



Internet of Things Companion Guide

Acknowledgments

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Introduction

The CIS Critical Security Controls® (CIS Controls®) are a prioritized set of actions that collectively form a defense-in-depth approach and best practices that mitigate the most common attacks against systems and networks. The CIS Controls are developed by a community of information technology (IT) experts who apply their first-hand experience as cyber defenders to create these globally accepted security best practices. The experts who develop the CIS Controls come from a wide range of sectors, including retail, manufacturing, healthcare, transportation, education, government, defense, and others. While the CIS Controls address the general practices that most enterprises should take to secure their systems, some operational environments may present unique requirements not addressed by the CIS Controls.

The purpose of the CIS Controls Internet of Things Community is to develop best practices and guidance for implementing the CIS Controls in association with a variety of devices within the Internet of Things (IoT). Enterprise use of IoT presents unique and complex challenges for security professionals. IoT devices are being embedded into the enterprise across the globe and often cannot be secured via standard enterprise security methods, such as running a monitoring application on the device, as the devices can't support these types of applications. Yet for ease of use, enterprise IoT devices are often connected to the same networks that employees use day in and day out, and are often directly connected to the internet via a variety of network protocols (e.g., Ethernet, Bluetooth, wireless fidelity [Wi-Fi], cellular).

Definition of Internet of Things

There is no universally agreed upon definition for IoT. The variety of perspectives from industry, academia, governments, and others across the world have led to different definitions, each focused on the needs of their sector, business, or area of interest. Each definition has relevant strengths and weaknesses, and they do not act to invalidate each other. Instead these definitions work within their desired context, and others may choose to use and apply them as they see fit for the systems that will be procured and implemented.

- In The Internet of Things: An Overview, a 2015 report from The Internet Society, IoT is defined as: "...scenarios where network connectivity and computing capability extends to objects, sensors, and everyday items not normally considered computers, allowing these devices to generate, exchange, and consume data with minimal human intervention."
- A 2015 report from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
 Engineers Incorporated (IEEE), titled Towards a Definition of
 the Internet of Things, defines IoT as "A network of items—each
 embedded with sensors—which are connected to the Internet."
- IoT has been defined within a recommendation from the International Telecommunication Union as "a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies."
- Gartner's IT Glossary defines IoT as "the network of physical objects that contain embedded technology to communicate and sense or interact with their internal states or the external environment."

Regardless of which definition an enterprise chooses to use, there are certain common features:

 Communications – Whether this is via a local medium, such as radio frequency identification (RFID), Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or via a wide area network (WAN) protocol, such as cellular, IoT devices can communicate with other devices.

- Functionality IoT devices have a core function as well as some additional functionality but they do not do everything. Most IoT devices do one thing and do it well.
- Processing capability IoT devices have sufficient processing capability to make their own decisions and act on inputs received from outside sources, but not enough intelligence to do complex tasks. For instance, they generally cannot run a rich operating system designed for a traditional desktop or mobile device.

The lack of a consistent, agreed-upon definition is actually part of the challenge within the IoT arena. IoT is a large, complex space and common issues include:

- Ubiquity There are a large number of overall devices.
- **Diversity** Devices are developed by different manufacturers with varying version numbers of hardware, firmware, and software.
- Ecosystem Multiple vendors are involved in creating each device, including hardware, firmware, and software.
- Standardization There are minimal agreed upon standards for securing access and communications for these devices

Examples of IoT devices that might be included within an enterprise include: speakers, security cameras, door locks, window sensors, thermostats, headsets, watches, power strips, and more—basically any device that may be integrated into a typical business IT environment.

Methodology

A consistent approach is needed for analyzing the CIS Controls in the context of IoT. For each of the 18 CIS Controls, the following information is provided in this document:

- Applicability This assesses the degree to which a CIS Control functions or pertains to IoT.
- Challenges These are unique issues that make implementing any of the relevant CIS Controls, or associated Safeguards, for IoT devices difficult.
- Additional Discussion A general guidance area to include relevant tools, products, or threat information that could be of use can be found here.

