remarkably terse. The takings clause, arriving as the final clause of the Fifth Amendment, reads simply “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”.³⁷

The compensation requirement is clearly stated, if embryonic, but the takings clause is also understood to include the requirement that property may only be taken for “public use”. This is the aspect of the clause that interests me in this thesis, since it provides an anchor for legitimacy that is particularly relevant – and contentious – in relation to economic development takings.³⁸ Specifically, the question is to what extent such takings offend against the clause: is a taking for economic development by a commercial company really a taking for “public use”?

Going back to the time when the Fifth Amendment was introduced, there is not much historical evidence explaining why the takings clause was included in the Bill of Rights.³⁹ Moreover, there is little in the way of guidance as to how the takings clause was originally understood. James Madison, who drafted it, commented that his proposals for constitutional amendments were intended to be

³⁶ See *R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council* (n 26) 82.

³⁷ See Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution 1791.

³⁸ At least this is so on a social function understanding of legitimacy. For an in-depth discussion of the compensation requirement applied to economic development takings, arguing that the compensatory viewpoint does not get to the heart of the legitimacy question, see Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘Norwegian Waterfalls: A Case Study of Commercial Expropriation in Light of Property as a Human Right’ in Ann Apers and others (eds), *Property Law Perspectives III* (Ius Commune: European and Comparative Law Series, 2015) vol 132.

³⁹ See Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution 1791.

uncontroversial.⁴⁰ Hence, it is natural to regard the takings clause as a codification of an existing principle, not a novel proposal. Indeed, several state constitutions pre-dating the Bill of Rights also included takings clauses, seemingly based on codifying principles from English common law.⁴¹

Just like English scholars at the time, early American scholars emphasised the importance of private property. James Kent, for instance, described the sense of property as “graciously implanted in the human breast” and declared that the right of acquisition “ought to be sacredly protected”.⁴² Indeed, the Supreme Court itself expressed similar sentiments early on, when it spoke of the impossibility of passing a law that “takes property from A and gives it to B”.⁴³

However, just as in England, this early US attitude changed in response to industrial advances and a desire for economic development. As the 19th century progressed, eminent domain was used more frequently, now also to benefit (privately operated) railroad operations, hydroelectric projects, and the mining industry.⁴⁴ During this time, it also became increasingly common for landowners to challenge the legitimacy of takings in court, undoubtedly a consequence of the fact that eminent domain was used more widely, for new kinds of projects.⁴⁵

Controversy over the public use requirement arose particularly often with respect to the so-called mill Acts.⁴⁶ Such Acts were found throughout the US, many of them dating from pre-

⁴⁰ See letters from Madison to Edmund Randolph dated 15 June 1789 and from Madison to Thomas Jefferson dated 20 June 1789, both included in James Madison, *The papers of James Madison, vol. 12, 2 March 1789–20 January 1790 and supplement 24 October 1775–24 January 1789* (Charles F Hobson and Robert A Rutland eds, University Press of Virginia 1979).

⁴¹ See Emily A Johnson, ‘Reconciling Originalism and the History of the Public Use Clause’ (2011) 79 Fordham Law Review 265, 299.

⁴² See James Kent, *Commentaries on American law* (1st edn, Commentaries on American Law, vol 2, O Halsted 1827) 257.

⁴³ This was a *de dicta* in *Calder v Bull* 3 US 386, 388 (1798). See also *Vanhorne’s Lessee v Dorrance* 2 US 304, 310 (1795).

⁴⁴ Errol Meidinger, ‘The ‘Public Uses’ of Eminent Domain: History and Policy’ (1980) 11 Environmental Law 1, 23-33.

⁴⁵ Meidinger (n 44) 24.

⁴⁶ Meidinger (n 44) 24. See also Johnson (n 41) 306-313 and Morton J Horwitz, ‘The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860’ (1973) 40 University of Chicago Law Review 248, 251-252.

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industrial times when mills were primarily used to serve the farming needs of agrarian communities.⁴⁷ Following economic and technological advances, provisions originally enacted to serve local farming purposes were now being used by developers wishing to harness hydropower for manufacturing and hydroelectric plants.⁴⁸

It is important to note, however, that mill Acts could not be used to authorise large-scale compulsory transfers of natural resources from owners to non-owners.⁴⁹ Rather, mill Acts provided management tools that could be used to ensure that owners of water resources could make better use of their rights. This would sometimes involve allowing riparian owners to interfere with, or take a necessary part of, the property of their neighbours, e.g., by constructing dams that would flood neighbouring land.⁵⁰ However, the primary purpose of most mill Acts was to facilitate rational coordination among owners, to the benefit of their community as a whole. This point was frequently made by the courts to justify upholding takings on the basis of mill Acts, including takings that would benefit the manufacturing industry.⁵¹

More generally, case law on public use from the state courts at this time was characterised by a highly contextual understanding of property protection and the meaning of public use.⁵² Arguably,

⁴⁷ A total of 29 states had passed mill Acts, with 27 still in force, when a list of such Acts was compiled in *Head v Amoskeag Mfg Co* 113 US 9, 17 (1885). According to Justice Gray, at pages 18-19 in the same, the “principal objects” for early mill Acts had been grist mills typically serving local agrarian needs at tolls fixed by law, a purpose which was generally accepted to ensure that they were for public use.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., *Head* (n 47) 18-21 and *Minnesota Canal & Power Co v Koochiching Co* 97 Minn 429, 449-452 (1906).

⁴⁹ See the discussion in *Head* (n 47).

⁵⁰ See, e.g., Abram P Staples, ‘The Mill Acts’ (1903) 9(4) *The Virginia Law Register* 265, 265.

⁵¹ See *Fiske v Framingham Mfg Co* 12 Pick 68 (1831). See also the discussion (including references to other cases) in *Head* (n 47).

⁵² See, e.g., *Scudder v Trenton Delaware Falls Co* 1 NJ Eq 694 (1832) (taking upheld, but said that “the great principle remains that there must be a public use or benefit. That is indispensable. But what that shall consist of, or how extensive it shall be to authorize an appropriation of private property, is not easily reducible to a general rule.”); *Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co v Seawell* 11 Nev 394, 409 (1876) (taking for a mineral company upheld on the basis that mining was the “greatest of the industrial pursuits” in the state of Nevada and that the benefits of the industry were “distributed as much, and sometimes more, among the laboring classes than with the owners of the mines and mills.”); *Ryerson v Brown* 35 Mich 333, 337 (1877) (taking struck down, by a state court that was “not disposed to say that incidental benefit to the public could not under any circumstances justify an exercise of the right of eminent domain.”. See also Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 31) (with many references to state courts striking down takings as impermissible).

the case law on public use from the states even deserves to be categorised as an early example of a legitimacy approach based on a social function understanding of property. Initially, it was also well received by the Supreme Court, although a much more deferential stance was eventually adopted at the federal level.

3.3.1 Legitimacy as Discussed by the Supreme Court

With respect to takings ordered by the federal government, the Supreme Court never showed much willingness to enforce a strict public use requirement.⁵³ In *United States v Gettysburg Electric Railway Co*, a case from 1896, deference to the legislature in federal takings cases was referred to as a principle that should be observed unless the judgement of the legislature was “palpably without reasonable foundation”.⁵⁴

Importantly, however, such a deferential stance was not adopted in cases originating from the states.⁵⁵ In *Cincinnati v Vester*, a case from 1930, the Supreme Court commented that “it is well established that, in considering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases of expropriation of private property, the question what is a public use is a judicial one”.⁵⁶

In the earlier case of *Hairston v Danville & W R Co*, from 1908, the same was expressed by Justice Moody, who surveyed the state case law and declared that “the one and only principle in which all courts seem to agree is that the nature of the uses, whether public or private, is ultimately

⁵³ However, for a long time, federal takings were of limited practical significance since the common practice was that the federal government would rely on the states to condemn property on its behalf, see Meidinger (n 44) 30. This changed towards the end of the 19th century, particularly following the decision in *Trombley v Humphrey*, where the Supreme Court of Michigan struck down a taking that would benefit the federal government, see *Trombley v Humphrey* 23 Mich 471 (1871).

⁵⁴ *US v Gettysburg Electric R Co* 160 US 668, 680 (1896).

⁵⁵ Originally, the Supreme Court had held that the takings clause in the US Constitution did not apply to state takings at all, see *Barron v City of Baltimore* 32 US 243 (1833). However, this changed after the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was introduced after the Civil War, see, e.g., *Head* (n 47). Later, in 1897, the Supreme Court held that state takings could be scrutinized directly against the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, see *Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR Co v City of Chicago* 166 US 226 (1897).

⁵⁶ *City of Cincinnati v Vester* 281 US 439, 447 (1930).

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a judicial question.”⁵⁷ Justice Moody continued by describing in more depth the typical approach of the state courts in determining public use cases:

The determination of this question by the courts has been influenced in the different states by considerations touching the resources, the capacity of the soil, the relative importance of industries to the general public welfare, and the long-established methods and habits of the people. In all these respects conditions vary so much in the states and territories of the Union that different results might well be expected.⁵⁸

Justice Moody goes on to give a long list of cases illustrating this aspect of state case law, showing how assessments of the public use issue had been inherently contextual.⁵⁹ Following up on this, he points out that “no case is recalled” in which the Supreme Court overturned “a taking upheld by the state *court* as a taking for public uses in conformity with its laws” (my emphasis). After making clear that situations might still arise where the Supreme Court would not follow state courts on the public use issue, Justice Moody goes on to conclude that the cases cited “show how greatly we have deferred to the opinions of the state courts on this subject, which so closely concerns the welfare of their people”.⁶⁰

Hairston is important for three reasons. First, it makes clear that initially, the deferential stance in cases dealing with state takings was primarily directed at state courts rather than legislatures and administrative bodies. Second, it demonstrates federal recognition of the fact that a consensus had emerged in the states, whereby scrutiny of the public use determination was consistently regarded as a judicial task.⁶¹ Third, it provides a valuable summary of the contextual approach to

⁵⁷ *Hairston v Danville & W R Co* 208 US 598, 606 (1908).

⁵⁸ *Hairston v Danville & W R Co* (n 57) 606.

⁵⁹ *Hairston v Danville & W R Co* (n 57) 607.

⁶⁰ *Hairston v Danville & W R Co* (n 57) 606.

⁶¹ Indeed, *Hairston* provides the authority for *Vester* on this point. See *City of Cincinnati v Vester* (n 56) 606.

the public use test that had developed at the state level.

The *Hairston* Court clearly looked favourably on the case law from state courts. Importantly, when a deferential stance was adopted, this was clearly contingent on the assumption that state courts would continue to administer the public use test with the required vigour. Despite this, *Hairston* would later be cited as an early authority in favour of almost unconditional deference to legislators.⁶²

This happened in *US ex rel Tenn Valley Authority v Welch*, concerning a federal taking.⁶³ The Court first cited *US v Gettysburg Electric R Co* as an authority in favour of deference with regards to the public use limitation.⁶⁴ The Court then paused to note that *Vester* later relied on a conflicting view, namely that the public use test was a judicial responsibility.⁶⁵ The Court then attempts to undercut this by setting up a contrast between *Vester* and *Hairston*, by selectively quoting the observation made in the latter case that the Supreme Court had never overruled the state courts on the public use issue.⁶⁶ Hence, *Hairston* is effectively used to argue against judicial scrutiny, in a manner that is quite incommensurate with the full rationale behind the Court's decision in that case.

Later, *Welch* was used as an authority in the case of *Berman v Parker*.⁶⁷ This case concerned condemnation for redevelopment of a partly blighted residential area in the District of Colombia, which would also condemn a non-blighted department store. In a key passage, the Court states that the role of the judiciary in scrutinizing the public purpose of a taking is "extremely narrow".⁶⁸

⁶² In fact, it was cited in this way also by the majority in *Kelo*, see *Kelo v City of New London* 545 US 469, 482-483 (2005).

⁶³ *US ex rel Tenn Valley Authority v Welch* 327 US 546, 552 (1946).

⁶⁴ *US v Gettysburg Electric R Co* (n 54).

⁶⁵ *City of Cincinnati v Vester* (n 56).

⁶⁶ See *US ex rel Tenn Valley Authority v Welch* (n 63) 552.

⁶⁷ *Berman v Parker* 348 US 26.

⁶⁸ *Berman v Parker* (n 67) 32.

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The Court provides only two references to previous cases to back up this claim, one of them being *Welch*.⁶⁹

Moreover, both of the cases cited were concerned with federal takings, while in *Berman* the Court explicitly says that deference is due in equal measure to the state legislature.⁷⁰ It is possible to regard this merely as a *dictum*, since the District of Columbia is governed directly by Congress. However, *Berman* was to have a great impact on future cases. In effect, it undermined a large body of case law on judicial review of takings without engaging with it at all.

In *Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff*, the Supreme Court further entrenched the principle expressed in *Berman*.⁷¹ Here the state of Hawaii had made use of eminent domain to break up an oligopoly in the housing sector. Given the circumstances of the case, it would have been natural to argue in favour of this taking on the basis that it served a proper public purpose.

However, the Court instead decided to rely on the doctrine of deference, shunning away from scrutinizing the takings purpose. Justice O'Connor, in particular, observed that "judicial deference is required because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of eminent domain".⁷²

Effectively, what had been a doctrine of deference to state courts had now transformed into a doctrine of deference to state legislatures. In light of this, it had to be expected that *Kelo* would be decided in favour of the taker.⁷³ However, the history of the public use requirement tells us that

⁶⁹ The other case, *Old Dominion Land Co v US*, concerned a federal taking of land on which the military had already invested large sums in buildings. The Court commented on the public use test by saying that "there is nothing shown in the intentions or transactions of subordinates that is sufficient to overcome the declaration by Congress of what it had in mind. Its decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility. But the military purposes mentioned at least may have been entertained and they clearly were for a public use", see *Old Dominion Land Co v US* 269 US 55, 66 (1925). A partial quote, to the effect that deference to the legislature is in order except when it involves an "impossibility", was used to justify the decision in *Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff* 467 US 229, 240 (1984).

⁷⁰ *Berman v Parker* (n 67) 32.

⁷¹ *Midkiff* (n 69).

⁷² *Midkiff* (n 69) 244.

⁷³ In fact, as pointed out by Somin, the *Kelo* case represents a slight tightening of the earlier line on public use. See Ilya

this outcome was by no means inevitable. Hence, the question arises whether legitimacy can be increased by reviving the public use test. The next section sheds some light on this, on the basis of legislative developments in the US after *Kelo*.

3.3.2 Economic Development Takings after *Kelo*

Following *Kelo*, much attention was directed at the danger of eminent domain abuse in the US.⁷⁴ Moreover, the *Kelo* decision itself proved extremely unpopular. Surveys suggest that about 80-90 % of the general population believe that it was wrongly decided, an opinion widely shared also among members of the political elite.⁷⁵

Many states responded by introducing reforms aimed at limiting the use of eminent domain for economic development.⁷⁶ Within two years, 44 states had passed post-*Kelo* legislation in an attempt to achieve this.⁷⁷ Various legislative techniques were adopted. Some states, including Alabama, Colorado and Michigan, enacted explicit bans on economic development takings and takings that would benefit private parties.⁷⁸ In South Dakota, the legislature went even further, banning the use of eminent domain “(1) For transfer to any private person, nongovernmental entity, or other public-private business entity; or (2) Primarily for enhancement of tax revenue”.⁷⁹

In other states, more indirect measures were taken, such as in Florida, where the legislature enacted a rule whereby property taken by the government could not be transferred to a private

Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after *Kelo*’ English (2007) 15(1) Supreme Court Economic Review 183.

⁷⁴ See generally Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to *Kelo*’ (n 1).

⁷⁵ Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to *Kelo*’ (n 1) 2109.

⁷⁶ For an overview and critical examination of the myriad of state reforms that have followed *Kelo*, I point to Steven J Eagle and Lauren A Perotti, ‘Coping with *Kelo*: A potpourri of legislative and judicial responses’ (2008) 42(4) Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 799. See also Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to *Kelo*’ (n 1).

⁷⁷ See ‘50 State Report Card’ (*Castle Coalition*, 2015) (<http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-report-card>) accessed 17th July 2015.

⁷⁸ See Eagle and Perotti (n 76) 107-108.

⁷⁹ South Dakota Codified Laws § 11-7-22-1, amended by House Bill 1080, 2006 Leg, Reg Ses (2006).

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party until 10 years after the date it was condemned.⁸⁰ Many states also offered lengthy lists of uses that were to count as public, designed to restrict the room for administrative discretion while allowing condemnations for purposes that were regarded as particularly important.⁸¹

These reforms show that *Kelo* had a great effect on the discourse of eminent domain in the US. However, the practical effects of the many state reforms that have been enacted are less clear. According to Somin, most of these reforms have in fact been ineffective, despite the overwhelming popular and political opposition against economic development takings.⁸² Specifically, even when seemingly strict rules have been introduced, it is typically easy for the government to carry out economic development takings as before, provided these takings are not referred to as economic development takings, but described in some other vague manner, e.g., as removal of “blight”.⁸³ At the same time, property lawyers report a greater feeling of unease regarding the correct way to approach the public use requirement, expressing hope that the Supreme Court will soon revisit the issue.⁸⁴

Why have legislative reforms proved inadequate? Part of the reason, according to Somin, is that people are “rationally ignorant” about the economic takings issue.⁸⁵ For most people, it is unlikely that eminent domain will come to concern them personally or that they will be able to influence policy in this area. Hence, it makes little sense for them to devote much time to learn more about it. This, in turn, helps create a situation where experts can develop and sustain a system based on

⁸⁰ Eagle and Perotti (n 76) 809.

⁸¹ Eagle and Perotti (n 76) 804.

⁸² Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2170-2171.

⁸³ See Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2170-2171.

⁸⁴ See MM Murakami, BCK Ace and RH Thomas, ‘Recent developments in eminent domain: Public use’ (2013) 45(3) Urban Lawyer 809 (“Until the Supreme Court revisits the issue, we predict that this question will continue to plague the lower courts, property owners, and condemning authorities.”).

⁸⁵ See Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2170.

practices that a majority of citizens actually oppose.⁸⁶ To back up this analysis, Somin points out that surveys seem to show that people generally overestimate the effectiveness of eminent domain reform, by mistaking symbolic legislative measures for materially significant changes in the law.⁸⁷

Arguably, this also shows that the legislative approach so far, which has focused on introducing more elaborate and detailed versions of the public use restriction, need to be supplemented by different kinds of proposals. Specifically, it seems important to also target the structural processes that result in the taking of private land for economic development. After all, it is when we direct attention at the decision-making involved in bringing about actual takings that we will locate those stakeholders who cannot afford to remain rationally ignorant about eminent domain.

This points towards another perspective on legitimacy, whereby focus shifts towards the institutional setting where the relevant decisions are made. Importantly, cases such as *Kelo* suggest that this needs to involve more than administrative law and ideas about procedural due process. Specifically, institutional legitimacy appears to have an important substantive component whereby a decision is legitimate only in so far as it results from democratically legitimate decision-making within an administrative framework that is generally conducive to fair and proportional outcomes. Arguably, recent developments at the ECtHR point towards a perspective on legitimacy that emphasises this interconnectedness between substantive and procedural aspects of fairness at the institutional level.

3.4 The ECtHR: Legitimacy as Institutional Fairness

It is often said that the P1(1) of the ECHR consists of three rules. The first rule guarantees a right to ‘peaceful enjoyment of possessions’, the second rule regulates the legitimacy of ‘deprivation’ and

⁸⁶ Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to *Kelo*’ (n 1) 2163-2171.

⁸⁷ Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to *Kelo*’ (n 1) 2155-2157.

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the third rule regulates how the states can legitimately ‘control the use of property’.⁸⁸

When dealing with complaints pertaining to P1(1), the Court in Strasbourg will typically first consider which of these three rules it should apply.⁸⁹ However, as noted by Allen, it is not clear that this choice has any great significance for the outcome.⁹⁰ In practice, the evaluation of legitimacy proceeds in much the same way regardless of which rule is used, with an emphasis on the requirement that a *fair balance* must be struck between the opposing interests in cases when states interfere with private property rights.⁹¹

In this regard, it is important to note that the Court has gradually adopted a more active role in assessing whether or not particular instances of interference are proportional and able to strike a fair balance between the interests of the public and the property owners. As argued by Allen, this has caused P1(1) to attain a wider scope than what was originally intended by the signatories.⁹²

In the early case law behind this development, the focus was predominantly on the issue of compensation, with the Court gradually developing the principle that while P1(1) does not entitle owners to full market value compensation in all cases of interference, the fair balance will typically be upset when such compensation is not paid, especially if the deviation from the norm of market value is severe or inadequately justified.⁹³

However, the fair balance test encompasses more than the issue of compensation. In particular, the hunting cases discussed in chapter 2 show that the Court in Strasbourg is willing to reflect

⁸⁸ See *Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden* (1982) Series A no 52, para 61.

⁸⁹ See Tom Allen, *Property and the Human Rights Act 1998* (Hart Publishing 2005) 102-104.

⁹⁰ See Allen, *Property and the Human Rights Act 1998* (n 89) 104-105.

⁹¹ See Allen, *Property and the Human Rights Act 1998* (n 89) 103. It is also typically assumed that an interference is only legitimate when it takes place for an appropriate purpose, but here the ECtHR has consistently maintained a deferential stance, pointing to the ‘wide margin of appreciation’ that the member states enjoy in this regard. See, e.g., *James and others v United Kingdom* (1986) Series A no 98, para 54.

⁹² Allen, ‘Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (n 29) 1055.

⁹³ See *Scordino v Italy* ECHR 2006-V 276, para 103.

broadly on the context and purpose of interference, to critically assess the social function of the taking.⁹⁴ Moreover, institutional aspects of fairness have come to play an important role in the Court’s reasoning in some other recent cases involving property.⁹⁵ This is particularly clearly demonstrated by the case of *Hutten-Czapska v Poland*.⁹⁶

3.4.1 Legitimacy *Erga Omnes*

The striking conclusion in *Hutten-Czapska v Poland*, underscoring the institutional turn at the ECtHR, was that the case demonstrated “systemic violation of the right of property”.⁹⁷ The case concerned a house that had been confiscated during the Second World War. After the war, the property was transferred back to the owners, but in the meantime, the ground floor had been assigned to an employee of the local city council.⁹⁸ The state implemented strict housing regulations during this time, which eventually led to the applicant’s house being placed under direct state management.⁹⁹ Following the end of communist rule in 1990, the owners were given back the right to manage their property, but it was still subject to strict regulation that protected the rights of the tenants.¹⁰⁰ In addition to rent control, rules were in place that made it hard to terminate the rental contracts.¹⁰¹

After an in-depth assessment of the relevant parts of Polish law and administrative practice, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of P1(1). Importantly, they did not reach this conclusion by focusing on the owners and the interference that had taken

⁹⁴ See chapter 2, section 2.4.1.

⁹⁵ See *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2); *Lindheim and others v Norway* ECHR 2012 985.

⁹⁶ See *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2).

⁹⁷ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 239.

⁹⁸ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) paras 20-31.

⁹⁹ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) paras 20-31.

¹⁰⁰ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) paras 31-53.

¹⁰¹ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) paras 20-53.

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place with respect to their individual entitlements. Rather, they focused on the overall character of the Polish system for rent control and housing regulation, as exemplified by the applicant's situation.

Specifically, the consequences for the owners were considered not in isolation, but in order to shed light on a broader question of sustainability.¹⁰² The Court was particularly concerned with the fact that the total rent that could be charged for the house in question was not sufficient to cover the running maintenance costs.¹⁰³ In particular, it was noted that the consequence of this would be "inevitable deterioration of the property for lack of adequate investment and modernisation".¹⁰⁴

In the end, the Court highlighted how three factors combined to bring both owners and their properties to a precarious position. First, the rigid rent control system made it hard to sustainably manage rental property. Second, tenancy regulation made it hard for owners to terminate tenancy agreements. Third, the Court noted that the state itself had set up many tenancy agreements during the days of direct state management, shedding doubt on the fairness of the obligations that these contracts imposed on owners.¹⁰⁵

The Court's reasoning in *Hutten-Czapska* is also interesting because of how the 'social rights' of the tenants is placed on an equal footing to the property rights of the owners.¹⁰⁶ Arguably, property rights and social rights are not considered merely as separate sets of entitlements, locked in opposition to one another. In the reasoning of the Court they also appear as mutually dependent social functions, both hampered by an unsustainable approach to property and housing during the communist era and beyond.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) paras 60-61.

¹⁰³ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 224.

¹⁰⁴ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 224.

¹⁰⁵ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) paras 224-225.

¹⁰⁶ *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 225.

¹⁰⁷ Specifically, the Court attached great significance to the finding that rents were too low to cover maintenance costs, see *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 224. A lack of incentives for maintenance is clearly a threat to tenants as much as to

In this regard, the Court places considerable weight on the precarious situation of the owners. Specifically, the Court notes the “absence of any legal ways and means making it possible for them either to offset or mitigate the losses incurred in connection with the maintenance of property or to have the necessary repairs subsidised by the State in justified cases”.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the Court comments that the “burden cannot, as in the present case, be placed on one particular social group, however important the interests of the other group or the community as a whole”.¹⁰⁹ Importantly, however, the Court does not censor the political reasoning that motivated the rent control scheme, but rather focuses on the fact that it had not been implemented properly.¹¹⁰

On this basis, the Court concludes that there had been a systemic violation of P1(1), and orders Poland to take measures to rectify the “malfunctioning of Polish housing regulation”.¹¹¹ Hence, the lack of legitimacy was pronounced with a kind of *erga omnes* (towards all) effect, establishing an obligation for Poland directed at all its citizens in equal measure, not merely the applicant.¹¹² Judgements of this kind, known as ‘pilot judgements’, have now gained formal recognition as a distinct procedural form that the ECtHR can use to address systemic problems.¹¹³

The institutional approach conditioned by the introduction of pilot judgements might point to

owners, illustrating the interdependence between the two groups. Despite this, when summing up their reasoning in broad strokes, the Court itself reverts back to a traditional narrative when it speaks about the “conflicting interests of landlords and tenants”. See *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 225.

¹⁰⁸ See *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 224.

¹⁰⁹ See *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 225.

¹¹⁰ See *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 224.

¹¹¹ See *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) para 237. The basis originally relied on for formulating such an order was Article 41 in the ECHR, first used in this way in the case of *Broniowski v Poland* ECHR 2005 647.

¹¹² There was some dissent as to whether or not this was an appropriate response, with Judge Zagrebelsky in particular arguing against it on the grounds that it would see the Court “entering territory belonging specifically to the realm of politics.”. See *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2).

¹¹³ In 2011, the pilot procedure was explicitly incorporated and regulated in the Rules of Court, see Philip Leach, *Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights* (Oxford University Press 2011) 87. For pilot judgements generally, see P Leach and others, *Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the European Court of Human Rights and Their Impact at National Level* (Intersentia 2010).

3.4. THE ECtHR: LEGITIMACY AS INSTITUTIONAL FAIRNESS

the core function that the ECtHR is likely to serve in the future.¹¹⁴ Indeed, the ECtHR will hardly be able to protect human rights in Europe on a case-by-case basis. Nor would it seem appropriate for it to do so, given its remoteness to local conditions and its relative lack of democratic accountability. However, when the Court is able to identify systemic failures that look set to systematically give rise to imbalances and unfairness, it seems appropriate that it should take action.

This is particularly clear when, as in the case of *Hutten-Czapska*, the Court notes that the applicants have insufficient options available for achieving a fair balance by appealing to institutions within the domestic legal order. In such cases, it seems appropriate for the Court to demand a change at the level of the state's own institutions, giving rise to a broad duty for the state to improve those institutions. Moreover, by scrutinizing the procedures and principles that the states apply when fulfilling this duty, it is likely that the Court will still be able to steer and unify the development of the case law on human rights, at least to the extent that this is required to meet minimum standards.

Against the deferential implications of this shift of attention, it could be argued that the judicial or administrative bodies of the signatory states can easily circumvent their obligations by providing superficial reforms or biased assessments of the facts in human rights cases, to avoid embarrassment for the state's political or bureaucratic elites. However, this might then be raised as a more procedurally oriented complaint before the ECtHR, perhaps also against Articles 6 (fair trial) and 13 (effective remedy).¹¹⁵

In this way, the Court can streamline its functions, by always aiming to direct attention at issues that arise at a higher level of abstraction.¹¹⁶ This, in my view, seems highly desirable. The

¹¹⁴ See, e.g., Steven Greer and Luzius Wildhaber, 'Revisiting the Debate about 'Constitutionalising' the European Court of Human Rights' (2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 655 (arguing that a "constitutional pluralism" approach to adjudication – better filtered, more principled, yet still context sensitive – is the way ahead for the ECtHR).

¹¹⁵ I note that this also fits with recent developments at the ECtHR, toward somewhat broader scrutiny under Article 6, see *Khamidov v Russia* ECHR 2007 928.

¹¹⁶ A similar argument was given by Judge Zupančič in *Hutten-Czapska* (n 2) ("Is it better for Poland to be condemned

ECtHR should not aim to micromanage the signatory states, particularly not in relation to a norm such as P1(1), which the Court itself regards as highly dependent on context. By shifting attention towards institutional fairness, the Court can avoid getting stuck in deference to the states without overstepping its bounds with regards to the democratic process.¹¹⁷

Indeed, the case of *Hutten-Czapska* is highly suggestive of the merits of such a perspective, not only because of the special measures ordered, but also because the Court reasoned on the basis of institutional information to identify systemic weaknesses of Polish housing regulation.¹¹⁸ Another example is the recent case of *Lindheim and others v Norway*.¹¹⁹ Here the applicants complained that their rights had been violated by a Norwegian Act that gave lessees the right to demand indefinite extensions of ground leases on pre-existing conditions.¹²⁰

The Court agreed that this was a breach of P1(1). Moreover, it engaged in the same form of assessment as it had adopted in *Hutten-Czapska*. Specifically, it concluded that the Ground Lease Act 1996 as such was the underlying source of the violation. The problem was not merely that this Act had been applied in a way that offended the rights of the applicants. In light of this, the Court did not only award compensation, it also ordered that general measures had to be taken by the Norwegian state to address the structural shortcomings that had been identified.¹²¹

in this Court 80,000 times and to pay all the costs and expenses incurred in 80,000 cases, or is it better to say to the country concerned: ‘Look, you have a serious problem on your hands and we would prefer you to resolve it at home...! If it helps, these are what we think you should take into account as the minimum standards in resolving this problem...’? Which one of the two solutions is more respectful of national sovereignty?”).

¹¹⁷ Getting this balancing act right is a key challenge for any system of judicial review, especially in cases with socio-economic and political overtones. I will not provide a discussion of previous work on this issue, but mention specifically that the Constitutional Court in South Africa has moved in an interesting direction that also appears conducive to an institutional fairness perspective, particularly through its recent emphasis on “meaningful engagement” in cases where social and economic rights are at stake, see Anashri Pillay, ‘Toward effective social and economic rights adjudication: The role of meaningful engagement’ (2012) 10(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 732.

¹¹⁸ Specifically, it seems that the shift signalled by recent cases on property at the ECtHR does not end with a new take on remedies, but also signals some changes in the way the Court approaches the fair balance determination under P1(1). This seems natural; if the Court looks for systemic violations, not (only) individual transgressions, its substantive assessments of fairness will naturally be influenced.

¹¹⁹ See *Lindheim and others v Norway* (n 95).

¹²⁰ See *Lindheim and others v Norway* (n 95) para 119 (the Act in question was the Ground Lease Act 1996).

¹²¹ See *Lindheim and others v Norway* (n 95).

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The Court also commented that its decision should be regarded in light of “jurisprudential developments in the direction of a stronger protection under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.¹²² However, in light of the change in perspective that accompanies this development, it is interesting to ask in what sense exactly the protection is stronger. In particular, it is not *prima facie* clear that the Court’s remark should be read as a statement expressing a change in its understanding of the content of individual rights under P1(1).

Rather, it may be read as a statement to the effect that the Court has assumed greater authority to address structural problems under that provision. This might even allow the Court to conclude that a violation has occurred due to structural unfairness, even when it is not possible to trace this back to any abnormal decision that specifically targets the individual entitlements of applicants.

If this is true, it could make a big difference in cases involving takings for economic development. As illustrated by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in *Kelo*, a main concern here is that such takings are likely to have “perverse” consequences at the structural level, because they lack democratic merit.¹²³ In light of cases such as *Hutten-Czapska* and *Lindheim*, I think the ECtHR would have been likely to approach *Kelo* in a manner consistent with Justice O’Connor’s approach.

Whether they would reach the same conclusion seems more uncertain, particularly since confidence in the states’ ability and willingness to regulate private-public partnerships might be higher in Europe than in the US.¹²⁴ However, it seems unlikely that the ECtHR would follow the majority in *Kelo*, by simply deferring to the determinations made by the granting authority. Rather, Justice O’Connor’s predictions about the fallout of the *Kelo* decision would likely have been of significant interest also to the justices at the Court in Strasbourg.

¹²² *Lindheim and others v Norway* (n 95) para 135.

¹²³ To quote Justice O’Connor’s dissent in *Kelo*, see *Kelo* (n 62).

¹²⁴ For a discussion from the point of view of English law, arguing that the prevailing regulatory regime limits the risk of eminent domain abuse largely through regulation of the takings power rather than strict property protection, see Allen, ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative View’ (n 30).

To conclude, I think notions of institutional fairness can help us locate a welcome middle ground between largely procedural notions of justiciable legitimacy, such as those found in England and Wales, and substantive notions, such as those found in the US. The question remains how Courts adopting such a middle ground should proceed when presented with a concrete case of alleged eminent domain abuse. In the next section, I present a possible heuristic.

3.5 The Gray Test

Pointing to early US case law on public use as a “laboratory of elementary proprietary ideas”, Kevin Gray builds on the evidence found there to provide a set of conditions for recognising what he calls “predatory takings”.¹²⁵ His conditions capture key aspects of eminent domain abuse that I believe should be recognised by a theory of economic development takings inspired by the notion of human flourishing and an institutional perspective on legitimacy. Below, I briefly present the criteria proposed by Gray, as well as three addenda that I believe suggest themselves on the basis of the discussions presented earlier in this and the previous chapter. I will refer to the resulting set of conditions as the *Gray test*, to be understood as a proposed general heuristic for assessing the legitimacy of takings, especially in situations when there are strong commercial interests present on the taker side.

Several combinations of conditions might be sufficient to justify designating a taking as eminent domain abuse. The purpose of the Gray test is not to produce a definite set of such conditions that provide a final answer in all cases. Rather, the aim is to provide a heuristic to facilitate concrete assessment against the social, economic and political circumstances surrounding the taking in question. If an economic development taking represents an abuse of power, one would expect it to run afoul with regard to some, and probably several, of the criteria set out in the following points.

¹²⁵ See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 31) 28-30.

Balance of Power among the Parties

In a typical case of eminent domain abuse, the parties that stand to benefit will be more economically and politically powerful than those from whom property is taken.¹²⁶ For example, this can be reflected in the takers' ability to solicit legal assistance and other services to defend the taking, as well as in the owners' inability to launch a coordinated defence.¹²⁷ If there is an imbalance of power, this is particularly likely to be noticeable early on, during the planning stages, before the decision to condemn has actually been made.

After the decision has been made, the procedural position of the owners might improve. However, this can be insufficient to restore an appropriate balance between the parties; when special procedural protections kick in, it will often be too late for the owners to launch an effective defence against the taking. For instance, strict rules concerning cost reimbursement for costs incurred *after* the decision to take has already been made, is not a sufficient response to an imbalance of power, especially not in legal systems that offer limited opportunity for judicial review of takings purposes.

More generally, a possible imbalance of power should be assessed against the decision-making process as a whole, going back to the first initiative made for taking the property in question. A critical assessment of what role the owners have played in the decision-making process is a good way to uncover more information about imbalances of power, and whether or not such imbalances could have unduly influenced the outcome.

The Net Effect on the Parties

As Gray notes, a hallmark of eminent domain abuse is that the net effect of the taking is a "significant transfer of valued resource from one set of owners to another"¹²⁸ In itself, this is not a

¹²⁶ See Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 31) 30-31. Gray himself omits any explicit mention of political power, but it is present in Justice O'Connor's dissent in *Kelo*, and in my view clearly belongs here.

¹²⁷ See Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 31) 30-31.

¹²⁸ See Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 31) 31.

conclusive sign of abuse, but it directs us to ask two important questions. First, we should inquire critically into the main purpose of the taking. Is the transfer of resources between the parties an acknowledged motive or an unacknowledged side-effect of some ostensibly distinct public purpose?

In the latter case, it might be that the public purpose is only a pretext for benefiting the taker, in which case it counts as clear evidence of abuse. In less obvious cases, if the transfer of resources arising from the fulfilment of the public purpose was not properly discussed and critically examined by the decision-maker, this too can point towards predation.

The assessment will be different if redistribution of (control over) resources is openly acknowledged as part of the rationale justifying eminent domain. In such cases, it is pertinent to ask further questions about the economic and social status of the parties, and the structure of the decision-making process, to shed light on whether the redistributive motive itself appears democratically legitimate. If there is eminent domain abuse, one would expect the taking to fail to stand up to scrutiny in this regard.

In some cases, it might be debatable whether a taking passes the net effect test. However, the scrutiny is still significant, since it helps bring the crucial questions into the open, thereby ensuring higher quality of the decision-making regarding the taking. Indeed, if the Gray test is applied at an early stage of the proceedings, this in itself might help increase acceptance of the decisions reached. Making room for more extensive legitimacy tests in takings law might well end up bolstering the government's power to take property, as long as the power is used faithfully.

Initiative

In many suspicious economic development takings, the party benefiting commercially from the taking is the party that initially made the suggestion for using eminent domain.¹²⁹ In uncontroversial cases, on the other hand, the initiative tends to come from some government body that seeks to

¹²⁹ See Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 31) 32.

pursue a specific policy goal, e.g., to provide a public service or bestow a benefit on a particular group that is found to be in need of support. The contrast between this and cases when the initiative lies with the commercial beneficiaries themselves point to a disturbance of the decision-making underlying the decision to use eminent domain. As such, it is an important hallmark of abuse.

To investigate further under this point, one should take into account the wider social and political context of the taking, particularly the position of the parties involved. If the beneficiary is both more powerful and privileged than the owners *and* takes the initiative for the taking, this is clearly a sign pointing towards predation. On the other hand, if the beneficiaries are marginalised groups who could only expect any consideration if they were to take the initiative themselves, the situation might have to be viewed differently.

Location

The location, in a broad sense of the word, of the property that is taken, can be a strong indicator that eminent domain is inappropriate.¹³⁰ For instance, cases involving the taking of dwellings are naturally more suspect than cases involving the taking of barren or unused plots of land. Similarly, the taking of property that is important to the subsistence of the current owner should raise the bar for when a taking may be considered legitimate. Moreover, if the taker's choice of location appears to be one of convenience rather than necessity, this points towards predation. It is particularly telling if alternative locations would be less intrusive, or obviate the need for using eminent domain altogether.

On the other hand, the location of the property can sometimes point towards *increased* legitimacy of a taking that would otherwise appear suspect. This might be the case, for instance, if the property that is taken has special value to the taker or the community specifically because of its

¹³⁰ See Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 31) 33-34.

strategic importance with respect to the taker's own property or the rights of non-owners.¹³¹ The proper balance of burdens and benefits might still be upset, but a taking that fits smoothly into a 'special value' narrative will be less suspect than one that does not.

Social Merit

As Gray notes, a taking that is hard to justify on the basis of its social merits is more likely to be predatory.¹³² This asks for closer scrutiny of the kinds of public interests that can be used to justify a taking. If the justification narrative surrounding a taking revolves solely around 'trickle-down' effects and the successful business ventures that the taking will facilitate, there is reason to be suspicious. Specifically, if the taking cannot sustain a social merit narrative, whereby attention is shifted away from purely economic considerations, this is a strong independent indication that the taking might count as predation.

The point here is not that the language of social merit should replace the language of public use or public interest as some kind of conclusive test of legitimacy. Rather, the point is that one should always be encouraged to analyse takings specifically in terms of non-economic, social, effects. This is particularly important in difficult cases, because it can help us to arrive at a better understanding of where exactly the taking sits on the gray scale between admissible governance and predatory exploitation.

¹³¹ For instance, if riparian owners cannot make rational use of the water flowing over their land without intruding on the land of their neighbours, using eminent domain to resolve this might be considerably less suspect than other kinds of economic development takings. This particular scenario was much discussed in the US during the 19th century, in relation to mill Acts which authorised neighbour-to-neighbour takings of limited property rights needed for development. See the discussion in section 3.3.

¹³² See Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 31) 34. Gray writes of lap-dancing clubs and cigarette factories as examples of purposes that are suspect. Importantly, such purposes might well fulfil a public interest requirement via the economic development narrative, yet still fail a social merit test that focuses rather on the social dimensions of the use to which the property will be put.

Environmental Impact

According to Gray, a typical feature of eminent domain abuse is that it has an adverse environmental impact. Moreover, a typical feature of eminent domain abusers is that they show disregard for such adverse affects.¹³³ This is an additional element that pertains specifically to the status of the taker, asking us to consider whether it is appropriate to grant their activities public interest status. It is not primarily a question of how the development stands with regard to environmental regulation. Rather, what is at stake is whether or not the characteristics of the taker and the development plans make it appropriate to use the power of eminent domain.

It might be appropriate to use environmental law as a starting point, but the relevant environmental standard with regard to the legitimacy question should be drawn up more strictly than the standards generally applied to the type of development in question. Indeed, one should be entitled to expect heightened environmental awareness from a developer and a development plan that benefits from the power of eminent domain.

Arguably, the mere fact that takers engage in active lobbying for leniency in relation to environmental standards can be enough to shed doubt on the claim that they act in the public interest. What might otherwise be considered natural and admissible behaviour for a common commercial company can be improper or inadmissible behaviour for one that benefits from eminent domain powers. I note that this particular observation has general import, pertaining to a potentially wider set of obligations that takers may be expected to take on, not only environmental ones. This brings me to the first addendum that I propose to add to Gray's original evaluation points.

¹³³ See Gray, 'Recreational Property' (n 31) 34 ("predatory takers tend to be relatively unperturbed if they lay waste to the earth.").

Addendum 1: Regulatory Effects

As discussed in chapter 2, property has an important regulatory effect, also outside the realm of positive law. This effect typically changes following a taking, sometimes quite dramatically. For instance, if locally owned property is taken by external commercial actors for high-intensity commercial use, the post-taking regulatory status of the property will most likely be completely different to its status prior to the interference. Moreover, the changed status might have as much to do with informal social functions as it has to do with positive regulation.

It might be, for instance, that the property in question is found in a jurisdiction that emphasises the freedom of owners to do as they please without state interference. In this case, the fallout of allowing external commercial actors to take locally owned property can be particularly severe, as the new owner is likely to be unconstrained by locally grounded systems for sustainable resource management. In these cases, there is a risk that there will be a ‘tragedy of the taken’, arising from how the taking undermines an important building block of sustainability.

