NIST SP 800-218 10/1/2025

NIST IR 8477-Based Set Theory Relationship Mapping (STRM)
Reference Document: Secure Controls Framework (SCP) version 2025.1
STRM Guidance: https://securecontrolsframework.com/set-theory-rel

Focal Document Focal Document URL: Published STRM URL:

NIST SP 800-218 Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1
https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final
https://securecontrolsframework.com/content/strm/scf-strm-general-nist-800-218.pdf

STRM Secure Controls Framework (SCF)
Control Description FDE Name Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that the can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and knangement strategy) and external sources (e.g., propicable lows and regulations). Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification Example 1: Define policies for securing software Example 1: Define policies for securing software development infrastructures and their components, including development endpoints, throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security.

Example 2: Define policies for securing software development processes throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security, including for open-source and other third-party software components utilized by software being developed.

Example 3: Review and update security requirements at least annually, or sooner if their are new requirements at least annually, or sooner if there are new requirements from internal or external sources, or a major security incident trageting software development infrastructure has occurred. Example 4: Educate affected individuals on impending changes to requirements. and implementation of relevant statutory, egulatory and contractual controls. Define Security Statutory, Regulatory & PO.1 Requirements for Software Developm Functional Intersects With CPL-01 Contractual Compli changes to requirements Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so it can be taken into account throughout the SDLO and duplication of effort can be minimal because the requirements information as the collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objective is management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations). ecnanisms exist to document and valid cope of cybersecurity and data protectic introls that are determined to meet stat gulatory and/or contractual compliance digations. Define Security PO.1 Intersects With Compliance Scope CPL-01.2 5 Software Develor re that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that th echanisms exist to include data privacy nsure trait security requirements for sortware development are known at all times so that the anne betaken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes equirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, an lisk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations). reclaims is each to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisitio related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers. Requirements for Contractors & Service Requirements fo oftware Developm Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that the can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, an risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., splicable laws and regulations). Mechanisms exist to identify critical systen components and functions by performing a criticality analysis for critical Technology A Applications and/or Services (TAAS) at pre-defined decision points in the Secure Define Security Cybersecurity & Data PO.1 ection Reau PRM-05 Software Develop Definition Development Life Cycle (SDLC). Mechanisms exist to ensure changes to sure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that the nsure that security requirements for somware development are known at all times so that the anne betaken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized occause the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes equirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and lisk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations). Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) within the Secure Developmen Life Cycle (SDLC) are controlled through forms change control procedures. Cycle (SDLC) Management Requirements fo Software Developm Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimize because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives in the source of the sources of the so fechanisms exist to design, develop and roduce Technology Assets, Applications a rervices (TAAS) in such a way that risk-bas achnical and functional specifications ens finimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria esta Define Security Requirements for PO.1 Intersects With (MVP) Security TDA-02 Software Develop an appropriate level of sec sed on annlicable risks and threats Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that the can be taken into account throughout the SDLO and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and its management strategy and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations). development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques minimize flawed and/or malformed software PO.1 Requirements for ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that the can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes on Secure Software Develo Define Security Requirements fo Secure Software PO.1 Intersects With lopment Practic (SSDP) equirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and Software Develop isk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations). Ensure that excurity requirements for software development are known at all times so that the ran be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of affort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and the management strategy and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations). Mechanisms exist to facilitate the mplementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique busine Define Security PO.1 Subset Of TDA-01 10 Software Deve Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that th can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes fechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactivel govern the design, development and producti esses to proactively requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and of Technology Assets, Applications and/or isk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations). Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: Requirements for Software Developm (2) Enhance security and resiliency capa (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, reguland/or contractual obligations. Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that the can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements for cybersecurity and data protection requirements with third-parties, Define Security Third-Party Contrac PO.1 Intersects With TPM-05 equirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and reflecting the organization's needs to protect its isk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations). Technology Assets, Applications, Services Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data If IASSID.

Mechanisms exist to identify critical system components and functions by performing a criticality analysis for critical Technology Ass Applications and/or Services (TAKS) at predefined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC). entify and document all security requirements for the organization's sof frastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time. Example 2: Define policies that specify the security nts for the organization's software, and verif e at key points in the SDLC (e.g., classes of compliance at key points in the SDLC software flaws verified by gates, respondiscovered in released software). s to vulnerabilities Example 3: Analyze the risk of applicable technology stacks Cybersecurity & Data rotection Requiremen (e.g., languages, environments, deployment models), and recommend or require the use of stacks that will reduce risk PRM-05 compared to others.

Example 4: Define policies that specify what needs to be archived for each software release (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation, data inventory) and how long it needs to be retained based on the SDLC model, software end-of-life, and other factors. software end-of-life, and other factors.

Example S: Ensure that policies cover the entire software life cycle, including notifying users of the impending end of software support and the date of software end-of-life.

Example S: Review all security requirements at least enually, or sooned if there are new equirements from internal or external sources, a major vulnerability is discovered in released software, or a major security incident transition or another incident transition or external courses. Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time. Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce Technology Assets, Applications and Services (TAAS) in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establis an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats. (MVP) Security



