NIST IR 8477-Based Set Theory Relationship Mapping (STRM)
Reference Document: Secure Controls Framework (SCF) version 2025.
STRM Guidance: https://securecontrolsframework.com/set-theory

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security-policy-resource-center

FDE Name minal Justice Information is the term used to refer to all of the FBI CJIS provi criminal Justice information is the term used to refer to all of the FBI CJIS provided data necessary for law enforcement and civil, agencies to perform their missions including, but not imitted to biometric, cliently history, biographic, property, and case/incident history data. The following categories of Cli describe the various dat sets housed by the FBI CJIS architecture:

1. Biometric Data—data derived from one or more intrinsic physical or behavioral trails of humans by piculally for the purpose of uniquely identifying individuals from within a population. Used to identify individuals, to include fingerprints, palm prints, iris exame, and facial recognition data.

2. Identify History Data—textual data that corresponds with an individual's biometric data, providing a history of criminal and/or civil events for the identified individual.

3. Biographic Data—information about Individuals associated with a unique case. contention case, provising a missibly or criminal amond downers for in electricities inclinidated.

3. Biographic Data—information about individuals associated with a unique case, and not necessarily connected to identify data. Biographic data does not provide a history of an individual, only information related to unique case.

4. Properly Data—information about vehicles and properly associated with crime when accompanied by any personally identifiable information (PII).

5. CaseInclined in Instrum—information about the history of criminal incidents. The following type of data are exempt from the protection levist engined for CII: transaction control type numbers (e.g., CRI, NC, UC, VK, etc.) when not accompanied by information that reveals CI or PII.

The intent of the CIS Security Policy is to ensure the protection of the aforeamonioned CII until information its released to the public via authorized descendination (e.g., within a court system, presented an crime reports data; expenditude in the intenset of public safety); purged or destroyed in accordance with applicable record electricity and in the released to the public via authorized despellable in the intenset of public safety; purged or destroyed in accordance with public information in the intenset of public safety; purged or destroyed in accordance with public information in the intenset of public safety; purged or destroyed in accordance with public information in the intenset of public safety; purged or destroyed in accordance with public via proceeding that can be released to the public via a public records request is 4.1 Functional N/A continued has to the CHIS Counties, finalization (CHRI), a cometimes informally referred to as restricted data", is a subset of CJI. Due to its comparatively sensitive nature, additional controls are required for the access, use and dissemination of CHRI. In addition to the dissemination restrictions outlined below, Pittle 28, Part 20, Code of rederial Regulations (CFR), defines CHRI and provides the regulatory guidance for issemination of CHRI, While the CLIS Security Policy strengts to be architecturally adependent, the III and the NCIC are specifically identified in Title 28, Part 20, CFR, echanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant 4.1.1 CPL-01 and the NCIC Operating Manual, as associated with CHRI. Criminal History Record Information (CHRI), sometimes informally referred to as "restricted data", is a subset of CII. Due to its comparatively sensitive nature, additionat controls are required for the access, use and dissemination of CHRI. In addition to the dissemination restrictions outlined below, Title 28, Part 20, Code of Federal Regulations (CFRI, effence CHRI and provides the regulatory patience of dissemination of CHRI. While the CIIS Security Policy attempts to be architecturally independent, the lian dit he NCIC are specifically identified in Title 28, Part 20, CFR, and the NCIC Operating Menual, as associated with CHRI. ms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in acco statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements. Criminal History Record 4.1.1 intersects with Data & Asset Classificati DCH-02 Information (CHRI) Access, Use and Access, Use and Dissemination of Criminal History Record Information (CHRI), NCIC Restricted Files Information, and NCIC Non-Restricted Files This section describes the requirements for the access, use and dissemination CHRI, NCIC restricted files information, and NCIC non-restricted files informat N/A 4.2 Functional no relationship N/A N/A N/A ments to man to Information obtained from the III is considered CHRI. Rules governing the access use, and dissemination of CHRI are found in Title 28, Part 20, CFR. The III shall be accessed only for an authorized purpose. Further, CHRI shall only be used for an Proper Access, Use, and authorized purpose consistent with the purpose for which III was accessed Dissemination to another agency is authorized if (a) the other agency is an Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance 4.2.1 Functional subset of CPL-01 10 Dissemination of CHRI Authorized Recipient of such information and is being serviced by the accessing agency, or (b) the other agency is performing personnel and appointment function agency, or (b) the other agency is performing personnel and appointment function for criminal lustice aemidorment analosicants. Information obtained from the III is considered CHRI. Rules governing the access use, and dissemination of CHRI are found in Title 28, Part 20, CFR. The III shall be accessed only for an authorized purpose. Further, CHRI shall only be used for an authorized purpose consistent with the purpose for which III was accessed. Dissemination to another agency is authorized if (a) the other agency is an Authorized Recipion of such information and is being serviced by the accessing agency, or (b) the other agency is performing personnel and appointment function. Mechanisms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in accordance with DCH-02 4.2.1 Functional intersects with Data & Asset Classification for criminal justice employment applicants. echanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant The NCIC hosts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their access and use. Proper access to, use, and dissemination of data from restricted files sha and use. Proper access to, use, and dissemination of data from restricted files sha be consistent with the access, use, and dissemination policies concerning the III described in Title 28, Part 20, CFR, and the NCIC Operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows: 1. Gang Files 2. Threat Screening Center Files 3. Supervised Release Files 4. National Sex Offender Registry Files Proper Access, Use, and Dissemination of NCIC Restricted Files Information 4.2.2 CPL-01 10 Historical Protection Order Files of the NCIC Identity Theft Files . Treactive Interest Files . Person With Information (PWI) data in the Missing Person Files . Violent Person File Niolent Person File
 NICS Denied Transactions File
 The remaining NCIC files are considered non-restricted files. The NCIC hosts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their access and use. Proper access to, use, and dissemination of data from restricted files have be consistent with the access use, and dissemination of data from restricted files the sconsistent with the access use, and dissemination policies concerning the III described in Title 28, Part 20, CFR, and the NCIC Operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:

1. Gang Files Mechanisms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements. Threat Screening Center Files Supervised Release Files Dissemination of NCIC 3. Supervised Release Files

1. National Sec Offender Registry Files

5. Historical Protein Order Files of the NCIC

5. Hearity Heaf Files

7. Protective Interest Files

8. Person With Information (Pull All Section 1)

7. Wollent Person File

10. NICS Denied Transactions File

10. NICS Denied Transactions File

10. NICS Denied Transactions File 4.2.2 Functional Data & Asset Classification DCH-02 Restricted Files Information The NCIC hosts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their acce and use. Proper access to, use, and dissemination of data from restricted files al be consistent with the access, use, and dissemination policies concerning the II Mechanisms exist to:

(I) Retain Personal Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;

(2) Dispose of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of the method of storage; and

(3) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records). described in Title 28, Part 20, CFR, and the NCIC Operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows: les, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:
.dnag Files
.mreat Screening Center Files
.supervised Releases Files
.National Sex Offender Registry Files
.Hational Sex Offender Registry Files
.Hational Protection Order Files of the NCIC
.dentity Ther Files
.Person With Information (PWI) data in the Missing Person Files
.Person With Information (PWI) data in the Missing Person Files Dissemination of NCIC Restricted Files Information Personal Data (PD) Retention & Disposal 9. Violent Person File 10. NICS Denied Transactions File ne remaining NCIC files are considered non-restricted files.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
4.2.2	Proper Access, Use, and Dissemination of NCIC Restricted Files Information	The NCIC hosts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distriguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their access and use. Proper access to use, and dissemination of data from restricted files shall be consistent with the access, use, and dissemination policies concerning the III described in Tile 2-B, per 120, CPF, and the NCIC Operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:  1. Gang Files  2. Threat Screening Center Files  3. Supervised Release Files  4. National Sex Offender Registry Files  5. Historical Protection Order Files of the NCIC  6. Identity Thet Files  7. Protective Interiest Files  8. Person With Information (PWI) data in the Missing Person Files  9. Violent Person File  10. NICS Denied Transactions File  10. NICS Denied Transactions File  The remaining NCIC files are considered non-restricted files.	Functional	intersects with	Internal Use of Personal Data (PD) For Testing, Training and Research	PRI-05.1	Mechanisms exist to address the use of Personal Data (PD) for internal testing, training and research that:  (1) Takes measures to limit or minimize the amount of PD used for internal testing, training and research purposes; and (2) Authorizas the use of PD when such information is required for internal testing, training and research.	5	
4.2.2	Proper Access, Use, and Dissemination of NCIC Restricted Files Information	The NCIC hosts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their access and use. Proper access to, use, and dissemination of data from restricted files shall be consistent with the access, use, and dissemination of data from restricted files shall be dissemined in Title 28, Part 20, CER, and the NCIC Operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:  1. Gaog Files  2. Timest Screening Center Files 3. Supervised Release Files 5. Historical Protection Order Files of the NCIC 6. Identify The File S. Historical Protection Order Files of the NCIC 6. Identify The File Thomaston Files 9. Protective interest Files 9. Protective interest Files 9. Violent Person File 10. NCIS Denier of Innanactions File The remaining NCIC files are considered non-restricted files.	Functional	intersects with	Usage Restrictions of Personal Data (PD)	PRI-05.4	Nechanisms exist to restrict collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, underlain and/or sharing Personal Data (PD).  (1) The purpose(s) originally collected, consistent with the data privacy notice(s): (2) What is subroized by the data subject, or suthorized agent; and (3) What is consistent with applicable laws, regulations and contractual obligations.	5	
4.2.3	Dissemination of NCIC Non-Restricted Files	N/A	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.
4.2.3.1	For Official Purposes	NCIC non-restricted files are those not listed as settricted files in Section 4.2.2. MCIC non-restricted files information may be accessed and used for any suthorized purpose consistent with the inquiring agency's responsibility. Information obtained may be disseminated to jo other government agencies or 10p invaries entities authorized by law to receive such information for any purpose consistent with their responsibilities.	Functional	subset of	Data Protection	DCH-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls.	10	
423.1	For Official Purposes	NCIC non-restricted files are those not listed as restricted files in Section 4.2.2. NCIC non-restricted files information may be accessed and used for any authorized purpose consistent with the inquiring agency's responsibility, information obtained may be disseminated to (a) other government agencies or (b) private entities authorized by (an to receive such information for any purpose consistent with their responsibilities.	Functional	intersects with	Personal Data (PD) Retention & Disposal	PRI-05	Nechanisms exist to: (I) Retain Personal Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; (2) lipuses of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of twice method of storage; and (3) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records).	5	
4.2.3.1	For Official Purposes	NCIC non-restricted files are those not listed as restricted files in Section 4.2.2. NCIC non-restricted files information may be accessed and used for any authorized purpose consistent with the inquiring agency's responsibility, Information obtained may be disseminated to (a) other government agencies or (b) private entities authorized by law to receive such information for any purpose consistent with their responsibilities.	Functional	intersects with	Internal Use of Personal Data (PD) For Testing, Training and Research	PRI-05.1	Mechanisms exist to address the use of Personal Data (PD) for internal testing, training and research that:  (1) Takes measures to limit or minimize the amount of PD used for internal testing, training and research purposes; and  (2) Authorizes the use of PD when such information is required for internal testing, training and research.	5	
4.2.3.1	For Official Purposes	NCIC non-restricted files are those not listed as restricted files in Section 4.2.2.  NCIC non-restricted files information may be accessed and used for any authorized purpose consistent with the inquiring segarcy's responsibility. Information obtained may be disseminated to (a) other government agencies or (b) private entities authorized by law to receive such information for any purpose consistent with their responsibilities.	Functional	intersects with	Usage Restrictions of Personal Data (PD)	PRI-05.4	Mechanisms exist to restrict collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, underlained and/or sharing Personal Data (PD) to: (1) The purpose(s) originally collected, consistent with the data privacy notice(s); (2) What is authorized by the data subject, or authorized agent; and (3) What is consistent with applicable laws, regulations and contractual obligations.	5	
42.3.2	For Other Authorized Purposes	NCIC non-restricted files may be accessed for other purposes consistent with the resources of the inquiring agency; however, requests for bulk data are discouraged, information dereived from NCIC one-restricted files for both then law enforcement purposes can be used by subnotized criminal justice personnel only to confirm the status of a person or property (i.e., warred or raisoin). An inquiring agency is subnoticed to charge a nominal administrative feel for such service. Non-restricted files information shall not be disseminated commercially. A response to a NCIC person inquiry may include NCIC restricted files information as well as NCIC non-restricted files information, agencies shall not disseminate restricted files information for purposes other than law enforcement.	Functional	intersects with	Personal Data (PD) Retention & Disposal	PRI-05	Mechanisms exist to:  (I) Retain Personal Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;  (2) Dispose of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of the method of storage, and  (3) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records).	5	
4.2.3.2	For Other Authorized Purposes	NCIC non-restricted files may be accessed for other purposes consistent with the resources of the inquiring agency, however, requests for bulk data are discouraged. Information derived from NCIC non-restricted files for other than law enforcement purposes can be used by subtroated criminal gastice personned only to confirm the statement of the confirmation of the	Functional	intersects with	Internal Use of Personal Data (PD) For Testing, Training and Research	PRI-05.1	Mechanisms exist to address the use of Personal Data (PD) for internal testing, training and research that:  (I) Takes measure so limit or minimize the amount of PD used for internal testing, training and research purposes; and  (2) Authorizes the use of PD when such information is required for internal testing, training and research.	5	
4.2.3.2	For Other Authorized Purposes	NCIC non-restricted files may be accessed for other purposes consistent with the resources of the inquiring agency, however, requests for built data are discouraged information derived from NCIC non-restricted files for other than law enforcement purposes can be used by authorized, variently artistical para nonlining agency is authorized, some property (i.e. artistical para nonlining agency is authorized to change and a normal administrated vomencially.)  A response to a NCIC pean ninquiry may include NCIC restricted files information as well as NCIC non-restricted files information as well as NCIC non-restricted files information.	Functional	intersects with	Usage Restrictions of Personal Data (PD)	PRI-05.4	Mechanisms exist to restrict collecting, meroining, processing, storing, transmitting, undiring and/or shallong memoral Data (PO) to:  (1) The purpose(s) originally collected, consistent with the data privacy notice(s);  (2) What is authorized by the data subject, or sulthorized agent, and  (3) What is also consistent with applicable laws, regulations and contractual obligations.	5	
4.2.3.3		If no federal, state or local law or policy prohibition exists, the CSO may exercise discretion to approve or deny dissemination of NCIC non-restricted file information.	Functional	intersects with	Data Stewardship	DCH-01.1	Mechanisms exist to ensure data stewardship is assigned, documented and communicated.	5	
4.2.3.3		If no federal, state or local law or policy prohibition exists, the CSO may exercise discretion to approve or deny dissemination of NCIC non-restricted file information.	Functional	intersects with	Disclosure of Information	DCH-03.1	Mechanisms exist to restrict the disclosure of sensitive / regulated data to authorized parties with a need to know.	5	
4.2.4	Storage	When CHRI is stored, agencies shall establish appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to ensure the security and contidentiality of the information. These records shall be stored for extended periods only when they are key elements for the integrity and/or utility of case files and/or criminal record files. See Section. 5.3 for physical security controls.	Functional	subset of	Sensitive / Regulated Data Protection	DCH-01.2	Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive/regulated data wherever it is stored.	10	
4.2.5	Justification and Penalties	N/A  In addition to the use of purpose codes and logging information, all users shall	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.
4.2.5.1	Justification	provide a reason for all III inquiries whenever requested by NCIC System Managers, CSAs, local agency administrators, or their representatives.	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.
4.2.5.2	Penalties	Improper access, use or dissemination of CHRI and NCIC Non-Restricted Files information is serious and may result in administrative sanctions including, but not limited to, termination of services and state and federal criminal penalties.	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
4.3	Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	For the purposes of this document, Pill is information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identhy, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, or mother's maiden name. Any FBL CIS provided data maintained by an agency, including but not limited to, deucation, financial transactions, metal inhatory, and criminal or employment history may include PIL. A criminal history record for example, inherently contains PI as avoud a Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DE) case file. PII shall be extracted from CII for the purpose of official business only. Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rules, to ensure appropriate controls are applied when handling IP extracted from CII for Use to the expansion nature of PIL, this Policy does not specify auditing, logging, or personnel security requirements associated with the life occided PIL.	Functional	intersects with	Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance	CPL-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.	5	
4.3	Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	reformed purposes of trial occument, Puls information when can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identify, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, or mother's maiden name. Any PEI CIS provided data maintained by an agency, including but not tilmeted to, deucation, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history may include PII. A criminal history record for example inherently contains PII as would a Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DE) case file. PII shall be extracted from CI for the purpose of official business only. Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rules, to ensure appropriate controls are applied when handling PII extracted from CI. Due to the expansive mature of PII, this Policy does not specify qualiffing, logging, or personnal security	Functional	intersects with	Data & Asset Classification	DCH-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements.	5	
4.3	Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	moutements associated with the life cycle of PIL.  For the purpose of this document, PIII is information which can be used to distinguish or trace an includual's identity, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of Drint, or mother's maiden aman, Ary PEIC IS provided data maintained by an agency, including but not influed to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment faitor may include PIL. A criminal history record for example inherently contains PII as would a Law Enforcement National PI shall be extracted from CII for the purpose of folicial business only, Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rules, to ensure appropriate controls are applied when handing PIL sertaceted from CII. Due to the expansive nature of PII, this Policy does not specify auditing, logging, or personnel security requirements associated with the life cycle of PII.	Functional	intersects with	Personal Data (PD) Retention & Disposal	PRI-05	Mechanisms exist to:  (I) Retain Personal Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to built the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;  (2) Bipase of, destroys, enses, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of the method of stonge; and  (3) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records).	5	
4.3	Personally Identifiable information (PII)	neutrements associated with the life cycle of PIL.  For the purpose of this document, PILI is information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, of biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and blace of birth, or mother's maiden mane. Ayr BIC LIS provided data maintained by an agency, including but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history may include PIL A criminal history record for example inherently contains PIL as would a Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DE) case file.  PII shall be extracted from CII for the purpose of official business only. Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rules, to ensure appropriate controls are applied when handling PIL extracted from CII to the expansion of the propriate controls are applied when handling PIL extracted from LID but the expansion and the propriate controls are applied when handling PIL extracted from LID but the expansion and the propriate controls are applied when handling PIL extracted from LID but the expansion and the propriate controls are applied when handling PIL extracted from LID but the expansion and the propriate controls are applied to the	Functional	intersects with	Internal Use of Personal Data (PD) For Testing, Training and Research	PRI-05.1	Mechanisms exist to address the use of Personal Data (PD) for internal testing, training and research that:  (1) Takes measures to limit or minimize the amount of PD used for internal testing, training and research purposes, and (2) Authorizes the use of PD when such information is required for internal testing, training and research.	5	
4.3	Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	moutements associated with the life cycle of PIL.  For the purpose of this document, PIII is information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, or blometric records, alone or when contined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or inhable to a specific individual, such as date and place of Dritt, or morth's madeln amen. Ay PIEI CIE provided data maintained by an agency, including but not infined to, education, financial transactions, medical record for example inherently contains PII as would a Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DE) case file.  PII shall be extracted from CII for the purpose of official business only, Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rules, to ensure appropriate controls are applied when handling PIE extracted from CII. Due to the expansion nature of PII, this Policy does not specify auditing, logging, or personnel security requirements associated with the life excluded PIII.	Functional	intersects with	Usage Restrictions of Personal Data (PD)	PRI-05.4	Mechanisms exist to restrict collecting, neoliving, processing, storing, transmitting, underling and/or sharing Personal Data (PD) to:  (1) The purposet(s) originally collected, consistent with the data privacy notice(s);  (2) What is authorized by the data subject, or authorized agent; and  (3) What is a shortest by the data subject, or authorized agent; and  obligations.	5	
5.1	Policy Area 1: Information Exchange Agreements	The information shared through communication mediums shall be protected with appropriate security safeguards. The agreements established by entities sharing information across systems and communications mediums are vital to ensuring all	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1	Policy Area 1: Information Exchange Agreements	parties fully understand and agree to a set of security standards. The information shared through communication mediums shall be protected with appropriate security safeguards. The agreements established by entities sharing information across systems and communications mediums are vital to ensuring all parties fully understand and agree to a set of security standards.	Functional	subset of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Governance Program	GOV-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity and data protection governance controls.	10	
5.1.1	Information Exchange	Serior exchange (C), agencies shall up from a green to a second variables.  Before exchange (C), agencies shall up from a greements in place that specify security controls. The exchange of information may take several forms including electronic mall, instant messages, web services, faceimile, hard copy, and information systems endering, receiving and storing CI. Information exchange agreements outline the roles, responsibilities, and data momerably between agencies and any external parties. Information exchange agreements to regencies shall receive the secret of the security control can do conditions described in this document. Information exchange agreements shall be supported by documentation committing both parties to the terms of information exchange, As described in subsequent sections, different agreements and policies apply, depending on whether the parties involved are CIAs or INAS. See Appendix D for examples of Information Exchange Agreements. There may be instances, on an ad-noc basis, where CII is authorized for further dissemination to Authorized Recipients not covered by an information exchange agreement with the releasing agency. In these instances the dissemination of CII is considered to be secondary dissemination. Law Enforcement and child agencies shall have a local policy to validate a requestor of CII is an authorized recipient before disseminating CII. See Section 5.1.3 for secondary dissemination guidance.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1.1	Information Exchange	Before exchanging CJI, agencies shall put formal agreements in place that specify security controls. The exchange of information may take several forms including electronic mail, instant messages, we be services, faceinfile, hard copy, and information systems sending, receiving and storing CJI. Information exchange agreements until the froite, responsibilities, and data ownership between agencies and any external parties. Information exchange agreements to green sharing CJI and that hat is sent to addrer received from the FBI CJIS shall specify the security controls and conditions described in this document. Information exchange agreements that be supported by documentation committing both parties to the terms of information exchange. As described in subsequent sections, different agreements and policies apply, depending on whether the parties involved and CJIS and NCIAs. See Appendix D for examples of information exchange Agreements.  There may be instances, on an ad-hoc basis, where CJI is authorized for further dessemination to Authorized Recipients not covered by an information exchange agreement with the releasing agency. In these instances the dissemination of CJIS are considered to be accordant y dissemination. Law Enforcement and child agencies shall have a local policy to validate a request of CJI as an authorized recipient short deserminating CJI. See Section 5.1 for secondary dissemination (CJIS assemination undessemination in GJIS assemination in GJIS asseminatin GJIS assemination in GJIS assemination in GJIS assemination in	Functional	subset of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Governance Program	GOV-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity and data protection governance controls.	10	
5.1.1.1	Information Handling	Procedures for handling and storage of information shall be established to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure, alteration or misuse. Using the requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the handling, processing, storing, and communication of CII. These procedures apply to the exchange of CI in omatter the form of exchange. The policies for information handling and protection also apply to using CJI shared with or rocewider from PEILOIS for nonriminal justice purposes. In general, a noncriminal justice purpose includes the use of criminal history records for purposes and process and process and proposes relating to the administration of criminal justice, including – but not limited to - employment suitability, licensing determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national security clearances.	Functional	subset of	Data Protection	DCH-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls.	10	