Scope

The objective of this guide is to have broad applicability across sectors. IoT affects all areas of computing across multiple sectors, such as healthcare, aviation, public safety, and energy. This has led to sector-specific IoT security guidance, but this document is purposefully sector-agnostic. As such, this guide focuses on purchasing, deploying, and monitoring commercially available IoT devices. It does not provide guidance on how to design, develop, and manufacture secure IoT devices, such as the secure system development process noted within National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST®) Special Publication (SP) 800-160 Revision 1.

Note that the CIS Implementation Groups (IGs) are a guideline to help enterprises determine a starting point for implementation of the CIS Controls. This guide does not re-group the Safeguards for IoT, and instead maintains the same prioritization used in the CIS Controls. Enterprises will, at times, find the need to implement CIS Safeguards in a higher IG. When integrating new technology into an environment, such as IoT, an enterprise should fully consider, and assess the security risks and impacts to assets and data; that understanding should drive the selection and implementation of appropriate CIS Safeguards regardless of IG.

Terminology

As noted earlier, there are many definitions of IoT. Below are basic descriptions of IoT components and terminology that we use throughout this guide. Devices are the *things* within *IoT* and are the primary focus of this guide. Gateways are devices that multiple things connect to in order to receive instructions, transfer data, etc. Multiple devices are often connected to a single gateway, or a gateway may passively monitor IoT devices. A gateway has an internet connection, whereas not all IoT devices will, and may only support local wireless protocols such as RFID, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Zigbee; or may be used over wide area networks such as LoraWAN.

Gateways, and other types of edge IoT devices often transition from a constrained set of devices and protocols to a less constrained environment. Gateways are one way to help reduce the attack surface of legacy IoT devices that cannot be properly secured. Many consumer IoT devices are associated with complex cloud platforms that can control the behavior of IoT devices and access and store data.

Applicability Overview

- More than 60% of CIS Safeguards apply
- Between 1% and 60% of CIS Safeguards apply
- 0% of CIS Safeguards apply

CONTROL	CIS CONTROL TITLE	APPLICABILITY
1	Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets	
2	Inventory and Control of Software Assets	
3	Data Protection	
4	Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software	
5	Account Management	
6	Access Control Management	
7	Continuous Vulnerability Management	
8	Audit Log Management	
9	Email and Web Browser Protections	
10	Malware Defenses	
11	Data Recovery	
12	Network Infrastructure Management	
13	Network Monitoring and Defense	
14	Security Awareness and Skills Training	
15	Service Provider Management	
16	Application Software Security	
17	Incident Response Management	
18	Penetration Testing	

Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets

Overview

Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all enterprise assets (end-user devices, including portable and mobile; network devices; non-computing/Internet of Things (IoT) devices; and servers) connected to the infrastructure, physically, virtually, remotely, and those within cloud environments, to accurately know the totality of assets that need to be monitored and protected within the enterprise. This will also support identifying unauthorized and unmanaged assets to remove or remediate.

IoT Applicability

It is important to track which devices have access to the network and are accessing data and enterprise resources. IoT devices are no different and this Control is considered extremely important. Traditional media access control (MAC) and internet protocol (IP) addresses can be used for device identifiers. Unfortunately, not all IoT devices will have these identifiers present (e.g., MAC address, IP address). For instance, while Zigbee devices support a physical layer MAC address, they use a Zigbee network address in lieu of an IP address. Very simple sensors and devices used for location tracking may only beacon identifiers for RFID. When using devices that do not support network-based authentication, network segmentation can be considered as a possible way to mitigate risk.

IoT Challenges

Enterprises must deploy technology that tracks the myriad of IoT devices which can be deployed across their enterprise. Understanding the device types and, in some cases, which specific devices are authorized to connect to the network is the starting point to adapting this Control for IoT. To the extent practical, this Control should be limited to enterprise assets and assets that connect to the enterprise network. For devices without traditional identifiers, physical tags can be placed onto the devices themselves that integrate with asset

management systems. In order to perverse privacy, these tags should not identify the organization. For some IoT devices with an externally accessible physical interface, cellular devices may be inserted into the device to allow it to be included in a cloud-based asset management system.