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (ontional)	Notes (optional)
PO.1.1	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Asseth, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and realisinery capabilities; 3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
PO.1.2	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Subset Of	Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance	CPL-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.	10	Example 1: Define a core set of security requirements for software components, and include it in acquisition documents, software components, and include it in acquisition documents, software contracts, and other agreements with third parties.  Example 2: Define security-related criteria for selecting software; the criteria can include the third party's vulnerability disclosure program and product security incident response capabilities or the third party's adherence to organization-defined practices.  Example 3: Require third parties to attest that their software complies with the organization's security requirements.  Example 3: Require their during the provide provenance data and integrity verification mechanisms for all components of their software.  Example 3: Exatibilish and follow processes to address risk when there are security requirements that third-party software components to be acquired do not meet; this should include periodic reviews of all approved exceptions to requirements.
PO.1.2	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in such a way that risk-based tachnical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PO.1.2	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assett, Applications and/or Services (TASS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and realisiency capabilities; 33 Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
PO.2	Implement Roles and Responsibilities	Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared to perform their SDLC-related roles and responsibilities throughout the SDLC. Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared to	Functional	Intersects With	Defined Roles & Responsibilities Competency	HRS-03	Mechanisms exist to define cybersecurity roles & responsibilities for all personnel. Mechanisms exist to ensure that all security-	5	
PO.2	Implement Roles and Responsibilities	perform their SDLC-related roles and responsibilities throughout the SDLC.	Functional	Intersects With	Requirements for Security-Related Positions	HRS-03.2	related positions are staffed by qualified individuals who have the necessary skill set.	5	
PO.2.1	N/A	Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.	Functional	Subset Of	Human Resources Security Management	HRS-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of personnel security controls.	10	Example 1: Define SOLC-related roles and responsibilities for all members of the software development team.  Example 2: Integrate the security roles into the software development team.  Example 3: Define roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity staff, security rolempions, project managers and leads, senior management, software developers, software testers, software estarence leads and staff, roduct cowers, operations and platform engineers, and others involved in the SOLC.  Example 4: Conduct an annual review of all roles and responsibilities.  Example 5: Educate affected individuals on impending changes to roles and responsibilities, and confirm that the individuals understand the changes and ages to follow them.  Example 6: Educate affected individuals on impending changes to roles and responsibilities, and confirm that the individuals in the solution of the s
PO.2.1	N/A	Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Defined Roles & Responsibilities	HRS-03	Mechanisms exist to define cybersecurity roles & responsibilities for all personnel.	5	
PO.2.2	N/A	them as readed.  Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Persodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Equal	Role-Based Cybersecurity & Data Protection Training	SAT-03	Mechanisms exist to provide role-based ophersecurity and data protection-related training. (1) Before authorizing access to the system or performing assigned duties; (2) When required by system changes; and (3) Annually thereafter.	10	Example 1: Document the desired outcomes of training for each role. Example 2: Define the type of training or curriculum required to achieve the desired outcome for each role. Example 3: Oseta a training plan for each role. Example 4: Acquire or create training for each role; acquired training may need to be customized for the organization. Example 5: Messure outcome performance to dentity areas where changes or training may be eneficial.
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Sensitive / Regulated Data Storage, Handling & Processing	SAT-03.3	Mechanisms exist to ensure that every user accessing a system processing, storing or transmitting sensitive / regulated data is formally trained in data handling requirements.	5	
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Privileged Users	SAT-03.5	Mechanisms exist to provide specific training for privileged users to ensure privileged users understand their unique roles and responsibilities	5	
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Cyber Threat Environment	SAT-03.6	Nechanisms exist to provide role-based cybersecurity and data protection awareness training that is current and relevant to the cyber threats that users might encounter in day-to-day business operations.	5	
PO.2.3	N/A	Obtain upper management or authorizing official commitment to secure development, and convey that commitment to all with development-related roles and responsibilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Assigned Cybersecurity & Data Protection Responsibilities	GOV-04	Mechanisms exist to assign one or more qualified individuals with the mission and resources to centrally-manage, coordinate, develop, implement and maintain an enterprise- wide cybensecurity and data protection program.	5	Example 1: Agonist a single leader or leadership team to be responsible for the entire secure software development process, including being accountable for releasing software to production and delegating responsibilities as appropriate to production and delegating responsibilities as appropriate Standard 2: Increase authorizing officials' awareness of the sket of developing offerware without integrating security throughout the development practices. Example 3: Seasit upper management in incorporating secure development support into their communications with personnel with development-related roles and responsibilities. Example 4: Educate all personnel with development-related roles and responsibilities on upper management and the importance of secure development and the importance of secure development to the organization.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM	STRM	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF)	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
102#	PDE Name	Obtain upper management or authorizing official commitment to secure development, and	Rationale	Relationship	30F Control	3011	Control Description  Mechanisms exist to enforce an accountability	(optional)	ivites (optional)
PO.2.3	N/A	convey that commitment to all with development-related roles and responsibilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Stakeholder Accountability Structure	GOV-04.1	structure so that appropriate teams and individuals are empowered, responsible and trained for mapping, measuring and managing data and technology-related risks.	5	
PO.3	Implement Supporting Toolchains	Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tool army by used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business	10	
PO.3	Implement Supporting Toolchains	address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline.  Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-vide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	needs. Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry- recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PO.3	Implement Supporting Toolchains	Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline.	Functional	Equal	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	10	
PO.3.1	N/A	Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to neure that their software developers to neure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and for malformed software.	5	Example 1: Define categories of toolchains, and specify the mandatory tools or tool types to be used for each category. Example 2: Identify security tools to integrate into the developer toolchain. Example 3: Define what information is to be passed between tools and what data formats are to be used. Example 4: Evaluate tools' signing capabilities to create simutable records flogs for auditability within the tocichain. Example 5: Use automated technology for toolchain management and orchestration.
PO.3.1	N/A	Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	5	
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procrument methods to meet unique business needs.	10	Example 1: Evaluants, select, and acquire tools, and assess the security of each tool.  Example 2: Integrate tools with other tools and existing software development processes and workflows.  Example 3: Use code-based configuration for toolchains (e.g., pipelines-ac-ods, toolchains-as-code).  Example 4: Implement the technologies and processes needed for reproducible builds.  Example 5: Update, upgrade, or replace tools as needed to tool and didness tool vulnerabilities or add met void capabilities.  Example 6: Continuously monitor tools and tool logs for potential caperational and security issues, including policy violations and anomalous behavior.  Example 6: Continuously monitor tools and tool logs for potential caperational and security issues, including policy violations and anomalous behavior.  Example 7: See PW 6 regarding compiler, interpreter, and build tools.  Example 8: See PW 6: regarding implementing and maintaining secure environments.
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP)	OPS-01.1	Mechanisms exist to identify and document Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP), or similar documentation, to enable the proper execution of day-to-day / assigned tasks.	5	
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Service Delivery (Business Process Support)	OPS-03	Mechanisms axist to define supporting business processes and implement appropriate governance and service management to ensure appropriate planning, delively and support of the organization's technology capabilities supporting business functions, worldorce, and/or customers based on industry-recognized standards to achieve the specific goals of the process area.	5	
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or matformed software.	5	
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	5	
PO.3.3	N/A	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	Example 1: Use existing tooling (e.g., workflow tracking, issue tracking, value steem mapping) to create an audit trail of the sacure development-related actions that are performed for continuous improvement purposes.  Example 2: Determine how often the collected information should be audited, and implement the necessary processes.  Example 3: Exalish and enforce security and retention policies for artifact data.  Example 4: Assign responsibility for creating any needed artifacts that tools cannot generate.
PO.3.3	N/A	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Identification & Justification of Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.5	Mechanisms exist to require process owners to identify, document and justify the business need for the ports, protocols and other services necessary to operate their technology solutions.	3	
PO.3.3	N/A	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	Mechanisms exist to obtain, protect and distribute administrator documentation for Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (FAS) that describe: (I Secure configuration, installation and operation of the TAAS; (2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (e.g., privileged) functions.	5	
PO.3.3	N/A	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Functional Properties	TDA-04.1	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to provide information describing the functional properties of the security controls to be utilized within Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in sufficient detail to permit analysis and testing of the controls.	3	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity and data protection requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	5	



