Preaching to, or Beyond, the Choir

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Preaching to or beyond the choir:

The politicizing effects of fitting value-identity communication in ideologically heterogeneous groups

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Abstract

Although values motivate participation in collective action, little is known about whether their *communication* by a social movement motivates identification with it. In the context of student protests against budget cuts, we tested whether and how fitting a *value* (right to free education) to two relevant *group identities* (i.e., student vs. national identity) influenced politicized identification among individuals in ideologically different student subgroups (N=168). Specifically, for students who shared the movement's ideological background, we found that communicating values increased the predictive power of affective predictors of politicized identification over instrumental ones. However, for students who did not share the movement's ideological background, fitting values to student (but not national) identity, decreased politicized identification. These findings imply that value-identity fit must be taken into account if one wants to motivate a broad audience of potential followers with diverse ideological backgrounds for collective action.

Keywords: social identity, values, communication, politicized identity, collective action

Word count: 142

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Social movements sometimes succeed in gathering the support of many people (e.g., the civil rights movement; McAdam, 1982). A key explanation for this lies in the manner in which movements communicate their goals to different audiences in an effective way. This is important because effective communication of who they *are* (i.e., their identity) and what they *stand for* (i.e., their values) may help movements to motivate not only those who already value what the movement values, but also those in the disadvantaged group who do not necessarily share the movement's values (i.e., the larger mobilization potential). This raises the question of how social movements may effectively communicate their values and identity in order to motivate a broad audience with diverse ideological backgrounds. This question is particularly relevant in the context of incidental or situation-based disadvantage (Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008), where there is often no already established activist organization that can influence the process of mobilization in a top-down manner.

We seek to answer this question by building on theory and research on the motivational power of values and group identities because these constitute powerful motivators of individual (Rokeach, 1973) and collective behavior (Klandermans 1997; Van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears & Betache, 2011; Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears 2012). Specifically, we focus on the communication of *values* and their motivational effects in ideologically diverse subgroups. For instance, student organizations may communicate that governmental budget cuts on higher education imply that the value of free education is being violated in order to increase the perceived illegitimacy of the situation and followers´ identification with the action group (which

we refer to as *politicizing* effects; indeed, politicized group identification is a strong predictor of collective and social movement participation; Simon et al., 1998; for a meta-analysis, see Van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, little is known about whether such a focus on values will have the same politicizing effects on those who already share movement values ("preaching to the choir") and on those who do not ("preaching beyond the choir").

We suggest that, when preaching to or beyond the choir, communicating a *value-identity fit* is important for politicization. We experimentally tested this proposal by manipulating how a social movement communicated a value and a relevant group identity, and measured their politicizing effects among Dutch students in the context of budget cuts for higher education (an issue that also arose in, for instance, the UK and Germany in recent years; e.g., Tausch & Becker, 2013). The student movement emerged in a bottom-up manner in response to the government's policy and was comprised of various locally operating groups at each university. On the basis of a pilot study, we distinguished between two subgroups of students with ideological backgrounds that fit or did not fit that of the movement. We then experimentally manipulated the contextually relevant value (the right to free education) and two contextually relevant identities (student or Dutch identity) that could be fitted to the value. Below, we develop our line of thought and specific expectations and then report the pilot study and the experiment.

Politicizing Effects of Value-Identity Communication

From a psychological perspective, many different actions can be considered collective actions, ranging from signing a petition to participating in massive demonstrations and occupations of public spaces. The defining feature of these acts is that they are undertaken as group members and aimed at improving the group's (rather than the individual's own) position (Van Zomeren et al.., 2008; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). For this reason,

identification with their group is a powerful predictor of whether individuals are willing to act on behalf of it (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Theory and research on collective action distinguishes between identification with the general social category (e.g. race, gender or ethnicity) from identification with social movement organizations (often referred to as *politicized* identification), the latter of which is typically most predictive of social movement participation (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). This is because in a larger societal context, collective action represents an intergroup power struggle where a politicized identity symbolizes a conscious choice on the part of the individual to enter the political arena (e.g., to become a feminist, or environmental activist; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The more strongly individuals become politicized, the higher is their intrinsic motivation to act on behalf of their group (Stürmer & Simon, 2004).

However, in the context of suddenly imposed grievances (Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Walsh 1981;1987), there is often no social movement organization (such as Greenpeace or Blank Panthers), with clear goals which potential followers can identify with. Nevertheless, a movement may arise and gain support when individuals come to realize that they share similar views on the issue (McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas,& Bongiorno, 2009) and are effective in communicating their beliefs to other members of their group. However, one cannot a priori assume that all members of the disadvantaged group are supportive of a movement that aims to represent them (Becker & Wagner, 2009) because they may not share movement's values.

Previous literature distinguished between affective and instrumental antecedents of politicized identities (Mazzoni, Van Zomeren, & Cicognani, 2015; Van Zomeren, 2013). Politicization is more likely when individuals experience the unfairness and anger about the group's disadvantage more strongly (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) and/or when individuals more strongly believe that their group is capable of achieving social change (i.e., group efficacy

beliefs; Bandura, 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Values have an important place in this motivational picture because they often define what individuals deem to be unjust and what their relevant goals are (e.g., Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Tetlock, Kirstel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Moreover, values that reflect subjectively absolute principles (such as human rights; Mazzoni et al., 2015) may transcend existing personal or group identities, because violations of such absolutist values have strong motivational consequences (Van Zomeren et al., 2012). On one hand, values can facilitate politicization as a fit between violated values (e.g., governmental cuts on higher education) and politicized identities geared towards the same issue (e.g., identifying as a student that opposes those governmental measures) can transform an individually held value into a collectively moralized basis for collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2012).

