

Security Assessment Report

Scope

December 16, 2024

Summary

The Sec3 team (formerly Soteria) was engaged to conduct a thorough security analysis of the Scope smart contracts.

The artifact of the audit was the source code of the following programs, excluding tests, in https://github.com/Kamino-Finance/scope/tree/3dba648.

The initial audit focused on the following versions and revealed 4 issues or questions.

| program | type | commit |
|---------|--------|--|
| scope | Solana | 3dba648851fec203b1853cf765a388263ee22ff4 |

This report provides a detailed description of the findings and their respective resolutions.

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Result Overview

| Issue | Impact | Status |
|--|--------|--------------|
| SCOPE | | |
| [M-01] Incorrect timestamp retrieval in "switchboard_on_demand::get_price" | | Resolved |
| [L-01] Inconsistent behavior in "reset_twap" | | Resolved |
| [I-01] Outdated AggregatorAccountData handling | | Acknowledged |
| [Q-01] Reference price design question | | Resolved |

Findings in Detail

SCOPE

[M-01] Incorrect timestamp retrieval in "switchboard_on_demand::get_price"

In the current implementation of "switchboard_on_demand::get_price", the data of a Switchboard feed account of type "PullFeedAccountData" is deserialized, and the "result.timestamp" field is recorded as the price data's timestamp.

```
/* programs/scope/src/oracles/switchboard_on_demand.rs */
052 | let unix_timestamp = feed.result.timestamp.try_into().unwrap();
053 |
054 | Ok(DatedPrice {
055 | price,
056 | last_updated_slot,
057 | unix_timestamp,
058 | ..Default::default()
059 | })
```

However, the actual layout of the "CurrentResult" struct used in the "switchboard-on-demand" program differs from the layout assumed in the code.

Specifically, the location in the data where the code attempts to read the "timestamp" actually contains the fields "u8 num_samples", "u8 submission_idx", and 6 bytes of padding. This discrepancy results in incorrect retrieval of the timestamp.

Resolution

Fixed by commit "f85ec25".

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[L-01] Inconsistent behavior in "reset_twap"

The "reset_twap" instruction, intended for admin use to reset the TWAP of a specific token, exhibits two inconsistencies in its implementation compared to other TWAP price update mechanisms:

1. Incorrect Update of Metadata

Instead of using the relevant information from "DatedPrice", the "reset_twap" instruction updates "last_update_slot" and "last_update_unix_timestamp" using the current slot and Unix timestamp. This divergence may introduce errors in the calculation of the smoothing factor, potentially leading to inaccurate EMA price computations.

```
/* programs/scope/src/handlers/handler_reset_twap.rs */
036 | crate::oracles::twap::reset_twap(
037 | &mut oracle_twaps,
038 | token,
039 | price,
040 | clock.unix_timestamp as u64,
041 | clock.slot,
042 | )?;
```

2. Inconsistent Handling of Data Points in update_ema_twap

- The "update_ema_twap" function determines the absence of data points by checking whether "last_update_slot" equals 0.
- However, the "reset_twap" implementation does not reset "last_update_slot" to 0 while clearing the "updates_tracker_1h".
- As a result, the actual number of data points involved in calculations may exceed the count recorded in the tracker by one.

```
/* programs/scope/src/oracles/twap.rs */
124 | pub(super) fn update_ema_twap(
125 | twap: &mut EmaTwap,
126 | price: Price,
127 | price_ts: u64,
128 | price_slot: u64,
129 | ) -> ScopeResult<()> {
```

```
130
         // Skip update if the price is the same as the last one
131 |
         if price_slot > twap.last_update_slot {
             if twap.last_update_slot == 0 {
132
                 twap.current_ema_1h = Decimal::from(price).to_scaled_val().unwrap();
133
134
             } else {
162
163 | pub(super) fn reset_ema_twap(twap: &mut EmaTwap, price: Price, price_ts: u64, price_slot: u64) {
164
         twap.current_ema_1h = Decimal::from(price).to_scaled_val().unwrap();
165
         twap.last_update_slot = price_slot;
166
         twap.last_update_unix_timestamp = price_ts;
         twap.updates_tracker_1h = 0;
167
168 | }
```

Resolution

Fixed by commit "1c38d2f" in a private repo.