Some IoT devices are designed to work in relative isolation and never connect to an enterprise network. These devices still may be network-connected though, as they can communicate with a back-end cloud platform that the enterprise neither controls nor manages. Wireless IoT gateways can also be used to monitor wireless traffic from IoT devices. This information can then be relayed to an asset management system, either in the cloud or physically hosted at the enterprise. Another challenge is using digital certificates in IoT devices. Finally, Global Positioning System (GPS) can also be an effective way to monitor the location of IoT devices distributed outside the enterprise.

IoT Additional Discussion

Typical asset tracking tools may not work out of the box with IoT devices. Network scans for legacy and non-traditional devices may be dangerous to device, network, and system stability, potentially leaving IoT endpoints in an error state. Before purchasing devices and using them within an enterprise, it is worthwhile to understand how a device will respond to an asset discovery tool, and how well it will integrate with any asset management tools being utilized by an enterprise. The conventional approach of using ping responses, transmission control protocol synchronization (TCP SYN) or acknowledge (ACK) scans can disrupt communications or, in some cases, even impact device operations. Passive methods are preferred and are less likely to impact system availability or interact with vendor systems in a manner that could cause warranty issues. Where practical, non-intrusive methods should be leveraged, including media access control-address resolution protocol (MAC-ARP) tables, domain name system (DNS), active directory (AD), or a variety of IoT-specific tools employed to control and collect data in these systems for the express purpose of locating the variety of connected assets.

Wireless monitoring may be necessary to identify devices, as many IoT devices lack wired physical connections. Many newer IoT devices support integration into IoT management systems via application programming interfaces (APIs). At the very least, enterprises can

create a listing of device MAC address, device type, serial number, and other relevant information. "Smarter" IoT devices can utilize digital certificates to enhance identity and access management.



E O 2

Inventory and Control of Software Assets

Overview

Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all software (operating systems and applications) on the network so that only authorized software is installed and can execute, and that unauthorized and unmanaged software is found and prevented from installation or execution.

IoT Applicability

Network scanning and agent-based approaches are typical methods for software asset management. As mentioned in CIS Control 1, network scanning can leave many IoT devices in an unsafe or unusable state. Agent-based approaches will be ineffectual for IoT devices as there is not a common platform for the agent to be installed on the device. Manual and procedural methods can be used for asset tracking (for example, a spreadsheet).


IoT Challenges

Identifying the versions of firmware of IoT devices within the enterprise is a challenge. It may be possible to leverage central command and control systems, which are aware of device firmware versions. However, custom and restricted operating systems may limit remote query capability. In general, IoT device firmware is not patchable, but it is loaded onto the device as a new complete image. To obtain the listing of firmware applications on an embedded device, it may be necessary to work with the device developer/manufacturer. Manual sampling or firmware extraction via on-board direct maintenance ports (e.g., joint test action group [JTAG]) using proprietary software and hardware tools may be required.

IoT Additional Discussion

In many cases, firmware must be delivered over the network to IoT devices. This often includes verifying digital signatures as part of the installation of firmware. To the extent practical, utilize best practices for securing firmware images, which often includes applying digital signatures that are evaluated by the device before loading. The user or the device may check the firmware signature. This may require a secured space within the device to store credentials used for signature validation. Understanding the firmware update procedure before purchasing the device is best practice in these situations, since firmware can't be changed after the fact.

Tracking versions of Bluetooth and Wi-Fi in devices can be quite difficult and may not be possible using traditional scanning methods. Applications like Airodump-ng for Wi-Fi devices and hoitool or ubertooth-scan for Bluetooth devices will provide broadcast advertisements and MAC addresses. Note that for Bluetooth devices, MAC addresses do not conform to typical conventions and are oftentimes represented as the device Wi-Fi MAC address incremented by 1 bit. The information available from Wi-Fi and Bluetooth advertisements will allow enterprises to identify which versions of wireless protocols are supported. Allowlisting is generally not available on IoT devices. Allowlisting can occur at the application layer, or specific libraries or scripts can be allowlisted. A more common capability is for devices to perform command allowlisting, which only specifies a subset of commands that a device would accept. This will more likely be available with IoT vendors that engage within a security engineering process over the life cycle of the product.