Secure Controls Framework (SCF) 3 of 13

,	Version 2025.1
	10/1/2025

FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with operations of adda protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (TSE4) plan, or similar capability. (2) Implement a verificials flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	(optional)	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensures that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteries for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to employ static code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	3	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis	TDA-09.3	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	3	
PO.4.1	N/A	Define criteria for software security checks and track throughout the SDLC.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with ophersecurity and data protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weeknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	Example 1: Ensure that the criteria adequately indicate how effectively security risk is being managed.  Example 2: Define key performance indicators (RPIs), key risk indicators (KRIs), vulnerability severity scores, and other measures for software security.  Example 3: Add software security.  Example 3: Add software security criteria to existing checks (e.g., the Delinfixion of Done in agile SDLC methodologies).  Example 4: Review the artifacts generated as part of the software development vorificion yestem to determine if they meet the criteria.  Example 5: Record security check approvals, rejections, and exception requests as part of the workflow and strucking system.  Example 6: Analyze collected data in the context of the security successes and failures of each development project, and use the results to improve the SDLC.
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP)	OPS-01.1	Mechanisms exist to identify and document Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP), or similar documentation, to enable the proper execution of day-to-day / assigned tasks.	5	Example 1: Use the toolchain to automatically gather information that informs security decision-making. Example 2: Deply additional tools if needed to support the generation and collection of information supporting the oritoria. Example 3: Automate decision-making processes utilizing the criteria, and periodically review these processes. Example 4: Only allow authorized personnel to access the sathered information, and prevent any alteration or deletion of the information.
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gether and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality. (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Intersects With	Development & Test Environment Configurations	CFG-02.4	Mechanisms exist to manage baseline configurations for development and test environments separately from operational baseline configurations to minimize the risk of unintentional changes.	5	
PO.5		Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, baild, test, and distribution environments. Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly	Functional	Subset Of	Secure Development Environments	TDA-07	Mechanisms exist to maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.  Mechanisms exist to manage separate		
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	crease that at components or the environments of software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Intersects With	Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments	TDA-08	recriminaria total to imaniga separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to production Technology Assets, Apolications and/or Services (TAAS).	5	
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Migration Practices	TDA-08.1	Mechanisms exist to ensure secure migration practices purge Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) of test/development/staging data and accounts before it is migrated into a production environment.	5	
PO.5.1	N/A	Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.	Functional	Subset Of	Secure Development Environments	TDA-07	swiptifilation.  Mechanisms exist to maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.		Example 1: Use multi-factor, risk-based authentication and conditional access for each environment. Example 2: Use network segmentation and access controls to separate the environments from each other and from production environments, and to separate components from each other within each non-production environment, in order to reduce attack surfaces and tattackers' lateral movement and privilege/access escalation. Example 3: Enforce authentication and tightly restrict connections entering and exiting each software development environment, including minimizing access to the internet to only what is necessary. Example 4: Piniting edirect human access to toolchain systems, such as build services. Continuously monitor and audit all access attempts and all use of privileged access. Example 5: Minimize direct human access to toolchain systems, such as build services. Continuously monitor and software and services from non-production environments. Example 6: Regularly log, monitor, and audit trust relationships for authorization and access between the environments and between the components within each environments. Example 7: Continuously log and monitor operations and alerts across all components of the development environment to environments and production environments and alerts across all components of the development environment to environment to environment to environment to generate artifacts for their activities. Example 8: Continuously monitor all software deployed in separating and protecting the environment to generate artifacts for their activities.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PO.5.1	N/A	Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.	Functional	Intersects With	Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments	TDA-08	Mechanisms exist to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to production Technology Assets, Apolications and/or Services (TASS).	5	
PO.5.2	N/A	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Functional	Subset Of	System Hardening Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02	Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAS) that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.		Example 1: Configure each development endpoint based on approved hardening uides, checklists, etc.; for example, enable FPR-compliant encryption of all sensitive data at rest and in transit.  Example 2: Configure each development endpoint and the development executes to provide the least functionality needed by users and services and to enforce the principle of least privilege.  Example 3: Continuously monitor the security posture of all development endpoints, including monitoring and auditing all use of privileged access.  Example 4: Configure security controls and other tools univolved in securing and handering development endpoints to generate artifacts for their activities.  Example 4: Configure experience artifacts for their activities.  Example 5: Royaler multi-factor authentication for all access to development endpoints and development endpoints on non-production networks for performing all development-related tasks. Provide separate endpoints on production networks for performing all development-related tasks. Provide separate endpoints on production networks for performing all development endpoints for all other tasks.
PO.5.2	N/A	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Functional	Intersects With	Development & Test Environment Configurations	CFG-02.4	Mechanisms exist to manage baseline configurations for development and test environments separately from operational baseline configurations to minimize the risk of unintentional changes.	5	
PO.5.2	N/A	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Functional	Intersects With	Configure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) for High-Risk Areas	CFG-02.5	Mechanisms exist to configure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) utilized in high-risk areas with more restrictive baseline configurations.	5	
PS.1	Protect All Forms of Code from Unauthorized Access and Tampering	Help prevent unauthorized changes to code, both inadvertent and intentional, which could circumvent or negate the intended security characteristics of the software. For code that is not intended to be publicly accessible, this helps prevent theft of the software and may make it more difficult or time-consuming for attackers to find vulnerabilities in the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Access Restriction For Change	CHG-04	Mechanisms exist to enforce configuration restrictions in an effort to restrict the ability of users to conduct unauthorized changes.	5	
PS.1	Protect All Forms of Code from Unauthorized Access and Tampering	Help prevent unauthorized changes to code, both inadvertent and intentional, which could circumvent or negate the intended security characteristics of the software. For code that is not intended to be publicly accessible, this helps prevent their of the software and may make it more difficult or time-consuming for attackers to find vulnerabilities in the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Library Privileges	CHG-04.5	Mechanisms exist to restrict software library privileges to those individuals with a pertinent business need for access.	5	
PS.1.1	N/A	Store all forms of code – including source code, executable code, and configuration-as-code – based on the principle of least privilege so that only authorized personnel, tools, services, etc. have access.	Functional	Equal	Access to Program Source Code	TDA-20	Mechanisms exist to limit privileges to change software resident within software libraries.	10	
PS.2	Provide a Mechanism for Verifying Software Release Integrity	Help software acquirers ensure that the software they acquire is legitimate and has not been tampered with.	Functional	Equal	Software Release Integrity Verification	TDA-20.1	Mechanisms exist to publish integrity verification information for software releases.	10	