A different regulatory concern is that the legal status of the property can change, for instance because the development in question brings it under the scope of different rules. A concrete example of this mechanism will be encountered in Part II of the thesis, when we consider expropriation of water rights for hydropower development in Norway. As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, water rights in Norway are typically held in common by local smallholders, arising from their co-ownership of the surrounding outfields. Water rights are then typically classified as agricultural property, meaning that special rules apply, including rules that protect the local community and identifies the municipalities and other democratic institutions at the local level as the primary regulatory bodies. As soon as water rights are expropriated, the connection with land rights and local agriculture is severed, resulting also in an almost complete transfer of regulatory authority from democratic institutions at the local level to the national water directorate. This serves as an example of how the regulatory framework can change dramatically when property rights are

expropriated. When assessing the legitimacy of a taking, it will then be especially relevant to consider whether the new framework offers better or weaker protection for the local community, the environment, or the general public interest. If the effects appear to be largely negative in these regards, it will reflect badly on the decision to use eminent domain.

Addendum 2: Impact on Non-Owners

Following up on the theoretical arguments made in chapter 2, it is appropriate to direct special attention at the status of non-owners directly affected by economic development takings. It is of particular importance to ascertain whether or not the interests of such non-owners were given due consideration prior to the decision to use eminent domain. If their interests appear to have been neglected, or have not been considered at all, there is additional reason to be sceptical of the purported public interest of the taking. Indeed, just as disregard for the environment is a typical sign of predation, a general disregard for local non-owners is also an indicator of abuse.

Moreover, if directly affected non-owners enjoyed little or no influence over the decision-making or if they will be made to suffer severe adverse effects, this should be counted as an indication of predation irrespective of mitigating procedural arrangements, e.g., measures to ensure ‘consultation’ or the like. If these measures have little or no material significance, they cannot hope to restore legitimacy.

Importantly, awarding compensation is also not sufficient to excuse shortcomings in this regard. If people are displaced, for instance, the fact that new opportunities are provided for them somewhere else should not be allowed to detract from the fact that a community has been destroyed.¹³⁴ It is possible that the needs of the public necessitate such a drastic interference with property’s proper function, but this should then at once give rise to a more in-depth scrutiny of legitimacy. Moreover, the bar to pass the legitimacy test should be raised considerably in such cases.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., Philippe Cullet, ‘Human Rights and Displacement: The Indian Supreme Court Decision on Sardar Sarovar in International Perspective’ (2001) 50(4) *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 973.

It should also be noted that the position of non-owners is largely determined by the regulatory framework surrounding the property in question. Hence, the evaluation of legitimacy of takings with respect to non-owners is closely related to the evaluation with respect to regulatory effects, considered in the previous point. For instance, if property taken under eminent domain is simultaneously removed from the ambit of democratic decision-making at the local level, this can weaken the position of non-owners. Moreover, if the property is re-classified and brought under the scope of different rules, for instance because its status changes from agricultural to industrial property, this can leave the non-owners with weaker substantive rights. If we take the social function perspective on property to heart, such effects should also be considered when considering the legitimacy of takings.

Addendum 3: Democratic Merit

Perhaps the most important characteristic to consider when assessing the legitimacy of a taking is its democratic merit. In an important sense, putting a taking to the test against this measure serves to encapsulate all the other points raised above. Specifically, it asks us to consider the totality of these factors in order to judge whether good governance standards have been observed within a system based on democratic decision-making. The inquiry made in this regard should not be focused on second-guessing government policies, but should compel us to take seriously the idea that a commitment to democracy places real constraints on the exercise of government power.¹³⁵ In this way, an overarching focus on democratic merit can render the principles of scrutiny expressed by the Gray test as a possible template for courts across different jurisdictions, with respect to both constitutional and human rights provisions.

The main question that arises with respect to democratic merit is whether the taking in question can be said to arise from a legitimate process of decision-making, in the pursuit of a fair and

¹³⁵ See the discussion in chapter 2, sections 2.4 and 2.5.

equitable outcome. It bears emphasising that the relevant assessment under this point involves both procedural and substantive elements. Fairness in itself is a constraint on the democratic process, particularly when fundamental economic and social rights are involved. At the same time, the notion of democratic merit rightly brings procedural questions to the foreground. Indeed, it might be a weakness of Gray's original proposal that it does not single out procedural issues for special consideration.

A commitment to property as a social institution requires us to take into account that the owners generally make up the group of people who will be most directly affected by any decision involving the future of their property. As such, they should normally be granted a decisive voice in decision-making processes leading up to economic development. At the same time, the social function account leaves room for recognising that this presumption in favour of emphasising the rights of owners can be defeated by the context. It is clear, for instance, that the substantive interests of absentee landlords might be limited compared to the substantive interests of local non-owners who depend more directly on the property for their livelihoods. In these cases, the social function approach allows us to recognise that a taking might have significant democratic merit, even if it is based on a form of decision-making that prioritises the interests and participation rights of non-owners.

Nevertheless, within a system based on private property rights it will always be appropriate to show caution in this regard. The presumption should always be, within such a system, that the owners are the primary stakeholders in decision-making processes involving their property. Moreover, if this presumption is defeated, it would usually point to a structural weakness of property's function within society, a weakness that should arguably be addressed by more general reforms of property, not by inflating the state's power to undermine it. If caution is not observed here, property can soon become a less secure basis on which to support local communities, including those marginalised groups that are most in need of protection from predators.

By itself, however, a legitimacy test cannot make property a more secure basis for promoting good outcomes in cases when the public desires economic development. What the Gray test provides is a list of possible symptoms to look out for when attempting to diagnose a suspected case of eminent domain abuse. Hopefully, this can help flag problems and limit the prevalence of abuse, but it can not be regarded as a solution, especially not in cases when the public's apparent desire for economic development is a genuine reflection of a democratic commitment.

In short, after diagnosing a lack of legitimacy, the question becomes how to find a cure. In the next section, I consider this challenge in more depth, premised on the idea that there is a need for alternatives to eminent domain in cases when the collective wishes to take decisive steps to promote economic development on privately owned land.¹³⁶

3.6 Alternatives to Takings for Economic Development

As mentioned briefly in chapter 2, the work of Ostrom and others on common pool resources suggests that sustainable resource management can often be better achieved through local self-governance than through markets or states.¹³⁷ The connection between this work and property theory is highly interesting, and has been explored in some recent work, particularly by US legal

¹³⁶ If this premise is rejected as too radical, an institutional fairness perspective on legitimacy can still inspire other kinds of reform proposals, e.g., in the context of good governance. For an example, consider the Committee on World Food Security, 'Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security' (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 11th May 2012) (<http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf>) accessed 14th September 2015. These guidelines contain a section on expropriation which elaborates greatly on typical property clauses by going into more detail about the meaning of fairness, especially in relation to the expropriation procedure as such. Hence, the guidelines appear to embody a perspective on legitimacy that is quite close to the one I have put forth in this thesis. However, the question is whether a "soft" law mechanism, such as that of the Guidelines, will be strong enough to keep powerful commercial interests in check. For a more in-depth assessment of the expropriation provisions in the guidelines, see Björn Hoops, 'The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure: Distilling Good Governance Standards for Expropriation Procedures' in Ann Apers and others (eds), *Property Law Perspectives III* (Ius Commune: European and Comparative Law Series, Intersentia 2015) vol 132.

¹³⁷ See generally Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (Cambridge University Press 1990). For a recent exposition of the main ideas, placing the work in a broader academic context, see the revised version of Ostrom's Nobel Lecture, Elinor Ostrom, 'Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems' (2010) 100(3) *The American Economic Review* 641.

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scholars.¹³⁸ As these scholars have observed, the connection can be made at a very high level of generality. Indeed, in a democracy, property as such has a kind of (partial) commons structure, since property as an institution depends on the collective choices we make regarding the legal order.¹³⁹ In cases when property is made subject to eminent domain, this perspective becomes particularly salient, since then the collective explicitly withdraws its backing for the rights of the owner, in favour of collective decision-making about the future of the property in question.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, in case of an economic development taking, the property in question typically pertains to land or some other natural resource, which invariably form part of a larger resource system with some common pool characteristics.¹⁴¹

Importantly, to designate something as a common pool resource does not in any way imply that the resource in question is open-access or that it is held as a form of common property, a public trust, or under some other legal construction moving away from the sphere of private property.¹⁴² Perhaps more controversially, designating something as a common pool resource does not in any way imply that the resource *should* be removed from this sphere.¹⁴³ According to Ostrom and

¹³⁸ See generally Carol Rose, 'Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal academy' (2011) 5(1) *International Journal of the Commons* 28; LA Fennel, 'Ostrom's Law: Property Rights in the Commons' (2011) 5(1) *International Journal of the Commons* 9.

¹³⁹ For similar observations, see Carol M Rose, 'Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory' (1990) 2(1) *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities* 37, 51; Hanoch Dagan and Michael A Heller, 'The Liberal Commons' (2001) 110(4) *Yale Law Journal* 549, 577.

¹⁴⁰ A common pool resource is typically identified by the fact that exclusion is difficult or costly, while use can cause depletion (and hence should be limited), see, e.g., Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, 'Private and Common Property' in Boudewijn Bouckaert (ed), *Property Law and Economics* (Edward Elgar 2010) 57. Hence, the mere fact that some property is apt to be regulated, or taken, by the collective, demonstrates that property has common pool characteristics (although these might be imposed by the polity, rather than arising from the nature of the underlying good).

¹⁴¹ See, e.g., Fennel (n 138) 16 ("we are *always* operating at least partially within a commons of some sort."). I also mention Smith's notion of a "semicommons", used to describe settings where common pool arrangements for resource management interact with individual property rights, see generally Henry E Smith, 'Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields' (2000) 29(1) *The Journal of Legal Studies* 131; Henry E Smith, 'Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights' (2002) 31(S2) *The Journal of Legal Studies* S453.

¹⁴² See, e.g., Ostrom and Hess (n 140) 58.

¹⁴³ See Ostrom and Hess (n 140) 58 ("there is no automatic association of common-pool resources with common-property regimes – or, with any other particular type of property regime.").

Hess, the appropriate property regime for a given common pool resource is a pragmatic question that depends on the circumstances.¹⁴⁴

It should be noted, however, that this neutral position on the relationship between property and common pool resources is premised on a bundle of rights understanding.¹⁴⁵ Potentially, a more ambitious theory of property could suggest a different perspective. Specifically, the question arises as to how theories of common pool resource management relates to the social function account. This is a particularly interesting avenue for future work, as it could shed light on the normative stance that private property can be a good basis for sustainable self-governance, at least when backed up by a human flourishing account of what private property should be.

In this thesis, I limit myself to noting that the link between property and theories of commons governance provides a possible route towards an institutional perspective on how to solve legitimacy problems associated with economic development takings.

To make progress in this regard, it will be useful to first briefly consider one of the most important theoretical legacies of Ostrom's work, namely a list of eight design principles that she formulated on the basis of empirical studies.¹⁴⁶ These principles were formulated because they seemed to be particularly crucial in ensuring good governance at the local level, and have since been supported by a growing body of empirical evidence.¹⁴⁷ In brief, the so-called CPR (common pool resources) design principles are the following:

1. **Well-defined boundaries:** There should be a clearly defined boundary around the resource in question, and a clear distinction should exist between members of the user community,

¹⁴⁴ See Ostrom and Hess (n 140) 58.

¹⁴⁵ See Ostrom and Hess (n 140) 59.

¹⁴⁶ See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 90.

¹⁴⁷ See M Cox, G Arnold and SV Tomas, 'A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management' (2010) 15(4) *Ecology And Society* 38 (the authors also suggest splitting some of the original principles in two parts, resulting in a slightly more fine-grained list, not needed in this thesis).

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who are entitled to access the resource, and non-members, who may be excluded. This will internalise the costs of resource exploitation and other externalities, ensuring that proper incentives for sustainable management arise within the community of resource users.¹⁴⁸

2. **Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions:** Management principles should be flexible and responsive to changing local conditions. Moreover, management practices should be anchored in the economic, social, and cultural practices prevalent at the local level. In addition, the individual benefits should generally exceed the individual costs associated with membership in the community of users, and collectively managed benefits should be distributed fairly among community members.¹⁴⁹
3. **Collective-choice arrangements:** The individual members of the user community should have an opportunity to participate in decision-making processes regarding the rules that govern the user community and the resource management. In addition to securing fairness and legitimacy, this will enhance the quality of the decision-making, as the users themselves have first-hand knowledge and low-cost access to information about their situation and the state of the resource in question.¹⁵⁰
4. **Monitoring:** There should be mechanisms in place to ensure that the behaviour of users is monitored for violations of management rules. To increase efficiency, monitoring should be locally organised. Moreover, to ensure local responsiveness and legitimacy, individuals acting as monitors should themselves be members of the user community or in some way answerable

¹⁴⁸ Importantly, the possibility of excluding non-members marks a distinction between open-access resources and common pool resources, where the latter appears much less susceptible to a commons tragedy than the former, because externalities are internalised to a clearly defined community. See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 91-92.

¹⁴⁹ See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 92.

¹⁵⁰ See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 93.

to this community.¹⁵¹

5. **Graduated sanctions:** There should be an effective system in place for penalising violations of user community rules. These penalties should be graduated so that more severe or repeated violations are sanctioned more severely than minor or one-time transgressions.¹⁵²
6. **Conflict-resolution mechanisms:** The user community should be endowed with low-cost procedures for conflict resolution. These procedures should be sensitive to local conditions, to ensure local legitimacy.¹⁵³
7. **Minimum recognition of rights:** The user community should be protected from interference by external actors, including government agencies. As a minimum, the existence of local institutions and the right to self-governance should be recognised and respected by external government authorities.¹⁵⁴
8. **Nested enterprises:** There should be vertical integration between local, small-scale, management institutions and larger institutions aimed at protecting and furthering non-local interests. This integration should be based on the minimum recognition of rights mentioned in the previous point. Furthermore, it should provide a template for integrated decision-making about larger scale issues, where local competences are employed incrementally in more general settings, involving also institutions working on behalf of municipalities, regions, states and the international community. Local institutions for resource management should not only be respected by such larger scale structures, they should also feed into larger scale decision-making and be called to respond to greater community needs.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 94-100.

¹⁵² See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 94-100.

¹⁵³ See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 100-101.

¹⁵⁴ See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 101.

¹⁵⁵ See Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (n 137) 101-102.

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There is an implicit tension in the CPR principles, between the right to self-governance and the need to integrate local decision-making into non-local institutional structures. As pointed out by much CPR research, finding the right balance can be a challenge, especially if the goal is to *design* institutions for local decision-making in settings where such institutions have not formed naturally.¹⁵⁶

Finding the right balance between local autonomy and integration into the greater institutional order is important not only to protect the interests of the public, but also to protect minorities and weaker parties within the local community. A major concern associated with self-governance, especially if it is imposed by design, is that elites will capture the decision-making at the local level.¹⁵⁷

It is well-documented that elite capture can occur at *all* levels of institutional decision-making, from the local to the international stage. There is also ample evidence that self-governing communities *can* succeed in creating and sustaining healthy environments for collective decision-making; there is no reason to think that self-governance will necessarily lead to abuse by local elites.¹⁵⁸ Quite the contrary, one of the crucial insights emanating from commons research is that the risk of elite capture can be reduced by respecting the local community's right to self-governance. That said, there is no automatic guarantee that decentralisation leads to better governance and greater respect for weaker groups; decentralisation policies themselves can be captured, especially if they are imposed from the outside by power groups or national governments. This points to the importance of appropriate nesting of institutions, where legal guarantees in particular can serve as important safeguards both for weaker groups and the greater public. The challenge associated with this will

¹⁵⁶ See Cox, Arnold and Tomas (n 147).

¹⁵⁷ See generally Krister P Andersson and Elinor Ostrom, 'Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective' (2008) 41(1) Policy Sciences 71.

¹⁵⁸ See Andersson and Ostrom (n 157) (with many further references to empirical studies).

be highlighted when I consider a concrete institutional proposal in section 3.6.1 below.¹⁵⁹

There are at least two interesting connections between the CPR principles and the issue of economic development takings. First, one may observe that when economic development takings appear to lack legitimacy with respect to social functions, this is typically also an indication that the surrounding framework for resource management is not well-designed. In particular, it appears that the Gray test closely tracks many of the design principles proposed by Ostrom.

For instance, consider the balance of power between the owners and beneficiaries of a taking, the first point to consider according to the Gray test. When a taking fails on this point, doubts naturally arise also with regard to the underlying framework for resource management, particularly aspects pertaining to the recognition of local rights, the adequacy of collective-choice arrangements, and the congruence between appropriation, provision and local conditions. If property is taken by powerful actors, chances are that these actors are not representative of community interests. Moreover, takings characterised by an imbalance of power typically indicate that the government is unwilling to respect the rights of local people, even when these rights are formally recognised as property rights.

By contrast, the situation might be different if it involves a taking that is not suspect according to the Gray test. For instance, if property is taken from absentee landlords and given to local land users in order to facilitate development, this might be an honest attempt at setting up a management framework that complies with CPR principles. In such a case, one would also not expect the balance of power between owners and takers to point towards abuse.

The second link between CPR design and economic development takings is arguably even more relevant. This link becomes apparent as soon as we shift attention away from diagnosing a lack of legitimacy towards coming up with alternative management principles that can restore it.

¹⁵⁹ I also return to this in more depth in chapter 6, when I discuss Norwegian land consolidation and the safeguards offered by that specific framework for facilitating self-governance among owner communities.

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Specifically, work done on local governance of common pool resources point to an *alternative* way of approaching the goal of economic development in cases that might otherwise result in the use of eminent domain.

This has not received much attention in the literature so far. One notable exception, discussed in depth in the following subsection, is the work of Heller, Dagan and Hills.¹⁶⁰ Looking at their work will serve to make the abstract discussion above more concrete, and will set the stage for a comparison between their proposal and solutions that can be facilitated by the system of land consolidation presented in chapter 6.

3.6.1 Land Assembly Districts

In an article from 2001, Heller and Dagan considered the connection between CPR design and overarching (liberal) property values.¹⁶¹ From this, they arrived at a proposal for what they call a “liberal commons”, which adds some design constraints rooted in a desire to protect individual autonomy and minority rights. In particular, they emphasise the value of exit, the opportunity for rights holders to alienate their share in the commons resource (conceived of as a property right).¹⁶² The right of owners to leave the collective is thought of as a safety mechanism, to prevent failing institutions from trapping its members in a state of oppression. This is argued to be an important overarching design constraint, described as a “liberal” idea, that should complement the other design principles for local management of common pool resources.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ The work of Lehari and Licht also deserves a brief mention, even though it focuses on compensation rather than alternatives to eminent domain. The reason is that this work relies on proposing a novel institution that also touches on issues related to self-governance. In particular, Lehari and Licht propose that post-taking, collective, price bargaining should be carried out on behalf of owners by a Special Purpose Development Company, in an effort to give them a chance to get a share of the commercial benefit arising from development, see Amnon Lehari and Amir N Licht, ‘Eminent Domain, Inc.’ (2007) 107(7) Columbia Law Review 1704.

¹⁶¹ See Dagan and Heller (n 139).

¹⁶² See Dagan and Heller (n 139) 567-572.

¹⁶³ Despite their commitment to protect the right of exit, Heller and Dagan are also aware of the destabilising effect exit can have on an otherwise well-functioning institution. To address this, they discuss additional mechanisms, such as rights of first refusal, that can ensure that exit does not prove too disruptive to the local collective, as long as a

In a later article, responding to the *Kelo* controversy, Heller and Hills build on the idea of the liberal commons by proposing a novel approach to the takings issue, consisting of a new institutional framework to facilitate land assembly for economic development. The key innovation is that of the *Land Assembly District* (LAD), an institution that is meant to be set up on demand, whenever the property owners in a specific area need to make a collective decision about whether or not to sell their land to a developer or a municipality.¹⁶⁴ The idea is that while anyone will be able to propose and promote the formation of a LAD, the planning authorities and the owners themselves must consent before it is formed.¹⁶⁵ Clearly, some kind of collective action mechanism is required to allow the owners to make such a decision.

Heller and Hills suggest that voting under the majority rule will be adequate in this regard, at least in most cases.¹⁶⁶ How to allocate voting rights in the LAD is given careful consideration, with Heller and Hills opting for the proposal that they should in principle be given to owners in proportion to their share in the land belonging to the LAD.¹⁶⁷ Owners can opt out of the LAD, but in this case, eminent domain can be used to transfer the land to the LAD using a conventional eminent domain procedure.¹⁶⁸

Heller and Hills envision an important role for governmental planning agencies in approving, overseeing and facilitating the LAD process. Their role will be most important early on, in approving and spelling out the parameters within which the LAD is called to function.¹⁶⁹ While it is not

sufficient number of members choose to remain. See Dagan and Heller (n 139) 596-702.

¹⁶⁴ Heller and Hills (n 3) 1469-1470.

¹⁶⁵ Heller and Hills (n 3) 1488-1489.

¹⁶⁶ See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1496. However, when many of the owners are non-residents who only see their land as an investment, Heller and Hills note that it might be necessary to consider more complicated voting procedures, for instance by requiring separate majorities from different groups of owners. See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1523-1524.

¹⁶⁷ See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1492. For a discussion of the constitutional one-person-one-vote principle and a more detailed argument in favour of the property-based proposal, see Heller and Hills (n 3) 1503-1507.

¹⁶⁸ Heller and Hills (n 3) 1496.

¹⁶⁹ Heller and Hills (n 3) 1489-1491.

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discussed at any length, the assumption appears to be that the planning authorities will define the scope of the LAD by specifying the nature of the development it can pursue in quite some depth. Hence, the powers of the planning authority appear likely to remain quite extensive.

If the owners do not agree to forming a LAD, or if they refuse to sell to any developer, Heller and Hills suggest that the government should be precluded from using eminent domain to assemble the land.¹⁷⁰ This is a crucial aspect of their proposal that sets the suggestion apart from other proposals for institutional reform that have appeared after *Kelo*. A LAD will not only ensure that the owners get to bargain with the developers over compensation, it will also give them an opportunity to refuse any development to go ahead. Hence, the proposal shifts the balance of power in economic development cases, giving owners a greater role also in preparing the decision whether or not to develop, and on what terms. Hence, the LAD proposal promises to address the democratic deficit of economic development takings, without failing to recognise that the danger of holdouts is real and that institutions are needed to avoid it.

There are some problems with the model, however. First, planning authorities might have an incentive to refuse granting approval for LAD formation. After all, doing so entails that they give up the power of eminent domain for the land in question. For this reason, Heller and Hills propose that a procedure of judicial review should exist whereby a decision to deny approval for LAD formation can be scrutinized.¹⁷¹ However, the question then arises as to how deferential courts should be in this regard, echoing the conundrum that engulfs the safeguard intended by the public use restriction. Presumably, one would want the courts to strictly scrutinise LAD rejections, to instil that LADs should normally be promoted. However, would the courts be comfortable providing such scrutiny, also against a government body claiming that the “public interest” speaks against LAD formation? This would likely depend on the exact formulation and spirit of the LAD-enabling

¹⁷⁰ Heller and Hills (n 3) 1491.

¹⁷¹ Heller and Hills (n 3) 1490.

legislation. To work as intended, some sort of presumption in favour of LAD approval appears to be in order, but this in turn can have the effect of making it easier for powerful landowners to abuse the LAD system, e.g., by pushing through LADs that enable them to impose their will on other community members.

This worry is related to a second possible objection against the LAD proposal, concerning the practicalities of the process leading up to the LAD's decision on whether or not to accept a given offer. Is it possible to organise such a process in a manner that is at once efficient, inclusive and informative, without making it too costly and time consuming? Here Heller and Hills envision a system of public hearings, possibly organised by the planning authorities, where potential developers meet with owners and other interested parties to discuss plans for development.¹⁷² The process envisioned here would resemble existing planning procedures to such an extent that additional costs could hopefully be kept at a minimum.

The significant difference would concern the relative influence of the different actors, with the owners as a group receiving a considerable boost as a result of the LAD. Rather than being sidelined by a narrative that sees the use of eminent domain as the culmination of planning, the owners are now likely to occupy center stage throughout, as they now will have the final say on whether or not the development will go ahead.

This raises the question of how the interests of other locals, without property rights, will be protected. Heller and Hills assume that local non-owners will also be represented during the stages leading up to the LAD's final decision, but their role in the process is not clarified in any detail.¹⁷³ This raises the worry that LADs might undermine local democracy by giving property owners a privileged position with respect to policy questions that should be decided jointly by all members

¹⁷² See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1490-1491. It might also be necessary for the planning authorities or other government agencies to take on some responsibilities with respect to providing guidance and assistance to less resourceful members among the owners.

¹⁷³ Heller and Hills (n 3) 1490-1491.

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of the community.

If property rights are distributed evenly among community members, the risk of abuse in this regard might be limited. Moreover, the local anchoring that LADs provide should also benefit non-owners, by bringing the decision-making process closer to the people most directly affected, including non-owners. If some members of the local community remain marginalised, this should arguably be regarded as a regulatory failure or a reflection of underlying inequality in society, not a shortcoming of the LAD proposal. In these cases, a reasonable approach might even be to *expand* the function of LADs, by granting voting rights to a larger class of local property dependants, not only formally titled owners.

The ideal of the LAD proposal is clearly stated and highly attractive. LADs should help to establish self-governance for land assembly and economic development. In particular, Heller and Hills argue that LADs should have “broad discretion to choose any proposal to redevelop the neighbourhood – or reject all such proposals”.¹⁷⁴ As they put it, two of the main goals of LAD formation is to ensure “preservation of the sense of individual autonomy implicit in the right of private property and preservation of the larger community’s right to self-government”.¹⁷⁵ The problem is that these ideals turn out to be at odds with some of the concrete rules that Heller and Hills propose, particularly those aiming to ensure good governance of the LAD itself.

In relation to the governance issue, Heller and Hills emphasise, in direct contrast to their comments about “broad discretion” and “self-governance”, that “LADs exist for a single narrow purpose – to consider whether to sell a neighborhood”.¹⁷⁶ This is a good thing, according to Heller and Hills, since it provides a safeguard against mismanagement, serving to prevent LADs from becoming battle grounds where different groups attempt to co-opt the community voice to

¹⁷⁴ See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1496.

¹⁷⁵ See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1498.

¹⁷⁶ See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1500.

further their own interests. As Heller and Hills put it, the narrow scope of LADs will ensure that “all differences of interest based on the constituents’ different activities and investments, therefore, merge into the single question: is the price offered by the assembler sufficient to induce the constituents to sell?”.¹⁷⁷

This means that there is a significant internal tension in the LAD proposal, between the broad goal of self-governance on the one hand and the fear of neighbourhood bickering, or even majority tyranny, on the other. Indeed, it is hard to see how LADs can at once have both a “narrow purpose” as well as enjoy “broad discretion” to choose between competing proposals for development. If broad discretion is granted to LADs, what prevents special interest groups among the landowners from promoting development projects that will be particularly favourable to them, rather than to the landowners as a group? What is to prevent landowners from making behind-the-scene deals with favoured developers at the expense of their neighbours? It might be difficult to come up with general rules that prevent mechanisms of this kind, without also making substantive self-governance an impossibility.

Moreover, as Kelly points out in a commentary, the idea of majority voting might be inherently vulnerable to abuse when applied to decision-making about land assembly.¹⁷⁸ The problem is that if different owners value their property differently, majority voting will tend to disfavour those with the strongest views, either in favour of, or against, assembly. If these viewpoints are assumed to be non-strategic and genuine reflections of the welfare associated with the land, this can result in inefficiencies and abuse. In short, the problem is that a majority can often be found that does not take due account of minority interests. This is worrying, since it can undermine property’s function as a means for minorities to protect and assert themselves on the basis of right rather than voting power.

¹⁷⁷ Heller and Hills (n 3) 1500.

¹⁷⁸ Daniel B Kelly, ‘The Limitations of Majoritarian Land Assembly’ (2009) 122 Harvard Law Review Forum 7.

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This weakening of property can be enough to allow powerful groups to pursue nefarious objectives. Indeed, it is conceivable that developers might come to rely on LADs to push through *de facto* condemnations of property, through a procedure that leaves minorities less strongly protected than the traditional takings process. For instance, it would be theoretically possible for any landowner to use a LAD to cheaply condemn any neighbouring property that is smaller or less valuable (giving rise to fewer votes) than their own.¹⁷⁹ Eventually, a whole community might be taken over by one or a few powerful landowners, through a sequence of appropriately designed LADs and development projects.

If a LAD is tightly regulated, required to offer the land on an open auction, and obliged to only look at the price, this will limit the risk of abuse. But it will not give owners broad discretion to consider the social functions of property when choosing among development proposals. In my view, therefore, it is undesirable to restrict the operations of LADs in this way. It is easy to imagine cases where competing proposals, perhaps emerging from within the community of owners themselves, will be made in response to the formation of a LAD. Such proposals may involve novel solutions that are superior to the original development plans, in which case it is hard to see why they should be disregarded simply because they are less commercially attractive, or because the developer interested in pursuing such a proposal cannot offer the highest payment to the owners. In the end, the decision that the LAD makes concerns the future of the community as a whole. This is not an exercise in profit-maximization, and there are good reasons to believe that LAD regulation should encourage a broad perspective, not enforce a narrow one.

By contrast, Heller and Hills are quite determined that the degree of self-governance needs to be limited in favour of strict regulation to reduce the risk of LAD abuse. In particular, they argue that “LAD-enabling legislation should require especially stringent disclosure requirements and bar any

¹⁷⁹ If the owners opt out, as they will be able to under the LAD proposal, it will be possible for the dominating owner to use ordinary eminent domain to complete the transaction, which might now have a veil of legitimacy over it due to the existence of a LAD.

landowner from voting in a LAD if that landowner has any affiliation with the assembler”.¹⁸⁰ Here, the notion of self-governance is made very thin indeed, as owners will effectively be barred from using LADs as a template for gaining the right to participate in development projects themselves.

Moreover, new questions arise. For one, what is meant by “affiliation”? Say that a landowner happens to own shares in some of the companies proposing development. Should they then be barred from voting? If so, should they be barred from voting on all proposals, or just those involving companies in which they are a shareholder? If the answer is yes, how can this be justified? Would it not be easy to construe such a rule as discrimination against landowners who happen to own shares in development companies? On the other hand, if the landowner in question is allowed to vote on all other proposals, would it not be natural to suspect that their vote is biased against assembly that would benefit a competing company? Or what about the case when some of the landowners are employed by some of the development companies? Should such owners be barred from voting on proposals that could benefit their employers? This seems quite unfair as a general rule. But in some cases, employment relations could play a decisive factor in determining the outcome of a vote. This might happen, for instance, if a company proposes development in a neighbourhood where it has a large number of employees. Heller and Hills give no clear answer to the questions arising in this regard, and at this point, their proposal has in a sense come full circle. Indeed, similarly to how courts today struggle with the “public use” requirement, it seems that the proposed “affiliation” criterion for depriving someone of their voting rights would provide a very shaky basis for judicial review.

More generally, it seems that how to best organise a LAD remains an open problem. The challenge is to ensure that LADs deliver a real possibility of self-determination, while also ensuring good governance and protection against abuse. That it remains unclear how to do this is acknowledged by Heller and Hills themselves, who point out that further work is needed and that only

¹⁸⁰ Heller and Hills (n 3).

a limited assessment of their proposal can be made in the absence of empirical data.¹⁸¹ Later in the thesis, I will take on this challenge when I consider the Norwegian framework for land consolidation. This framework provides a sophisticated institutional embedding of many of the central ideas of LADs. In particular, I will discuss how Norwegian land consolidation can be employed in cases of economic development, and how it is increasingly used as an alternative to expropriation in cases of hydropower development. This will allow me to shed further light on the issues that are left open by Heller and Hills' important article.

3.7 Conclusion

The legitimacy issue is at the heart of this thesis. There are many ways of approaching it, catering to different ideas about the appropriate role that the courts should play in safeguarding private property. This chapter has tried to distil an approach that is particularly suited in cases when property is taken for economic development.

This led to a proposal for an institutional fairness approach that combines procedural and substantive standards, to arrive at a template for assessing the democratic quality of the decision-making as such, not merely the outcome. This is appropriate because it helps address a key worry associated with an economic development taking: that the decision to take represents an abuse of power, reflecting badly on the institutions that gave rise to it.

On this basis, the chapter went on to provide a possible heuristic for assessing the legitimacy of economic development takings. This heuristic was based on six legitimacy indicators provided by Gray, with three new ones added, based on the work done in this and the previous chapter. The resulting heuristic, the Gray test, should be able to identify cases of eminent domain abuse, particularly those that offend against social functions of property at the institutional level, rather

¹⁸¹ See Heller and Hills (n 3).

than merely the financial entitlements of owners.

Testing for failure is only the first step towards increased legitimacy, to be followed up by proposals for structural improvements. The question is how to respect property and its social functions without giving up on the idea that the collective has an overarching responsibility to regulate property and its uses, in keeping with the principle of democracy. This chapter proposed looking to the work done by Elinor Ostrom and others on common pool resources. Specifically, some key design principles for local self-governance was presented, along with an argument that these could be used as a starting point for coming up with institutions to replace eminent domain for economic development.

Heller and Hills' proposal for Land Assembly Districts represents a first pass at such a solution to the legitimacy problem in the US. However, I argued that the proposal is marked by a severe tension between the overarching goal of self-governance and the need to prevent abuses of power at the local level. In the end, the proposal did not appear to deliver on the initial promise of self-governance, because there were simply too many limits placed on the authority of the local decision-makers.

Arguably, this points to the need for adapting a less abstract perspective on legitimacy, to encourage flexible mechanisms that can be adapted to the circumstances. Limitations and safeguards against abuse that might be reasonable in an inner city neighbourhood with many poor tenants might be entirely misplaced in a village of equally positioned home-owners. This insight also echoes one of the key design principles formulated by Ostrom, concerning the need to maintain congruence with local conditions. According to the empirical evidence available regarding common pool resource management, a one-size-fits-all approach to legitimacy at the local level is not going to work.¹⁸² In light of this, I believe the critical examination of Land Assembly Districts marked a natural end to this chapter, as well as to the theoretical part of this thesis as a whole.

¹⁸² See Cox, Arnold and Tomas (n 147).

Part II

A Case Study of Norwegian Waterfalls

4 Norwegian Waterfalls and Hydropower

4.1 Introduction

Norway is country of many mountains, fjords and rivers, where around 95 % of the annual domestic electricity supply comes from hydropower.¹ The right to harness energy from rivers, streams and waterfalls generally belongs to local landowners under a riparian system whereby many water rights are derived from ownership of a riverbed.² Historically, waterfalls were very important to local communities, particularly as a source of power for grist and saw mills.³

Following the industrial revolution, local ownership and management came under increasing pressure. At the beginning, this pressure was exerted by private commercial interests, often foreign investors, who saw the industrial potential in hydropower and started speculating in Norwegian water resources.⁴ Later, the pressure on local self-governance was exerted mainly by the govern-

¹ See 'Electricity, annual figures, 2013' (Statistics Norway 25th March 2015) (<http://www.ssb.no/en/elektrisitetaar/>) accessed 12th September 2015.

² This arrangement is rooted in the first known legal sources in Norway, the so-called "Gulating" laws, thought to have been in force well before AD 1000. See Knut Robberstad (ed), *Gulatingsslovi* (4th edn, An edition of the old "Gulatingssloven", a collection of the first known legal principles used by a Norwegian court (the Gulating), dating back to before AD 1000, Det Norske Samlaget 1981) 111-112,120.

³ See Terje Tvedt, *A Journey in the Future of Water* (IB Tauris 2013) 121.

⁴ See *NOU 2004:26* (Report to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy from a special committee appointed by the King in Council on 04 April 2003) 30-31.

ment, following the introduction of new legislation to regulate the development of hydroelectric power.⁵ This legislation set up a system that gave highly preferential treatment to public utilities over private actors, including local owners.⁶ At first, the motivation behind this reform was to facilitate a decentralised form of government control, led by public utilities controlled by the municipality governments.⁷ However, the hydroelectric sector underwent gradual centralisation, a process that gained momentum after the Second World War when the state itself assumed a leading role.⁸ After this, local communities and local riparian owners became increasingly marginalised. In particular, local communities were systematically pressured into shutting down their hydroelectric plants, often as a condition for being granted access to electricity through the national, monopolised, electricity grid.⁹

Then, in the early 1990s, the electricity sector was liberalised, largely inspired by the market-orientation and privatisation of the public sector in the UK under Thatcher.¹⁰ The production sector was decoupled from the grid sector, while public utilities were reorganised as commercial companies.¹¹ At the same time, the regulatory system was decoupled from political decision-making processes, to become more expert-based.¹² Moreover, the sector underwent additional centralisa-

⁵ See Lars Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (Ad notam Gyldendal 1996) 41-57 (describing the regulatory system set up during this time).

⁶ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 46 (describing legislation introduced to promote public utilities, including new expropriation authorities directed at local owners of waterfall).

⁷ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 44-47.

⁸ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 59-85. For the history of the state's involvement with hydropower generally, see Lars Thue, *Statens Kraft 1890-1947: Kraftutbygging og Samfunnsutvikling* (Universitetsforlaget 2006); Dag Ove Skjold, *Statens Kraft 1947-1965: For Velferd og Industri* (Universitetsforlaget 2006); Lars Thue and Yngve Nilsen, *Statens Kraft 1965-2006: Miljø og Marked* (Universitetsforlaget 2006).

⁹ See Hans Hindrum, *Elektrisitetforsyning ved hjelp av statsstøtte* (NVE 1994) p.111.

¹⁰ See generally Atle Midttun and Steve Thomas, 'Theoretical ambiguity and the weight of historical heritage: a comparative study of the British and Norwegian electricity liberalisation' (1998) 26(3) *Energy Policy* 179.

¹¹ See *EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway* [2007] EFTA Court Report 164, 86 (describing how Norwegian electricity companies, most of which are still (partly) publicly owned, now operate as for-profit, limited liability companies).

¹² See Ole Andreas Brekke and Høgne Lerøy Sataøen, 'Fra Samkjøring til Overkjøring' (2012) 44(6) *Plan* 22, 26-27.

tion, as a result of mergers and acquisitions among former public utilities.¹³

Following the reform, access rights to the national grid are meant to be granted equally to all potential actors on the energy market, including private companies.¹⁴ After the passage of the Energy Act 1990, the energy companies that operate the national grid (the grid is divided into regions) are no longer authorised to shut out competitors.¹⁵ A side-effect of this is that it has become possible for local landowners to undertake their own hydropower projects. Local owners can now access the grid to sell the electricity they produce on Nord Pool, the largest electrical energy market in Europe.¹⁶ This has led to increased tension between local interests and established hydropower companies. The following fundamental question has arisen: who is entitled to benefit from rivers and waterfalls, and who is entitled to a say in decision-making processes concerning their use?

This chapter sets the stage for discussing this question in more depth, by detailing how the hydropower sector is organised. It looks both to the law and to commercial and administrative practices. Special attention is directed at those aspects that have changed following liberalisation, and which have resulted in conflicts involving property. The main goal is to show that the tension between large-scale development companies and local owners can only be understood on the basis of a social function perspective on riparian ownership. To set the stage for making this point, the chapter first provides a brief overview of the legal system, emphasising the role that private

¹³ See Jens Bibow, 'Energiloven, forvaltningspraksis og EØS-retten: Organisatoriske krav til energiselskaper' (2003) 42(10) *Lov og Rett* 579, 583. I mention that despite significant continuous centralisation from the Second World War to this day, the Norwegian hydroelectric sector is still relatively decentralised compared to other countries, e.g., the UK, see Midttun and Thomas (n 10) 181. Arguably, this is a lasting influence of a tradition based on local, egalitarian, ownership of water resources.

¹⁴ See generally Ulf Hammer, 'Hovedtrekk ved Organiseringen og Reguleringen av Kraftmarkedet' [1996] *Lov og Rett* 390. For an interesting presentation and analysis of grid-based markets in general, see Ingvald Falch, *Rett til Nett: Konkurransen i Nettbundne Sektorer* (Universitetsforlaget 2004).

¹⁵ See the Energy Act 1990 s 3-4.

¹⁶ See generally Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, 'Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter' [2006] *Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett* 175; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, 'Fallerstatning – Uleberg-dommen' [2008] *Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett* 46; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, 'Er naturhestekraftmetoden rettshistorie?' [2012] (1) *Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett* 21.

property has played in the development of Norwegian democracy.¹⁷

4.2 Norway in a Nutshell

The Norwegian legal system is often said to be based on a special “Scandinavian” variety of civil law, which includes strong common law elements: legislation is not as detailed as elsewhere in continental Europe, some legal areas lack a firm legislative basis, it is generally accepted that courts develop the law, and the opinions of the Supreme Court are often of crucial importance when the lower courts interpret and apply legislation.¹⁸ In this regard, it should be noted that the Supreme Court operates a very strict restriction on the leave to appeal.¹⁹ It typically only hears cases if a matter of principle is at stake, or if the law is thought to be in need of clarification.²⁰ Moreover, legislation remains the primary source used to resolve most legal disputes. When applying it, the courts tend to place great weight on preparatory documents procured by the executive branch. These documents are widely regarded as expressions of legislative intent, even though Parliament is not usually involved in their preparation.

The Constitution of Norway dates back to 1814 and was heavily influenced by then recent political movements, particularly in the US and France.²¹ Moreover, it was influenced by a desire for self-determination, as Norway was at that time a part of Denmark-Norway, largely controlled by the Danish elite. Following the Napoleonic wars, Norwegian politicians sought to take advantage of Denmark’s weakened position to gain independence and they drafted the Constitution with

¹⁷ The classic reference on Norwegian constitutional law is Johs Andenæs and Arne Fliflet, *Statsforfatningen i Norge* (10th edn, Akademika 2006).

¹⁸ See, generally, Ulf Bernitz, ‘What is Scandinavian law?’ (2007) 50 *Scandinavian Studies in Law* 13.

¹⁹ See the Civil Dispute Act 2005, s 30-4.

²⁰ See, generally, Jens Edvin A Skoghøy, ‘Anketillatelse til Norges Høyesterett’ in Jan Kleineman, Peter Westberg and Stephan Carlsson (eds), *Festskrift til Lars Heuman* (Jure 2008).

²¹ See generally Ola Mestad, ‘Grunnlovas Historie’ (*Store norske leksikon*, 4th October 2014) (https://snl.no/Grunnlovas_historie) accessed 14th July 2015.

this objective in mind. In the end, Norway was forced to enter into a union with Sweden (who was backed by the winning side of the Napoleonic wars), but the Constitution remained in place. Moreover, after the triumph of the parliamentary system in 1884, Norway would also eventually gain independence, in 1905, following a peaceful and democratic transition process.²²

During the 19th century, farmers and smallholders emerged as a powerful group in Norwegian politics. This was in large part due to the fact that they were also landowners, whose rights and contributions were not limited to traditional farming.²³ This had not always been the case; during the middle ages, the Norwegian farmer had usually been a tenant.²⁴ However, tenant farmers always enjoyed a significant degree of control over the management of the land and its natural resources.²⁵ Moreover, between the 17th and the end of the 18th century, almost all Norwegian tenant farmers bought their land from their landlords.²⁶ As a result, the distribution of land ownership in Norway had become highly egalitarian at the time of the Constitution.