SAFEGUAF	RD			IMPLE	MENTATION	GROUPS	APPLICABIL	ІТҮ		
NUMBER	CONTROL TITLE	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION		
2.2	Ensure Authorized Software Is Currently Supported	Applications	Identify	•	•	•	Yes	Enterprises should check the period of time for which a device		
	Ensure that only currently sup software inventory for enterprise the fulfillment of the enterprise controls and residual risk acc exception documentation, de- software support at least more	will be supported before purchase. Additional support may be available for purchase, but this is uncommon.								
2.3	Address Unauthorized Software	Applications	Respond	•	•	•	No	Firmware that is not approved by		
	Ensure that unauthorized soft receives a documented excep	the enterprise should be removed. Unfortunately, enterprises are often unable to control the software that is running on an IoT device.								
2.4	Utilize Automated Software Inventory Tools	Applications	Detect		•	•	No	Not all IoT devices will be able to integrate or be inventoried by an		
	Utilize software inventory too the discovery and documenta	automated tool, but those that have this capability should use it.								
2.5	Allowlist Authorized Software	Applications	Protect		•	•	No	This capability is unavailable on mos		
	Use technical controls, such a software can execute or be ac						rized	loT devices, many of which will lack the processing power or security architecture to perform allowlisting.		
2.6	Allowlist Authorized Libraries	Applications	Protect		•	•	No	Allowlisting individual libraries is		
	Use technical controls to ensi .dll, .ocx, .so, etc. files, are allo libraries from loading into a s	zed	typically not available on IoT devices.							
2.7	Allowlist Authorized Scripts	Applications	Protect			•	No	Allowlisting individual scripts is		
	Use technical controls, such a only authorized scripts, such unauthorized scripts from exe	typically not available on IoT devices.								

Data Protection

Overview

Develop processes and technical controls to identify, classify, securely handle, retain, and dispose of data.

IoT Applicability

Protecting the security of data being stored, transmitted, and manipulated on IoT devices can be critical depending on use case or sector. Certain industries may not contain any sensitive data in the traditional sense. In other instances, certain IoT devices will be dedicated to environments that have an informal set of standards and norms, or their usage may be directly regulated (e.g., Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard [PCI DSS], Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA], General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR]). The level of data protection needed is often specific to the use case at hand, depending on factors such as data sensitivity and likelihood of exposure.

Some IoT devices will process and transmit complex enterprise or customer information in modern formats, whereas other devices will read and transmit physical attributes such as temperature or pressure. This latter information is sometimes not deemed to be especially sensitive or proprietary on its own, though it may become more sensitive when coupled with other data points, such as location or identifiers used for people. In some cases, these "simple" IoT use cases can be absent of any particular protections in the way it is collected, transferred, stored, and analyzed.

IoT Challenges

Detecting and preventing the flow of data out of IoT devices is a difficult task, as is preventing unauthorized disclosure. IoT devices will often have a diverse supply chain, utilizing numerous hardware manufacturers, all of which will leverage cloud platforms. This makes data protection quite difficult for the menagerie of IoT devices in

use. If possible, data-in-transit security, through protocols such as compact Transport Layer Security (cTLS), should be implemented to guard against eavesdropping on data flowing between IoT and other enterprise components. Although IPsec would be an excellent alternative, it's unlikely to be supported on an IoT device. This is difficult as most IoT devices will ship with a set of security protocols that are supported which may never change over the life time of the device.

Protections must also be implemented for the data stored on any cloud platform or the device itself, including integrated memory or removable storage media. This is another area typically outside of enterprise control and may need to be screened for pre-purchase. The same can be said for any IoT device's ability to manage cryptographic keys. This is further addressed in Control 15: Service Provider Management.

IoT Additional Discussion

Legacy or low-end IoT devices often do not encrypt data in transit or in storage. Typically, IoT traffic is perishable, near real-time, of limited historical value, and tolerant of loss. Sophisticated attacks looking to manipulate data often require deep system knowledge and serious mission benefit to justify the cost of technique and exploit development. In cases where actual threats or observed threat intelligence indicates the need, methods such as multi-path redundancy, cross-sensor correlation, or a custom in-line device may be put into place. Many IoT devices will attempt to store data in the cloud by default without enterprise approval. This may also include storing data on any mobile devices used to control a device. This makes data protection hard, as enterprises may not have visibility into what information is being transmitted.