PS.2.1	N/A	Make software integrity verification information available to software acquirers.	Functional	Equal	Software Release Integrity Verification	TDA-20.1	Mechanisms exist to publish integrity verification information for software releases.	10	Example 1: Post cryptographic hashes for release files on a well-secured website. Example 2: Use an established certificate authority for code signing so that consumers' operating systems or other tools and services can confirm the validity of signatures before use. Example 3: Periodically review the code signing processes, including certificate renewal, rotation, revocation, and protection.
PS.3	Archive and Protect Each Software Release	Preserve software releases in order to help identify, analyze, and eliminate vulnerabilities discovered in the software after release.	Functional	Equal	Archiving Software Releases	TDA-20.2	Mechanisms exist to archive software releases and all of their components (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation) to maintain integrity verification information.	10	
PS.3.1	N/A	Securely archive the necessary files and supporting data is g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.	Functional	Equal	Archiving Software Releases	TDA-20.2	Mechanisms exist to archive software releases and all of their components (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation) to maintain integrity verification information.	10	Example 1: Store the release files, associated images, etc. in reportatories following the origination's established policy. Allow read-only access to them by necessary personnel and no access by aryone eise. Example 2: Store and protect release integrity verification and immission and provenance data, such as by keeping it in a separate location from the release files or by signing the data.
PS.3.1	N/A	Securely archive the necessary files and supporting data (e.g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Escrow	TDA-20.3	Mechanisms exist to escrow source code and supporting documentation to ensure software availability in the event the software provider goes out of business or is unable to provide support.	5	
PS.3.2	N/A	Collect, safeguard, maintain, and share provenance data for all components of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	Mechanisms exist to obtain, protect and distribute administrator documentation for Tachnology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAS) that describe: (1) Secure configuration, installation and operation of the TAAS; (2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (e.g., privileged) functions.	5	
PS.3.2	N/A	Collect, safeguard, maintain, and share provenance data for all components of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	TDA-04.2	Mechanisms exist to generate, or obtain, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that lists software packages in use, including versions and applicable licenses.	5	
PW.1	Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks	Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.1	Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks	(identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be related or wavied. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Criticality Analysis	TDA-06.1	Mechanisms exist to require the developer of the system, system component or service to perform a criticality analysis at organization- defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).	5	
PW.1	Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks	(identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be related or wavied. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	Mechanisms exist to perform threat modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to software and solutions are identified and accounted for.	5	
PW.1	Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks	Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development liffecycle for the development of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.1.1	N/A	Use forms of risk modeling – such as threat modeling, attack modeling, or attack surface mapping – to help assess the security risk for the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	Mechanisms exist to perform threat modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to advance and solutions are identified and accounted for.	(optional)	Example 1: Train the development team (security champions, in particular) or collaborate with a risk modeling expert to create models and analyze how to use a risk-based approach to communicate the risks and determine how to address them, including implementing mitigations. Example 2: Perform more rigorous assessments for high-risk areas, such as protecting sensitive data and safeguarding identification, authentication, and access control, including credential transagement. Example 3: Review sufnerability reports and statistics for previous software to inform the security risk assessment. Example 4: Use data classification methods to identify and characterize each type of data that the software will interact with.
PW.1.2	N/A	Track and maintain the software's security requirements, risks, and design decisions.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to pronactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assett, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.		Example 1: Record the response to each risk, including how mitigations are to be achieved and what the rationales are for any approved exceptions to the security requirements. Add any mitigations are to the softward's security requirements. Example 2: Maintain records of design decisions, risk responses, and approved exceptions that can be used for auditing and maintenance purposes throughout the rest of the software life cycle.  Example 3: Periodically re-evaluate all approved exceptions to the security requirements, and implement changes as needed.
PW.1.2	N/A	Track and maintain the software's security requirements, risks, and design decisions.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in such a way that risk-based tachnical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PW.1.3	N/A	Where eppropriets, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly PW.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Valable Product (NPV) retires establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	Example 1: Maintain one or more software repositories of modules for supporting standardized security features and services.  Example 2: Determine secure configurations for modules for supporting standardized security features and services, and make these configurations available (e.g., as configuration-as code) so developer can readily use them.  Example 3: Define criteria for which security features and services must be supported by software to be developed.
PW.1.3	N/A	Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identify management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly PW.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) being deployed with weak security settings that would put the TAAS at a greater risk of compromise.	5	
PW.1.3	N/A	Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized socurity features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerty PW.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in such a way that risk-based tachnical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Insecure Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.6	Mechanisms exist to mitigate the risk associated with the use of insecure ports, protocols and services necessary to operate technology solutions.	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Representatives For Product Changes	TDA-02.7	Mechanisms exist to include appropriate cybersecurity and data protection representatives in the product feature and/or functionality change control review process.	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of Technology Assets,	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Applications and/or Services (TAAS).  Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity and data protection requirements are met and that any identified risks are existence of the design to the confirm that all cybersecurity and data protection requirements are met and that any identified risks are existence of the confirmation of	5	
PW.2.1	N/A	Have 1) a qualified person (or people) who were not involved with the design and/or 2) automated processes instantiated in the toolchain review the software design to confirm and enforce that it meets all of the security requirements and satisfactority addresses the identified risk information.	Functional	Equal	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	satisfactorily addressed.  Mechanisms sixt to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity and data protection requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	10	Example 1: Review the software design to confirm that it addresses applicable security requirements. Example 2: Review the risk models created during software design to determine if they appear to adequately identify the risks.  Example 3: Review the software design to confirm that it satisfactorily addresses the risks identified by the risk models.  Example 4: Have the software's designer correct failures to meet the requirements.  Example 5: Change the design and/or the risk response strategy if the security requirements cannot be met.  Example 6: Record the findings of design reviews to serve as artifacts (e.g., in the software yellow).
PW.4	Reuse Existing, Well- Secured Software When Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionality	Lower the costs of software development, expedite software development, and decrease the likelihood of introducing additional security vulnerabilities into the software by reusing software modules and services that have already and their security posture checked. This is particularly important for software that implements security functionality, such as cryptographic modules and protocols.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; 33 Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	tracking system in the threat model)