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FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
5.1.1.1	Information Handling	Procedures for handling and storage of information shall be established to protect hat information from unsubtroised disclosurs, afteration or missue. Using the requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the handling, processing, storing, and communication of CLI. These procedures apply to the exchange of CLI no matter the form of exchange. The policies for information handling and protection is also apply to using CJI shared with or received from FBI CJIS for noncriminal justice purposes. In general, a noncriminal justice purpose includes the use of criminal history records for purposes suthorized by federal or state law other than purposes relating to the administration of criminal justice, including—but not limited to -employment suitability, Icensing determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national security clearances.	Functional	intersects with	Data Stewardship	DCH-01.1	Mechanisms exist to ensure data stewardship is assigned, documented and communicated.	5	
5.1.1.1	Information Handling	Procedures for handling and storage of information shall be established to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure, alteration or misuse. Using the requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the handling, processing, storing, and communication of CLI. These procedures apply to the exchange of CLI no matter the form of exchange. The policies for information handling and protection also apply to using CJI shared with or received from FBI CJIS for noncriminal justice purposes. In general, a noncriminal justice purpose includes the use of criminal history records for purposes suthorized by federal or state law other than purposes relating to the administration of criminal justice, including—but not limited to e-employment suitability, licensing determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national security clearances.	Functional	subset of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Governance Program	GOV-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity and data protection governance controls.	10	
5.1.1.1	Information Handling	Procedures for handling and storage of information shall be established to protect that information from unsuthcroad disclosure, afteration or missue. Unlight requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the handling, processing, storing, and communication of CLI. These procedures apply to the exchange of CLI no matter the form of exchange. The policies for information handling and protection last apply to using CJI shared with or received from FBI CJIS for noncriminal justice purposes. In general, a noncriminal justice purpose includes the use of criminal history seconds for purposes authorized by federal or state law other than purposes relating to the administration of criminal justice, including—but not limited to e-mployment suitability, licensing determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national security clearances.	Functional	intersects with	Sensitive / Regulated Data Storage, Handling & Processing	SAT-03.3	Mechanisms exist to ensure that every user accessing a system processing, storing or transmitting sensitive / regulated data is formally trained in data handling requirements.	5	
5.1.1.2	State and Federal Agency User Agreements	Each CSA head or SIB Chlef shall execute a signed written user agreement with the FIB CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy bottore accessing and participating in CIIS records information programs. This agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS systems. As confined through the particular CSA or SIB Chnef, each Interface Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements with the FBI CIIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1.1.2	State and Federal Agency User Agreements	Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the FIB CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy before accessing and participating in CIIS records information programs. This agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS systems. As condinated through the particular CSA or SIB Chief, each Interface Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements with the FBI CIS Posion shall be coordinated with the CSA head.	Functional	subset of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Governance Program	GOV-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity and data protection governance controls.	10	
5.1.1.2	State and Federal Agency User Agreements	Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the FIB CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy before accessing and participating in CIIS records information programs. This agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS systems. As condinated through the particular CSA or SIB Chief, each Interface Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements with the FBI CIS Posion shall be coolinated with the CSA head.	Functional	intersects with	Adequate Security for Sensitive / Regulated Data In Support of Contracts	IAO-03.2	Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.	5	
5.1.1.2	State and Federal Agency User Agreements	Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the FIB CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy before accessing and participating in CIIS records information programs. This agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIB Chief, sech interface Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's network through the acternal network connection or system. All user agreements with the FBI CIIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	
5.1.1.2	State and Federal Agency User Agreements	Each CSA head or SIB Chlef shall execute a signed written user agreement with the FIB CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy bother accessing and participating in CIIS records information programs. This agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS systems. As confined through the particular CSA or SIB Chnef, each Interface Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements with the FBI CIIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.	Functional	intersects with	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
5.1.1.2	State and Federal Agency User Agreements	Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the FIB CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy before accessing and participating in CIIS records information programs. This agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIB Chief, each interface Agency shall also allow the FIB to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FIB's network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements with the FIB CIIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.	Functional	intersects with	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybensecurity and data protection requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organizations needs to protect its Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).	5	
5.1.1.3	Criminal Justice Agency User Agreements	4. Logging. 5. Quality Assurance (QA). 6. Screening (Pre-Employment). 7. Security. 8. Timeliness. 9. Training. 10. Use of the system. 11. Validation.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1.1.3	Criminal Justice Agency User Agreements	Any CLA receiving access to CLI shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signers valuncity of the CSA providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FBI CJB systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CJB Shystem and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CJB Shystem and services to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include:  1. Audit.  2. Dissemination.  3. Hit confirmation.  4. Logging.  6. Screening (Pie-Employment).  7. Security.  8. Timeliness.  9. Training.  10. Use of the system.	Functional	intersects with	Adequate Security for Sensitive / Regulated Data In Support of Contracts		Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
5.1.1.3	Criminal Justice Agency User Agreements	Any CLIA receiving access to CII shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signers qualitorly of the CAS providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FER CIIS systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CIIS Division policies to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include:  1. Audit.  1. Audit.  4. Logsing.  5. Quality Assurance (QA).  6. Screening (Pre-Employment).  7. Security.  8. Timelines.  9. Training.  10. Use of the system.  11. Validation.  Any CLIA receiving access to CII shall enter into a signed written agreement with the	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	
5.1.1.3	Criminal Justice Agency User Agreements	aspropriate signatory authority of the CSA providing the access. The written agreement shall spoofly the FBC ISS systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CIIS Division policies to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include:  1. Audit.  2. Dissemination.  3. Hit confirmation.  4. Logaing.  5. Quality Assurance (QA).  6. Screening (Pre-Employment).  7. Security.  8. Timeliness.  9. Training.  10. Use of the system.  11. Validation.	Functional	intersects with	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
5.1.1.3	Criminal Justice Agency User Agreements	Any CLA receiving access to CL shall enter into a signed written agreement with the sperporpiate signery authority of the CAS providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FEI CIIS systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FEI CIIS Division policies to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include: 1. Audit. 2. Dissemination.	Functional	intersects with	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity and data protection requirements with triting-raties, reflecting the organization's needs to protect its Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).	5	
5.1.1.4	Interagency and Management Control Agreements	A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is suthorized pursuant no executive order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates a management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The MCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) as city information technology (II) department.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1.1.4	Interagency and Management Control Agreements	A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to executive order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates a management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The MCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) is a city information technology (If) department only of the control of the criminal solely with the CIA.	Functional	intersects with	Adequate Security for Sensitive / Regulated Data In Support of Contracts	IAO-03.2	Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.	5	
5.1.1.4	Interagency and Management Control Agreements	A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is suthorized pursuant no executive order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates a management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The MCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) as city information technology (II) department.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	
5.1.1.4	Interagency and Management Control Agreements	A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to execute order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The MCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) is a city information technology (If) department.	Functional	intersects with	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
5.1.1.4	Interagency and Management Control Agreements	A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant no executive orders, statute, regulation, or intersgency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The NCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) as city information technology (if) department.	Functional	intersects with	Third-Party Contract Requirements		Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity and data protection requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to protect its Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).	5	
5.1.1.5	Private Contractor User Agreements and CIIS Security Addendum	The CJIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHIS, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentially of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CJIS Security Policy, provides for senctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General or my require.  Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall insert the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of such reviews as set local series and the CJIS Security Policy and the CJIS Security anamed with the CJIS Security and the CJIS Security and the CJIS Se	Functional	Intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
5.1.1.5	Private Contractor User Agreements and CIS Security Addendum	The CIIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the overniment agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHRI, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentiality of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CIIS Security Policy, provides for annotizing, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General my require. Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same raining and certification crimer a required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit reviews as we local sear agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall acknowledge, via signing of the CIIS Security Addendum Certification page, and sible by all aspects of the CIIS Security Addendum. The CIIS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modifications to the CIIS Security Addendum shall be enacted only by the prictions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specificatily identifies the agency's purpose and acceps of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the CIA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions on behalf of NCIA (government) shall be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specifically identifies the agency's purpose and accept on providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the CIA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice. The agreement between the CIA acceptance of the CIAS acceptance of the CIAS and the private contractors are acceptance of the CIAS acceptance of the CIAS acceptance of the CIAS acceptance of the CIAS acceptance	Functional	Intersects with	Adequate Security for Sensitive? Regulated Data In Support of Contracts	IAO-03.2		5	
5.1.1.5	Private Contractor User Agreements and CJIS Security Addendum	The CLIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHRI, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentially of the information to consistent with existing regulations and the CJS Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General or many require.  Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall acknowledge, via signing of the CJIS Security Addendum. The CJIS Security Addendum shall pushed to the CJIS Security Addendum. The CJIS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modifications to the CJIS Security Addendum shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted pursuant to a greenment which specifically identifies the agency's purpose and scope of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the CJIA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions on behalf of a NCJA (government) shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specifically identifies the Sacra, as referenced in Title 2 CFR 2.0.3 (a)(7).  2. Private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions on behalf of a NCJA (government) shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specifically identifies the sagency's purpose and scope of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the NCJA and the private contractors thal incorporate the CJIS Security Addendum approved	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	
5.1.1.5	Private Contractor User Agreements and CIS Security Addendum	as reterencions in line 2s c.H.2.0.3.8 (a)(7). The CIJS Security Addendum is an uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which a specifically unthrivera access to CHRI, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentially of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CIJS Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General of Provides and the CIJS Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General may require.  Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall acknowledge, via signing of the CIJS Security Addendum. The CIJS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modifications to the CIJS Security Addendum and private contractors to the CIJS Security Addendum and the CIJS Security Addendum	Functional	intersects with	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
5.1.1.5	Private Contractor User Agreements and CIIS Security Addendum	The CIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHRI, limits the use of the information to the purposes bro which is a provided, ensures the security and confidentiality of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CIS Security Policy, provides for senctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General or the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CIS Security Policy, provides for senctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General only require. Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall intend the cities are applied by a superior of the CIS Security Addendum Centralication ranges, and abide by all aspects of the CIS Security Addendum Centralication gags, and abide by all aspects of the CIS Security Addendum Centralication gags, and abide by all aspects of the CIS Security Addendum Centralication gags, and abide by all aspects of the CIS Security Addendum Centralication gags, and specification of the CIS Security Addendum Centralication gags and propriet and appropriate the Additional Security Addendum Centralication gags and propriet private contractors designated by a perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specificatify identifies the agency's purpose and scope of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the CIA and the private contractors dealingarded to perform criminal justice functions on behalf of a NCIA (government) and be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which and hall be eligible for access to CIA. Security Addendum approvate the CIS Security Addendum approvated by the Director of the FIB, acting for the U.S. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 28 CF	Functional	Intersects with	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybenseculty and data protection requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to protect its Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
5.1.1.6	Agency User Agreements	ANCIA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CLI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. ANCIA (public) receiving access to CLI shall enter into a signed written agreement with the epopropriate signatory authority of the CSA/SIB providing the access. An example of a NCIA (public) is a county school board.  ANCIA (private) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, which is the control of the control of the county school because of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CLI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. ANCIA (private) receiving access to CLI shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA, SIB, or authorized agreautor providing the access. An example of a NCIA (private) is a local bank.  All NCIAs accessing CII shall the subject to all pertinent areas of the CII Security accesses FIB CII shall all so allow the FIB to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FIB's network through the external network connection or system.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1.1.6	Agency User Agreements	A NCIA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is stating place, for nonciminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal and scale statute approved by the LIS. Attorney General. A NCIA (public) receiving access to CII access that the purpose of the CSA-80 providing the access. An example of a NCIA (public) is a construction of the control of the CSA-80 providing the access. An example of a NCIA (public) is a control of the control of	Functional	intersects with	Adequate Security for Sensitive Regulated Data In Support of Contracts	IAO-03.2	Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.	5	
5.1.1.6	Agency User Agreements	A NCIA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal awar of state statute approved by the U.S. Attrons (General. A NCIA) public receiving access to CI ahail enter into a signer of written agreement with the appropriate signatory stated by the CSASTB providing the access. An exemple of a NCIA (public) is a county school board.  A NCIA (private) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	
5.1.1.6	Agency User Agreements	ANCIA (public) designated to request cell fingenprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the relief value of whom a background check is taking place, for onceriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CLI. Access shall be pormitted when such designation is undorsed pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the LIS. Attorney General. ANCIA (public) receiving access to CLI shall enter into a gindew witten apprement with the appropriate signatory sathority of the CSA/SIB providing the access. An example of a NCIA (public) is a country school boads.  A NCIA (private) designation to request clief fingerprint-based background checks, to stain grade with the full consent of the individual ow whom a background check is taking place, for onceriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CLI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is undortized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the LIS. Attorney General. ANCIA (private) receiving access to CLI shall enter his or a gindew witten apprement with the appropriate signatory suthority of the CSA, SIB, or authorized agency providing the access. An example of a NCIA (private) receiving access to CLI shall enter his oli accessing CLI shall shall sail to a loca bank.  All NCIAs accessing CLI shall alt so allow the FBI to periodically text the ability to penetrate the FBI's network through the external network connection or system.	Functional	intersects with	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that exhabiling data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
5.1.1.6	Agency User Agreements	A NCIA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney Germal. A NCIA (public) receiving access to CII shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSASIB providing the access. An example of a NCIA (public) is a country school board.  A NCIA (private) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney Germal. A NCIA (private) receiving access to CII shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory sutherly of the CSA, SIB, or estimated approved by CSA, SIB, or suthorized agency providing the access. An example of a NCIA (private) is a local bank. In CIAs accessing CII shall be subject to all pertinent areas of the CIIS Security Policy (see Appendix) for supplemental guidance). Each NCIA that directly accesses FIB CII shall also allow the FIB to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FIB a network or system.	Functional	intersects with	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybensecurity and data protection requirements with third-raties, reflecting the organization is needs to protect its Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).	5	
5.1.1.7	Outsourcing Standards for Channelers	Channelers designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks or noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (prinvate) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attornog Forenti. All Channelers accessing CI shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security and Management Control Outsouring Standard. Each Channeler that directly accesses CI shall also allow the FBI to conduct periodic penetration testing. Channelers leveraging CJ to perform civil functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1.1.7	Outsourcing Standards for Channelers	Channelers designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks or noncriminal justices ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (printal printal p	Functional	intersects with	Adequate Security for Sensitive / Regulated Data In Support of Contracts	IAO-03.2	Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
5.1.1.7	Outsourcing Standards for Channelers	Channelers designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks or noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice ancillary functions for noncriminal justice ancillary functions flat be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be parmitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All Channelers accessing CII shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security and Management Control Culsouring Stander. Sea Channeler that directly accesses CII shall also allow the FBI to conduct period penetration testing. Clannelers leveraging CII to perform civil functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall threat the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	
5.1.1.7	Outsourcing Standards for Channelers	Channelers designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks or noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice ancillary functions and beautiful of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice ancillary state of the private of	Functional	intersects with	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
5.1.1.7	Outsourcing Standards for Channelers	Channelers designated to request civil fingenprint based background checks or moncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All Channelers accessing CII shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security and Management Control Outsouring Standard. Each Channeler that directly accesses CII shall also allow the FBI to conduct periodic penetration testing. Channelers lesenging CII to perform outl' functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit reviews as are local user agencies.	Functional	intersects with	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity and data protection requirements with triti-parties, reflecting the organizations needs to protect its Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).	5	
5.1.1.8	Outsourcing Standards for Non-Channelers	Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf or in ANA (public) or NAIA (private) for noncriminal justice functions a half be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attomyc General. All contractors accessing CII shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Count Oil Outsouring Standard for Non-Chamelers. Contractors leveraging CII to perform civit functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same straining and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1.1.8	Outsourcing Standards for Non-Channelers	Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf or ANCA (public) or NCAI (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to C.II. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized justice and the private state of the private private by the private private functions described contractors accessing C.II shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Countie Olfusouring Standard for Non-Chamelers. Contractors leveraging C.II to perform civil functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of sudfit review as and local user agencies.	Functional	intersects with	Adequate Security for Sensitive / Regulated Data In Support of Contracts	IAO-03.2	Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.	5	
5.1.1.8	Outsourcing Standards for Non-Channelers	Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillarly functions on behalf of a NAL (Apublic) or NAL (Aprivate) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to Cill. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statutes approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All contractors accessing Cill shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Outsourcing Standard for Non-Chamelers. Contractors learning in the Compact Council Outsourcing Standard for Non-Chamelers. Contractors learning in the Compact Council	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	
5.1.1.8	Outsourcing Standards for Non-Channelers	as are local user agencies.  Contractor designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice tunctions as shall be eligible of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice tunctions shall be eligible or access to ICI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All contractors accessing ICI shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Outsouring Standard for Non-Channellers. Contractors leveraging CII to perform lovid functions to health of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review	Functional	intersects with	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
5.1.1.8	Outsourcing Standards for Non-Channelers	as are local user asencies.  Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to ICI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All contractors accessing Cli shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Oilsouscing Standard for Non-Chamelers. Contractors leaveraging Cli to perform civit functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same straining and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of sudit review as relocal user agencies.	Functional	intersects with	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity and data protection requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to protect its Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).	5	
5.1.2	Monitoring, Review, and Delivery of Services	As specified in the interagency agreements, MCAs, and contractual agreements with private contractual agreements with private contractual agreements and the private provider shall be regularly monitored and reviewed. The CLA, authorized agency, or FEB hall malminal marillarient overall control and visibility into all security aspects to include, but not limited to, identification of vulnerabilities and information security incident reporting/reapones. The incident reporting/reapone process used the service provider shall conform to the incident reporting/response specifications provided in this pallicy.	Functional	intersects with	Service Delivery (Business Process Support)	OPS-03	standards to achieve the specific goals of the process area.	5	
5.1.2.1	Managing Changes to Service Providers	Any changes to services provided by a service provider shall be managed by the CIA, authorized agency or REI. This includes provision of services, changes to existing services, and new services. Evaluation of the risks to the agency shall be undertaken based on the criticality of the data, system, and the impact of the change. If CHRI is released to another authorized agency, and that agency was not part of the releasing agency's primary information exchange agreement(s), the releasing	Functional	intersects with	Service Delivery (Business Process Support)  Disclosure of Information	OPS-03	Mechanisms exist to define supporting business processes and implement supporpriate governance and service management to sarvare parporpriate planning, delivery and support of the organization's technology capabilities supporting business functions, worldrore, and/or customers based on industry-recognized standards to selview the specific goals of the process are standards to selview the specific goals of the process are Mechanisms exist to restrict the disclosure of sensitive / regulated data to authorized paties with a need to know.	5	
5.1.4	Secondary Dissemination of Non-CHRI CJI	reasoning agency a juntary micromatoric exchange agreements, in the reasoning abancy shall follow dissemination.  If CII does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement then it does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy validating the requestor of the CII as an employee and/or contractor of a law enforcement agency or civil agency requiring the CII to perform their mission or a member of the public receiving CII was untorized dissemination.	Functional	intersects with	Disclosure of Information	DCH-03.1	Mechanisms exist to restrict the disclosure of sensitive / regulated data to authorized parties with a need to know.	5	
5.1.4	Secondary Dissemination of Non-CHRI CJI	memore of the pulsic receiving CII via authorized assermination.  If CII does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement then it does not reed to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy validating the requestor of the CII as an employee and/or contractor of a law antorcement agency or chill agency requiring the CII to perform their mission or a member of the public receiving CII via subnotraced dissemination.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
5.1.4	Secondary Dissemination of Non-CHRI CJI	TCII does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement then it does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement then it does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy validating the requestor of the CII as an employee and/or contractor of a law enforcement agency or Ivil agency requiring the CII to perform their mission or a member of the public receiving CII via authorized dissemination.	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	
5.1.4	Secondary Dissemination of Non-CHRI CJI	If CII does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement then it does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy validating the requestor of the CII as an employee and/or contractor of a law antiocement agency or civil agency requiring the CII to perform their mission or a member of the public receiving CII via authorized dissemination.	Functional	intersects with	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
5.1.4	Secondary Dissemination of Non-CHRI CJI	If CII does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement then it does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy validating the requestor of the CII as an employee and/or contractor of a law enforcement agency or civil agency requiring the CII to perform their mission or a member of the public receiving CII via authorized dissemination.	Functional	intersects with	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity and data protection requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to protect its Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
5.2	AWARENESS AND TRAINING (AT)	Security training is key to the human element of information security. All users with untortized access to CII should be made aware of their individual responsibilities and expected behavior when accessing CII and the systems which process CII. LASOs require enhanced training on the specific duties and responsibilities of those positions and the impact those positions have on the overall security of information area.	Functional	intersects with	Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation	GOV-02	Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity and data protection policies, standards and procedures.	5	
5.2	AWARENESS AND TRAINING (AT)	systems.  Security training is key to the human element of information security. All users with suthorized access to CII should be made aware of their individual responsibilities and expected behavior when accessing CII and the systems which process CII. LASOs require enhanced training on the specific duties and responsibilities of those positions and the impact those positions have on the overall security of information systems.	Functional	intersects with	Periodic Review & Update of Cybersecurity & Data Protection Program	GOV-03	Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity and data protection program, including policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.	5	
5.2	AWARENESS AND TRAINING (AT)	Security training is key to the human element of information security. All users with authorized access to CII should be made aware of their individual responsibilities and expected behavior when accessing CII and the systems which process CI. LASOs require enhanced training on the specific duties and responsibilities of those positions and the impact those positions have on the overall security of information systems.	Functional	subset of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection-Minded Workforce	SAT-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of security workforce development and awareness controls.	10	
5.3	INCIDENT RESPONSE (IR)	N/A	Functional	intersects with	Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation	GOV-02	Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity and data protection policies, standards and procedures.	5	
5.3	INCIDENT RESPONSE (IR)	N/A	Functional	intersects with	Periodic Review & Update of Cybersecurity & Data Protection Program	GOV-03	Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity and data protection program, including policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.	5	
5.4	Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability	Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior. Agencies shall careful yeases the intentity of components that compose their information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the various components produced by a possible to the components of an information system that provide auditing capability (servers, etc.), and would not necessarily be applied to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality and a be found in such devices as personal digital assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security controls in accordance with an agency assessment of fast. Refer to Section 5.13.8 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices used to access.	Functional	intersects with	Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation	GOV-02	Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity and data protection policies, standards and procedures.	5	