This suggests that movements may increase their mobilization potential by making salient the relevant value and the relevant group identity in their communication. In other words, communicating values and identities may help movements to create a sense of common cause that will appeal to the majority of group members, which is the first step in the mobilization process (Klandermans, 1984). Only once this is achieved, movements can focus on increasing motivation and on removing potential obstacles to participation. On the other hand, communicating values may not always have the desired effects depending on the ideological background of the audience, as movements can engage in communication with those who already share their values (preaching to the choir) or those who do not (preaching beyond the choir).

Different Politicizing Effects for Different Audiences

Social movements typically attempt to change public opinion, including those who do or do not already value what the movement values (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). Theory

and research suggests at least two ways through which public opinion can be affected: (1) directly increasing or decreasing relevant attitudes (i.e. mean-level changes) or (2) more indirectly by changing the processes leading to a certain attitude (i.e. qualitative changes or changes in the meaning of a certain attitude without necessarily mean-level changes; see Druckman, 2001; Nelson & Garst, 2005; Nelson, Oxley & Clawson 1997; Slothuus, 2008). This differentiation is important for present purposes because different audiences may not respond equally to the same value communication. To illustrate, in a study about different framings of welfare bills, Slothuus (2008) observed that among moderately politically aware individuals, policy messages increased the support in line with the frame through introduction of novel arguments (i.e. mean-level change). In contrast, among highly politically aware individuals, policy messages changed the predictive power of existing arguments or the meaning of a certain policy in line with the frame (i.e. qualitative change in the policy meaning). This suggests that, in the context of social movements at least, value communication may also have different effects among the audience that may or may not share the movement's values.

We thus examined two ways in which communicating values can have politicizing effects. First, we tested whether value communication increases motivation to participate in a social movement action (i.e., by looking at the mean-level changes). This reflects a *direct* way by which values may operate psychologically by increasing politicized identification. Second, we also tested whether values affect individuals' motivation *indirectly* by affecting the relative predictive weights of affective and instrumental antecedents of politicized identification (see also Mazzoni et al., 2015; Van Zomeren et al. 2008).

More specifically, we hypothesized, first, that communicating that important societal values are being transgressed may not directly increase politicized identification when

"preaching to the choir" because those individuals will already perceive their values to be violated. Still, we expect that communicating values may make individuals' affective, rather than instrumental, motivations more important in predicting politicized identification. Indeed, Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Van Dijk (2009) found that protesters' instrumental motivation appeared more important for those mobilized by the labor union (an instrumental movement), whereas perceived unfairness appeared more important for those mobilized by a value-based movement. Thus, our *first hypothesis* is that communicating values to "the choir" has *indirect* but no direct politicizing effects among those who already value what the movement values.

However, when "preaching beyond the choir", communicating values is unlikely to have any politicizing effects. In fact, talking about values may even decrease the perception of a common ground between ideologically opposed parties (Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, 2012). Nevertheless, the effects of values may depend on the identities made salient in the message put forward by the movement. For example, in the context of governmental cuts on higher education, this means that one could fit the right to education to student identity (the disadvantaged group in this context), or to Dutch identity (the larger societal group in this context). Indeed, theory and research on politicization (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) and recategorization (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see also Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) suggest that aligning the disadvantaged group's identity to national identity may increase movement's mobilization potential (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Simon and Klandermans (2001) argued that disadvantaged groups seeking to win public support must emphasize their membership within the larger category because that entitles them with equal status and treatment. Such dual identification also facilitates participation in collective action among the disadvantaged group members as evidenced by

Turkish immigrants living in Germany (Simon & Ruhs, 2008). We extended this idea to a new type of audience, namely the members who have a different ideological background within the disadvantaged group. By framing students' struggle as violation of a value important to the society as a whole (compared to the students only), we were able to explore whether and how a value-identity fit may have politicizing effects when "preaching beyond the choir".

Overview of Studies

We tested our ideas in a pilot study and a follow-up experiment. Through the use of an experimental design we were able to control the specific content of value-identity message (which increases internal validity). Through the use of the real-life student context we could target psychologically meaningful subgroups with different ideological backgrounds (which increases external validity). We took advantage of Dutch students' protests during 2011 and 2012 occurring after the introduction of governmental budget cuts for higher education (that led to fines for 'slow' students and the elimination of students' free access to public transport). Several bigger student unions managed to co-ordinate and organize one nation-wide event (i.e. demonstration in The Hague in January 2011) not resulting in any change, while most of the protests took place locally at each university organized by different student groups operating locally. Within this context, value communication referred to these measures not only as a collective disadvantage for students but also as a violation of the right to free education[1].

We first conducted a pilot study to (a) validate our assumption that different subgroups of

[1] Under the European Convention on Human Rights the right to free *higher* education is only an ideal (unlike free basic education which is considered obligatory) and it is left to each nation state to interpret it accordingly (United Nations Human Rights, 1966). In the Netherlands, the universities do charge an entrance fee, so the goal of free higher education is less realized as it is for example in Germany, Finland or Sweden. Thus, imposing additional fees on students seems as moving further away from the internationally held objective.

students who share or do not share the movement's ideological background can be identified, and to (b) pre-test the value-identity manipulation within such a diverse sample. We reasoned that these aims were important because they would allow us to effectively focus on two clearly different subgroups in the follow-up experiment, and to evaluate and possibly improve our manipulation.

We note that the manipulation was not designed to reflect a rich, real-life mobilization attempt that one may recognize from movement campaigns. The aim was to focus specifically on the messages that either contain or do not contain values which enabled us to 'cleanly' differentiate this type of communication from potential others such as making group identity salient or not (which was held constant) or using highly affective language to increase anger. We only mentioned the value (the right to free education) and the student situation (budget cuts) and left to our participants to deduce that a violation has occurred without suggesting that our participants should feel angry or outraged in any way. By opting for a very subtle manipulation and not explicitly stating a value violation, we increased internal validity but also offered a rather conservative test of our hypotheses.

Pilot Study

Method

The sample consisted of 98 bachelor and master students (45 females, M_{age} = 22.04[2], *SD* = 3.15), from different faculties (social sciences, law, economics, natural sciences) of the University of Groningen. Participants were approached in university canteens and asked to fill in the questionnaire and as a reward for their participation they were offered money (3 Euros).