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
PW.4	Reuse Existing, Well- Secured Software When Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionality	Lower the costs of software development, expedite software development, and decrease the likelihood of introducing additional security vulnerabilities into the software by reusing software modules and services that have already had their security posture checked. This is particularly important for software that implements security functionality, such as cryptographic modules and protocols.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors / manufacturers: (1) Beliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implemented; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade.	(optional)	
PW.4	Reuse Existing, Well- Secured Software When Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionality	Lower the costs of software development, expedite software development, and decrease the likelihood of introducing additional security vulnerabilities into the software by reusing software modules and services that have already had their security posture checked. This is particularly important for software that implements security functionality, such as cryptographic modules and cortocols.	Functional	Intersects With	Commercial Off-The- Shelf (COTS) Security Solutions	TDA-03	Mechanisms exist to utilize only Commercial Off- the-Shelf (COTS) security products.	5	
PW.4.1	N/A	Acquire and maintain well-accured software components (e.g., software libraries, modules, middleware, fameworks) from commercial, open-source, and other third-party developers for use by the organization's software.	Functional	Intersects With	Commercial Off-The- Shelf (COTS) Security Solutions	TDA-03	Mechanisms exist to utilize only Commercial Off- the-Shelf (COTS) security products.	5	Example 1: Review and evaluate third-party software components in the context of their peeted use. If a component is to be used in a substantially different way in the future, perform the review and evaluation again with that new context in mind.  Example 2: Determine secure configurations of a rothware components, and make these available (e.g., as configuration-as acode) so developers can neadily use the configurations.  Example 3: Obtain provenance information (e.g., SBOM, source composition analysis, binary software composition analysis, binary software composition analysis, binary software composition analysis is the software component, and analyse that information to better assess the risk that the component may introduce.  Example 4: Establish on or more software repositories to host sanctioned and vetted open-source components.  Example 5: Maintain a list of organization-approved commercial software component and component versions along with their provenance data.  Example 5: The performance of acquired and component versions along with their provenance data.  Example 5: The performance of security of the components of the versions of software components on a component or the versions of software components and it transitions from those versions have been completed successfully.  Example 5: The integrity or provenance of acquired binaries cannot be confirmed, build binaries from source code effects.
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) scross the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	weinying in source cours in singing val in Jovenines. Example 1: Follow organization-established security practices for secure software development when creating and maintaining the components. Example 2: Determine secure configurations for software components, and make these available (e.g., se configuration-se-code) so developers can readily use the configurations. Example 3: Designate which components must be included in software to be developed. Example 4: Designate which components must be included in software to be developed. Schample 5: Inplement processes to update deployed software components to newer versions, and maintain older versions of software components until all transitions from those versions have been completed successfully.
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured aothware components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Developer Architecture & Design	TDA-05	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to produce a design aspecification and security architecture that: (1) Is consistent with and supportive of the organization's security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization's enterprise architecture; (2) Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality and the allocation of security controls among physical and logical components; and (3) Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.	5	
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of Technology Assets, Annilications and/or Services (TAAS)	5	
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce facilities and are produced refundings Assets, Applications and/or Services (TASS) in such a wey that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Vabele Product (MVP) crientie establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	Example 1: Regularly check whether there are publicly known witherneal/tiles in the software modules and services that wendors have not yet fixed. Example 2: Build into the toolchain automatic detection of known vulnerabilities in software components. Example 3: Use existing results from commercial services for withing the software modules and services. Example 4: Ensure that each software component is still actively maintained and has not reached end of tife, the should include new vulnerabilities found in the software being remediates. Example 5: Determine a plan of action for each software component that in a longer being maintained or will not be available in the near future. Example 6: Centifum the integrity of software components through digital signatures or other mechanisms. Example 6: Centifum the integrity of software components through digital signatures or other mechanisms.
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Ports, Protocols & Services In Use	TDA-02.1	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to identify early in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC), the functions, ports, protocols and services intended for use.	5	
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Identification & Justification of Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.5	Mechanisms exist to require process owners to identify, document and justify the business need for the ports, protocols and other services necessary to operate their technology solutions.	5	
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.  Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components	Functional	Intersects With	Insecure Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.6	Mechanisms exist to mitigate the risk associated with the use of insecure ports, protocols and services necessary to operate technology solutions.  Mechanisms exist to generate, or obtain, a	5	
PW.4.4	N/A	veiny that acquired commercial, open-source, and as oner train-party sortware components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	TDA-04.2	Mechanisms exist to generate, or outain, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that lists software packages in use, including versions and applicable licenses.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.S	Create Source Code by Adhering to Secure Coding Practices	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source code creation that meet or exceed organization- defined vulnerability severity criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	(optional)	
PW.5	Create Source Code by Adhering to Secure Coding Practices	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities includeed during source code creation that meet or exceed organization- defined vulnerability severity criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PW.5	Adhering to Secure	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source code creation that meet or exceed organization-	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.5.1	Coding Practices	defined vulnerability severity criteria. Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to prosectively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and realisinery capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Eample 1: Veilidate all inputs, and validate and properly encode all outputs.  Example 2: Avoid using unsafe functions and calls.  Example 3: Detect errors, and handle them greadfuly.  Example 4: Two led legging and tracing capabilities.  Example 4: Frovide legging and tracing capabilities.  Example 5: Use development environments with automated features that encourage or require the use of secure coding practices with just-th-time training-in-place.  Example 6: Follow procedures for manually ensuring compliance with secure coding practices when automated example 5: Use tools (e.g., linters, formatters) to standardize the style and formatting of the source code.  Example 8: Check for other vulnerabilities that are common to the development languages and environment.  Example 9: Have the developer review their own human-readable code to complement (not replace) code review performed by other people or tools. See PW.7.
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TASA) in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (NVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors / manufacturers: (1) Deliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implementate; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or uperade.	5	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices	5	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	(SSDP)  Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	(SSDP). Which amount is a second to require system developers/integrators consult with operations of data protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Teating and Evaluation (ST&D plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation (process); and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
		Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.					Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the		
PW.5.1	N/A	Contract Con	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	likelihood of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) being deployed with weak security settings that would put the TAAS at a greater risk of compromise.	5	
PW.6	Configure the Compilation, Interpreter, and Build Processes to Improve Executable Security	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities before testing occurs.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/insignors consult with ophersecurity and data protection personnel to: (I) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability. (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing and testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
PW.6	Configure the Compilation, Interpreter, and Build Processes to Improve Executable Security	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities before testing occurs.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) being deployed with weak security settings that would put the TAAS at a greater risk of compromise.	5	
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	Example 1. Use up-to-date versions of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Example 2: Follow change management processes when deploying or updating compiler, interpreter, and build tools, and audit all unexpected changes to tools. Example 3: Regularly validate the authenticity and integrity of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. See PO.3.
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	Dample 1: Use up-to-date versions of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Example 2: Follow change management processes when deploying or updating compiler, interpreter, and build tools, and audit all unexpected changes to tools. Example 3: Regularly validate the authenticity and integrity of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. See PO.3.
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compilar, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	5	