Traditional enterprise data loss prevention (DLP) systems can be helpful for email and network stored data. It is important to perform methodical threat modeling for every new IoT system being implemented. Consider the value of data when determining whether encryption should be applied to protect that data. In some instances, the need to support near real-time communications outweighs the need to apply an encryption layer to the data. The output of a threat analysis will provide the foundation for an effective data protection strategy.

CIS Control 3: Data Protection SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION GROUPS APPLICABILITY NUMBER TITLE/DESCRIPTION ASSET TYPE SECURITY FUNCTION IG3 INCLUDED? JUSTIFICATION **Establish and Maintain a Data** 3.1 The elements of the data Identify Data Ves **Management Process** management process mentioned in this Safeguard description can all Establish and maintain a data management process. In the process, address apply to IoT. It's possible that these data sensitivity, data owner, handling of data, data retention limits, and disposal can be addressed as a subcomponent requirements, based on sensitivity and retention standards for the enterprise. Review of an IoT Security Policy, or and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that possibly addressed as part of Data could impact this Safeguard. Management. **Establish and Maintain a Data** Sensitive information on IoT Data Identify Ves Inventory and associated management platforms should be understood Establish and maintain a data inventory, based on the enterprise's data management and inventoried. This Includes data process. Inventory sensitive data, at a minimum. Review and update inventory annually, passing through the system and data at a minimum, with a priority on sensitive data. recorded by various onboard sensors. 3.3 **Configure Data Access Control** IT administrators may be able Data Protect Ves Lists to control access and lifetime of accounts via administrative Configure data access control lists based on a user's need to know. Apply data access consoles if an IoT device's control lists, also known as access permissions, to local and remote file systems, manufacturer provides an app or databases, and applications. other management interface. If this is supported, access should be controlled. 3.4 **Enforce Data Retention** Data Protect Yes IT administrators may be able to control access and lifetime of Retain data according to the enterprise's data management process. Data retention accounts via administrative consoles. must include both minimum and maximum timelines. This will depend on the device and platform. 3.5 Securely Dispose of Data Data Yes This can be difficult for IoT devices Protect that require access to specific cloud Securely dispose of data as outlined in the enterprise's data management process. platforms. Not all devices will provide Ensure the disposal process and method are commensurate with the data sensitivity. the ability to delete the data stored on the device. Device destruction may be necessary. 3.6 **Encrypt Data on End-User** IoT devices are typically not **Devices Protect** No **Devices** considered end-user devices. With that said, corporate sensitive data Encrypt data on end-user devices containing sensitive data. Example implementations including hours of operation or can include, Windows BitLocker®, Apple FileVault®, Linux® dm-crypt. access, information collected via sensors or cameras may be stored and are likely worth protecting. Object Security of Constrained Application Protocol (OSCOAP) may be a useful solution in the near future.1 **Establish and Maintain a Data** 3.7 Data classification decisions Data Identify Yes Classification Scheme should be explicitly made for IoT data, to include data stored Establish and maintain an overall data classification scheme for the enterprise. on, or downloaded from, their Enterprises may use labels, such as "Sensitive," "Confidential," and "Public," and management platforms. classify their data according to those labels. Review and update the classification scheme annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.

https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-core-object-security-04.html