5.4	Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability	Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior. Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the various components. Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system that provide auditing capability (serven, etc.), and would not nocessarily be applied to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality on a be found in such device as a personal digital assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security controls in accordance with an agency assessment of fast. Refer to Section 5.13.8 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices used to access.	Functional	intersects with	Periodic Review & Update of Cybersecurity & Data Protection Program	GOV-03	Mechanisms exist to review the cybensecurity and data protection program, including polices, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or it significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.	5	
5.4	Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability	Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior. Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the various components. Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system that provide auditing appability terrent, etc.) and would not nocessarily be applied to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality and be found in such devices as personal digital assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security controls in accordance with an agency assessment of fast. Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices used to access CII.	Functional	subset of	Continuous Monitoring	MON-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-wide monitoring controls.	10	
5.4	Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability	Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior. Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the various components. Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system that provide auditing capability (servers, etc.) and would not necessarily be applied to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality can be found in such device as a personal digital assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security controls in accordance with an agency assessment of risk. No	Functional	intersects with	Alert Threshold Tuning	MON- 01.13	Mechanisms exist to "une" event monitoring technologies through analyzing communications tratflic/event paterns and developing profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events.	5	
5.4	Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability	Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior. Agencies shall carefully assess the intentry of components that compose their information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the various components. Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system that provide auditing appability (servers, etc.) and would not necessarily be applied to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality can be found in such device as a personal digital assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security controls in accordance with an agency assessment of risk. Refer to Section 5.13.8 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices used to access.	Functional	intersects with	Analyze and Prioritize Monitoring Requirements	MON- 01.16	Mechanisms exist to assess the organization's needs for monitoring and prioritize the monitoring of assets, based on asset criticality and the sensitivity of the data it stores, transmits and processes.	5	
5.4	Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability	Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior. Agencies shall carridly assess the inventory of components that compose their information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the various components. Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system that provide auditing capability (servers, etc.) and would not not necessarily be applied to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality can be found in such devices as personal digital assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security controls in accordance with an agency assessment of fast. Refer to Section 5.13.8 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices used to access.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Collection of Security Event Logs	MON-02	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Socurity incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event logs.	5	
5.4	Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability	Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior. Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the various components. Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system that provide auditing appability terrent, etc.) and would not not necessarily be applied to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more powerful and devent functionally can be fund in such devices as personal digital assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security controls in accordance with an agency assessment of Tax. Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices used to access 201.	Functional	intersects with	Correlate Monitoring Information	MON-02.1	Automated mechanisms exist to correlate both technical and non-technical information from across the enterprise by a Security incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to enhance organization-wide airuational awareness.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
5.4.1	Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)	The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the souther of the internation system. The agency shall specify which information system are components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can safet information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquilation of information systems. The agency's information systems for acquilation of information systems. The agency's information systems for a such as a considerable of the sources of the events. The audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the last of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take judge.	Functional	intersects with	Alert Threshold Tuning	MON- 01.13	Mechanisms exist to "tune" event monitoring technologies through analyzing communications traffic/event patterns and developing profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events.	(optional)	
5.4.1	Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)	The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify he information system professors and the issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency's information systems in produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events coursef, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.	Functional	intersects with	Anatyze and Prioritize Monitoring Requirements	MON- 01.16	Mechanisms exist to assess the organization's needs for monitoring and prioritize the monitoning of assets, based on asset criticality and the sensitivity of the data it stores, transmits and processes.	5	
5.4.1	Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)	The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system professors and the issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems or system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency's information systems increase, and the successor of the events and the volumes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.	Functional	intersects with	Automated Tools for Real- Time Analysis	MON-01.2	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar automated tool, to support near real-time analysis and incident escalation.	5	
5.4.1	Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)	The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the socity of the information system. The agency shall specify he information system promains carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency is information systems here are also also according to the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency of does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.	Functional	intersects with	Inbound & Outbound Communications Traffic	MON-01.3	Mechanisms exist to continuously monitor inbound and outbound communications traffic for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.	5	
5.4.1	Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)	The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify he information system professors and the issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency's information systems in produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.	Functional	intersects with	System Generated Alerts	MON-01.4	Mechanisms exist to generate, monitor, correlate and respond to alerts from physical, cybersecurity, data protection and supply chain activities to achieve integrated altustional awareness.	5	
5.4.1	Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)	The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency's information systems hall produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Collection of Security Event Logs	MON-02	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Sacurity incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event logs.	5	
5.4.1	Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)	The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system necessary of the information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency is information systems in produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and rupdate the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency of does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.	Functional	intersects with	Correlate Monitoring Information	MON-02.1	Automated mechanisms exist to correlate both technical and non-technical information from across the enterprise by a Security incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to enhance organization-wide aituational awareness.	5	
5.4.1	Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)	The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency is information systems shall produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and upleate the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.	Functional	intersects with	Content of Event Logs	MON-03	Mechanisms exist to configure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to produce event logs that contain sufficient information to, at a minimum: (1) Establish what type of event occurred; (2) When (date and time) the event occurred; (3) Where the event cocurred; (4) The source of the event; (4) The source of the event; (5) The outcome (success or failure) of the event, and (6) The identity of any user/subject associated with the event.	5	
5.4.1.1	Events	The following events shall be logged:  1. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts.  2. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts.  2. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts.  2. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to use:  3. create permission on a user account. file, directory or other system resource;  4. delate permission on a user account. file, directory or other system resource;  5. delate permission on a user account. file, directory or other system resource.  5. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to change account passwords.  5. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to change account (a.e., root, Oracle, DBA, John, etc.).  5. Successful and unsuccessful attempts for users to:  a. access the audit log file;  6. destroy the audit log file.	Functional	intersects with	System Generated Alerts	MON-01.4	Nechanisms exist to generate, monitor, correlate and respond to alerts from physical, cyber-security, data protection and supply chain activities to achieve integrated altustional awareness.	5	
5.4.1.1	Content	The following content shall be included with every sudited event:  1. Date and time of the event.  2. The component of the information system (e.g., software component, hardware component where the event occurred.  3. Type of event:  4. User/subject identity.  5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.	Functional	intersects with	Content of Event Logs	MON-03	Mechanisms exist to configure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TASA) to produce even logs that contains sufficient information to, at a minimum: (1) Eatabilah what type of event occurred; (2) When (data and time) the event occurred; (3) When the event occurred; (4) When the event occurred; (5) The outcome (success or failure) of the event; (5) The outcome (success or failure) of the event; (6) The identity of any user/subject associated with the event.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
5.4.1.1.1	Content	The following content shall be included with every audited event:  1. Date and time of the event.  2. The component of the information system (e.g., software component, hardware component) where the event occurred.  3. Type of event:  4. User'subject identity.  5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.	Functional	intersects with	System Generated Alerts	MON-01.4	Mechanisms exist to generate, monitor, correlate and respond to alerts from physical, cybersecurify, data protection and supply chain activities to achieve integrated altuational awareness.	5	
5.4.1.1.1	Content	The following content shall be included with every audited event:  1. Date and time of the event.  2. The component of the information system (e.g., software component, hardware component) where the event occurred.  3. Type of event.  4. Users/ubject/identity.  5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.	Functional	intersects with	Content of Event Logs	MON-03	Mechanisms exist to configure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to produce event logs that contain sufficient information to, at a minimum: (1) Establish what type of event occurred; (2) When (date and time) the event occurred; (3) Where the event occurred; (4) The source of the event; (5) The outcome (success or failure) of the event; and (6) The identity of any user/aubject associated with the event.	5	
5.4.2	Response to Audit Processing Failures	The agency's information system shall provide alerts to appropriate agency officials in the event of an audit processing failure. Audit processing failures include, for example: software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded.	Functional	equal	Response To Event Log Processing Failures	MON-05	Mechanisms exist to alert appropriate personnel in the event of a log processing failure and take actions to remedy the disruption.	10	
5.4.3	Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting	The responsible management official shall designate an individual or position to vinelwankaya information system suid records for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity, investigate suspicious activity or suspected violations, to report fidnings to appointed molficials, and to take necessary actions. Audit review/nahayisi shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of review/nahayisi should be increased when the volume of an agency's processing indicates an elevated need for audit review. The agency shall increase the level of audit monitoring and analysis activity within the information system whenever there is an indication of increased risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information.	Functional	subset of	Continuous Monitoring	MON-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-wide monitoring controls.	10	
5.4.3	Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting	The responsible management official shall designate an individual or position to review/manayar information system suid records for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity, investigate suspicious activity or suspected violations, to report fidingies to appropriate officials, and to take necessary actions. Audit review/analysis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of review/analysis should be increased when the volume of an agency's processing indicates an elevation flee of the active review. The agency shall increase the level of audit monitoring and analysis activity within the information system whenever there as an indication of increased risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information.	Functional	intersects with	Alert Threshold Tuning	MON- 01.13	Mechanisms exist to "tune" event monitoring technologies through analyzing communications stratific/event paterns and developing profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events.	5	
5.4.3	Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting	The responsible management official shall designate an individual or position to review/markpair formation system suid records for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity, investigate suspicious activity or suspected violations, to report findings to appropriate officials, and to take necessary actions. Autor review/arlanghis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of review/arlanghis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of review/arlanghis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of review/arlanghis shall be conducted at a minimum once and expension of review/arlanghis shall be conducted at a minimum once and the processing indicates an elevated meet of read after veive. The agency has all increases the level of audit monitoring and analysis activity within the information system whenever there as an indication of increased risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information.	Functional	intersects with	Analyze and Prioritize Monitoring Requirements	MON- 01.16	Mechanisms exist to assess the organization's needs for monitoring and prioritize the monitoring of assets, based on asset criticality and the sensitivity of the data it stores, transmits and processes.	5	
5.4.3	Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting	The vester of the control of the con	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Collection of Security Event Logs	MON-02	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Security incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event logs.	5	
5.4.3	Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting	Now see a ministration agreement official shall designate an individual or position to werelewanalyze information system audit records for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity, investigate suspicious activity or suspected violations, to report findings to appropriate officials, and to take necessary actions. Audit reviewlanshysis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of reviewlanshysis should be increased when the volume of an agency's processing indicates an elevated need for out frevel. The agency shall increase the level of audit monitoring and analysis activity within the information system whenever there is an indication of increased risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information.	Functional	intersects with	Correlate Monitoring Information	MON-02.1	Automated mechanisms exist to correlate both technical and non-technical information from across the entreprise by a Security incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to enhance organization-wide situational awareness.	5	
5.4.4	Time Stamps	Source on minimistroin.  The agency's information system shall provide time stamps for use in audit record generation. The time stamps shall include the date and time values generated by the internal system clocks in the audit records. The agency shall synchronize internal information system clocks on an annual basis.	Functional	equal	Time Stamps	MON-07	Mechanisms exist to configure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to use an authoritative time source to generate time stamps for event logs.	10	
5.4.5	Protection of Audit Information	The agency's information system shall protect audit information and audit tools from modification, deletion and unauthorized access.	Functional	equal	Protection of Event Logs	MON-08	Mechanisms exist to protect event logs and audit tools from unauthorized access, modification and deletion.	10	
5.4.6	Audit Record Retention	The agency shall retain audit records for at least one (1) year. Once the minimum retention time period has passed, the agency shall continue to retain audit records until it is determined they are no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, for example, retention and availability of audit records relative to Freadom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, subpoens, and law enforcement actions.	Functional	equal	Event Log Retention	MON-10	Mechanisms exist to retain event logs for a time period consistent with records retention requirements to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of security incidents and to meet statutory, regulatory and contractual retention requirements.	10	
5.4.7	Logging NCIC and III Transactions	A log shall be maintained for a minimum of one (1) year on all MCIC and III transactions. The III portion of the log shall clearly identify both the operator and the suthorized receiving agency. III logs shall also clearly identify the requester and the secondary recipient. The Identification on the log shall take the form of a unique identifier that shall remain unique to the individual requester and to the secondary recipient throughout the minimum on eyer retention period.	Functional	subset of	Event Log Retention	MON-10	requirements.	10	
5.5	ACCESS CONTROL (AC)	Access control provides the planning and implementation of mechanisms to restrict reading, writing, processing, and transmission of CISI formation and the modification of information systems, applications, services, and communication configurations allowing access to CISI information. Rafer to Section 5.13.6 for additional access control requirements related to mobile devices used to access CII.	Functional	intersects with	Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation	GOV-02	Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity and data protection policies, standards and procedures.	5	
5.5	ACCESS CONTROL (AC)	Access control provides the planning and implementation of mechanisms to restrict reading, writing, processing, and transmission of CISI formation and the modification of information systems, applications, services, and communication configurations allowing access to CISI information. Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional access control requirements related to mobile devices used to access CII.	Functional	intersects with	Periodic Review & Update of Cybersecurity & Data Protection Program	GOV-03	Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity and data protection program, including policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or it significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.	5	
5.6	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (IA)	Identification is a unique, auditable representation of an identify within an information system usually in the form of a simple character stripe cach individual user, machine, software component, or any other entity, Authentication refers to mechanisms or processes to verify the identity of a user, process, or device, as a prevential to allowing access to a system's resources.	Functional	intersects with	Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation	GOV-02	Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity and data protection policies, standards and procedures.	5	
5.6	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (IA)	Identification is a unique, suditable representation of an identity within an information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each individual user, methies, software component, or any other entity, Authentication refers to mechanisms or processes to verify the Settinty of a user, process, or device, as a prevential to following access to a system's resources.	Functional	intersects with	Periodic Review & Update of Cybersecurity & Data Protection Program	GOV-03	Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity and data protection program, including policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or it significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.	5	
5.7	Policy Area 7: Configuration Management	N/A	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.
5.7.1	Access Restrictions for Changes	Ranned or unplanned changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system can have significant flects on the overall security of the system. The goal is to allow only qualified and authorized individuals security of the system. The goal is to allow only qualified and authorized individuals secess to information system components for purpose or initiating changes, including upgrades, and modifications. Section 5.5, Access Control, describes searcy requirements for cornor for frivileges and restrictions.	Functional	equal	Access Restriction For Change	CHG-04	Mechanisms exist to enforce configuration restrictions in an effort to restrict the ability of users to conduct unauthorized changes.	10	
5.7.1.1	Least Functionality	The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide only essential capabilities and shall specifically prohibit and/or restrict the use of specified functions, ports, protocols, and/or services.	Functional	equal	Least Functionality	CFG-03	Mechanisms exist to configure systems to provide only essential capabilities by specifically prohibiting or restricting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services.	10	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
5.7.1.2	Network Diagram	The agency shall ensure that a complete topological drawing depicting the interconnectivity of the agency network, to crimnal justice information, systems and services is aministed in a current status. See Appendix C for sample network diagrams.  1. All communications paths, circuits, and other components used for the interconnection, beginning with the agency-owend system(s) and traversing through all interconnected systems to the agency end-point.  2. The logical toston of all components (e.g., firewalls, routers, switches, hubs, servers, encryption devices, and computer workstations), individual workstations (clients) do not have to be shown, the number of clients is sufficient.  3. "For Official Use Only" (FOUC) markings.  4. The agency vame and date (day, month, and year) drawing was created or updated.	Functional	subset of	Network Diagrams & Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs)	AST-04	Mechanisms exist to maintain network architecture diagrams that: () Contain sufficient detail to assess the security of the network architecture; (2) Reflect the current architecture of the network environment; and (3) Document all sensitive/regulated data flows.	10	
5.7.2	Security of Configuration Documentation	The system configuration documentation often contains sensitive details (e.g., descriptions of applications, processes, procedures, data structures, authorization processes, data flow, etc.) Agencies shall protect the system documentation from unauthorized access consistent with the provisions described in Section 5.5 Access Control.	Functional	subset of	Data Protection	DCH-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls.	10	
5.7.2	Security of Configuration Documentation	The system configuration documentation often contains sensitive details (e.g., descriptions of applications, processes, procedures, data structures, authorization processes, data flow, etc.) Agencies shall protect the system documentation from unauthorized access consistent with the provisions described in Section 5.5 Access Control.	Functional	intersects with	System Security & Privacy Plan (SSPP)	IAO-03	Mechanisms exist to generate System Security & Privacy Plans (SSPPs), or similar document repositories, to identify and maintain key architectural information ach each critical Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS), as well as influence inputs, entities and TAAS, providing a historical record of the data and its origins.	5	
5.8	MEDIA PROTECTION (MP)	Documented and implemented media protection policies and procedures ensure	Functional	intersects with	Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation	GOV-02	Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity and data protection policies, standards and procedures.	5	
5.8	MEDIA PROTECTION (MP)	Documented and implemented media protection policies and procedures ensure that access to digital and non-digital media in all forms is restricted to authorized individuals using authorized methods and processes.	Functional	intersects with	Periodic Review & Update of Cybersecurity & Data Protection Program	GOV-03	Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity and data protection program, including policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.	5	
5.9	Policy Area 9: Physical Protection	Physical protection policy and procedures shall be documented and implemented to ensure CJI and information system hardware, software, and media are physically protected through access control measures.	Functional	intersects with	Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation	GOV-02	Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity and data protection policies, standards and procedures.	5	
5.9	Policy Area 9: Physical Protection	Physical protection policy and procedures shall be documented and implemented to ensure CJI and information system hardware, software, and media are physically protected through access control measures.	Functional	intersects with	Periodic Review & Update of Cybersecurity & Data Protection Program	GOV-03	Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity and data protection program, including policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.	5	
5.9	Policy Area 9: Physical Protection	Physical protection policy and procedures shall be documented and implemented to ensure CJI and information system hardware, software, and media are physically protected through access control measures.	Functional	subset of	Physical & Environmental Protections	PES-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the operation of physical and environmental protection controls.	10	
5.9.1	Physically Secure Location	A physically secure location is a facility, a criminal justice conveyance, or an area, a room, or a group of rooms within a facility with both the physical and personnel security corrols sufficient to protect [2 and associated information systems. The physically secure location is subject to criminal justice agency management controls [38] control [36] CIS Security addendum; or a combination thereof.  Sections 5, 9.1.1 – 5, 9.1.8 describe the physical controls required in order to be considered a physically secure location, while Sections 5, 2 and 5, 12, respectively, dissorbet the minimum security awareness training and personnel security controls required for unsecroted access to a physically secure location. Sections 5, 5, 5, 2, 2, 1, and 5, 10 describe the requirements for technical security controls required to access CII from within the perimeter of a physically secure location without AA.	Functional	subset of	Physical & Environmental Protections	PES-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the operation of physical and environmental protection controls.	10	
5.9.1.1	Security Perimeter	The perimeter of a physically secure location shall be prominently posted and separated from non-secure locations by physical controls. Security perimeters shall be defined, controlled and secured in a manner acceptable to the CSA or SIB.	Functional	intersects with	Controlled Ingress & Egress Points	PES-03.1	Physical access control mechanisms exist to limit and monitor physical access through controlled ingress and egress points.	5	
5.9.1.2	Physical Access Authorizations	The agency shall develop and keep current a list of personnel with authorized access to the physically secure location (except for those areas within the permanent facility officially designated as publicly accessible) or shall issue credentials to authorized personnel.	Functional	equal	Physical Access Authorizations	PES-02	Physical access control mechanisms exist to maintain a current list of personnel with authorized access to organizational facilities (except for those areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible).	10	
5.9.1.3	Physical Access Control	The agency shall control all physical access points (except for those areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible) and shall verify individual access authorizations before granting access.	Functional	intersects with	Role-Based Physical Access	PES-02.1	Physical access control mechanisms exist to authorize physical access to facilities based on the position or role of the individual.	5	
5.9.1.3	Physical Access Control	The agency shall control all physical access points (except for those areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible) and shall verify individual access authorizations before granting access.	Functional	intersects with	Physical Access Control	PES-03	Physical access control mechanisms exist to enforce physical access authorizations for all physical access points (including designated entry/exit points) to facilities (excluding those areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible).	5	
5.9.1.4	Access Control for Transmission Medium	The agency shall control physical access to information system distribution and transmission lines within the physically secure location.	Functional	equal	Transmission Medium Security	PES-12.1	Physical security mechanisms exist to protect power and telecommunications cabling carrying data or supporting information services from interception, interference or damage.	10	
5.9.1.5	Access Control for Display Medium	The agency shall control physical access to information system devices that display CJI and shall position information system devices in such a way as to prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing and viewing CJI.	Functional	intersects with	Physical Security of Offices, Rooms & Facilities	PES-04	Mechanisms exist to identify systems, equipment and respective operating environments that require limited physical access so that appropriate physical access controls are designed and implemented for offices, rooms and facilities.	5	
5.9.1.5	Access Control for Display Medium	The agency shall control physical access to information system devices that display CJI and shall position information system devices in such a way as to prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing and viewing CJI.	Functional	intersects with	Working in Secure Areas	PES-04.1	Physical security mechanisms exist to allow only authorized personnel access to secure areas.	5	
5.9.1.5	Access Control for Display Medium	The agency shall control physical access to information system devices that display CJI and shall position information system devices in such a way as to prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing and viewing CJI.	Functional	intersects with	Access Control for Output Devices	PES-12.2	Physical security mechanisms exist to restrict access to printers and other system output devices to prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.	5	
5.9.1.6	Monitoring Physical Access	The agency shall monitor physical access to the information system to detect and respond to physical security incidents. The agency shall control physical access by authenticating visitors before authorizing escorted access to the physically secure location (except for those	Functional	equal	Monitoring Physical Access	PES-05	Physical access control mechanisms exist to monitor for, detect and respond to physical security incidents. Physical access control mechanisms exist to identify, authorize and monitor visitors before allowing access to the facility (other than areas designated as	10	
5.9.1.7	Visitor Control	areas designated as publicly accessible). The agency shall escort visitors at all times and monitor visitor activity.	Functional	equal	Visitor Control	PES-06	publicly accessible).  Physical security mechanisms exist to isolate information processing facilities	10	
5.9.1.8	Delivery and Removal	The agency shall authorize and control information system-related items entering and exiting the physically secure location.  If an agency cannot meet all of the controls required for establishing a physically	Functional	equal	Delivery & Removal	PES-10	from points such as delivery and loading areas and other points to avoid unauthorized access.  Mechanisms exist to identify systems, equipment and respective operating	10	
5.9.2	Controlled Area	If an agency cannot meet any on the controls vegence to establishing a physically account of the same operational need to access or store CII, the agency shall designate an area, a room, or a storage container, as a controlled area for the purpose of day-foxy CII access or storage. The agency shall, at a minimum:  1. Limit access to the controlled area during CII processing times to only those personnel estudricated by the agency to access or view CII.  2. Lock the area, room, or storage container when unattended.  3. Peatition information system devices and documents containing CII in such a way as to prevent unauthorized individuals from access and view.  4. Follow the encyption requirements found in Section 5. 10. 1.2 for electronic storage (i.e., data "at rest") of CII.	Functional	intersects with	Physical Security of Offices, Rooms & Facilities	PES-04	environments that require limited physical access so that appropriate physical access controls are designed and implemented for offices, rooms and facilities.	5	
5.9.2	Controlled Area	If an agency cannot meet all of the controls required for establishing a physically social cost one. Whe has an operational need to access or stor CII, the agency shall designate an area, a room, or a storage container, as a controlled area for the purpose of days-fox CII access or storage. The agency shall, at a minimum: 1. Limit access to the controlled area during CII processing times to only those personnel authorized by the agency to access or view CII.  2. Lock the area, room, or storage container when unattended.  3. Peation information system devices and documents containing CII in such a way as to prevent unauthorized individuals from access and view.  4. Follow the encrybroin enquirements tough in Section 5.10.1.2 for electronic storage (i.e., data "at cert") of CII.  Examples of systems and communications safeguasts range from boundary and	Functional	intersects with	Working in Secure Areas	PES-04.1	Physical security mechanisms exist to allow only authorized personnel access to secure areas.  Mechanisms exist to develop, govern & update procedures to facilitate the	5	
5.10	Policy Area 10: System and Communications Protection	Commission by systems and commission and agreement state of the capability transmission protection to securing an agency's virtualized environment. In addition, applications, services, or information systems must have the capability to ensure system imaging through the defection and protection against unauthorized ensure systems and communications infrastructures. The commission of the policy for protecting systems and communications infrastructures. The commission of the com	Functional	subset of	Network Security Controls (NSC)	NET-01	Psechaminal exist to develop, govern a update procedures to facultate the implementation of Network Security Controls (NSC).	10	