In the years that followed, the landed nobility in Norway was further marginalised. The Constitution itself prohibited the establishment of new noble titles and estates.²⁷ Then, in 1821, all hereditary titles were abolished (although existing nobles kept their titles for their lifetimes).²⁸ By the middle of the 19th century, farmers and smallholders had gained significant political influence.

²² See generally Francis Sejersted, 'Unionsoppløsningen i 1905' (*Store norske leksikon*, 24th April 2015) (<https://snl.no/Unionsoppl%C3%B8sningen.i.1905>) accessed 14th July 2015.

²³ See generally Marthe Hommerstad, *Politiske bønder - Bondestrategene og kampen om demokratiet 1814-1837* (Spartacus 2014). The "classic" presentation of the political influence of farmers in Norway is Halvdan Koht, *Norsk Bondehistorie: Fyrebuing til Bondepolitikken* (Aschehough 1926).

²⁴ See generally John Ragnar Mykin, *Herre over andre si jord? Norske leiglendingsvilkår i europeisk lys 1500-1800* (Høyskoleforlaget 2005).

²⁵ See Tore Pryser, *Norsk Historie 1814-1860: Frå Standssamfunn mot Klassesamfunn* (Samlaget 1999) 59-60; Mykin (n 24) 226-238.

²⁶ See, e.g., Ernst Nordtveit, 'History of Water Law in Scandinavia' in Terje Tvedt, Owen McIntyre and Tadessa Kasse Woldesadik (eds), *A History of Water, Series III, Volume 2: Sovereignty and International Water Law* (IB Tauris 2015) 108.

²⁷ The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814, s 23.

²⁸ See 'Adel' (*Store norske leksikon*, 13th February 2009) (<https://snl.no/adel>) accessed 12th September 2015.

In fact, they emerged as the leading political class, alongside the city bureaucrats.²⁹ During this time, Norway also introduced a system of powerful local municipalities. These were organised as representative democracies, becoming miniature versions of the cherished, as of yet unfulfilled, nation state (Norway was still in a union with Sweden at this time). Even today, municipalities retain a great deal of power in Norway, particular in relation to land use planning.³⁰ They represent a highly decentralised political structure, with a total of 428 municipalities as of 01 January 2013.³¹

There can be no doubt that the egalitarian distribution of property rights found in Norway was crucial to the development of a democratic economic and political order, especially in rural parts of the country.³² Moreover, landownership itself was never understood in purely individualistic terms, but rather as an important building block of local communities. A reflection of this is the fact that outfields in Norway tend to be held under a form of common ownership, whereby each smallholding in the local community owns a share in the surrounding land and its resources.

This type of co-ownership has no exact common law equivalent, but is most similar to the tenancy in common. However, there is no requirement that the co-ownership takes place behind a trust – all individual shareholders are formally registered as owners of their share of the land and there is a presumption in favour of continued co-ownership accompanied by collective productive use of the land, not alienation or individuation. In the Common Ownership Act 1965, further rules are given to regulate property in private co-ownership. The main principle is that each owner has a right to the “normal” enjoyment of the property, taken in light of the natural conditions, the local

²⁹ See generally Hommerstad (n 23).

³⁰ They are the primary decision-makers for spatial planning, as pursuant to Planning and Building Act 2008.

³¹ This is down from the all-time high of 747 in 1930. There have long been proposals to reduce the number of municipalities further, but so far the political resistance against this has prevented major reforms. See ‘Kriterier for god kommunestruktur’ (1st December 2014) (<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/kommuner-og-regioner/kommunereform/ekspertutvalg/sluttrapport/id751494/>) accessed 14th July 2015 (report to the Ministry from an expert committee on municipality reform, 2014).

³² For a comparative discussion, focusing on how egalitarianism influenced the industrialisation process in Norway, setting it apart from the industrialisation process in the UK, see Ottar Brox, ‘Fattigdom og framgang: Alternative fortider? – Norsk industrialisering i komparativt lys’ (2013) 24(3/4) Norsk antropologisk tidsskrift 169.

customs, and the original purpose of the co-ownership arrangement (if it is known). Moreover, an individual owner's use must not exceed what corresponds to their share of the property and must not be unduly burdensome to the other owners. If damage occurs, compensation must be paid.

To some extent, the majority shareholders can enforce a specific use of the property against the will of a minority.³³ This includes new forms of commercial activity, including activities requiring additional investments in the property. If such activities are organised against the will of a minority, the minority will still be entitled to take part in the enterprise.³⁴ There are limits to what the majority can do; they can only order uses for which the property is deemed "suitable", and they cannot do anything to dramatically change the character of the property, sell it, or use it as security for debt.³⁵ Moreover, if the majority does something to interfere with the use rights of a minority shareholder, compensation must be paid.³⁶ Because of these restrictions, gridlock can often result if the owners disagree fundamentally about how to manage their land.

For real property, particularly in rural areas, the standard way of resolving conflicts among co-owners is to bring a case before the Norwegian land consolidation courts. These courts are empowered to either dissolve systems of co-ownership or else to organise joint use of the land. The prevalence of common ownership over outfields means that land consolidation courts are important in rural Norway, and it also explains why these courts have been granted such wide powers to help organise the use of privately owned land. I return to the details of this in chapter 6, as part of a broader discussion on how the institute of land consolidation can be used as an alternative to eminent domain in economic development situations.

In addition to the form of co-ownership regulated in the Common Ownership Act 1965, there

³³ See Common Ownership Act 1965, s 4.

³⁴ See Common Ownership Act 1965, s 5.

³⁵ See Common Ownership Act 1965, s 4 paras 1 and 3.

³⁶ See Common Ownership Act 1965, s 4 para 4.

are two other special forms of ownership of land found in Norway that should be briefly mentioned. Both pertain to land over which a large group of people enjoy extensive rights of use that have been recognised as so-called common rights under Norwegian land law. There is always also an owner of the land in the normal private law sense of the word, but special rules are in place to protect the group of people who enjoy common rights. These rules presuppose that the land is owned either by the state or a council of the local community.³⁷ If the owner of common land is the state, the primary legislation that protects the rights of the local people is the Mountain Act 1975. If the land is owned by a local community, the relevant legislation is the Village Commons Act 1992. The details differ, but the main purpose of both Acts is to offer special protection for rights in common, especially with regard to traditional land uses that local farmers depend on for their livelihoods.³⁸ There is no extant concept of a commons in Norway that attaches to land owned by private individuals.³⁹ This can partly be explained by the fact that private landlords and tenant farming is absent from the structure of rural landownership and has been for quite some time.

Local control over water resources, ensured through property rights, has always been very important to farmers and rural communities in Norway. According to Terje Tvedt, 10 000-30 000 mills were in operation in Norway in the 1830s.⁴⁰ As Tvedt argues, the fact that these mills were under local control was particularly important because it helped ensure self-sufficiency. In addition, saw mills became an important source of extra income for Norwegian farming communities. In the

³⁷ Historically, the state was not considered the owner of the commons in the private law sense of the word, but rather as a custodian with special regulatory powers. However, perceptions of this changed over time, with the Supreme Court finally declaring with full generality that the state was to be considered the owner of the state commons in the full private law sense of ownership, see *Staten v Fron Almenningsstyre* Rt-1963-1263.

³⁸ For further details on the commons in Norwegian law, see Geir Stenseth, *Almennings janusansikt* (Gyldendal 2005).

³⁹ Traditionally, there was also a concept of a “private commons”, but this has all but disappeared from the law since the land in question has typically been transformed into co-owned private land or a village commons. The courts might still occasionally derive usage rights over private land from earlier rights in common over that land, but these use rights would be unlikely to receive legal recognition as specially protected commons rights.

⁴⁰ See Tvedt (n 3) 121.

introduction, I already highlighted the concept of a waterfall right, used to refer to the right to harness power from a river, an historically important stick in the property bundle associated with landownership in Norway. Moreover, I mentioned briefly that waterfall rights are usually held in common by members of the local population. In some cases, this is because a river suitable for hydropower development runs across many distinct private properties. Hence, the relevant waterfall rights are held in common in the narrow sense that an assembly of private rights is required in order for development to take place. However, in most cases, waterfalls suitable for hydropower development will be owned in common in the stronger sense of arising from co-ownership of the surrounding land.

After the industrial revolution, there was some doubt as to whether rights in common over land could serve to give non-owners a claim to waterfall rights, or whether waterfall rights were held exclusively by the landowners. This question was particularly important for land owned by the state, since common rights would be the only potential route for local community members to claim a proprietary stake in local hydropower resources.⁴¹ The question was settled by the Supreme Court in the case of *Vinstra* in 1963.⁴² Here the Court held that no rights to waterfalls in state commons could be derived from communal use rights over that land. For this reason, the takings issue does not arise with respect to hydropower development on commons land, at least not with respect to the waterfall rights as such. Moreover, questions that arise specifically with respect to common rights will not be dealt with in at any length in this thesis. However, in Chapter 5, we will discuss the *Alta* case in some depth.⁴³ This was a takings case that arose in the 1970s after the national government had decided to build a hydropower project in Finnmark, a part of Norway where the state is traditionally regarded as the owner of all outfields. The state's ownership of land

⁴¹ In village commons, by contrast, the owners themselves are also local community members, although the group of owners is typically smaller than the group of people who have use rights in common.

⁴² See *Staten v Fron Almenningsstyre* (n 37).

⁴³ *Alta Laksefiskeri Interessentskap v Staten (Norges Vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen)* Rt-1982-241.

in this region tends to be at odds with the interests of the Sami people, an indigenous group from northern Scandinavia. Traditionally, the state's ownership was considered to be more or less entirely unencumbered by indigenous interests, except when Sami rights had been explicitly recognised in positive law. Also, the use rights of the Sami people did not enjoy a protected status along the lines of rights in common over state land.

Hence, in the *Alta* case, the formal standing of the Sami people was derived from expressly recognised use and property rights that would be lost or depreciate in value following the development. Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected claims based on indigenous rights, and the case did not involve takings of waterfalls as such. Still, *Alta* has later been considered an important precedent for disputes surrounding expropriation of waterfalls, since it dealt with many aspects of administrative law pertaining to the licensing procedure surrounding hydropower development. As discussed in chapter 5, the case also marked a watershed moment in the legal history of the Sami people, whose rights over land in Finnmark have since received greater recognition within the Norwegian legal order. Today, in the special context of Sami land, the law appears to be moving towards a framework where the Norwegian state is increasingly seen as a custodian of Sami lands, rather than an owner in the standard private law sense.

In other parts of Norway, a similar perspective has yet to develop. Natural resources owned by the state, or taken by it under eminent domain, has the same legal status as private property. There is no enforceable legal basis for regarding the state as a custodian, and there is no legal doctrine according to which state-owned lands are supposed to be held in trust on behalf of the people. However, in a recent revision of the Constitution, a new section 112 was introduced that compels the government to preserve the environment and promote sustainability. The exact wording is as follows:

Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural resources

shall be managed on the basis of comprehensive long-term considerations which will safeguard this right for future generations as well.

In order to safeguard their right in accordance with the foregoing paragraph, citizens are entitled to information on the state of the natural environment and on the effects of any encroachment on nature that is planned or carried out. The authorities of the state shall take measures for the implementation of these principles.

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This provision replaces a sustainability clause that was first introduced in the Constitution in 1992, following the influential Rio summit at the United Nations. This clause left little or no impact on Norwegian law, with no consequences discernible at all within the law of property. No one, to my knowledge, has proposed to read section 112 as having any direct bearing on the status of the state as a landowner; the standard private law notion of ownership still applies. However, section 112 is meant to give rise to a general obligation to promote sustainability through regulation, meaning that regulatory failures could conceivably be challenged under the provision. So far, however, few challenges of this kind have appeared and none have been successful. Indeed, it has been argued that the constitutional sustainability provision as such has been a failure.⁴⁵

After the new formulation was introduced in 2014, there have been some indications that the legal status of the sustainability provision might be about to change. Indeed, the legislator itself expressed a desire to make the provision more easily justiciable.⁴⁶ However, there have been no

⁴⁴ See The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814, s 112.

⁴⁵ See Ole Kristian Fauchald, 'Forfatning og miljøvern - en analyse av grunnlovens § 110 b' [2007] (1-2) Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 1.

⁴⁶ See *Dok.nr.16 (2011-2012)* (Report from the Committee on Human Rights regarding human rights in the Constitution) 246. As an example of where this might lead in the future, I mention that a group of Norwegian environmental

indication so far that section 112 will become relevant in the law of hydropower. Moreover, given the prevailing legal climate in Norway it seems quite unlikely that the section will attain relevance with respect to the issue of expropriation. For this reason, section 112 will not be examined further in this thesis.⁴⁷

Although the sustainability clause in the Constitution is of marginal importance in the law of hydropower, environmental interests are quite well protected during the licensing procedure in hydropower cases. The rules and practices that apply in this regard are presented in more depth in section 4.3 below. Before looking at the details, it should be mentioned that Norway has implemented the Water Framework Directive of the European Union.⁴⁸ This directive attempts to ensure that water resources are managed according to an ecosystem perspective where the regulator takes an holistic approach to planning in water systems. Such a perspective is at odds with the sector-based approach that still dominates in Norwegian water law. Indeed, some have argued that the Norwegian implementation of the directive has not sufficiently recognized the need for structural reforms.⁴⁹ However, in the political discourse, the holistic perspective on water resources and sustainability now appears to be gaining ground. As we will see towards the end of this chapter, the effect of this on local communities and owners have been mixed. In some cases, an increased emphasis on conservation and planning has had a negative effect on communities since it further inflates the power of stakeholders with much political and financial capital, including commercial

lawyers are presently considering the possibility of taking a class action against the Norwegian state for not doing enough to fight climate change, using section 112 as a legal basis for the claim. See Kjerstin Gjengedal, 'Venter global bølge av klimarettssaker' (*Ny Tid*, 7th July 2015) (<https://www.nytid.no/venter-global-bolge-av-klimarettssaker/>) accessed 4th March 2016.

⁴⁷ Of course, a normative argument could well be made that the provision *should* entail greater regard for the interests and property rights of local people. Such an argument might perhaps also be backed up by considerations based on international environmental law. Further exploration of economic development takings from this angle will be left for future work.

⁴⁸ See Water Framework Directive [2000] OJ L327/1. It has been implemented in Norwegian law as the Directive Regarding Frameworks for Water Management, FOR-2006-12-15-1446.

⁴⁹ See Gro Sandkjær Hanssen, Sissel Hovik and Gunn Cecilie Hundere, 'Den nye vannforvaltningen - Nettverksstyring i skyggen av hierarki' (2014) 3 Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift 155.

development interests.

It is worth noting that the importance of water in Norway does not arise from the fact that water is scarce, but rather from the fact that it is so plentiful. Not only is water power the main source of domestic energy. It also occupies a special place in Norwegian culture. It is important to the identity of many communities, particularly in the western part of the country, where majestic waterfalls are considered symbols both of the hardship of the natural conditions and the sturdiness of local people. The implications for the tourism industry are also significant, as the natural environment attracts visitors and economic activity to regions of Norway that are otherwise threatened by stagnation and depopulation.

In light of this, it is not surprising that there is a tradition in Norway for local resistance against large-scale development that is considered damaging to the environment. In the 1960s and 70s, when the state embarked on their most ambitious projects, local environmental movements became nationally significant, as symbols of resistance against centralisation, exploitation of weaker groups, and environmental destruction.⁵⁰

This illustrates that water resources are embedded in the social fabric in such a way that a purely entitlements-based approach to property rights in these resources would be largely inappropriate. Rather, the case of Norwegian water seems to be well-suited for an investigation based on a social function view on property. As I show in this and the following two chapters, rivers and waterfalls serve to bring out tensions between rights and obligations in property, while also shedding light on the question of how to organise decision-making processes regarding economic development.

In the next section, I argue that the present law on hydropower in Norway tends to recognise only a small part of the relevant picture. On the one hand, it recognises the financial entitlements of individual owners, which it tries to balance against the regulatory needs of the state. But it

⁵⁰ See Yngve Nilsen, 'Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-årene' (2008) 87(1) *Historisk tidsskrift* 61.

largely fails to take into account that owners have broader interests, even obligations, relating to the sustainable management of their streams and their waterfalls. Moreover, the law appears largely unable to prevent commercial interests from exerting a strong pull on various state bodies, particularly those that are only weakly grounded in processes of democratic decision-making.

4.3 Hydropower in the Law

As mentioned in chapter 1, the right to harness power from a river is regarded as a separate unit of private property in Norway, referred to as a waterfall.⁵¹ The system is riparian, so by default, a waterfall belongs to the owner of the land over which the water flows.⁵² The landowners do not own the water as such – freely running water is not subject to ownership – and the riparian owners’ right to withhold or divert water is limited.⁵³

However, the waterfall owners have the exclusive right to harness the potential energy in the water over the stretch of riverbed belonging to them. This right can be partitioned off from rights in the surrounding land, and large-scale hydropower schemes typically involve such a separation of water rights from land rights; the energy company acquires the right to harness the energy, while the local landowners retain ownership of the surrounding land.

Norwegian rivers, and especially rivers suitable for hydropower schemes, tend to run across outfields that are owned jointly by local farmers. Hence, rights to streams and waterfalls are typically held among several members of the rural community.⁵⁴ Local owners might not be willing

⁵¹ Historically, the law emphasised ownership of traditional agrarian water resources, such as fishing rights. However, new sticks were added to the waterfall bundle over the years, including the right to develop hydropower, see Arne Vislie, *Grensene for Grunneierens Rådighet over Vassdrag* (Centraltrykkeriet 1944) 14-32. See also Nordtveit, ‘History of Water Law in Scandinavia’ (n 26) 108. For a detailed presentation of the history of water law in pre-industrial times, I refer to UA Motzfeld, *Den Norske Vasdragsrets Historie indtil Aaret 1800 med Domsamling* (Brøgger 1908).

⁵² See the Water Resources Act 2000 s 13.

⁵³ See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 8.

⁵⁴ Rivers tend to run through land that has not to been enclosed. Moreover, in places where there has been a land enclosure, water rights are often explicitly left out, such that they are still considered jointly owned rights belonging

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to give up their ownership to facilitate development, especially not on terms proposed by external developers. Hence, the authority to expropriate has been an important legal instrument for state-backed hydropower companies. It has also been used extensively, particularly after the state made hydropower development a priority following the Second World War.

This has resulted in a tension where, on the one hand, rights to harness hydropower from streams and waterfalls are considered private property, while on the other hand, it has become common to speak of hydropower as a resource belonging to the public. Since the Industrial Licensing Act 1917 was amended in 2008, this ambivalence in the discourse surrounding hydropower has also been part of the statutory provisions regulating hydropower development. I quote the two relevant sections side by side below:

A river system belongs to the owner of the land it covers, unless otherwise dictated by special legal status. [...]

The owners on each side of a river system have equal rights in exploiting its hydropower.

(Water Resources Act 2000, s 13)

Norwegian water resources belong to the general public and are to be managed in their interest. This is to be ensured by public ownership.

(Industrial Licensing Act 1917, s 1 (after amendment in 2008))

The intended reading of section 1 of the Industrial Licensing Act 1917, quoted on the right above, is that it provides a “general starting point”.⁵⁵ According to the Ministry, it expresses what has always been the purpose of the legislation used to regulate large-scale hydropower.⁵⁶

This should not be understood as an explicit attack on the principle of private ownership expressed in section 13 of the Water Resources Act 2000, quoted on the left above.⁵⁷ However,

to the community of local farmers. For more details on (forms of) joint ownership among Norwegian farmers, see, e.g., Geir Stenseth, ‘Utmarksstrekninger med mange rettighetshavere. Noen linjer mellom historiske forhold og gjeldende rett’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Areal og Eiendomsrett* (Universitetsforlaget 2007) 570.

⁵⁵ See *Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008)* (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy regarding changes to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917) 72.

⁵⁶ See *Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008)* (n 55) 72.

⁵⁷ There are no indications in the preparatory materials that the Ministry sought to confront the principles of ownership

the Ministry's comment underscores the extent to which the government regards it as natural to interfere with private rights to waterfalls, to pursue policies that it regards to be in the public interest. Taken in this light, section 1 of the Industrial Licensing Act 1917 reflects the prevailing opinion that there are few, if any, recognised limits on the state's power to manage privately owned water resources.⁵⁸

This aspect of the Norwegian system has become particularly significant following the liberalisation of the electricity sector in the early 1990s.⁵⁹ Since then, there have been an increasing number of cases where owners who are interested in undertaking their own development schemes attempt to fend off commercial energy companies wishing to expropriate.⁶⁰ Importantly, the state has tended to side with the commercial companies in these cases, granting them the authority to expropriate for economic development. This has resulted in several Supreme Court decisions on hydropower and expropriation in the past few years, all of which have been in favour of the energy companies.⁶¹ Before discussing these cases in more detail in the next chapter, I provide an in-depth analysis of hydropower in the law and in practice, to shed further light on the underlying conflict that has led to the recent surge in cases on expropriation. First, I briefly present the key legislation regulating the hydropower sector.

encoded in the Water Resources Act 2000.

⁵⁸ For a reflection of the same attitude, citing the state's broad regulatory competence as the main reason not to nationalise Norwegian water power rights, I refer to the preparatory documents underlying the Water Resources Act 2000. See *NOU 1994:12* (Report to the Ministry of Business and Energy from a special committee appointed by the Crown Prince Regent in Council 09 November 1990) 152-153.

⁵⁹ See, e.g., Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, 'Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter' (n 16).

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Christian Sontum and Einar Sofienlund, 'Ekspropriasjon av vannkraft – hvorfor den historiske metoden fra norsk rettspraksis ikke er relevant i dagens marked' [2007] (4) *Småkraftnytt*.

⁶¹ See *Agder Energi Produksjon AS v Møllen* Rt-2008-82 (Uleberg); *Måland v Jørpeland Kraft AS* Rt-2011-1393; *BKK Produksjon AS v Austgulen* Rt-2011-1683 (Kløvtveit); *Bjørnara v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening* Rt-2013-612.

4.3.1 The Water Resources Act

The Water Resources Act 2000 contains the basic rules regarding water management in Norway. This Act is not only concerned with hydropower, but regulates the use of river systems and ground-water generally.⁶² In section 8, the Act sets out the basic license requirement for anyone wishing to undertake measures in a river system.⁶³ The main rule is that if such measures may be of “appreciable harm or nuisance” to public interests, then a license is required.⁶⁴ The water authorities themselves decide if this condition is met.⁶⁵ In relation to hydropower development, it is established practice that most hydropower projects over 1000 KW will be deemed to require a license.⁶⁶

The basic assessment criterion is that a license “may be granted only if the benefits of the measure outweigh the harm and nuisances to public and private interests affected in the river system or catchment area”.⁶⁷ Hence, the water authorities are empowered to decide whether a licence *should* be granted, if they find that the benefits outweigh the harms. The courts are very reluctant to censor the discretion of the administrative decision-makers on this point.⁶⁸

The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy maintains indirect control over the assessment process

⁶² See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 1. A river system is defined as “all stagnant or flowing surface water with a perennial flow, with appurtenant bottom and banks up to the highest ordinary floodwater level”, see the Water Resources Act 2000, s 2. Artificial watercourses with a perennial flow are also covered (excluding pipelines and tunnels), along with artificial reservoirs, in so far as they are directly connected to groundwater or a river system, see the Water Resources Act 2000, ss 2a, 2b.

⁶³ Measures in a river system are defined as interventions that “by their nature are apt to affect the rate of flow, water level, the bed of a river or direction or speed of the current or the physical or chemical water quality in a manner other than by pollution”, see the Water Resources Act 2000, s 3a.

⁶⁴ See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 8. There are two exceptions, concerning measures to restore the course or depth of a river, and concerning the landowner’s reasonable use of water for his permanent household or domestic animals, see the Water Resources Act 2000, s 12.

⁶⁵ See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 18.

⁶⁶ See, e.g., ‘Konsesjonsplikt-vurdering vannkraft’ (Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 9th February 2009). Exceptions are possible, for instance projects that upgrade existing plants, or which utilise water flowing between artificial reservoirs.

⁶⁷ See the Water Resources Act 2000 s 25.

⁶⁸ This is an expression of the principle of “freedom of discretion” (*det frie forvaltningsskjønn*) for the administrative branch, a fundamental tenet of Norwegian administrative law. See generally Torstein Eckhoff and Eivind Smith, *Forvaltningsrett* (10th edn, Universitetsforlaget 2014) 71-74.

by issuing directives regarding the administrative procedure in licensing cases.⁶⁹ In addition, the procedure is determined in large part by administrative practices developed by the water authorities themselves. A further discussion of the licensing procedure is given in section 4.3.5.

The rules in the Water Resources Act 2000 apply to any measures in river systems, not only hydropower projects. However, special procedures that apply to hydropower cases are described in other statutes, the most important being the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.

4.3.2 The Watercourse Regulation Act

In order to maximise the output of a hydropower scheme, the flow of water may be regulated using dams or diversions. Regulation was particularly important in the early days of hydropower, before the national electricity grid was developed.⁷⁰ Indeed, in the early days, it was common for electricity producers to get paid based on the stable effect they were able to deliver, rather than the total amount of energy they harnessed.⁷¹

Today, this has changed, as producers get paid based on the total amount of electricity they deliver, measured in kilowatt hours (KWh). The price fluctuates over the year, and the supply-side is still influenced by instability in the waterflow in Norwegian rivers. However, the smoothing effect of the national grid means that run-of-river schemes can be carried out profitably, even if most of the electricity from the plant is produced during peak periods.

Despite the growing importance of run-of-river schemes, many key rules regarding hydropower development are still found in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. This Act defines regulations as “installations or other measures for regulating a watercourse’s rate of flow”. It also explicitly states that this covers installations that “increase the rate of flow by diverting water”.⁷² The core

⁶⁹ See section 65 of the Water Resources Act 2000.

⁷⁰ See *Uleberg* (n 61) 83.

⁷¹ See Sontum and Sofienlund (n 60).

⁷² See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 s 1.

rule of the Act is that watercourse regulations that affect the rate of flow of water above a certain threshold are subject to a special licensing requirement.⁷³

The threshold is defined in terms of the notion of a “natural horsepower”, such that a license is required if the regulation yields an increase of at least 400 natural horsepower in the river. Natural horsepower is a gross estimate of the power that can be harnessed from a river continuously for at least 350 days a year.⁷⁴ The definition is a simple mathematical expression, given below:

$$nat.hp(Q, H) = 13.33 \times H \times Q$$

This formula states that the natural horsepower of a regulation project ($nat.hp(Q, H)$) is a function of two variables, H and Q . The constant factor 13.33 is the force of gravity of Earth exerted on a mass of 1 kg (or, approximately, 1 litre of water). The variable H is the difference in altitude (measured in metre) from the intake dam to the power generator. The variable Q is the amount of water (measured in litre) continuously available per second of the day, for at least 350 days per year. The result is then a gross estimate (assuming no energy loss) of the stable horsepower output of a hydroelectric plant that harnesses the power of Q litres of water per second over a difference in altitude of H metres.

Section 2 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 asks for the *increase* of this figure after regulation. To arrive at this number, one first uses the formula with Q taken to be Q_1 , the stable water flow prior to regulation, before calculating it with Q taken to be Q_2 , the stable water flow after regulation. The difference between the second and the first figure ($nat.hp(Q_2, H) - nat.hp(Q_1, H)$) is the increase of natural horsepower resulting from regulation.

Effectively, at a time when electricity had to be produced at a stable effect, from a stable source

⁷³ See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 2.

⁷⁴ See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 2.

of power, this increase in natural horsepower was a gross estimate of the value added to the river by regulation. In the present context, it suffices to say that if a hydropower project involves regulation at all (i.e., if it is not a run-of-river scheme), it will indeed yield 400 natural horsepower or more. Hence, a special license will be required pursuant to section 2 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.

The criteria for granting a regulation license are similar to those for granting a license pursuant to the Water Resources Act 2000. In particular, section 8 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 states that a license should ordinarily be issued only if the benefits of the regulation are deemed to outweigh the harm or inconvenience to public or private interests.⁷⁵ In addition, it is made clear that other deleterious or beneficial effects of importance to society should be taken into account.⁷⁶ Finally, if an application is rejected, the applicant can demand that the decision is submitted for review by Parliament.⁷⁷ However, the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 contains more detailed rules regarding the procedure for dealing with license applications, c.f., section 4.3.5 below.

In general, the issue of who owns and controls the water resources in question receives little attention in relation to licensing applications, both pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 and the Water Resources Act 2000. Instead, the focus is on weighing environmental interests against the interest of increasing the electricity supply and facilitating economic development. The issue of resource ownership is more prominent in relation to a third important statute, namely the Industrial Licensing Act 1917.

⁷⁵ See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 8.

⁷⁶ See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 8.

⁷⁷ See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 8.

4.3.3 The Industrial Licensing Act

In the early 20th century, industrial advances meant that Norwegian waterfalls became increasingly interesting as objects of foreign investment. To maintain national control of water resources, Parliament passed an Act in 1909 that made it impossible to purchase valuable waterfalls without a special license.⁷⁸ The follow-up to this Act is the Industrial Licensing Act 1917, which is still in force. It applies to potential purchasers and leaseholders of rivers that may be exploited so that they yield more than 4000 natural horsepower.⁷⁹

To reach this number requires a substantial regulation, so the Act does not apply to many run-of-river hydropower schemes, even large-scale projects. Originally, the main rule in the Industrial Licensing Act 1917 stated that all licenses granted to private parties were time-limited, and that the waterfalls would become state property without compensation when they expired, after at most 60 years.⁸⁰ This was known as the rule of *reversion* in Norwegian law.⁸¹

In a famous Supreme Court case from 1918, the rule was upheld after having been challenged by owners on constitutional grounds.⁸² This was based on the finding that reversion represented a form of regulation of property, not expropriation. Hence, it could not be challenged on the basis of section 105 of the Constitution, even though the owners were not awarded any compensation.

While the rule of reversion withstood internal challenges, it was eventually struck down by the EFTA Court in 2007, as a breach of the EEA agreement.⁸³ This conclusion was based on

⁷⁸ See Thor Falkanger, 'Acquisition of Real Property and State Approval' (1987) 31 *Scandinavian Studies in Law* 57, 59.

⁷⁹ Unlike section 2 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, this asks only for the number of horsepower in the river (after regulation), not the *increase* of this number.

⁸⁰ See the previous Industrial Licensing Act 1917, s 2, in force before the amendment on 26 September 2008.

⁸¹ This is a misnomer, however, in light of how most rivers and waterfalls were originally owned by local smallholders, not the state.

⁸² See *Johansen v Den norske Stat (1 Regjeringens chef, 2 A/S Furuberg ved dets direktions formand)* Rt-1918-403 (Konsesjonsdommen).

⁸³ See *EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway* (n 11). The EEA (European Economic Area) agree-

the fact that reversion only applied to privately owned companies, which the Court regarded as an illegitimate form of discrimination. After this ruling, the Industrial Licensing Act 1917 was amended. Today, only companies where the state controls more than 2/3 of the shares may purchase waterfalls or rivers to which the Act applies.⁸⁴

This means that such rivers and waterfalls can only be bought, leased or expropriated by companies in which the state is a majority shareholder. In practice, however, landowners are still able to sell the land from which the right to a waterfall originates, even if this also means transferring the waterfall to a new owner. The rule is typically only enforced when riparian rights as such are transferred, specifically for the purpose of large-scale hydropower development. In particular, small-scale development and large run-of-river schemes can still usually be carried out by local owners. The policy justification for the (amended) Industrial Licensing Act 1917 is based on the idea that giving preference to state-owned actors will protect the public interest in Norwegian hydropower. However, this perspective clashes with the fact that the electricity sector itself has been liberalised. The state may be a majority shareholder in the most powerful companies, but these companies are now run according to commercial principles, with little or no direct political involvement.⁸⁵

Hence, as the EFTA court highlights in its judgement on reversion, there appears to be a lack of convincing policy reasons why state-owned companies should be given preferential treatment.⁸⁶ In light of this, Norway's response to the Court's decision is a curious one: instead of creating a

ment sets up a framework for the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein and the European Union. The EFTA (European Free Trade Association) oversees the implementation of the EEA for those members of EFTA that are also members of the EEA (all except Switzerland). For further details, see generally Henrik Bull, 'The EEA Agreement and Norwegian Law' [1994] (12) *European Business Law Review* 291; Mads Magnussen, 'Traktatbruddssøksmål ved EFTA-domstolen' [2002] *Lov og Rett* 131; Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, 'Er EFTA-domstolen mer Katolsk enn Paven?' [2009] *Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap* 507.

⁸⁴ See the Industrial Licensing Act 1917, s 2.

⁸⁵ See *EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway* (n 11) 86.

⁸⁶ See *EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway* (n 11) 84-87.

level playing field, the preference given to state-owned commercial companies is made even more marked, as privately owned companies are now excluded from one segment of the hydropower market altogether.

4.3.4 The Energy Act

Before 1990, the Norwegian electricity sector was tightly regulated by the government.⁸⁷ The responsibility for the national grid was divided between various public utilities that would also typically engage in electricity production, wielding monopoly power within their districts. The most powerful utilities were controlled by the state, which also developed large-scale hydropower to supply the metallurgical industry with cheap electricity.⁸⁸ However, the county councils and the municipalities maintained a significant stake in the hydroelectric sector, as they often controlled the utilities responsible for the electricity supply in their own local area.⁸⁹ Prior to 1990, there was no real competition on the electricity market, and the local monopolists could deny other energy producers access to their segment of the distribution grid.⁹⁰

This system was abandoned following the passage of the Energy Act 1990.⁹¹ This Act set up a new regulatory framework, where management of the grid was decoupled from the hydropower production sector.⁹² In particular, the Act established a system whereby consumers could choose their electricity supplier freely. At the same time, the Act aimed to ensure that producers were granted non-discriminatory access to the electricity grid. This laid the groundwork for what has

⁸⁷ See generally Torstein Bye and Einar Hope, 'Deregulation of Electricity Markets: The Norwegian Experience' (2005) 40(50) *Economic and Political Weekly* 5269; Dag Ove Skjold and Lars Thue, *Statens nett: systemutvikling i norsk elforsyning 1890-2007* (Universitetsforlaget 2007).

⁸⁸ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 67-71.

⁸⁹ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 85.

⁹⁰ See *Uleberg* (n 61) 83-84.

⁹¹ See generally Jens Naas-Bibow and Gunnar Martinsen, *Energiloven med kommentarer* (2nd edn, Gyldendal 2011).

⁹² See generally Bye and Hope, 'Deregulation of Electricity Markets: The Norwegian Experience' (n 87).

today become an international market for the sale of electricity, namely the Nord Pool.⁹³

In response to this, monopoly companies were reorganised, becoming commercial companies that were meant to compete against each other, and against new actors that entered the market.⁹⁴ In addition to commercialisation, the market-orientation of the sector has also lead to centralisation, as many of the locally grounded municipality companies have disappeared as a result of mergers and acquisitions.⁹⁵ As a result, the local and political grounding of the electricity sector, which used to be ensured through decentralised municipal ownership, has been significantly weakened.

At the same time, the fact that any developer of hydropower is now entitled to connect to the national grid gives private actors a possibility of entering the Norwegian electricity market. They may do so not merely as (minority) shareholders in former utilities, but also as *competitors*, as long as they stick to run-of-river or small-scale hydropower.⁹⁶ In the next section, I give a step-by-step presentation of the licensing procedure for hydropower, which serves to summarise the legislative framework and provide information about the institutional framework within which it is called to function.

4.3.5 The Licensing Procedure

The water authorities in Norway are centrally organised. The most important body is the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), based in Oslo. In many cases, the NVE have been delegated authority to grant development licenses themselves, but in case of large-scale

⁹³ See generally Lars Galtung, 'Nord Pool og Kraftmarkedet' 39(6) Plan 22.

⁹⁴ See DH Claes and A Vik, 'Kraftsektoren: fra samfunnsgode til handelsvare' in DH Claes and PK Mydske (eds), *Forretning eller fordeling? Reform av offentlige nettverkstjenester* (Universitetforlaget 2011).

⁹⁵ Today, the 15 largest companies, largely controlled by the state and some prosperous city municipalities, own roughly 80% of Norwegian hydropower, measured in terms of annual output. See *Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008)* (n 55) 28. The process causing this concentration started long before the market-oriented reform of the sector. In particular, after the Second World War, there was a significant push by the state towards increased centralisation, see Skjold (n 8); Thue and Nilsen (n 8).

⁹⁶ See generally Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, 'Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter' (n 16); Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, 'Fallerstatning – Uleberg-dommen' (n 16); Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, 'Er naturhestekraftmetoden rettshistorie?' (n 16).

development, they only prepare the case, then hand it over to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.⁹⁷ The Ministry, in turn, gives its recommendation to the King in Council, who makes the final decision.⁹⁸ Parliament must also be consulted for regulations that will yield more than 20 000 natural horsepower.⁹⁹

As indicated by the survey of relevant legislation given in previous sections, there are many categories of hydropower projects. Moreover, different categories call for different licenses. Hence, the first step in the application process is for the developer to determine exactly what kind of license they require. This is further complicated by the fact that some categories overlap, since they are based on different measuring sticks for assessing the scale of an hydropower project.

One important parameter is the power of the hydropower generator, measured in MW (Megawatts). There are four categories of hydropower formulated on this basis: the micro plants (less than 0.1 MW), the mini plants (less than 1 MW), the small-scale plants (less than 10 MW), and the large-scale plants (more than 10 MW). In practice, one tends to use small-scale hydropower more loosely, to refer to all projects less than 10 MW. Still, a further qualification is sometimes required. For example, the authority to grant a license for a micro or mini plant has been delegated to the regional county councils since 2010, in an effort to reduce the queue of small-scale applications at the NVE.¹⁰⁰ The council's decision is based on a (simplified) assessment made by the regional office of the NVE. In addition, licenses for micro and mini plants may be granted even in

⁹⁷ See Delegation of 19 December 2000, from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (FOR-2000-12-19-1705) and Directive of 15 December 2000, from the King in Council (FOR-2000-12-15-1270), pursuant to the Water Resources Act 2000 s 64.

⁹⁸ See Directive of 15 December 2000, from the King in Council (FOR-2000-12-15-1270).

⁹⁹ See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 2.

¹⁰⁰ See Delegation letter from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, dated 07 December 2009, available at <http://www.nve.no> (accessed 24 August 2014). The county council is an elected regional government institution situated between the municipalities and the central government. There are 19 county councils in Norway as of 01 January 2015. They are comparatively less important than both the municipalities and the central government, but have several responsibilities, particularly in relation to infrastructure, education and resource management. See generally Ole T Berg, 'Fylkeskommune' (*Store norske leksikon*, 29th April 2015) (<https://snl.no/fylkeskommune>) accessed 14th July 2015.

watercourses that have protected status pursuant to environmental law.¹⁰¹

For small-scale plants proper, the authority to grant a license is delegated to the NVE, with the Ministry serving as the instance of appeal.¹⁰² For large-scale plants, the granting authority is the King in Council, based on a recommendation from the Ministry.¹⁰³ However, in practice, the decision is usually closely based on assessments and recommendations provided by the NVE.¹⁰⁴

While the relevant licensing authority depends on the effect of the plant, the kind of license required depends on a different categorisation, relating to the level of planned water regulation, measured in natural horsepower. Here, there are three categories: run-of-river schemes (less than 500 natural horsepower), non-industrial regulations (500–4000 natural horsepower), and industrial regulations (more than 4000 natural horsepower).¹⁰⁵

Almost all hydropower schemes require a license pursuant to section 8 of the Water Resources Act 2000.¹⁰⁶ For run-of-river schemes, no further licenses are required for the development itself, although an operating license pursuant to the Energy Act 1990 is typically required for the electrical installations.¹⁰⁷ For schemes involving a non-industrial regulation, an additional license pursuant to section 8 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 is required. Industrial regulation schemes require yet another license, pursuant to section 2 of the Industrial Licensing Act 1917.

As is to be expected, the complexity of the licensing procedure tends to increase with the number of different licenses required. However, the licensing applications tend to be dealt with in

¹⁰¹ See Decision no 240, Stortinget (2004-2005), St.prp.nr.75 (2003-2004) and Innst.S.nr.116 (2004-2005).

¹⁰² See Delegation of 19 December 2000, from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (FOR-2000-12-19-1705).

¹⁰³ See Directive of 15 December 2000, from the King in Council (FOR-2000-12-15-1270).

¹⁰⁴ For a detailed guide to the administrative process for large-scale applications, published by the NVE, see Ragnhild Stokker (ed), *Konsesjonshandsaming av vasskraftsaker – Rettleiar for utarbeiding av meldingar, konsekvensutgreiingar og søknader* (Rettleiar nr 3/2010, NVE 2010).

¹⁰⁵ See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 s 2 and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917, ss 1,2.

¹⁰⁶ As mentioned in section 4.3.1, the exceptions are very small schemes (usually mini or micro) that are deemed to be relatively uncontroversial. Such schemes only require a license pursuant to the Planning and Building Act 2008.

¹⁰⁷ See the Energy Act 1990, s 3-1.

parallel, so that all licenses are granted at the same time, following a unified assessment. In practice, when the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 applies, it structures the procedure as a whole, also those aspects that pertain to other licenses.

In addition, yet another categorisation of hydropower schemes is used to determine the relevant application procedure. This categorisation is based on the annual production of the proposed plant, measured in GWh/year. There are three categories: simple schemes (less than 30 GWh/year), intermediate schemes (30 – 40 GWh/year), and complicated schemes (more than 40 GWh/year). As mentioned in section 4.3.2, the most important rules in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 apply to complicated schemes, regardless of whether or not the scheme involves a regulation.¹⁰⁸ In addition, applications for such schemes must be accompanied by an impact assessment pursuant to section 14-6 of the Planning and Building Act 2008.

This means that the applicant is required to organise a public hearing prior to submitting their formal application, to collect opinions on the project and provide an overview of benefits and negative effects of the plans, particularly as they relate to environmental concerns.¹⁰⁹ In practice, if an impact assessment is required this significantly increases the scope and complexity of the application process.

For intermediate schemes that do not involve regulation, the rules in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 do not apply. However, impact assessments *may* still be required.¹¹⁰ Here the threshold of 30 GWh/year has been set as an additional threshold by the NVE, who have been delegated authority to require impact assessments for hydropower projects even when these yield less than 40 GWh/year.¹¹¹ For the intermediate schemes, NVE decides whether an impact assessment is

¹⁰⁸ See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 19.

¹⁰⁹ See Directive of 19 December 2014 (FOR-2014-12-19-1758), pursuant to the Planning and Building Act 2008, ss 1-2,14-6.

¹¹⁰ See Konesjonshandsaming av vasskraftsaker – Rettleiar for utarbeiding av meldingar, konsekvensutgreiingar og søknader (n 104) 20.