ecure Controls Framework (SCF) 8 of 13

								Strength of	
FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.6.2	N/A	Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Sendess (TASS) scross the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and realismor capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Example 1: Enable compiler features that produce warnings for poorly secured code during the compilation process.  Example 2: Implement the "clian build" concept, where all compiler warnings are treated as recors and eliminated except those determined to be false positives or irrelevent.  Example 3: Perform all builds in a dedicated, highly controlled build environment.  Example 4: Enable compiler features that randomize or obtinaced revenuion characteristics, such as memory location usage, that would otherwise be predictable and the proteinally exploitable.  Example 5: Test to ensure that the features are working as expected and are not inadvertently causing any operational issues or other problems.  Example 5: Test thouse the such as the provided configurations are being used.  Example 6: Cante the approved tool configurations available as configuration-as-code so developers can readily use them.
PW.6.2	N/A	Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.6.2	N/A	Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	5	
PW.7	Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify unknown between the contracted before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resource needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers'integrators consult with ophersecurity and data protection personnel to: (I create and implement a Sacurity Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) implement a verifiable flave remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing and existing evaluation and flave remediation processes.		
PW.7	Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to employ static code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	5	
PW.7	Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities	Help identify unlensibilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation, Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis	TDA-09.3	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	5	
PW.7	Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Malformed Input Testing	TDA-09.4	Mechanisms exist to utilize testing methods to ensure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.	5	
PW.7	Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities	Help identify unlensibilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect winershillities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Application Penetration Testing	TDA-09.5	Mechanisms exist to perform application-level penetration testing of custom-made Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).	5	
PW.7.1	Program of the ITS	Determine whether code review (a person looks directly at the code to find issues) and/or code analysis (tools are used to find issues in code, either in a fully automated way or in conjunction with a person) should be used, as defined by the organization.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developeral ritergrators consult with cycleseacurily and data protection personnel to: (1) Croste and implement a Security Testina and evaluation process to cornect weaknesses and deficiencies evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security Se		Example 1: Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code review should be performed and how it should be conducted. This may include thit pleny code and reusable code modules written in-house.  Example 2: Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code analysis should be performed and how it should be conducted.  Example 3: Choose code review and/or analysis methods based on the stage of the software.
PW.7.2	N/A	Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization's secure coding standards, and record and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	Mechanisms axist to require the developers of Technology, Assets, Applications and/or Sancies (TAS) to employ static code enabysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	5	Lample 1: Perform peer review of code, and review any variating code review, analysis, or testing results as part of the peer review.  Lample 2: Use expert reviewers to check code for backdoors and other malicious content.  Example 3: Use expert reviewers to check code for backdoors and other malicious content.  Example 3: Use peer reviewing tools that facilitate the peer veriew process, and document all discussions and other feedback.  Example 4: Use a static analysis tool to automatically check code for vulnerabilities and compliance with the organization's secure coding standards with a human reviewing the suses reported by the tool and remediating them as necessary.  Example 5: Use review checklists to verify that the code complies with the requirements.  Example 6: Use review checklists to verify that the code complies with the requirements.  Example 6: Use review checklists to verify that the code complies with the requirements.  Example 6: Use review checklists to verify that the code complies with the requirements.  Example 6: Use review checklists to verify that the code complies with the requirements.  Example 6: December 1: A considerable of the code of the covered issues.
PW.7.2	N/A	Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization's secure coding standards, and record and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis	TDA-09.3	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	5	
PW.8	Test Executable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released in order to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities and improves traceability and repeatability. Executable code includes binaries, directly executed bytecode and source code, and any other form of code that an organization deems executable.	Functional	Intersects With	Malformed Input Testing	TDA-09.4	Mechanisms exist to utilize testing methods to ensure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.	5	
PW.8		an (biginization teering executable).  Helpi identify vilentabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released in order to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods fowers the effort and resources meeded to detect vulnerabilities and improves traceability and repeatability. Executable code includes binaries, directly executed bytecode and source code, and any other form of code that an organization deems executable.	Functional	Intersects With	Application Penetration Testing	TDA-09.5	Its interraces. Mechanisms exist to perform application-level penetration testing of custom-made Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).	5	