FDE #	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
5.10.1	Information Flow Enforcement	The network infrastructure shall control the flow of information between interconnected systems, information flow control regulates where information is allowed to rave within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesse to that information. In other works, controlling how dark moves from one place to the next in a secure manner. Examples of controls that are better expressed as flow control than access control (see Section 5.5) ser. 1. Prevent Clf from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network.  1. Prevent Clf from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network.  2. Block outside forefit that claims to be from within the agency.  3. Den of pass any web requests to the public network that are not from the internal web provy.  Specific examples of flow control enforcement can be found in boundary protection devices (e.g., pros, greevings, guestes, encrypted turniers, fievaells, and routers) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services or provide a packet filtering capability.	Functional	intersects with	Layered Network Defenses	NET-02	Mechanisms exist to implement security functions as a layered structure that minimizes interactions between layers of the design and avoids any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or correctness of higher layers.	(optional)	
5.10.1	Information Flow Enforcement	The network intrastructure shall control the flow of information between interconnected systems, Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to rave within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information. In other works, controlling how data moves from one place to the next in a secure manner. Examples of controls that are better expressed as flow control than access control (see Section 5.5) ser.  1. Prevent Clif from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network.  2. Block costaid exfert that claims to be from within the agency.  3. Do not pass any web requests to the public network that are not from the internal web proxy.  Specific examples of flow control enforcement can be found in boundary protection devices (e.g., proxies, gretways, guarges, encrypted tunnels, frewalls, and routers) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services or provide a packet fiftering capability.	Functional	intersects with	Data Flow Enforcement – Access Control Lists (ACLs)	NET-04	Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.	5	
5.10.1.1	Boundary Protection	The agency shalt:  1. Control access to networks processing CII.  2. Monitor and control communications at the external boundary of the information system and at key internal boundaries within the system.  3. Ensure any connections to the internat, other external networks, or information systems occur through controlled interfaces (e.g., proting, pattways, routers, frewalls, encrypted tunnels). See Section 5.13.4.3 for guidance on personal frewalls.  4. Employ tools and techniques to monitor network events, detect attacks, and provide identification of unauthorized values.  5. Ensure the operational failure of the boundary protection mechanisms do not result in any unauthorized release and information outside other information system boundary (i.e., the device "fails closed" vs. "fails copen").  6. Allocate publicly accessible information outside on propnents (e.g., public Web sarvers) to separate sub networks with separate, network interfaces. Publicly accessible information systems components (e.g., public Web sarvers) to separate sub networks with separate, network interfaces. Publicly accessible information systems residence on a virtual net salth offlow the guidance	Functional	equal	Boundary Protection	NET-03	Nechanisms exist to monitor and control communications at the external network boundary and at key internal boundaries within the network.	10	
5.10.1.2	Encryption	In Secricia S. 10.3.2 to achieve assessation.  In Secricia S. 10.3.2 to achieve assessation for provide confidentiative of tensitive) information. Decryption is the reversing of the confidentiative of tensitive) information because the reversing of the copylographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable) format. There are two main types of encyption: symmetric encyption in plaintext (readable) format. There are two main types of encyption: symmetric encyption in the conversion of existing encyption (eliab known as public key encyption). Hydrid encyption solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encyption for client/tener certificate exchange — season integrity and symmetric encyption for build data encyption.	Functional	subset of	Use of Cryptographic Controls	CRY-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cryptographic protections controls using known public standards and trusted cryptographic technologies.	10	
5.10.1.2	Encryption	data confidentiality.  Encryption is a form of cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide confidentiality of jeensitive) information. Decryption is the reversing of the cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable) format. There are two main types of encryption: symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption (also known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption solutions do easier and use both asymmetric encryption client/server certificate exchange – session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption-data confidentiality.	Functional	intersects with	Transmission Confidentiality	CRY-03	Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality of data being transmitted.	5	
5.10.1.2	Encryption	Encryption is a form of cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide confidentiality of (sensitive) information. Deception is the reversing of the cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable) format. There are two main types of encryption: symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption falso known as public key encryption. Hybrid encryption solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate exchange—session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption— data confidentialistic.	Functional	intersects with	Encrypting Data At Rest	CRY-05	Cryptographic mechanisms exist to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data at rest.	5	
5.10.1.2	Encryption	Encryption is a form of cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide confidentiality of researchly of information. Decryption is the reversing of the cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable) format. There are two maint pass of encryption: symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption (also known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate exchange—session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption— data confidentiality.	Functional	intersects with	Protection of Confidentiality / Integrity Using Encryption	NET-14.2	Cyptiographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions (e.g., VPN).	5	
5.10.1.2	Encryption	Encryption is a form of cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide confidentiality of (sensitive) information. Deception is the reversing of the cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable) format. There are two main tipses of encryption: symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption (falso known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate exchange—session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption— data confidentiality.	Functional	intersects with	Authentication & Encryption	NET-15.1	Machanisms exist to secure Wi-Fi(e.g., IEEE 802.11) and prevent unauthorized secess by:  (1) Authenticating devices trying to connect; and (2) Encrypting transmitted data.	5	
5.10.1.2.1	Encryption for CJI in Transit	When CI is transmitted outside the boundary of the physically secure location, the data shall be immediately protected us encryption. We encryption Wenn encryption is employed, the cryptographic module used shall be FIPS 140-2 certified and use a symmetric cipher key strength of at least 128 list strength to protect [1]. NOTE: Subsequent versions of approved cryptographic modules that are under current review for FIPS 140-2 compliancy can be used in the interim until certification is complete.  EXCEPTIONS:  1. See Sections 5.13.1.2 and 5.10.2.  2. Encryption shall not be required if the transmission medium meets all of the following regority owners.  1. See Sections 5.13.1.2 and 5.10.2.  2. Encryption shall not be required if the transmission medium meets all of the following regority owners.  2. Physical access to the medium is controlled by the agency using the requirements in Sections 5.0.1 and 5.12.  4. Protection includes safequards (e.g., acoustic, electric, electromagnetic, and physical) and freshible countermeasures (e.g., alarms, officialistics) permit its use for the transmission of unencrypted information through an area of lesser classification or controll.  a. With prior approval of the CSD.  Examples:  4. Campus is completely owned and controlled by a criminal justice agency (CIA)—filtine-of-sight between buildings exists where a cable is buried, encryption is not required.  4. A mutil-story building is completely owned and controlled by a CIAI—If floors are physically secure or sale from through non-accure areas are protected.	Functional	subset of	Use of Cryptographic Controls	CRY-01	Machanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cryptographic protections controls using known public standards and trusted cryptographic technologies.	10	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
5.10.1.2.1	Encryption for CII in Transit	When CI is transmitted outside the boundary of the physically secure location, the data shall be immediately protected via encyption. Ne encyption is employed, the cryptographic module used shall be FIPS 140-2 certified and use a symmetric lopher key strength of at least 128 bit strength to protect CII.  NOTE: Subsequent versions of approved cryptographic modules that are under current review for PRS 140-2 compliancy can be used in the interim until certification is complete.  ENCEPTIONS:  1. See Sections 5.13.1.2 and 5.10.2. 2. Encryptions hall not be required if the transmission medium meets all of the following requirements: a. The agency own, operates, manages, or protects the medium.  2. Medium terminates within physically secure locations at both ends with no interconnections between.  2. Physical access to the medium is controlled by the agency using the requirements is Sections 5.1 and 5.1.2.  3. Protection includes asteguards (e.g., acoustic, electric, electronagentic, and physicall and releasible countermeasures (e.g., alarms, notifications) to permit its use for the transmission of unencrypted information through an area of lesser classification or control.  4. A multis topy building is completely owned and controlled by a criminal justice agency (CIA)—If time-of-aight between buildings exists where a cable is buried, encryption is not required.  4. A multis topy building is completely owned and controlled by a CIA—If floors are in the foundary of the Multis of CIAB and non-CIAB—If floors are	Functional	intersects with	Transmission Confidentiality	CRY-03	Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality of data being transmitted.	5	
5.10.1.2.2	Encryption for CJI at Rest	Be changed when previously authorized personnel no longer require access.  A whitigh life maintained in the same unencrypted folder shall have separate and  distinct passiphrases. A single passiphrase may be used to encrypt an entire folder or  dask containing multiple files. All audit requirements fround in Section 5.4.1.  Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems) shall be applied.  NOTE: Commonly available encryption tools often use a key to unlock the cipher to  allow data access; this key is called a passiphrase. While a  passiphrase is not used for user authentication. Additionally, the passiphrase  or  contains stringent character requirements making it more accura and thus providing  a higher level of confidence that the passiphrase will not be compromised.  For agencies using public key infrastructure (PKI) etchnology, the agency shall	Functional	equal	Encrypting Data At Rest	CRY-05	Cyptographic mechanisms exist to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data at rest.  Mechanisms exist to securely implement an internal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)	10	
5.10.1.2.3	Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Technology	develop and implement a certificate policy and certification practice statement for the issuance of public key certificates used in the information system. Registration to receive a public key certificate shall: 1. Include authorization by a supervisor or a responsible official. 2. Be accomplished by a secure process that verifies the identity of the certificate holder. 3. Ensure the certificate is issued to the intended party.	Functional	subset of	Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)	CRY-08	infrastructure or obtain PKI services from a reputable PKI service provider.	10	
5.10.1.3	Voice over Internet Protocol	Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public awtiched telephone network (PSTN) and some provide branch exchange (PSR) telephone systems. The immediate benefits are lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-line with an organization's existing internet Protocol (P) services. Among VoIP's risks that have to be considered carefully are: myriad security concerns, cost issues associated with new networking hardware requirements, and overarching quality of service (QS) Stacks in the security controls described in this document, the following additional controls shall be implemented when an agency deploys VoIP within a network that contains unencrypted CII:  1. Establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for VoIP technologies.  2. Change the default administrative password on the IP phones and VoIP ewitches.  3. Utilize Virtual Local Area Network (VLAX) technology to segment VoIP traffic from data traffic.  Appendix C3. outlines threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and NIST best practices for VoIP.	Functional	intersects with	Host Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (HIDS / HIPS)	END-07	Mechanisms exist to utilize Nost-based intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (HIDS / HIPS), a rimilar technologies, to monitor for and protect against anomalous host activity, including lateral movement across the network	5	
5.10.1.3	Voice over Internet Protocol	Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public switched telephone network (PSTN) are private branch exchange (PRS) telephone systems. The immediate benefits are lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-line with an organization's existing internet Protocol (IP) services. Among VoIP's risks that have to be considered carefully are: myried security concerns, cost issues associated with new networking hardware requirements, and overarching quality or service (QS) States shall be implemented when an agency deploys VoIP within a network that contains unencrypted CII:  L'Establish usage seritactions and implementation guidance for VoIP technologies.  2. Change the default administrative password on the IP phones and VoIP exchologies.  3. Utilize Virtual Coal Area Network (VAI) technology is orgament VoIP traffic from data traffic.  Appendix G. 2 outlines threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and NIST best practices for VoIP.	Functional	intersects with	Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems (IDS & IPS)	MON-01.1	Mechanisms exist to implement intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (IDS / IPS) technologies on critical systems, key network segments and network choke points.	5	
5.10.1.3	Voice over Internet Protocol	Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public ewitched telephone network (PSTN) and private branch exhange (PSN) telephone systems. The immediate benefits are lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-line with no riganization's existing internet Protocol (PI) services. Anony VoIP's risks that have to be considered carefully are: myriad security concerns, cost issues associated with new retworking hardware requirements, and overarching quality of service (QSS) factors.  In addition to the security control described in this document, the following additional controls shall be implemented when an agency deploys VoIP within a network that contains unencrypted CI.  1. Establish usage restrictions and implementation guidence for VoIP technologies.  2. Change the default administrative password on the IP prones and VoIP parket.  3. Utilize Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) technology to segment VoIP traffic from data traffic.  Appendix G.2 outlines threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and NIST best practices for VoIP.	Functional	intersects with	Network Intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (NIDS / NIPS)	NET-08	Mechaniams exist to employ Network Intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (NIDS/NIPS) to detect and/or prevent intrusions into the network.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
5.10.1.3	Voice over internet Protocol	Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public awitched telephone network (PSTN) and an addition to, or replacement for, public awitched telephone network (PSTN) and toward to the provide branch schange (PSN) telephone systems. The immediate banefits are lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-line with an organization is existing internet Protocol (P) services. Annoy VoIP's risks that have to be considered carefully are: myriad security concerns, cost issues associated with me wetvorhigh photware requirements, and overarching quality of service (QSO) factors.  In addition to the security controls described in this document, the following additional controls shall be implemented when an agency deploys VoIP within a network that Controls used controls and implementation guidance for VoIP technologies.  2. Undite Virtual Local Area Network (VLAM) technology to segment VoIP traffic from VoIP.  Appendix G. Joulines threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and NIST best practices for VoIP.	Functional	intersects with	Wireless Intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (WIDS / WIFS)	NET-08.2	Machaniams exist to monitor wireless network segments to implement Wireless intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (WIDS/WIPS) technologies.	5	
5.10.1.4	Cloud Computing	Organizations transitioning to a cloud environment are presented unique opportunities and helilenges (e.g., upported cost as wings and increased efficiencies ventus a loss of control over the datal, Reviewing the cloud computing efficiencies ventus a loss of control over the datal, Reviewing the cloud computing white paper (Appendix G.3), the cloud assessment located within the security policy resource center on FBLgov, NRIST Special Publications (800-144, 800-145, and 800-146), as well as the cloud provider so policies and capabilities will enable organizations to make informed decisions on whether or not the cloud provider so offer service that maintains compliance with the requirements of the CIS Security Policy. The storage of CII, regardless of encryption status, shall only be permitted in cloud environments (e.g., government or third-party/commercial datacenters, etc.) which reside within the physical boundaries of APP-member county (i.e., U.S. – Ideat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor). Note: This restriction does not apply to exchanges of CII with foreign government agencies under international exchange agreements (i.e., the Preventing and Combating Serious Circin (PCSO) agreements, fugitive sectors, and exchanges made for humanitarian and criminal investigatory purposes in particular corumstances).  Metadata derived from unencrypted CI shall be protected in the same nanner as CI and shall not be used for any advertising or other commercial purposes by any cloud service provider or other associated entity.  The agency may permit limited use of metadata derived from unencrypted CI when specific and provide or	Functional	intersects with	Use of Communications Technology	HRS-05.3	Mechanisms exist to establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for communications technologies based on the potential to cause damage to systems, if used maliciously.	5	
5.10.1.4	Cloud Computing	Upganizations transitioning to a cloud environment are presented unique opportunities and challenges (e.g., purported cost savings and increased efficiencies versus a loss of control over the data). Reviewing the cloud computing white apper (Appendix G.3), the cloud assessment located within the security policy resource center on Filgo. yn NET Speal Publications (601-48, 601-445, and 800-146), as well as the cloud provider's policies and capabilities will enable of 1860-146). The security policy and provider's policies and capabilities will enable organizations to make informed declaries on whether or not the cloud provider can ofter service that maintains compliance with the requirements of the CISS Security Policy.  The storage of CII, regardless of encryption status, shall only be permitted in cloud environments (e.g., government or third-party/commercial datacenters, etc.) which reside within the physical boundaries of APP-member country (i.e., U.S Idearal/state/arten/troy, Indian Tribs, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Policie (ROMP).  Note: This restriction does not apply to exchanges of CII with foreign government agancies under international exchange agreements (e. In the Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreements, fugitive extracts, and exchanges made for humanistarian and criminal investigatory purposes in particular accumstances).  Hateddata derived from unencrypted CII when septically approved by the agency and its "international exchanges and for humanistarian and criminal investigatory purposes in particular accumstances).  Canadian service of the control of the companies of the comp	Functional	subset of	Cloud Services	CLD-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cloud management controls to ensure cloud instances are secure and in-line with industry practices.	10	
5.10.2	Facsimile Transmission of CJI	Cil transmitted via a single or multi-function device over a standard telephone line is exempt from encryption requirements. Cil transmitted external to a physically secure location using a facsimile server, application or service which implements email-like technology, shall meet the encryption requirements for Cil in transit as	Functional	intersects with	Use of Communications Technology		Mechanisms exist to establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for communications technologies based on the potential to cause damage to systems, if used maliciously.	5	
5.10.3	Partitioning and Virtualization	defined in Section 5.10.  As resources grow scarce, agencies are increasing the centralization of applications, services, and system administration. Advanced software now provides the ability to create virtual machines that allows agencies to reduce the amount of hardware needed. Although the concepts of partitioning and virtualization have assted for a while, the need for securing the partitions and virtualized machines has evolved due to the increasing amount of distributed processing and federated information sources now available across the Internet.	Functional	intersects with	Virtual Machine Images	CLD-05	Mechanisms exist to ensure the integrity of virtual machine images at all times.	5	
5.10.3	Partitioning and Virtualization	As resources grow scarce, agencies are increasing the centralization of applications, services, and system administration. Advanced software now provides the ability to create virtual machines that allows agencies to reduce the amount of hardware needed. Although the concepts of partitioning and virtualization have seatest for a white. The need for security the partitions and virtualization achieves evolved due to the increasing amount of distributed processing and federated information sources now available sects the Internet.	Functional	intersects with	Standardized Virtualization Formats	CLD-08	Mechanisms exist to ensure interoperability by requiring cloud providers to use industry-recognized formats and provide documentation of custom changes for review.	5	
5.10.3	Partitioning and Virtualization	As resources grow scarce, agencies are increasing the centralization of applications, services, and system administration. Advanced software now provide the ability to create virtual machines that allows agencies to reduce the amount of hardware needed. Although the concepts of partitioning and virtualization have seated for a while, the need for security the partitions and virtualization have seated for a while, the need for security the partitions and virtualization have second due to the increasing amount of distributed processing and federated information sources now available across the internet. The application, service, or information system shall separate user functionality	Functional	intersects with	Virtualization Techniques	SEA-13.1	Mechanisms exist to utilize virtualization techniques to support the employment of a diversity of operating systems and applications.  Mechanisms exist to partition systems so that partitions reside in separate	5	
5.10.3.1	Partitioning	(including user interface services) from information system management functionality. The application, service, or information system shall physically or logically separate user interface services (e.g., public weep bages) from information storage and management services (e.g., database management). Separation may be accomplished through the user of one or more of the following:  1. Different compraises grain guits.  2. Different central processing units.  3. Different network addresses.  4. Different network addresses.	Functional	intersects with	System Partitioning	SEA-03.1	physical domains or environments.	5	
5.10.3.1	Partitioning	The application, service, or information system shall separate user functionality (including user interface services) from information system management functionality. The application, service, or information system shall physically or togically separate user interface services (e.g., public web pages) from information storage and management services (e.g., database management, Separation may be accomplished through the use of one or more of the following:  1. Different computers.  2. Different computers.  3. Different instances of the operating system.  4. Different network addresses.  5. Other methods secreved by the FBI CJS ISO.	Functional	intersects with	Application Partitioning	SEA-03.2	Mechanisms exist to separate user functionality from system management functionality.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
5.10.3.2	Virtualization	Virtualization refers to a methodology of dividing the resources of a computer (kindward and software) into mutiple osecution environments. Virtualization environments are authorized for criminal justice and noncriminal justice activities, in addition to the socurity control described in this Policy, the following additional controls shall be implemented in a virtual environment:  1. soldate the host from the virtual menchine. In other words, virtual machine users cannot access host files, firmware, etc.  2. Maintain audit logs for all virtual machines and hosts and store the logs outside the hosts' virtual environment.  2. Maintain audit logs for all virtual machines and hosts and store the logs outside the hosts' virtual environment.  3. Virtual Machines that are internet facing (web servers, portal servers, etc.) shall be physically separate from Virtual Machines (Wh5) that process CII internally or be separated by a virtual frewall.  4. Drivers that serve critical functions shall be stored within the specific VM they service. In other words, do not store these drivers within the hypervisor, or host operating system, for sharing. Each VM is to be treated as an independent system-secured as independently appossible.  The following additional technical security controls shall be applied in virtual environment.  The control of segregate and store unencepted CI within its own secure VM.  2. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.  2. Virtually or physically firewall sech VM within the virtual environment to ensure the total process of the control of the greated of the monitoring within the virtual environment.  2. Virtually or physically firewall sech VM within the virtual environment to ensure that only allowed practices with environment and difficulty or physically firewall sech VM within the virtual environment to ensure that only allowed process of the control of the monitoring within the virtual environment to ensure that only allow	Functional	subset of	Secure Engineering Principles	SEA-01	Mechanisms exist to aclitize the implementation of industry-recognized cybersecurity and data protection practices in the specification, design, development, implementation and modification of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).  Mechanisms exist to utilize virtualization techniques to support the employment of a deversity of operating systems and applications.	10	
5.10.3.2	Virtualization	environments are authorized for criminal justice and noncriminal justice activities. In addition to the socurity control selectified in the Policy, the following additional controls shall be implemented in a virtual environment:  1. soldate the host from the virtual menkine, in other words, virtual machine users cannot access host files, firmware, etc.  2. Maintain audit logs for all virtual machines and hosts and store the logs outside the hosts' virtual environment.  3. Virtual Machines for all virtual machines and hosts and store the logs outside the hosts' virtual environment.  3. Virtual Machines that are internet facing (web servers, portal servers, etc.) shall be physically separate from Virtual Machines (Web) that process CII internally or be separated by a virtual frewall.  4. Drivers that serve critical functions shall be stored within the specific VM they service. In other words, do not store these drivers within the hypervisor, or host operating system, for sharing. Each VM is to be treated as an independent system-secured is independently as possible.  The following additional technical security controls shall be applied in virtual environment where CII is comingied with non-CII:  1. Encrypt CII when stored in a virtualized environment where CII is comingied with non-CII or seggested and store unercepted CII within to own secure VM.  2. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.  1. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.  2. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.  2. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.  3. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.  3. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.	Functional	intersects with	Virtualization Techniques	SEA-13.1		5	
5.11	Policy Area 11: Formal Audits	Formal audits are conducted to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.	Functional	intersects with	Independent Assessors	CPL-03.1	Mechanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurity and data protection controls at planned intervals or when the system, service or	5	
5.11.1	Audits by the FBI CJIS Division	N/A	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	project undergoes significant changes. N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.
5.11.1.1	Triennial Compliance Audits by the FBI CJIS Division	The FBI CIIS Division is authorized to conduct sudita, once every three (3) years as a minimum, to assess agency compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies. The CIIS Audit Unit (CAI) shall conduct a triennial audit of each CSS in order to verify compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies. This sudit shall include a sample of CIAs and, in coordination with the SIIS, the NCIAs. Audits may be conducted on a more frequent basis if the sudit reveals that an agency has not complied with applicable statutes, regulations and policies. The FBI inspections and scheduled audits of Contractor facilities.	Functional	intersects with	Independent Assessors	CPL-03.1	Mechanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurity and data protection controls at planned intervals or when the system, service or project undergoes significant changes.	5	
5.11.1.2	Triennial Security Audits by the FBI CJIS Division	The FBI CIIS Division is authorized to conduct security audits of the CSA and SIB networks and systems, once every three (3) years as a minimum, to assess agency compliance with the CIIS Security Policy. This audit shall include a sample of CIAs and NCIAs. Audits may be conducted on a more frequent basis if the audit reveals that an agency has not compliated with the CIIS Security Policy.	Functional	intersects with	Independent Assessors	CPL-03.1	Machanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurity and data protection controls at planned intervals or when the system, service or project undergoes significant changes.	5	
5.11.2	Audits by the CSA	Each CSA shalt:  1. At a minimum, triennially audit all CJAs and NCJAs which have direct access to the state system in order to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.  2.1 moders to AL, in order to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.  2.1 moders to AL, in order to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.  3. Here the submitty to conduct unanounced security inspections and scheduled audits of Contractor facilities.  4. Here the submitty to conduct unanounced security inspections and scheduled audits of Contractor facilities and provide the results to the requesting CSA. It a subsequent CSA requests an audit of the same contractor facilities and provide the results to the requesting CSA may provide the results to the previous audit unless otherwise notified by the requesting CSA that a new audit be performed.  Note: This suthority does not apply to the audit requirement outlined in the Security and Management Control Outsourcing Standard for Note-Chameler and Chamer related to outsourcing noncriminal justice administrative functions.	Functional	intersects with	Independent Assessors	CPL-03.1	Mechanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurily and data protection controls at planned intervals or when the system, service or project undergoes significant changes.	5	
5.11.3	Special Security Inquiries and Audits	appropriate inquiry and audit of any alleged security violations. The inspection team shall be appointed by the APB and shall include at least one representative of the CJIS Division. All results of the inquiry and audit shall be reported to the APB with	Functional	intersects with	Independent Assessors	CPL-03.1	Mechanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurity and data protection controls at planned intervals or when the system, service or project undergoes significant changes.	5	
5.11.4	Compliance Subcommittees	appropriate recommendations.  The Criminal Justice information Services (CIS) Advisory Policy Board (APB) established the Compliance Evaluation Subcommittee (CES) to evaluate the results of audits conducted by the CIS Audit (mit (CAU). The CES has especially experienced to the APB concerning compliance with applicable policies and regulations. The most current information regarding the CAI audits that are which the puriose of the CES and detailed CES sanctions process procedures are available at CIS, by (Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal) CIS Special Interest Groups CES Section and CIS Section of Fill gov.  The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact (Compact) Council at Article VI established the Compact Council (Council). The Compact Council Association Committee is responsible for ensuring the use of the Interest destribution in disc System for noncriminal justice purposes complies with the Compact and with rules, standards, and procedures established by the Compact Council. As such the Sanctions Committee reviews the results of audits conducted by the Federal Bureau of investigation (Figl) of participants in the FFI's Criminal justice Services (CIS). Division programs. The Sanctions Committee reviews the results of audits conducted by the Federal Bureau of investigation (Figl) of participants in the FFI's Criminal justice Services (CIS). Division programs. The Sanctions Committee reviews the audit results and the participant into compliance and make recommendations to the Compact Council or the FE AII. Additional Information on the Compact Council Sanctions process is evaluable on the Compact Council and evaluation and all participants are proposed to the compact Council and evaluation and the PER AII additional Information on the Compact Council Sanctions process is evaluable on the Compact Council or section.	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.
5.12	Policy Area 12: Personnel Security	Having proper security measures against the insider threat is a critical component for the CIS Security Policy. This section's security terms and requirements apply to all personnels who were unescorted access to unencrypted CII. Regardless of the implementation model: physical data center, virtual cloud solution, or a hybrid model - unescorted access to unencrypted CII must be determined by the agency taking into consideration if those individuals have unescorted logical or physical access to any information system resulting in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CII.	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