Manipulation and measures. There were three versions of the questionnaire that reflected the three conditions of the value manipulation (value / context-only / empty-control

[2] One person did not indicate age or gender.

condition). In the context-only condition, participants read an article describing that, during 2010 and 2011, the Dutch government announced budget cuts for higher education and that, in response, in January 2011 there was a large protest in The Hague. In the value condition, this information was preceded by an introductory paragraph describing education as a basic right and its importance to the Dutch society in general, thus making the super-ordinate identity salient (see Supplementary Material). After reading the text, participants responded to two information-check questions that assessed if they had understood the text (e.g. what were the government's plans regarding the budget for education and the reason for fining students). A manipulation check question asked if any of the following three things were mentioned in the article: "the education being universal and basic human right" (the correct answer for the value condition), "some faculties closing down" (which was not mentioned at all) and "none of the above" (the correct answer for context-only condition). In the empty-control condition, participants did not read any text, but were asked to fill in the dependent measures; this condition served to tap baseline attitudes and motivation to participate in collective action.

Participants then answered questions with standardized response scales (7-point Likert-type scales, with anchors 1 = *Not at all* to 7 = *Very much*). First, we measured the *intentions to join collective action*[3] (eight items, e.g. ranging from signing an online petition, to joining a demonstration, boycotting lectures and occupying a building, $\alpha = .91$), followed by *identification with the politicized group* (four items, e.g. "I identify with the students who oppose these measures", $\alpha = .90$). We focused on students who opposed the austerity measure as broadly

[3] A principal component analyses on action intention scale with oblique rotation yielded a one factor solution explaining 53.94% variance, with the individual item loadings ranging from .52 to .84.

indicating the politicized group as there were many different student organizations trying to motivate and co-ordinate students for actions.

Furthermore, we also measured students' *identification with the Dutch society* (four items, e.g. "I identify with the Dutch society" $\alpha = .85$). As an indicator of *instrumental motivation*, we included a four-item measure of group efficacy (e.g. "I think that students, as group, can stop budget cuts"; $\alpha = .97$). *Affective motivation*[4] was operationalized as a combination of perceived illegitimacy and perceived immorality of government's decisions[5] (e.g. "How fair are the austerity measures placed upon students", "The decision to cut the budget for higher education is against universal moral values", (eight items in total, $\alpha = .91$).

Finally, participants filled in the demographic questions (age, gender, nationality). They also indicated whether they went to the protests in The Hague (11 participants did) which defined our sample as consisting mainly of potential followers (and not as actual participants such as in Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009).

Results and Discussion

Most participants apart from two, responded correctly on information check questions. However, we encountered a problem with the manipulation check as only seven out of 35 participants in the value-framing condition circled the correct answer. The other 27 participants thought that 'none of the above' was mentioned in the text. Thus, they did not *misremember* the introductory paragraph in the text, but simply did not remember it, which may be related to the

[4] A principal component analyses on affective motivation scale with oblique rotation yielded a one factor solution explaining 53.1% variance, with the individual item loadings ranging from .68 to .86.

[5] We also asked participants to indicate their emotions (anger and contempt) regarding the students' disadvantage, though our main expectation was that the manipulation will have an effect on the affective motivation.

minimalistic form the manipulation took. In any event, we decided to include a more explicit check in the follow-up experiment.

With this in mind, we then tested whether value communication had a direct effect on motivation. Mean-level scores on most motivational variables did not significantly differ across conditions (see Table 1). We only found the significant effect of condition on affective motivation, $F(2,95) = 4.76$, $p = .011$, $\eta^2 = .09$. However, the post hoc comparisons revealed that the participants in the control condition differed from the rest, which was of less interest to us (see Table 1). We then proceeded to identify the ideologically different subgroups. Our strategy was to compare students groups based on their study background[5], as previous research had found ideological differences among students depending on their majors (Guy, 2011). Due to relatively small sample size and no effects of the manipulation, we calculated the mean scores on all variables collapsing over the three conditions. Overall, the economics students seem to be the least supportive of student protest in contrast to social sciences students who on average were the most motivated (see Table 2). The contrast test comparing those social science and economics students indicated that these two samples differed in their intentions to act $t(52) = 1.87$, $p = .068$ and politicized identification, $t(52) = 2.08$, $p = .04$ suggesting that these two groups would be fairly good representatives of different audiences.

We note that these findings are in line with observations by Fiske, Kitayama, Markus and Nisbett (1998) and previous studies showing differential support of welfare policies (Guy, 2011) and system justifying ideologies (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) among students of social sciences and economics. To corroborate this choice, we decided to include specific measures of ideological background. In sum, the pilot study suggested that our choice of context

and group suited our aims, but also pointed to potential improvements with an eye to the follow-up experiment.

Experiment

The experiment's main aim was to test whether value communication would have politicizing effects both within and beyond the movement's own "choir". Furthermore, in the follow-up experiment we manipulated whether the value message was embedded in a student or national identity, in order to test the notion of value-identity fit. We wanted to explore whether communicating values as embedded in a national identity may have politicizing effects when "preaching beyond the choir", whereas we expected indirect rather than direct politicizing effects when "preaching to the choir".

Method

Participants and design. The sample consisted of 181 students. We excluded 13 students from the analysis because they either indicated they did not have the Dutch nationality or did not fill in the nationality question; one student did not fill in his educational background. Participants were approached in canteens, libraries and lectures at either the social sciences or at the economics faculty and asked to fill in the questionnaire. Six students did not originally belong to either of the two (they were students of natural sciences), but were still included in the final sample and assigned to a study based on the location they were approached. The data were collected among bachelor and master students (M_{age} = 21.51, SD = 2.35; 68 men, 100 women). Only 19 students participated in any student protests organized in the past years, which confirmed that our sample consisted of potential followers. The experimental design was a 2 (Subgroup of students: social sciences vs. economics) x 4 (Value communication: value-student

identity vs. value-national identity vs. context -only vs. empty-control condition) between-subjects design.