NIST ST 000-210	
Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1	

FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.8.1	N/A	Determine whether executable code testing should be performed to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing and, if so, which types of testing should be used.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; 3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Example 1: Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code testing should be performed and how its about be conducted (e.g., within a sandboxed environment). This may include third-party executable code and reusable executable code modules written in-house. Example 2: Choose testing methods based on the stage of the software.
PW.8.1	N/A	Determine whether executable code testing should be performed to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing and, if so, which types of testing should be used.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cyclemecurity and data protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Teating and Evaluation (TSEQ) plan, or smilar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flow remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process. and (3) Document the results of the security setsing levaluation and flow remediation processes.	5	
PW.8.2	N/A	Scope the testing, design the tests, perform the testing, and document the results, including recording and triaging all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cyclemecuring and data protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (15%) plan, or milar expebility; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weakenses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Perform robust functional testing of security features.  Example 2: Integrate dynamic vulnerability testing into the project's automated test suite.  Example 3: Incorporate tests for previously reported vulnerabilities into the project's test suite to ensure that errors are not reintrodued.  Example 4: Take into consideration the infrastructures and technology stacks that the software will be used with in production when developing test plans.  Example 5: Use fuzz testing tools for find issues with input handing,  Example 6: If resources are available, use penetration testing to simulate how an attacker might attempt to compromise the software in high-risk scenarios.  Example 7: Identify and record the root causes of discovered issues.  Example 8: Document tessions learned from code testing in a with that developers can access and learn.  Example 9: Use source code, design records, and other
PW.9	Configure Software to Have Secure Settings by Default	Help improve the security of the software at the time of installation to reduce the likelihood of the software being deployed with weak security settings, putting it at greater risk of compromise.	Functional	Equal	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) being deployed with weak security settings that would put the TAAS at a greater risk of compromise.	10	
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Equal	System Hardening Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02	Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.	10	Example 1: Conduct testing to ensure that the settings, including the default settings, are working as expected and are not inadvertently causing any security weaknesses, operational issues, or other problems.
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect or security or security-related setting to on that default settings are secure and do not weeken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in such a way that risk-based tachnical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors / manufacturers: (1) Deliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implementate; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or uperands.	5	
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) being deployed with weak security settings that twould put the TAAS at a greater risk of compromise.	5	
PW.9.2	N/A	Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in such a way that risk-based tachnical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Value Froduct (FVP) critical establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	Example 1: Verify that the approved configuration is in place for the software. Example 2: Document each setting's purpose, options, default value, security relevance, potential operational impact, and relationships with other settings. Example 3: Use authoritative programmatic technical mechanisms to record how each setting can be implemented and assessed by software administrators. Example 4: Store the default configuration in a usable format and follow change control practices for modifying it (e.g., configuration-as-corde)
PW.9.2	N/A	Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors / manufacturers:  (1) Deliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implemented; end of 2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or	5	
PW.9.2	N/A	Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	uperade.  Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) being deployed with week security settings that would put the TAAS at a greater risk of compromise.	5	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure practices for secure control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Representatives For Product Changes	TDA-02.7	Mechanisms exist to include appropriate cybersecurity and data protection representatives in the product feature and/or functionality change control review process.	5	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity and data protection requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	5	