5.12.1	Personnel Screening Requirements for Individuals Requiring Unescorted Access to Unencrypted CJI	1, To verify identification, state of residency and residual ringeoprint-based record excess shall be conducted africt or garring access to GLR for all personnel who conducted for the granting access to GLR for all personnel was considered to the conducted residual to the conducted residual	Functional	equal	Personnel Screening	HRS-04	Mechanisms exist to manage personnel security risk by screening individuals prior to authorizing access.	(optional)	
5.12.2	Personnel Termination	identification, state of residency and national fingerprint-based record checks shall be conducted truit or armitian access to Elf for all nexonous why how how successful and upon termination of personnel by an interface agency, the agency shall immediately terminate access to local agency systems with access to CII. Furthermore, the interface agency shall provide notification or other action to ensure access to state and other agency systems at sterminated. Here employee is an employee of a NCIA or a Contractor, the employer shall notify all interface Agencies that may be affected	Functional	equal	Personnel Termination	HRS-09	Mechanisms exist to govern the termination of individual employment.	10	
5.12.3	Personnel Transfer	by the personnel change.  The agency shall review CII access authorizations when personnel are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the agency and initiate appropriate actions such as closing and establishing accounts and changing system access authorizations.	Functional	equal	Personnel Transfer	HRS-08	Mechanisms exist to adjust logical and physical access authorizations to Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) and facilities upon personnel reassignment or transfer, in a timely manner.	10	
5.12.4	Personnel Sanctions	The agency shall employ a formal sanctions process for personnel failing to comply with established information security policies and procedures.	Functional	equal	Personnel Sanctions	HRS-07	Mechanisms exist to sanction personnel failing to comply with established security policies, standards and procedures.	10	
5.13	Policy Area 13: Mobile Devices	This policy area describes considerations and requirements for mobile devices including smartphones and tablets. Mobile devices are not limited to a single form factor or communications medium. The requirements in this section augment those in other areas of the Policy to address the gaps introduced by using mobile devices in other areas of the Policy to address the gaps introduced by using mobile devices in other areas of the Policy to address the gaps introduced by using mobile devices of the gaps of the properties of the gap of	Functional	subset of	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Machanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	10	
5.13.1	Wireless Communications Technologies	Examples of wireless communication technologies include, but are not limited to: 802.11, cellular, Bluetooth, satellite, microwave, and land mobile radio (LMR). Wireless technologies require at least the minimum security applied to wireless technology and, based upon the specific technology or implementation, wireless technologies may require additional security controls as described below.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Machanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	
5.13.1	Wireless Communications Technologies	Examples of wireless communication technologies include, but are not limited to 802.11, cellular, Bluetooth, satellite, microwave, and laud mobile and to [LMR]. Wireless technologies require at teach the minimum security applied to wireld stehnology and, based upon the specific technology or implementation, wireless technologies may require additional security controls as described below.	Functional	intersects with	Wireless Networking	NET-15	Mechanisms exist to control authorized wireless usage and monitor for unauthorized wireless access.	5	
5.13.1.1	802.11 Wireless Protocols	Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wir-Firotected Access (WPA) cryptographic algorithms, used by gin-e202.11 [protocols, do not meet the requirements for FIPS 140-2 and shall not be used. Agencies shall implement the following controls for all agency-managed wireless access points with access to an agency's network that processes unencrypted CII: 1-Reform validation testing to ensure regular Placesses points do not exist the 802-11 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) and to fully understand the wireless network security posture.  2. Maintain a complete inventory of all Access Points (APs) and 802.11 wireless devives.  3. Place APs in secured areas to prevent unauthorized physicial access and user manipulation.  4. Test AP range boundaries to determine the precise extent of the wireless coverage and design the AP wireless coverage to limit the coverage area to only what is needed for operational purposes.  5. Enable user autheritaction and encryption mechanisms for the management interface of the AP.  6. Ensure that all APs have strong administrative passwords and ensure that all passwords are changed in accordance with Section 5.6.2.1.  7. Ensure the react function on APs is used only when needed and is only invoked by suthorized personnel. Restore the APs to the latest security settings, when the reset function are required to ensure the factory default settings are not utilized.  8. Change the default service set identifier (SSID) in the APs. Disable the broadcast SSID features on that the client SSID must match that of the AP Validite that the SSID character string does not contain any agency identifiable information (division, department, steveral, and other evaluation are valued to the password of the cryptographic autherication and expense of the wireless product, including the cryptographic autherications are the strong administrative password and the default shared keys served the value and the default shared keys served the value and the default shared keys served the value and the default shared keys s	Functional	subset of	Wireless Networking	NET-15	Mechanisms exist to control authorized wireless usage and monitor for unauthorized wireless access.	10	
5.13.1.2	Cellular Devices	Cellular telephones, smartphones (i.e., Blackberry, Phones, etc.), bablets, personal digital assistants (PDA), and "alcacets" are examples of collular handheld devices or devices that are capatite of employing cellular technology. Additionally, cellular handheld devices or devices that are capatite of semploying cellular technology. Additionally, cellular handheld devices between the collular handheld devices stem manish from their size, portability, and available writers thandheld devices stem manish from their size, portability, and available writers therefores and associated services. Examples of threats to cellular handheld devices include:  1. Loss, that, or disposal.  2. Unsushorized access.  3. Nativaries.  4. Spain.  5. Electronic racking (threat to security of data and safety of the criminal justice professional).  7. Cioning (not as prevalent with later generation cellular technologies).  8. Server-resident data.	Functional	subset of	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Machanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	10	
5.13.1.2.1	Cellular Service Abroad	Cartain internal functions on cellular devices may be modified or compromised by the cellular carrier during international uses as the devices are intended to have cartain parameters configured by the cellular provider which is considered a "trusted" entity by the device.  When devices are authorized to access Cil outside the U.S., agencies shall perform an inspection to ensure that all controls are in place and functioning properly in accordance with the agency's policies prior to and after deployment outside of the 1s.	Functional	intersects with	Physical Tampering Detection	AST-08	Mechanisms exist to periodically inspect systems and system components for Indicators of Compromise (IoC).	5	
5.13.1.2.1	Cellular Service Abroad	U.S.  Cortain internal functions on cellular devices may be modified or compromised by the cellular carrier during international use as the devices are intended to have contain parameters configured by the cellular provider which is considered a "trusted" entity by the device.  The control of the control	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
5.13.1.2.1	Cellular Service Abroad	Certain internal functions on cellular devices may be modified or compromised by the cellular carrier during international use as the devices are intended to have certain parameter configured by the cellular provider which is considered a "trusted" entity by the device. When devices are authorized to access CII outside the U.S., agencies shall perform an inspection to ensure that all controls are in place and functioning properly in accordance with the agency's policies prior to and after deployment outside of the U.S.	Functional	intersects with	Mobile Device Tampering	MDM-04	Mechanisms exist to protect mobile devices from tampering through inspecting devices returning from locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk, prior to the device being connected to the organization's network.	(optional)	
5.13.1.2.2	Voice Transmissions Over Cellular Devices	Any cellular device used to transmit CJI via voice is exempt from the encryption and authentication requirements.	Functional	intersects with	Use of Communications Technology	HRS-05.3	Mechanisms exist to establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for communications technologies based on the potential to cause damage to systems, if used maliciously.	5	
5.13.1.2.2	Voice Transmissions Over Cellular Devices	Any cellular device used to transmit CJI via voice is exempt from the encryption and authentication requirements.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	
5.13.1.3	Bluetooth	Bluetooth is an open standard for short-range radio frequency (RF) communication. Bluetooth is used primarily to establish wireless personal area networks (MPAN). Bluetooth technology has been integrated into many types or business and consumer devices, including cell phones, laptops, automobiles, medical devices printers, keyborach, mice, hasdestes, and biometric capture devices. Bluetooth technology and associated devices are susceptible to general wireless metworking threats (e.g., denial of service [DOS] attacks, exestopoping, man-in-the-middle [MHM] attacks, message modification, and resource misappropriation as well as specific Bluetooth-related attacks that trager known vulnerabilities in Bluetooth implementations and specifications. Organizational security policy shall be used to dictate the user of Bluetooth and its associated devices based on the agency's operational and business processes.	Functional	intersects with	System Hardening Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02	Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for Echnology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.	5	
5.13.1.3	Bluetooth	Bluetooth is an open standard for short-range radio frequency (RF) communication. Bluetooth is used primarily to establish wireless personal area networks (WPAN). Bluetooth technology has been integrated into many types or business and consumer devices, including cell phones, laptops, automobiles, medical devices, printers, keyborads, mice, haedsets, and biometric capture devices. Bluetooth technology and associated devices are susceptible to general wireless are according to the control of	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Machanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	
5.13.1.4	Mobile Hotspots	Many mobile devices include the capability to function as a Wi-Fi hotsport that allows other devices to connect through the device to the internet over the devices collution rebeator.  When an agency allows mobile devices that are approved to access or store CI to When an agency allows mobile devices that are approved to access or store CI to United to a Wi-Fi hotsport connecting to the internet, they shall be configured:  1. Enable encryption on the hotsport  2. Enable the hotsport SSI does not identify the device make/model or agency ownership.  3. Create a writers a retwork password (pre-shared key)  4. Enable the hotsport port filtering/blocking features if present.  5. Ordest low visions entroin of password (pre-shared key)  4. Enable the hotsport port filtering/blocking features if present.  5. Only allow connections from agency-controlled devices.  Note: Refer to the requirements in Section 5.10.1.2 Encryption for item #1. Refer to the requirements pascetons of the device of the password standards for item #3. Only password attributes #1, #2 and #3 are required.  OR  1. Have a NDM solution to provide the same security as identified in items 1 – 5 above.	Functional	intersects with	System Hardening Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02	Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain socure baseline configurations for Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.	5	
5.13.1.4	Mobile Hotspots	Many mobile devices include the capability for function as a WF-Fi hotspot that allows other devices to connect through the device to the internet over the devices cellular network.  When an agency allows mobile devices that are approved to access or storo-CII to function as a WF-Fi hotspot connecting to the Internet, they shall be configured:  1. Enable encryption on the finishpot.  2. Change the hotspot's default SSID  2. Change the hotspot's default SSID  3. Ensure the hotspot SSID does not identify the device make/model or agency ownership  3. Create a wireless network password (pre-shared key)  4. Enable the hotspot's port filtering/blocking features if present  5. Only allow connections from agency-controlled devices.  Note: Refer to the requirements in Section 5.10.1.2 Encryption for item #1. Refer to the requirements in Section 5.10.1.2 Encryption for item #3. Only password attributes #1, #2 and #3 are required.  OR  1. Have a MDM solution to provide the same security as identified in items 1 – 5 above.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Machanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	
5.13.2	Mobile Device Management (MDM)	Mobile Device Management (MDM) facilitates the implementation of sound security controls for mobile devices and allows for centralizad oversight of configuration control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, if so desired by the agency.  Due to the potential for inconsistent network access or monitoring capability on mobile devices, methods used to monitor and manage the configuration of full-featured operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems. MDM systems and applications coupled with device specific technical policy can provide a robust method for device configuration or full-instance operating systems. NDM systems and applications coupled with device specific technical policy can provide a robust method for device configuration.  Devices that have had any unauthorized changes made to them (including but not limited to being robot of juilibroken) abla to the used to process, store, or transmit CII data at any time. User agencies shall implement the following controls when directly accessing 12 from devices unning a limited-feature operating system:  1. Ensure that CI is only transferred between CII authorized applications and storage areas of the device.  2. MDM with centralized administration configured and implemented to perform at least the following controls:  a. Remote being or device  2. Setting and locking device configuration  1. Ensure management processing or the device of a publication of the processing of the proces	Functional	subset of	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Mechaniams exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	10	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
		Mobile Device Management (MDM) facilitates the implementation of sound security controls for mobile devices and allows for centralized oversight of configuration					Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services	(optional)	
5.13.2	Mobile Device Management (MDM)	control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, if so desired by the signory.  Due to the potential for inconsistent network access or monitoring capability on mobile devices, methods used to monitor and manage the configuration of full-featured operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems. MDM systems and applications coupled with device specific technical policy can provide a robust method for device configuration management if properly implemented.  Devices that have the dary unauthorized changes made to them (including but not immited to being rooted or julibroken) shall not be used to process, store, or transmit! Clid data at any time. Duer agencies shall implement the following controls when directly accessing Cli from devices running a limited-resture operating system: 1. Finanze that Cli ion sity transferred between Cli authorized applications and storage areas of the device. John of the control	Functional	intersects with	Access Control For Mobile Devices	MDM-02	(TAAS).	5	
5.13.2	Mobile Device Management (MDM)	PICEPTION An MMM is not manisert when revealed in CII from an indirect access. Mobile Device Management (IMP) facilitates the implementation of sound security controls for mobile devices and allows for centralized oversight of configuration control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, if so desired by the agency. Due to the potential for inconsistent network access or monitoring capability on mobile devices, methods used to monitor and manage the configuration of full-flature operations are supplied to the configuration of the con	Functional	intersects with	Full Device & Container- Based Encryption	MDM-03	Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on mobile devices through full-device or container encryption.	5	
5.13.2	Mobile Device Management (MDM)	Mobile Device Management (MDM) facilitates the implementation of sound security controls for mobile devices and allows for centralizad overlight of configuration control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, it so desired by the agency.  Due to the potential for inconsistent network on and recovery, it so desired by the agency.  Due to the potential for inconsistent network or management for application of full-featured operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems. MDM systems and applications coupled with device spacific technical policy can provide a robust method for device configuration management filter properly implemented.  Devices that have that day mustitorized changes made to them (including but not initial to be interpreted in the properties of the	Functional	intersects with	Remote Purging	MDM-05	Mechanisms exist to remotely purge selected information from mobile devices.	5	
5.13.3	Wireless Device Risk Mitigations	EIGEPTION. An MIDMI a not required when receiving CII from an indirect access Organizations shall, at a minimum, ensure that writess device; setem as soon as they become available ortice alpatches and suggrades to the operating system as soon as they become available for the device and after necessary strating as described in Section 5.10.4.1.  2. Are configured for local device authentication (see Section 5.13.7.1).  3. Use advanced authentication or CSO approved compensating controls as per Section 5.13.7.2.1  4. Encrypt all CIV resident on the device.  5. Frame scander information, to include authenticators (see Section 5.5.2.1) in 5. Frame cander information, to include suthenticators (see Section 5.6.2.1) in 6. Employ personal frewalls on full-featured operating system devices or run Anobial Device Management (MIM) system that facilitates the ability to provide firewall services from the agency level.  7. Employ mail-closs code protection on full-featured operating system devices or run a MIM system that facilitates the ability to provide anti-malware services from the agency level.	Functional	intersects with	Endpoint Protection Measures	END-02	Mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of endpoint devices.	5	
5.13.3	Wireless Device Risk Mitigations	Organizations shall, at a minimum, ensure that wireless devices:  1. Apply wailable critical patches and suggrades to the operating system as soon as they become available for the device and after necessary testing as described in Section 5.10.4.1.  2. Are configured for local device authentication (see Section 5.13.7.1).  3. Use advanced authentication or CSO approved compensating controls as per Section 5.13.7.2.1.  4. Encrypt all CII resident on the device.  5. Erase cached information, to include authenticators (see Section 5.8.2.1) in applications, when easilon its terminated.  6. Employ personal frewalts on till-featured operating system devices or run ADMobile Device Amangement (MDM) system that facilitates the ability to grovide friewalt services from the agency level.  7. Employ malicious code protection on full-featured operating system devices or run and MDM system that facilitates the ability to provide anti-malware services from the agency level.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Machanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	
5.13.4	System Integrity	Managing system integrity on limited function mobile operating systems may require methods and technologies significantly different from traditional full-featured operating systems. In many cases, the requirements of Section 5.10 of the CIIS Security Policy comorb to met with a mobile device without the installation of a third- party MDM, application, or supporting service infrastructure.	Functional	intersects with	Endpoint Protection Measures	END-02	Mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of endpoint devices.  Mechanisms exist to implement and assert Mehills Device Measurement (MMM)	5	
5.13.4	System Integrity	Managing system integrity on limited function mobile operating systems may require methods and tochnologies significantly different from traditional full-featured operating systems. In many cases, the requirements of Section 5.10 of the CIS Security Policy comorb term et with a mobile device without the installation of a third- party MDM, application, or supporting service infrastructure.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (ontional)	Notes (optional)
		Based on the varying connection methods for mobile devices, an always on connection cannot be guaranteed for patching and updating. Devices without					Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.		
5.13.4.1	Patching/Updates	always-on cellular connections may not be reachable for extended periods of time by the MDM or solution either to report status or initiate patching. Agencies shall monitor mobile devices to ensure their patch and update state is	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01		5	
		Agencies shall monitor mobile devices to ensure their patch and update state is current.  Appropriately configured MDM software is capable of checking the installed					Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM)		
		applications on the device and reporting the software inventory to a central management console in a manner analogous to traditional virus scan detection of					controls.		
5.13.4.2	Maticious Code Protection	unauthorized software and can provide a high degree of confidence that only known software or applications are installed on the device.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01		5	
		Agencies that allow smartphones and tablets to access CJI shall have a process to approve the use of specific software or applications on the devices. Any device natively capable of performing these functions without a MDM solution is							
		natively capacie of periorning trese functions without a PIDPI solution is acceptable under this section.  For the purpose of this policy, a personal firewall is an application that controls					Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM)		
		network traffic to and from a user device, permitting or denying communications based on policy. A personal firewall shall be employed on all mobile devices that					controls.		
		have a full-feature operating system (i.e., laptops or tablets with Windows or Linux/Unix operating systems). At a minimum, the personal firewall shall perform							
		the following activities:  1. Manage program access to the Internet.  2. Block unsolicited requests to connect to the user device.							
5.13.4.3	Personal Firewall	S. Filter incoming traffic by IP address or protocol.      Filter incoming traffic by destination ports.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01		5	
		Maintain an IP traffic log.     Mobile devices with limited-feature operating systems (i.e., tablets, smartphones)							
		may not support a personal firewall. However, these operating systems have a limited number of system services installed, carefully controlled network access,							
		and to a certain extent, perform functions similar to a personal firewall on a device with a full-feature operating system. Appropriately configured MDM software is capable of controlling which applications are allowed on the device.							
		In addition to the requirements in Section 5.3 Incident Response, agencies shall develop additional or enhanced incident reporting and handling procedures to					Mechanisms exist to implement and govern processes and documentation to facilitate an organization-wide response capability for cybersecurity and data		
		address mobile device operating scenarios. Rapid response to mobile device related incidents can significantly mitigate the risks associated with illicit data					protection-related incidents.		
		access either on the device itself or within online data resources associated with the device through an application or specialized interface.							
5.13.5	Incident Response	Special reporting procedures for mobile devices shall apply in any of the following situations:  1. Loss of device control. For example:	Functional	subset of	Incident Response Operations	IRO-01		10	
		a. Device known to be locked, minimal duration of loss     b. Device lock state unknown, minimal duration of loss			Ороганоли				
		c. Device lock state unknown, extended duration of loss d. Device known to be unlocked, more than momentary duration of loss							
		Total loss of device     Device compromise							
5.13.6	Access Control	Device loss or compromise outside the United States     Multiple user accounts are not generally supported on limited-feature mobile     operating systems. Access control (Section 5.5 Access Control) shall be	Functional	intersects with	Access Control For Mobile Devices	MDM-02	Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services	5	
5.13.7	Identification and	accomplished by the application that accesses CJI.  Due to the technical methods used for identification and authentication on many limited-feature mobile operating systems, achieving compliance may require many	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management	MDM-01	(ITAAS).  Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	
	Authentication	different components.  Due to the technical methods used for identification and authentication on many	Tunctional	meracota mai	Of Mobile Devices  Access Control For Mobile	1101101	Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of		
5.13.7	Authentication	limited-feature mobile operating systems, achieving compliance may require many different components.  When mobile devices are authorized for use in accessing CJI, local device	Functional	intersects with	Devices	MDM-02	mobile devices to organizational Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).  Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM)	5	
5.13.7.1	Local Device Authentication	when mone devices are summered on use in accessing Cit, local device authentication shall be used to unlock the device for use. The authenticator used shall meet the requirements in section 5.6.2.1 Standard Authenticators.	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management Of Mobile Devices	MDM-01	controls.	5	
5.13.7.1	Local Device Authentication	When mobile devices are authorized for use in accessing CJI, local device authentication shall be used to unlock the device for use. The authenticator used shall meet the requirements in section 5.6.2.1 Standard Authenticators.	Functional	intersects with	Access Control For Mobile Devices	MDM-02	Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).	5	
5.13.7.2	Advanced Authentication	When accessing CJI from an authorized mobile device, advanced authentication shall be used by the authorized user unless the access to CJI is indirect as described	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management	MDM-01	Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.	5	
		in Section 5.6.2.2.1. If access is indirect, then AA is not required.			Of Mobile Devices		Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of	_	
5.13.7.2	Advanced Authentication	When accessing CJI from an authorized mobile device, advanced authentication shall be used by the authorized user unless the access to CJI is indirect as described in Section 5.6.2.2.1. If access is indirect, then AA is not required.	Functional	intersects with	Access Control For Mobile Devices	MDM-02	mobile devices to organizational Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).	5	
		CSO approved compensating controls to meet the AA requirement on agency- issued smartphones and tablets with limited-feature operating systems are					Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.		
		permitted. Compensating controls are temporary control measures that are implemented in lieu of the required AA control measures when an agency cannot							
		meet a requirement due to legitimate technical or business constraints. Before CSOs consider approval of compensating controls, Mobile Device Management (MDM) shall be implemented per Section 5.13.2. The compensating controls shall:							
		Meet the intent of the CJIS Security Policy AA requirement     Provide a similar level of protection or security as the original AA requirement							
		Not rely upon the existing requirements for AA as compensating controls     Expire upon the CSO approved date or when a compliant AA solution is							
5.13.7.2.1	Compensating Controls	implemented.  Additionally, compensating controls may rely upon other, non-AA, existing requirements as compensating controls and/or be combined with new controls to	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Management	MDM-01		5	
5.15.7.2.1	Companiating Controls	create compensating controls.  The compensating controls for AA are a combination of controls providing	Tunctional	meracota with	Of Mobile Devices	1101101			
		acceptable assurance only the authorized user is authenticating and not an impersonator or (in the case of agency-issued device used by multiple users)							
		controls that reduce the risk of exposure if information is accessed by an unauthorized party.  The following minimum controls shall be implemented as part of the CSO approved							
		compensating controls:  - Possession and registration of an agency issued smartphone or tablet as an							
		indication it is the authorized user - Use of device certificates per Section 5.13.7.3 Device Certificates							
		- Implemented CJIS Security Policy compliant standard authenticator protection on the secure location where CJI is stored							
		Device certificates are often used to uniquely identify mobile devices using part of a public key pair on the device in the form of a public key certificate. While there is					Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.		
		value to ensuring the device itself can authenticate to a system supplying CJI, and may provide a critical layer of device identification or authentication in a larger							
5.13.7.3	Device Certificates	scheme, a device certificate alone placed on the device shall not be considered valid proof that the device is being operated by an authorized user. When certificates or cryptographic keys used to authenticate a mobile device are	Functional	subset of	Centralized Management	MDM-01		10	
0.13.7.3	Device Certificates	when certificates or cryptographic keys used to authenticate a mobile device are used in lieu of compensating controls for advanced authentication, they shall be: 1. Protected against being extracted from the device	runctionat	SUDSEL OI	Of Mobile Devices	1-1DM-01		10	
		Configured for remote wipe on demand or self-deletion based on a number of unsuccessful login or access attempts							
		3. Configured to use a secure authenticator (i.e., password, PIN) to unlock the key for use.							
5.14	SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION (SA)	N/A	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.
5.15	SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY (SI)	N/A	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.
5.16	MAINTENANCE	N/A	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No requirements to map to.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM	STRM	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF)	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
AC-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	a. Develop, document, and disseminate to: organizational personnel with access control responsibilities  1. Agency-level coses control policy that: (a) Addresse purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable lave, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and compliance; and 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and the associated access controls; b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the access control policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current access control:	Rationale	Relationship subset of	Identity & Access Management (IAM)	IAC-01	Control Description  Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of identification and access management controls.	(optional)	
AG-2	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT	1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cil or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cil; and 2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cil or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cil; and cases to Cil or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cil.  a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system;  b. Assign account managers;  c. Specify.  a. Specify.  a. Specify.  a. Specify.  a. Authorized users of the system;  2. Group and role membership; and  b. Access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and attributes listed for each account;  Attribute Name  Famil Address Text  Employer Name  faderation of Given Name  Identity Provider Id  Sur Name  Identity Provider Id  Guiven Number  Identity Provider Id  Counter Fororism Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator  Criminal History Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator  Criminal Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator  Criminal Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator  Criminal Fororism Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator  Criminal Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator  Criminal Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator  Criminal Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator  N-DER Privilege Indicator  N-DER Privilege Indicator  N-DER Privilege Indicator  Cil Certification Indicator  Robot Certification Indicator  Finationer Cills  Intervilence Certification Indicator	Functional	intersects with	Termination of Employment	IAC-07.2	Mechanisms exist to revoke user access rights in a timely manner, upon termination of employment or contract.	5	
AC-2	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT	Emolower OBI  a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system; b. Assign account managers; c. Require conditions for group and role membership; d. Specify: 1. Authorized users of the system; 2. Group and role membership; and activation of the system; 3. Access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and attributes listed for each account; Attribute Name Email Address Text Employer Name Faderston id Given Name Identity Provider id John Start Start Identity Provider id John Start Indiges Indicator Cuiminal instigue Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Cuiminal instigue Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Cuiminal instigue Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Cuiminal instiguere Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Display Name Covernment Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Cuiminal Instiguere Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Display Name Covernment Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Cuiminal Instiguere Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator NICLE Privilege Indicator 2d CIP Carellation Indicator 2d CIP Carellation Indicator	Functional	intersects with	Account Management	IAC-15	Mechanisms exist to proactively govern account management of individual, group, system, service, application, guest and temporary accounts.	5	
AC-2	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT	Employer OBI  a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system; b. Assign account managers; c. Require conditions for group and role membership; d. Specify; l. Authorized users of the system; l. Authoriz	Functional	intersects with	Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks	NET-12	Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.	5	



