





# About You!

### **CTO, Secure Delivery**

OWASP Global Foundation Vice-Chair OWASP Project Lead:

- Open AppSec Curriculum
- Cornucopia
- Open AppSec Tooling API project lead

CTO and Co-founder of Secure Delivery

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# Secure Delivery

### **Continuous Application Security**

We enable organisations to design, build and operate the most secure applications possible through security coaching, assessments and secure practice across the entire technical delivery function.





# Your Session

Tiny Setup

- OWASP API Top 10 (1 5)
  - Short Break
- OWASP API Top 10 (6 10)

# Getting Started (part 1/5)

**Applications you'll need:** 

Docker (ensure that you can use docker-compose)

git (ensure you can git clone public repositories)

Postman (https://www.postman.com/downloads/)

ZAP (https://www.zaproxy.org/download/) () bviously.

Bonus.

Waydroid (https://waydro.id/) or

Bluestacks (https://www.bluestacks.com/download.html)

# Getting Started (part 2/5)

**Getting the API:** 

git clone https://github.com/secure-delivery/vapi.git cd vapi docker-compose up -d

# Getting Started (part 3/5)

#### **Run Postman:**


File | Import ./vapi/postman/vAPI\_ENV.postman\_environment.json


· File | Import ./vapi/postman/vAPI.postman\_collection.json

### Run ZAP:

Run ZAP: zap.sh-config api addrs addr name= \*

# Getting Started (part 4/5)







# OWASP API Top 10 (1 - 5)



In (about) 60 minutes



### #1 - Broken Object Level Authorization

#### **AuthZ / Access Control**

What actions you are allowed to take; on which objects

#### **Actions and Objects**

#### **APIs expose either:**


- SOAP services (actions); or
- REST data (objects)

directly to consuming services.

#### Large attack surface:

- each and every endpoint needs protecting
   Complex mapping of access controls
  - contextual understanding
  - business logic
  - scopes











**Ferraiolo, D. and Kuhn, R.**, 1992. *Role-based access controls*. In Proceedings of 15th NIST-NCSC National Computer Security Conference (Vol. 563). Baltimore, Maryland: NIST-NCSC.





**Ferraiolo, D. and Kuhn, R.**, 1992. *Role-based access controls*. In Proceedings of 15th NIST-NCSC National Computer Security Conference (Vol. 563). Baltimore, Maryland: NIST-NCSC.

http://e{{host}}/vapi/api1/user/1





### #2 - Broken User Authentication

#### **AuthC / Identity**

Who you (or your application) are (is)

#### **Implementations**

There are several options: Basic Auth, API
Keys, Bearer Tokens, OAuth2, OIDC, SAML, or
Certificate-based authentication (mTLS) to
name a few

#### There are many options for identity

- Some of which are terrible (looking at you basic auth!)

It's easy to set up wrong / misconfigure

- Some require infrastructure (mTLS)
- Some are easily exposed (API Keys)
- Some are complicated (OAuth vs OAuth2 / OpenID vs OIDC)







https://oauth.net/2/https://oauth.net/2/









# ssertion arkup anguage

https://duo.com/blog/the-beer-drinkers-guide-to-saml

**Wilson, Y. and Hingnikar, A.**, 20<sup>1</sup>9. Solving Identity Management in Modern Applications: Demystifying OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, and SAML 2.0. Apress.



"email":"<u>savanna48@ortiz.com</u>","password":"zTyBwV/9" "email":"<u>hauck.aletha@yahoo.com</u>","password":"kU-wDE7r" "email":"<u>harber.leif@beatty.info</u>","password":"kU-wDE7r"



# #3 - Excessive Data Exposure

#### APIs are all about data!

The *Endpoints* are literally data *Objects* exposed for other applications to consume.

So... what's excessive?