¹¹¹ See Directive of 19 December 2014 (FOR-2014-12-19-1758).

required on a case-by-case basis. For simple schemes, on the other hand, impact assessments will not be required. Such schemes make up the core of what is described as small-scale hydropower in daily language.

The time from application to decision can vary widely, depending on the complexity of the case, the level of controversy it raises, and the priority it receives by the licensing authority. Usually, the assessment stage itself will last 1-3 years, sometimes longer.¹¹² While large-scale schemes involve more complicated procedures, they are also typically given higher priority than small-scale schemes. In recent years, following the surge of interest in small-scale development, a processing queue has formed at the NVE.¹¹³ This means that small-scale applications typically have to wait a long time, sometimes several years, before the NVE begins processing them.¹¹⁴

The applicant is expected to submit application notices for publication in local newspapers, and for larger projects there will typically also be an information meeting arranged in the local area, where the applicant and the authorities appear side by side, presenting the plans and the licensing procedure respectively.¹¹⁵ For large-scale projects, it is also common for the applicant to distribute brochures widely in the local area. These procedural arrangements arguably reflect some concern for the interests of local populations. However, the procedure is organised in a way that can also create the impression that the applicant enjoys significant state-backing from the start.

Indeed, applicants not only communicate with locals in place of the authorities, they are also given responsibility for many material aspects of the assessment process, including the often crucial assessment of possible alternatives.¹¹⁶ This would seem to raise competency questions, particularly

¹¹² See *NOU 2012:9* (Report to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy from a special committee appointed by the King in Council on 04 March 2011) 84-85.

¹¹³ See *NOU 2012:9* (n 112) 84.

¹¹⁴ See *NOU 2012:9* (n 112) 84.

¹¹⁵ See *Konsesjonshandsaming av vasskraftsaker – Rettleiar for utarbeiding av meldingar, konsekvensutgreiingar og søknader* (n 104) 23.

¹¹⁶ See *Konsesjonshandsaming av vasskraftsaker – Rettleiar for utarbeiding av meldingar, konsekvensutgreiingar og*

in cases where the owners themselves propose alternatives that the applicant hoping to expropriate will then assess on behalf of the government. However, the Supreme Court has not found any fault with this remarkable form of administrative subcontracting.¹¹⁷

More generally, as shown in chapter 5, the protection offered to waterfall owners is very limited. For instance, the government does not recognise a duty to notify these owners individually, to ensure that they are informed of what is at stake for them as owners of a very valuable resource. Rather, a generic letter is typically sent by the applicant to all affected private parties. The statement that private property “will be expropriated” unless a settlement is reached has also been observed.¹¹⁸

After the hearing stage, the NVE will usually compile a final report along with a recommendation and send it to the interested parties for comments.¹¹⁹ It is established practice that local owners do *not* count as interested parties in this regard.¹²⁰ Hence, while the municipalities and various environmental interest groups are informed of how the case progresses and asked to comment prior to the final decision, the owners must inquire on their own accord if they wish to be kept up to date on the application process.¹²¹

In summary, the procedural framework surrounding licensing of hydropower development leaves local owners in a precarious position, especially when the applicants wish to expropriate their waterfalls. At the same time, the liberalisation of the electricity sector means that owners are in a far better position than before when it comes to developing hydropower themselves. This is discussed in more depth in the next section.

søknader (n 104) 24.

¹¹⁷ See *Jørpeland* (n 61) 51-55.

¹¹⁸ In the case of *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* LG-2007-176723.

¹¹⁹ See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 6.

¹²⁰ See *Jørpeland* (n 61) 46.

¹²¹ In a written statement to the Supreme Court in the case of *Jørpeland* (n 61), the director of the hydropower division of the Ministry pointed out that the documents would be made available on the web page of the NVE and that local owners had to “look after their own interests”.

4.4 Hydropower in Practice

The history of hydropower in Norway can be roughly divided into four stages. The first stage was the development that took place prior to 1909. During this time, private actors dominated, with public ownership playing a minor role.¹²² Moreover, there were many private interests speculating in acquiring Norwegian waterfalls, anticipating the value that these would have for industrial development.¹²³

After 1909, the introduction of licensing obligations and the rule of reversion made it much harder for private companies to acquire waterfalls that were suitable large-scale industrial development. At the same time, local municipalities began to invest in hydropower to provide electricity to their citizens, a service they were increasingly being obliged to provide.¹²⁴ This marked the start of the second stage of hydropower development, which saw the development of a more strictly regulated sector. However, this sector was also highly decentralised, for a large part dominated by local actors.

In fact, throughout the first half of the 20th century, most hydroelectric plants were small-scale plants that supplied local communities with electricity.¹²⁵ Moreover, as late as in 1943, 89% of all hydroelectric power stations in Norway were still private, many of which were mini and micro plants that were owned and operated by the local community.¹²⁶ However, many bigger plants were also under private ownership, and 57% of the total hydroelectric power available at this time was supplied by the private sector.

¹²² See *Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008)* (n 55).

¹²³ See *NOU 2004:26* (n 4) 30-31.

¹²⁴ See *Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008)* (n 55).

¹²⁵ See *Utbygd vannkraft i Norge (Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen 1946)* 11. This is a report from the water directorate published in 1946, showing that as of 31 December 1943, 97.8% of all hydroelectric plants in Norway were small-scale plants. However, these plants contributed only 28% of the total hydroelectric power installed at that time.

¹²⁶ See *Utbygd vannkraft i Norge* (n 125) 6. See also *Hindrum* (n 9) 111.

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By the end of 1943, 80% of the Norwegian population had access to electricity at home.¹²⁷ Hence, the decentralised approach to hydropower development, based on private ownership and local control, had not been an impediment to the supply of electricity to most of the country's population.

However, the regulatory regime was soon to undergo a significant change, designed to facilitate industrial development and increased state control. This change came quite rapidly after the Second World War, when the central government began to invest heavily in hydropower, often to ensure economic development by subsidising the metallurgical industry.¹²⁸ This period saw increased marginalisation of small private electricity companies, as well as local owners.¹²⁹ Indeed, it was often demanded, as a condition for allowing local communities access to the national electricity grid, that local hydroelectric plants had to be shut down.¹³⁰ During this time, the development of hydropower was seen as an important aspect of rebuilding the nation, a task carried out in the public interest, not primarily to supply the public with electricity, but rather to facilitate a specific kind of economic development that the central government regarded as desirable.¹³¹

The state-dominated system set up on this basis remained in place until the 1970s, when increasingly vocal opposition from environmental groups and local populations led to some reforms.¹³² As the scale of typical development projects had increased significantly compared to earlier times, new projects would tend to meet with broader and better organised forms of resistance. In many cases, municipal and regional government institutions would join in opposition against large-scale

¹²⁷ In rural areas, the corresponding figure was 70%, see Utbygd vannkraft i Norge (n 125) 7.

¹²⁸ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 59-65.

¹²⁹ At the same time, powerful (private) metallurgical interests benefited greatly, sometimes also at the expense of the general supply of electricity. See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 65-71.

¹³⁰ See Hindrum (n 9) p.111.

¹³¹ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 59.

¹³² See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 71-75.

development.¹³³ The typical response from the state was to introduce measures that sought to pacify the regional and municipal government opposition, which was considered more serious than opposition from local people and environmental groups. The standard approach was to grant an increased share of the financial benefit to local and regional institutions of government, to instil support for state-led development plans.¹³⁴ The centralisation process in the hydroelectric sector slowed down somewhat during this time.¹³⁵ However, despite limiting the discontent among local power groups, high-profile controversies continued to arise, most notably the *Alta* case discussed in the next chapter.

The fourth stage of hydropower development began in 1990 after the passage of the Energy Act 1990. The liberalisation that followed saw the transformation of the hydropower sector into a commercial market, based on profit-maximising and competition. As a result, the structure of decentralised management withered away further, as many municipality companies were either bought up by more commercially aggressive actors or forced to merge and change their business practices in order to remain competitive.¹³⁶ At the same time, a new decentralised force emerged in the sector, in the form of local owner-led projects.¹³⁷

The core idea behind the Energy Act 1990 was that the electricity sector should be restructured in such a way that production and sale of electricity, activities deemed suitable for market regulation, would be kept organisationally separate from electricity distribution over the national grid, a natural monopoly. However, the Act itself does not explain in any depth how this is to be achieved. In practice, the divide has not been strictly implemented. Most of the large energy companies in

¹³³ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 71-72.

¹³⁴ See Nilsen, 'Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-årene' (n 50) 73-76.

¹³⁵ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 5) 85.

¹³⁶ See Bibow (n 13) 583 (commenting on the increased concentration of power on the electricity market, following acquisitions and mergers after 1990).

¹³⁷ See section 4.4 below.

Norway continue to maintain interests in both distribution, production and sale of electricity, a phenomenon known as “vertical integration”.¹³⁸ In fact, the degree of vertical integration in the electricity sector initially increased after the passage of the Energy Act 1990.¹³⁹

The water authorities responded to this by accepting increased concentration of ownership, while also ordering distribution activities to be kept organisationally separate from other activities, for instance through the establishment of a special subsidiary company.¹⁴⁰ Typically, a conglomerate structure is used, with a single parent company that controls both the distribution company, the production company and the sales company. Indeed, this model has now been implemented by most of the large energy companies in Norway.¹⁴¹

The extent to which this is an adequate response to increased concentration of power in the electricity sector will not be addressed in any depth here. However, I will direct attention at one aspect that arises with particular urgency for small-scale development of hydropower, concerning access to the grid. It is quite common, in particular, that small-scale projects remain unrealised because the grid is regarded to lack sufficient capacity to accommodate new electricity.¹⁴²

Following an amendment of the Energy Act in 2009, grid companies are now obliged to facilitate access for producers, even when this necessitates new investments.¹⁴³ However, the energy producer seeking access is typically required to reimburse the grid company for the cost of new investments, as determined in the first instance by the grid company itself (the NVE serves a supervisory function).¹⁴⁴ In addition, grid companies may still deny access in cases when the needed investments

¹³⁸ See Bibow (n 13) 580-583.

¹³⁹ See Bibow (n 13) 583.

¹⁴⁰ See Bibow (n 13) 581-582.

¹⁴¹ Bibow (n 13) 582.

¹⁴² See, e.g., *NOU 2012:9* (n 112) 84,161-162.

¹⁴³ See Act no 105 of 19 June 2009 regarding changes in the Energy Act 1990.

¹⁴⁴ See Directive of 7 December 1990 (FOR-1990-12-07-959), s 3-4.

are not “socio-economically rational”.¹⁴⁵

Often, the relevant grid company will be a sister company of an energy producer operating in direct competition with the company seeking access. This can raise questions about the impartiality of the assessments carried out by the grid company. In expropriation cases, this becomes an issue particularly in relation to the assessment of the cost of undertaking an alternative development scheme.¹⁴⁶ Riparian owners are rarely pleased when they realise that the expropriating party is part of the same conglomerate as the grid company that estimates the grid connection costs associated with owner-led development.¹⁴⁷

Meanwhile, the market-orientation of the electricity sector has reduced the level of political control and accountability. Today, a management model based on economic rationality and expert-rule has become dominant. According to Brekke and Sataøen, this serves to set the reform that took place in Norway apart from similar energy reforms in Sweden and the UK.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, Brekke and Sataøen argue that this has resulted in a lack of legitimacy that has been a significant contributory cause of recent national-scale controversies, particularly with regards to the development of the national grid.¹⁴⁹

At the same time, the growth of the small-scale hydropower sector gives local communities a new voice, as market participants, thereby acting as a counterweight to centralisation and expert-rule. Since the mid- to late 1990s, the small-scale sector has grown significantly. In a recent report, the potential for profitable small-scale hydropower projects was estimated to be around 20 TWh

¹⁴⁵ See the Energy Act 1990, s 3-4. The authority to decide whether this requirement is fulfilled is vested with the Ministry.

¹⁴⁶ This assessment is often crucial, because it provides information about the value of the development potential that the owners stand to lose.

¹⁴⁷ See, e.g., *SKS Produksjon AS v Pedersen* LH-2015-92631 (Smibelg).

¹⁴⁸ See Brekke and Sataøen (n 12).

¹⁴⁹ The most serious case so far is that of *Sima - Samnanger*, concerning a new distribution line that will cut through the area known as *Hardanger*, a scenic part of south-western Norway. The plans met with significant resistance at both the national and the local level, but the government pushed ahead, leading to confrontations that also involved some acts of civil disobedience. See Brekke and Sataøen (n 12) 22-23.

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per year.¹⁵⁰ On this basis, the authors of the report estimate that the total present-day value of all waterfalls suitable for small-scale hydropower is about 35 billion Norwegian kroner, i.e., about 3.5 billion pounds.¹⁵¹ This calculation is based on a model where the waterfalls are exploited in cooperation with an external commercial company, inspired by existing agreements between owners and the limited company *Småkraft AS*. Hence, the calculation might be an underestimate of what small-scale hydropower could represent for local communities if they remain in charge of development themselves.

Small-scale hydropower has become socially and political significant in Norway. In the report mentioned above, it is estimated that the value of rivers and waterfalls amount to just under 50 % of the total equity in Norwegian agriculture.¹⁵² Moreover, hydropower is increasingly seen as a possibility for declining regions to counter depopulation and poverty. In some communities, small-scale hydropower is the only growth industry. For these communities, pursuing hydropower development at the local level also provides a way to regain some autonomy with respect to how local natural resources should be managed. Hence, small-scale hydropower takes on great political and social importance, not just for the owners of waterfalls, but for the community as a whole.

For an example of a community where small-scale hydropower has played such a role, I point to Gloppen, a municipality in the county of Sogn og Fjordane, in the western part of Norway. Here, 19 hydropower plants have been built in recent years, all except one by local owners themselves, amounting to a total production of over 250 GWh per year. This prompted the mayor to comment that “small scale hydro-power is in our blood”.¹⁵³ When interviewed, he also directed attention

¹⁵⁰ See Normann Aanesland and Olaf Holm, *Verdiskapning av Småkraft* (Rapport Nr. 31, Universitetet for miljø- og biovitenskap 2009). For comparison, suggesting the scale of this potential, I mention that the total consumption of electricity in Norway in 2013 amounted to about 120 TWh, see (n 1). According to the government, about one third of the remaining potential for hydropower in Norway, measured in annual energy output, will come from small-scale projects. See *NOU 2012:9* (n 112) 231.

¹⁵¹ See *Verdiskapning av Småkraft* (n 150) 1.

¹⁵² *Verdiskapning av Småkraft* (n 150) 1.

¹⁵³ See Andreas Starheim, ‘Kommunen med Småkraft i Blodet’ [2012] (3) *Småkraftnytt*.

at the fact that hydropower had many positive ripple effects, since it significantly increased local investment in other industries, particularly agriculture, which had been severely on the decline.

To achieve such effects, it is important to organise development in an appropriate manner. Moreover, to explain how waterfalls came to be as valuable as they are today, it is crucial to direct attention to the way in which waterfall owners initially asserted themselves on the market. In the following, I do this by giving an in-depth presentation of an early model for local involvement in hydropower development, presented at a seminar in 1996.¹⁵⁴ This model contains an early expression of several ideas that would prove influential to the development of the small-scale hydropower sector.

4.5 *Nordhordlandsmodellen*

In five brief points, the *Nordhordlandsmodellen* sets out a framework for cooperation between waterfall owners, professional hydroelectricity companies, local communities, and society as a whole.¹⁵⁵

The first point makes clear that the aim of cooperation should be to ensure local ownership and control: external interests should never be allowed to hold more than 50 % of the shares in the development company. If the company is organised as a limited liability enterprise, then the model stipulates that local residents – not necessarily owners – are to be given a right of preemption in the event that shares come up for sale.

The second point of the model sets out a method for valuing the riparian rights prior to development. It stipulates that the appraisal should reflect the real value of such rights, normally estimated on the basis of lease capitalisation. More concretely, the valuation should be based on the premise that the riparian owners will be entitled to rent based on the level of annual production in

¹⁵⁴ See Otto Dyrkolbotn and Arne Steen, *Nordhordlandsmodellen* (A manifesto on local hydropower development, published following a seminar on small-scale hydropower, Dyrkolbotn Leirskole 1996).

¹⁵⁵ See *Nordhordlandsmodellen* (n 154). The model was the result of a collaboration between Otto Dyrkolbotn, a farmer and a lawyer, and Arne Steen, the director of *Nordhordland Kraftlag*, a municipality-owned energy company.

the planned hydropower project. Then, for the purpose of appraisal, the expected rent per annum is capitalised to find the present value of the riparian rights, relative to the development project in question.¹⁵⁶

After such a value has been calculated, the model stipulates that owners are to be given a choice of either leasing out their water rights to receive rent, or to use the capitalised value of (part of) this rent as equity to acquire shares in the development company. The third point in the model then offers a clarification, by stating that the development company should not in any event acquire ownership of riparian rights, but only a time-limited right of use. After 25-35 years, this usufruct should fall away and the waterfall should revert back to the owners of the surrounding land, free of charge. This is the proposed rule even in cases when the landowners themselves initially control the majority of the shares in the development company. Hence, the rule places a limit on alienation; no separation of water rights from land rights is allowed to last for more than 35 years.

The *Nordhordland* model demonstrated the commercial viability of this organisational model by pointing to a concrete municipality-owned energy company that had stated its willingness to cooperate with owners on such terms, to help with financing and share the risk.¹⁵⁷

Following up on this organisational blueprint, the fourth and fifth points of the model describe the intended role of the local development company in society, by stressing the relationship between hydropower and other interests and potential uses of the affected river. Importantly, the model stipulates that potential developers should be willing to take on formal obligations towards other user groups. Moreover, obligations should not only be negatively defined, as duties to minimise or avoid harms. Positive obligations should also be introduced, such as duties to improve other qualities of the river system, and to engage in active cooperation with other users.

¹⁵⁶ This approach stands in stark contrast to the earlier valuation method, discussed in chapter 5, section 5.4.1.

¹⁵⁷ The company in question is Nordhordland Kraftlag, where one of the authors of *Nordhordlandsmodellen*, Arne Steen, was a director.

It is made clear that the overall aim is to ensure sustainable management of the river system as a whole. Interestingly, the model predicts that active local ownership will achieve more in this regard than what can be achieved through governmental regulation alone. This claim is illustrated by a concrete example of a case in which the local owners decided to pursue a scheme that was less environmentally invasive than the project endorsed by the water authorities.¹⁵⁸

The model goes on to emphasise the need for integrated processes of resource planning and decision-making, to ensure that hydropower development is not approached as an isolated economic and environmental concern, but looked at in a broader social and political context. To achieve this, it is argued that local communities need to play an important role in the management of water resources. Another concrete example follows, regarding *Romarheimsvassdraget*, a river system in the municipality of Lindås, in the county of Hordaland.

This river system was originally intended for large-scale development undertaken by BKK AS, without the participation of local owners.¹⁵⁹ The project would involve a total of three river systems, such that the water from *Romarheimselva* and another river would be diverted to a neighbouring municipality for hydropower development there. The local owners argued against these plans by proposing a number of smaller development schemes. Eventually, they were successful, as the NVE agreed to endorse an alternative consisting of 7 distinct run-of-river projects to be undertaken by local owners.¹⁶⁰

It is important to note that when *Nordhordlandsmodellen* was formulated, owner-led development of hydropower was still a recent phenomenon, driven forward by individual owners and local groups that saw the potential and had enough know-how to get organised. Later, commercial

¹⁵⁸ Today, this project has become Svartdalen Kraftverk, finalised in 2006. It produces 30 GWh annually, enough electricity for about 1500 households.

¹⁵⁹ BKK AS is one of the 15 biggest hydropower companies in Norway, and would later also purchase Nordhordland Kraftlag.

¹⁶⁰ See Vassragsrapport nr. 25 (Direktoratet for Naturforvaltning 1999).

companies have emerged that specialises in cooperating with local owners.¹⁶¹ Today, this has made it relatively easy for owners to initiate small-scale hydropower development. Moreover, owners are often approached by interested commercial actors who wish to cooperate with them. Most of them rely on cooperation on terms that reflect the main ideas expressed in the first three points of *Nordhordlandsmodellen*.

However, several adjustments have become standard, and these systematically benefit the external partner: the requirement that locals should at all times control a majority of the shares is dropped, the period of usufruct is typically longer than 35 years, the reversion to the landowners after this time is made conditional on payment for machines and installations, and no preemption rights are granted to local residents.¹⁶² However, the core idea that riparian rights are to be valued based on a capitalisation of future rent is accepted. This means, in turn, that local owners rarely need to raise any additional capital to acquire shares in the development company. Moreover, the rent itself can become a significant source of income.

There are two main approaches to calculating this rent. The first approach, introduced already in *Nordhordlandsmodellen*, specifies the rent as a percentage of the gross revenue from sale of electricity, today often around 10-20 %.¹⁶³ In this way, passive owners need not take on any risk related to the performance of the hydropower company. The second approach has been developed by the company Småkraft AS, which is now the leading market actor specialising in cooperation with local owners.¹⁶⁴ According to their model, riparian owners are paid a share of the annual *surplus* from hydropower generation.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ See, e.g., Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, 'Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter' (n 16).

¹⁶² See generally Katrine Broch Hauge, 'Erstatningsnivået ved tvangsovertaking av fallrettar' (PhD Thesis, 2015).

¹⁶³ Source: contracts presented to the court in *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 118) (available from the author upon request). See also Hauge (n 162) 55-57.

¹⁶⁴ It is owned by several large-scale actors on the energy market, see www.smaakraft.no.

¹⁶⁵ See Hauge (n 162) 57-60 (also discussing variants of this contractual idea, based on how the surplus is actually defined in the contract).

This share is usually higher than the rent payable based on the net revenue; often, the owners are entitled to 50% of the profit.¹⁶⁶ Hence, if the project is a success, the riparian owners might be better compensated. However, the owners have to accept some risks as though they were shareholders, and they do so even though they might not have much of a say in how the company is run.¹⁶⁷

To illustrate the financial scale of the rent agreements that have now become standard, let us consider a typical small-scale hydropower plant that produces 10 GWh annually. With an electricity price of NOK 0.3 per KWh, this gives the hydropower plant an annual gross income of NOK 3 million. If the rent payable is 20 %, the waterfall owners will receive NOK 600 000 annually, approximately GBP 60 000. This is many times more than what the owners could hope to receive according to the traditional method for calculating compensation following expropriation.¹⁶⁸

All in all, the financial consequences of the ideas expressed in *Norhordlandsmodellen* have been dramatic. However, the latter two points of the model, addressing the importance of holistic and inclusive management of river systems, have not had the same degree of influence. In the next section, I address what appears to be a negative consequence of this for the small-scale industry, threatening to undermine its status as a sustainable alternative to large-scale exploitation.

4.6 The Future of Hydropower

In recent years, there has been a growing tension between the small-scale hydropower sector and environmental groups. There is talk of a brewing “hydropower battle”, as environmentalists grow increasingly critical of what they regard as predatory practices.¹⁶⁹ Reports on small-scale producers

¹⁶⁶ Source: contracts presented to the court in *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 118) (available from the author upon request). See also Hauge (n 162) 58.

¹⁶⁷ To limit the risk for owners, companies such as Småkraft AS also operates a system of “guaranteed” rent, but this rent is usually quite a lot less than what the owners could expect from an agreement based solely on rent based on gross income. Source: contracts presented to the court in *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 118) (available from the author upon request).

¹⁶⁸ For an example based on comparing two concrete cases, see chapter 5, section 5.4.1. See also Hauge (n 162) 283-289.

¹⁶⁹ See Lars Haltbrekken, ‘Det yppes til ny vassdragsstrid!’ (2012) 44(03-04) Plan 34.

who are alleged to have violated environmental regulations help fuel the negative impression of the industry.¹⁷⁰

On the regulatory side, the water authorities have now adopted much stricter procedures to assess licenses for small-scale hydropower.¹⁷¹ In addition, different planning routines have been adopted to ensure that small-scale schemes are no longer considered individually, but in so-called “packages”, collecting together applications from the same area. As a consequence of these changes, the number of rejected small-scale applications have increased dramatically in recent years.¹⁷²

At the same time, powerful market actors who favour a traditional mode of exploitation have seized the opportunity to lobby more aggressively against small-scale hydropower, in favour of large-scale projects.¹⁷³ Such projects, they argue, are preferable also from an environmental point of view. In recent years, this argument has proven influential in many quarters, particularly among state agencies, such as the NVE and the Norwegian Environmental Agency.¹⁷⁴ It has also been claimed that this perspective is backed up by research done on environmental effects of small-scale

¹⁷⁰ In 2010, the NVE conducted randomised inspections and announced that 4 out of 5 mini and micro plants operated in violation of regulations pertaining to the amount of water they may use at any given time. See ‘Små kraftverk driver ulovlig’ (*Teknisk Ukeblad*, 13th December 2010) (<http://www.tu.no/kraft/2010/12/13/sma-kraftverk-driver-ulovlig>) accessed 15th July 2015. In the largest newspaper in Norway, this was reported under the heading that four out of five small-scale plants break the law, see ‘Fire av fem småkraftverk driver ulovlig’ (*Verdens Gang*, 13th December 2010) (<http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/stroemprisene/fire-av-fem-smaakraftverk-driver-ulovlig/a/10020264/>) accessed 15th July 2015. This is misleading, since mini and micro plants are distinct from small-scale plants proper. Most importantly, the former kinds of plants do not usually require a sector-specific development license. Because of this, it also seems plausible that the reported violations might in large part be due to a lack of knowledge and professionalism, not predation. I remark that questions later emerged regarding the accuracy of the report itself. Apparently, one of the plants that was reported to have violated regulations did not even exist, see Øyvind Lie, ‘NVE inspiserte kraftverk som ikke finnes’ (*Teknisk Ukeblad*, 20th December 2010) (<http://www.tu.no/kraft/2010/12/20/nve-inspiserte-kraftverk-som-ikke-finnes>) accessed 15th July 2015.

¹⁷¹ See Øyvind Lie, ‘NVE varsler flere småkraftavslag’ (*Teknisk Ukeblad*, 18th January 2012) (<http://www.tu.no/kraft/2012/01/18/nve-varsler-flere-smakraft-avslag>) accessed 15th July 2015.

¹⁷² In 2013, the number of rejections tripled compared to previous years, while the number of accepted applications remained stable. See Linda Sunde, ‘Rekordmange småkraft-avslag’ (*Bondebladet*, 6th February 2014) (<http://www.bondebladet.no/nyhet/rekordmange-smakraft-avslag/>) accessed 15th July 2015.

¹⁷³ See, e.g., Rune S Alexandersen, ‘Troms kraft lobber for å stoppe konkurrent - vil bygge kraftverk til 649 mil’ (*Nord 24*, 16th August 2014) (<http://www.nord24.no/nyheter/article7531155.ece>) accessed 15th July 2015.

¹⁷⁴ See Jannicke Nilsen, ‘Vil ha større vannkraftverk’ (*Teknisk Ukeblad*, 14th October 2011) (<http://www.tu.no/kraft/2011/10/14/vil-ha-store-vannkraftverk>) accessed 15th July 2015.

and large-scale projects.¹⁷⁵

The core environmental argument against small-scale solutions has a very simply structure: small-scale plants indirectly affect a greater total area of land per electricity unit produced, therefore they are considered more intrusive than large-scale schemes.¹⁷⁶ The stated premise of this reasoning is no doubt correct; several small-scale plants, at many different locations, are required to match the energy produced by a single larger plant, hence a greater land area will be affected. However, this quantitative observation has no bearing on the issue of how small-scale plants qualitatively affect the surrounding environment, compared to large-scale projects. In particular, the parameters used to compare small-scale and large-scale developments tend to be defined in terms of generic buffer zones that do not take into account differences in the severity of different kinds of environmental intrusions. For instance, as long as both installations are observable by passers by, a small cabin with a turbine inside is considered to have the same “scenic impact” as an imposing concrete dam that stretches out for 100 meters and significantly distorts the water level in a lake.¹⁷⁷

Despite the apparent lack of qualitative arguments, the idea that large-scale development is better for the environment now appears to be gaining ground in Norway. This represents a complete reversal compared to the political narrative that has dominated for the last 15-20 years. Indeed, the merits of small-scale development was strongly emphasised by political leaders around the turn of the century. In his New Year’s speech 01 January 2001, the Prime Minister went as far as to declare that the age of large-scale development was over.¹⁷⁸ The same phrase was then repeated

¹⁷⁵ See generally Tor Haakon Bakken and others, ‘Development of Small Versus Large Hydropower in Norway – Comparison of Environmental Impacts’ (2012) 20 *Energy Procedia* 185; Tor Haakon Bakken and others, ‘Demonstrating a new framework for the comparison of environmental impacts from small- and large-scale hydropower and wind power projects’ (2014) 140 *Journal of Environmental Management* 93.

¹⁷⁶ Bakken and others, ‘Demonstrating a new framework for the comparison of environmental impacts from small- and large-scale hydropower and wind power projects’ (n 175) 96-99.

¹⁷⁷ See Bakken and others, ‘Demonstrating a new framework for the comparison of environmental impacts from small- and large-scale hydropower and wind power projects’ (n 175) 95.

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., Haltbrekken (n 169) 34.

in the policy platforms of two successive national governments, in 2005 and 2009 respectively.¹⁷⁹

However, as administrative practices and case law on hydropower shows, the end of large-scale exploitation has proved impossible to implement. Despite being official policy at the highest level of government for almost 15 years, large-scale development interests continue to dominate in the hydropower sector.¹⁸⁰ Interestingly, the leading national politicians are now changing their position as well.¹⁸¹ Arguably, this demonstrates how the politicians have responded to pressure from high-ranking bureaucrats and large energy companies.¹⁸²

The political shift observed at present is likely to result in a further weakening of property and the rights of local communities. For example, it provides indirect political legitimacy to the NVE, which pursues an explicit policy of prioritising applications for large-scale projects when these come into conflict with small-scale schemes in the same rivers.¹⁸³ Hence, the NVE is likely to refuse to consider applications from owners as long as there are applications pending that might result in the expropriation of their property.¹⁸⁴

At the same time, the small-scale industry itself has occasionally sought to undermine property rights, possibly in an effort to mimic the successes of their large-scale competitors. The industry has argued, in particular, that expropriation should be made more easily available as a tool for

¹⁷⁹ See the “Soria Moria” declaration from 2005, p 57, and “Soria Moria II”, from 2009, p 52 (available at www.regjeringen.no).

¹⁸⁰ I believe the material presented in this thesis warrants making this claim. Moreover, it is underscored by the two recent Supreme Court decisions in *Jørpeland* (n 61) and *Otra II* (n 61).

¹⁸¹ See Øyvind Lie, ‘Energiministeren etterlyser mer regulerbar kraft’ (*Teknisk Ukeblad*, 28th October 2014) (<http://www.tu.no/kraft/2014/10/28/energiministeren-etterlyser-mer-regulerbar-vannkraft>) accessed 15th July 2015 (reporting on recent public statements made by the Minister of Petroleum and Energy in support of large-scale development).

¹⁸² In addition to their environmental arguments, these actors also rely on more familiar arguments in favour of large-scale development, especially the idea that large-scale development is more efficient. See Lie, ‘NVE varsler flere småkraftavslag’ (n 171). For a contrasting view on efficiency, emphasising the efficiency benefits associated with small-scale development and a decentralised approach to hydropower, see *Innst.O.nr.101 (1999-2000)* (Recommendation from parliamentary committee to Parliament regarding the Water Resources Act 2000) 5.

¹⁸³ See Nye rutiner for behandling av søknader om konsesjon for småkraft (Letter from the NVE regarding new administrative routines, Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat 2012) 3. See also Lie, ‘NVE varsler flere småkraftavslag’ (n 171).

¹⁸⁴ For a concrete example of this, see *Smibelt* (n 147).

small-scale developers and owners who wish to take property from reluctant neighbours.¹⁸⁵ This argument rests on a peculiar form of anti-discrimination reasoning; as long as large-scale developers are allowed to take property by force, small-scale developers should be allowed to do the same. In a world where takings are endemic, this might make some sense. However, it is hardly an attitude that helps the small-scale industry preserve its image as the more sustainable hydropower option.

At the same time, the industry is beginning to struggle financially because the price of electricity has been much lower in recent years than what had previously been forecast.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, it has become clear that some of the investors on the market have engaged in speculative practices, by aggressively entering into agreements with local owners, without carrying out much hydropower development.¹⁸⁷

These critical remarks should not detract from the fact that the growth in small-scale hydropower has led to dramatically increased benefit sharing with many local owners of rivers and waterfalls. However, recent events indicate that it is inappropriate to look at this development in isolation from other concerns. When assessing the future of small-scale hydropower and local property rights to waterfalls, it seems important to also take into account the broader societal consequences of new commercial practices. If one fails in this regard, the pernicious image of owners as socially passive “profit-maximisers” gains a firmer hold both on the political and the legal narrative. The negative consequences this can have for property as an institution are already apparent in Norway, as I will argue in the next chapter.

More generally, recent developments in the hydropower industry illustrate that an entitlements-

¹⁸⁵ See Ola Brekken, ‘Småkraftverk og ekspropriasjon’ [2007] (4) Småkraftnytt; Ola Brekken, ‘Småkraftverk og ekspropriasjon – replikk til NVE’ [2008] (1) Småkraftnytt 21. The articles are written by a leading Norwegian energy lawyer, apparently in his capacity as legal representative of “Småkraftforeningen”, an interest organisation for small-scale hydropower.

¹⁸⁶ See Linda Sunde, ‘Småkraft: Kong Midas i revers’ (*Bondebladet*, 8th May 2014) (<http://www.bondebladet.no/midten/smakraft-kong-midas-i-revers/>) accessed 15th July 2015.

¹⁸⁷ See Rune Endresen, Jostein Løvås and Stig Tore Laugen, ‘Solgte før kraftflopp’ (*Dagens Næringsliv*, 20th March 2014) (<http://www.dn.no/nyheter/2014/03/20/Energi/solgte-for-kraftflopp>) accessed 15th July 2015.

based perspective on waterfalls is inappropriate, since local ownership is meant to facilitate sustainable management first, and profit-seeking only second. This insight is also strongly implicit in *Nordhordlandsmodellen*. However, as the current debate is evolving, it seems to be at risk of disappearing from view.

4.7 Conclusion

Water resources have been, and still are, very important to Norway as a nation. Not only does the energy of streaming water provide electricity to people and industries, it also provides a source of profit, prestige and power to those who harness it. Historically, many rural communities in Norway benefited greatly from this, as it was they who managed local water resources.

Plainly, they did rather well. By the end of 1943, at a time when small-scale plants still outnumbered large-scale plants 45 to 1, around 80% of the population had access to electricity at home. The government, especially local governments, also felt responsible for the supply of electricity to the public, but they generally assumed this responsibility without encroaching on local populations who wished to manage their own resources.

As discussed in this chapter, the situation changed dramatically after the Second World War, when the government, especially the central government, assumed more direct control over the nation's water resources. This led to a situation where local owners became increasingly marginalised. In recent years, there has been a partial reversal of this trend, as the liberalisation of the electricity market has enabled local owners and communities to take part in hydropower development once again.

The result has been a growing tension between large-scale and small-scale development, which in turn corresponds to a tension between the owners of waterfalls and the energy companies that wish to expropriate. In the next chapter I will explore this tension in more depth, as I investigate the rules and practices relating to expropriation for hydropower development.

5 Taking Waterfalls

5.1 Introduction

The Norwegian water authorities have extensive powers to take waterfalls for hydropower development. However, they rarely need to reflect on this power, not even when they use it. The reason is that expropriation tends to be an *automatic* consequence of a development license; those who obtain a license to develop a large-scale hydropower plant almost always obtain also a license to expropriate the private property rights they require for this purpose.

In some cases, this follows from section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, which gives license holders a right to expropriate all property rights needed for the development in question. However, even outside the scope of these provisions, the same approach to expropriation tends to be adopted. Specifically, the authorities adhere to the presumption that whenever a license to undertake large-scale development should be granted, then so should a license to expropriate.¹

The expropriation presumption has remained in place even though the regulatory and economic context of riparian expropriation has changed dramatically after the liberalisation of the electricity sector. This is significant, especially due to how licensing cases are processed. As discussed in the previous chapter, the administrative licensing assessment tends to focus on the environmental

¹ The leader of the hydropower licensing division of the NVE expressed this presumption in Rune Flatby, ‘Småkraftverk og ekspropriasjon – NVEs praksis’ [2008] (1) Småkraftnytt 20 (noting also that the same presumption is not applied for small-scale projects, e.g., when some owners wish to expropriate from neighbours who oppose development).

consequences of development, with little attention devoted to how the loss of property rights affects the owners and their local communities. This is so even though a license to develop is in effect also a license to expropriate. How did this system come about, and where does it leave local owners whose waterfalls are targeted by large-scale proposals? This chapter addresses these two questions in depth.

First, the history of the law is presented. This will serve to demonstrate that the current state of affairs developed gradually from a pre-industrial starting point where expropriation of waterfalls was generally not permitted. Further to this, the chapter discusses more recent changes, specifically the changes in the expropriation regime that were implemented following liberalisation of the electricity sector.

To make expropriation available as a tool for commercial companies, the earlier rules had to be modified. Specifically, public interest requirements had to be relaxed and limitations on private-to-private transfers had to be abrogated. The manner in which this was achieved, with only minimal parliamentary involvement, is in itself worth noting when addressing the legitimacy of current practices.

After the historical assessment, the chapter illustrates how the water authorities and the courts interpret and apply the rules currently in place. Specifically, I give a detailed presentation of the recent Supreme Court case of *Jørpeland*.² This case demonstrates that the standing of owners is very weak under administrative law, and it highlights a range of practical problems that can arise in a system where a right to expropriate is understood as an automatic consequence of obtaining a development license.

I conclude this chapter with a more overarching assessment based on the theoretical framework presented in Part I of the thesis, to shed further light on the legitimacy of rules and practices surrounding takings of waterfalls in Norway. This culminates in an argument suggesting that the

² See *Måland v Jørpeland Kraft AS* Rt-2011-1393 (I mention that I acted as legal counsel for the owners in this case).

current system systematically produces takings that fail the Gray test presented in chapter 2.

5.2 Norwegian Expropriation Law: A Brief Overview

As mentioned in chapter 2, the right to property is entrenched in section 105 of the Norwegian Constitution. There it is made clear that when property is taken for public use, full compensation is to be paid to the owner. The formulation bears a close resemblance to the formulation of the US takings clause in the Fifth Amendment.³ However, there is no active public use debate in Norway. The meaning of public use is hardly ever discussed by the courts, and according to legal scholars, the public use formulation should not be interpreted as a limitation on the state's authority to expropriate.⁴

However, it is a rule of unwritten constitutional law that administrative decisions which affect the rights of individuals can only be carried out when they are positively authorised by law.⁵ Moreover, the Constitution is not understood as providing an authority for the state to expropriate. It merely expresses the presupposition that expropriation is possible.⁶ Hence, when applying eminent domain, the government needs to justify this on the basis of a more specific authorising provision.

Historically, there was no general Act relating to expropriation and a range of different Acts authorised the executive to expropriate for specific purposes such as roads, public buildings, and

³ The Norwegian clause can be translated as follows: "If the needs of the state require that any person shall surrender their movable or immovable property for public use, they shall receive full compensation from the Treasury.". I remark that the translation provided by the parliamentary administration is plainly incorrect. There the "needs of the state" have been replaced by "the welfare of the state", without any basis in the Norwegian text (the Norwegian expression used is "statens tarv", literally the state's need or, it might be argued, the state's interest). See 'The Constitution' (*The Storting's Administration*, 3rd August 2015) (<https://www.stortinget.no/en/Grunnlovsjubileet/In-English/The-Constitution---Complete-text/>) accessed 17th September 2015.

⁴ See Jørgen Aall, *Rettsstat og menneskerettigheter* (Fagbokforlaget 2004) 249; *Aktieselskabet Saudafaldene v Hallingstad* LG-2007-176723.

⁵ See generally Alf Petter Høgberg and Morten Kinander, 'Det formelle legalitetsprinsippet og rettskildelæren' [2011] *Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap* 15.

⁶ See, e.g., Carl August Fleischer, 'Grunnlovens § 105' [1986] *Jussens Venner* 1, 6.

schools.⁷ Today, many of these authorities have been broadened and included in the Expropriation Act 1959. After an amendment in 2001, this Act includes an authority for the government to authorise expropriation of property and use rights in order to facilitate hydropower production.⁸ This is understood to include the authority to expropriate waterfalls.⁹

According to the Expropriation Act 1959, expropriation can only be authorised if the benefits undoubtedly outweigh the harms, as determined following a discretionary assessment.¹⁰ Formally, the authorising authority lies with the King in Council. However, this authority can be delegated to ministries or other state bodies that the King in Council can instruct.¹¹ The compensation to the owner is determined following a judicial procedure administered by the so-called appraisal courts.¹² This is the name given to the regular civil courts when they hear appraisal cases, observing the special procedure set out in the Appraisal Act 1917.

The appraisal procedure emphasises the importance of factual assessment and lay discretion (the appraisal court typically sits with four lay judges).¹³ In addition, there are special rules regarding costs, indicating that the expropriating party is usually required to pay for the procedure, including the owners' legal expenses.¹⁴ In other regards, the appraisal procedure resembles a typical adversarial process before a civil court.¹⁵

The Expropriation Act 1959 states that unless the King in Council decides otherwise, expropri-

⁷ See *NUT 1954:1* (Report to the Ministry of Justice from a special committee appointed by the King in Council on 22 June 1951) 11-12.

⁸ Expropriation Act 1959, s 2 no 51.

⁹ See, e.g., *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* TSTAV-2004-84901.

¹⁰ Expropriation Act 1959, s 2.

¹¹ Expropriation Act 1959, s 5.

¹² See the Expropriation Act 1959, s 2.

¹³ See Appraisal Act 1917, s 11-12.

¹⁴ Appraisal Act 1917, s 54.

¹⁵ For a more in-depth discussion, see Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, 'Expropriation Law in Norway' in JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), *Expropriation Law in Europe* (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 382-384.

5.2. NORWEGIAN EXPROPRIATION LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

ation orders may only be granted to state or municipality bodies. This is formulated as a limiting principle, but in effect it serves as a general authorisation for the executive to decide, without parliamentary involvement, that a larger class of legal persons may be granted expropriation licenses. For many purposes, directives have been issued that extend the class of possible beneficiaries to any legal person, including companies operating for profit. In 2001, such a directive was issued for the authority to expropriate in favour of hydropower production.¹⁶

In addition to providing a general authority for expropriation, the Expropriation Act 1959 also contains several procedural rules. These are collected in chapter 3 of the Act. Here the Act sets out minimal requirements as to what an application for an expropriation license must include: it should make clear who will be affected, how the property is to be used, and what the purpose of acquisition is.¹⁷ In addition, the Act requires the applicant to specify exactly what property they require, and to include information about the type of property in question and the current use that is made of it.