Manipulation. In order to create a fit between violation of the right to education and student and national identity the wording of the first sentence was different in those conditions: "Modern Dutch society is based on the principles of freedom and equality" vs. "Most students value the principles of freedom and equality". With this subtle reformulation, we defined the same value as embedded in the national (Dutch) or group (students) identity. The last paragraph in both conditions was slightly changed to reflect the most recent changes in the governmental plans (after the failed negotiations during the summer, the first generation of students was obliged to pay the fine starting from September[6]).

Again, the design also included the context-only and an additional empty-control condition where people were asked to fill in the dependent variables. Adding these two conditions enabled us to test, for either those who already share or do not share the movement's ideological background, both a) *mean-level effects* of value-identity communication (i.e. whether mentioning a value would *increase* politicized identification) and b) its *qualitative effects* (i.e. whether mentioning a value would increase the relative predictive strength of affective motivation and national identification).

Information and manipulation check. The information checks were the same as in the pilot study. However, we reformulated the manipulation check by referring specifically to the opening sentence of the article. Participants could choose between three options, i.e. the opening

[6] A month after our data collection the government decided to withdraw this fine. This was the result of political negotiations and elections that took place just after our data collection and not the result of the successful student protest.

sentences of the two value conditions, plus 'none of the above' which was correct for the context only condition.

Dependent variables. We used the same scales regarding action intentions, identification, affective and instrumental motivation as used in the pilot study. Furthermore, in order to support our assumption that economics and social sciences students differ in their ideological views we included a number of new scales[7]. First of all, based on a system justification scale by Jost and Hunyady (2003) and a protestant work ethic scale by Ghorpade, Lackritz and Singh (2006) we created a short 6-item scale tapping into system-justification beliefs (e.g. "Most people who don't get ahead in our society should not blame the system; they have only themselves to blame"; $\alpha = .81$; a principal component analyses with an oblique rotation extracted only one factor explaining 51.3% of the variance, with all factor loadings > .68). Next, we included two bipolar items measuring political orientation (from 1 = *Progressive* to 7 = *Conservative* and 1 = *Left* to 7 = *Right*) and participants' opinion about the necessity to cut on welfare in times of crisis (two items, $\alpha = .73$). Finally, we asked the students what would be the appropriate size of the fine if they were asked to determine it (the answers ranged 1 = *Less than 500 Euros* to 5 = *2000-3000 Euros,* increasing by 500 Euros apart from the last step). These measures enabled a more specific interpretation of any difference between the subgroups of students we chose to sample.

Results

[7] In some countries economics is also considered as social sciences. However, at University of Groningen economics faculty is separate from the social sciences faculty and is actually part of the natural sciences campus. This of course does not immediately imply that they have different political preferences, but they do not attend the same lectures as other social scientist and are exposed to different type of thinking about the social welfare issues.

Information and manipulation check. The number of participants who failed the manipulation check was significantly smaller in this study (twelve students or 9.5%). Some students made a mistake on one of the information check questions, but did not fail the manipulation check. Considering that we collected the data at canteens and lectures, overall a large majority of the sample responded correctly to all information check and manipulation check question (77.6%), therefore we ran the analyses on the whole sample[8].

Sample differences. Verifying assumptions regarding different subgroups' overall ideological background, results showed that economics students were more right-wing ($M_{economics}$ = 4.51, SD = 1.49 vs. $M_{socialsciences}$ = 3.20, SD = 1.36), $F(1,164) = 34.76$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$, and endorsed system-justifying ideologies to a larger extent than social sciences students ($M_{economics}$ = 3.81, SD = 1.02 vs. $M_{socialsciences}$ = 3.20, SD = 1.10), $F(1,163) = 14.07$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Although both subgroups described themselves as being relatively progressive rather than conservative ($M_{economics}$ = 3.23, SD = 1.39 vs. $M_{socialsciences}$ = 3.07, SD = 1.39), economics students perceived the budget cuts for welfare as more justified in times of crisis ($M_{economics}$ = 3.69, SD = 1.35 vs. $M_{socialsciences}$ = 3.14, SD = 1.31), $F(1,165) = 7.15$, $p = .008$, $\eta^2 = .04$ and thought that students should pay higher fines for prolonging their studies ($M_{economics}$ = 2.53, SD = 1.40 vs. $M_{socialsciences}$ = 2.10, SD = 0.9), $F(1,162) = 5.66$, $p = .018$, $\eta^2 = .03$. This corroborates the notion of ideologically heterogeneous subgroups within the larger student group. It also corroborates the idea that the social sciences students reflected the movement's "choir" better than the economics students.

[8] We also compared the participants who answered all the questions correctly with the ones who made mistakes and there were no difference found on any of the collective action or ideological variables. The only difference that emerged was on the identification with the Dutch society, where participants who responded correctly had somewhat higher scores: $M_{correct}$ = 5.24, SD = 1.02 vs. $M_{incorrect}$ = 4.80, SD = 1.02, $F(1,166) = 4.3$, $p = .04$.

Testing Direct (Mean-Level) Effects

In order to examine the effects of our manipulation we conducted a 2 (education type) x 4 (condition) analysis of variance (ANOVA). We only found significant differences between two study groups whereby social sciences students had higher actions intentions ($M_{socialsciences}$ = 3.09, SD = 1.15 vs. $M_{economics}$ = 2.62, SD = 1.32), $F(1,160) = 6.52$, $p = .012$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, they identified more strongly with the group that opposes the measures ($M_{socialsciences}$ = 3.95, SD = 1.28 vs. $M_{economics}$ = 3.42, SD = 1.36), $F(1, 160) = 6.64$, $p = .011$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, and perceived the situation to be more unfair ($M_{socialsciences}$ = 4.56, SD = 0.94 vs. $M_{economics}$ = 4.13, SD = 1.09), $F(1,160) = 8.44$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. Instrumental motivation and national identification did not differ between the groups. No other effects were significant. Still, as the main hypotheses regarding the effects of communication were formulated depending on the type of audience, we also tested whether our manipulation had effects on the issue supporters and issue opponents separately.

