

Security Assessment Report **Sol-Token-Mill** 

November 18, 2024

### **Summary**

The Sec3 team (formerly Soteria) was engaged to conduct a thorough security analysis of the Sol-Token-Mill smart contracts.

The artifact of the audit was the source code of the following programs, excluding tests, in a private repository.

The initial audit focused on the following versions and revealed 1 issues or questions.

program	type	commit
token-mill	Solana	b3e6d6e83cfea8a111f50e4f5070fc6ba9f6ea24

This report provides a detailed description of the findings and their respective resolutions.

After addressing the issues identified in this review, the codebase of the "token-mill" program was moved to a public repository at <a href="https://github.com/traderjoe-xyz/sol-token-mill">https://github.com/traderjoe-xyz/sol-token-mill</a>, commit <a href="https://github.com/traderjoe-xyz/sol-token-mill">b0b9f84</a>.

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# **Result Overview**

Issue		Status
TOKEN-MILL		
[H-01] Missing token2022 extension checks for the quote token	High	Resolved

### **Findings in Detail**

#### **TOKEN-MILL**

### [H-01] Missing token2022 extension checks for the quote token

When creating the market, both "base\_token\_mint" and "quote\_token\_mint" can use token2022 mints.

```
/* programs/token-mill/src/instructions/create_market.rs */
024 | pub struct CreateMarket<'info> {
         #[account(
036
037 |
             init,
038 |
            payer = creator,
039 |
            mint::token_program = token_program,
040 |
             mint::authority = market,
           mint::decimals = MILL_TOKEN_DECIMALS,
041 |
           extensions::metadata_pointer::authority = market,
042
             extensions::metadata_pointer::metadata_address = base_token_mint,
044 |
         )]
         pub base_token_mint: Box<InterfaceAccount<'info, Mint>>,
045 |
         pub quote_token_mint: Box<InterfaceAccount<'info, Mint>>,
067 I
075 | }
076 |
077 | pub fn handler(
078 |
         ctx: Context<CreateMarket>,
079
         name: String,
080
         symbol: String,
         uri: String,
081 I
082
         total_supply: u64,
083
         creator_fee_share: u16,
084 |
         staking_fee_share: u16,
085 | ) -> Result<()> {
        require!(
094 |
             check_mint_extensions(&ctx.accounts.base_token_mint)?,
095 I
             TokenMillError::UnsupportedTokenMint
096
097
         );
```

Although "base\_token\_mint" is created in this instruction, the handler ensures it can include only the "MetadataPointer" and "TokenMetadata" extensions.

However, for "quote\_token\_mint", extensions that may introduce side effects are not rejected.

If the permanent delegate extension in the "quote\_token\_mint" is enabled, its authority gains unrestricted access to tokens and accounts. This authority can transfer or burn tokens in market

quote token vaults, such as "market\_quote\_token\_ata".

If the transfer fee extension is enabled, fees are applied with each transfer. The accounting will become inconsistent with the actual quote tokens received. For example, the market may receive fewer tokens than the computed "quote\_amount".

The "base\_token\_mint" in the extension check at line  $94 \, \text{should}$  be replaced with "quote\_token\_mint".

#### Resolution

Resolved by commit "b97059b" in PR#45.

## Appendix: Methodology and Scope of Work

Assisted by the Sec3 Scanner developed in-house, the manual audit particularly focused on the following work items:

- Check common security issues.
- Check program logic implementation against available design specifications.
- Check poor coding practices and unsafe behavior.
- The soundness of the economics design and algorithm is out of scope of this work

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### **ABOUT**

The Sec3 audit team comprises a group of computer science professors, researchers, and industry veterans with extensive experience in smart contract security, program analysis, testing, and formal verification. We are also building automated security tools that incorporate static analysis, penetration testing, and formal verification.

At Sec3, we identify and eliminate security vulnerabilities through the most rigorous process and aided by the most advanced analysis tools.

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