#### **APIs return RAW data**

- developers rely on the consuming app to filter and to modify for presentation
- this often includes metadata that the app doesn't need

APIs try to be self-describing

install and run ./vapi/Resources/API3\_APK/TheCommentApp.apk

# Exercise #3 - Mobile App Configuration



Enter the Base URL

Eg. http://localhost/

http://192.168.0.102/vapi/

Proceed



Best in class social media now over cloud.

testuser .....

Forgot Password?

Login

# Exercise #3 - Post Comment



#### The Comment App

I went to the shop the other day to buy six cans of Sprite. It was only when I got home that I realised I had picked 7 Up.

#### Comments


#### THIS POST IS SH\*\*\*Y

@baduser007

#### wow

@testuser

# Exercise #3 - Check out Response





### #4 - Lack of Resources & Rate Limiting

#### Resources

The services and the data we provide via the API.

#### **Rate Limiting**

Preventing those resources from being stolen or the systems from being abused

**Problem is:** 

**APIs are for machines.** 

We want them fast and as unlimited as required, so we build them to scale.

Allows for brute forcing!





### #5 - Broken Function Level Authorization

#### **AuthZ / Access Control**

Again!

#### **Function Level**

The focus here is on the actions you can take over the data you have access to

Again: very large attack surface:

- each and every endpoint needs protecting

**Definitely a complex mapping** 


- contextual understanding
- business logic
- scopes

# Exercise #5 - Hints

ZAP can use add ons...

https://www.zaproxy.org/addons/

Check out the FuzzDB Files





users



# OWASP API Top 10 (6 - 10)



In (what's left of) 60 minutes

### #6 - Mass Assignment

#### **Mass Assignment**

User passes an unexpected parameter / property to a Method (that can handle Objects with that property) because the Class can have them..

Objects - data instances (again)

Methods - procedures for a Class

**<u>Classes</u>** - the blueprint Object

Objects still can have all the elements their Class defines...

Methods exposing an Object could also expose those other properties without meaning to.



"credit": "1000000"





### #7 - Security Misconfiguration

#### **Misconfiguration?**

Yes, it could be a great many things

#### **Server Configuration**

- Patch status
- Storage configuration
- Error level configuration

#### **Network Configuration**

- Protocol setup
- HTTP header setup

#### What kinds of things go wrong?

- Unpatched systems
- Unhardened setups
- Unnecessary features
- Debug logging
- Unprotected storage
- Exposed management panels
- Insecure default configurations
- Misconfigured HTTP headers
- Misconfigured CORS
- Misconfigured TLS



Origin: hackerserver.com



# Exercise #7 - Exploit

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
   <title>CORS Exploit (vapi 7) </title>
  <script>
   function corsAttack()
     var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
     req.onreadystatechange = function()
      //Push the response back to us here
     req.open("GET", "http://localhost/vapi/api7/user/key", true);
     req.withCredentials = true;
     req.send();
</head>
       <h2>CORS Exploit </h2>
       <div id="demo">
           <button type="button" onclick="corsAttack()">Click here for magic </putton>
       </div>
  </center>
</body>
</html>
```



# #8 - Injection

#### **Injection?**

User controlled input that is used without sanitising first can lead to injection

Mass Assignment is a specific case of this, but not the only one.

APIs are potentially exposed to injection through:

- SQL
- NoSQL
- LDAP
- OS commands
- XML parsers
- Object-Relational Mapping (ORM)

' or 1=1--



### #9 - Improper Assets Management

#### Assets?

This either refers to

- versions of the Endpoints;
- restricted Endpoints (for debug); or
- the different SDLC environments

#### **Management?**

Exactly, what does management of those mean? Who does it? How?

Legacy often means old vulnerabilities

Debug almost certainly means information disclosure

Sharing or otherwise linking components between environments

Sharing data between environments



### #10 - Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

#### **Logging**

While debug logging is bad, lack of logging is worse (arguably)

#### **Monitoring**

This is DevOps, we monitor production, right?

**Errors** over logs, or <u>logging</u> for errors

**Logging** for usage

**Logging for functional correctness** 

Monitoring is almost exclusively for usage







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