## **Secure Steganography on ML-Based Channels**


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Universität zu Lübeck

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The Prisoners' Problem (Simmons, 1984)

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- Apply tools and methods from cryptography to show security and reliablity of a stegosystem
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- Embed hiddentext in sampling from generative model.
- **Provably secure** by reduction to PRG real-or-random game.

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- This causes decoding failures, hence unreliability.


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
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- Calculate **tokenization distance** *D*.
- Random variable  $X = D(T_A(c), T_B(c))$ .
- If distance greater than zero: decoding failure.



$$\hat{Pr}_{128}[X=0]\approx 0.57$$



$$\hat{Pr}_{1024}[X=0]\approx 0.13$$

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- Bad news: exponential computational overhead (potentially).

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- Average case:  $|c_w| = 5$ , up to 16 tokenizations (GPT tokenizer).

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
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- Ambiguous tokenization causes computational overhead.
- Meteor is easily adaptable to different models, e.g., DialoGPT.
- We can **improve security** by replacing cryptographic primitive.
- Improved hardware support and model performance.


# **Appendix**




#### Appendix: Improving the Security of the Meteor Stegosystem

- SS-CHA security by reduction to PRG.
- Meteor's implementation is deterministic.
- **Secure** against CHA with query complexity one.
- Insecure against CHA with higher query complexity.
- Improve security with SES-CTR to randomize outputs.

#### **Appendix: Meteor One-Way (Example with GPT-2)**



#### Appendix: Meteor Conversation (Example with GPT-2)



#### **Appendix: Meteor Conversation (Example with DialoGPT)**