The Act also stipulates that owners must be notified, and that every owner should be given individual notice, although this obligation is relaxed when it is “unreasonable difficult” to fulfil.¹⁸ In such cases, it is sufficient that the documents of the case are made available at a suitable place in the local area. In addition, a public announcement must then be made in the Norwegian Official Journal as well as in two widely read local newspapers.¹⁹

The licensing authority is required to ensure that the facts of the case are clarified to the “greatest extent possible”.²⁰ This formulation seems very strict, but is highly non-specific. In

¹⁶ See Directive no 391 of 06 April 2001.

¹⁷ Expropriation Act 1959, s 11.

¹⁸ Expropriation Act 1959, s 12, para 2.

¹⁹ Expropriation Act 1959, s 12.

²⁰ The Norwegian expression is “best råd er”, which literally means “best possible way”, see the Expropriation Act 1959, s 12, para 2.

practice, the level of scrutiny given to the expropriation question under Norwegian law varies greatly depending on sector-specific administrative practices.²¹ Moreover, established practice from several fields, including the hydropower sector, suggests that when expropriation takes place to implement a public plan or a licensed development, little attention is devoted to expropriation as a special issue.²²

The applicant must cover costs incurred by owners in relation to a pending application for expropriation.²³ The exact formulation is that the applicant is obliged to cover the costs that “the rules in this chapter carry with them”. That is, the applicant is obliged to cover the costs that are related to the owners’ rights pursuant to chapter 3 of the Expropriation Act 1959. In practice, an owner will be denied costs if the competent authority takes the view that they are unreasonable or disproportionate to their interests in the case.²⁴ Finally, the decision to grant an expropriation license must be justified, and the parties should be informed of the reasons for the decision.²⁵

In addition to the procedural rules in the Expropriation Act 1959, the rules of the Public Administration Act 1967 also apply in expropriation cases. These rules largely stipulate the same requirements as those discussed above, so I omit a detailed presentation. Instead, I go on to present sector-specific rules pertaining to takings for hydropower.

5.3 Taking Waterfalls by Obtaining a Development License

As mentioned in the introduction, section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 establishes an automatic right to expropriate rights needed to implement a licensed watercourse regulation. This

²¹ See Dyrkolbotn, ‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ (n 15) 380-381.

²² For zoning plans, see *Namsos Kommune v Braaholmen sameie* Rt-1998-416; *Harald Bø v Radøy kommune* Rt-1999-513. For hydropower, see *Jørpeland* (n 2).

²³ Expropriation Act 1959 s 15.

²⁴ If the case progresses to an appraisal dispute, the competent authority to decide on costs is the appraisal court. Otherwise, the decision is left with the executive. See the Expropriation Act 1959, s 15.

²⁵ Expropriation Act 1959, s 12, para 3.

5.3. TAKING WATERFALLS BY OBTAINING A DEVELOPMENT LICENSE

does not include a right to expropriate rivers and waterfalls needed for the hydropower development as such. However, it includes a right to transfer water away from a river for development somewhere else. This has the *de facto* effect of a waterfall expropriation, since the water is transferred away from the source river.

This kind of expropriation has always been treated as waterfall expropriation in relation to the compensation issue.²⁶ Formally, however, the interference is not considered an expropriation of real property, but rather an expropriation of a right to remove the water, a sort of easement whereby the developer acquires the right to interfere with the rights of riparian owners in source rivers.

In theory, the rules in the Expropriation Act 1959 and the Public Administration Act 1967 still apply when the right to expropriate follows automatically from a development license. Indeed, the rules in the Public Administration Act 1967 express general principles of administrative law, pertaining to all kinds of individual decisions, including both expropriation and licensing decisions. The Expropriation Act 1959, for its part, explicitly states that it applies to property interferences authorised under the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.²⁷ However, it is also stated that the rules in the Expropriation Act 1959 only apply in so far as they are “suitable” and do not “contradict” sector-specific rules.²⁸ This points to the potential caveat that while a range of procedural rules apply in theory, there is a risk that they will be ignored in practice, if they are deemed unsuitable by the licensing authorities.

This is practically significant in hydropower cases. Specifically, the water authorities regard the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 as providing an exhaustive legislative basis for the licensing procedure.²⁹ This also means that the material assessment requirement in the Expropriation Act

²⁶ See *Jørpeland* (n 2).

²⁷ See Expropriation Act 1959 s 30.

²⁸ Expropriation Act 1959, s 30.

²⁹ This was made clear through the case of *Jørpeland* (n 2), where this practice also got a stamp of approval from the Supreme Court.

1959 is not considered to have any independent significance alongside the assessment criterion in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.³⁰

This is so even though case law on the former assessment criterion emphasises the interests of affected property owners in a way that case law and administrative practice on the licensing issue does not.³¹ As a consequence of how the law is understood on this point, it is very hard for owners to challenge a decision to allow expropriation of their riparian rights, especially when expropriation takes place pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.³² Moreover, even if section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 does not apply, the water authorities rely on the presumption that an expropriation license should be granted whenever a large-scale development license is granted.³³

Hence, in order to defend themselves, owners must proceed in a roundabout manner by addressing the licensing question, for instance by arguing that large-scale development will be environmentally unsound or by presenting a detailed development plan of their own in the hope of convincing the water authorities of its merits. This is a daunting task, particularly in light of the continued influence of administrative practices developed during the period of monopoly regulation, which systematically favour the large energy companies.³⁴

To shed further light on how the current situation came about, I will now present the history

³⁰ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 30.

³¹ In addition, as mentioned above, the formulation in the Expropriation Act 1959, s 2 contains the additional qualification that the benefit of interference must “undoubtedly” outweigh the harm. This is interpreted to mean that the benefit must *clearly* outweigh the harm (pertaining to the evidence, not the weight of the benefit compared to the harm), see *Løvenskiold-Vækerø v Staten (Landbruks- og matdepartementet)* Rt-2009-1142. No corresponding requirement is included in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 8. Instead, the formulation there is that a license should “normally” not be given unless the benefits outweigh the harms. See also Odd Stiansen and Kjell Haagenen, ‘Vannkraftutbygging’ in Thor Falkanger and Kjell Haagenen (eds), *Vassdrags- og energirett* (2nd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2002) 325-236 (arguing that the “normally” qualification is without practical significance).

³² It follows from the discussion in chapter 4 that large-scale development projects almost always involve a license pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 (or such that many of the rules from this Act, including section 16 on expropriation, apply pursuant to the Water Resources Act 2000).

³³ See *Flatby* (n 1).

³⁴ See sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 below.

of the law in this area. As will become clear, the current state of affairs was not inevitable, but rather the result of a series of reforms that gradually undermined property as an anchor for active community participation in hydropower development.

5.4 Taking Waterfalls for Progress

In the now repealed Water Systems Act 1887, several provisions authorised appropriation of water-rights and land for various water-related purposes, but the criteria were very narrow.³⁵ Waterfall rights as such could never be expropriated, and expropriation of other rights pertaining to the use of water could only be permitted in so far as the affected owners were not thereby deprived of any water-power that they could reasonably make use of themselves.³⁶

Specifically, expropriation for hydropower development was only permitted when it benefited waterfall owners who needed to acquire surrounding land in order to make better use of their own property rights.³⁷ Moreover, riparian owners could apply for licenses to engage in various industrial exploits, in some cases also when this would prove damaging to other landowners, for instance through deprivation of water or flooding.³⁸ These rules were similar to many of the rules found in contemporaneous mill Acts from the US, discussed in section 3.3 of chapter 3. As in the US, these rules could be classified as giving rise to economic development takings. However, they did not permit the source of the economic development potential as such to be taken from the owners.³⁹ Rather, takings were only warranted with respect to additional rights that existing

³⁵ See WS Dahl, *Den Norske Vasdragsret* (Den Norske Forlagsforening 1888) 69-85. In addition, the purpose of expropriation was largely understood to be binding also on future use, so that the taker would not gain unrestricted control over the rights they acquired. Rather, they were obliged to use these rights to pursue the specific public purpose for which expropriation was authorised. See, e.g., Per Rygh, 'Ekspropriantens raadighet over eksproprierting' Rt-1912-113, 133-140.

³⁶ See Dahl (n 35) 58.

³⁷ See the Water Systems Act 1887, ss 15, 16. See also the commentary in Dahl (n 35) 60-65.

³⁸ See Water Systems Act 1887, s 14. See also the commentary in Dahl (n 35) 54-60.

³⁹ See Dahl (n 35) 168-170.

owners needed to realise the full potential of their own resources.

In fact, an important principle of Norwegian expropriation law at this time was that no property could be taken if the taker's interest in that property was part of the current owner's bundle of interests associated with the property.⁴⁰ This applied regardless of whether or not the owners, subjectively speaking, were likely to pursue the interest in question in an optimal way. On the basis of this principle, expropriation of waterfalls for hydropower development was not permissible. The reason was simple: the right to develop hydropower was considered part of the owners' bundle of interests. Hence, it could not be taken from them, as a matter of principle.

By contrast, if ancillary land was needed by someone wishing to make optimal use of *their* waterfall rights, expropriation was possible. In these cases, the takers did not seek to take the owners' rights as much as to negate them, in order to fully enjoy their own. More generally, expropriation at this time was considered a way to resolve conflicts between rights, not a way to redistribute them.⁴¹

Following industrial advances, the interest in hydropower exploded in the late 19th century.⁴² As a result, the state increasingly came to see it as a political priority to regulate the hydropower sector, especially to prevent foreign speculators and industrialists from acquiring ownership of Norwegian resources.⁴³ As discussed in chapter 3, the most important expressions of this came in the form of two new licensing Acts, namely the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 (section 4.3.2) and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917 (section 4.3.3).

Following up on this, Parliament soon passed legislation that authorised expropriation of riparian rights – including waterfalls – for the benefit of public bodies, also when the purpose was

⁴⁰ See Dahl (n 35) 168-170.

⁴¹ See Dahl (n 35) 168-170.

⁴² See Thor Falkanger, 'Acquisition of Real Property and State Approval' (1987) 31 *Scandinavian Studies in Law* 57, 58-59.

⁴³ See Falkanger (n 42) 58-59.

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hydropower development.⁴⁴ In 1940, these authorities were consolidated and integrated in the general water resource legislation, through the Water Systems Act 1940.⁴⁵ According to this Act, the authority to expropriate waterfalls could be granted only to the state and the municipalities. Moreover, the municipalities could only expropriate waterfalls when the purpose was to provide electricity to the local district.⁴⁶ Private parties could not expropriate except in exceptional circumstances, when they already owned more than 50 % of the riparian rights they sought to exploit.⁴⁷

In all cases of waterfall expropriation, it was felt that benefit sharing with local owners was required. Hence, special rules were introduced to ensure that takers would have to pay *more* than full compensation (typically a 25 % premium, but in some cases the owner was also given a right to opt for compensation in the form of a proportion of the electricity output of the plant).⁴⁸

As I showed in chapter 4, the electricity supply in Norway just after the passage of the Water Systems Act 1940 was already well developed, with 80 % of the population having access to electricity. Moreover, in the rural areas the supply often came from one among a vast number of small power plants. In light of the progress already made and the highly decentralised structure of the hydroelectric sector at this time, one might have expected expropriation to remain a relatively rare occurrence.

However, the prevalence of expropriation to facilitate hydropower development increased greatly after the war, as the state itself became engaged much more actively with hydropower development,

⁴⁴ Legislation that made it possible to expropriate waterfalls to the benefit of the municipalities was introduced in 1911, and a similar authority that authorised expropriation in favour of the state appeared in 1917, see Olaf Amundsen, *Lov om vasdragsreguleringer av 14 december 1917 (nr. 17) med senere tillæg og forandringer: med kommentar* (Aschehough 1928) 29.

⁴⁵ This Act has since largely been replaced by the Water Resources Act 2000.

⁴⁶ See the Water Systems Act 1940, s 148. See also the commentary in A Hugo-Sørensen and Birger Olafsen, *Lov om vassdragene av 15. mars 1940: med kommentarer* (Tanum 1941) 201-210.

⁴⁷ See the Water Systems Act 1940, s 55. See also the commentary in Hugo-Sørensen and Olafsen (n 46) 70-74. I remark that this was a novel rule in the 1940 Act, which contradicted earlier theories about the legitimacy of allowing expropriation for private benefit.

⁴⁸ See Hugo-Sørensen and Olafsen (n 46) 70-91, 184, 210. For more on compensation, see below in section 5.4.1.

also for commercially oriented industrial purposes.⁴⁹ Hence, despite the spirit and wording of the Water Systems Act 1940, this was the time when expropriation of rivers and waterfalls became a measure to facilitate large-scale transfers of resources.

This development had little to do with supplying electricity to the people. Rather, it arose from increased political demand for hydropower to support the metallurgical and electrochemical industries, combined with the fact that the hydropower sector was reorganised and brought under increasingly centralised political control.⁵⁰ Following this, a growing share of the financial benefits from development would accrue to urban areas, as local development companies were replaced by state companies and companies dominated by prosperous city municipalities.⁵¹ In addition, a highly idiosyncratic compensation method was adopted in expropriation cases, resulting in a situation where waterfalls could be acquired very cheaply from local owners.

5.4.1 The Natural Horsepower Method

In section 4.3.2 of the previous chapter, I presented the notion of a natural horsepower, used to determine when a development project requires development licenses pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917. As mentioned, the natural horsepower of a development scheme is a gross measure of the stable electric effect harnessed following the development. Specifically, it measures the electric output that can be maintained for at least 350 days each year, a figure that is sensitive to fluctuating river flows. In practice, a power plant can often generate electricity at a much higher output than this 350-days minimum, by using more

⁴⁹ See Lars Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (Ad notam Gyldendal 1996) 59-71. See also Dag Ove Skjold, *Statens Kraft 1947-1965: For Velferd og Industri* (Universitetsforlaget 2006).

⁵⁰ See Thue, *Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv* (n 49) 69-71.

⁵¹ In 2007, as the result of a gradual centralisation process, the 15 largest hydropower companies in Norway, which are largely controlled by the state and some city municipalities, owned roughly 80% of Norwegian hydropower, measured in terms of annual output. In 2006, the public owners of hydropower in Norway benefited from receiving more than NOK 9 billion in dividends. See *Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008)* (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy regarding changes to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917) 28.

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water whenever it is available.⁵²

For this reason, the number of natural horsepower in a development project is an unreliable measure of the total amount of energy harnessed in a year. As a result, it is also an unreliable starting point for assessing the value of a development project. Today, energy producers get paid for all the energy they produce, not just that which they can guarantee in advance.⁵³ Prior to the establishment of a national grid, this was different. Without a grid, fluctuations in electric output would not be evened out by supply from other parts of the country. Hence, the importance of maintaining a stable supply was much greater. Indeed, energy producers would often get paid based on the amount of electric effect they could deliver stably over the year, not the total amount of energy harnessed.⁵⁴

Hence, early in the 20th century, the notion of natural horsepower could be used to provide a sensible measure of how much a developer would be willing to pay for access to riparian rights.⁵⁵ Indeed, the notion was used in this way on the market for waterfalls that existed prior to state regulation. The price of a waterfall was typically calculated on the basis of the price that the developer was willing to pay per natural horsepower that the planned development would yield.⁵⁶ The total payment offered to the owners, consequently, would be found by multiplying the natural horsepower of the development with the price offered per natural horsepower.

This method was also adopted by appraisal courts to fix the level of compensation following expropriation.⁵⁷ Moreover, when the notion of natural horsepower fell into disuse among energy

⁵² See Christian Sontum and Einar Sofienlund, 'Ekspropriasjon av vannkraft – hvorfor den historiske metoden fra norsk rettspraksis ikke er relevant i dagens marked' [2007] (4) Småkraftnytt.

⁵³ See *Agder Energi Produksjon AS v Møllen* Rt-2008-82 (Uleberg) 83-84.

⁵⁴ See *Uleberg* (n 53) 83.

⁵⁵ See *Uleberg* (n 53) 83.

⁵⁶ See *Uleberg* (n 53) 83.

⁵⁷ Ingolf Vislie, 'Ekspropriasjon og Skjønn i Vassdrag' in Thor Falkanger og Kjell Haagenen (ed), *Vassdrags- og energirett* (2nd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2002) 521.

producers, because it no longer reflected the actual value of development projects, the courts did not modify their compensation practices. They stuck with the natural horsepower method, which was now applied on a customary basis, not as a way of calculating realistic economic values.⁵⁸

Over time, the price level became more and more unrealistic as a measure of the value of waterfalls as a natural resource. By the time of liberalisation in the early 1990s, the discrepancy had become extreme. To give an example: in 1999, the appraisal court of appeal awarded a one time payment of NOK 722 068 in compensation for a waterfall that yields 152 GWh per annum.⁵⁹ By comparison, in the case of *Sauda* from 2009, where a market-based valuation method was used, the owners of the *Maldal* river were awarded NOK 1 149 044 in compensation as a *yearly payment* for a waterfall that would yield 36.5 GWh per annum.⁶⁰ If we assume an interest rate of 4 %, this corresponds to a one time payment of NOK 28 726 100. This, in turn, corresponds to NOK 787 017 per 1 GWh produced annually. That is, the owners of *Maldal* were paid in the excess of 150 times more for their waterfall than the owners of *Hellandsfoss*.

This data is from the time after liberalisation, when commercial exploitation became possible and a more realistic method of valuation came to be used by some appraisal courts, based on the leasehold model discussed in section 3.5 of the previous chapter. However, the mismatch between economic values and compensation payments had in fact been noted much earlier, on the basis of socio-economic calculations. A major discrepancy had been identified as early as in the 1950s, by the head of the water directorate himself. In an article published in an internal newsletter in 1956, the director commented that the natural horsepower method did not result in compensation payments that reflected the economic value of waterfalls as natural resources.⁶¹ Moreover, he

⁵⁸ See, e.g., *Bergenshalvøens Kommunale Kraftselskap v Neset* RG-2000-459, 1599 (the Supreme Court comments that the method is used customarily because the market provides “little guidance”).

⁵⁹ See *Bergenshalvøens Kommunale Kraftselskap v Neset* (n 58).

⁶⁰ See *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 4).

⁶¹ See Olaf Rogstad, ‘Verdien av Rå Vannkraft’ [1956] (4) Fossekallen.

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speculated that the method could be sustained only by exploiting the lack of knowledge about hydropower development among rural populations.⁶²

One might think that the continued use of the natural horsepower method, in a situation when the water authorities themselves were aware of its shortcomings, would result in controversy. However, at this time, the local owners of waterfalls did not attack the method in court. Active resistance on this point would not be seen until much later, after the liberalisation of the electricity sector, as discussed in sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 below. However, conflicts arose with respect to other aspects of the regulatory framework regarding hydropower, as discussed in the following section.

5.4.2 Increased Scale of Development and Increased Tension

As discussed in the previous chapter, the state pursued increasingly complex hydropower projects after the Second World War. At this time, technological and economic advances also made it more feasible to divert water over great distances, to collect several different rivers in a common reservoir for joint exploitation. Such projects became known as “gutter” projects, and they grew greatly in scope during the post-War years. Since the relevant licensing procedure was covered by the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, the practical importance of the expropriation authority in section 16 of this Act also increased dramatically.

Initially, the law stood in the way of this development, since section 16 itself stated that a license to divert water should “normally” not be given unless the owners in the source rivers agreed to it.⁶³ However, this rule was removed after an amendment in 1959. The department argued that the rule had an unfortunate effect on the administrative procedure in large-scale diversion cases, noting also the vastly increasing complexity and scale of typical diversion regulations.⁶⁴ The

⁶² See Rogstad (n 61).

⁶³ See generally *Innst.O.I (1959)* (Recommendation to Parliament from parliamentary committee regarding changes to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917).

⁶⁴ *Innst.O.I (1959)* (n 63) 11.

minority in the parliamentary committee recommended against the amendment, noting that it would “greatly increase” the authority to expropriate waterfalls, conflicting with the principles of the Water Systems Act 1940.⁶⁵ However, the majority rejected this argument by maintaining that the state would prevent any abuse of power, and that the practical significance of the amendment would be limited to ensuring a “more rational” approach to large-scale applications.⁶⁶

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the opposition to hydropower grew proportionally to the scale and complexity of typical development projects.⁶⁷ The critical focus was often on environmental effects, but the interests of local people also featured in these debates. Moreover, local interest were often aligned with the environmental interests.⁶⁸

Some controversies led to legal conflicts that came before the Supreme Court. Here the claims of owners and local communities were consistently rejected. First, the Court held that owners of ancillary rights (e.g., land needed for dams or buildings) were not entitled to compensation based on the value of their rights as an asset for hydropower development.⁶⁹ Instead, they would only receive damages based on the value of their current use of the property. Second, it was held that when compensation was awarded to waterfall owners according to the natural horsepower method, then this would preclude additional compensation for harms and nuisances associated with large-scale watercourse regulation.⁷⁰

In the case of *Aura*, the owners argued that they had originally agreed to sell their water rights to a private developer, on the understanding that a specific development project would take place,

⁶⁵ See *Innst.O.I (1959)* (n 63) 14.

⁶⁶ See *Innst.O.I (1959)* (n 63) 14.

⁶⁷ See generally Yngve Nilsen, ‘Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-årene’ (2008) 87(1) *Historisk tidsskrift* 61, 64-65.

⁶⁸ See Nilsen, ‘Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-årene’ (n 67) 72-73.

⁶⁹ See *Torgeir Tjønn v Hovedstyret for Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen* Rt-1963-316 (Tokke-Vinje) 332-333.

⁷⁰ See *Endre Vange v Fellesskapet Vikfalli* Rt-1971-1217; *Sør-Trøndelag Kraftselskap v Grunneierne og rettighetshaverne i Driva-skjønnet* Rt-1982-1518 (Driva).

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not involving diversion of water.⁷¹ Hence, the owners thought that the purchaser of their water rights had not acquired a right to divert the water away from the river. Still, when the government later acquired the water rights in question, they decided to embark on a more intrusive project that *would* involve water diversion. For this reason, the owners argued that they were entitled to additional compensation.

The claim was rejected by the Supreme Court, which held that insufficient evidence had been provided to establish that the sale of the water rights was made conditional on a specific type of development.⁷² Moreover, it was held – on the basis of the facts – that the sale of the water rights had *not* been restricted to only cover the waterfall (i.e., the right to harness hydropower from the river in question). According to the Supreme Court, the fact that the rights in question had been referred to as “water rights” meant that the right to divert away the water was also included.⁷³

In the later case of *Mardøla*, the situation was similar, with the crucial difference being that these local owners had not sold “water rights”; their contract explicitly stated that what had been sold was the waterfalls.⁷⁴ However, the government interpreted this to mean that they had a right to divert water away from the river, without paying any additional compensation.⁷⁵ This contradicted the premise of *Aura*, where the decision to allow a diversion was premised on the fact that *not only* the waterfalls had been acquired by the developer. Still, in *Mardøla*, the Supreme Court cites *Aura* as the primary authority in favour of a *general rule* by which the sale of a “waterfall” also includes the right to divert water away from the river.⁷⁶ No explanation is provided by the Court

⁷¹ See *Staten (Hovedstyret for Norges vassdrag- og elektrisitetsvesen) v Peder Utigard* Rt-1961-1282 (*Aura*) 1284 (the original transaction took place in the period 1906-1910, when there was still a market for sale of waterfalls to private speculators and developers).

⁷² See *Aura* (n 71) 1285-1286.

⁷³ See *Aura* (n 71) 1284-1285.

⁷⁴ See *Neset kommune v Staten (Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen)* Rt-1973-107 (*Mardøla*) 112 (the voluntary sale dated back to the early 20th century, when the market for waterfall was still unregulated).

⁷⁵ See *Mardøla* (n 74) 112.

⁷⁶ See *Mardøla* (n 74) 112.

to reconcile this with what was actually said in *Aura*.⁷⁷

The case of *Mardøla* illustrates the increasing tension that arose regarding hydropower in the 1970s, and arguably also a tendency on part of the Supreme Court to side with large-scale development interests. Indeed, the development in *Mardøla* stirred up a high level of controversy that also resulted in civil disobedience and criminal prosecutions.⁷⁸ The culmination of the increasing tension surrounding hydropower at this time came with the case of *Alta*, where the question of procedural legitimacy was raised in full breadth. To this day, the *Alta* case remains the most important Supreme Court precedent in the area of hydropower law.

5.4.3 The *Alta* Controversy

The *Alta* case went before the Supreme Court in 1982 after a long period of high-intensity conflict going back to the mid-seventies.⁷⁹ In *Alta*, the affected local population largely lacked formal title to the property they sought to defend. This was because the development in question would take place in the northernmost part of Norway, in the native land of the Sami people.⁸⁰

Norway has a history of discrimination against the Sami, and as their culture is largely nomadic, their land rights were never formalised in private law.⁸¹ As a result, land and natural resources in the county of Finnmark are largely owned by the state, at least in the sense of the state appearing

⁷⁷ Arguably, the Court's finding on this point has since been overruled by *Jørpeland* (n 2). Here a waterfall right was defined explicitly as a right to exploit the hydropower in a river along its present trajectory. This definition was provided in order to avoid the conclusion that a diversion of water by someone other than the waterfall owner (in the source river) amounts to a waterfall expropriation. If the Court had instead concluded in keeping with the precedent set by *Mardøla*, by holding that the diversion right is part of the waterfall bundle, it would have shed serious doubt on the legitimacy of the established practice of allowing diversions under section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, with no prior acquisition of the waterfall rights in source rivers.

⁷⁸ See *Statsadvokat Knut Hval, aktor v A* Rt-1971-1120.

⁷⁹ See *Alta Laksefiskeri Interessentskap v Staten (Norges Vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen)* Rt-1982-241. For commentaries, see Torstein Eckhoff, 'Alta-dommen' [1982] *Lov og Rett* 399; Erik Boe, 'Altadommen – en rettslig løsning på konflikten mellom energiforsyning, naturvern og minoritetsbeskyttelse' (1983) 6(3) *Retfærd* 76; Geir Hågvær, 'Alta-dommen og Høyesteretts oppgave. En studie i forholdet mellom jus og økologi' [1988] (4) *Kart og Plan* 401.

⁸⁰ For Sami law generally, see Susann Funderud Skoglund, *Samerett: om samenes rett til en fortid, nåtid og fremtid* (Universitetsforlaget 2002).

⁸¹ See Øyvind Ravna, 'Samerett og samiske rettigheter i Norge' in Tore Henriksen and Øyvind Ravna (eds) (Gyldendal juridisk 2012) 149-156

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as the nominal *in rem* owner.⁸²

Due to the sensitive context of interference, the *Alta* plans met with particularly strong criticism from local people, as well as environmental groups and groups fighting for indigenous rights. A broad political movement was mobilised in opposition to the plans, eventually resulting in several serious cases of civil disobedience.⁸³ The plans for development had initially involved a dam that would flood a village and displace its inhabitants, but this aspect of the project was abandoned. However, the conflict continued, with the local population arguing that the proposed hydropower plans would threaten their livelihoods. The case eventually came before the courts, when the locals joined forces with environmental groups to request judicial review of the development licenses that had been granted.⁸⁴

The *Alta* case did not involve expropriation of waterfalls. However, because of the priority given to the licensing procedure over specific expropriation procedures, the principles expressed in *Alta* also largely determine the legal position of waterfall owners whose rights to hydropower are expropriated.⁸⁵ Moreover, the case involved expropriation of other property rights as well as special usufructuary rights held by the Sami people.

Alta was admitted to the Supreme Court in plenum, directly on appeal from the district court.⁸⁶

The presiding judge commented that as far as he knew, it was the longest and most extensive civil

⁸² In the past 30 years, partly as a response to the controversy of the *Alta* case, there has been a gradual change in attitude, whereby the rights of the Sami people receives greater legal recognition. In 2007, formal title to most of the land in the county of Finnmark was transferred to a special state agency which is regulated by a special statute that obliges it to manage the land with due regard to customary and prescriptive rights of indigenous groups and local people. See generally Kirsti Strøm Bull, 'Finnmarksloven: finnmarkseiendommen og kartlegging av rettigheter Finnmark' (2007) 46(9) *Lov og rett* 545.

⁸³ This included hunger strikes and attempts at sabotage, see Nilsen, 'Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-årene' (n 67) 80-83. For the *Alta* controversy generally, see Lars Martin Hjorthol, *Alta. Kraftkampen som utfordret statens makt* (Gyldendal akademisk 2006); 'Alta Controversy' (*Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*, 23rd January 2015) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alta_controversy) accessed 16th July 2015.

⁸⁴ See Eckhoff (n 79).

⁸⁵ See *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 4); *Jørpeland* (n 2).

⁸⁶ This is a special arrangement available in cases that raise important questions of principle, see Civil Dispute Act 2005 s 30-2 and Courts of Justice Act 1915, s 5.

case that the Court had ever heard.⁸⁷ In an opinion totalling 138 pages, the Court considers a long range of objections against the development licenses, all of which are either rejected or held to provide insufficient reasons to declare the licenses invalid.

First, the Court summarily rejects arguments based on indigenous and human rights law on the basis that the impact of the planned development would not be sufficiently severe to raise any issues in this regard.⁸⁸ After concluding in this way, the Supreme Court goes on to approach the case on the basis of administrative law. The focus is solely on the procedural rules of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. In this regard, the opponents of the *Alta* development had pointed to a large number of purported shortcomings of the decision-making process.

First, it had been argued that the original licensing application did not meet the requirements stipulated in section 5 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. Essentially, the original application contained little more than technical details about the planned development, with hardly any identification or assessment of deleterious effects.⁸⁹ This shortcoming had been openly acknowledged by the water authorities themselves, but a public hearing had nevertheless been initiated.⁹⁰

The Supreme Court concluded that this was “clearly unfortunate”.⁹¹ However, several reports and assessments had subsequently been provided, to fill the gaps left open by the initial application. For this reason, the Supreme Court held that the initial mistakes were irrelevant, since it was the licensing process as a whole that should be assessed.⁹² Shortcomings at specific stages in the

⁸⁷ *Alta* (n 79) 254.

⁸⁸ See Eckhoff (n 79) 351-352. I note that the most important international instrument protecting indigenous rights, ILO Convention No 107, was not ratified by Norway at the time of *Alta* (Norway later ratified its replacement, ILO Convention No 169). Still, it was argued that it had the status of customary international law, an argument not considered in any depth by the Supreme Court. See generally Asbjørn Eide, ‘Menneskerettigheter og samenes rettigheter’ [1980] *Lov og Rett* 139.

⁸⁹ See *Alta* (n 79) 264-265.

⁹⁰ See *Alta* (n 79) 265.

⁹¹ *Alta* (n 79) 265.

⁹² See *Alta* (n 79) 265-266.

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assessment would not be given weight unless they could be seen to imbue the process with a dubious character overall.⁹³

The Court then moved on to assess whether the process as a whole fulfilled the procedural requirements of sections 5 and 6 in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. In addition, the Court considered whether the assessment of the licensing criteria in section 8 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 had been sufficiently detailed. In addition to assessing a large amount of information regarding the negative effects of development and how these had been assessed by the water authorities, the *Alta* Court also made some important statements of principle. In particular, the Court held that since a licensing decision itself is discretionary, it is appropriate to grant the executive some margin of appreciation also with regard to the question of how to interpret vague requirements of administrative law.⁹⁴

The Court made a second decision of principle when it supported the state's contention that the administrative licensing assessment did not have to be as thorough as that required in a subsequent appraisal dispute.⁹⁵ This observation was used to downplay the risk of factual error; if mistakes are made with regard to the owners' losses at the assessment stage, these mistakes can be corrected later by a correct compensation award.

In fact, the *Alta* Court agreed that the license had been based on erroneous information about some issues, particularly regarding alternative ways to meet the need for electricity in Finnmark.⁹⁶ However, the Supreme Court did not regard the factual errors in this regard as relevant to the licensing decision.⁹⁷

Here a third clarification of principle took place. The Court held, in particular, that the duty

⁹³ *Alta* (n 79) 265.

⁹⁴ See *Alta* (n 79) 262-264.

⁹⁵ See *Alta* (n 79) 279.

⁹⁶ See *Alta* (n 79) 346-357.

⁹⁷ See *Alta* (n 79) 346.

to consider alternatives – different ways in which the public purpose could be satisfied – is very limited in hydropower cases.⁹⁸ This was how the Court dealt with factual errors and inadequate information concerning alternatives; since the information in question was not required in the first place, the mistakes had no bearing on the validity of the decision.⁹⁹

The Court's perspective on alternatives appears to have been at odds with how Parliament had approached the licensing question, on three separate occasions.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, there was little doubt that the favourable political assessment of the *Alta* development depended strongly on the perceived electricity crisis in Finnmark and the supply situation in Norway generally, as well as the perceived inadequacies of alternative solutions.¹⁰¹

Hence, it is quite remarkable how little attention the Court directs towards the factual errors and the inadequate information that had been provided in this regard.¹⁰² By contrast, the Court goes into painstaking detail regarding issues that seem to have been far less important to the political decision-makers.

The dismissive attitude towards the duty to correctly assess alternatives is a controversial aspect of the *Alta*-decision. On this point, the decision met with particularly clear criticism from legal scholars.¹⁰³ It has been argued that the way the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of alternatives in *Alta* can serve as an example of a more general tendency for the Norwegian judiciary to identify itself with other organs of state.¹⁰⁴ Some also argued that it was unlikely that *Alta* would become

⁹⁸ See *Alta* (n 79) 346.

⁹⁹ *Alta* (n 79) 346.

¹⁰⁰ See *Alta* (n 79) 342.

¹⁰¹ See *Alta* (n 79) 338-347.

¹⁰² See also the surprise expressed in Eckhoff (n 79) 349-351.

¹⁰³ See Stiansen and Haagensen (n 31) 311. For an example of a particularly critical assessment, see Inge Lorange Backer, *Naturvern og Naturinngrep* (Universitetsforlaget 1986) 580-584.

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., Hans Petter Graver, 'Norms and Decisions' (1988) 32 *Scandinavian Studies in Law* 49, 64 (commenting also that "government prestige" was at stake).

a leading precedent in this regard.¹⁰⁵ However, this has been proven wrong. Indeed, *Alta* continues to receive favourable citations by the Supreme Court, both in relation to hydropower and with respect to administrative law generally.¹⁰⁶

It should be mentioned, however, that after the *Alta* decision, the legal position of the Sami people has improved quite significantly.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the controversy surrounding *Alta* has been regarded as a catalyst for change in this regard.¹⁰⁸ Hence, it is unlikely that the courts today would be as quick as the *Alta* court to dismiss arguments based on indigenous rights.¹⁰⁹

However, with regard to local owners more generally, the *Alta* decision is considered to express key principles that still apply.¹¹⁰ At the same time, the context surrounding takings for hydropower development have changed significantly. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, takings of waterfalls now occur in a very different economic context. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, the legal context has also changed, giving rise to a situation where expropriations of waterfalls now take place to the benefit of companies operating for profit, not public utilities.

5.5 Taking Waterfalls for Profit

Following the introduction of the Water Resources Act 2000, the legislative authority to expropriate waterfalls was expanded and incorporated in the Expropriation Act 1959. This change in the law was not singled out for political consideration. In fact, the increased scope of expropriation was

¹⁰⁵ See Backer, *Naturvern og Naturinngrep* (n 103) 580-584.

¹⁰⁶ See *Naturvernforbundet i Oslo og Akershus v Staten (Miljøverndepartementet)* Rt-2009-661; *Jørpeland* (n 2).

¹⁰⁷ See generally Jon Gauslaa, 'Utviklingen av sameretten de siste 25 årene og betydningen for arealforvaltning og rettspleie' in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Areal og Eiendomsrett* (Universitetsforlaget 2007). Gauslaa presents the emergence of *Sami law*, a collection of rules and principles serving to protect established land use patterns and the Sami way of life while also giving the Sami people a better opportunity to partake in decision-making processes that affect them as group.

¹⁰⁸ See Ravna, 'Samerett og samiske rettigheter i Norge' (n 81) 156.

¹⁰⁹ See Gauslaa (n 107) 180.

¹¹⁰ See *Jørpeland* (n 2). See also Stiansen and Haagensen (n 31) 312.

not mentioned at all when the Ministry presented their proposals to Parliament. Rather, the new expropriation authority was described merely as a “simplification” of existing law.¹¹¹

The proposal stemmed from the report handed to the Ministry by a committee appointed to prepare a new Act relating to water resources. The report totals almost 500 pages, but devotes only three of those pages to discussing the new expropriation authority.¹¹² Here it is noted that a range of different authorities for expropriation has long co-existed in the law, with many of them positing strict and specific public interest requirements as a precondition for granting a license. This, it is argued, is not a very “pedagogical” way of providing expropriation authorities.¹¹³ Moreover, it is suggested that such a system runs the risk of omitting important purposes for which expropriation should be possible. Hence, the committee proposes to replace all older authorities by a sweeping authority that will make expropriation possible for the purpose of facilitating “measures in watercourses”.¹¹⁴

The committee notes that such a formulation might seem wide, but remarks that this is not a problem since the executive can simply refuse to issue an expropriation order when they regard expropriation as undesirable.¹¹⁵ There is no discussion of the consequences of such a perspective, neither in relation to property rights nor in relation to the balance of power between the legislature, the executive and the courts.

However, the later case of *Sauda* shed light on this question, as it emerged that the new authority would, for the first time in Norwegian history, make it possible for private commercial interests to

¹¹¹ *Ot.prp.nr.39 (1998-1999)* (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy regarding the Water Resources Act 2000) 223-225.

¹¹² See *NOU 1994:12* (Report to the Ministry of Business and Energy from a special committee appointed by the Crown Prince Regent in Council 09 November 1990) 235-237.

¹¹³ *NOU 1994:12* (n 112) 235.

¹¹⁴ *NOU 1994:12* (n 112) 235-236.

¹¹⁵ *NOU 1994:12* (n 112) 235.

directly expropriate waterfalls.¹¹⁶

5.5.1 *Sauda*

In *Sauda*, a case before the court of appeal, the riparian owners formally protested a license that granted a private company the right to expropriate their rivers and waterfalls.¹¹⁷ In the district court, the owners' principal argument was that the executive could not grant such a right to a private party, since the legislation authorising private expropriation of waterfalls had not been properly authorised by Parliament.¹¹⁸

This argument appeared weak, since the Expropriation Act 1959 contains a provision which implies that the executive is authorised to decide what legal persons can benefit from expropriation licenses under that Act.¹¹⁹ However, the owners argued that the executive had not appropriately informed Parliament that private takings of waterfalls would result from including the waterfall expropriation authority in the Expropriation Act 1959. It was pointed out, in particular, that the crucial amendment to the Expropriation Act 1959 had been passed as a mere formality following the adoption of the Water Resources Act 2000, on the basis of the Ministry's description of the new expropriation authority as a "simplification" of existing law.

To back up their constitutional argument, the owners presented the written testimony of two members of the parliamentary committee that had prepared and voted for the Water Resources Act 2000 and the associated amendments of the Expropriation Act 1959.¹²⁰ Neither of them could

¹¹⁶ In cases involving diversion of water, a *de facto* right to expropriate could be granted to private actors indirectly under section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. See the discussion in section 5.4.2 above.

¹¹⁷ See *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 9) (the decision from the district appraisal court) and *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 4) (the decision from the appraisal court of appeal).

¹¹⁸ See *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 9).

¹¹⁹ See section 3 of the Expropriation Act 1959. As mentioned in section 5.2 above, the provision gets to the point in a rather roundabout way, by stating that no one except state bodies may be granted a permission to expropriate, *unless* the King in Council has decided otherwise.

¹²⁰ Presented to the Court in *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 9) (available from the author on request).

recollect that they had been aware that their actions would make private expropriation possible. Plainly, they had not been told, and had not realised on their own, that this would be the result. Their ignorance was not in fact very surprising, since the crucial change in the law was only apparent as an implicit consequence of the combined effect of three different sections in two separate Acts.¹²¹ In the entire collection of preparatory documents, the change was discussed only once, and then only very briefly, in the report from the committee to the Ministry.

On this basis, the owners argued that the purported expropriation authority was not constitutionally valid, since Parliament had not intended it. Unsurprisingly, this argument was rejected by the district court.¹²² It had to be assumed that members of Parliament understood the consequences of their own legislative actions.

Interestingly, however, when the case went before the court of appeal, the issue was not discussed at all, since the court decided to rely on a *different* authority as the legislative basis for allowing the expropriation to go ahead. Specifically, since the expropriation in question involved a diversion of water, the court of appeal held that the taker did not in fact require the expropriation license it had been granted pursuant to the Expropriation Act 1959. Section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 would suffice.¹²³ Hence, the constitutional question could be laid to rest.

In addition to the constitutional complaint, the owners in *Sauda* also raised procedural objections. They argued, in particular, that the expropriation question had been insufficiently assessed by the water authorities.¹²⁴ The court did not agree, and the procedural arguments at stake here foreshadow the later Supreme Court case of *Jørpeland*, discussed in more depth in section 5.6.

While the owners in *Sauda* lost the validity dispute, the level of compensation they received

¹²¹ See the Water Resources Act 2000 s 51 and the Expropriation Act 1959, ss 2, 3.

¹²² See *Aktieselskabet Saundefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 9).

¹²³ See *Aktieselskabet Saundefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 4). See also the discussion in section 5.2 above.

¹²⁴ See *Aktieselskabet Saundefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 4).

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was dramatically increased compared to earlier practice. Because of this, the development company appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, with the owners lodging a counter-appeal regarding the question of legitimacy. The Supreme Court decided not to hear the case, possibly because it had recently considered the compensation issue in the case of *Uleberg*, discussed in the next section.¹²⁵

5.5.2 *Uleberg*

Just before the *Sauda* case was decided by the court of appeal, the Supreme Court had addressed the compensation question in the case of *Uleberg*.¹²⁶ Here the Supreme Court agreed in principle that the natural horsepower method was not binding on the appraisal courts. Specifically, the Court held that market value compensation could be awarded just in case small-scale development by owners would have been “foreseeable” in the absence of expropriation.¹²⁷ In *Uleberg*, this was not the case. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the relevant date of valuation was in 1968, when the waterfall rights in question had been transferred to the developer by a voluntary agreement.¹²⁸

This agreement stated that the final payment to the owners should be fixed by the appraisal courts at the time when the development took place. Both the appraisal court and the appraisal court of appeal took this to mean that the valuation should be based on the value of the waterfall at the time when the compensation was awarded. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding instead that the intended reading was that the valuation should be based on the value of the waterfall at the date when the voluntary agreement was made (with interest paid for the delay).¹²⁹

Furthermore, the Supreme Court then stated, without any substantive argument, that the

¹²⁵ As is the norm in Norway, the Supreme Court did not give any reason for its refusal to hear *Sauda*.

¹²⁶ See *Uleberg* (n 53).

¹²⁷ See *Uleberg* (n 53) 81.

¹²⁸ See *Uleberg* (n 53) 70.

¹²⁹ See *Uleberg* (n 53) 71.

natural horsepower method should then be used.¹³⁰ Presumably, this was based on the opinion that it was obvious that owner-led development would have been ‘unforeseeable’ at the relevant time of valuation. The exact meaning of the foreseeability requirement has since become a much contested issue, resulting in several Supreme Court cases pertaining specifically to the compensation question.