As expected, among the social science students, value-identity communication did not directly influence any of the dependent variables (see Table 3). Thus, although there was a clear value-identity fit, the communication of this fit did not have politicizing effects at the mean-level.

Among the economics students, we found a hint at a direct value-identity effect on affective motivation $F(3, 79) = 2.67$, $p = .053$, $\eta_p^{2 =} .09$. Inspection of the means shows that communicating a violation of a human right as a part of the normative content of the student identity *decreased* the affective motivation compared to when national identity was made salient or when values were not communicated at all. Post-hoc analysis using the least significance difference method (LSD) confirmed the differences between the value-student identity condition

and the other conditions[9]. However, in contrast to our expectation, communicating the same value violation as embedded in the national identity did not significantly increase the affective motivation or other motivational indicators compared to the context-only or empty-control condition.

Indirect Effects (Regression Analyses)

To test whether predictors of politicized identification depend on the type of communication, we first ran multiple regression analyses predicting politicized identification and action intentions including both samples. However, our main hypothesis was formulated depending on the type of audience and these regressions will be the main focus of our analyses. All regression analyses were conducted in the same order: in the first step we included three dummy variables separating the value-student, context-only and control conditions. Hence, the value- nation condition served as a baseline. In the second step we included the relevant predictors (national identification, affective and instrumental motivation), followed by interactions between our manipulations and predictors of politicized identification. In the final regression analysis on action intentions we also added politicized identification as a predictor to test whether, in line with the literature, politicized identification predicted action intentions.

First, there were no differences between the baseline and the other three condition (value-student condition $B = 0.06$, $t(164) = 0.21$, $p = .832$; context-only $B = 0.19$, $t(164) = 0.66$, $p = .509$; empty-control $B = 0.35$, $t(164) = 1.21$, $p = .228$). In the second step, the national identification *(*$B = 0.22$, $t(161) = 2.75$, $p = .007$), affective motivation (Step 2, $B = 0.73$, $t(161) =$

[9] We note that among the economists, the control group had consistently higher scores compared to others. We believe that this is due to the difference in age: namely, there were a larger number of first year students in this condition and the average age was lower than the average of the whole sample (20.1 compared to 21.5).

8.24, $p < .001$) and instrumental motivation (Step 2, $B = 0.13$, $t(161) = 1.91$, $p = .059$, marginally significant) positively predicted politicized group identification. There was a marginally significant interaction between value-student condition and national identification (Step 3, $B = -0.49$, $t(158) = -1.90$, p = .059). In order to unpack this interaction, we conducted a simple slope analysis (see Figure 1). The more students identified with their nation, the higher they identified with the group that opposes the budget cuts when value was communicated as part of the national identity, $B = 0.34$, $t(158) = 1.99$, p = .048). But in contrast, there was no relationship between national and politicized identification (the slope was even in the opposite direction) when the value was communicated as part of the student identity $B = -0.15$, $t(158) = 0.78$, $p = .43$.

In the regression analysis on collective action intentions, again there were no differences between the baseline and the other three condition (value-student condition $B = 0.08$, $t(164) = 0.27$, $p = .786$; context-only condition $B = -0.03$, $t(164) = -0.12$, $p = .904$; empty-control condition $B = 0.19$, $t(164) = 0.7$, $p = .485$). We found only the main effects of affective motivation (Step 2, $B = 0.20$, $t(160) = 2.20$, $p = .03$), instrumental motivation (Step 2, $B = 0.16$, $t(160) = 2.77$, p = .006) and politicized identification $B = 0.48$, $t(160) = 7.01$, $p < .001$) and no interaction effects suggesting that our manipulation did not influence action intentions[10]. Hence, as a follow up, we only repeated the regression analysis on politicized identification in the two samples, as previous analysis and our theoretical reasoning revolved around the effects of

[10] In the regression analysis emerged a marginally significant interaction between national identification and the control condition $B = 0.46$, $t(157) = 1.51$, $p = .058$. However, as this was an empty condition, we cannot say what exactly influenced the responses.

communication on politicized identification rather than action intentions (for more details see Supplementary Materials).

For economics students, the regression analysis rendered similar results to the one obtained on the whole sample. Again, there were no differences between the baseline and other conditions, but national identification (Step 2, $B = 0.25$, $t(76) = 2.07$, $p = .042$), affective motivation (Step 2, $B = 0.61$, $t(79) = 4.47$, $p < .001$) and instrumental motivation (Step 2, $B = 0.18$, $t(76) = 1.75$, $p = .084$, marginally significant) positively predicted politicized identification (see Table 4). However, more importantly and in line with our expectations, there was a significant interaction between type of values communicated and national identification, $B = -0.88$, $t(73) = -2.66$, $p = .01$ (Step 3). Thus, depending on the identities made salient, the value communication increased politicized identification[11] by appealing to the national identity ($B = 0.51$, $t(73) = 2.26$, $p = .027$) or decreased it by appealing to the group's identity, though this effect was not statistically significant ($B = -0.37$, $t(73) = -1.57$, $p = .12$). For more details, see Figure 2.

For social sciences students, affective motivation was the main predictor of politicized identification $B = 0.83$, $t(78) = 6.82$, $p < .001$ (Step 2, see Table 5). Thus, communication of value violation allowed for a stronger psychological basis of politicized identity in terms of affective concerns (which reflects the findings by Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009, to some extent).

