

Enforcement techniques

A wide variety

- Processor privilege levels
- Virtual memory
- Capabilities
- Shielded execution (SGX, TZ, ...)
- Trusted computing (TPM)
- Tagged hardware
- Hardware support for
 - Bounds checking (MPX)
 - Exploit mitigation (CFI, NX, ...)
- Cryptography
- Type checking
- Static analysis
- Program verification
- Language design
- Run-time monitoring
- Taint tracking
- Program rewriting
- Inlined reference monitors

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 - More principled software based countermeasures for crypto code
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- Enforcing liveness properties? (Deepak's talk)
 - Interrupts /scheduling?

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- (Andrew's talk:) tag-based security monitors at C-level?
- Are source level abstraction or information hiding constructs useful as indications of protection domains?
- Do we need some kind of intermediate representation for platform-level enforcement techniques?
 - If so, what would this look like?
 - At LLVM IR level? (Address spaces?)
 - (Perhaps Typed LLVM IR can play a role here?)

Question: Expressivity vs complexity vs performance in enforcement mechanisms

- E.g. Capabilities versus virtual memory
 - Why would capabilities succeed now? (The idea is decades old)
 - What else do we need? (Dominique's talk)
 - Linear capabilities? Attestation?
 - Somebody (Pramod?) mentioned "time-limited" capabilities yesterday?
 - Scalability of capability systems (Pramod's talk today)?

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 - Why would capabilities succeed now? (The idea is decades old)
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 - Somebody (Pramod?) mentioned "time-limited" capabilities yesterday?
 - Scalability of capability systems (Pramod's talk today)?
- For what other protection primitives do we need fast hardware support to build efficient secure compilers?
 - Efficient isolation within one address space? (Deepak/Deian)

Question: Static vs dynamic enforcement mechanisms?

- At source language level, both static and dynamic approaches to enforcement are popular
- At target (low) level, there are mainly dynamic mechanisms
- (Except for some academic work: e.g. Amal's work)

Other questions from the audience?