5.5.3 Recent Developments on Compensation

Since *Uleberg*, there have been many controversial cases involving expropriation of waterfalls.¹³¹ In most of these, the issue of compensation has occupied center stage. With respect to this issue, owners initially appeared to be gaining significant ground, as the appraisal courts started to apply a market-based method quite systematically, resulting in dramatically increased compensation payments.¹³²

The large energy companies consistently resisted this development, typically by arguing that small-scale hydropower was unforeseeable and therefore not compensable according to the principle expressed in *Uleberg*.¹³³ Moreover, the takers would tend to argue that a license to undertake large-scale development was by itself conclusive evidence that small-scale development was unforeseeable.¹³⁴ The large-scale development license showed, according to the takers, that a license to undertake small-scale development would not have been granted.

This line of argument conflicts with the so-called no-scheme principle, whereby compensation

¹³⁰ See *Uleberg* (n 53) 62.

¹³¹ See generally Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter’ [2006] *Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett* 175; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Fallerstatning – Uleberg-dommen’ [2008] *Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett* 46; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Er naturhestekraftmetoden rettshistorie?’ [2012] (1) *Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett* 21.

¹³² See the discussion on the natural horsepower method above, in section 5.4.1. See also Katrine Broch Hauge, ‘Erstatningsnivået ved tvangsovertaking av fallrettar’ (PhD Thesis, 2015) 278-290.

¹³³ See, e.g., *BKK Produksjon AS v Austgulen* Rt-2011-1683 (Kløvtveit); *Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaen Brugseierforening v Bjørnarå* Rt-2010-1056; *Bjørnarå v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening* Rt-2013-612.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., *Otra I* (n 133) 17.

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for expropriated property is to be based on the situation such as it would have been in the absence of the expropriation scheme.¹³⁵ This principle is often contentious, and notoriously hard to apply in practice.¹³⁶ However, in hydropower cases, its meaning is typically clear enough: compensation should be based on the situation as it would have been in the absence of plans for large-scale development. Hence, the energy companies contradict the no-scheme principle when they argue that small-scale hydropower should be considered unforeseeable *because* the licensing authorities prefer large-scale development.

In most early cases before the lower courts, this type of argument failed precisely because the no-scheme principle was applied. Moreover, in the case of *Otra I*, the Supreme Court appeared to express its support for this line of precedent.¹³⁷ However, the Court did not focus specifically on the no-scheme principle and how it should be applied in hydropower cases. Moreover, the taker in that case succeeded in having the appraisal court of appeal's decision overturned on the basis that inadequate reasons had been provided to justify the amount of compensation awarded to owners.¹³⁸ The court of appeal therefore had to hear the case again. This time, the taker was able to successfully argue that small-scale hydropower was unforeseeable. Hence, the court of appeal

¹³⁵ This principle is found in many jurisdictions. See JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), *Expropriation Law in Europe* (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 20-21; Amnon Lehari and Amir N Licht, 'Eminent Domain, Inc.' (2007) 107(7) Columbia Law Review 1704, 1722. The common law formulation is also often referred to as the *Pointe Gourde* rule, named after *Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad and Tobago)* [1947] UKPC 71.

¹³⁶ For a recent clarification of (some aspects of) the principle as applied in England and Wales, see *Waters and other v Welsh National Assembly* [2004] UKHL 19; *Transport for London v Spierose Limited* [2009] UKHL 44, (2009) 1 WLR 1797. There have been many calls for legislative reform as well, which have so far not been taken up by the government, see Emma Waring, 'Expropriation Law in England' in JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), *Expropriation Law in Europe* (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 152. In Norway, the principle has proven itself equally problematic (if not more so), see for instance *NOU 2003:29* (Report to the Ministry of Justice and Police from a special committee appointed by the King in Council 16 March 2001) (including an aggressive dissent from a professor of law opposing a widening of the no-scheme principle, especially in cases when the 'scheme' involves protecting the environment). I also mention that in economic development situations, a wide application of the no-scheme principle can have the effect of precluding benefit sharing between takers and owners, giving rise to a legitimacy issue that is discussed in depth in Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, 'On the compensatory approach to economic development takings' in Björn Hoops and others (eds), *The Context, Criteria, and Consequences of Expropriation* (forthcoming, Ius Commune 2015).

¹³⁷ See *Otra I* (n 133) 31-48.

¹³⁸ See *Otra I* (n 133) 52.

used the natural horsepower method to calculate compensation.¹³⁹

The owners duly appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the case for a second time.¹⁴⁰ But this time, the Supreme Court endorsed the understanding of the no-scheme principle argued for by the energy company. Specifically, the Court refused to censor the appraisal court of appeal's assessment of foreseeability, even though it was based explicitly on the premise that the expropriation project was preferable from the point of view of the licensing authorities.¹⁴¹

If the precedent set by *Otra II* stands, compensation for the loss of alternative development opportunities will generally not be awarded in future cases where waterfalls are expropriated in favour of large-scale schemes.¹⁴² However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has been very vague on how exactly it understands the no-scheme principle in these cases. Instead of tackling this issue directly, the Court has chosen to rely largely on deference to the foreseeability determinations carried out by the appraisal courts.

This is clearly illustrated by the earlier case of *Kløtveit*.¹⁴³ Here the Supreme Court agreed with the appraisal court of appeal that it might in principle be foreseeable that the owners, in the absence of expropriation, could have cooperated with the taker to implement the expropriation project. This too contradicts the no-scheme principle, but unlike the reasoning of *Otra II*, it also provides an alternative route to substantial compensation, on the basis of a valuation of the expropriation project itself. In effect, it points to an approach that promises to deliver a form of *benefit sharing*

¹³⁹ In fact, the court used a slightly modified version of the method, first developed in *Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad* (n 4), serving to make the discrepancy between market value and compensation slightly less pronounced. See *Bjørnarå v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening* LA-2010-181441.

¹⁴⁰ See *Otra II* (n 133).

¹⁴¹ See *Otra II* (n 133) 53-54.

¹⁴² The precedent has already been used to deny such compensation in the case of *SKS Produksjon AS v Pedersen* LH-2015-92631 (Smibelg) (appeal to the Supreme Court denied).

¹⁴³ See *Kløtveit* (n 133).

between owners and takers.

For this reason, *Kløtveit* is an interesting decision. However, it seems quite unlikely that it will become an important precedent for the future. Its importance was undermined already by *Otra II*, when the presiding judge explicitly denied that cooperation between the taker and the owners was a realistic scenario in that case.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, *Kløtveit* itself was eventually sent back to the appraisal court of appeal, because the Supreme Court held that the date of valuation had been incorrectly determined.¹⁴⁵ On the second hearing in the appraisal court of appeal, cooperation between owners and taker was regarded as unforeseeable, so market value compensation was denied.¹⁴⁶

In fact, no case heard by the Supreme Court so far has concluded with compensation based on commercial values. In the end, the natural horsepower method has always been used. This, no doubt, sends a clear signal to the appraisal courts. In the future, it seems likely that we will see a resurgence of the natural horsepower method and a return to compensation awards amounting to tiny fractions of the values that are taken from local owners.

In light of this development, the broader issue of legitimacy becomes increasingly important. The financial entitlements of owners and communities, which seemed to be better protected after *Uleberg*, are again at risk of being undermined. Moreover, as the social function theory of property indicates, the issue of legitimacy goes well beyond the individual financial entitlements of owners. It also pertains to the future of the local communities, the duties of owners in this regard, sustainable management, and the democratic legitimacy of decision-making regarding natural resources. These aspects have not received any attention from Norwegian courts so far. However, as I have already mentioned, the case of *Jørpeland* saw the procedural legitimacy of hydropower takings come to the forefront, for the first time since the case of *Alta*. In addition to clarifying legal points in this

¹⁴⁴ See *Otra II* (n 133) 69-71.

¹⁴⁵ See *Kløtveit* (n 133) 35-39.

¹⁴⁶ See *BKK Produksjon AS v Austgulen* LG-2011-205374.

regard, the case also sheds light on the practices adopted by the water authorities in expropriation cases. Hence, it provides an excellent opportunity for a closer inquiry into the legitimacy question.

5.6 A detailed case study: *Ola Måland v Jørpeland Kraft AS*

The expropriating party was a public-private commercial partnership, Jørpeland Kraft AS. Originally, this limited liability company was jointly owned by Scana Steel Stavanger AS, with 1/3 of the shares, and Lyse Kraft AS, with the remainder.¹⁴⁷ Lyse Kraft AS is a publicly owned energy company with the city municipality of Stavanger being the dominating shareholder. Scana Steel Stavanger AS, on the other hand, was a subsidiary of the publicly traded Scana Steel Industrier ASA. The largest shareholder of the parent company is a private individual, a leading business person and one of the richest people in the city of Stavanger.¹⁴⁸

Scana Steel had long operated a steel mill in the small town of Jørpeland, belonging to the municipality of Stranda, Rogaland county, in south-west Norway. The source of energy was a relatively small hydropower plant harnessing energy from the river that reaches the sea near Jørpeland.¹⁴⁹ At the height of activity, the mill had about 1200 employees and was an important local institution.¹⁵⁰ However, after going bankrupt and being reorganised in 1977, the importance of the steel mill declined significantly.¹⁵¹ After a second bankruptcy in 2015, Scana Steel Stavanger AS was wound up. The mill has since been reorganised yet again, with the number of employees reduced

¹⁴⁷ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* TSTAV-2007-185495, 2.

¹⁴⁸ See Harald Birkevold, 'Milliardærer mot strømmen' (*Aftenbladet*, 21st October 2009) (<http://www.aftenbladet.no/nyheter/okonomi/skatt/Milliardarer-mot-strommen-2078850.html>) accessed 3rd September 2015 (the business man in question is John Arild Ertvaag).

¹⁴⁹ See Camilla Aadland, 'Scana Industrier vil eie kraften selv' (*Teknisk Ukeblad*, 2nd November 2009) (<http://www.tu.no/kraft/2009/11/02/scana-industrier-vil-eie-kraften-selv>) accessed 3rd September 2015.

¹⁵⁰ See Eilef A Meland and Geir Nybø, *Konkursen ved Stavanger Staal A/S: reorganisering, ansettelsestrygghet og arbeidsmarkedspolitik* (Rogalandsforskning 1982) 11.

¹⁵¹ See Meland and Nybø (n 150) 8-15.

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from around 100 to around 30.¹⁵²

In parallel with the decline of the steel mill, the hydropower plant in Jørpeland was rebuilt and expanded, not to supply energy for local industry, but to sell electricity on the national grid.¹⁵³ Jørpeland Kraft AS was put in charge of this development, which was thereby decoupled from the steel mill operations. In 2011, the same year when *Måland* came before the Supreme Court, Scana Steel Stavanger AS sold their shares in Jørpeland Kraft AS to the German investment company Aquilla Capital.¹⁵⁴ In light of this, the story of Jørpeland nicely illustrates broader trends in the history of hydropower, reflecting the centralisation and commercialisation pressures discussed in chapter 4.

The river that gave rise to controversy in *Måland* was not located in the same municipality as Jørpeland, but in a different valley across a mountain range, in the rural municipality of Hjelmeland. The contested license in *Måland* gave Jørpeland Kraft AS the right to divert the water from this river for electricity production at Jørpeland. In the following, I present the facts of the case in more detail, before considering the legal questions that were addressed by the courts.

5.6.1 The Facts of the Case

The plans to divert water from Hjelmeland would deprive riparian owners of potential hydropower along some 15 kilometres of riverbed, all the way from the mountains on the border between Hjelmeland and Jørpeland, to the sea at Tau. Not all the water would be removed, but the flow of water would be greatly reduced in the upper part of the river known as Sagåna, the rights to which is held jointly by Ola Måland and five other local farmers from Hjelmeland.

The water in question comes from a lake called Brokavatn, located 646 meters above sea level,

¹⁵² See Tor Inge Jøssang, 'Smelter igjen på stålverket' (*Aftenbladet*, 21st April 2015) (<http://www.aftenbladet.no/nyheter/lokalt/ryfylke/Smelter-igjen-pa-stalverket-3679339.html>) accessed 3rd September 2015.

¹⁵³ See Aadland (n 149).

¹⁵⁴ See John Sandvik, 'Vannet blir delvis tysk' (*Strandbuen*, 6th July 2011) (http://strandbuen.no/index.php?page=vis_nyhet&NyhetID=7652) accessed 3rd September 2015.

where altitude soon drops rapidly, making the river suitable for hydropower development. Plans were already in place for such a project, which would use the water from just below the altitude of Brokavatn, to the valley in which the original owners' farms are located, about 80 meters above sea level.

A rough estimate of the potential of this project was made by the NVE itself, stating that the energy yield would be 7.49 GWh per annum.¹⁵⁵ This is about five times more energy than the water from Brokavatn would contribute to the project proposed by Jørpeland Kraft AS.¹⁵⁶

This estimate was not made in relation to the expropriation case, but as part of a national project to survey the remaining energy potential in Norwegian rivers.¹⁵⁷ The owners were not informed of these assessments carried out regarding their resources. Moreover, even after Jørpeland Kraft AS had submitted a formal application for permission to divert the water, the owners were not notified that this would deprive them of a valuable natural resource.¹⁵⁸

Moreover, the procedural approach to the case was the traditional one, with an assessment directed at evaluating the environmental impact. Many interest groups were called on to comment on environmental consequences, and public debate arose with respect to the balancing of commercial interests and the desire to preserve wildlife and nature.¹⁵⁹

One of the local owners, Arne Ritland, also commented on the proposed project. He did this in an informal letter sent directly to Scana Steel Stavanger AS.¹⁶⁰ In this letter, he inquired for further

¹⁵⁵ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 16.

¹⁵⁶ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 19.

¹⁵⁷ The survey was carried out in 2004 and its results are summarised in Torodd Jensen (ed), *Beregning av Potensial for Små Kraftverk i Norge* (Rapport nr. 19-2004, NVE 2004).

¹⁵⁸ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 16. The owners claimed not to have been notified of the diversion plans at all, but Jørpeland Kraft AS was able to convince the court of appeal that *they* had sent a generic orientation letter to substantially affected private individuals, including the owners of Sagåna. See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* LG-2009-138108, 5.

¹⁵⁹ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 19.

¹⁶⁰ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 17.

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information and protested the proposed diversion of water from Brokavatn. He also mentioned the possibility that an alternative hydropower project could be undertaken by original owners, but he did not go into any details, stating only that a locally owned hydropower plant had previously been in operation in the area.¹⁶¹

Arne Ritland received a reply from Scana Steel Stavanger AS, which stated that more information on the project and its consequences would soon be provided. Ritland did not pursue the matter further at this time. Meanwhile, Scana Steel Stavanger AS submitted his letter to the NVE, who in turn presented it as a comment directed at the application.¹⁶²

This prompted the majority owner of Jørpeland Kraft AS, Lyse Kraft AS, to undertake their own survey of alternative hydropower in Sagåna.¹⁶³ The conclusions were sent to the water authorities, but the owners were not informed that such an investigation was being conducted.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, the water authorities did not take steps to investigate the commercial potential of local hydropower on their own accord. Instead, they referred to the conclusion presented by Jørpeland Kraft AS, stating that if the local owners decided to build two hydropower plants in Sagåna, then one of them, in the upper part of the river, would not be profitable, not even with the contested water. The other project, in the lower part, could apparently still be carried out, even after the diversion.¹⁶⁵

No mention was made of what the original owners stood to lose, nor was there any argument given as to why it made sense to build two separate small-scale power plants in Sagåna. Nevertheless, the NVE handed the expropriating party's findings over to the Ministry, without conducting

¹⁶¹ The plant he was referring to dates back to the time before there was a national grid. It ensured a local supply of electricity, but has since been shut down, in keeping with the general trend mentioned in chapter 4, section 4.4.

¹⁶² *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 18.

¹⁶³ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 19.

¹⁶⁴ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 23.

¹⁶⁵ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 23.

their own assessment and without informing the original owners.¹⁶⁶

In addition to the report made by Jørpeland Kraft AS, the municipality government of Hjelmeland also commented on the possibility of local hydropower. In its statement to the NVE, the municipality directed attention to the data in the NVE's own national survey, which suggested that a single hydropower plant in Sagåna would be a highly beneficial undertaking.¹⁶⁷ On this basis, the municipality protested the diversion, arguing that original owners should be given the possibility of undertaking such a project. This statement was not communicated to the original owners, and in its final report, the NVE stated that the most efficient use of the water would be to transfer it and harness it at Jørpeland.¹⁶⁸

In addition to the statement made by Ritland, one other property owner, Ola Måland, commented on the plans.¹⁶⁹ He did so without having any knowledge of the commercial potential of the waterfall and without having been informed of the statement made by the municipality of Hjelmeland. On this basis, Måland expressed his support for Jørpeland Kraft's plans, citing that the risk of flooding in Sagåna would be reduced. He also phrased his letter in such a way that it could be interpreted as a statement on behalf of the owners as a group.¹⁷⁰ However, Måland was the only person who signed.

In the final report to the Ministry, the NVE refers to Måland's letter and state that the owners are in favour of the plans.¹⁷¹ For this reason, the NVE concludes that the opinion of the municipality of Hjelmeland should not be given any weight.¹⁷² The NVE neglects to mention that

¹⁶⁶ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 22-23.

¹⁶⁷ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 19.

¹⁶⁸ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 19.

¹⁶⁹ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 17.

¹⁷⁰ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 17.

¹⁷¹ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 19.

¹⁷² See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 19.

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Arne Ritland's statement strongly opposed the development.

The report made by the NVE was not communicated to the affected local owners at all, so the owners had no chance of correcting the mistakes that had been made. However, the report was sent to many other stakeholders, including the municipality of Hjelmeland.¹⁷³ In light of the report, the municipality changed their original position and informed the Ministry that they would not press for local hydropower, since this was not what the affected owners (i.e., Ola Måland) wanted.¹⁷⁴

Again, this happened without the owners' knowledge. However, while the case was being prepared by the water authorities, the original owners had begun to seriously consider the potential for hydropower on their own accord. In late 2006, Jørpeland Kraft's application reached the Ministry and a decision was imminent. At the same time, the owners were under the impression that they would receive further information before the case progressed to the assessment stage.

All the owners, including Ola Måland, had now come to realise the value of the water from Brokavatn. Hence, they approached the NVE, inquiring about the status of the plans proposed by Jørpeland Kraft AS. They were subsequently informed that an opinion in support of the transfer had already been delivered to the Ministry. This communication took place in late November 2006, summarised in minutes from meetings between local owners, dated 21 and 29 November. On 15 December 2006, the King in Council granted a concession for Jørpeland Kraft AS to transfer the water from Brokavatn to Jørpeland.¹⁷⁵

At this point, it had become clear to the original owners that the water from Brokavatn would be crucial to the commercial potential of their own project. They also retrieved expert opinions that further substantiated that the NVE was wrong to conclude that diversion to Jørpeland would

¹⁷³ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 24.

¹⁷⁴ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 24.

¹⁷⁵ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 3.

be the most efficient use of the water.¹⁷⁶ In light of this, the owners decided to question the legality of the licence (with the corresponding permission to expropriate).

In the following section, I present the main legal arguments relied on by the parties, as well as a summary of how the three national courts judged the case.

5.6.2 Legal Arguments

First, the owners argued that procedural mistakes had been made by the water authorities when preparing the case.¹⁷⁷ This, in turn, had resulted in factual mistakes forming the basis of the decision to grant the development license. Since the outcome might have been different if these mistakes had not been made, the owners concluded that the development license could not be upheld.

Second, the owners argued that expropriation of their rights would result in a disproportionate loss of an economic development potential.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, they argued that the economic loss would clearly be greater than the gain also from the point of view of the public, since the owners were in a position to make more efficient use of the contested water. Therefore, allowing expropriation would only serve to benefit the commercial interests of Jørpeland Kraft AS, to the detriment of both local and public interests.

Third, the owners argued that the government had not fulfilled its duty to consider the case with due care.¹⁷⁹ In particular, the assessment of local community interests and the interests of local owners had not been satisfactory. The local owners should have been informed about the progress of the case, especially when assessments were made pertaining to their hydropower interests.

Fourth, the owners argued that irrespective of how the matter stood with respect to national

¹⁷⁶ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 23.

¹⁷⁷ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 12.

¹⁷⁸ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 5.

¹⁷⁹ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 12.

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law, the expropriation was unlawful because it would be in breach of the provisions in P1(1) of the ECHR regarding the protection of property.¹⁸⁰

Jørpeland Kraft AS protested, arguing first that the report from the NVE was not based on factually erroneous information.¹⁸¹ With respect to the apparent mistakes that had been made, Jørpeland Kraft AS argued that these did not in any event undermine the quality of the report as a whole.¹⁸² Moreover, it was argued that Måland had probably discussed the diversion of water with other affected owners, and that they had all probably agreed to support it.¹⁸³

Furthermore, according to Jørpeland Kraft AS, all the procedural rules of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 had been observed. Other procedural rules might be relevant, but only if they were compatible with sector-specific practices.¹⁸⁴ It was also argued that it was not for the courts to subject the assessment of public and private interests to any further scrutiny, since this was a matter for the administrative branch.¹⁸⁵ Finally, Jørpeland Kraft AS argued that diverting the water did not represent a breach of the owners' human rights.¹⁸⁶ They argued for this by pointing to the fact that the procedural rules had been followed and that the material decision was discretionary. Moreover, Jørpeland Kraft AS argued that since the owners would be compensated financially for whatever loss they incurred, it was clear that no human rights issues were at stake in the case.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁰ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 07-08.

¹⁸¹ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 16.

¹⁸² See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 2.

¹⁸³ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 2.

¹⁸⁴ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 16.

¹⁸⁵ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 2.

¹⁸⁶ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 2.

¹⁸⁷ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 2.

5.6.3 The Lower Courts

The matter went before the district court in the city of Stavanger, which decided in favour of the owners on 20 May 2009.¹⁸⁸ The district court agreed with the local owners that the decision to grant the license was based on an erroneous account of the relevant facts.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, the court concluded that it was evident that allowing the applicants to use the water from Brokavatn in their own hydroelectric scheme would be the most efficient way of harnessing the hydropower potential.¹⁹⁰ This, the court noted, directly contradicted what the NVE had stated in their report.¹⁹¹

The court backed up its conclusion by giving several direct quotes from the report made by the NVE. On the legal side, the court relied on a well-established principle of administrative law: while the exercise of discretionary powers is usually not subject to review by court, a decision based on factual mistakes is invalid if it can be shown that the mistakes in question were such that they could have affected the outcome.¹⁹² Since the small-scale alternative would in fact represent a more effective use of the water in question, the court was not in doubt that this principle applied here.¹⁹³

After this, there was no need to consider claims regarding the legitimacy of the diversion with respect to human rights law. However, the district court commented that the traditional procedure used to deal with diversion cases was inadequate and had to be supplemented by looking to the procedural rules in the Expropriation Act 1959 and the Public Administration Act 1967.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁸ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147).

¹⁸⁹ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 25.

¹⁹⁰ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 22-23.

¹⁹¹ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 23.

¹⁹² See Public Administration Act 1967, s 41; Torstein Eckhoff and Eivind Smith, *Forvaltningsrett* (10th edn, Universitetsforlaget 2014) 407-410.

¹⁹³ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 25.

¹⁹⁴ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 21.

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Moreover, the court made a crucial statement about expropriation of riparian rights in general, regarding the duty of the water authorities to properly assess whether or not an expropriation license should be granted.¹⁹⁵ This duty, the court held, included a duty to properly consider negative effects on small-scale development potentials.¹⁹⁶ According to the court, this was the natural consequence of the increasing interest in small-scale development.

If the principle expressed by the district court on this point had been allowed to stand, it would have had significant implications for the water authorities. Specifically, it would directly confront their traditional lack of interest in the expropriation question. However, it was not to be, as the district court's decision was overturned on appeal.

The court of appeal approached the case very different than the district court. Specifically, its decision did not rely on any close assessment of the facts against the report made by the NVE. Instead, the court of appeal largely based its decision on the opinion that the rules in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 exhaustively regulate the administrative procedure in watercourse regulation cases.¹⁹⁷ According to the court of appeal, the procedural rules in the Expropriation Act 1959 and the Public Administration Act 1967 do not apply at all to diversions of water authorised under section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.¹⁹⁸

This finding was based on the argument that the more specific rules of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 have priority under the so-called *lex specialis* principle, which applies in case of conflict between different sets of rules, giving priority to those that are more specific.¹⁹⁹ Apparently, the court thought that the procedural rules of the Expropriation Act 1959 and the Public

¹⁹⁵ Compare Expropriation Act 1959, s 12 and Public Administration Act 1967, s 16.

¹⁹⁶ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 22.

¹⁹⁷ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 7.

¹⁹⁸ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 7.

¹⁹⁹ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 7.

Administration Act 1967 conflict with the rules that apply specifically in hydropower cases.²⁰⁰ With regard to the procedural rules of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, the conclusion is that the NVE's assessment met all general requirements and was clearly adequate. Regarding the factual basis for the license, the court did not comment on most of the evidence presented to it. Moreover, the Court did not address those quoted segments of the report from the NVE that had formed the basis for the district court's decision.

Specifically, the court of appeal never mentions the objection to the transfer made by the municipality of Hjelmeland, nor does it mention the fact the small-scale alternative proposed by the municipality would use the contested water more effectively. Instead, the court of appeal points out that the NVE was well aware of the possibility of developing small-scale hydropower, was well-informed about such development, and had considered it during their assessment.²⁰¹ The court notes that the NVE's written assessment on this point was brief, but argues that this must be understood as a natural response to what the court of appeal describes as a lack of input from local owners.²⁰²

The owners appealed the court of appeal's decision to the Supreme Court, which decided to hear the juridical aspects of the case.²⁰³

5.6.4 The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court approached the case in much the same way as the court of appeal. Regarding the facts, the Court emphasised that the majority owner of Jørpeland Kraft AS had considered

²⁰⁰ The court also made a sweeping remark to the effect that the rules in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 conform to all "basic and general" procedural demands of administrative law. This seems to be a reference to core unwritten principles, not specific provisions included in other Acts.

²⁰¹ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 9.

²⁰² See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 158) 9.

²⁰³ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 8. Specifically, the Supreme Court would not engage in any independent fact-finding, but only consider legal questions, including how the law should be applied to the facts.

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the possibility that a hydroelectric scheme could be undertaken by local property owners.²⁰⁴ As mentioned, Lyse Kraft AS had indeed made a report on this, concluding that one small-scale plant would be unprofitable regardless of the diversion, while another one, further down in the river, could still be carried out.²⁰⁵ As mentioned earlier, the report did not explain why anyone would want to build two consecutive small-scale plants so close to each other in the same river.²⁰⁶

In any case, the follow-up question was what the owners stood to lose when the water from Brokavatn was diverted away from Sagåna. Both the report and the Supreme Court remained silent on this point. Moreover, the Court does not mention that the report was never handed over to the applicants, nor that the details of the calculations were never independently considered by the NVE. Just like the court of appeal, the Supreme Court also neglects to mention that small-scale development would be a more efficient use of the water, according to the national survey of small-scale potentials carried out by the NVE itself.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, no mention is made of the fact that the NVE claims that the opposite is true in the report to the Ministry, contradicting also the statement made by the municipality of Hjelmeland.

Regarding the legal questions raised by the case, the Supreme Court rejects the view that the procedural rules in the Expropriation Act 1959 and the Public Administration Act 1967 do not apply to the case.²⁰⁸ However, the Court holds that these procedural rules do not imply a more extensive duty to assess the expropriation question, compared to established practices in hydropower cases.²⁰⁹

Importantly, there is no rule in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 which states that the

²⁰⁴ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 53.

²⁰⁵ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 23.

²⁰⁶ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 16.

²⁰⁷ See *Jørpeland Kraft AS v Måland* (n 147) 16.

²⁰⁸ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 32-34.

²⁰⁹ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 51-52 (citing also the *Alta* case, *Alta* (n 79)).

authorities are required to consider specifically the question of how the regulation affects the interests of property owners. This is also rarely done in practice.²¹⁰ However, a rule explicitly demanding this is found in section 2 of the Expropriation Act 1959.

This is not regarded as a procedural rule, as it pertains to the *content* of substantive considerations. Hence, according to the Supreme Court, the rule does not apply at all when expropriation takes place on the basis of section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.²¹¹ This was the conclusion despite the fact that section 30 of the Expropriation Act 1959 explicitly states that the provisions of that Act apply to expropriations pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, in so far as they are compatible with the rules therein. It would appear to follow, by implication, that the Supreme Court does *not* think that directing more attention at owners' interests is compatible with the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.

This is a clear rejection of the principled position taken by the district court, whereby the water authorities should generally be obliged to consider small-scale alternatives before allowing expropriation. According to the Supreme Court, no special procedural obligations arise on account of the owners' interests in small-scale development. Essentially, cases that involve expropriation can be processed as though the waterfalls already belonged to the applicant; expropriation is permitted to remain a non-issue during the licensing process pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.²¹²

Formally, this implication of *Jørpeland* only applies to expropriations carried out on the basis

²¹⁰ See Ragnhild Stokker (ed), *Konsesjonshandsaming av vasskraftsaker – Rettleiar for utarbeiding av meldingar, konsekvensutgreiingar og søknader* (Rettleier nr 3/2010, NVE 2010). This is the water authorities' own guideline for the assessment of large-scale applications. The previous version of this guideline (which also fails to mention the interests of owners) was presented to the Supreme Court. The Court also refers to it explicitly when it comments that existing practices are beyond reproach. See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 51.

²¹¹ See *Jørpeland* (n 2) 30.

²¹² Moreover, the procedural standards that the water authorities were held to in *Jørpeland* appear to be essentially the same as those formulated by the Court in *Alta* (n 79). In particular, the *Jørpeland* Court maintained a controversial position on the duty to assess alternatives, see Nikolai K Winge, *Kampen om arealene: Rettslige styringsmidler for en helhetlig utmarksforvaltning* (Universitetsforlaget 2013) 157.

of section 16 of that act. However, in practice, there is reason to believe that the impact will be the same for all cases involving large-scale hydropower development. Indeed, the water authorities themselves do not appear to make any significant distinction between cases where expropriation is automatic and cases where a separate license is formally required.²¹³

5.7 Predation?

How should takings of waterfalls be assessed according to the normative theory developed in the first part of this theory? In chapter 3, I presented the Gray test, a set of key assessment points for determining whether a taking violates important property norms.²¹⁴ In the following, I briefly assess takings of waterfalls against the criteria of the Gray test, to shed further light on the normative status of current practices observed in Norway.

5.7.0.1 The Balance of Power

In light of the presentation so far, it is safe to conclude that typical large-scale waterfall expropriations in Norway are marked by a severe imbalance of power between the taker and the owners. The economic and political power of local communities is clearly very limited compared to that of the large energy companies. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that this imbalance is accentuated by procedural arrangements and practices presided over by the water authorities. As demonstrated by the case of *Jørpeland*, the formal position of owners and local communities under administrative law is very weak in hydropower cases. Hence, in addition to shedding doubt on the legitimacy of current practices in Norway, assessing waterfall takings against the balance of power criterion also underscores that this criterion is related to administrative law.

Ideally, procedural rules should function so as to maintain an appropriate balance of power

²¹³ See Flatby (n 1).

²¹⁴ See chapter 3, section 3.5.

between the different actors involved in an administrative dispute. At least, the rich and powerful should not be allowed to dominate decision-making processes within the polity, at the expense of those most intimately affected by the decisions reached. If the administrative branch fails in this regard, or acts in such a way that existing imbalances are worsened, this is surely a cause for additional criticism with respect to the balance of power criterion. I believe the case study so far shows that the framework for management of Norwegian hydropower is deserving of such criticism.

5.7.0.2 The Net Effect on the Parties

The immediate financial effect that a taking for hydropower has on the owners depends on how the compensation is calculated. As discussed in section 5.4.3, the law on this point has been in turmoil in recent years. In the late 2000s, there were signs that a commercially realistic valuation method might become dominant, leading in turn to a dramatic increase in compensation compared to earlier practice based on the natural horsepower method. But this trend now appears to have been reversed, as the energy companies have successfully argued that a license for large-scale development counts as proof that owner-led projects would not in any case have been ‘foreseeable’ (because the necessary licenses would not have been granted). For this reason, the argument goes, owners suffer no actual loss when their resources are taken from them.²¹⁵

The local owners are in an even weaker position when it comes to indirect financial effects, as well as social and political effects, such as harms done to the cohesion and prosperity of the local community. In this regard, losses are not only under-compensated, they are typically not acknowledged at all, neither by the executive nor by the courts. The effects that go unnoticed range from the concrete, such as losses incurred because the expropriation proceedings drag out in time, to the abstract, such as the damage that is done to democracy when owners and local municipality governments are replaced by energy companies as the primary resource managers in

²¹⁵ See *Otra II* (n 133).

the local district.²¹⁶

5.7.0.3 Initiative

It follows from the regulatory framework that almost all cases involving expropriation for hydropower development originate from applications submitted by commercial companies.²¹⁷ The energy company draws up the plans and initiates the expropriation proceedings, by submitting a request for a development license to the water authorities. The main purpose, which is usually acknowledged by both the applicant and the water authorities, is to make money. Hence, it is usually hard or impossible to argue that takings of waterfalls for hydropower development in Norway are motivated by any direct public interests.

Exceptions to this are possible, in so far as the energy companies themselves embody public service functions. In some cases one might argue that they do, but such arguments are becoming increasingly unconvincing due to the fact that most energy companies have been reorganised as for-profit enterprises whose activities are largely unconstrained by institutions of local government.²¹⁸

5.7.0.4 Location

As mentioned in chapter 4, riparian rights are often of great importance to Norwegian farming communities and the subsistence of its members.²¹⁹ Indeed, the taking of riparian rights from a local community might well contribute significantly to depopulation, although indirectly rather than by physical displacement.²²⁰ Moreover, in many rural communities, small-scale hydropower

²¹⁶ In *Smibelg* (n 142), the owners submitted applications for small-scale hydropower in several affected rivers in 2005, but the water authorities refused to process these on account of the pending large-scale application. In 2015, compensation was awarded based on the natural horsepower method, with no compensation for, or discussion of, the owner's loss in the 10 year period where the water authorities refused to process the owners' applications.

²¹⁷ See especially chapter 4, section 4.4 and chapter 5, section 5.3.

²¹⁸ See, e.g., the EFTA Court's description of the industry, *EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway* [2007] EFTA Court Report 164.

²¹⁹ See especially chapter 4, sections 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5.

²²⁰ Today, it is very unlikely that the Norwegian government would sanction physical displacement of people from their homes in order to facilitate hydropower development. However, this state of affairs cannot be taken for granted;

appears to be the only growth industry, as farming is becoming increasingly unprofitable and communities are threatened by stagnation and decline.²²¹

Hence, the location criterion suggests that takings of waterfalls merit heightened critical scrutiny, especially due to the importance of the property that is taken to the subsistence of the local communities forced to give it up.

5.7.0.5 Social Merit

There is no shortage of electric energy in Norway, and electricity prices are very low compared to the rest of Europe.²²² Indeed, development projects such as *Jørpeland* are not motivated by any particular need to supply more energy to the Norwegian people or local industry, but openly pursued as commercial endeavours.²²³ Hence, they do not appear to have any particular social merit.

On the contrary, waterfall takings can contribute to creating social ills, by exacerbating rural decline and depopulation. In south-western Norway, for instance, the average income for a sheep farmer corresponds to about half of the minimum wage that farmers are required to pay to full-time farm workers.²²⁴ During harvesting season, sheep farmers wishing to hire 16 year old vacation workers are required to pay the kids about 30 % more per hour than they themselves can expect

the current political attitude on this point appears to have arisen in large part due to extensive and forceful anti-development activism during the 1970s, especially in relation to the *Alta* case (which initially involved plans to physically displace a local Sami community). See (n 83).

²²¹ For an example, I refer again to the case of the Gloppen municipality, discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4.

²²² See chapter 4, section 4.1.

²²³ See chapter 5, section 5.6.

²²⁴ According to the Norwegian Bioresearch Institute, the average sheep farmer in the western part of Norway could expect to earn NOK 65 per hour from working at their farm in 2012. See Anna Smedsdal and Heidi Knudsen, *Økonomien i jordbruket på Vestlandet: Trendar og økonomisk utvikling* (Norsk institutt for landbruksøkonomisk forskning 2014) 50. The minimum wage for unskilled farm workers during the same time was NOK 123.15 per hour. The minimum wage for 16-17 year old vacation workers was NOK 83.75 per hour. See ‘Tariffnemndas vedtak 27. november 2012 om videreføring av forskrift om allmenngjøring av tariffavtale i jordbruks- og gartnerinæringene’ (*Arbeids- og Sosialdepartementet*, 7th December 2012) (<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/asd/org/nemnder-styrer-rad-og-utvalg/permanente-nemnder-rad-og-utvalg/tariffnemnda/vedtak/2012/protokoll-fra-tariffnemndas-mote-27-nove/id709433/>) accessed 6th September 2015.

to earn from running their own farms. In short, sheep farming communities in western Norway, such as that affected by the taking in *Jørpeland*, are struggling.

In this context, it seems that the social harm created by expropriation, whereby disadvantaged rural communities are deprived of the opportunity to manage their own water resources, should be a pressing concern. Because of the traditional approach to hydropower, focusing solely on environmental harms, the social merit of maintaining local ownership and control over resources receives little or no attention from the water authorities in expropriation cases. This in itself suggests that typical cases of waterfall expropriation in Norway will tend to fail the social merit test.

5.7.0.6 Environmental Impact

It is clear that hydropower development can have negative environmental impacts. Hence, it is important that the value of development is appropriately balanced against environmental interests. To ensure this is a core aspect of the regulatory system. As discussed in chapter 4, local initiatives for small-scale hydropower are now typically scrutinized quite intensely in this regard, particularly after reforms in recent years. By contrast, large-scale projects appear increasingly likely to receive preferential treatment.

Moreover, the large companies are clearly in a better position to exert pressure on the regulator in order to overcome regulatory hurdles. The fact that large-scale solutions continued to receive priority, despite it being official government policy for a decade that no more large-scale plants should be built, is an indication of the severity of this effect. Hence, while the debate continues regarding the comparative environmental merits of different kinds of hydropower, it appears safe to conclude that the dynamics of power on display in relation to environmental issues raise further doubts about the legitimacy of waterfall takings.

5.7.0.7 Regulatory Impact

When waterfall rights are expropriated, they also become a separate commodity, divorced from the surrounding land rights. They are also typically removed from the sphere of municipal control on land use, falling instead under the regulatory jurisdiction of the centralised water authorities.²²⁵ Hence, the regulatory context shifts from one emphasising holistic resource management and local community needs to one which focuses mainly on facilitating hydropower development.

Moreover, the fact that the takers of waterfalls are powerful actors might make it harder for regulators to do their job. After expropriation, the parties who stand to lose from increased regulation are the state-supported energy companies. They are therefore likely to oppose stricter standards, and to do so in a manner that is much more forceful than any lobbying one might expect from local community owners of waterfalls. Hence, takings in this sector appear likely to cause systemic imbalances and a push for less intrusive government control, or government regulation on terms dictated by the major market players. A sign of this effect can be found in recent controversial decisions made with regard to the national grid, where the interests of the electricity industry appears to have completely overshadowed broad public opposition against further environmental intrusions in valuable nature areas in the west of Norway.²²⁶

5.7.0.8 Impact on Non-Owners

Non-owners can exercise some influence during the licensing procedure. However, this typically requires them to be organised or aligned with special interest groups, to effectively stand up to the authority of the prospective takers, who are expected by the government to take the lead during the administrative process.²²⁷ If there are objections, organisations rather than individuals

²²⁵ Specially, the water resource legislation will take priority over the otherwise rather municipality-empowering Planning and Building Act 2008.

²²⁶ See **sataoen**

²²⁷ See the discussion in chapter 4, section 4.3.5.

are prioritised under the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. The non-owners most directly affected by hydropower development are usually local residents, from the same community as the waterfall owners. They have little chance of being heard in the process, except if they find that their interests are aligned with those of more powerful stakeholders, such as national or regional environmental groups. In general, the means available for local non-owners to influence the decision-making do not appear commensurate with the local stakes in hydropower cases.

The transfer of property to a large-scale owner, moreover, changes the dynamics of interaction between owners and non-owners. Formally, the transfer of riparian rights away from the jurisdiction of municipal governments is particularly significant, since it significantly reduces the level of (local) democratic control over the use of the water resource. In addition, one should again consider the informal effect of transferring property away from local community members to large corporations. Unlike local owners, corporations that take waterfalls appear highly unlikely to interact with local non-owners on equal terms.

5.7.0.9 Democratic Merit

Following *Jørpeland*, it seems that owners' right to participate in decision-making processes regarding the use of their rivers and waterfalls is extremely limited under Norwegian law. The regulatory system effectively negates private property rights by making expropriation an automatic consequence of any large-scale development license granted to any non-owner. The original justification for this might be found in the idea that the regulatory power of the state should take precedence over private proprietary entitlements. However, after the liberalisation of the energy sector, this idea has transformed into a practice of systematic prioritisation of powerful commercial interests at the expense of local communities. This has happened despite the political commitment to end large-scale development, which remained official government policy for over a decade.

In light of this, it is difficult to see any democratic merit in the practice of taking waterfalls for

profit, to the benefit of large-scale development companies. Overall, it seems clear that according to the Gray test, current rules and practices regarding takings for hydropower render such takings highly suspect with regard to the question of legitimacy.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has explored expropriation of waterfalls, focusing on the legitimacy issue. The presentation has demonstrated that waterfall rights have effectively been rendered subservient to the management framework set up by the sector-oriented water resource legislation. Specifically, the chapter tracked a transformation of the regulatory framework whereby the water authorities can now exercise *de facto* proprietary control over water resources through licensing arrangements, largely unconstrained by the fact that these resources nominally remain in private ownership.

As such, this chapter has shed further light on the tension identified at the beginning of the previous chapter, between hydropower as private property and hydropower as a ‘national asset’. Importantly, the flavour of this national asset is strongly influenced by the liberalisation of the electricity sector. In particular, this chapter has made the case that takings of waterfalls today are pure takings for profit. In most cases, the government itself does not even feel the need to argue otherwise, since expropriation simply follows automatically from large-scale development licenses granted to commercial energy companies.

The chapter used the case of *Jørpeland* to shed light on the effect that this can have in practice, showing how owners desiring to carry out alternative projects can be marginalised in the decision-making process, regardless of the merits of their proposals. In light of this, I concluded that the Norwegian system fails to deliver on legitimacy in the sense of the word explored in Part I of this thesis.

From this arises the question of how to restore legitimacy in a way that does not hamper the democratic process by placing too much emphasis on exclusion rights and individual entitlements

attached to property. This is addressed in the next chapter, where I consider the institution of land consolidation and how it is used as an alternative to expropriation in Norway.