CIS Control 3: Data Protection SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION GROUPS APPLICABILITY NUMBER TITLE/DESCRIPTION ASSET TYPE SECURITY FUNCTION INCLUDED? JUSTIFICATION **Document Data Flows** Identify The enterprise should understand Data 3.8 Yes how sensitive data is transferred Document data flows. Data flow documentation includes service provider data flows to and from IoT devices, apps, and and should be based on the enterprise's data management process. Review and update cloud-based platforms. documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard. 3.9 **Encrypt Data on Removable** IoT devices do not commonly Data Yes **Protect** Media utilize USB storage; however, other removable storage media (such as Encrypt data on removable media. SD cards) might be used to store video files, telemetry, or even the operating system of the IoT device. Based on the sensitivity of stored data, encryption should be used to mitigate risks related to data theft and disclosure. 3.10 **Encrypt Sensitive Data in** This is an important Safeguard for Data **Protect** Yes **Transit** IoT devices, but enterprises will need to verify if this capability is available Encrypt sensitive data in transit. Example implementations can include, Transport Layer for the specific device before Security (TLS) and Open Secure Shell (OpenSSH). device purchase. 3.11 Encrypt Sensitive Data at Rest Data **Protect** Yes This is an important Safeguard for IoT devices, but enterprises will need Encrypt sensitive data at rest on servers, applications, and databases containing to verify if this capability is available sensitive data. Storage-layer encryption, also known as server-side encryption, meets for the specific device, and within the the minimum requirement of this Safeguard. Additional encryption methods may device management platform, before include application-layer encryption, also known as client-side encryption, where device purchase. access to the data storage device(s) does not permit access to the plain-text data. 3.12 Segment Data Processing and The use of network segmentation Network Yes **Protect** Storage Based on Sensitivity strategies is strongly recommended to keep IoT components operating Segment data processing and storage, based on the sensitivity of the data. Do not in their own zones or on their own process sensitive data on enterprise assets intended for lower sensitivity data. separate networks. This concept applies to this Safeguard as well. IoT data processing and storage will typically not be a highly sensitive computing activity and should be kept separate. Deliberate decisions should be made as to where and how IoT gateways should be segmented. 3.13 **Deploy a Data Loss Prevention** Traditional enterprise Data Loss Data **Protect** No Solution Prevention (DLP) can be helpful for email and network stored data, but Implement an automated tool, such as a host-based Data Loss Prevention (DLP) cloud applications and data may be tool to identify all sensitive data stored, processed, or transmitted through enterprise more difficult to get visibility from IoT assets, including those located onsite or at a remote service provider, and update the devices. There are tools that leverage enterprise's sensitive data inventory. cloud service APIs to gain this visibility, or filtering clouds that proxy IoT services. Log Sensitive Data Access Data IoT devices themselves are likely 3.14 Detect Yes going to be unable to log sensitive Log sensitive data access, including modification and disposal. data access within their own system, but enterprises can log which systems and datastores an IoT device accesses.

Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software

Overview

Establish and maintain the secure configuration of enterprise assets (end-user devices, including portable and mobile; network devices; non-computing/IoT devices; and servers) and software (operating systems and applications).

IoT Applicability

A majority of the time, resource constrained IoT devices lack the configuration and customization options provided by laptops or even mobile devices. These configuration and customization options are essential to device hardening and secure configuration. Yet some IoT devices can still be hardened in a limited fashion. This is true even of embedded IoT devices. A common example is changing default passwords. End users should familiarize themselves with the developers' or manufacturers' documentation in order to take advantage of other available resources (e.g., academic papers, conference proceedings) to understand what configuration options are available and whether a device can be sufficiently configured to meet your needs.

IoT Challenges

A device or application's configuration may drift over time, even if efforts are made to properly configure the device before or during deployment. This could be due to firmware updates, factory resets, or potentially even software errors. Some IoT device configurations, especially for consumer or typical enterprise use, are solely available within a corresponding mobile application. Users will need to first connect the device to the application before configuration is an option. Although this can make device configuration, monitoring, and maintenance easier, it also expands the overall attack surface of the device as now the mobile device (and mobile application) must also be secured.

Undocumented APIs, service provider, and developer backdoors may offer original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and potentially malicious parties' access to the device, and subsequently consumer or enterprise information. For instance, many IoT devices run a web server with network troubleshooting tools installed (e.g., ping, nslookup) that can be used to profile any internal or external network to which the IoT device is connected. Monitoring what network services an IoT device responds to is necessary as these devices should not be considered trusted until after extensive vetting has occurred.

IoT Additional Discussion

IoT devices sold and marketed as "appliances" with integrated software generally contain proprietary firmware components, limiting applicability of post-development hardening. When configuration options are available, cybersecurity professionals should review and decide if any particular configurations are untenable for your organization. Additionally, if a certain configuration setting is required to assure the security of the component on the network, then that should also be documented. Cybersecurity professionals should baseline these configurations and keep them documented as best practices. This information can be helpful as requirements when selecting future devices.