	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
AC-2	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT	A Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system:  b. Assign account managers: c. Require conditions for group and role membership; d. Specify. 2. Specify. 2. Group and role membership; and 3. Access as without some of the system; 2. Group and role membership; and 3. Access as without some (i.e., privileges) and attributes listed for each account; Attribute Name Email Address fext Employer Name Federation Id Given Name Identity Provider Id Sur Name Identity Provider Id Sur Name Identity Provider Id Counter Terrorism Destruction Id	Functional	intersects with	Input Data Validation	TDA-18	Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.	(Optional)	
	ACCOUNT	Criminal Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Criminal Investigative Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Display Name Government Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Local Id NCIC Certification Indicator PNECE Privilege Indicator PCIC Certification Indicator PCIC Certification Indicator 22 CFR Certification Indicator FmnInver CRII					Automated mechanisms exist to support the management of system accounts		
AC-2(1)	MANAGEMENT   AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT	Support the management of system accounts using automated mechanisms including email, phone, and text notifications.	Functional	equal	Automated System Account Management (Directory Services)	IAC-15.1	(e.g., directory services).  Automated mechanisms exist to disable or remove temporary and emergency	10	
AC-2(2)	MANAGEMENT   AUTOMATED TEMPORARY AND EMERGENCY ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT	Automatically remove temporary and emergency accounts within 72 hours.  Disable accounts within one (1) week when the accounts:	Functional	equal	Removal of Temporary / Emergency Accounts	IAC-15.2	accounts after an organization-defined time period for each type of account.	10	
AC-2(3)	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   DISABLE ACCOUNTS	Usable accounts within one (1) week when the accounts: ((a) Have expired; (b) Are no longer associated with a user or individual; (c) Are in violation of organizational policy; or ((d) Have been inactive for 90 calendar days.	Functional	equal	Disable Inactive Accounts	IAC-15.3	Automated mechanisms exist to disable inactive accounts after an organization- defined time period.	10	
AC-2(4)	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS	Automatically audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions.	Functional	equal	Automated Audit Actions	IAC-15.4	Automated mechanisms exist to audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling and removal actions and notify organization-defined personnel or roles.  Mechanisms exist to initiate a session lock after an organization-defined time	10	
AC-2(5)	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   INACTIVITY LOGOUT ACCOUNT	Require that users log out when a work period has been completed.	Functional	equal	Session Lock	IAC-24	period of inactivity, or upon receiving a request from a user and retain the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication methods.  Mechanisms exist to expedite the process of removing "high risk" individual's	10	
AC-2(13)		Disable accounts of individuals within 30 minutes of discovery of direct threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of CJI.	Functional	intersects with	High-Risk Terminations	HRS-09.2	access to Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD) upon termination, as determined by management.  Mechanisms exist to disable accounts immediately upon notification for users	5	
AC-2(13)	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH- RISK INDIVIDUALS	the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of CJI.	Functional	intersects with	Account Disabling for High Risk Individuals	IAC-15.6	posing a significant risk to the organization.	5	
AC-3	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.	Functional	intersects with	Access Enforcement	IAC-20	Mechanisms exist to enforce Logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of "least privilege."	5	
AC-3	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.	Functional	intersects with	Safeguarding Data Over		Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open,	5	
		**			Open Networks	NET-12	public networks.		
AC-3 AC-3(14)	INDIVIDUAL ACCESS	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.	Functional	intersects with		TDA-18  PRI-06	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to: (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the burden, risk or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access; (2) Obtain answers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed; (3) Obtain the access(a) other (PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies;	5	
	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow or information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be flow within the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, fermillant controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, additions, oro		intersects with	Open Networks Input Data Validation  Data Subject	TDA-18	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to:  (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the brunder, nike or expense of providing scoses would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access;  (2) Obtain answers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed;  (3) Obtain the assuracyles of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared;  (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies;  (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies;  (7) Restrict the thate collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review frewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.	5	
AC-3(14)	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unnercypted across the public network, blocking outside faffer that claims to be from within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., oroxies, alterways, firewells, or routers).	Functional	intersects with	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement -	TDA-18	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to: (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the burden, risk or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access; (2) Obtain answers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed; (3) Obtain the accept insert their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust to inaccuracies; (6) Request expense of their PD dust	10	
AC-3(14) AC-4	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CLI from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be flow more than the appendix of the provided authorization of themse boundary protection devices (e.g., more).  a. Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to milgate risk to CLI; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  a. Identify and document apparation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to milgate risk to CLI; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.  b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.	Functional Functional	intersects with equal	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement— Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)	PRI-06	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to:  (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the brundn, risk or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access;  (2) Obtain the access;  (2) Obtain the acception of the PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared;  (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared;  (3) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies;  (6) Request correct	10	
AC-3(14) AC-4 AC-5	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., access, authorization to mitigate in the CII; and before the controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., access, authorization to support separation of duties.  a. Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. a. Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  John Separation of duties access authorization to support separation of duties.	Functional  Functional	equal equal intersects with	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement— Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change	PRI-06  NET-04  CHG-04.3	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to: (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the burden, risk or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access; (2) Obtain answers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed; (3) Obtain the accept insert the Drienig collected, received, processed, (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, (3) Obtain the acception of their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request co	10	
AC-3 (14)  AC-4  AC-5  AC-5  AC-5	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control peticles.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be flow mythin the agency, and not peasing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., access, authorization and access authorization as usuant seasonic duties, operations, but the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., access, authorization as usuant seasonic duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.  a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties, a leader or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties, a leader or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties, a leader of the provided accesses for users information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.	Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional	equal equal intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement— Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation	TDA-18  PRI-06  NET-04  CHG-04.3  HRS-11  NET-12	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to: (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the burden, risk or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access; (2) Obtain answers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed; (3) Obtain the accept insert the Dising collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (3) Obtain the suageries of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (6) Request correction to their PD dost to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD data to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD data to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD data to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD data to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD data to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD data to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD data to inaccuracies; (6) Request ensure of their PD, and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undated and/or a brain of their PD. Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.	10 10 5 5 5 5 5 5	
AC-4 AC-5 AC-5 AC-5	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing Cli from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be flow within the approximation of the prevention of	Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional	equal equal intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement Access Control Llats (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks	TDA-18 PRI-06 NET-04 CHG-04.3 HRS-11 NET-12	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to: (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the burden, risk or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access; (2) Obtain ensures on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed; (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request requested and requested corrections; (7) Restrict the due to the du	10 10 5 5 5	
AC-3 (14)  AC-4  AC-5  AC-5  AC-5  AC-6	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be flown within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, asteways, firewalls, or routers, and web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, asteways, to mispage risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. A literatify and document separation of drutes based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Let be the control of the protection of the control	Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional	equal equal intersects with	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement - Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Access Enforcement	TDA-18  PRI-06  NET-04  CHG-04.3  HRS-11  NET-12  TDA-18  IAC-20	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to:  (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the brunder, nike or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access;  (2) Obtain answers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed;  (3) Obtain the assocracy is of their PD; and (3) Obtain the assocracy is of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared;  (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (7) Restrict the thrather collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting.  Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review friewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Mechanisms exist to enforce Logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of fleast privilege.*  Mechanisms exist to utilize the concept of fleast privilege, allowing only authorized access to processe secessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordancy access to processes and a concept of the privilege.*	5 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 5	
AC-3 (14)  AC-4  AC-5  AC-5  AC-5  AC-6	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO  SECURITY FUNCTIONS	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be flown within the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., and or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define systems access authorizations to support separation of duties.  Judically and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, on mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define systems access authorizations to support separation of duties.  Judically and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, on mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define systems access authorization to support separation of duties.  Judically and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, on mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define systems access subnotization to support separation of duties.  Judically and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, on mitigate accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf or users) that are necess	Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional	equal equal intersects with	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement - Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Access Enforcement	TDA-18  PRI-06  NET-04  CHG-04.3  HRS-11  NET-12  TDA-18  IAC-20	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to: (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the burden, risk or espanse of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access; (2) Obtain ensures on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed; (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (7) Restrict the futher collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undated actifics sharing of their PD. McChanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to engine the store of their processing, storing, transmisting, undated assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement storing cryptography and security protocols to setgleand sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, sublic networks.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of "least privilege."  Mechanisms exist to to check the validity of information inputs.  Mechanisms exist to concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized access to processes necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational business functions.  Mechanisms exist to limit access to security functions to explicitly-authorized privileged users.	5 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 5	
AC-3 (14)  AC-4  AC-5  AC-5  AC-5  AC-6  AC-6	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow or information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be flow mithin the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency, and not pessing any the representation of such as a consideration of such as a consideration of such as a consideration of information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CI; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes. A Identify and document separation of duffes based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CI; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes.  Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes.  Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes.  Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes.  Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes.  Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes.  Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes.  Define system access authorization to support separation of duffes.  Define system access authorizat	Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional	equal equal intersects with	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement— Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Access Enforcement  Least Privilege	TDA-18  PRI-06  NET-04  CHG-04.3  HRS-11  NET-12  TDA-18  IAC-20  IAC-21	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to:  (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the bruther, nike or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access;  (2) Obtain answers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed;  (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared;  (3) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Request correction to their PD dea to inaccuracies;  (9) Rechanisms exist to design, implement and review frewall and router  configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Mechanisms exist to internacies and their propriets of the propriets of the pro	5 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	
AC-3(14)  AC-4  AC-5  AC-5  AC-5  AC-6  AC-6  AC-6	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE   AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS  LEAST PRIVILEGE   NON- PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS  LEAST PRIVILEGE   PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS  LEAST PRIVILEGE   PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be flow mowithin the agency, and not pessing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency- ontrolled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosios, asteware, firewalls, or routed agency and the possing and the possing of the public network that are not from the agency- ontrolled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosios, asteware, firewalls, or routed as the public network that are not from the agency- ontrolled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosios, asteware, firewalls, or routed to the public network that are not from the agency- ontrolled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosios, asteware, firewalls, or routed to the public network that are not from the agency- ontrolled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosios, asteware, firewalls, or routed to the public duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  Jo Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.  Londing and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.  Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes authorized not becomes authorized not support separation of duties.  Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing	Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional	equal equal intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with equal	Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Data Subject Empowerment  Data Flow Enforcement— Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Access Enforcement  Least Privilege  Authorize Access to Security Functions	TDA-18 PRI-06 NET-04 CHG-04.3 HRS-11 NET-12 TDA-18 IAC-20 IAC-21.1	public networks.  Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to:  (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the burden, risk or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access;  (2) Obtain near submanisms, shared, updated and disposed;  (3) Obtain the acception of their PD:  (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared;  (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared;  (3) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies;  (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies;  (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies;  (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, included action at sense at their PD.  Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal applications.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cyptographic mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cyptographic mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a Logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of Teast privilege.  Mechanisms exist to processe necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational burstens burstens.  Mechanisms exist to transmission over open, Mechanisms exist to transmission over o	5 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 10 10	
AC-3(14)  AC-4  AC-5  AC-5  AC-5  AC-6  AC-6  AC-6  AC-6  AC-6  AC-6(1)	ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   INDIVIDUAL ACCESS  INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE   AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS  LEAST PRIVILEGE   NON- PRIVILEGE ON	Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.  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Judically and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.  Judically and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.  Judically and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties.  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Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to: (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared, except where the bruther, nike or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting access; (2) Obtain answers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (3) Obtain the acception of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored and shared; (3) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (7) Restrict the futher collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, included active activation of their PD. (7) Restrict the futher collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, included active activation of their PD. 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FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
AC-6(10)	LEAST PRIVILEGE   PROHIBIT NON- PRIVILEGED USERS FROM EXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS	Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions.	Functional	equal	Prohibit Non-Privileged Users from Executing Privileged Functions	IAC-21.5	Mechanisms exist to prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to included disabiling, circumventing or altering implemented security safeguards / countermeasures.	10	
AC-7	UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS	Enforce a limit of five (5) consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a 15-minute time period; and3     Automatically lock the account or node until released by an administrator when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.	Functional	equal	Account Lockout	IAC-22	Mechanisms exist to enforce a limit for consecutive invalid login attempts by a user during an organization-defined time period and automatically locks the account when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.	10	
AC-8	SYSTEM USE NOTIFICATION	a. Display a system use notification message to users before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable laws, esocutive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines and state that:  1. Users are accessing a restricted information system;  2. System usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;  3. Unauthorized use of the system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties; and  4. Use of the system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;  b. Retain the notification message or banner on the screen until users a scknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the system; and  c. For publicly accessible systems:  1. Display system use information consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines, before granting further access to the publicly accessible system;  2. Display references, flant, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with privacy accommendations for sub-systems the spenserally prohibit those activities, and  3. Inclusion a federactives on the authorized uses of the exeten.	Functional	equal	System Use Notification (Logon Banner)	SEA-18	Mechanisms exist to utilities system use notification / logon bonness that display an approved system use notification message or banner before granting access to the system that provides cybersecurity and data protection notices.  Mechanisms exist to initiate a session lock after an organization-defined time	10	
AC-11	DEVICE LOCK	a. Prevent further access to the system by initiating a device lock after a maximum of 30 minutes of inactivity and requiring the user to initiate a device lock before leaving the system unattended.  NDIE: In the interest of safety, devices that are: (1) part of a criminal justice conveyance; or (2) used to perform dispatch functions and located within a physically secure location; or (3) terminals designant as losely for the purpose of receiving alert notifications (i.e., receive only terminals or ROI) used within physically secure location facilities that remain staffed when in operation, are exempt from this requirement.  I. Retain the device lock until the user restablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.	Functional	equal	Session Lock	IAC-24	preciations exist, to make a session lock used an long anziation reminds unite period of inactivity, or upon receiving a request from a user and retain the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication methods.	10	
AC-11(1)	DEVICE LOCK   PATTERN- HIDING DISPLAYS	Conceat, via the device lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.	Functional	equal	Pattern-Hiding Displays	IAC-24.1	Mechanisms exist to implement pattern-hiding displays to conceal information previously visible on the display during the session lock.	10	
AC-12	SESSION TERMINATION	Automatically terminate a user session after a user has been logged out.  a. Identify any specific user actions that can be performed on the system without	Functional	equal	Session Termination	IAC-25	Automated mechanisms exist to log out users, both locally on the network and for remote sessions, at the end of the session or after an organization-defined period of inactivity.	10	
AC-14	PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION	Identification or authentication consistent with organizational mission and business functions; and  b. Document and provide supporting rationale in the security plan for the system,  user actions not requiring identification or authentication.  Le Establish and occument usage restrictions, configuration/connection	Functional	equal	Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authorization	IAC-26	Mechanisms exist to identify and document the supporting rationale for specific user actions that can be performed on a system without identification or authentication.  Mechanisms exist to define, control and review organization-approved, secure	10	
AC-17	REMOTE ACCESS	requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; and b. Authorize each type of remote access to the system prior to allowing such connections.	Functional	equal	Remote Access	NET-14	remote access methods.	10	
AC-17(1)	REMOTE ACCESS   MONITORING AND CONTROL REMOTE ACCESS	Employ automated mechanisms to monitor and control remote access methods.	Functional	equal	Automated Monitoring & Control	NET-14.1	Automated mechanisms exist to monitor and control remote access sessions.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of	10	
AC-17(2)	PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION REMOTE ACCESS	Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions.	Functional	equal	Protection of Confidentiality / Integrity Using Encryption	NET-14.2	remote access sessions (e.g., VPN).	10	
AC-17(3)	MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS	Route remote accesses through authorized and managed network access control points.	Functional	equal	Managed Access Control Points	NET-14.3	control points (e.g., VPN concentrator).	10	
AC-17(4)	REMOTE ACCESS   PRIVILEGED COMMANDS AND ACCESS	a. Authorize the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access only in a format that provides assessable evidence and for the following needs: competing operational needs; and b. Document the rationale for remote access in the security plan for the system.	Functional	equal	Remote Privileged Commands & Sensitive Data Access	NET-14.4	Mechanisms exist to restrict the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access only for competling operational needs.	10	
AC-18	WIRELESS ACCESS	Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of wireless access; and b. Authorize each type of wireless access to the system prior to allowing such connections.	Functional	intersects with	Wireless Access Authentication & Encryption	CRY-07	Mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of wireless networking technologies by implementing authentication and strong encryption.	5	
AC-18	WIRELESS ACCESS	<ul> <li>a. Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of wireless access; and b. Authorize each type of wireless access to the system prior to allowing such connections.</li> </ul>	Functional	intersects with	Wireless Networking	NET-15	Mechanisms exist to control authorized wireless usage and monitor for unauthorized wireless access.	5	
AC-18(1)	WIRELESS ACCESS   AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION	Protect wireless access to the system using authentication of authorized users and agency-controlled devices, and encryption.	Functional	equal	Authentication & Encryption	NET-15.1	Mechanisms exist to secure WI-Fi (e.g., IEEE 802.11) and prevent unauthorized access by: (1) Authenticating devices trying to connect; and [2] Encrypting transmitted data.	10	
AC-18(3)	WIRELESS ACCESS   DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKING	Disable, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities embedded within system components prior to issuance and deployment.	Functional	equal	Disable Wireless Networking	NET-15.2	Mechanisms exist to disable unnecessary wireless networking capabilities that are internally embedded within system components prior to issuance to end users.	10	
AC-19	ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES	a. Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices, to include when such devices are outside of controlled areas; and b. Authorize the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.	Functional	equal	Access Control For Mobile Devices	MDM-02	(TAAS).	10	
AC-19(5)	ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES   FULL DEVICE OR CONTAINER- BASED ENCRYPTION	Employ full-device encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on full- and limited-feature operating system mobile devices authorized to process, store, or transmit CJI.	Functional	equal	Full Device & Container- Based Encryption	MDM-03	Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on mobile devices through full-device or container encryption.	10	
AC-20	USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS	a. Establish agency-level policies governing the use of external systems consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations covering, operating, and/or maintaining external systems, allowing authorized individuals to:  1. Access the system from external systems; and 2. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external systems; or 3. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external systems; or 5. Problem the use of personally-owned information systems including mobile devices (i.e., bring your own device [8YOD] and publicly accessible systems for accessing, processing, storing, or transmitting C/II.	Functional	equal	Use of External Information Systems	DCH-13	Mechanisms exist to govern how external parties, including Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS), are used to securely store, process and transmit data.	10	
AC-20(1)	USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS   LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USE	Permit authorized individuals to use an external system to access the system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only after: a. Verification of the implementation of controls on the external systems as specified in the organization's security and privacy policies and security and privacy plans; or b. Retention of peroved system connection or processing agreements with the organizational entity hosting the external system.	Functional	equal	Limits of Authorized Use	DCH-13.1	Mechanisms exist to prohibit external parties, including Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TASS), from storing, processing and transmitting data unless authorized individuals first; or the control of	10	
AC-20(2)	USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS   PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES — RESTRICTED USE	Restrict the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external systems.	Functional	equal	Portable Storage Devices	DCH-13.2		10	
AC-21		s. Enable authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to sahering partner between the information access and use restrictions as defined in an executed information exchange agreement; and b. Employ stributes-based access control (see AC-2(d)(3)) or manual processes as defined in information exchange ag. 8. Enable authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing	DCH-14	Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.	5	
AC-21		a. Enation authorized users to obermine whether access authorizations assigned to a sharing partner match the information's access and use restrictions as defined in an executed information exchange agreement; and b. Employ attribute-based access control (see AC-2(d)(3)) or manual processes as defined in information exchange ag	Functional	intersects with	Information Sharing With Third Parties	PRI-07	Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
		Designate individuals authorized to make information publicly accessible;     Train authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does					Mechanisms exist to control publicly-accessible content.	(optional)	
AC-22	PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE CONTENT	not contain nengulable information;  C. befereit the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and  d. Reviser the contract not the publicly occessible system for nonpublic information  guaranty and remove such information, if discovered.  D. Everlip Opcounter, and dissemination of all personnel when their unescorted	Functional	equal	Publicly Accessible Content	DCH-15		10	
AT-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to very, modity, or make use of unexpressed CP privilege to very, modity, or make use of unexpressed CP.  1. Organization-level extensions and training policy that:  (a) Addresses purpose, scope, rotes, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entitles, and compliance, and (b) consistent with applicable lews, proposibilities, the compliance, and (b) is consistent with applicable lews, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and 2. Procedures to feelitate the implementation of the averaness and training policy and the associated awareness and training control or additional personal with information accurity awareness and training responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the awareness and training.  1. Review and update the current awareness and training.  2. Review and update the current awareness and training.  2. Procedures for the awareness and training.  2. Procedures annually understoom cocur, or when changes to the CIIS Security Policy are made.  3. Procedures annually and following changes in the information system operating environment, when security incidents occur, or when changes to the CIIS Security Policy are made.  3. Procedures annually and following changes in the information system operating environment, when security incidents occur, or when changes to the CIIS Security Policy are made.	Functional	subset of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection-Minded Workforce	SAT-01	Mechaniams exist to facilitate the implementation of security workforce development and awareness controls.	10	
AT-2	LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS	a. Hrowes security and privacy interlacy training to system users (inclusing managers, senior executives, and contractors):  1. As part of initial training for new users prior to accessing CII and annually thereafter; and  2. When required by system changes or within 30 days of any security event for individuals involved in the event;  b. Employ one or more of the following techniques to increase the security and privacy avareness of system users:  1. Displaying posters  2. Offering supplies inscribed with security and privacy reminders  3. Displaying logon screen messages  4. Generating emal advisories or notices from organizational officials  5. Conducting awareness events  6. Update literacy training and awareness content annually and following changes in the information system operating environment, when security incidents occur, or when changes are made in the CIIS Security Policy, and	Functional	equal	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Awareness Training	SAT-02	Mechanisms exist to provide all employees and contractors appropriate awareness education and training that is relevant for their job function.	10	
AT-2(2)	LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS   INSIDER	Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.	Functional	equal	Insider Threat Awareness	THR-05	Mechanisms exist to utilize security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.	10	
AT-2(3)	THREAT  LITERACY TRAINING AND  AWARENESS   SOCIAL  ENGINEERING AND  MINING	Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential and actual instances of social engineering and social mining.	Functional	equal	Social Engineering & Mining	SAT-02.2	Mechanisms exist to include awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential and actual instances of social engineering and social mining.	10	
AT-3	ROLE-BASED TRAINING	a. Provide role-based security and privacy training to personnel with the following roles and responsibilities:  **All individuals with unescorded access to a physically secure location;  **Ceineral User A. Ley. Dut not a process, who is authorized to use an information system;  **Privileged User: A user that is authorized (and, therefore, trusted) to perform security-relevant functions that general users are not authorized to perform;  **Organizational Personnel with Security Reposnabilities; Personnel with the responsibility to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CI land the responsibility to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CI land the responsibility to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CI land the responsibility to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CI land the responsibility to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CI land the responsibility to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CI land the CIBSCE/POL.  1. Before authorizing access to the system, information, or performing assigned duties, and annually thereafter; and local agencies; changes in the information system operating environment; security incidents, or when changes are made to the CIBS Security Policy;  c. Incorporate lessons learned from internal or external security incidents or breaches into role-based training;  of Incorporate the minimum following topics into the appropriate role-based training content:  1. All individuals with unescorted access to a physically secure location (CHRI), NICIC Restricted Files Information, and NCIC Non-Restricted Files Information  Penalties  D. Reporting Security Events  L. incidenting Response Fraining  d. System Use Notification  1. Physical Access Control  4. Monotroine Physical Access  Control  4. Monotroine Physical Access	Functional	equal	Role-Based Cybersecurity & Data Protection Training	SAT-03	Mechanisms exist to provide role-based cybersecurity and data protection-related training:  (1) Before authorizing access to the system or performing assigned duties;  (2) When required by system changes; and  (3) Annually thereafter.	10	
AT-3(5)	ROLE-BASED TRAINING   PROCESSING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	Provide all personnel when their unescorted logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CII with initial and annual training in the employment and operation of personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls.	Functional	equal	Sensitive / Regulated Data Storage, Handling & Processing	SAT-03.3	Mechanisms exist to ensure that every user accessing a system processing, storing or transmitting sensitive / regulated data is formally trained in data handling requirements.	10	
AT-4	TRAINING RECORDS	<ul> <li>Document and monitor information security and privacy training activities, including security and privacy awareness training and specific role-based security and privacy training; and</li> <li>Retain individual training records for a minimum of three years.</li> </ul>	Functional	equal	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Training Records	SAT-04	Mechanisms exist to document, retain and monitor individual training activities, including basic cybersecurity and data protection awareness training, ongoing awareness training and specific-system training.	10	
IA-O	USE OF ORIGINATING AGENCY IDENTIFIERS IN TRANSACTIONS AND INFORMATION EXCHANGES	An FBI authorized originating agency identifier (ORI) shall be used in each transaction on CBI systems in order to identify the sending agency and to ensure the proper level of access for each transaction. The original identifier between the requesting agency and the CBA/SIBCAnneler's shall be the ORI, and other agency identifiers, such as user identification or personal identifier, an access device memorance, or the internet Protocol (PJ) address.  Agencies may set as a servicing agency and perform transactions on behalf of authorized agencies requesting agencies movies. Servicing agencies may go a set as a servicing agencies may also use their own off to perform inquiry transactions on behalf of another agency may do so using the requesting agency in CRI. Servicing agencies may also use their own off to perform inquiry transactions on behalf of a requesting agency the means and procedures see in place to provide an audit taul for the current specified retention period. Because the agency performing the transaction may not necessarily be the same as the agency respecting the transaction and train that, to the specific agency which is requesting the transaction. Audit trails can be used to identify the requesting agency if there is a reason to inquire into the details surmounding why an agency part an in riquiry on a subject. Agencies assigned a limited access ORI of all not use the tulk access ORI of another agency to conduct an inquiry transaction.	Functional	no relationship	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
IA-1	POLICYAND PROCEDURES	B. Develop, document, and disseminate to authorized personnel:  1. Agency/Entity identification and authentication policy that:  (a) Addresse purpose, cope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entitles, and compliance; and  (b) its consistent with applicable leave, securitive orders, discriber segulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and the associated identification and authentication controls; b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication controls; b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication controls; b. Televis annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII.	Functional	subset of	Identity & Access Management (IAM)	IAC-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of identification and access management controls.  Mechanisms exist to uniquely identify and centrally Authenticate, Authorize and	10	
IA-2	AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)	Uniquely identify and authenticate organizational users and associate that unique identification with processes acting on behalf of those users.	Functional	equal	Identification & Authentication for Organizational Users	IAC-02	Precrainsmise sost to uniquely berting and centrally Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA) organizational users and processes acting on behalf of organizational users.	10	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
IA-2(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)	IAC-06	Automated mechanisms exist to enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for: (1) Remote network access; (2) Timid-party Rehonology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS); and/or (3) Non-console access to critical TAAS that store, transmit and/or process sensitive/regulated data.	(optional)	
IA-2(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Network Access to Privileged Accounts	IAC-06.1	Mechanisms exist to utilize Mutti-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate network access for privileged accounts.	5	
IA-2(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Network Access to Non- Privileged Accounts	IAC-06.2	Mechanisms exist to utilize Mutt-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate network access for non-privileged accounts.	5	
IA-2(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Local Access to Privileged Accounts	IAC-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize Multi-Factor Authentication (NFA) to authenticate loca access for privileged accounts.	5	
IA-2(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Out-of-Band Multi-Factor Authentication	IAC-06.4	Mechanisms exist to implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for access to privileged and non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is independently provided by a device separate from the system being accessed.	5	
IA-2(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Hardware Token-Based Authentication	IAC-10.7	Automated mechanisms exist to ensure organization-defined token quality requirements are satisfied for hardware token-based authentication.	5	
IA-2(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Information Assurance Enabled Products	TDA-02.2	Mechanisms exist to limit the use of commercially-provided Information. Assurance (IA) and A-enabled IT products to those products that have been successfully evaluated against a National Information Assurance partnership (NAP)-approved Protection Profile or the cryptographic module is FIPS-validated or NSA-approved.	5	
IA-2(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)	IAC-06	Automated mechanisms exist to enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for: (1) Remote network access; (2) Third-party Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS); and/or (3) Non-console access to critical TAAS that store, transmit and/or process sensitive/regulated data.	5	
IA-2(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Network Access to Privileged Accounts	IAC-06.1	Mechanisms exist to utilize Mutti-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate network access for privileged accounts.	5	
IA-2(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Network Access to Non- Privileged Accounts	IAC-06.2	Mechanisms exist to utilize MuIti-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate network access for non-privileged accounts.	5	
IA-2(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Local Access to Privileged Accounts	IAC-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate local access for privileged accounts.	5	
IA-2(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Out-of-Band Multi-Factor Authentication	IAC-06.4	Nechanisms exist to implement Multi-Factor Authentication (NFA) for access to privileged and non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is independently provided by a device separate from the system being accessed.	5	
IA-2(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Hardware Token-Based Authentication	IAC-10.7	Automated mechanisms exist to ensure organization-defined token quality requirements are satisfied for hardware token-based authentication.	5	
IA-2(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS	Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.	Functional	intersects with	Information Assurance Enabled Products	TDA-02.2	Nechanisms exist to limit the use of commercially-provided information Assurance (IA) and K-enabled IT products to those products that have been successfully evaluated against a National Information Assurance partnership (NAA7-approved Protection Profile or the cryptographic module is FIPS-validated or NSA-approved.	5	
IA-2(8)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   ACCESS TO ACCOUNTS — REPLAY RESISTANT IDENTIFICATION AND	Implement replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for access to privileged and non-privileged accounts.	Functional	equal	Replay-Resistant Authentication	IAC-02.2	Automated mechanisms exist to employ replay-resistant authentication.  Mechanisms exist to accept and electronically verify organizational Personal	10	
IA-2(12)	AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS	Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials.	Functional	equal	Acceptance of PIV Credentials	IAC-02.3	Identity Verification (PIV) credentials.	10	
IA-3	DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION	Uniquely identify and authenticate agency-managed devices before establishing network connections. In the instance of local connection, the device must be approved by the agency and the device must be identified and authenticated prior to connection to an agency asset.	Functional	equal	Identification & Authentication for Devices	IAC-04	Mechanisms exist to uniquely identify and centrally Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA) devices before establishing a connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically-based and replay resistant.	10	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
IA-4	IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT	Manage system identifiers by:  a. Receiving authorization from organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities to assign an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier;  b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device; c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device; and d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for one (1) year.	Functional	intersects with	Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA)	IAC-01.2	Mechanisms exist to strictly govern the use of Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA) solutions, both on-premises and those hosted by an External Service Provider (ESP).	5	
IA-4	IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT	Manage system identifiers by:  a. Receiving authorization from organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities to assign an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier;  b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device; c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device; and d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for one (1) year.	Functional	intersects with	Identifier Management (User Names)	IAC-09	Mechanisms exist to govern naming standards for usernames and Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).	5	
IA-4(4)	IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT   IDENTIFY USER STATUS	Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency or nonagency.	Functional	intersects with	Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA)	IAC-01.2	Mechanisms exist to strictly govern the use of Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA) solutions, both on-premises and those hosted by an External Service Provider (ESP).	5	
IA-4(4)	IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT   IDENTIFY USER STATUS	Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency or nonagency.	Functional	intersects with	User Identity (ID) Management	IAC-09.1	Mechanisms exist to ensure proper user identification management for non- consumer users and administrators.	5	
IA-4(4)	IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT   IDENTIFY USER STATUS	Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency or nonagency.	Functional	intersects with	Identity User Status	IAC-09.2	Mechanisms exist to identify contractors and other third-party users through unique username characteristics.	5	
IA-S	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT	Manage system authenticators by: a. Verliying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, cost, service, or device receiving the authenticators.  b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization: C. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended uses; d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticators institution, for fost or compromise or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators; e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use; f. Changing or refreshing authenticators annually or when there is evidence of authenticator information annually or when there is evidence of g. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification.  h. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators; and 3.  L. Changing authenticators or group or role accounts when membership to those accounts changes. 3.	Functional	intersects with	System Hardening Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02	Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for Echnology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.	5	
IA-5	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT	Manage system authenticators by: a. Verliying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, cost, service, or device receiving the authenticators. b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators is used by the organization; c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended uses; d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticators distribution, for lost or compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators; e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use; f. Changing or refreshing authenticators annually or when there is evidence of authenticatoring authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; f. Protecting authenticators content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; h. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators and such processing authenticators or content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; h. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators and such processing and such proce	Functional	intersects with	Authenticator Management	IAC-10	Mechanisms exist to:  (I) Securely manage authenticators for users and devices; and  (2) Ensure the strength of authentication is appropriate to the classification of the data being accessed.	5	
IA-5	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT	Manage system authenticators by: a. Verlifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, cole, service, or device receiving the authenticators.) b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any suthenticators issued by the organization; c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended uses; d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lots or compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators; e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use; f. Changing or refreshing authenticators annually or when there is evidence of authenticatoring authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; f. Requiring individuals to take, and an having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators; and	Functional	intersects with	Password-Based Authentication	IAC-10.1	Mechanisms exist to enforce complexity, length and lifespan considerations to ensure strong criteria for password-based authentication.	5	
IA-S	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT	Manage system authenticators by: a. Verliving, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, cole, service, or device receiving the authenticators. b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any suthenticators issued by the organization; c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended uses; d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticators distribution, for lost or componised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators; e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use; f. Changing or infessibling understituted to the content of the desired content of the des	Functional	intersects with	Protection of Authenticators	IAC-10.5	Mechanisms exist to protect authenticators commensurate with the sensitivity of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.	5	
IA-5	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT	Manage system authenticators by:  a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the molificial, group, rots, service, or device receiving the authenticator;  b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the content of the state of the	Functional	intersects with	Default Authenticators	IAC-10.8	Mechanisms exist to ensure default authenticators are changed as part of account creation or system installation.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
IA-5(1)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT   AUTHENTICATOR TYPES	(a) Hemotized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Mentania alia is commonly-used, sepected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly organized and passiphrases, including spaces and all printable characters; 3.  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators; 3.  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when spencies elect to follow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a preparame.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  (c) Epile within a maximum of 90 calendar days.  (d) Not be identicat to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (e) Not be displayed when entered.  6. If chosen by the subscriber, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in least.	Functional	intersects with	Authenticator Management	IAC-10	Mechanisms exist to:  (1) Securely manage authentication for users and devices; and (2) Ensure the strength of authentication is appropriate to the classification of the data being accessed.	(ogtonal)	
IA-5(1)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT I AUTHENTICATOR TYPES	(a) Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Melatianal laist commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or inflicatory;  2. Require immediate selection of an ewa password upon account recovery;3  3. Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and ast printable characters;3  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;3  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a proper name.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  (c) Expire within a maximum of 90 celendar days.  (d) Not be identicated to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (d) Not be disenticated to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (d) Not be disenticated to the previous ten (10) passwords.	Functional	intersects with	Out-of-Band Authentication (OOBA)	IAC-02.4	Mechanisms exist to implement Out-of-Band Authentication (OOBA) under specific conditions.	5	
IA-5(1)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT   AUTHENTICATOR TYPES	(a) Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Mentainal list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or inflicted recipitations.  2. Require immediate selection of an exp password upon account recovery.  3. Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to tollow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a proper name.  (b) Rote be discussed to the previous tent (10) passwords.  (c) Expire within a maximum of 90 calendar days.  (d) Not be displayed when entered.  (e) Not be displayed when entered.	Functional	intersects with	Authenticator Management	IAC-10	Mechanisms exist to: (1) Securely mage authenticators for users and devices; and (2) Ensure the strength of authentication is appropriate to the classification of the data being accessed.	5	
IA-S(1)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT   AUTHENTICATOR TYPES	(a) Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Melantian lais lat commonly—use opected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly.  2. Require immediate selection of a new password upon account recovery;  3. Allow user selection of negative passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;  3. Allow user selection of the passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password suthernicators;  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a proper name.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  (c) Expire within a maximum of 90 calendar days.  (d) Not be displayed when entered.  6. If chosen by the subscriber, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in	Functional	intersects with	Password-Based Authentication	IAC-10.1	Mechanisms exist to enforce complexity, length and lifespan considerations to ensure strong criteria for password-based authentication.	5	
IA-5(1)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT   AUTHENTICATOR TYPES	Jacoth John Monizord Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Natinatian list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quentry and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly;  2. Require immediate selection of an exp password upon account recovery;  3. Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characteris;  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password suthenticators;  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a proper name.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  (c) Exper within a maximum of 90 calender days.  (d) Not be identicat to the previous ten (10) passwords.	Functional	intersects with	Automated Support For Password Strength	IAC-10.4	Automated mechanisms exist to determine if password authenticators are sufficiently strong enough to satisfy organization-defined password length and complexity requirements.	5	
IA-S(t)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT   AUTHENTICATOR TYPES	6. If chosen by the aubscriber, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in learn.  (a) Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  (a) Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Mentania lais ist of commoniby-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or inflictors.  2. Require immediate selection of an ewe password upon account recovery;3  3. Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;3  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;3  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a proper name.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  (c) Expire within a maximum of 90 calendar days.  (d) Not be diefinicated to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (e) Not be diefinicated to the previous ten (10) passwords.  6. If chosen by the subscriber, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in least.	Functional	intersects with	Protection of Authenticators	IAC-10.5	Mechanisms exist to protect authenticators commensurate with the sensitivity of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.	5	
IA-5(2)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT   PUBLIC KEY BASED AUTHENTICATION	(a) For public key-based authentication:  I. Enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key; and  2. Mag the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and  (b) When public key-instructurus (PG) is used:  1. validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted rust andon, including checking certificated status information; and  2. Implement a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and  validation.	Functional	intersects with	Dynamic Management	IAC-09.3	Mechanisms exist to dynamically manage usernames and system identifiers.	5	
IA-5(2)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT   PUBLIC KEY BASED AUTHENTICATION	(a) For public key-based authentication:  1. Entorce authorized access to the corresponding private key; and  2. May the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and  (b) When public key infrastructure (PKI) is used:  1. Validates certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted rust anchor, including checking certificate status information; and  2. Implement a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation.	Functional	intersects with	PKI-Based Authentication	IAC-10.2	Automated mechanisme exist to validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor including checking certificate status information for PRI-based authentication.	5	
IA-5(6)	AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT   PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS	Protect authenticators commensurate with the security category of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.  Obscure feedback of authentication information during the authentication process	Functional	equal	Protection of Authenticators	IAC-10.5	Mechanisms exist to protect authenticators commensurate with the sensitivity of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.  Mechanisms exist to obscure the feedback of authentication information during	10	
IA-6	AUTHENTICATION FEEDBACK CRYPTOGRAPHIC	to protect the information from possible exploitation and use by unauthorized individuals.  Implement mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the	Functional	equal	Authenticator Feedback  Cryptographic Module	IAC-11	the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.  Automated mechanisms exist to enable systems to authenticate to a	10	
IA-7	MODULE AUTHENTICATION	requirements of applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines for such authentication.	Functional	intersects with	Authentication	CRY-02	cryptographic module.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
IA-7	CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE	Implement mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations,	Functional	intersects with	Cryptographic Module Authentication	IAC-12	Mechanisms exist to ensure cryptographic modules adhere to applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for security strength.	(optional) 5	
IA-8	AUTHENTICATION  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON- ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)	standards, and guidelines for such authentication.  Uniquely identify and authenticate non-organizational users or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users.	Functional	equal	Identification & Authentication for Non- Organizational Users	IAC-03	Mechanisms exist to uniquely identify and centrally Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA) third-party users and processes that provide services to the organization.	10	
IA-8(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON- ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIES	Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compilant credentials from other federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial (SLTI) agencies.	Functional	equal	Acceptance of PIV Credentials from Other Organizations	IAC-03.1	Mechanisms exist to accept and electronically verify Personal identity Verification (PV) credentials from third-parties.	10	
IA-8(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON- ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   ACCEPTANCE OF EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATORS	(a) Accept only external authenticators that are NIST-compliant; and (b) Document and maintain a list of accepted external authenticators.	Functional	equal	Acceptance of Third-Party Credentials	IAC-03.2	Automated mechanisms exist to accept Federal identity, Cradential and Access Management (FICAM)-approved third-party credentials.	10	
IA-8(4)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON- ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   USE OF DEFINED PROFILES	Conform to the following profiles for identity management: Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) or OpenID Connect.	Functional	equal	Use of FICAM-Issued Profiles	IAC-03.3	Mechanisms exist to conform systems to Federal Identity, Credential and Access Management (FICAM)-Issued profiles.	10	
IA-11	RE-AUTHENTICATION	Require users to re-authenticate when: roles, authenticators, or credentials change, security categories of systems change, the execution of privileged functions occur, or every 12 hours.	Functional	equal	Re-Authentication	IAC-14	Mechanisms exist to force users and devices to re-authenticate according to organization-defined circumstances that necessitate re-authentication.	10	
IA-12	IDENTITY PROOFING	Lidentity proof uners that require accounts for logical access to systems based on appropriate identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable standards and guidelines: N. Resche user identities to a unique individual; and c. Collect, unidates, and verify identity evidence. I clientity proof uners that require accounts for logical access to systems based on	Functional	intersects with	Identity Proofing (Identity Verification)	IAC-28	Mechanisms exist to verify the identity of a user before issuing authenticators or modifying access permissions.  Mechanisms exist to conduct in-person or trusted third-party identify verification	5	
IA-12	IDENTITY PROOFING	appropriate identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable standards and guidelines;  b. Resolve user identities to a unique individual; and  c. Collect, validate, and verify identity evidence.	Functional	intersects with	In-Person or Trusted Third- Party Registration	IAC-10.3	before user accounts for third-parties are created.	5	
IA-12(2)	IDENTITY PROOFING   IDENTITY EVIDENCE	Require evidence of individual identification be presented to the registration authority.  a. Require that the presented identity evidence be validated and verified through	Functional	equal	Identity Evidence	IAC-28.2	Mechanisms exist to require evidence of individual identification to be presented to the registration authority.	10	
IA-12(3)	IDENTITY PROOFING   IDENTITY EVIDENCE VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION	a. Require that the prisement obsertly evidence to valuntee alon verification methods. Jagency-defined resolution, validation, and verification methods. In identity proofing SHALL NOT be performed to determine suitability or entitlement to gain access to services or benefits. c. 1. Collection of PII SHALL be limited to the minimum necessary to validate the valuncial edirection in gene context. 2. Collection of PII SHALL be limited to the minimum necessary to validate the existence of the claimed identity and associate the claimed identity with the applicant providing identity evidence for appropriate identity resolution, validation, and verification.	Functional	equal	Identity Evidence Validation & Verification	IAC-28.3	Mechanisms exist to require that the presented identity evidence be validated and verified through organizational-defined methods of validation and verification.	10	
IA-12(5)	IDENTITY PROOFING   ADDRESS CONFIRMATION	a. Require that a registration code or notice of proofing be delivered through an out- of-band channel to verify the users address (physical or digital) of record. b. The CSP SHALL confirm address of record	Functional	equal	Address Confirmation	IAC-28.5	Mechanisms exist to require that a notice of proofing be delivered through an out- of-band channel to verify the user's address (physical or digital).	10	
IR-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	as Develop, document, and disseminate to all presonnel when their unrescorted logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CII: 1, Agency-level Indient response policy that: (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, disectives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and compliance; and CII and CII are associated inclient response policy and the associated inclient response policy and the associated inclient response controls:  D. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the incident response policy and procedures; and  C. Review and update the current incident response. 2011.  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized ascess to CII or systems used to process, struce, or transmit CII and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized sceeped to the process to CII or systems used to process.	Functional	subset of	Incident Response Operations	IRO-01	Mechanisms exist to implement and govern processes and documentation to fracilitate an organization-wide response capability for cybersecurity and data protection-related incidents.	10	
IR-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	access to CII or externs used to encoses, atone, or transmit CIII.  a. Develop, document, and disseminate to all personnel when their unescorted logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modity, or make use of unencrypted CIII.  1. Agency-level incident response policy that: (a) Addresses purposes, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) (is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and (c) Exceedives to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and the associated incident response controls; (b) Designates an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the incident response policy and procedures; and (c). Review and update the current incident responses: 3  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized secess to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and 2. Procedures or navally and following any sequenty incidents involving unauthorized secess to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CIII; and 2. Develop, decounter, and dissemination to all personnel when their unescorted	Functional	intersects with	IRP Update	IRO-04.2	Mechanisms exist to regularly review and modify incident response practices to incorporate lessons learned, business process changes and industry developments, as necessary.	5	
IR-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CII.  1. Agency-level inclient response policy that:  1. Agency-level inclient response compliance; and  (1) I consistent with applicable leave, security or orders, directives, regulations,  policies, standards, and guidelines; and  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and  the associated inclient response controlis;  1. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development,  and  C. Review and update the current incident response policy and procedures;  and  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized  access to CI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized  access to CI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII in unauthorized  access to CI or systems used to process.	Functional	intersects with	Root Cause Analysis (RCA) & Lessons Learned	IRO-13	Mechanisms exist to incorporate lessons learned from analyzing and resolving cybersecuting and data protection incidents to reduce the likelihood or impact of future incidents.	5	
IR-2	INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING INCIDENT RESPONSE	a. Provide incident response training to system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities.  1. Prior to assuming an incident response role or responsibility or acquiring system access;  2. When required by system changes; and  3. Annually thereafter; and  b. Review and update incident response training content annually and following any security incidents into wiving unsuthorized access to CLI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CLI.  Provide incident response training on how to identify and respond to a breach,	Functional	equal	Incident Response Training	IRO-05	Mechanisms exist to train personnel in their incident response roles and responsibilities.  Mechanisms exist to train personnel in their incident response roles and	10	
IR-2(3)	TRAINING   BREACH	including the organization's process for reporting a breach. Test the effectiveness of the incident response capability for the system annually	Functional	equal	Incident Response Training	IRO-05	responsibilities.  Mechanisms exist to formally test incident response capabilities through realistic	10	
IR-3 IR-3(2)	TESTING  INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING   COORDINATION WITH	using the following tests: tabletop or walk-through exercises; simulations; or other agency-appropriate tests.  Coordinate incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for related name.	Functional	equal	Incident Response Testing  Coordination with Related Plans	IRO-06.1	exercises to determine the operational effectiveness of those capabilities.  Mechanisms exist to coordinate incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.	10	
	RELATED PLANS	related plans.			Plans				