6 Enabling Participation to Replace Eminent Domain

6.1 Introduction

In recent years, land consolidation has been used to facilitate hydropower projects in Norway, sometimes also by imposing development against the will of private owners. So far land consolidation has been used almost exclusively for small-scale projects organised by local owners themselves. In these situations, expropriation orders are rarely sought and rarely authorised, even if some owners object to the development plans.¹ Instead, various consolidation measures are used, including the practically important “use directives”, serving to set up organisational frameworks for compulsory implementation of a development plan, possibly against some of the owners’ wishes.

Essentially, a use directive can be used to take some of the holdout power away from the owners, without depriving them of their property. Instead, owners are encouraged to cooperate and participate in a decision-making process that has economic development as an overarching aim. Some argue that because of the compulsion involved, land consolidation can leave owners in a precarious position by weakening their property rights.² By contrast, this chapter sets out to

¹ See Ola Brekken, ‘Småkraftverk og ekspropriasjon – replikk til NVE’ [2008] (1) Småkraftnytt 21.

² See, e.g., Geir Stenseth, ‘De nye reglene om “urbant jordskifte”’. En presentasjon og vurdering’ [2007] Tidsskrift for Eiendomsrett 293.

make the opposite case, namely that the use of consolidation for economic development can be used to strengthen property as an institution, particularly when use directives replace traditional expropriation proceedings. The chapter starts by introducing this idea in some more depth, before clarifying the consolidation alternative and its building blocks. It then goes on to demonstrate how it works in practice, in the context of hydropower development. It concludes with a discussion of possible objections to the legitimacy of consolidation and a brief assessment of the possibility of exporting the Norwegian consolidation model to other jurisdictions.

6.2 Land Consolidation as an Alternative to Expropriation

The notion of land consolidation is widely used on the international stage, but it is somewhat ambiguous. Often, it refers to mechanisms whereby boundaries in real property are redrawn to reduce fragmentation, without affecting the relative value of the different owners' holdings.³ However, it is also common to use consolidation to refer to mechanisms for pooling together small parcels of land to create larger units.⁴ There is a tension between these two notions of consolidation, with some claiming that consolidation in the latter sense is sometimes used to surreptitiously bestow benefits on powerful property owners, at the expense of weaker groups.⁵

In light of this, I should stress that I will use the term land consolidation in a very broad sense in this chapter, much wider than *both* of the interpretations mentioned above. Land consolidation, as I use the term, refers to any mechanism by which the state intervenes, at the request of some interested party, to (re)organise property rights and land uses in a local area. Hence, a consolidation measure might as well involve *increased* fragmentation of property, if this is deemed a rational form

³ See, e.g., the entry on *land consolidation* in Susan Mayhew, *A Dictionary of Geography* (Oxford University Press 2009).

⁴ See, e.g., Zvi Lerman and Dragoş Cimpoeş, 'Land Consolidation as a Factor for Rural Development in Moldova' (2006) 58(3) *Europe-Asia Studies* 439.

⁵ Michael Lipton, *Land Reform in Developing Countries: property rights and property wrongs* (Routledge 2009) 237-239.

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of consolidation of the property *values* involved. Importantly, I also use land consolidation to refer to efforts directed at *managing* property, not just redrawing boundaries.

Some might argue that this terminology is strained, but I adopt it for a reason. It is motivated by the fact that in Norway, the institution known as “jordskifte”, which is officially translated as land consolidation, has exactly such a broad scope.⁶ Since land consolidation measures in Norway can be used to interfere with property rights quite extensively, one may ask about the legitimacy of consolidation, held against rules that protect private property owners.⁷

There is a shortage of case law on this regarding the Norwegian system, but legitimacy issues have been raised before the ECtHR regarding the Austrian system of land consolidation, which is also equipped with broad powers to interfere with private rights. Specifically, the Austrian system has been found to offend against the property norm in P1(1) of the ECHR in cases when the consolidation procedure has dragged out in time, while severely restricting the owners’ use of their property.⁸

In some situations, it may be argued that a land consolidation measure *is* a form of expropriation, even if it is not recognised as such by the legislature or the executive. In the US, for instance, a land consolidation provision ordering escheat (to Native American tribes) of fractional property interests in Native American reservations was struck down as an uncompensated taking by the Supreme Court.⁹

⁶ See, e.g., Magne Reiten, ‘Avgjerd om fremme av jordskiftesak’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Perspektiver på jordskifte* (Gyldendal Akademisk 2009); Jørn Rognes and Per Kåre Sky, ‘Intervention methods in land disputes’ (2003) 11(8) European Planning Studies 965. The notion of consolidation at work in Norway appears to be quite unique, but I note that land consolidation also has a relatively broad scope in many other jurisdictions of continental Europe, as well as in Japan and in parts of the developing world. See generally Per Kåre Sky, ‘Internasjonalt perspektiv på jordskifte’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Areal og eiendomsrett* (Universitetsforlaget 2007); Arvo Vitikainen, ‘An overview of land consolidation in Europe’ (2004) 1(1) Nordic journal of surveying and real estate research 25.

⁷ For an analysis of the Norwegian land consolidation process held against the provisions of the ECHR, I refer to Karl Arne Utgård, ‘Jordskiftedomstolane og den europeiske menneskerettskonvensjonen’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Perspektiver på jordskifte* (2009).

⁸ See *Erkner and Hofauer v Austria* (1987) Series A no 61; *Poiss v Austria* (1987) Series A no 103.

⁹ See *Hodel v Irving* 481 US 704 (1987).

In relation to the legitimacy issue, the Norwegian system stands out in two important respects. First, the consolidation procedure is managed by judicial bodies, namely the land consolidation courts.¹⁰ Second, land consolidation is largely seen as a service to owners, not a tool for increased state control and top-down management.¹¹ In particular, a case before the land consolidation courts is almost always initiated by (some of) the affected owners themselves and the court often acts as a “problem-solver”, aiming to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among owners.¹² Finally, the so-called no-loss requirement is a core principle of consolidation law, stating that no consolidation measure can take place unless the benefits make up for the harms, for all the properties involved.¹³ Indeed, this remains one of the key principles of land consolidation in Norway.¹⁴

The combination of a judicial procedure that emphasises owner-participation and a no-loss criterion that ensures local benefits means that, arguably, land consolidation in Norway *strengthens* property as an institution. Moreover, land consolidation courts can serve as an effective counter-measure against two of the most widely discussed challenges to any property regime.

¹⁰ See generally Tor Langbach, ‘Jordskiftedomstolene og de alminnelige domstoler – likheter og ulikheter’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Perspektiver på jordskifte* (Gyldendal Akademisk 2009). The fact that the land consolidation process is administered by a judicial body appears to be unique to Norway, see Per Kåre Sky, ‘Jordskifte i andre land – organisering og prosess’ [2001] Kart og Plan 43, 45.

¹¹ See generally Per Kåre Sky, ‘Jordskiftets ulike effekter’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Perspektiver på jordskifte* (Gyldendal Akademisk 2009).

¹² See generally Jørn Rognes and Per Kåre Sky, *Mediation in the Norwegian Land Consolidation Courts* (Working Papers, 12808, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Land Tenure Center 1998) (<http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwltwp:12808>); Rognes and Sky, ‘Intervention methods in land disputes’ (n 6); Kjell Jørn Rognes and Per Kåre Sky, ‘Konfliktløsning og fast eiendom – ekisterende og nye arenaer’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Areal og eiendomsrett* (Universitetsforlaget 2007).

¹³ See the Land Consolidation Act 1979 s 3 a). In terms of economic theory, this amounts to requiring that all measures should lead to Pareto improvements, see Thomas J Miceli, *The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain: Private Property, Public Use* (Cambridge University Press 2011) 59-61. Moreover, what is required is actual improvement, not merely *potential* improvement (known as Kaldor-Hicks improvement, see Miceli (n 13) 61-63). Importantly, the no-loss guarantee requires Pareto improvements in or in relation to the affected *properties*; no mention is made of their respective individual owners. As a result, the no-loss criterion is averse to the monetization of benefits and harms – it is normally not possible to fulfil the no-loss requirement by paying compensation to the owners of adversely affected properties, see Sky, ‘Jordskiftets ulike effekter’ (n 11) 394. Improvements must typically be rendered in kind, in a manner that offsets potential losses to the property as such, independently of the owner’s own (hidden or revealed) valuations, see Sky, ‘Jordskiftets ulike effekter’ (n 11) 371-372. Hence, the starting point here is completely different from that normally assumed in economic analyses of takings law, where complete monetization and individuation is standard (usually starting from the notion of the owners’ *reservation price* – the price at which they would be willing to sell if they behaved non-strategically).

¹⁴ See generally Ola Rygg, ‘Jordskiftelova § 3 a)’ [1998] Kart og Plan 179.

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First, consolidation can serve to protect an egalitarian distribution of property against the threat of inefficiency and underdevelopment that is otherwise associated with fragmentation.¹⁵ Importantly, it can do so without disturbing the underlying property structure and without bestowing disproportionate benefits or harms on certain owners or other select groups. In particular, land consolidation can ensure commercial development without pooling together property rights and without handing property over to powerful market actors.

Second, land consolidation can be used to manage privately owned common pool resources to tackle problems of over-exploitation and under-investment that can arise when harms and benefits are inefficiently distributed across a potentially large group of resource users.¹⁶ In particular, land consolidation can ensure sustainable management of collectively owned resources without necessarily forcing an enclosure process (enclosure *can* be the result of land consolidation, but it is only one of many measures in the consolidation toolbox).

In short, land consolidation can be used to address both anti-commons and commons problems, in a way that protects, and possibly enhances, desirable social functions of property, through a judicial system that combines participatory and adversarial decision-making. Furthermore, land consolidation is based on a conceptual premise that – potentially – offers increased protection to owners and their properties, by recognising them as members of a community that are mutually dependent on each other. In this way, the form of property protection offered in the context of land consolidation is distinct from the protection offered in the context of expropriation. But it is not necessarily weaker.

In the context of economic development, the no-loss criterion will generally be possible to fulfil through benefit sharing. Indeed, it becomes the responsibility of the land consolidation court to

¹⁵ See generally Michael A Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ (1998) 111(3) Harvard Law Review 621.

¹⁶ See generally Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243; Harold Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57(2) The American Economic Review 347.

ensure that a sufficient degree of benefit sharing results, so that consolidation measures may be applied in accordance with the law.¹⁷ Moreover, ensuring a fair distribution of benefits is usually regarded as one of the key goals of consolidation, independently of the no-loss criterion. Often, this is taken to mean that the benefits should be distributed among the affected properties in accordance with their relative value prior to the consolidation measure.¹⁸

This way of thinking can clearly be applied to address the compensation issue that arises following an economic development taking.¹⁹ However, the principle of benefit sharing at work in consolidation is usually not compensatory, but rather one that sees the owners as active participants in the development project, also when it takes place against their will. This is a highly interesting shift of attention, particularly from the point of view of human flourishing conceptions of property. On such accounts, it can make good sense to impose obligations on owners to participate in the fulfilment of public interests, particularly when they and their properties also stand to benefit from doing so.²⁰

The fact that consolidation implies benefit sharing and owner participation means that commercially motivated developers may have an *incentive* to favour eminent domain over consolidation. Hence, the question becomes whether or not owners should be able to use land consolidation as a *defence* against expropriation. If owners are granted such a right, it would become a very powerful

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion of the extent of the court's duties in this regard, also discussing recent changes in the law that might indicate a weakening of the no-loss guarantee, see Katrine Broch Hauge, 'Erstatningsnivået ved tvangsovertaking av fallrettar' (PhD Thesis, 2015).

¹⁸ This principle is not as strictly encoded as the no-loss criterion, but is formulated as an "ought"-rule. See the Land Consolidation Act 1979 s 31. In my opinion, this is a weakness of the current framework. I mention that for the special case of consolidation to implement a zoning plan, the rule is absolute, see Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 3 b).

¹⁹ For the compensation issue generally, see Lee Anne Fennell, 'Taking Eminent Domain Apart' (2004) 2004 Michigan State Law Review 957; Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, 'Taking Compensation Private' (2007) 59(4) Stanford Law Review 871. The land consolidation approach to benefit sharing also parallels key insights contained in the proposal for compensation reform made in Amnon Lehavi and Amir N Licht, 'Eminent Domain, Inc.' (2007) 107(7) Columbia Law Review 1704 (proposing that a special institution should be set up to allow owners to bargain for higher compensation in for-profit situations).

²⁰ See the discussion on the social function theory and human flourishing in chapter 2, sections 2.4 and 2.5.

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version of what is known in some jurisdictions as the “self-realisation” mechanism, a rule whereby owners can sometimes preclude a proposed taking by proposing to implement the required development themselves.²¹ Even in the absence of any legislation explicitly granting owners the right to rely on consolidation as a self-realisation argument, one might ask whether owners can already achieve the desired effect in practice. Can owners preclude expropriation by asking the court to organise the desired development as a consolidation measure?

As long as the expropriation application is still pending a final decision, the owners could theoretically hope to achieve this. Moreover, consolidation measures to implement economic development would generally fulfil the no-loss criterion. Hence, the land consolidation courts should in fact be *obliged* to take on such a case, even if there were also plans for expropriation. However, I am not aware of any case where the consolidation courts have actually intervened in this way. They might hesitate to get involved, particularly if the proposed development is large-scale. Moreover, even if they did decide to get involved, it is not clear how the expropriation authorities would react. In principle, an ongoing consolidation case, or even a formally valid use directive, would not in itself prevent expropriation from taking place. However, it might then become harder to justify that an economic development taking would be in the public interest.

After an expropriation order has been granted, things are very different. The law as it stands leaves no room for a consolidation defence in these cases. Quite the contrary, the land consolidation courts would have to respect a valid expropriation order and might even be called on to implement it, by awarding replacement land or financial damages to affected owners.²²

In the future, if the consolidation alternative to expropriation is to develop successfully, it seems that the owners’ right to request consolidation in place of expropriation must be strengthened. So

²¹ Rules to this effect are found in several jurisdictions in continental Europe (including a very limited rule to this effect in Norway, pertaining to housing projects), see JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), *Expropriation Law in Europe* (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 13-14.

²² See Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 6.

far, there are no signs of this happening in Norway. However, the use of consolidation as an alternative to expropriation has received attention from a different angle, as a potentially valuable service to developers who seek a more efficient way of acquiring property.²³

Following a change in the law that takes effect in 2016, private developers without existing property interests in the target area will be granted the right to bring a case before the land consolidation courts, to seek help in implementing projects that would otherwise necessitate expropriation.²⁴ Developers might well be motivated to do so, since this could result in reduced administrative costs and (cheaper) compensation arrangements, e.g., compensation in kind through land readjustment.

In light of this, one must ask the following: will land consolidation remain a service to owners, or will it become a service to developers who seek cheap access to property owned by others? This question is about to become pressing in Norway, as the scope of land consolidation continually broadens, making it interact with expropriation law to a greater extent than before.²⁵

The idea that consolidation can serve as an alternative to expropriation also raises practical questions. Specifically, it seems pertinent to ask how well such arrangements could be expected to work in practice. Here there is already some interesting empirical data available, arising mainly from situations when some owners wish to undertake economic development projects on collectively owned land against the will of other owners, possibly also in cooperation with external developers. In the context of hydropower development, such uses of land consolidation have become very important in recent years. In 2009, the Court Administration reported that land consolidation had helped realise 164 small-scale hydropower projects with a total annual energy output of about 2

²³ See *Prop. 101 L (2012-2013)* (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Agriculture regarding the Land Consolidation Act 2013) 84.

²⁴ See Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 1-5(3).

²⁵ In addition to the new rules granting developers a formal standing in certain consolidation disputes, this development is also strongly felt in the move to apply land consolidation in the context of urban development, outside the traditional scope of agricultural pursuits. See generally Stenseth, 'De nye reglene om "urbant jordskifte". En presentasjon og vurdering' (n 2).

TWh per year.²⁶ Moreover, in the Supreme Court case of *Kløtveit*, discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the importance of land consolidation was recognised also in the context of expropriation.²⁷ Specifically, the presiding judge pointed to the prevalence of consolidation in the context of hydropower as a justification for requiring a commercial taker to pay additional compensation to the owners. According to the Court, it would have been possible for the taker to cooperate with the owners rather than expropriate from them. Increased compensation was then required because the taker should not be allowed to benefit financially from choosing not to cooperate.²⁸

To set the stage for a more in-depth presentation of consolidation for hydropower development, I will now give some further details about the Norwegian system, focusing on the rules and practices relating to use directives.

6.3 Land Consolidation in Norway

Rules regarding land consolidation have a long history in Norwegian law. The first known consolidation rules were included already in King Magnus Lagabøte's *landslov* (law of the land) from 1274, the first piece of written legislation known to have been introduced at the national level in Norway.²⁹ The earliest rules targeted jointly held rights in farming land, giving owners and rights holders on that land an opportunity to demand apportionment that would give them exclusive rights on a single parcel.³⁰ The land consolidation courts still provide this function, but additional

²⁶ See *Gevinstbetraktninger ved jordskifte* (Domstoladministrasjonen 2009). For the scale, I mention that 2 TWh per year is roughly what it takes to supply Bergen with electricity, the second largest city in Norway with around 250 000 inhabitants.

²⁷ See chapter 5, section 5.5.3.

²⁸ See *BKK Produksjon AS v Austgulen Rt-2011-1683* (Kløtveit).

²⁹ See chapter 4, section 2 of *NOU 2002:9* (Report to the Ministry of Agriculture from a special committee appointed by the King in Council 10 October 2000).

³⁰ The share in joint rights belonging to each individual farm was historically determined based on the amount of rent ("skyld") that each farmer paid to the landowner (a figure that was also used to determine the level of taxation). As mentioned in chapter 4, most tenant farmers in Norway had bought back their land by the end of the 18th century. However, the notion of "skyld" was kept as a measure of the share each farm had in the now jointly owned larger estates. The notion is still important, for instance in apportionment proceedings, as discussed in Øyvind Ravna,

rules were introduced during the 19th century. At this time, the main use of land consolidation was to pool together fragments and divide up jointly owned land, to create larger single-owned parcels that could facilitate higher-intensity farming.³¹ However, it was noted that complete individuation of property rights was not necessarily required or desirable. As an alternative, collective-action mechanisms were introduced, to facilitate economic development without disturbing the established governance structures associated with agrarian property rights.³²

Today, consolidation measures can be roughly grouped into the following three categories:³³

- *Apportionment of land*: Rules that empower the court to dissolve systems of joint ownership by apportioning to each estate a parcel corresponding to its share, or by reallocating property through exchange of land.³⁴
- *Delimitation of boundaries*: Rules that empower the court to determine, mark and describe boundaries between properties and the content and extent of different rights of use attached to the land.³⁵
- *Directives for use*: Rules that empower the court to prescribe rules for the use of land that can benefit from joint management, including setting up organisational units for carrying out

‘Skiftegrunnlaget i sameier’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), *Perspektiver på jordskifte* (Gyldendal Akademisk 2009).

³¹ The fragmented system of land ownership that was consolidated at this time served an interesting function in the earlier agrarian economy, to promote governance through a combination of scattered individual rights and property held in common. See generally Henry E Smith, ‘Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields’ (2000) 29(1) *The Journal of Legal Studies* 131; Henry E Smith, ‘Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights’ (2002) 31(S2) *The Journal of Legal Studies* S453.

³² This idea was behind a range of provisions introduced during the 19th century, not all pertaining to land consolidation. For instance, a special management structure was set up to govern forestry on common land, to avoid overexploitation and ensure rational management without necessitating enclosure. See generally Geir Stenseth, ‘Bygdeallmenningenes rettshistorie og dens møte med fremtidens landbruk’ in Kirsti Strøm Bull (ed), *Natur, Rett, Historie* (Oslo Studies in Legal History 5, Akademisk Publisering 2010).

³³ I consciously omit the compensatory function that a consolidation court can serve by acting as an appraisal court, e.g., in expropriation cases, see Land Consolidation Act 2013 s 1-4(d). This is arguably not a consolidation power at all, but rather an additional function that distracts from the uniqueness of consolidation.

³⁴ This is the traditional form of land consolidation in Norway and the main legislative basis for it is provided in the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 2.

³⁵ The main legislative basis for this form of consolidation is found in the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 88.

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specific development projects.³⁶

In all cases, the consolidation court can only employ these tools when they are called on to do so by someone with legal standing.³⁷ This was traditionally limited to the owners and those holding perpetual rights of use.³⁸ Today, the government also has legal standing in many kinds of consolidation cases, but most cases (about 90 %) are still initiated by owners.³⁹ From 2016, when the Land Consolidation Act 2013 comes into force, legal standing will be granted to a larger class of actors, including development companies that could otherwise obtain an expropriation licence.⁴⁰ Moreover, legal standing will be granted to all rights- and ground leaseholders.⁴¹

After a case has been brought before the court, the consolidation court can implement consolidation measures in so far as they are needed to alleviate problems and difficulties preventing rational use of the affected land.⁴² To determine whether or not this requirement has been met, the court will look to the prevailing economic and social situation, as well as predictions for the future.⁴³ In this regard, the court is also influenced by what it regards as the prevailing public interests in property use. The role of the perceived public interest is gaining importance; recent reforms have underscored that considerations based on the common good should inform the decisions made by the consolidation courts.⁴⁴

The procedural rules of consolidation closely mimics those that pertain to regular civil courts.

³⁶ These rules are found in the Land Consolidation Act 1979, ss 2 c), 34, 35.

³⁷ See Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 5.

³⁸ See Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 5.

³⁹ See, e.g., Øystein Jakob Bjerva, 'Jordskiftedomstolene og forvaltningsmyndighetene – to kokker og ingen oppskrift?' (2012) 72 Kart og Plan 130, 135.

⁴⁰ See Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 1-5(3).

⁴¹ See Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 1-5(1).

⁴² See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 1.

⁴³ See generally Reiten, 'Avgjerd om fremme av jordskiftesak' (n 6).

⁴⁴ See generally *Prop. 101 L (2012-2013)* (n 23) (proposal from the Ministry of Agriculture to the parliament regarding the Consolidation Act 2013).

This ensures that consolidation measures are only applied by the court following a public hearing where all involved parties are given an opportunity to present their case, give supporting evidence, and contradict each others' testimony. In the following section, I briefly elaborate on the consolidation process step by step.

6.3.1 The Consolidation Process

A consolidation case is usually initiated by an owner or someone holding use rights.⁴⁵ The request for consolidation measures is to be directed at the relevant district consolidation court, one of the 34 district courts for land consolidation that have been set up by the King in accordance with section 7 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979. The request is meant to include further details about the affected properties, the owners and rights holder involved, as well as the specific issues that consolidation should address. This requirement is not usually interpreted very strictly, meaning that the consolidation court will often be inclined to take steps to clarify further what the case should encompass, more so than in regular civil disputes.⁴⁶ However, the court may reject the consolidation request if it finds that it suffers from formal shortcomings, pursuant to the same rules as those that apply to civil disputes.⁴⁷

If the court decides that the request is well-formed and that it includes sufficient detail to permit material consideration, it goes on to prepare public hearings, following the rules set out in chapter 3 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979. These rules mirror those that are in place for civil hearings, including the duty to inform affected parties, the parties' right to present their claims, as well as their duty and right to give testimony and provide evidence supporting it.⁴⁸ As in civil

⁴⁵ See section 5, paragraph 1 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁴⁶ Langbach (n 10) 39.

⁴⁷ See section 12, paragraph 2 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979, which refers to section 16-5 of the Civil Dispute Act 2005.

⁴⁸ See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 13.

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cases, a decision is usually made only after at least one oral hearing where the parties may present and comment on the evidence and the issues raised by the case.

Unlike in civil cases, the main hearing typically takes place on the disputed land itself and often revolves around practical rather than legal issues. Moreover, a consolidation case will usually not take the form of a two-party adversarial process, but rather present as a multi-party discussion where the court interacts with a large number of persons who may have both common and conflicting interests in the outcome. The typical case involves 5-10 people, but in some cases there can be hundreds of parties involved.⁴⁹ In addition, it is quite common that the parties are not represented by legal counsel.⁵⁰ And even if they are, the owners themselves are typically expected to take an active part in the proceedings.⁵¹

The request for consolidation will be the court's point of departure when assessing the case. However, the court is not bound by the claims put forth by the parties. This again marks a difference with most civil disputes. With a few exceptions explicitly listed in statute, the consolidation court may decide to use any measure that it deems suitable to ensure a favourable structure of rights and ownership for the future. However, there is some restriction placed on the court in that the measures taken must be regarded as *necessary* in light of considerations based on the original request.⁵² In short, the court should remain focused on the issues raised by the parties, but is free to address these issues using the tools they deem most suited for the job. The consolidation court, in particular, is meant to be a 'problem solver', more so than an ordinary civil court.⁵³

When a decision is reached, the parties are notified and the decision is presented and argued

⁴⁹ Langbach (n 10) 39.

⁵⁰ Kjell Jørn Rognes and Per Kåre Sky, 'Megling i domstolene, særlig i jordskifteretten' [2000] Lov og Rett 101, 109-111.

⁵¹ See generally Rognes and Sky, 'Megling i domstolene, særlig i jordskifteretten' (n 50).

⁵² See sections 26 and 29 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁵³ See generally Rognes and Sky, 'Konfliktløsning og fast eiendom – ekisterende og nye arenaer' (n 12).

for in keeping with the rules of the Civil Dispute Act 2005.⁵⁴ The appropriate format for the decision depends on its content. A regular civil ruling is the form used for decisions that only involve ascertaining the boundaries between properties, while a special “consolidation decision” is used to implement apportionment and directives of use. The difference in form affects the appeals procedure; while civil rulings are dealt with by the regular courts of appeal, the consolidation decisions can only be appealed to one of 4 designated consolidation courts of appeal.⁵⁵

The procedural rules remain largely the same at the consolidation court of appeal, which provides an entirely new consolidation assessment.⁵⁶ The decision of the consolidation court of appeal can only be appealed on the grounds that it is based on an incorrect understanding of the law, or that procedural mistakes were made. The ordinary appeal courts hear the case in the first instance, while the Supreme Court is the last instance of possible appeal.⁵⁷

In general, consolidation cases are different from other civil cases mainly in that they have a fundamentally different scope. A consolidation case is not primarily concerned with deciding the merits of individual claims, but focuses on introducing structures of ownership and rights that will prove favourable to the community of owners. In this respect, the process has an administrative character. However, the fact that it is organised similarly to a civil dispute means that the affected parties can arguably expect to contribute more to the decision-making process than they do when decisions are made by administrative bodies.

Given the special context of arbitration, it is not surprising that the judges appointed to the consolidation courts are required to have a special skill set, different from that of regular civil law judges. In fact, consolidation judges are required to have successfully completed a special

⁵⁴ See the Land Consolidation Act 1979 s 7.

⁵⁵ See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 61.

⁵⁶ See section 69 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁵⁷ See section 71 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

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master level degree in consolidation. This is not a law degree, but a distinct form of professional education.⁵⁸

The consolidation court also relies on the participation of lay people who sit alongside the specialist judge.⁵⁹ These lay judges are appointed by the specialist judge from a committee of lay persons that are elected by the local municipalities.⁶⁰ Ideally, the appointed laypeople should have special knowledge of the issues raised by the case. However, they are drawn from the general population.⁶¹

Summing up, the consolidation process has both administrative, adversarial and participatory characteristics. While the content and scope of the court's decision will often have an administrative flavour and is not primarily directed at settling any specific dispute, the process is judicial. Hence everyone is entitled, and to some extent even *obliged*, to have their voice heard and to partake in the process. Moreover, while the process is guided and overseen by the court, the decisions made will be based on considerations arising from the interests of the properties involved, usually as expressed by the parties in their own words.⁶²

More generally, the court is tasked with determining what is best for the land as a productive unit in the local community, in light of all relevant economic, social and political facts, including the fact that the current owners will remain in charge after the consolidation procedure ends.⁶³ To flag the dual nature of the consolidation process, it is tempting to designate it as a process of judicially structured *deliberation*. The final decision-making authority rests with the court, but the

⁵⁸ See section 7, paragraph 5 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979. The degree in question is currently offered only at the Norwegian College of Life Sciences and Agriculture.

⁵⁹ See section 8 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁶⁰ See section 8 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979 (the appointment itself is regulated in the Courts of Justice Act 1915, s 64).

⁶¹ See section 9, paragraph 5 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁶² See generally Rognes and Sky, 'Konfliktløsning og fast eiendom – ekisterende og nye arenaer' (n 12).

⁶³ See generally Reiten, 'Avgjerd om fremme av jordskiftesak' (n 6); Sky, 'Jordskiftets ulike effekter' (n 11).

court is required to act on behalf of the rights holders, on the basis of their wishes, but always also in the best interest of their properties and their community.

For this reason, land consolidation is perfectly situated for providing an additional institutional layer in situations when the public wishes to facilitate or even compel economic development involving privately owned property. In the next section, I present the rules pertaining to use directives in more detail, to elaborate on how consolidation can be used to replace expropriation.

6.3.2 Organising the Use of Property

Traditionally, use directives targeted property rights that were owned jointly or for which some form of shared use had already been established.⁶⁴ However, in the 1979 Act, the power of the courts to issue use directives was extended, so that directives could also be issued when there was no prior connection between the rights and properties in question. The requirement was that *special reasons* made this desirable.⁶⁵ Traditional examples include directives for the shared use of a private road which crosses several different properties, or regulation of hunting that takes place across property boundaries.

The rules pertaining to use directives emerged as an alternative to apportionment of jointly owned property, a more subtle and less invasive measure that could often give rise to the same positive effect as a full division of ownership, without leading to unwanted fragmentation or excessive pooling of resources. Hence, in the now repealed Land Consolidation Act 1950 it was stated that use directives should be the *primary* mechanism of consolidation, such that apportionment could only take place if such directives were deemed insufficient to reach the goal of creating more favourable conditions for the use of the land.⁶⁶ In the Land Consolidation Act 1979, the two mechanisms

⁶⁴ In accordance with s 2 c) of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁶⁵ See s 2 c), para 2 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁶⁶ See section 3 no 3 and 4 of the Land Consolidation Act 1950 and the discussion in *NOU 1976:50* (Report to the Ministry of Agriculture from a special committee appointed by the King in Council 12 May 1972) 30-37.

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were formally put side by side, but the intention behind this was to ensure greater flexibility of the system, not to reduce the scope of use directives. Quite the contrary, the 1979 Act explicitly intended to promote the increased use of such directives, also in conjunction with other measures.⁶⁷

Since the Act was introduced, there has been a gradual increase in the willingness of the courts to rely on use directives to facilitate *new development* on the land, not just as a means to regulate an existing activity.⁶⁸ The Land Consolidation Act 1979 lists a range of different circumstances in which such directives can be applied.⁶⁹ But the list is not understood to be exhaustive. Hence, as the notion of agriculture has broadened to include activities such as small-scale hydropower development, the scope of use directives has followed suit.

In the Land Consolidation Act 2013, the list has been replaced altogether by a general rule which makes it clear that the consolidation courts have the authority to give directives whenever they regard this to be favourable to the properties involved.⁷⁰ The new Act maintains the principle that directives regarding joint use of properties with no prior connection can only be given if there are special reasons for it. However, this requirement is not intended to be very strict and the Ministry of Agriculture was initially inclined to remove it.⁷¹ However, it was eventually decided that it should be kept, in order to flag that two distinct questions arise in such cases. First, the court must consider whether or not joint use is in fact desirable, before moving on to the question of how it should be organised.

In addition to giving directives prescribing how joint use is to be organised, the consolidation court can give rules compelling owners to take joint action to realise potentials inherent in their

⁶⁷ See the discussion in *NOU 1976:50* (n 66) 35-37 and *Ot.prp.nr.56 (1978-1979)* (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Agriculture regarding the Land Consolidation Act 1979) 47-48.

⁶⁸ *Ot.prp.nr.57 (1997-1998)* (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Agriculture regarding changes to the Land Consolidation Act 1979) 103.

⁶⁹ See section 35 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁷⁰ See section 3-8 of the Land Consolidation Act 2013.

⁷¹ For a discussion on this see *Prop. 101 L (2012-2013)* (n 23) 140-141.

land. Rules to this effect were novel to the Land Consolidation Act 1979. According to this Act, joint action can only be prescribed in circumstances covered by one of the points in a concrete list of conditions.⁷² Moreover, joint action directives can only be directed at *in rem* property owners, not other parties.⁷³ Following the new Land Consolidation Act 2013, however, the consolidation courts will be authorised to prescribe joint action also to groups of use right holders. In addition, the existing list of circumstances that warrant joint action will be replaced by a general joint action rule, potentially increasing the scope of such directives.⁷⁴

When commenting on this change in the law, the Ministry noted that the joint action rules currently in place have been widely used. Indeed, applying them is now one of the core responsibilities of the consolidation courts.⁷⁵ Joint action directives can even include prescriptions for joint investments.⁷⁶ On the one hand, this means that such directives can be used to facilitate capital-intensive new development, making consolidation a more effective tool to implement economic development. On the other hand, questions arise regarding the extent to which it is legitimate to rely on compulsion in this regard, when the owners are required to contribute financially or put themselves at financial risk.

The magnitude of investments required to undertake complex projects can soon become quite burdensome for individual owners. The Land Consolidation Act 1979 attempts to resolve this by a rule stating that if a development project will involve “great risk”, the court must set up two *distinct* organisational units to undertake it.⁷⁷ First, the rights needed to undertake the scheme will be pooled together and managed by an owners’ association. Then, to undertake the scheme

⁷² The rules are given in the Land Consolidation Act 1979 ss 2 e), 42-44.

⁷³ See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 34 a).

⁷⁴ See section 3-9 of the Land Consolidation Act 2013.

⁷⁵ See *Prop. 101 L (2012-2013)* (n 23) 146.

⁷⁶ See section 3-9 of the Land Consolidation Act 2013.

⁷⁷ See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 34 b).

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itself, a separate development company will be set up on behalf of the owners.

In this way, the risk is diverted away from the individual owners onto a company controlled by them. This company will be entitled to the profit from the scheme, but it will also be required to pay rent to the owners' association on terms agreed on by the parties with the help of the court.⁷⁸ The owners are entitled to shares in the development company proportional to their share of the relevant rights in the land, as determined by the consolidation court. However, they are not obliged to acquire any such shares if they do not wish to do so. If they do not, they will still benefit from membership in the owners' association.

This two-tier system provides a mechanism that can also empower owners to undertake large-scale projects, possibly by setting up partnerships with external commercial actors. Moreover, the owners' association is not always obliged to lease out the development rights to a specific owner-controlled development company. The exact rules depend on the statutes of the association, as determined by the consolidation court, but typically it will be possible for a majority of owners to lease out the development rights to an external developer, should they choose to do so. In this regard, conflicts may arise, if some of the owners wish to undertake development themselves, while others wish to strike a deal with an external company. The challenge for the consolidation court, illustrated concretely in the next section, is to organise the owners' association in such a way that the chance of later conflicts is minimised.

After the new consolidation Act takes effect in 2016, both planning authorities and commercial developers may be granted legal standing in the consolidation process. This might prove particularly useful in connection with large-scale industrial development, as it might otherwise be hard to implement such projects successfully. In these cases, the consolidation courts can now function as an arena for interaction and deliberation between the three main groups of stakeholders: the public, the local owners, and the commercially motivated developers.

⁷⁸ See s 34 b) of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

To sum up, use directives are highly versatile tools that may be used to organise extensive projects of land development on behalf of local owners. This form of development organisation makes it possible for original owners to maintain their interest in the land, obviating the need for expropriation, while giving the public a greater opportunity to influence and control how their planning decisions are implemented in practice.

In the next section, I consider in depth the particular case of hydropower, where the consolidation courts have recently started to make use of a wide arsenal of its tools to facilitate owner-led development.

6.4 Enabling Participation in Hydropower Development

In this section, I look at four recent cases in detail, all of which involved directives of use for hydropower development by local owners. The waterfalls and rivers dealt with in these cases are all located in the county of *Hordaland*, in south-western Norway. Three of the cases revolved around proposals where the owners would develop hydropower themselves, while the fourth also involved an alternative where the owners would cooperate with an external energy company. The cases are particularly useful because we have access to data on how the process of consolidation was perceived by the owners themselves.⁷⁹

In the following, I present each case separately, focusing on the organisational issues, the solutions prescribed by the court, and the reception among the parties.

⁷⁹ This material is due to Sæmund Stokstad, who conducted interviews for his master thesis on land consolidation, devoted to the study of how consolidation measures can be used to facilitate hydropower development. See Sæmund Stokstad, 'Bruksordning ved Jordskifte i Samband med Utbygging av Småskalakraftverk' (Master Thesis, 2011).

6.4.1 *Vika*

The case was brought before the consolidation court in 2005, by riparian owners who had all agreed to pursue hydropower development.⁸⁰ The owners disagreed on how to organise the owners' association and on how the shares in this association should be divided among the properties involved, 15 in total.⁸¹ However, a consensus had formed regarding the main organisational principle, namely that the owners would rent out their waterfall to a separate development company which every owner would have a right (but not a duty) to take part in.

The parties in *Vika* were closely involved in the consolidation process and the statutes for the owners' association were based on suggestions made by the owners themselves. The main point of disagreement concerned how the shares in this association should be allotted, a question that was made more difficult by the fact that some owners benefited from old water-mill rights in the river.⁸²

There was also some disagreement about whether the voting rights in the owners' association should be tied to the number of shares belonging to each owner, or if the owners should simply be allotted one vote each, irrespectively of their share of the relevant riparian rights. The consolidation court went for the first option.⁸³ However, the way shares were allotted deserves special mention. In particular, the court decided to take into account that some additional water entered the main river from smaller rivers where only a sub-group of the owners held riparian rights.⁸⁴ These owners' share in the association was increased accordingly. This is surprising in light of Norwegian

⁸⁰ *Vika* 1210-2005-0014, [2005] Haugalandet og Sunnhordland jordskifterett.

⁸¹ See Stokstad (n 79) 25-28.

⁸² See Stokstad (n 79) 26. In the end, the consolidation court held that these rights were tied to the form of use relevant at the time they were established. Hence, the rights were not regarded as having any financial value and could therefore be extinguished without compensation, as provided for in the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 2.

⁸³ See Stokstad (n 79) 26.

⁸⁴ See Stokstad (n 79) 26.

water law, as ownership of riparian rights usually arises from ownership of land along the relevant riverbed, regardless of where the water itself comes from.⁸⁵ Hence, this is an illustration of how the land consolidation court can opt for organisational solutions that seem rational given the concrete circumstances, even if they do not follow from any generally recognised principles of law.

The statutes of the owners' association in *Vika* also contains a second interesting provision, based on a suggestion made by the owners.⁸⁶ This provision states that all rights in the association are to be tied to the underlying agricultural properties so that they can not be sold separately. In Norway, a division of agricultural property requires permission from the local municipality.⁸⁷ In recent years, however, this protection of farming communities has grown weaker in practice. It is interesting, therefore, that the owners in *Vika* decided that a dissociation of water rights from the underlying agricultural properties should be expressly forbidden.

According to Stokstad, a general consensus had developed among the parties whereby the land consolidation procedure was seen as a great success.⁸⁸ It allowed for an orderly and fair decision-making process regarding the conflicts that had arisen. The resolution of the case followed from continuous interaction between the owners and the court, where everyone felt they had been given an opportunity to have their voices heard.

Initially, the situation had been tense, but the consolidation process had resolved all conflicts. Some owners also pointed to the fact that the main hearing had been physically conducted in the local community, in a meeting hall that was neutral yet familiar to the owners. This also gave them a feeling that they were meant to actively partake in the decision-making process.

When the interviews were conducted, 5 years after the case was concluded, the owners also

⁸⁵ See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 13.

⁸⁶ See Stokstad (n 79) 26.

⁸⁷ See section 12 of the Land Act 1995.

⁸⁸ See Stokstad (n 79) 39-41.

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appeared to agree that the association was working as intended and that the climate of cooperation among the owners was good. The hydropower scheme itself had been completed in 2008, yielding an annual production of around 15 GWh per year, providing enough energy for around 700 households.⁸⁹

Moreover, following the experience of land consolidation, a culture of deliberation towards consensus had developed among the owners. The owners now emphasised the search for a common ground, aiming to reach agreement on important issues. This was reflected, for instance, in the fact that the owner who contributed the land for the power station was given a generous annual fee, in addition to his compensation as a riparian owner.

According to Stokstad, this fee exceeds what he might have gotten if this decision had been left to the discretion of the consolidation court.⁹⁰ Hence, it reflects a premium that the owners were now willing to pay to ensure agreement and a continued good climate for cooperation.

In light of this, the case of *Vika* serves as an excellent example of how land consolidation can empower local communities and enable them to embark on substantial development projects.

6.4.2 *Oma*

The case of *Oma* was brought before the courts in 2006.⁹¹ The case involved four properties. The owners of three of them, *A*, *B* and *C*, wanted to develop hydropower, while the fourth owner, *D*, was opposed to the plans.⁹² Rather than attempting to expropriate the necessary rights from owner *D*, owners *A*, *B* and *C* took the case to the consolidation court. They argued that development would benefit all the properties involved. Moreover, they pointed out that an alternative project which would not make use of owner *D*'s rights would be less profitable. Hence, in their view, the

⁸⁹ See Stokstad (n 79) 41.

⁹⁰ See Stokstad (n 79) 40.

⁹¹ *Oma* 1200-2006-0015, [2006] Nord- og Midthordaland jordskifterett.

⁹² See Stokstad (n 79) 36-39.

consolidation court should compel *D* to cooperate in a joint scheme. Owner *D* protested, arguing that the project would not economically benefit him, and that it would also be to the detriment of his plans to build holiday cottages in the same area.

The case of *Oma* differs from that of *Vika* since the question of whether it was appropriate to use compulsion was more prominent. In the end, the court agreed with the majority that an owners' association with compulsory membership should be set up.⁹³ To justify the use of compulsion against *D*, the court commented specifically on owner *D*'s plans for building holiday homes, noting first that he was unlikely to be given planning permission, and secondly that a hydropower plant would not adversely affect such plans in any significant way.⁹⁴ Moreover, the court noted that while owner *D*'s rights were relatively minor, they were quite crucial for the profitability of the project, particularly because owner *D* controlled the best location for the construction of a dam to collect the water used in the scheme. Overall, the court's conclusion was that a joint hydropower scheme would be a better option for everyone than a project that did not include owner *D*'s property.

The question then arose as to how the shares in the owners' association should be divided. With regard to this question, the court departed significantly from one of the basic principles of Norwegian hydropower law. This is the principle stating that no right to hydropower can be derived from being in possession of land suitable for the construction of dams or other facilities necessary to exploit riparian rights.⁹⁵ The land consolidation court broke with this principle in the case of *Oma*, deciding instead to set the value of the land designated for construction of a dam and a power station at 6% of the total value of the rights that went into the owners' association.⁹⁶

The proportion of financial benefit and decision-making power awarded to the unwilling owner

⁹³ In doing so, the court relied on s 2 c) of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.

⁹⁴ See Stokstad (n 79) 36-37.