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[I-01] Outdated AggregatorAccountData handling

In the "switchboard_v2::get_price", an older version of the "AggregatorAccountData" structure is utilized, which does not account for the newly added "resolution_mode" field.

When the "resolution_mode" field is set to "AggregatorResolutionMode::ModeSlidingResolution", subsequent checks for "min_oracle_results" and "latest_confirmed_round.num_success" can be omitted.

```
/*
https://github.com/switchboard-xyz/solana-sdk/blob/9e40fab/rust/switchboard-v2/src/aggregator.rs#L220-L230
220 | pub fn get_result(&self) -> anchor_lang::Result<SwitchboardDecimal> {
          if self.resolution_mode == AggregatorResolutionMode::ModeSlidingResolution {
221 |
222
              return Ok(self.latest_confirmed_round.result);
223 I
          }
224 I
          let min_oracle_results = self.min_oracle_results;
225
          let latest_confirmed_round_num_success = self.latest_confirmed_round.num_success;
226
          if min_oracle_results > latest_confirmed_round_num_success {
227 |
              return Err(SwitchboardError::InvalidAggregatorRound.into());
228
229
          Ok(self.latest_confirmed_round.result)
230 | }
```

However, the absence of corresponding handling for this scenario does not introduce any security risks.

Resolution

The team clarified that Switchboard v2 has been deprecated. They have ceased using it, and its support will be removed from Scope.

SCOPE

[Q-01] Reference price design question

In the "refresh_price_list" instruction, for tokens with a reference price, if the new price deviates from the reference price by more than a certain threshold (5%), the price will not be updated. However, the TWAP is updated before this check is performed.

This means that even if the current price significantly deviates from the reference price, it will still impact the TWAP.

We would like to confirm if this behavior is intentional by design.

```
/* programs/scope/src/handlers/handler_refresh_prices.rs */
116 | if oracle_mappings.is_twap_enabled(token_idx) {
         let _ = crate::oracles::twap::update_twap(&mut oracle_twaps, token_idx, &price)
              .map_err(|_| msg!("Twap not found for token {}", token_idx));
118
119 | };
120
121 | // Only temporary load as mut to allow prices to be computed based on a scope chain
122 | // from the price feed that is currently updated
124 | let mut oracle_prices = ctx.accounts.oracle_prices.load_mut()?;
125
126 | // check that the price is close enough to the ref price is there is a ref price
127 | if oracle_mappings.ref_price[token_idx] != u16::MAX {
128
         let ref_price =
129
             oracle_prices.prices[usize::from(oracle_mappings.ref_price[token_idx])].price;
130
         if let Err(diff_err) = check_ref_price_difference(price.price, ref_price) {
131
             if fail_tx_on_error {
                 return Err(diff_err);
132 I
             } else {
133
134
                 msg!(
                  "Price skipped as ref price check failed (token {token_idx}, type {price_type:?})",
135 I
             );
136
                 continue;
137
             }
138 I
         }
139
140 | }
```

Resolution

The team clarified that this is the expected behavior. When the reference price is the TWAP itself, it ensures that the TWAP can still be updated, preventing a deadlock scenario where updates

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would cease entirely.

Appendix: Methodology and Scope of Work

Assisted by the Sec3 Scanner developed in-house, the manual audit particularly focused on the following work items:

- Check common security issues.
- Check program logic implementation against available design specifications.
- Check poor coding practices and unsafe behavior.
- The soundness of the economics design and algorithm is out of scope of this work

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ABOUT

The Sec3 audit team comprises a group of computer science professors, researchers, and industry veterans with extensive experience in smart contract security, program analysis, testing, and formal verification. We are also building automated security tools that incorporate static analysis, penetration testing, and formal verification.

At Sec3, we identify and eliminate security vulnerabilities through the most rigorous process and aided by the most advanced analysis tools.

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