

West Chester University

CSC 471

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Submitted by

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**1. Introduction:**

The purpose of this lab is to understand Kernel Mode Rootkits and use WinDBG with VirtualBox for debugging Windows kernels. Setting up kernel-mode debugging on a virtual machine manually involves employing a Virtual COM Port for communication. By delving into system-level operations, we aim to detect and analyze rootkit behavior within the Windows OS. Through the experiment setup, we establish a debug environment to observe the Windows XP virtual machine kernel under WinDBG scrutiny. This investigation deepens our understanding of rootkit operations and equips us with skills to mitigate such security risks.

## 2. Analysis and Results:

### Q1. What is a SSDT?

SSDT stands for System Service Descriptor Table. It is a core component of the Windows kernel. It maintains a list of system service call addresses, providing essential functions for user-mode applications. Malware often targets the SSDT to intercept system calls, allowing it to manipulate system behavior and evade detection

### Q2. Please use WinDBG and type the following command:

**dds KiServiceTable L 12a**

**Please take a screenshot of the output result. What's the meaning of each column?**

```
kd> dds KiServiceTable L 12a
804e2620 8057a521 nt!NtAcceptConnectPort
804e2624 805760c9 nt!NtAccessCheck
804e2628 8058cabf nt!NtAccessCheckAndAuditAlarm
804e262c 8058e3f7 nt!NtAccessCheckByType
804e2630 8058d7c0 nt!NtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarm
804e2634 80638f82 nt!NtAccessCheckByTypeResultList
804e2638 8063b113 nt!NtAccessCheckByTypeResultListAndAuditAlarm
804e263c 8063b15c nt!NtAccessCheckByTypeResultListAndAuditAlarmByHandle
804e2640 805745ef nt!NtAddAtom
804e2644 80649b8b nt!NtSetBootEntryOrder
804e2648 8063873d nt!NtAdjustGroupsToken
804e264c 8058cdde nt!NtAdjustPrivilegesToken
804e2650 80630120 nt!NtAlertResumeThread
804e2654 80577310 nt!NtAlertThread
804e2658 80591595 nt!NtAllocateLocallyUniqueId
804e265c 8062702f nt!NtAllocateUserPhysicalPages
804e2660 8059df59 nt!NtAllocateUuids
804e2664 80569302 nt!NtAllocateVirtualMemory
804e2668 805d7867 nt!NtAreMappedFilesTheSame
804e266c 805a1387 nt!NtAssignProcessToJobObject
804e2670 804e2c2c nt!NtCallbackReturn
804e2674 80649b77 nt!NtDeleteBootEntry
804e2678 805c99ad nt!NtCancelIoFile
804e267c 804ec61c nt!NtCancelTimer
804e2680 805699ae nt!NtClearEvent
804e2684 80567c07 nt!NtClose
804e2688 8058d24c nt!NtCloseObjectAuditAlarm
804e268c 8064f9c0 nt!NtCompactKeys
804e2690 8058b776 nt!NtCompareTokens
```

Each line displays the address of a system service function along with the corresponding function name prefixed by nt!. The first column represents the memory address of the function within the kernel's address space. The second column displays the relative address of the function within the nt module, noted

by the module name followed by an exclamation mark (nt!). The third column shows the name of the system service function, such as NtAcceptConnectPort, NtAccessCheck, NtAccessCheckAndAuditAlarm, etc. These functions represent some of the system operations that user-mode applications can invoke through system calls to interact with the operating system kernel.

**Q3: Comparing the two outputs (before hook and after hook), can you tell which functions have been hooked?**

65	804e2720	8063b1b7	nt!NtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm	65	804e2720	8063b1b7	nt!NtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm
66	804e2724	805936da	nt!NtDeleteValueKey	66	804e2724	fae1d158	SSDTHook+0x1158
67	804e2728	805796db	nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile	67	804e2728	805796db	nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile
97	804e27a0	805a95b1	nt!NtListenPort	97	804e27a0	805a95b1	nt!NtListenPort
98	804e27a4	805a29bd	nt!NtLoadDriver	98	804e27a4	fae1d08c	SSDTHook+0x108c
99	804e27a8	805adcbb	nt!NtLoadKey	99	804e27a8	805adcbb	nt!NtLoadKey
122	804e2804	80595ba5	nt!NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm	122	804e2804	80595ba5	nt!NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm
123	804e2808	80574bc1	nt!NtOpenProcess	123	804e2808	fae1d0be	SSDTHook+0x10be
124	804e280c	80571121	nt!NtOpenProcessToken	124	804e280c	80571121	nt!NtOpenProcessToken
257	804e2a20	80630999	nt!NtTerminateJobObject	257	804e2a20	80630999	nt!NtTerminateJobObject
258	804e2a24	80585851	nt!NtTerminateProcess	258	804e2a24	fae1d006	SSDTHook+0x1006
259	804e2a28	80578037	nt!NtTerminateThread	259	804e2a28	80578037	nt!NtTerminateThread

Above are screenshots of the four functions that have been hooked. On the left are “before hook” and on the right are “after hook”.

**Q4: Can you take a guess of what is this malware trying to do (based on the hooked functions)?**

The malware is pursuing a variety of objectives, including control, stealth, and possibly even remote access or data exfiltration. By hooking critical system functions related to security and process management, as shown in Question 3, the malware demonstrates an intention to manipulate system operations and evade detection. These hooks could facilitate activities like hiding its presence in the registry, loading malicious drivers stealthily, controlling processes to avoid detection, and preventing termination to maintain persistence. Additionally, hooks in functions related to network communications or security could suggest attempts to intercept or manipulate network traffic, suppress logging mechanisms, or enable unauthorized remote access. To summarize, the malware behaves in a way consistent with rootkit tactics. Specifically, compromises system security and integrity while remaining undetected and retaining control over the compromised system.

Analysis:

**Generated by ChatGPT-** To analyze, students explored the System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) using WinDBG, gaining insights into the structure and

function of this critical component of the Windows kernel. The output of the command `dds KiServiceTable` L 12a provided a detailed view of system service functions and their corresponding memory addresses within the kernel's address space. Through this examination, we identified the significance of each column in the output result, highlighting the role of the SSDT in facilitating essential system operations for user-mode applications. Furthermore, we speculated on the potential implications of hooked functions identified in the SSDT, suggesting the malware's intentions to manipulate system operations, evade detection, and potentially enable unauthorized access or data exfiltration. This analysis underscores the importance of understanding SSDT and its relevance in detecting and analyzing rootkit behavior within the Windows operating system.

### **3. Discussion and Conclusion:**

**Generated by ChatGPT-** The lab effectively fulfilled its objective of delving into Kernel Mode Rootkits and employing WinDBG alongside VirtualBox for Windows kernel debugging. Through hands-on experimentation, we gained a practical understanding of setting up kernel-mode debugging and scrutinizing the behavior of the Windows XP virtual machine kernel. Analysis of the System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) using WinDBG confirmed its pivotal role in facilitating system functions and vulnerability to malware interception. Examination of hooked functions revealed the malware's likely intentions to manipulate system operations, evade detection, and potentially enable unauthorized access or data exfiltration. While the exact functionality of the malware remains speculative, the lab provided valuable insights into the complexities of kernel-level security threats and equipped us with essential skills for detecting and analyzing rootkit behavior. Moving forward, continued exploration and research in this domain are crucial for developing robust cybersecurity measures to mitigate the risks associated with kernel-level vulnerabilities and exploits.