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
IR-4	INCIDENT HANDLING	a. Implement an incident handling capability for incidents that is consistent with the incident response plan and includes perparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery;  b. D. Coordinate incident handling activities with contingency planning activities; c. Incorporate leasons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response procedures, training, and testing, and implement the resulting changes accordingly; and d. Ensure the rigor, intensity, scope, and results of incident handling activities are commonated and ordinates have result and the constraint of the commonated and ordinates have resulted in the constraint or the commonated and ordinates have resulted in the commonate and the commonated and ordinates have resulted in the common the commonates and the commonates and conditions are considered as a common the common the common the common than the common that the common that the common the common that t	Functional	equal	Incident Handling	IRO-02	Mechanisms exist to cover: (1) Preparation; (2) Automated event detection or manual incident report intake; (3) Analysis; (4) Containment; (5) Eradication; and (6) Recovery.	10	
IR-4(1)	INCIDENT HANDLING   AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES	Support the incident handling process using automated mechanisms (e.g., online incident management systems and tools that support the collection of live response data, full network packet capture, and forensic analysis.	Functional	equal	Automated Incident Handling Processes	IRO-02.1	Automated mechanisms exist to support the incident handling process.	10	
IR-5	INCIDENT MONITORING	Track and document incidents.	Functional	equal	Situational Awareness For Incidents	IRO-09	Mechanisms exist to document, monitor and report the status of cybersecurity and data protection incidents to internal stakeholders all the way through the resolution of the incident.	10	
IR-6	INCIDENT REPORTING	a. Require personnel to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident response capability immediately but not to exceed one (1) how after discovery; and b. Report incident information to organizational personnel with incident handling responsibilities, and if confirmed, notify the CSO, SIB Chief, or interface Agency Official.	Functional	intersects with	Contacts With Authorities	GOV-06	Mechanisms exist to identify and document appropriate contacts with relevant law enforcement and regulatory bodies.	5	
IR-6	INCIDENT REPORTING	a. Require personnel to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident response capability immediately but not to exceed one (1) hour after discovery and b. Report incident information to organizational personnel with incident handling responsibilities, and if continued, notify the CSO, SIB Chief, or Interface Agency Official.	Functional	intersects with	Incident Stakeholder Reporting	IRO-10	Mechanisms exist to timely-sport incidents to applicable: (1) Internal stakeholders; (2) Affected clients & third-parties; and (3) Regulatory authorities.	5	
IR-6	INCIDENT REPORTING	a. Require personnel to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident response capability immediately but not to exceed one (1) how after discovery and b. Report incident information to organizational personnel with incident handling responsibilities, and if continued, notify the CSO, SIB Chief, or Interface Agency Official.	Functional	intersects with	Regulatory & Law Enforcement Contacts	IRO-14	Mechanisms exist to maintain incident response contacts with applicable regulatory and law enforcement agencies.	5	
IR-6(1)	INCIDENT REPORTING   AUTOMATED REPORTING	Report incidents using automated mechanisms.	Functional	equal	Automated Reporting	IRO-10.1	Automated mechanisms exist to assist in the reporting of cybersecurity and data protection incidents.	10	
IR-6(3)	INCIDENT REPORTING   SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION	Provide incident information to the provider of the product or service and other organizations involved in the supply chain or supply chain governance for systems or system components related to the incident.	Functional	equal	Supply Chain Coordination	IRO-10.4	Mechanisms exist to provide cybersecurity and data protection incident information to the provider of the Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) and other organizations involved in the supply chain for TAAS related to the	10	
IR-7	INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE	Provide an incident response support resource, integral to the organizational incident response capability, that offers advice and assistance to users of the system for the handling and reporting of incidents.	Functional	equal	Incident Reporting Assistance	IRO-11	Incident.  Mechanisms exist to provide incident response advice and assistance to users of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) for the handling and reporting of actual and potential cybersecurity and data protection incidents.	10	
IR-7(1)	INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE   AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION AND SUPPORT	Increase the availability of incident response information and support using automated mechanisms described in the discussion.	Functional	equal	Automation Support of Availability of Information / Support	IRO-11.1	Automated mechanisms exist to increase the availability of incident response- related information and support.	10	
IR-8	INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN	s. Develop an incident response plan that:  1. Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response capability.  2. Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability.  3. Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall organization;  4. Meats the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, and functions;  5. Defines reportable incidents;  6. Defines reportable incidents;  7. Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature an incident response capability within the organization;  7. Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature an incident response capability.  8. Addresses the sharing of incident information;  9. Is reviewed and approved by the organization fagency's executive leadership annually, and  10. Explicitly designates responsibility for incident response to organizational personnel with incident resporse parts to organizational personnel with incident negoring responsibilities and GSO or CISI WAN Official.  b. Distribute copies of the incident response plan to address system and organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;  d. Communicate incident response plan to address system and organizational personnel with incident the incident response plan to address system and organizational personnel with incident the incident response plan franges to organizational personnel with incident the incident response plan in might mentation, execution, or testing;  a. Protect the incident response plan franges to organizational personnel with incident fresponse plan franges to organizational	Functional	equat	Incident Response Plan (IRP)	IRO-04	Mechanisms exist to maintain and make available a current and viable incident Response Plan (IRP) to all stakeholders.	10	
IR-8(1)	INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN   BREACHES	Include the following in the incident Response Plan for breaches involving personally identifies information: a. A process to determine if notice to individuals or other organizations, including oversight organizations, in needed: b. An assessment process to determine the extent of the harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or untainness to affected individuals and any mechanisms to mitigate such harms; and c. (identification of applicable privacy requirements.	Functional	subset of	Data Breach	IRO-04.1	Mechanisms exist to address data breaches, or other incidents involving the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or regulated data, according to applicable laws, regulations and contractual obligations.	10	
MA-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities:     [1, agency-level maintenance policy that:     [1, agency-level maintenance policy that:     [1, agency-level maintenance policy that:     [1, agency-level maintenance policy and the coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and     [1, agency-level maintenance; and consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, poolicies, standards, and guidelines, and consistent with a guideline property of the maintenance policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current maintenance policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current maintenance policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current maintenance;     [1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4,	Functional	intersects with	Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation	GOV-02	Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity and data protection policies, standards and procedures.	5	
MA-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	a. Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities:  1. Agency-level maintenance policy that: [1. Agency-level maintenance policy and the compliance; and [1. Agency-level maintenance or organizations a entities, and compliance; and [1. Agency-level maintenance policy and the associated maintenance controls; [1. Agency-level maintenance policy and the associated maintenance controls; [1. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and C. Review and update the current maintenance; [1. Agency-level maintenance] [1. Age	Functional	intersects with	Periodic Review & Update of Cybersecurity & Data Protection Program	GOV-03	Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity and data protection program, including policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or it significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
MA-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	a. Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities:  1, Agency-level maintenance policy that:  1(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and  (b) la consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,  pocilicies, standards, and guidelines, actives, regulations or  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and the  associated maintenance controls;  D. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development,  documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and  C. Review and update the current maintenance policy and procedures; and  C. Review and update the current maintenance policy in a  C. Review and update the current maintenance or  C. Person and the process of the control of  C. Person and the process, store, or transmit CII; and  C. Procedures annually and following any savecurity incidents involving unauthorized  access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII.	Functional	subset of	Maintenance Operations	MNT-01	Mechanisms exist to develop, disseminate, review & update procedures to facilitate the implementation of maintenance controls across the enterprise.	10	
MA-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities:     1. Agency-level maintenance policy that:     1. Agency-level maintenance policy and the coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and     1b) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, oppositions, standards, and guidelines, active directives, regulations, oppositions, standards, and guidelines, and produces to the maintenance policy and the associated maintenance controls;     1. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and     1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and     1. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII.	Functional	intersects with	Auditing Remote Maintenance	MNT-05.1	Mechanisms exist to audit remote, non-local maintenance and diagnostic sessions, as well as review the maintenance action performed during remote maintenance sessions.	5	
MA-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	a. Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities:  1. Agancy-level maintenance policy that:  (a) Addresses purpose, zeope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, seacutive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and compliance; and  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and the associated maintenance controls;  b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current maintenance, policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current maintenance.  C. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and	Functional	intersects with	Remote Maintenance Notifications	MNT-05.2	Mechaniams exist to require maintenance personnel to notify affected stakeholders when remote, non-local maintenance is planned (e.g., date/time).	5	
MA-2	CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE	a. Schedule, document, and review records of maintenance, repair, and replacement on system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements;  b. Approve and monitor at it maintenance activities, whether performed on site or continuous control or an accordance of the control of the system components are serviced on site or convexed to another location;  c. Require that organizational personnel with information security and privacy reappropriately the control of the system organization or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, or replacement, of sanitize equipment to remove information from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, replacement, of estruction;  c. Check all potentially impacted controls to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following minimenance, repair, or replacement actions; and f. Include the following information in organizational maintenance records:  1. Component arenal number  2. Component aminimenance  4. Maintenance performed  5. Name(e) of entity performing maintenance including escort if required.	Functional	equat	Controlled Maintenance	MNT-02	Mechaniams exist to conduct controlled maintenance activities throughout the lifecycle of the system, application or service.	10	
MA-3	MAINTENANCE TOOLS	a. Approve, control, and monitor the use of system maintenance tools; and b. Review previously approved system maintenance tools prior to each use.	Functional	equal	Maintenance Tools	MNT-04	Mechanisms exist to control and monitor the use of system maintenance tools.	10	
MA-3(1)	INSPECT TOOLS	unauthorized modifications.	Functional	equal	Inspect Tools	MNT-04.1	Mechanisms exist to inspect maintenance tools carried into a facility by maintenance personnel for improper or unauthorized modifications.	10	
MA-3(2) MA-3(3)	MAINTENANCE TOOLS   INSPECT MEDIA  MAINTENANCE TOOLS   PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL	Check modia containing disposatic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in the system.  Prevent the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by:  a. Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment;  b. Santizing or destroying the equipment;  c. Retaining the equipment within the facility or  d. Obtaining an exemption from organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.	Functional	equal equal	Inspect Media  Prevent Unauthorized Removal	MNT-04.2	Mechanisms exist to check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media ex used.  Mechanisms exist to prevent or control the removal of equipment undergoing maintenance that containing organizational information.	10	
MA-4	NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE	Approve and monitor nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities;     b. Allow the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and documented in the security plan for the system;     c. Employ strong authentication in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions;     d. Maintain records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and     . Ferminats session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.	Functional	intersects with	Remote Maintenance	MNT-05	Mechanisms exist to authorize, monitor and control remote, non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities.	5	
MA-4	NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE	a. Approve and monitor nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; b. Allow the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and documented in the security plan for the system; c. Employ strong authentication in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions; d. Maintain records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and e. Terminate session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.	Functional	intersects with	Remote Maintenance Notifications	MNT-05.2	Mechanisms exist to require maintenance personnel to notify affected stakeholders when remote, non-local maintenance is planned (e.g., date/time).	5	
MA-5	MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL	a. Establish a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintain a list of suthorized maintenance organizations or personnel; b. Verify that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the system possess the required access suthorizations; and c. Designate organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not cossess the required access authorizations.	Functional	equal	Authorized Maintenance Personnel	MNT-06	Mechanisms exist to maintain a current list of authorized maintenance organizations or personnel.  Mechanisms exist to obtain maintenance support and/or spare parts for	10	
MA-6	TIMELY MAINTENANCE		Functional	equal	Timely Maintenance	MNT-03	Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) within a defined Recovery Time Objective (RTO).	10	
MP-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	a. Develop, document, and disseminate to authorized individuals:  1. Agency-level media protection policy that:  (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among agency entities, and compliance: and  (b) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and guidelines.  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and the associated media protection. Development, documentation, and dissemination of the media protection policy and procedures; and  2. Review and update the current media protection:  2. Projecy at least annually and following any security incidents involving digital and/or non-digital media; and	Functional	subset of	Data Protection	DCH-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls.	10	
MP-2	MEDIA ACCESS	and/or non-digital mardia Restrict access to digital and non-digital media to authorized individuals.	Functional	intersects with	Media Access	DCH-03	Mechanisms exist to control and restrict access to digital and non-digital media to authorized individuals.	5	