⁹⁵ The principle is well-established in expropriation law, going back to the Supreme Court decision in *Hosanger, Haus og Hamre kommunale kraftverk v Askild Fusesen Vare* Rt-1922-489. The principle was challenged unsuccessfully following the increased scale of development after the Second World War, as discussed in chapter 5, section 5.4.2.

⁹⁶ See Stokstad (n 79) 36.

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D thus increased accordingly, since these rights were all held by him. In fact, his share went from 1.75% to 7.75%, so the consolidation process itself led to a situation where he would have a far greater incentive for supporting the development. Hence, the decision in *Oma* was more to the benefit of owner *D* than any other among the involved parties. If the rights in question had been expropriated, *D* would have been given next to nothing in compensation and would have lost his rights forever. Instead, the solution prescribed by the consolidation court gave him a lasting and substantial interest in local hydropower.

According to Stokstad, interviews conducted with the parties show how the process and outcome of consolidation served to create a much better climate for further cooperation.⁹⁷ Indeed, when the interviews were conducted, 4 years after the court's decision, owner *D* had changed his mind and was now in favour of the development. Moreover, he had also decided that he wanted to take part in the development company. He was not obliged to do so, but his right to take part was ensured by the agreement made with the development company, as required by the statutes of the owners' association.⁹⁸

The owners all reported that the consolidation process had been very successful and that the court had listened to them, allowing everyone to have their voices heard. Moreover, some owners reported that the court had cleverly maintained a bird's eye view on the best way to develop the land in question, ensuring both long term benefits to all involved properties as well as creating an improved climate for cooperation and mutual understanding. The consensus was that making concessions to owner *D* was appropriate and had been in the interest of everyone involved. In 2011, the hydropower project was completed and today its output is roughly 5 GWh per year.⁹⁹

Oma serves as a good illustration of how consolidation can be an effective instrument for

⁹⁷ See Stokstad (n 79) 44-45.

⁹⁸ The owners' right to take part in the development company is obligatory in some situations, pursuant to Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 34 b) no 3.

⁹⁹ See Stokstad (n 79) 45.

facilitating locally controlled development, also in cases when this requires the use of compulsion against some owners. Interestingly, the successful outcome appears to be partly due to the fact that the consolidation court actively used its discretionary powers when deciding how to organise joint use. This power allowed them to deviate from established rights-based legal doctrine and adopt a more context-dependent approach, pursuing solutions that better suited the situation. Interesting legal questions arise in this regard, particularly regarding the extent to which the consolidation court can deviate from sector-based doctrines when organising development.

For instance, one may ask what would have happened if the majority owners in *Oma* had appealed the decision to the regular courts on the basis that *D* was awarded too many shares in the owners' association. Would this be regarded as a question of the court's interpretation of the law regarding the owners' *rights*, or would it be regarded as a discretionary decision regarding the best way to organise development? If a rights-based perspective was adopted, the decision would almost certainly be overturned. If not, it would seem beyond reproach, as an exercise of the consolidation courts' discretionary power.

A second interesting question that arises is whether or not consolidation can work as well as it did in *Oma* in cases where conflicts run deeper, or where the parties favouring development are a minority among the owners. The next two cases I consider shed some light on this issue.

6.4.3 *Djønno*

This case was brought before the courts in 2006, by a local owner *A* who wanted to develop hydropower in a small river crossing his land, the so called *Kvernhusbekken*.¹⁰⁰ *A* wanted the court to help him implement a hydropower project, by compelling the other owners, *B*, *C* and *D*, to rent out their share of the waterfall on terms dictated by the court.¹⁰¹ The starting point for the

¹⁰⁰ *Djønno Indre Kaland* 1230-2006-0010, [2006] Indre Hordaland jordskifterett.

¹⁰¹ See Stokstad (n 79) 28-31.

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other owners was that they did not want hydropower development. Hence, they were not willing to rent out their rights to owner *A* or any other developer. There was also a dispute regarding the ownership of the waterfall rights, with *A* believing initially that he controlled a large majority. It soon became clear that this was not the case. As it turned out, owner *A*'s share of the riparian rights was only 5%, so his financial interest in hydropower was in fact very limited compared to the owners who did not want any development.

On the other hand, the land rights needed for the necessary physical constructions were predominantly held by owner *A* alone. For this reason, *A* maintained that the court should compel the other owners to allow him to go ahead with his development plans. The court agreed that hydropower would be a rational use of the waterfall, and initially assessed the case against the rules relating to compulsory joint action.¹⁰² This could have resulted in concrete directives regarding how the hydropower development should be carried out, including at the level of specific investments and building steps.

However, the court eventually held that this approach would place too much of a burden on the owners opposing hydropower. Hence, it chose to resolve the case using directives for joint use. By doing so, the court also restricted the scope of their decision to the establishment of an owners' association that would be responsible for renting out the rights.

The model used for the owners' association was similar to the one the court adopted in *Oma*. This included allocating shares in the owners' association in a way that took into account the special importance of land needed for physical constructions. In total, this land was held to correspond to 6% of the shares in the association. Since these rights were held by owner *A* alone, his share in the association doubled. In addition to this, owner *A* purchased the shares from owner *B*, so that his total share ended up amounting to 22%. Still, for the majority, membership in the association was imposed on them against their will.

¹⁰² See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 2 e).

The wording of the statutes for the association took into account that it would be run by a majority of unwilling shareholders. In particular, it was stated clearly that the association was going to rent out the rights in the waterfall such that hydropower could be developed. In *Oma* and *Vika*, by contrast, the statutes only stated that this was the *purpose* of the association, leaving the shareholders with the freedom to determine whether or not to go through with development.

In interviews, those who were compelled to take part in the association against their will expressed dissatisfaction and surprise at the result. Moreover, while the association had apparently tried to be loyal to the wording of the statutes, by looking for interested developers, there had been no willingness among the majority to engage actively with this work. No deals had been made, no separate development company had been set up, and the conflict among the owners was ongoing. Hence, while the case of *Djønno* is an example that consolidation can be used even when it involves compulsion against the majority of owners, it also serves to illustrate that the chance of a successful outcome may be more limited.

The question arises as to how such cases should be dealt with by courts in the future. According to owner *A*, the problem was that the directives of use were not specific enough. In his opinion, the directives should not have been restricted to merely setting up an owners' association for renting out the rights. In addition, the court should have actively addressed the question of how the development company should be organised. Among the majority owners, on the other hand, the prevailing feeling was that the development in question was more or less doomed to fail from the start, since it was unwanted.

Hence, the case of *Djønno* illustrates that when the courts are not prepared to actively organise the development company, compulsory participation might fail in practice unless a majority agrees that development should take place.

6.4.4 *Tokheim*

This case was brought before the consolidation court in 2008, by the owners of *Tokheimselva*.¹⁰³ The five owners all agreed that development should take place, but they disagreed about how it should be done and about the proportion of each owners' share of the riparian rights.¹⁰⁴ Some owners argued that development should be organised by the owner community, while other owners thought it would be best to rent out the rights to an external developer. The case was further complicated by the fact that the proposed development was so substantial that it could require a waterfall transferral license pursuant to the Industrial Licensing Act 1917. As discussed in chapter 4, such a license can only be given to a company in which the state controls at least $\frac{2}{3}$ of the shares.¹⁰⁵

The consolidation court eventually decided to set up an owners' association. However, unlike in the previous cases I have considered, there was no adjustment made for land that would be needed for physical constructions. Instead, the statutes state that owners will be entitled to a lump sum estimated on the basis of the damages and disadvantages that a concrete hydropower project will bring. This marks a different kind of departure from established practice in expropriation law; specifically, it rejects the established principle that owners can be compensated on the basis of *either* the value of their waterfalls *or* the damages and disadvantages caused by the project, not both.¹⁰⁶

In other respects, the statutes for the owners' association are similar to those adopted in the previously considered cases. Specifically, the statutes do not resolve the controversial question of how to carry out development. Moreover, nothing is said about the extent to which interested

¹⁰³ *Tokheim* 1230-2008-0020, [2008] Indre Hordaland jordskifterett.

¹⁰⁴ See Stokstad (n 79) 34-36.

¹⁰⁵ See the discussion in chapter 4, section 4.3.

¹⁰⁶ See for instance the case of *Endre Vange v Fellesskapet Vikfalli* Rt-1971-1217. See also the discussion in chapter 5, section 5.4.2.

owners should be given a right of first refusal with respect to the development rights held by the owners' association. This was an important issue raised by the case, but the consolidation court explicitly decided not to address it.

In interviews, the owners expressed that they were happy with how the case was dealt with by the court.¹⁰⁷ Everyone was heard and the owners' association was set up in consultation with the parties. However, the main issue, concerning *who* should develop the waterfall, was still unresolved after the case concluded. Some of the owners expressed criticism against the court on this basis.

The case of *Tokheim* serves to illustrate that established practices of consolidation, while being well received and understood by local owners, face some new challenges in relation to hydropower, challenges that consolidation courts might be reluctant to take on. It seems that the court in *Tokheim* felt that it was not in a position to assess the question of what kind of development would be best. The court was particularly cautious about expressing an opinion about the legal status of the project with respect to the relevant licensing legislation.

It remains to be seen whether such an agnostic attitude can be maintained by the consolidation courts, as local owners increasingly turn to them for help in resolving disputes regarding hydropower. Moreover, it will be interesting to see how the new Land Consolidation Act 2013 will influence case law in this area. It seems that a case like *Tokheim* could benefit from the court taking a broader view, possible even by including government bodies as parties in the case, to clarify the licensing status of the proposed development.

6.5 Assessment and Future Challenges

The cases discussed in the previous section show that the system of land consolidation can work as a practical alternative to expropriation in the context of hydropower development. At the same

¹⁰⁷ See Stokstad (n 79) 43-44.

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time, the cases suggest that the land consolidation courts may find it hard to deliver effective directives if owners disagree fundamentally about how their water resources should be managed. In addition, land consolidation courts are clearly less effective in situations when they are forced to consider rules and regulations from other areas of the law, outside their traditional area of expertise. Specifically, the land consolidation courts might be overly cautious about implementing solutions that they fear will contradict sector-specific provisions. Furthermore, the land consolidation courts might be unwilling to intervene in a potential conflict between owners and powerful commercial interests, especially if the sector-specific rules seem to speak in favour of expropriation.

Paradoxically, the potential weaknesses of the land consolidation courts in this regard may be enhanced by the worry that the courts are not authorised to make use of sufficiently strong forms of compulsion against owners. This worry, specifically, can give rise to the argument that the public interest in development is unlikely to be realised through the use of consolidation measures alone. Hence, one may fall back on expropriation, to the detriment of all owners, including those that also oppose development by consolidation.

The consolidation alternative seems to be quite vulnerable to this mechanism. This is illustrated by the Supreme Court case of *Holen v Holen*, concerning a conflict between a small quarry and a neighbouring farmer.¹⁰⁸ In order to continue extracting his minerals, the owner of the quarry would have to interfere with the property of a neighbouring owner who was using his land for more traditional forms of agriculture. The farmer was unwilling to reach an agreement with the quarry owner, so the latter brought a case before the land consolidation court. The court noted that it would be possible to reach an accommodation that would benefit both parties and issued use directives that would allow the quarry to continue its operations.

The directives gave the quarry owner access to the farmer's land, who was in turn granted replacement property from the quarry owner. The consolidation court also noted that the quarry

¹⁰⁸ *Holen v Holen* Rt-1995-1474.

would, in the future, be likely to extract minerals that belonged to the farmer. Hence, a directive was issued that gave the quarry owner a right to extract these minerals, provided he paid market value for them.

Hence, not only was the farmer awarded replacement property for agricultural purposes, he was also granted a share of the benefits that would result from the continued operation of his neighbour's quarry. This was clearly beneficial to his property, economically speaking. The owner himself, however, objected to the arrangement. The Supreme Court found in his favour. This was not because they sanctioned his right to block the continued operations of the quarry, or because they thought the replacement property or the payment model was inappropriate. Instead, the Court held that the farmer's right to extract minerals could not be transferred to the quarry by a consolidation measure, even if the farmer was ensured payment for his share of the total mineral rights.¹⁰⁹ Specifically, such a transfer was not held to fall within the meaning of organising joint use of their properties.

This decision seems to suggest a reluctance to permit land consolidation being used in a way that tracks eminent domain too closely. However, *Holen v Holen* was decided in 1995, and as I have already mentioned, the law has developed in recent years in the direction of increased use of land consolidation as an alternative to expropriation. Moreover, it might have been possible for the land consolidation court to avoid the outcome in *Holen* by providing a more subtle use directive. Specifically, the court could set up an organisational arrangement that would have allowed the unwilling owner to take active part in the development company later on, if he were to his mind. If so, the arrangement as a whole would likely have fallen back inside the meaning of joint use. At least, it would then have been in keeping with current practices observed in the context of hydropower development, e.g., as seen in the *Oma* case discussed above. Still, *Holen v Holen* reminds us that critics might be able to raise convincing formal objections against compulsion in

¹⁰⁹ See *Holen* (n 108) 1481.

land consolidation, on the basis of earlier case law.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, some scholars argue that land consolidation sometimes offers less protection to owners than administrative expropriation.¹¹⁰ In expropriation cases, it is true that a range of procedural rules tend to apply, pertaining to notification to the owners, impact assessments, a duty to provide guidance and reasons for the decision, and a possibility (sometimes several) for administrative appeal.¹¹¹ Moreover, after an expropriation order has been granted, the owner can still challenge it before the appraisal courts, in principle at the expropriating party's expense.¹¹²

In practice, however, the administrative expropriation procedure often leaves the owners completely marginalised, as they are overshadowed by other stakeholders. This is particularly clear in situations when expropriation arises as a result of more comprehensive planning or licensing procedures, such as in the context of hydropower development.¹¹³ In addition to this, the possibility of raising validity objections before the courts in expropriation cases is mostly a theoretical one in Norway.¹¹⁴ The courts almost always defer to the discretion of the administrative decision-maker in such cases.

More generally, the narrative of expropriation is one where the owners have to endure a loss in the public interest, for which they must be compensated as individuals. By contrast, the narrative of consolidation is one where the owners themselves are tasked with making a *contribution* to the development project, in the best interests of both the local community and greater society. In particular, the owner's role is no longer that of a passive obstacle to development. Rather, the

¹¹⁰ See Stenseth, 'De nye reglene om "urbant jordskifte"'. En presentasjon og vurdering' (n 2) 318-319.

¹¹¹ See Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, 'Expropriation Law in Norway' in JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), *Expropriation Law in Europe* (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 377-382.

¹¹² See Dyrkolbotn, 'Expropriation Law in Norway' (n 111) 382-384.

¹¹³ See the discussion in chapter 5. For the same point with respect to planning more generally, see Dyrkolbotn, 'Expropriation Law in Norway' (n 111) 376.

¹¹⁴ For a discussion on this with further references, see Dyrkolbotn, 'Expropriation Law in Norway' (n 111) 384-386.

owner is placed in the position of active *participant*, one who might yet have to be nudged to fulfil their potential. In addition, the properties as such receive recognition as important resource units, independently of the interests of their current owners. Moreover, the owners as a *group* come into focus, as the process is meant to facilitate rational *collective* action.

This is achieved by placing owners in a partly deliberative, partly adversarial, context, which not only tolerates, but also presupposes, their active input to the decision-making process. In addition, the *grounds* for imposing compulsory measures that interfere with property rights need to be anchored explicitly in the social functions of the affected properties, not individual interests. A measure is warranted only when it enhances property values, also in the sense of improving conditions for the communities that take their livelihoods from the affected properties. Clearly, this broader sense in which consolidation serves to protect property is not matched by any administrative safeguards in expropriation law.

Hence, I conclude that land consolidation is highly attractive, even when it involves compulsion directed against owners. In a system based on private property rights, it seems only reasonable that owners and their communities retain their position as primary stakeholders, even if the public is adamant that development needs to take place on their property.

It should be noted that this positive assessment of consolidation as an alternative to expropriation is premised on the fact that property in Norway is distributed in an egalitarian manner among the members of local populations, especially in rural areas. If land consolidation is used outside of this context, even in urban Norway, one might ask whether the processes truly empowers the community, or merely the landowners.

Arguably, the existing land consolidation system is an incomplete solution to the legitimacy issues that arise in such cases. Moreover, land consolidation might even have indirect effects that make those issues harder to resolve. For instance, it might be that consolidation will undermine local democracy by allowing powerful owners to remove certain property issues from the broader

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political agenda. The consolidation courts could become arenas used by powerful owners to prevent marginalised group from accessing decision-making processes of societal significance.

On the other hand, it is wrong to assume that empowering owners will not also benefit non-owners. As long as the owners are themselves members of the local community, the fact that they are offered increased protection through land consolidation can positively affect the community as a whole. As I discussed at length in chapter 2, the social function theory of property asks us to recognise such effects. Indeed, a community represented by local property owners might be in a much better position to participate in decision-making than a local community represented by career politicians, expert planners, or judges.

How well a property-based form of representation will work depends closely on the distribution of property within the community, and the legal framework surrounding the property in question. If property rights are spread across many members of the community, if ownership is shared, or if obligations towards non-owners occupies a prominent place within the private law of property, it will help make decision-making through consolidation more representative of broader community interests.

In addition to this comes the fact that the land consolidation process has a judicial form, meaning that a judge is already present, as an administrator and a representative of public interests. Moreover, the judge is required to consider what is best for the properties, not the owners. Hence, on a human flourishing account of which functions property should fulfil, the interests of non-owners need to be taken into account. This also entails that the owners participating in consolidation are indeed meant to be representatives of their communities, with obligations as well as rights.

It should be emphasised that so far in Norway, the potential problem of elite capture in consolidation appears to be of limited practical significance. Land consolidation is used to organise decision-making among owners, with no direct legal consequences for non-owners or binding consequences for other branches of government. For instance, if a land consolidation courts orders

a community of owners to pursue hydropower development, this does not mean that the water authorities are compelled to give the necessary licenses. If environmental interests or the interests of non-owners suggest otherwise, a license will not be granted. The Norwegian system – so far – appears to successfully implement a division of power in this regard, so that land consolidation cannot be used to capture significant power outside the context of decision-making among owners.

However, as I have already mentioned, there have been indications that the scope of consolidation will be broadened, with governmental agencies and other stakeholders more often included in consolidation proceedings that concern their areas of competence. In light of this, there is a reason to worry that the community representation might become too narrow in the future, so that consolidation itself will come to lack legitimacy. Hence, in some contexts, it might be advisable to further extend the class of persons that can be recognised as having legal standing in consolidation disputes, to include non-owners without formally recognised property rights (e.g., neighbours, tenants or employees).

However, there are some good reasons for caution. First, there are obvious pragmatic concerns related to the increased cost and complexity of the procedure. From the Norwegian experience, it seems that a few hundred parties would be manageable, but more than that takes us to uncharted territory. Second, moving away from property as a basis for legal standing in consolidation might in fact make it *easier* for powerful external actors to unduly influence the process. This can be an indirect effect, arising from good intentions. For instance, if a large-scale development involves razing an impoverished part of town, it will not be a good idea to give full legal standing in consolidation to the employees of the development company that stands to benefit. This would be so even if the employees could be classified as ‘locals’ under some imprecise standard for determining who to include in the consolidations process.

The overarching question is how to ensure that land consolidation courts remain respectful towards owners and communities, while providing a good basis for equitable and participatory

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decision-making about how to manage property. In Norway after 2016, any potential taker can be granted legal standing in consolidation disputes, so this challenge is becoming pressing. What will the role of the new parties be? Will they become potential partners that owners can rely on to implement projects in the public interest, or will they be regarded as the main stakeholders, whom the land consolidation courts should assist so that they may successfully impose their will on local communities? It will be very interesting to follow this development further.

Clearly, the consolidation proposal is related to the theoretical argument made in chapter 3, in favour of alternatives to expropriation based on local institutions for self-governance. As noted by Ostrom and others, congruence with local conditions is crucial to the success of such institutions.¹¹⁵ Hence, no single institutional framework is likely to work in all cases. This was also the lesson drawn from the critical assessment of the Land Assembly Districts proposed by Heller and Hills.¹¹⁶ This proposal, aiming for self-governance while striving to limit the risk of abuse in all situations, ends up catering only to a very thin notion of participation, arguably without effectively reassuring those who worry about new ways in which governance might fail.

Setting up a Land Assembly District *might* still be appropriate, in which case a land consolidation court is ideally placed to order it.¹¹⁷ More generally, the consolidation procedure is always temporary, but consolidation leaves a lasting effect on how decision-making takes place within the affected area. In joint use cases, a consolidation court literally sets out to design an institution for local self-governance. This institution can then subsequently be tasked with resource management after the judicial proceedings come to an end.

The underlying idea at work here is to use special tribunals to interface between governments

¹¹⁵ See Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action* (Cambridge University Press 1990) 92.

¹¹⁶ See the discussion in chapter 2, section 2.6.

¹¹⁷ Arguably, a Norwegian land consolidation court would have to set it up as negotiations for a leasehold only, as in the hydropower cases, to avoid a full transfer of property that might fall outside the meaning of “joint use”, see *Holen* (n 108).

and communities, while overseeing and gently directing decision-making at the community level. Arguably, this idea has wide applicability, and can be viewed as a link that has so far been missing between theories of self-governance and legally enforceable human rights principles. Developing this link further can become a path towards sustainability that will not unduly inflate the power of states and markets, but rather allow people to flourish through participation in just social structures anchored in property. It also promises to address the crucial problem of institutional nesting in a neat way, to ensure that local decision-making takes place in an orderly and equitable fashion, in a way that can also inform and remain sensitive to decision-making processes in other institutions.¹¹⁸

This observation remains preliminary at this stage, but I think it points to a promising direction for future work. The intuitive appeal of the consolidation idea appears significant, especially because of its potential as a means to enlist the help of a judicial body to build and improve democracies from the ground up - starting with people in their communities, and their link to the properties they rely on for their subsistence and well-being.

6.6 Conclusion

The Norwegian land consolidation courts are unique judicial bodies which can be tasked with enabling coordination and participation in decision-making among groups of owners, increasingly also in conjunction with commercial partners and regulators. This suggests a new take on the role that tribunals can play in relation to decision-making regarding property, economic development, and public interests. Arguably, the sensitive issues that can arise in this context, and the need for orderly interaction between owners, market actors and government bodies, is a reason for courts to get involved *ex ante*, by taking charge of the whole process.

The land consolidation courts in Norway can get involved in this way because they have wide

¹¹⁸ Compare the discussion in chapter 3 section 3.6.

powers to organise self-governance, including the possibility of using compulsion to ensure that owners participate on reasonable terms that will benefit their properties. As shown in this chapter, consolidation can therefore be a powerful alternative to takings for economic development. In practice, however, current practices of land consolidation work best when there is a basic agreement among a majority of owners that development is desirable, or at least tolerable. The current procedure is less effective when there is deep disagreement about whether or not development should proceed at all.

To make consolidation better suited for dealing with deep disagreement, it might be appropriate to enhance the power of the land consolidation court, also in the direction of extending its authority to compel owners to engage with development projects that they fundamentally disagree with. But if this is done, it is important to simultaneously ensure that land consolidation remains a service to the owners. This challenge is currently arising with greater urgency in Norway, as the legislator has recently taken steps to increase the scope of consolidation further, including granting legal standing to other stakeholders. It will be interesting to see in the years to come how this will influence the system, especially with regard to the balance of power between different stakeholders in the process.

However, as argued in this chapter, consolidation as an alternative to expropriation has already been developed far enough to shed interesting light on the legitimacy question studied in this thesis. Indeed, land consolidation has been shown to be a highly versatile framework for enabling self-governance, more so than the Land Assembly Districts proposed by Heller and Hills.¹¹⁹ Unlike Land Assembly Districts, the alienation of property is rarely if ever the aim (or even the side-effect) of consolidation. Rather, the aim is to provide a democracy-on-demand for decision-making about economic development, in a way that should allow owners to adapt to changing property obligations while helping maintain a reasonable balance of power between them, their local communities, and

¹¹⁹ Michael Heller and Rick Hills, 'Land Assembly Districts' (2008) 121(6) *Harvard Law Review* 1465.

society as a whole. As such, consolidation seems worth considering further also for its potential applications in different jurisdictions and property contexts.

7 Conclusion

Proudhon got it all wrong. Property is not theft – it is fraud.¹

That's what makes it ours – being born on it, working on it, dying on it. That makes ownership, not a paper with numbers on it.²

This has been a thesis in two parts, each of which have approached the issue of economic development takings. The first part took a theoretical approach, starting from the notion of property itself, to answer the question of *why* it should be protected. This, in turn, gave rise to a framework for assessing the legitimacy of economic development takings, and for formulating alternatives to it that could obviate the need for dispossessing current owners.

The second part of the thesis approached the issue of legitimacy concretely, by giving a case study of takings of waterfalls for hydropower development in Norway. The political, social and economic context was also analysed, leading to an application of the Gray test formulated in the first part of the thesis. Moreover, the case study considered the possibility of alternatives to expropriation, by assessing the Norwegian institution of land consolidation, which is now used extensively by local owners who wish to undertake hydropower development themselves.

In the following, I offer a brief summary of the main points discussed in each chapter. While doing so, I hope to shed further light on a broader thread that runs through the work done in this

¹ Kevin Gray, 'Property in Thin Air' (1991) 50(2) The Cambridge Law Journal 252, 252.

² John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath* (Penguin Books 1939) 33.

thesis, pertaining to the importance of social justice considerations in takings law and the function of private property as an anchor for local self-governance and sustainable resource management in democratic societies.

Property theory

To arrive at a theoretical framework for discussing economic development takings, chapter 2 considered various theories of property. The chapter noted that there are differences between civil law and common law theorising about ownership, but concluded that these differences are not particularly relevant to the legitimacy issues that arise when property is taken for economic development. In particular, the chapter observed that neither the bundle theory, dominant in the common law world, nor the dominion theory, taught to many civil law jurists, helps to clarify the distinguishing features of economic development takings. Traditional thinking both in civil and common law jurisdictions has a tendency to disregard the social and political context of takings; private property is approached as a collection of disparate individual entitlements, not as an interconnected web of social functions. This implies that the broader societal effects of takings will often not be considered by the courts when owners protest against the use of eminent domain by invoking property clauses in constitutional and human rights law.

The thesis set out to arrive at a theoretical foundation for thinking about property that would support a more comprehensive approach to takings, especially in the context of economic development. The chapter focused especially on property theories that emphasise that property plays a crucial role in many social and political relations within a society. Such social function theories provide important *descriptive* insights into the workings of property and its role in the legal order. Chapter 2 highlighted this aspect and argued that we should actively try to decouple descriptive insights from normative claims about property. It was argued that if we succeed in doing this, the social function theory can serve as common ground for further value-driven debates that cross

ideological divisions.

Following up on this preliminary argument, the chapter clarified the normative starting point of this thesis, by expressing support for the human flourishing theory proposed by Alexander and Peñalver. This theory is based on the premise that property rights *should* be integrated in the legal order in such a way that they enable – possibly even compel – individuals and their communities to participate in social and political processes. Property can then become an anchor for democracy, since it provides a starting point for participatory decision-making on the basis of mutual obligation and respect, empowering owners and non-owners alike. In this regard, the human flourishing theory rightly emphasises the *duties* associated with private property, especially those duties that are directed at non-owners. The successful execution of such duties necessitate inclusive institutions for collective decision-making in cases when conflicting property interests are at stake.

Importantly, the human flourishing theory emphasises how such institutions can arise from the structure of property itself, rather than as a purely external framework imposed by the authority of the state. For this reason, the human flourishing theory contains a further important insight, concerning the scope of the state's obligation to protect property. In particular, the human flourishing theory leads to the conclusion that protecting property implies a commitment to also protect the right to self-governance for local communities. Therefore, being an owner of a property also comes with a right and a duty to take active part in decision-making regarding that property, also in situations involving large-scale economic development. This becomes directly relevant to the question of legitimacy in economic development takings, since a key worry is that such takings allow powerful stakeholders to capture decision-making processes at the expense of owners and communities.

Following up on the theoretical argument, chapter 2 sketched out what a social function perspective could imply in practice by considering *Kelo*, the paradigmatic case of a taking for economic

development in the US. It was observed that the disagreement within the Supreme Court seemed to turn, in part, on the willingness of the justices to adopt a social function perspective on the case. Justice O'Connor, who led the dissenting minority, departed from a formalistic, entitlements-based approach, when she argued that takings for economic development should be prohibited because such takings would systematically bestow benefits on powerful commercial interests at the expense of weaker social groups. In addition, both Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy, who voted with the majority to uphold the taking, emphasised the danger that the commercial incentives associated with using eminent domain to facilitate economic development could distort decision-making processes, creating a democratic deficit within government institutions endowed with eminent domain powers. These two themes, pertaining to the social fairness and institutional legitimacy of takings for economic development, remained in focus throughout the remainder of the thesis.

Testing for legitimacy and looking for alternatives to eminent domain

In chapter 3, I gave a more in-depth presentation of economic development takings in selected jurisdictions, focusing on the UK, the US, and the ECtHR. These jurisdictions adopt distinctly different approaches to the legitimacy question, yet they remain easily comparable with each other. In the UK, a judicial review of a taking is traditionally structured around procedural rules, while in the US the traditional starting point is to ask whether or not the taking is for a “public use”. Chapter 3 argued in favour of an approach that combines procedural and substantive standards of fairness, by testing the democratic merit of the decisions that result in the application of eminent domain. It was argued that such an institutional approach to fairness has started developing at the ECtHR in response to the newly introduced framework for pilot judgements applied in cases that might indicate systemic problems at the state level.

The chapter went on to propose a concrete heuristic for assessing the legitimacy of economic development takings. This heuristic, referred to as the “Gray test”, consists of a set of indicators

of eminent domain abuse, many of which are due to Kevin Gray, a leading UK property scholar. In addition to Gray's original indicators, chapter 3 added three additional points based on the work done in this thesis, to highlight the institutional fairness dimension of legitimacy. As a result, the Gray test also tracks recent developments at the ECtHR and should be a good fit for jurisdictions that emphasise the need to strike a "fair balance" between opposing interests in takings cases. Furthermore, the test incorporates several aspects of the social function theory of property. This is evident already from Kevin Gray's original indicators of abuse, which looks at the takings issue from a broad vantage point by asking how the interference will affect communities and the environment, not merely the individual owners. This makes the Gray test stand out in the literature, especially in the UK and the US, where individualistic perceptions of property have tended to dominate. As argued in chapter 3, the test should be able to identify many, if not most, cases of eminent domain abuse, especially in the context of economic development.

Following up on the presentation of the Gray test, chapter 3 considered the question of how to increase legitimacy without giving up on the idea that the collective should be entitled to push for economic development. It was argued that the work done by Elinor Ostrom and others on common pool resources provides a suitable starting point for making institutional proposals to achieve a better framework for making decisions about economic development on privately owned land. Specifically, the chapter briefly presented Ostrom's design principles for local self-governance of natural resources, which can be used as a starting point also when designing procedures to replace eminent domain for economic development.

The chapter went on to consider a proposal that has already been made along these lines, namely the idea of Land Assembly Districts, due to Heller and Hills. This proposal was analysed in depth, and the chapter pointed out some potential problems with it, including a tension between the overarching goal of self-governance and the perceived danger of tyranny by local elites and abuse of local minorities. In the end, the chapter concluded that a single institutional framework

is unlikely to work in all contexts; institutions for self-governance need to be attuned to local conditions, so they cannot be made too general or justified in overly theoretical terms. Indeed, sensitivity to local conditions is one of the key design principles proposed by Ostrom, and should influence also the proposals we come up with for institutional reform in the law of takings.

This observation marked the end of the first part of the thesis. In the second part, the thesis considered the case of Norwegian hydropower. This led to an analysis of the legitimacy of waterfall takings, including an application of the Gray test as well as a case study of the land consolidation courts and their power to set up local institutions for self-governance that can obviate the need for eminent domain. In this way, the second part applied key aspects of the theory developed in the first, while exploring further the idea that social functions run as a common thread through individual property rights.

Norwegian waterfalls and their social functions

Chapter 4 introduced the case study and provided background information that placed it in a broader context with respect to Norwegian law. The legal and regulatory framework surrounding hydropower development was discussed, and its history was traced back to pre-industrial times. The chapter emphasised that local rights to hydropower have a long tradition in Norway, with communities of smallholders typically holding the rights to harness power from local rivers in common, as incidents of their shared ownership of the surrounding outfields. This arrangement dates from a time when grist mills and saw mills were important to many local communities, whose proprietary rights provided them with an opportunity to benefit from local resources.³

After the advent of the industrial age, and particularly following the Second World War, the state took the view that hydropower was a public good that should be exploited for industrial

³ As noted in chapter 4, Norwegian tenant farmers also enjoyed such rights before they started buying back their farms in the 17th and 18th century. In particular, tenants would typically have quite extensive rights to natural resources found in the outfields. This highlights that private ownership of land was always imbued with egalitarian social functions in Norway, not simply an encapsulation of individual entitlements for the privileged classes.

development in the interest of the general public. This resulted in a tension between local self-governance, rooted in private property, and central management, rooted in the authority of the state. The tension became particularly severe after the liberalisation of the electricity sector in the early 1990s. This reform reorganised hydropower development as a commercial pursuit, meaning that when the state uses its regulatory powers, it tends to bestow benefits on commercial companies at the expense of local resource owners. At the same time, local owners themselves have been empowered by the liberalisation reform, since they can now engage in commercial hydropower development as market participants. This has been a side-effect of the fact that a market for electricity was set up, founded on the idea that all actors should have access to the electricity grid on non-discriminatory terms.

Chapter 4 discussed the resulting system in some depth, addressing also the question of whether or not the liberal market functions as intended. It was argued that the energy reform has marginalised the municipality governments, who used to play an important role because they were in charge of public utilities for the supply of electricity in their own local district. The result has been a concentration of power in the hands of the larger energy companies, a centralisation effect that threatens to undermine the market-stimulating intentions behind the reform. Specifically, chapter 4 argued that the regulatory framework is currently unable to accommodate new actors and facilitate competition on non-discriminatory terms. Special attention was directed at the position of waterfall owners and the companies that specialise in cooperating with them. It was argued that owners and small-scale development companies suffer under a regime that often tolerates, and sometimes encourages, discrimination against them.

The chapter went on to discuss how smaller market actors tend to organise themselves. First, the chapter presented an early organisational model that emphasised respect for property rights, local communities, and the environment. According to this model, owners and local communities would typically retain controlling stakes in development projects; external partners would provide capital

and technical expertise either as a paid service or in return for a minority stake in the enterprise. Many owner-led hydropower plants have since been built according to this model, demonstrating its commercial viability.

However, later developments have led to an increased concentration of power and ownership also in the small-scale segment of the electricity production sector. Specifically, external partners now typically demand controlling stakes in development projects and do not concede to organisational provisions meant to protect local communities and the environment. Effectively, the owners and their communities are increasingly asked to remain on the sideline. In many cases, local people have agreed to this in return for a promise of higher compensation in the future, calculated as a percentage of income from the generation of electricity. However, it has turned out that such promises have often been made with little realism. As discussed in chapter 4, there has been speculation in the small-scale market, where upstart energy companies have entered into a large number of agreements with local owners without carrying out much actual development.

In general, chapter 4 argued that recent developments in the small-scale sector marks a sharp departure from initial visions of this sector, visions that emphasised values such as local self-governance and environmental sustainability. Instead, the values and practices of leading small-scale actors have become increasingly similar to those of the established market actors. The chapter went on to argue that this might be a contributing reason why small-scale development now appears to be falling out of political favour. Today, critical voices claim that large-scale development is better, not only because it is more commercially optimal, but also because it is more environmentally friendly. The specific argument provided for this claim is that small-scale projects affect a greater number of square meters per energy unit they produce. As noted in chapter 4, this is no doubt true, since many small-scale plants will typically be required to match the energy output of a single large-scale plant. Unfortunately, issues relating to more substantive notions of sustainability, as well as issues relating to property, benefit sharing, and local participation in decision-making,

appear only at the fringes of the present debate. Hence, policies are now at risk of being formulated on the basis of an incomplete picture of what is at stake. As suggested in chapter 4, this makes the present thesis a timely scholarly contribution that could also inform policy making on hydropower in Norway.

Expropriation as an automatic consequence of a development license

In chapter 5, the legal framework surrounding expropriation of waterfalls was studied in depth. In addition to presenting the law, the chapter also discussed administrative practices developed by the water authorities. The chapter showed that current regulatory framework is based on an individualistic and narrow understanding of the meaning of private property; the presumption is that property embodies purely private values, while public values need to be pursued through direct government intervention, if necessary also by redistributing or negating property rights. Chapter 5 tracked how this perspective has shaped the law of expropriation of waterfalls. More generally, the chapter argued that the notion of property presupposed by Norwegian expropriation law is not based on a social function understanding of what property is and why it should be protected against interference.

Historically, the narrow perspective on private property was accompanied by a similarly narrow perspective on public values, a perspective that implied a sharp distinction between commercial and public uses of property. Hence, the law of expropriation initially tended to restrict the takings power to specific purposes that clearly served the common good. This was the case also in the context of water law, where the government did not initially have any authority to expropriate waterfalls for the purpose of developing hydropower. However, as noted in chapter 5, the increasing focus on electricity production as a public service resulted in the introduction of new authorities to expropriate waterfalls for public utilities. Still, expropriation could not take place for commercial purposes or in favour of private companies.

The restrictions placed on the power to expropriate waterfalls gave legitimacy to the legal framework. Still, the increasing centralisation of the energy sector and the increasing scale of projects seen after the Second World War led to increased tension surrounding new hydropower projects. Tensions came to a high-point in the case of *Alta*, when the indigenous Sami population from the north of Norway objected to a project that would have detrimental effects on Sami communities and their way of life. In collaboration with environmental groups, they launched a legal challenge directed at the development license, resulting in one of the most comprehensive cases ever dealt with by the Supreme Court. In the end, the development interests triumphed, and the regulatory framework surrounding hydropower and expropriation was given a stamp of approval.

As noted in chapter 5, the *Alta* conflict contributed to increased awareness of indigenous rights in Norway, starting a development that has since resulted in better protection of Sami rights within the legal order. No similar mechanism occurred in the law of hydropower; the precedent set by *Alta* remains leading in disputes over the legitimacy of licensing decisions and expropriation orders. This is so despite the fact that the context of waterfall expropriation has changed dramatically since the liberalisation of the electricity sector. Unlike before, expropriation is now regularly ordered for commercial purposes, to the benefit of limited liability companies.

As showed in chapter 5, this change of context has hardly influenced the administrative practices adopted by the water authorities. Rather, the traditional approach, which evolved when electricity generation was still organised as a public service, remains in force. The key feature of this approach is that it renders expropriation a *de facto* automatic consequence of obtaining a development license; if an energy company manages to obtain a development license for a large-scale project, the right to expropriate waterfalls is granted to it by default. As shown in chapter 5, this leaves the owners and their local communities in a precarious position. Essentially, they enjoy very limited protection under administrative law, not substantially more than arbitrary members of the public, and far

less than members of special interest groups.

Chapter 5 discussed the practical fallout from this in depth when considering the case of *Jørpeland*. This case served to illustrate that the administrative practices currently in place make expropriation a tool that market players can use to gain the upper hand in competition for resources owned by local communities. The chapter noted that *Jørpeland* is not unique in this regard, and that the compensation formula that is now being developed through case law at the Supreme Court renders expropriation a highly profitable way for energy companies to acquire water resources. Hence, the current state of hydropower law in Norway adds weight to the prediction made by Justice O'Connor in *Kelo*, namely that economic development takings would systematically benefit powerful commercial interests at the expense of weaker members of society. In Norway, with respect to waterfalls, this thesis has argued that her prediction has come true.

Land consolidation, self-governance, and sustainable resource management

In chapter 6, the Norwegian system of land consolidation was presented. It was shown to be a unique institution that combines a property-based approach to land management with a broad authority for the courts to intervene in order to organise collective decision-making and promote sustainable resource management at the local level. The chapter went on to show that the system of use directive has become widely used in recent years to facilitate hydropower projects organised by local owners. In some cases, it is also used to deprive some owners of their holdout power by compelling them to participate in a development project that they oppose.

In consolidation cases, interference in property is not justified by reference to the public interest. Instead, consolidation relies on proof that benefits will outweigh harms at the local level, with respect to each affected property. This requirement targets the property as a functional unit, irrespective (in principle) of the individual interests of its current owner. Hence, depending on what functions of property are regarded as more important, the wishes of the owner might have to

yield to other priorities, including priorities reflecting the common good. However, no deprivation of property is authorised, the owners retain their properties. At the same time, the compensatory perspective is abandoned; if the property as a functional unit does not suffer a loss as a result of consolidation, no compensation is payable to the owner as an individual.

As demonstrated in chapter 6, this perspective diverges from a perspective that sees private property as a way to encapsulate the financial entitlements of individuals. Instead, the perspective on property inherent in the land consolidation model is much closer to that postulated by the social function theorists discussed in chapter 2, especially those that focus on human flourishing as the underlying purpose of private property rights. Indeed, land consolidation relies on a highly functional perspective on property: beneficial resource uses, not individual entitlements, take center stage throughout the process. This might limit the power of the owners to do as they please, but it does not marginalise them. After all, it is hard to deny that one of the primary functions of private property is to bestow rights and obligations on its owners. Moreover, in normal circumstances, it would be safe to assume that when a property benefits, then so does its owner.

For this reason, it also seems that consolidation can be used to address the democratic deficit of economic development takings in an elegant way. Chapter 6 addressed this possibility in depth and argued that the land consolidation courts can be seen as providing an institution authorised to design and implement self-governance arrangements that approach private property rights in land as a way to organise the use of a common pool resource. This connected the case study of Norwegian hydropower with the discussion provided at the end of chapter 3, regarding institutional alternatives to eminent domain for economic development. In particular, it connected the system of land consolidation courts with theories about self-governance and sustainable resource management.

As argued in chapter 6, land consolidation is attractive as a vehicle for sustainable self-governance of community resources. Moreover, it provides the public with a means to strongly

influence owners and communities, without having to resort to the use of expropriation. A potential worry is that powerful stakeholders can abuse the consolidation system in much the same way as they abuse the state's eminent domain power. Chapter 6 argued that in order to address this worry, the law of land consolidation needs to clearly identify owners and local communities as the primary stakeholders. The consolidation process should be designed to help local people manage their properties in accordance with public interests, not as a means of depriving communities of control over local resources. This requires a clear commitment on part of the state to limit the power of commercial interests and public-private partnerships in consolidation proceedings.

Assuming that such a commitment can be fulfilled, chapter 6 argued that use directives issued by a land consolidation court can be empowering to local owners, who are then called on to participate in collective decision-making guided by a tribunal. Specifically, chapter 6 argued that land consolidation can be used to deal with many of the challenges that arise at the intersection between private property rights, local community interests, and economic development for the common good. For this reason, the Norwegian model should be of interest also to scholars from other jurisdictions, especially those that subscribe to an egalitarian ideal of what property should be and what social functions it should support.