


# Incident response analyst report

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2021




kaspersky


# Executive summary

Incident Response statistics are based on IR retainer and emergency cases from 2020.

## Threat intelligence view



## Security operations metrics view



\* There is no information about the impact of an event when we act as a complementary supplier for another IR team on the case

# — Introduction


The Incident Response Analyst Report provides insights into incident investigation services conducted by Kaspersky in 2020. We deliver a range of services to help organizations when they are in need: incident response, digital forensics and malware analysis. Data in the report comes from our daily practices with organizations seeking assistance with full-blown incident response or complementary expert activities for their internal incident response teams.

In 2020, pandemic forced companies to restructure their information security practices to accommodate


a work from home (WFH) approach. Although the main trends in terms of threats have stayed the same, our service approach moved to a complete – 97% of all cases – remote delivery.

Kaspersky Digital Forensics and Incident Response operations are presented by our [Global Emergency Response Team \(GERT\)](#), Computer Incidents Investigation Unit (CIIU), and [Global Research and Analysis Team \(GReAT\)](#) with experts in Europe, Asia, South and North America, Middle East and Africa.

## Geography of incident responses




## Verticals and Industries



# Reasons to go for incident response


Ransomware is overtaking money theft and other impacts as a more convenient monetization scheme with much broader industry coverage (not just financial). Most of the incidents with causes before the impact (suspicious events, tool alerts, etc.) can be confidently classified as ransomware.

## True positives



10% of all incident response requests were for false positives. Suspicious activity\* reported by network sensors (NIDS, firewall) and endpoint protection (EPP) generate most of the false positives. Every 4th request based on suspicious activity from a network sensor or endpoint was found to be false positive. Data leakage false positive cases are usually duplicates or leaks from a different organization.


## False positives



Ransomware attacks have maintained a dominant role in the cybersecurity threat landscape for years. We urge you to get up-to-date and actionable information about ransomware attacks from our publications, NoRansom project and [threat reports](#).

## Distribution of reasons for our top regions


The Americas and Africa almost exclusively face ransomware attacks, whereas other regions see a wider variety and obvious PII concerns.



## Distribution of reasons for selected industries

Old-school monetization from the financial sector is still in place, while Healthcare, Transportation and Industrial have become extensively affected by ransomware.

The Government sector showing no data leaks is likely due to the fact that governmental PII-heavy systems are usually hosted by Telecom and IT providers.






\* Suspicious activity is a category for a security tool stack generated alert or a user reported anomaly behavior

# Initial vectors

## Or how attackers got in

Year after year, security issues with passwords, software vulnerabilities and social engineering combine into the overwhelming majority of initial access vectors\* during attacks. Setting up and controlling password policies, security patch management and employee awareness along with anti-phishing measures can significantly minimize the capabilities of external attackers.

When attackers prepare their malicious campaign, they want to find low-hanging fruit like public servers with well-known vulnerabilities and known exploits. Implementing an appropriate patch management policy alone reduces the likelihood of becoming a victim by 30%, and implementing a robust password policy reduce the likelihood by 60%\*\*.



\* We identified the initial vector of attack in 55% of cases. Very old incidents, unavailable logs, (un)intentional evidence destruction by the victim organization, and supply-chain attacks were among the numerous reasons for failing to identify how adversaries initially gained a foothold in the network



\*\* According to incident cases from our dataset

# Tools and exploits

**44% of all incidents were tied to tools**

Almost half of all incident cases included the use of existing [OS tools \(like LOLbins\)](#), well known offensive tools from GitHub (e.g. Mimikatz, AdFind, Masscan) and specialized commercial frameworks (Cobalt Strike).

Inside all incident cases with tools



## Exploit usage was identified in 13% of all incidents

In only a few incidents, vulnerabilities from 2020 were used. In other cases, the vulnerabilities utilized were several years old. This suggests that timely security updates could have prevented a tenth of the investigated attacks.


CVE-2020-0796	CVE-2020-0787	CVE-2019-11510	CVE-2019-0604
SMB service in Microsoft Windows Remote code execution vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code without authentication in Microsoft SMBv3 service. Heir of MS17-010.	Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) Privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows BITS. Widely used by ransomware.	Pulse Secure SSL VPN Unauthenticated retrieval of VPN server user credentials. Instant access to victim organization through legitimate channel.	Microsoft SharePoint Remote code execution vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code without authentication in Microsoft SharePoint.

CVE-2018-8453	CVE-2017-0144	CVE-2017-11317	CVE-2017-8464
Win32k Microsoft Windows component An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Microsoft Windows when the Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory. Used by FruityArmor APT group.	SMB service in Microsoft Windows Vulnerability in SMBv1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted packets. Used in EternalBlue exploit.	Telerik.Web.UI Vulnerability uses weak RadAsyncUpload encryption, which allows remote attackers to perform arbitrary file uploads or execute arbitrary code.	Microsoft Windows Shell Allows local users or remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted LNK file, handled during icon display in Windows Explorer or any other application that parses the icon of the shortcut. Used in LemonDuck attack.

\* Each tool was identified in 11-13% incident cases

# — Attack duration

All incident cases can be grouped into three categories with different attacker dwell times, incident response duration, initial access, and impact from the attack.



## Rush

hours and days



## Average

weeks



## Long lasting

months and longer



### Attack duration average

1.5 days

18.1 days

90.4 days



### Representative impact

Ransomware

Ransomware and money theft

Data leakage and ransomware



### Initial attack vector (rated by frequency in cases)

- Brute force
- Exploit public-facing application
- Spearphishing link

- Exploit public-facing application
- Drive-by compromise
- Brute force
- Replication through removable media
- Spearphishing link

- Exploit public-facing application
- Spearphishing attachment
- Brute force
- Drive-by compromise
- Insider



### Incident response duration (effort in hours taken for investigation)

34.4 hours

- Attacks that lasted up to a week
- Major high-velocity ransomware attacks that present the biggest challenge even to mature security operations. Mostly noisy adversary behavior building up on low hanging fruits – publicly available and easily identifiable security issues

48.9 hours

- Attacks that lasted up to a month
- Due to ransomware, a lot of attacks are indistinguishable from faster ones (Rush). Many cases in this group have a significant time period between initial access and the following stages of attack

105.6 hours

- Attacks that lasted more than a month
- Uneven periods of active and passive phases during attack. The duration of active phases is very similar to the previous (Average) group

# Contacts

## Business inquiries

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## Report and IR

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