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FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
MP-2	MEDIA ACCESS	Restrict access to digital and non-digital media to authorized individuals.	Functional	intersects with	Enterprise Device Management (EDM)	END-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of Enterprise Device Management (EDM) controls.	5	
MP-4	MEDIA STORAGE	Is Physically control and securely store digital and non-digital media within physically secure locations or controlled areas and encyte. Cli on digital media when physical and personnal restrictions are not feasible; and b. Protect system media physic defined in PM-4 surful the media are distryed or sanitated using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures. In Protect and control digital and non-digital media to help prevent compromise of	Functional	equal	Media Storage	DCH-06	"Antiquement (city) consent to Mechanisms seat to: Mechanisms seat to: I was a seat to: I was a seat to: Controlled uses using againstein-defined security measures; and City Protect yethm media until the media are destroyed or santized using accrosed equipment, techniques and crocodures.	10	
MP-5	MEDIA TRANSPORT	the data during transport outside of the physically secure locations or controlled areas using encryption, as defined in Section 5.0.1.2 of the Policy, Physical media will be protected at the same level as the information would be protected in sectronic form. Restrict the activities associated with transport of electronic and physical media to authorized personnel; N. Amintain accountability for system media during transport outside of the physically secure location or controlled areas: C. Document activities associated with the transport of system media; and d. Restrict the activities associated with the transport of system media to authorized oersonnel.	Functional	equal	Media Transportation	DCH-07	rections and stakes to protect and control organization and visit registal measures transport outside of controlled areas using appropriate security measures.	10	
MP-6	MEDIA SANITIZATION	a. Sanitize or destroy digital and non-digital media prior to disposal, release out of agency control, or release for reuse using overwite technicogy at least three times or deguas digital media prior to disposal or release for reuse by unauthorized midviduals, inoperable digital media with to destroyed (cut up, shredded, etc.). Physical media will be securely disposed of when no longer needed for investigative or security purposes, whichever is later. Physical media will be destroyed by crosscut shredding or indineration; and to the processor disposal or indineration; and be also the processor disposal or indineration; and be the processor disposal or indineration; and be the processor disposal or indineration; and the strength and integrity commensurate with the security steapon or classification of the information.	Functional	intersects with	Physical Media Disposal	DCH-08	Mechanisms exist to securely dispose of media when it is no longer required, using formal procedures.	5	
MP-6	MEDIA SANITIZATION	a. Sanitize or destroy digital and non-digital media prior to disposal, release out of agency control, or release for reuse using overwite technicog at least three times or deguas digital media prior to disposal or release for reuse by unauthorized individuals. Inoperable digital media with be destroyed cut up, shredded, etc.). Physical media with be seturyl disposed of when no longer needed for investigative or security purposes, whichever is later. Physical media will be destroyed by crosscut shredding or incineration; and b. Employ sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with the security category or classification of the information. Sanitize or destroy digital and non-figital media prior to disposal, release out of	Functional	intersects with	System Media Sanitization	DCH-09	Machanisms exist to sanitize system media with the strength and integrity commensurate with the classification or sensitivy of the information prior to disposal, release out of organizational control or release for reuse.	5	
MP-6	MEDIA SANITIZATION	a. Saminze or destroy tigicis and inchruighain must princt to slapsoss, release out or agency control, or release for reuse using overwrite etchnicity at least three times or degatas digital media prior to disposal or release for reuse by unauthorized inchividuals. Inoperable digital media with ble estroyde (cut up, shredded, etc.), Physical media will be securely disposed of when no longer needed for investigative or security purposes, whichever is later. Physical media will be destroyed by crossout shredding or indineration; and is a strength and integrity commensurate with the security category or classification of the information.	Functional	intersects with	Sanitization of Personal Data (PD)	DCH-09.3	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the sanitization of Personal Data (PD).	5	
MP-7	MEDIA USE	a. Restrict the use of digital and non-digital media on agency owned systems that have been approved for use in the storage, processing, or transmission of criminal justice information by using technical, populacid, or administrative controls (examples below); and b. Prohibit the use of personally owned digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information, and c. Prohibit the use of digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information when such devices have no identificate owner.	Functional	intersects with	Media Use	DCH-10	Mechanisms exist to restrict the use of types of digital media on systems or system components.	5	
MP-7	MEDIA USE	a. Restrict the use of digital and non-digital media on agency owned systems that have been approved for use in the storage, processing, or transmission of criminal justice information by using technical, hypical, or administrative controls (examples below); and b. Prohibit the use of personally owned digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information, and c. Prohibit the use of digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information when such divides have no identificate owner.	Functional	intersects with	Prohibit Use Without Owner		Mechanisms exist to prohibit the use of portable storage devices in organizational systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.	5	
MP-7	MEDIA USE	a. Restrict the use of digital and non-digital media on agency owned systems that have been approved for use in the storage, processing, or transmission of criminal justice information by using technical, hypriscal, or administrative controls (examples below); and b. Prohibit the use of personally owned digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information, and c. Prohibit the use of digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that at one, process, or transmit criminal justice information when such devices have no identifiable owner.	Functional	intersects with	Media & Data Retention	DCH-18	Mechanisms exist to retain media and data in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations.	5	
SA-22	UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS	a. Replace system components when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer, or b. Provide the following options for stitemative sources for continued support for unsupported components: original manufacturer support, or original contracted world rupport.	Functional	intersects with	Unsupported Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS)	TDA-17	Mechanisms exist to prevent unsupported Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) by: (1) Removing and/or replacing TAAS when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor or manufacturers and (2) Requiring justification and documented approval for the continued use of unsupported TAAS required to satisfy mission/fusienses needs.	5	
SA-22	UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS	a. Replace system components when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer; or b. Provide the following options for atternative sources for continued support for unsupported components: original manufacturer support, or original contracted windor support.	Functional	intersects with	Alternate Sources for Continued Support	TDA-17.1	Mechanisms exist to provide in-house support or contract external providers for support with unsupported Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services	5	
SI-1	POLICY AND PROCEDURES	a. Develop, document, and disseminate to all organizational personnel with system and information integity responsibilities and information system owners:  1. Agency-level System and information integry policy that it (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and quite of the coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and quite of the coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and quite of the coordination of the system and information integrity controls;  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity controls;  3. Desligants organizations personnel with system and information, and dissemination of the organization of the system and information, and dissemination of the organization of the complete integrity controls;  5. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity.  6. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  8. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  9. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  9. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  9. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;  1. Posicy and update the current system and information integrity controls;	Functional	subset of	Secure Engineering Principles	SEA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of industry-ecognized cybersecurity and data protection practices in the specification, design, development, implementation and modification of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).	10	
SI-2	FLAW REMEDIATION	a. Identify, report, and correct system flave; b. Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation; 2 c. Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within the number of days listed after the testess of the updates; 5  **Critical - 15 days  **Hedium - 60 days  **Medium - 60 days  d. Incorporate flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.	Functional	intersects with	Automatic Antimalware Signature Updates	END-04.1	Automated mechanisms exist to update antimativare technologies, including signature definitions.	5	
SI-2	FLAW REMEDIATION	As Identify, report, and correct system flaves;  D. Tast software and firmware updates related to flav remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation; 2.  Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within the number of days listed after the release of the updates; 5.  **Citical - 15 days  **Hegin - 30 days  **Hegin - 50 days  **Citical - 10, days, and  d. Incorporate flav remediation into the organizational configuration management discosess.	Functional	subset of	Vulnerability & Patch Management Program (VPMP)	VPM-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of vulnerability management controls.	10	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
SI-2	FLAW REMEDIATION	a. Identify, report, and correct system flaws;  b. Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation;  c. Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within the number of days listed dare the release of the updates;  *Critical - 15 days  *High - 30 days  *Medium - 60 days  *Low - 80 days, and  d. Incorporate flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management	Functional	intersects with	Software & Firmware Patching	VPM-05	Mechanisms exist to conduct software patching for all deployed Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS), including firmware.	5	
SI-2(2)	FLAW REMEDIATION   AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS	orocess.  Determine if system components have applicable security-relevant software and firmware updates installed using vulnerability scanning tools as least quarterly or following any security incidents involving CJI or systems used to process, store, or	Functional	equal	Automated Remediation Status	VPM-05.2	Automated mechanisms exist to determine the state of system components with regard to flaw remediation.	10	
SI-3	MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION	transmit CB.  In Implement signature-based mallicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code; 2  In Automatically judate malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are evaluable in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;  C. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:  1. Perform periodic acans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and ext points and on all servers and endpoint devices as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and  2. Block or quaranten malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send alert to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and d. Address the receipt of fisials positives during malicious code detection and endication and the resulting potential impact on the evaluability of the system.	Functional	intersects with	Automatic Antimalware Signature Updates	END-04.1	Automated mechanisms exist to update antimalware technologies, including signature definitions.	5	
SI-3	MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION	Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system withy and soit points to detect and endicate malicious code; 2  A utomatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are evaluable in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;  C. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:  1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and exit points and on all severs and endpoint devices as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and  2. Block or quarantine malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send aier to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and 5  d. Address the receipt of fistale positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting potential impact on the evaluability of the system.	Functional	intersects with	Heuristic / Nonsignature- Based Detection	END-04.4	Mechanisms exist to utilize heuristic / nonsignature-based antimalware detection capabilities.	5	
SI-3	MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION	a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and ext points to detect and eradicate malicious code; 2  Automaticatly update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.  In extra the configuration of the configuration management policy and procedures.  In Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of fles tome activate sources at network or thy and exit points and on all enterers and endpoint devices as the filter are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and  2. Block or quarantine malicious code, take mitigating action(a), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send sief to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and d. Address the reselit of first be positive during malicious code detection and endication and the resulting potential impact on the evaluability of the system.	Functional	intersects with	Sateguarding Data Over Open Networks	NET-12	Cyptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cyptography and security protocols to adequard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.	5	
SI-3	MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION	a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and ear points to detect and eradicate malicious code; 3. Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases. Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases and procedures; considerate with organizational configuration management policy and grocedures; configuration mechanisms to: 1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and exit points and an all seners and endpoint devices as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and 2. Block or quarantine malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send aider to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and 3. Address the receipt of fistale positives during malicious code detection and arriadication and the resulting potential impact on the evaluability of the system.	Functional	intersects with	Input Data Validation	TDA-18	Machanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.	5	
SI-3	MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION	a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code; 2 b. Automatically judate malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures; c. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to: 1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and exit points and on all severs and employind device as the files are downloader, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and 2. Block or quantism malicious code, take miligating action(s), and when nacessary, implement incident response procedures; and send afair to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and 5. A. Address the eceipt of files positives during malicious code detection; and sendication and the resulting potential impact on the evaluation of the resulting potential impact on the evaluation of the resulting potential impact on the evaluation potential positions.	Functional	intersects with	Vulnerability & Patch Management Program (VPMP)	VPM-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of vulnerability management controls.	5	
SI-3	MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION	a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and ext points to detect and eradicate malicious code; 2. Automatically against malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.  C. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:  1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and explorits and on all severes and explorit serious as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and Section of the serious control of the conditional control of the serious	Functional	intersects with	Software & Firmware Patching	VPM-05	Mechanisms exist to conduct software patching for all deployed Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS), including firmware.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (ontional)	Notes (optional)
SI-4	SYSTEM MONITORING	a. Monitor the system to detect:  1. Artacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives: a. Intrusion detection and prevention b. Malicious code protection b. Malicious code protection d. Audit record monitoring d. Audit record monitoring e. Network monitoring f. Firewall monitoring; and 2. Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections; b. Identify unauthorized use of the system through the following techniques and methods: event logging (ref. 5. A Audit and Accountability); c. Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices: 1. Strategically within the systems to collect organization-determined essential information; and 2. Art and no locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization; d. Analyze detected events and anomalies; e. Adjust the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation; C Obtain legal opinion regarding system monitoring settivity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation; C Obtain legal opinion regarding system monitoring settivity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations code protection software, securing the organization of protection software, securing the organization advanced from the organization personnel with information and record monitoring securing personnel personnel with information and record monitoring securing personnel organization with minimation and record monitoring personnel personnel with information and record monitoring securing personnel organization and record monitoring activities and general personnel with information and record monitoring security personnel personnel with information and record monitoring activities and general personnel with information and record monitoring activities.	Functional	subset of	Continuous Monitoring	MON-01	Machaniams exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-wide monitoring controls.	10	
SI-4	SYSTEM MONITORING	A Modified the system to detect:  1. Artacks and indicators or potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives:  a. Intrusion detection and prevention  b. Malicious code protection  c. Vulnerability scanning  d. Audit record monitoring  d. Audit record monitoring  d. Audit record monitoring  2. Unsurbinity and monitoring  2. Unsurbinity and monitoring  3. Unsurbinity and monitoring  and  2. Unsurbinity and monitoring  3. Unsurbinity and the system through the following techniques and methods: event logging (ref. 5.4 Audit and Accountability):  c. Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices:  1. Strategically within the system to colicit organization-determined essential information; and  2. Ad a hot locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization within the system to colicit organization-determined essential information; and  2. Analyze detected events and anomalies;  a. Adjust the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organization logarization and sease, in device organization and sease, in the level of system monitoring activities; and  g. Provide intrusion detection and prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring incompany and freewall monitoring soltware logs to organizational personnel with information and development monitoring soltware with information and prevention systems, malicious one protection and record monitoring soltware logs to organizational personnel with information and record monitoring soltware logs to organizational personnel with information and record monitoring soltware logs to organization and prevention systems, malicious code protection and record monitoring soltware logs to organizational personnel with information and record monitoring soltware logs to organizational personnel with information and record monitoring soltware logs to organizational personnel with information and record monitoring s	Functional	intersects with	Centralized Collection of Security Event Logs	MON-02	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Sacurity incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event logs.	5	
SI-4	SYSTEM MONITORING	1. Attacks and indicators of potential stracks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives: a. Intrusion detection and prevention b. Mildicious code protection c. Vulneability acanning d. Audit record monitoring e. Network monitoring 2. Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections; b. Identify unauthorized use of the system through the following techniques and methods: event logging (erf. 5.4 Audit and Accountability); c. Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices: 1. Strategically within the systems to collect organization-determined essential internation; and 2. At all no locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization; d. Analysic detected events and anomalies; e. Adjust the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation; f. Obtain legal opinion regarding system monitoring activities; and p. Provide intrusion detection and prevention systems, malticious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring software promoned with information.	Functional	intersects with	Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks	NET-12	Cyptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to afleguand sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.	5	
SI-4		A Tacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives:  a. I Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives:  a. Infrusion defection and prevention  b. Malicious code protection  c. Vulnerability scanning  d. Audit record monitoring  e. Network monitoring  7. Firewalt monitoring:  and  2. Linauthorized local, network, and remote connections:  b. Identify insulationized use of the system through the following techniques and methods: event logging (ref. 5.4 Audit and Accountability):  c. Invoke internal monitoring: application of polymonitoring devices:  1. Strategically within the system to collect organization-determined assential information; and information; and information; and information; and information in the system to collect organization-determined ossential interest to the organization:  d. Analysis detected events and anomalies:  d. Aplist the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation;  l. Obtain signal opinion regarding system monitoring activities; and provided introduced in the province of	Functional	intersects with	Input Data Validation	TDA-18	Mechaniams exist to check the validity of information inputs.	5	
SI-4(2)	MECHANISMS FOR REAL- TIME ANALYSIS	Employ sutomated tools and mechanisms to support near real-time analysis of events.  a. Determine criteria for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions for inbound	Functional	equal	Automated Tools for Real- Time Analysis	MON-01.2	Mechanisms exist to continuously monitor inbound and outbound	10	
SI-4(4)	SYSTEM MONITORING   INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC	and outbound communications traffic;  Jo Monitor inbound and outbound communications traffic continuously for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions such as: the presence of malicious code or unauthorized use or legitimate code or credentials within organizational systems or propagating among system components, signaling to external systems, and the unauthorized use for principal critical maintains.	Functional	equal	Inbound & Outbound Communications Traffic	MON-01.3	communications traffic for unusual or unsutherized activities or conditions.	10	
SI-4(5)	SYSTEM MONITORING   SYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS	Alert organizational personnel with system monitoring responsibilities when the following system-generated indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: inappropriate or unusual activities with security or privacy implications.	Functional	equal	System Generated Alerts	MON-01.4	Mechanisms exist to generate, monitor, correlate and respond to alerts from physical, cybersecurity, data protection and supply chain activities to achieve integrated situational awareness.	10	
SI-5	SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES	a. Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from external source(e) (e.g., CISA, Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 1 and IUD/SCERT), hardware-fortware providers, federar/latas advisories, etc.) on an ongoing basis; Computer and the source of the state	Functional	intersects with	Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks	NET-12	Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
SI-5	SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES	a. Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from external source(s) (e.g., CISA, Mutti-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 1 sent (USCERT), hardwards/oftware providers, federal/attate advisories, etc.) on an ongoing beais; b. Generate Informal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed macessary. C. Disseminate security alerts, advisories, and directives to: organizational personnel implementing, operating, maintaining, and using the system; and d. Implement security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notify the issuing operating of the degree of noncompliant.	Functional	intersects with	Input Data Validation	TDA-18	Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.	(optional)	
SI-5	SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES	a. Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from external source(s) (e.g., CISA, Muth-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 1 sem (USCERT), hardware-fortware providers, federal/state advisories, etc.) on an ongoing basis; b. Generate Internal socurity alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary. c. Disseminate security selents, advisories, and directives to organizational personnel implementing, operating, maintaining, and using the system; and d. Implement security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notify the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.	Functional	intersects with	Threat intelligence Feeds Feeds	THR-03	Mechanisms exist to maintain situational awareness of vulnerabilities and evolving threats by leveraging the knowledge of attacks tectics, exchiques and procedures to facilitate the implementation of preventative and compensating controls.	5	
SI-7	SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY	a. Employ integrity-verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information systems that contain or process CII; and b. Take the following actions when unauthorized changes to the software, firmware, and information are detected: notify organizational presonant responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity and implement incident response procedures as appropriate.	Functional	intersects with	Endpoint File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)	END-06	Mechanisms exist to utilize File Integrity Monitor (FIM), or similar technologies, to detect and report on unauthorized changes to selected files and configuration settings.	5	
SI-7	SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY	a. Employ integrity verification tools to detect unsurborized changes to software, firmware, and information systems that contain or process ECI and b. Take the following actions when unauthorized changes to the software, firmware, and information are detected: notify organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity and implement incident response procedures as appropriate.	Functional	intersects with	Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks	NET-12	Cyptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to sefeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.	5	
SI-7	SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY	a. Employ integrity verification tools to detect unsuthorized changes to software, firmware, and information systems that contain or process EU and 1b. Take the following actions when unsuthorized changes to the software, firmware, and information are detected, notify operatization ples pennel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity and implement incident response procedures as appropriate.	Functional	intersects with	Input Data Validation	TDA-18	Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.	5	
SI-7(1)	SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY   INTEGRITY CHECKS	Perform an integrity check of software, firmware, and information systems that contain or process CJI at agency-defined transitional states or security relevant events at least weekly or in an automated fashion.	Functional	equal	Integrity Checks	END-06.1	Mechanisms exist to validate configurations through integrity checking of software and firmware.	10	
SI-7(7)	SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY   INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE	Incorporate the detection of the following unauthorized changes into the organizational incident response capability: unauthorized changes to established configuration setting or the unauthorized elevation of system privileges.	Functional	equal	Automated Central Management & Verification	CFG-02.2	Automated mechanisme suist to govern and report on baseline configurations of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) through Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM), or similar technologies.	10	
SI-8	SPAM PROTECTION	Employ spam protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and act on unsolicited messages; and     Update spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.	Functional	equal	Phishing & Spam Protection	END-08	Mechanisms exist to utilize anti-phishing and spam protection technologies to detect and take action on unsolicited messages transported by electronic mail.	10	
SI-8(2)	SPAM PROTECTION   AUTOMATIC UPDATES	Automatically update spam protection mechanisms at least daily.	Functional	equal	Automatic Spam and Phishing Protection Updates	END-08.2	Mechanisms exist to automatically update anti-phishing and spam protection technologies when new releases are available in accordance with configuration and change management practices.	10	
SI-10	INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION	Check the validity of the following information inputs: all inputs to web/application servers, database servers, and any system or application input that might receive or process CII.	Functional	intersects with	Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks	NET-12	Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.	5	
SI-10	INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION	Check the validity of the following information inputs: all inputs to web/application servers, database servers, and any system or application input that might receive or process CI.	Functional	intersects with	Input Data Validation	TDA-18	Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.	5	
SI-11	ERROR HANDLING	a. Generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited; and b. Reveal error messages only to organizational personnel with information security responsibilities.	Functional	equal	Error Handling	TDA-19	Mechanisms exist to handle error conditions by: (1) Identifying potentially security-relevant error conditions; (2) Generating error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing sensitive or potentially harmful information in error logs and administrative messages that could be exploited; and (3) Revealing error messages only to authorized personnel.	10	
SI-12	INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION	Manage and retain information within the system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, oblicies, standards, guidelines and operational requi	Functional	intersects with	Media & Data Retention	DCH-18	Mechanisms exist to retain media and data in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations.	5	
SI-12	INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION	Manage and retain information within the system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines and operational requirements.	Functional	intersects with	Personal Data (PD) Retention & Disposal	PRI-05	Nechanisms exist to: (1) Ratain Personal Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to Jutilit the purpose(e) identified in the notice or as required by law; (2) Dispose of, destroys, ensess, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of the method of storage; and (3) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records).	5	
SI-12(1)	INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION   LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS	Limit personally identifiable information being processed in the information life cycle to the minimum PII necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is collected (see Section 4.3).	Functional	equal	Minimize Sensitive / Regulated Data	DCH-18.1	Mechanisms exist to minimize sensitive/regulated data that is collected, received, processed, stored and/or transmitted throughout the information lifecycle to only those elements necessary to support necessary business processes.	10	
SI-12(2)	INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION I MINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH	Use the following techniques to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for research, testing, or training data obfuscation, randomization, analogymization, or use of synthetic data.	Functional	equal	Limit Sensitive / Regulated Data In Testing, Training & Research	DCH-18.2		10	
SI-12(3)	INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION   INFORMATION DISPOSAL	Use the following techniques to dispose of, destroy, or erase information following the retention period: as defined in MP-6.	Functional	equal	Information Disposal	DCH-21	Mechanisms exist to securely dispose of, destroy or erase information.	10	
SI-16	MEMORY PROTECTION	Implement the following controls to protect the system memory from unauthorized code execution: data execution prevention and address space layout randomization.	Functional	equal	Memory Protection	SEA-10	Mechanisms exist to implement security safeguards to protect system memory from unauthorized code execution.	10	