[11] Next to politicized identification, the value-identity (mis)fit also affected the relation between national identification and affective motivation. Namely, national identification was negatively related to affective motivation in the value-student identity condition ($r(16) = -.53$, $p = .025$), while there was no relationship (or even a positive one) between the two variables in the value-national identity condition ($r(22) = .20$, $p = .34$). The difference between correlations was significant, *Fisher's* $z = -2.35$, $p = .02$.

However, when the value was not communicated, the relation between the two variables changed, as evidenced by a negative slope for the interaction between context-only dummy and affective motivation $B = -0.96$, $t(73) = -2.51$, $p = .015$ (Step 4). Namely, when the value was communicated the affective motivation strongly predicted politicized identification $B = 1.16$, $t(73) = 5.11$, $p < .001$, while there was a very weak and a non-significant relationship between the two variables when the value was omitted from the communication $B = 0.19$, $t(73) = 0.62$, $p = .54$. Still, identity-value fit effects were much stronger among the economics students, directly influencing the relationship between the two identities.

General Discussion

This research showed different politicizing effects of value-identity communication within a student movement context in the Netherlands. Our findings suggest that for the audience that already shares the movement´s values, "preaching to the choir" with respect to values influenced their motivation only indirectly by creating a stronger link between affective motivation and politicized identification. One way of interpreting this finding is that for these students, their politicized identity became more defined by affective concerns.

Moreover, for the audience not sharing this ideological background, we found that "preaching beyond the choir" seems sensitive to the notion of value-identity (mis)fit. Specifically, our results suggest that a value-identity misfit may further alienate this audience from the movement that seeks their support (at the mean level). At the correlational level, however, we found support for the idea that a value-identity fit has indirect politicizing effects to the extent that the national identity (and presumably the values embedded in it) became more predictive of politicized identification. We discuss implications of our findings below.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

First of all, our findings complement research on motivational power of values (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2011) by looking at how *communication* of values by social movements influences politicization whereas previous work only looked to what extent participation in collective action was determined by individuals' values. Hence, together with other recent work (see also Mazzoni et al., 2015) this study offers more explicit evidence that values are the active ingredient in moral motivation to engage in collective action (Van Zomeren, 2013).

Second, the findings also complement research by Van Stekelenburg et al. (2009) by testing both direct and indirect effects of value-identity communication on potential protest participants (rather than actual ones, as in Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). This is important as the participants in the study by Van Stekelenburg and colleagues already passed through all four stages of mobilization according to the Klandermans (1984) model and their motives to participate have become crystallized. In contrast, our work is situated in the first two stages of mobilization and shows how movements can create consensus among potential followers by emphasizing values and identities. We move beyond this and other previous research by using an experimental approach, coupled with tests among different subgroups that reflect answers to the question whether preaching to or beyond the choir can have politicizing effects. This is an important issue for theorists, researchers, as well as practitioners of collective action.

Third, our focus on communication between movements and potential followers locates our research at the crossroads between 'micro'-level perspectives (i.e., psychological work on individuals' motivation) and 'meso'- (i.e. sociological work on framing and mobilization context) to studying collective action. One of the core functions of social movement frames is to motivate people by providing reasons for participation (Benford, 1993; Benford & Snow, 2000), and sociological theories of framing assumed that communicating values corresponding with beliefs

of the potential followers increases the mobilization potential of a frame. Thus, our findings provide support for this assumption among those who share the movement´s values, but importantly specify how (and for whom) such framing effects come about psychologically.

Fourth, another important implication of the current work is the analytical and empirical differentiation between direct and indirect politicizing effects of value-identity communication (Druckman, 2001; Slothuus, 2008). The former refers to mean-level increases or decreases in specific motivations as a function of communication, whereas the latter refers to shifts in the predictive power of specific motivations with respect to politicized identification (i.e., shifts in the psychological meaning of that identity). Looking at both effects at the same time broadens our understanding of communication between movements and their audiences. For instance, for those already sharing the movement's ideological background, making values salient allows for *affective* motivation to become more important in defining politicized identity. In contrast, for those not sharing the movement´s values, embedding the value in the 'right' identity, can overcome potential detrimental effects of value-laden messages and allow for the relevant broader identity to define the politicized identity.

We believe that, at least for those who already share the movement's ideology, value-identity communication in essence implies communicating a group norm that revolves around feelings of unfairness and anger. This is important as it effectively reduces individuals' reliance on instrumental motivations that may be characterized as opportunistic. Such a shift is in line with the idea that a politicized identity may be created through the alignment of group norms for group emotions such as anger and outrage (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Nevertheless, the work by Thomas et al. (2009) suggests that social interaction with similar-minded individuals is necessary to increase individuals' motivation for collective action, which makes it quite

different from the current focus on one-sided communication (from movements to the audience). Future research may examine whether communicating values may actually become effective at the mean-level when individuals can discuss their values and identity with similar-minded others.

However, movements have to be very sensitive in communicating their goals to an ideologically opposed group. For example, for the audience (i.e. economics students) that puts greater personal (rather than group) responsibility for misfortune and showed support for welfare cuts in times of crisis, a message that places an additional emphasis on the students as the inclusive group being deprived of important rights offered little common ground. This fits with the work by Sassenberg, Kessler and Mummendey (2003) who also showed that important psychological differences (e.g. promotion vs. prevention focus) go hand in hand with the values embedded in different majors or professions (orientation towards profit maximization among business majors vs. orientation towards inequality prevention among law majors). Moreover, it also corroborates our choice of economics students as a proxy of relatively more conservative group amongst students.

Consequently, one implication of our findings would be to simply *avoid* any type of value communication toward ideologically different groups. Such avoidance specifically reduces the risk of alienating a subgroup through a value-identity mismatch. However, it is doubtful whether this is a fruitful strategy in the long run because values are essential to identity, and identity is essential to social movements especially in the contexts of incidental disadvantage where the identity needs to be created bottom-up. In our view, our study points that a potentially more successful strategy is to link the value to national identity (or a similar type of superordinate identity) which opens the possibility, at least indirectly, for a movement's cause to

be seen as contributing to the wider society and therefore worthy of support.