Version 2025.1	
10/1/2025	

FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecutive and data protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Socurity Teating and Evaluation (1816) plan, or similar capability; (2) implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process. and (3) Document the results of the security testing valuation processes.	(optional)	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Continuous Monitoring Plan	TDA-09.1	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of cybersecurity and data	5	
RV.1.1	N/A	Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	ordetation control effectiveness.  Mechanisms exist to obtain, protect and distribute administrator documentation for Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that describe:  (1) Secure configuration, installation and operation of the TAAS;  2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (e.g., privileged) huncrions.	5	Example 1: Monitor vulnerability databases, security mailing lists, and other sources of vulnerability reports through manual or automated means.  Example 2: Use threat intelligence sources to better understand how underabilities in general are being exploited. Example 3: Automatically review provenance and software composition data for all software components to identify any new vulnerabilities they have.
RV.1.1	N/A	Gether information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Functional Properties	TDA-04.1	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to provide information describing the functional properties of the security controls to be utilized within Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in sufficient detail to permit analysis and testing of the controls.	5	
RV.1.1	N/A	Gather information from achiever acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	TDA-04.2	Mechanisms exist to generate, or obtain, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that lists software packages in use, including versions and applicable licenses.	5	
RV.1.1	N/A	Gether information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-purty components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Developer Architecture & Design	TDA-05	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to produce a design specification and security architecture that: (1) a consistent with and supportive of the organization's security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization's energies architecture; (2) Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality and the allocation of security controls among physical and logical components; and (1) Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.	5	
RV.1.2	N/A	Review, analyze, and/or test the software's code to identify or confirm the presence of previously undetected vulnerabilities.	Functional	Subset Of	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity and data protection requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.		Example 1: Configure the toolchain to perform automated code analysis and testing on a regular or continuous basis for all supported releases.  Example 2: See PW.7 and PW.8.
RV.1.3	N/A	Have a policy that addresses vulnerability disclosure and remediation, and implement the roles, responsibilities, and processes needed to support that policy.	Functional	Equal	Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP)	THR-06	Mechanisms exist to establish a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VPP) to assist with the sacuse development and maintenance of Technology, Assess, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) that receives unsolicited input from the public about vulnerabilities in organizational TAAS.	10	Example 1: Establish a vulnerability disclosure program, and make it easy for accurity researchers to learn about your program and myoot possible vulnerabilities. Example 2: Have Product Security incident Response Team (PSIRT) and processes in place to handle the responses to vulnerability reports and incidents, including communications plans for all stakeholders. Example 3: Have a security response playbook to handle a generic reported vulnerability, a report of zero-days, a vulnerability being exploited in the wild, and a major original condict involving multiple parties and open-source software components.
RV.2	Assess, Prioritize, and Remediate Vulnerabilities	Help ansure that vulnerabilities are remediated in accordance with risk to reduce the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
RV.2	Assess, Prioritize, and Remediate Vulnerabilities	Help ansure that vulnerabilities are remediated in accordance with risk to reduce the window of apportunity for attackers.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/inseptons consult with ophersecurity and data protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (TAE) plan, or smaller capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flow remediation process to correct weaknesses and decliencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process. and (3) Document the results of the security testing switchist control of the security testing switchiston and flow remediation processes.		
RV.2.1	N/A	Analyze each vulnerability to gather sufficient information about risk to plan its remediation or other risk response.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with operations of adda protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (18E4) plan, or similar capability; (2) implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation (process); and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation processes.		Example 1: Use existing issue tracking software to record each vulnerability. Example 2: Perform risk calculations for each vulnerability based on estimates of its exploitability, the potential impact it exploited, and any other relevant characteristics.



Version 2025.:	L
10/1/2025	5

FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TASS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Cornect security and realisiency capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Example 1: Make a risk-based decision as to whether each vulnerability will be remodiated or if the risk will be addressed through other means (e.g., risk acceptance, risk transference), and prioritize any extensions to be taken. Example 2: If a permanent mitigation for a vulnerability in not yet available, and eath temperanent solution is wallable, and eath that temperanenes solution is wallable, and eath that temperany remediation to the plan. Example 3: Develop and release security advisories that provide the necessary information to software acquirent, including descriptions of what the vulnerabilities are, how to distinct the plan. Example 3: Develop and release security advisories that ordicinate and the vulnerabilities are, how to distinct the plan. Example 3: Develop and release security advisories that ordicinate and the vulnerabilities are, how to distinct the participation of the vulnerabilities are, how to distinct the vulnerabilities are plan to the plan. Example 4: Deliver remediations to acquirers via en automated and trusted delivery mechanism. A single remediation could address multiple vulnerabilities. Example 5: Update records of design decisions, risk. responses, and approved acceptions as needed. See PVI.1.2. responses.
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	Mechanisms exist to perform threat modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to software and solutions are identified and accounted for.	5	
RV-2-2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/infegrators consult with cybersecurity and data protection personnel to: (1) Clease and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (1945 plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flow remediation process to correct weaknesses and defeliancies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing and residuation processes.		
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Vulnerability Remediation Process	VPM-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure that vulnerabilities are properly identified, tracked and remediated.	5	
RV.3	Analyze Vulnerabilities to Identify Their Root Cause	Help reduce the frequency of vulnerabilities in the future.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to:  (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.		
RV.3	Analyze Vulnerabilities to Identify Their Root Cause	Help reduce the frequency of vulnerabilities in the future.	Functional	Intersects With	Root Cause Analysis (RCA) & Lessons Learned	IRO-13	Mechanisms exist to incorporate lessons learned from analyzing and resolving cybersecurity and data protection incidents to reduce the likelihood or impact of future incidents.	5	
RV-3.1	N/A	Analyze identified vulnerabilities to determine their root causes.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system downlopers/inseptors consult with cybersecurity and data protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (\$T&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct vealnesses and defeliancies identified during the security testing and evaluation process: and (3) Document the results of the security testing evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Record the root cause of discovered issues. Example 2: Record bassons learned through root cause analysis in a wiki that developers can access and search.
RV-3.2	N/A	Analyze the root causes over time to identify patterns, such as a particular secure coding practice not being followed consistently.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with oppersouring and data protection personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (TSRE) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flav remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation processes; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Record lessons learned through root cause analysis in a with that developers can access and search. Example 2: Add mechanisms to the toolchain to automatically detect future instances of the root cause. Example 3: Update manual processes to detect future instances of the root cause.
RV.3.3	N/A	Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to endicate a class of vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality. (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security and resiliency capabilities; (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.		Example 1: See PW.7 and PW.8.
RV.3.3	N/A	Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developeral integrators consult with developeral integrators consult with developeral integrators consult with consultation of the state and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (TSE) plan, or a milar capability, [2] Implement a verifiable flaw remediation prosess consultation of the substances and defelocitical services and the substances of the state of the substances and defelocitical services and the substances and substances are substantially results of the security testing devaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs.	10	Example 1: Record lessons learned through root cause analysis in a wiki that developers can access and search. Example 2: Plan and implement changes to the appropriate SDLC practices.



Set Theory Newadonship Prapping (STNP)	Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1

FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of Technology Assett, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Representatives For Product Changes	TDA-02.7	Mechanisms exist to include appropriate cybersecurity and data protection representatives in the product feature and/or functionality change control review process.	5	
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	



scure Controls Framework (SCF) 13 of 13