This directly ties in with work on politicized identities. For instance, according to Simon and Klandermans (2001), national identity is seen as one of the main antecedents of the politicized collective identity as it provides “the context for shared grievances, adversarial attribution and the ensuing power struggles for social change” (p.326). Other studies have also noted the mobilizing power of the national identity by looking at speeches of political leaders who call upon ‘national values’ to justify discrimination against other minorities (Verkuyten, 2013). In other words, fitting values to national identity is a strategy that may work well for both right and left wing movements. Thus, our findings are in line with previous research and generalize the process from the usual groups like general public or media to members of ideologically heterogeneous groups.

Finally, the current findings also have practical implications to the extent that they provide specific pointers toward motivating individuals for collective action. First, movements need to consider that ideologically diverse subgroups require different value-identity communication (a point underscored by the finding that a focus on national identity appeared more promising for "preaching beyond the choir"). Second, this also means that activists should be flexible in tuning their communication to different audiences in order to mobilize greater number of followers (even if those to be mobilized do not share one's ideological background). In this sense, aligning the values of the movement with the greater societal goals appears a good strategy, with an eye on that movements’ actions should actually put those goals into practice and not only use it as an effective communication strategy. Moreover, value messages may lead to more long-term motivation as they increase the reliance on affective predictors of politicization that tend to be more stable. Although people care about values, the lack of direct

effect of value communication suggests that just talking about values, especially when the struggle is already been going on for a while, is not enough to get people out on the street. Our intuition is that movement practitioners should emphasize individuals' commitment to act upon their values and provide clear steps to achieve those values, rather than just reminding them of something they already believe in.

Limitations

One limitation of the current work concerns its external validity. Political issues may vary greatly with respect to how central are the values for their definition, where some such as abortion or gay rights are in their essence value conflicts, whereas others such as budget cuts or increase costs of living may not necessarily be directly related to values. Still, in countries like Germany or Finland where the right to free higher education is implemented in government policies, one could expect that issues like budget cuts could elicit stronger grievances as the discrepancy between the present "ideal" state and potential change is much bigger compared to the Netherlands where the students already pay entrance fees. In this context, we would assume that value-communication may have more direct effects on politicization and participation in collective action. The downside is that in a more polarized value context, people are usually divided in subgroups with firmly established view of the situation and the ones who hold opposite views may completely be irresponsive to the communication. Our findings may apply less to these issues. However, Van Stekelenburg et al. (2009) also found similar patterns among the demonstrators against a reform of early retirement policies attracting 300,000 people in Amsterdam in 2004. This convergence increases confidence in the external validity of the current findings. Future research should try to replicate the current findings in contexts where value conflict is stronger.

Another potential limitation concerns the generalization of the value identity (mis)fit effects beyond the movements operating within a national level context. In the current political arena, many movements have international agendas and aim to mobilize people from different countries (like the *Peace movement* or *Occupy*). Hence, in these situations national identification can have rather debilitating effects on politicized identification. The key point here is that aligning values with higher-order identities can be seen as a general communication strategy. Thus, we would expect similar motivational consequences in aligning values with identities like *European* or *human* on people from different countries and ideological backgrounds. This is clearly an important area for future research.

Lastly, we note that a single study with a cross-sectional design obviously cannot capture the richness of real-life discussions between activists and their potential followers. A longitudinal design encompassing all four stages of mobilization process (Klandermans, 1984) would enable a thorough analysis of changes in followers as well as movements' goals as a result of the communication. Indeed, our findings only point out to the effects of communication on potential followers, whereas communication is a two-sided process and movements may change their initial goals in order to win the support of various groups. For example, we only focused on the communication between a movement and its immediate target audiences, while movements may also engage in communication with the general public and with the outgroup itself. In any event, we believe that theory and research on collective action would benefit from more frequent use of longitudinal designs (e.g., Turner-Zwinkels, van Zomeren & Postmes, 2015) as they are better able to examine how various identity dynamics relate to participation in collective action.

Conclusion

Our findings suggest that the principle of value-identity fit can be used by social movements in their communication to individuals from different ideological subgroups. As multiple identities and value violations may be relevant in a given social context, the success of value-identity communication ultimately depends on the sensitivity of social movements to the (diverse) ideological backgrounds of their potential followers. The current work shows that it may be fruitful for movements to "tailor" different forms of value-identity messages to different subgroups, for instance focusing on value violations as embedded in the disadvantaged group identity or in society at large.

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Table 1

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on Dependent Variables in Three Conditions (Pre-test)

	Value-context		Context-Only		Empty-Control	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Politicized ID	4.31	1.18	3.87	1.58	3.78	1.61
Dutch ID	4.82	1.09	4.86	0.97	4.74	1.06
Affective Motivation	4.56 [a]	1.12	4.14 [ab]	1.32	3.67 [b]	0.99
Instrumental Motivation	3.54	1.43	3.17	1.59	3.41	1.48
Action Intentions	3.53	1.20	3.10	1.60	2.99	1.30

Note. ID = Identification. [ab]The different superscripts imply statistically significant differences between the groups

Table 2

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Students from Different Faculties Pulled Across all the Conditions (Pre-Test)

	Social Sciences[a]		Economics[b]		Law[c]		Natural Sciences[d]	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Politicized ID	4.55	1.49	3.69	1.54	4.17	1.29	3.93	1.45
Dutch ID	4.78	1.15	4.72	1.10	4.95	1.14	4.70	0.76
Affective Motivation	4.35	1.26	3.83	1.27	4.24	1.18	4.39	0.99
Instrumental Motivation	3.58	1.40	3.39	1.55	2.88	1.42	3.56	1.73
Action Intentions	3.66	1.34	2.94	1.45	3.18	1.70	3.42	1.03

Note. [a]$n = 23$; [b]$n = 31$; [c]$n = 15$;[d]$n = 21$. ID = Identification. CA = Collective action.

Table 3

Mean Scores and Standard Deviation for Social Sciences and Economics and Business Students (Main Study)

	Value-Student Identity		Value-National Identity		Context-Only		Empty-Control	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Social Sciences (*n* = 85)								
Politicized ID	3.94	1.18	3.80	1.46	4.13	1.11	3.93	1.42
Dutch ID	5.01	0.69	5.39	0.84	5.09	0.75	5.02	1.52
Affective Motivation	4.57	0.97	4.25	1.01	4.68	0.71	4.73	1.06
Instrumental Motivation	3.63	1.20	3.21	1.54	2.88	1.06	3.25	1.46
Action Intentions	3.40	1.15	2.94	1.33	3.11	1.16	2.93	0.98
Economics and Business(*n* = 83)								
Politicized ID	3.21	1.55	3.32	1.35	3.30	1.32	3.85	1.23
Dutch ID	5.21	1.20	4.99	0.99	5.19	1.10	5.50	0.97
Affective Motivation	3.53[a]	1.10	4.16[b]	0.87	4.37[b]	1.06	4.38[b]	1.20
Instrumental Motivation	2.81	1.45	2.89	1.31	2.64	1.33	3.54	1.63
Action Intentions	2.28	1.23	2.69	1.24	2.39	1.30	3.07	1.47

Note. [ab]The different superscripts imply statistically significant differences between the groups. ID = Identification. CA = Collective Action.

Table 4

Regression Analysis Predicting Politicized Identification Among Economics Students

	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 5	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Value-Student Condition	-0.12	0.42	0.23	0.36	0.10	0.35	0.21	0.39	0,31	0,40
Context-Only Condition	-0.02	0.41	-0.16	0.34	-0.16	0.33	-0.17	0.34	-0,18	0,35
Control Condition	0.52	0.41	0.14	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.09	0.34	0,05	0,35
Dutch ID			0.25*	0.12	0.51*	0.23	0.50*	0.23	0,50*	0,23
Affective Motivation			0.61***	0.14	0.49***	0.14	0.53*	0.27	0.48^{0}	0,28
Instrumental Motivation			0.18^{0}	0.10	0.25*	0.10	0.27*	0.11	0.37*	0,18
Interaction terms										
Value-Student Condition x Dutch ID					-0.88**	0.33	-0.79*	0.36	-0.56	0.40
Context-Only Condition x Dutch ID					-0.01	0.32	0.02	0.33	0.02	0.34
Control Condition x Dutch ID					-0.20	0.34	-0.20	0.34	-0.22	0,35
Value-Student Condition x Affective Motivation							0.13	0.39	0.45	0.46
Context-Only Condition x Affective Motivation							0.00	0.36	0.05	0.38
Control Condition x Affective Motivation							-0.21	0.34	-0.27	0.43
Value-Student Condition x Instrumental Motivation									-0.40	0.31
Context-Only Condition x Instrumental Motivation									-0.12	0.27
Control Condition x Instrumental Motivation									-0.01	0.30
F	0.92		7.58		6.59		4.90		3.99	
Df	3,79		6,76		9,73		12,70		15,67	
p	.44		<.001		<.001		<.001		<.001	
R^2*adjusted*	.00		.33		.38		.36		.35	
R^2*change*			.34		.07		.01		.02	
p change			<.001		.03		.78		.59	

Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are provided. ^{0} $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. ID = Identification.

Table 5

Regression Analysis Predicting Politicized Identification Among Social Sciences Students

	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 5	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Value-Student Condition	0.14	0.41	-0.10	0.32	-0.15	0.33	-0.26	0.33	-0.29	0,34
Context-Only Condition	0.33	0.40	0.04	0.32	0.00	0.33	-0.01	0.33	0.04	0,34
Control Condition	0.13	0.40	-0.21	0.32	-0.25	0.33	-0.38	0.33	-0.40	0,33
Dutch ID			0.16	0.11	0.00	0.28	0.01	0.27	-0.06	0,28
Affective Motivation			0.83***	0.12	0.83***	0.13	1.16***	0.23	1.18***	0.23
Instrumental Motivation			0.09	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.09	-0.09	0.15
Interaction terms										
Value-Student Condition x Dutch ID					0.11	0.44	0.08	0.43	0.14	0.44
Context-Only Condition x Dutch ID					0.30	0.41	0.39	0.40	0.50	0.41
Control Condition x Dutch ID					0.18	0.32	0.16	0.31	0.18	0.32
Value-Student Condition x Affective Motivation							-0.55^{0}	0.32	-0.59^{0}	0.34
Context-Only Condition x Affective Motivation							-0.96*	0.38	-1.06**	0.40
Control Condition x Affective Motivation							-0.16	0.31	-0.22	0.31
Value-Student Condition x Instrumental Motivation									0.23	0.26
Context-Only Condition x Instrumental Motivation									0.36	0.26
Control Condition x Instrumental Motivation									0.33	0.23
F	0.22		9.64		6.29		5.67		4.74	
Df	3,81		6,78		9,75		12,73		15,7	
p	.88		< .001		< .001		< .001		<. 001	
R^2*adjusted*	0		.38		.36		.40		.40	
R^2*change*			.42		.00		.06		.02	
p change			<.001		.90		.06		.40	

Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are provided. ^{0} $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. ID = Identification.



Figure 1. Interaction plot examining differences in politicized identification among the students (averaged across both samples) with low (-1SD) and high (+ 1SD) on scores on measure of national identification. The data for plotting was taken from the third step in regression analysis.



Figure 2. Interaction plot examining differences in politicized identification among the economics students with low (-1SD) and high (+ 1SD) on scores on measure of national identification. The data for plotting was taken from the third step in regression analysis.



Figure 3. Interaction plot examining differences in politicized identification among the social sciences students with low (-1SD) and high (+ 1SD) scores on the affective motivation scale. The data for plotting was taken from Step 3.