A subset of IoT devices support real-time operating systems (RTOSs) that allow for some amount of persistent storage. Oftentimes, this persistence comes in the form of startup scripts that can be modified to affect the configuration of the device at boot time. It is worthwhile to take the time to research if these configurations are written in a secure manner. When IoT devices support access control via user or administrator accounts and passwords, default accounts and passwords should be changed in accordance with modern guidelines. If available, multi-factor authentication (MFA) should be used to protect administrator accounts.

SAFEGUAF	RDS			IMPLEN	IENTATION	GROUPS	APPLICABIL	ІТҮ		
IUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION		
l.1	Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process	Applications	Protect	•	•	•	Y	Secure configurations generally cannot be established in the same		
	Establish and maintain a secu user devices, including portal servers) and software (operat documentation annually, or wimpact this Safeguard.	manner as traditional operating systems or applications. With that said, there may be certain configuration options available such as changing a default password or ensuring MFA is used to access any management functions.								
1.2	Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process for Network Infrastructure	Network	Protect	•	•	•	N	IoT devices may need hubs or gateways to function. These device are often treated like IoT devices		
	Establish and maintain a secu and update documentation a could impact this Safeguard.		themselves. Managing network infrastructure is out of scope for this IoT-based guide.							
.3	Configure Automatic Session Locking on Enterprise Assets	Users	Protect	•	•	•	N	This is not applicable to IoT devices as they are often headless.		
	Configure automatic session inactivity. For general purpose minutes. For mobile end-user	e operating syst	ems, the period	must n	ot exc	eed 15				
.4	Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers	Devices	Protect	•	•	•	N	There are no IoT considerations for this Safeguard if MUD is not in		
	Implement and manage a fire implementations include a vir firewall agent.	use. Enterprises leveraging MUD will need to ensure MUD logic is properly set up and configured within network devices.								
1.5	Implement and Manage a Firewall on End-User Devices	Devices	Protect	•	•	•	N	IoT devices do not typically contain a on-device firewall. Devices leveragin		
	Implement and manage a hos with a default-deny rule that dexplicitly allowed.							MUD will need to ensure MUD logic is properly set up and configured on each IoT device in question.		
l.6	Securely Manage Enterprise Assets and Software	Network	Protect	•	•	•	Υ	Software development teams designing IoT devices and infrastructure should use modern,		
	Securely manage enterprise a managing configuration throu accessing administrative inte Shell (SSH) and Hypertext Tramanagement protocols, such operationally essential.	igh version-con rfaces over sect ansfer Protocol	trolled-infrastruc ure network prot Secure (HTTPS)	ture-a ocols, s . Do no	s-code such a et use i	e and s Secu nsecur	re	infrastructure should use modern, secure management protocols. Research should be done beforehan to make sure loT devices use secure communication protocols before purchase, such as dTLS, cTLS, EDHOC, and OSCOAP.		
1.7	Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software	Users	Protect	•	•	•	N	This level of interaction is often not exposed on an IoT device. However,		
	Manage default accounts on administrator, and other pre-can include, disabling default	this should be established and appropriate management processes implemented where this level of access is available.								
.8	Uninstall or Disable Unnecessary Services on Enterprise Assets and Applications	Devices	Protect		•	•	N	IoT devices typically do not offer this level of feature granularity to IT administrators.		
	Uninstall or disable unnecess	h ac an								

	RDS			IMPLEN	IENTATION	GROUPS	APPLICABIL	ITY			
IUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION			
4.9	Configure Trusted DNS Servers on Enterprise Assets	Devices	Protect		•	•	N	This is a network-level mitigation, out of scope for IoT.			
	Configure trusted DNS server configuring assets to use entraccessible DNS servers.										
l.10	Enforce Automatic Device Lockout on Portable End-User Devices	Devices	Respond		•	•	N	IoT devices often will not have this feature available as they are often headless.			
	Enforce automatic device loc authentication attempts on p do not allow more than 20 fai no more than 10 failed auther Microsoft® InTune Device Loc										
.11	Enforce Remote Wipe Capability on Portable End-User Devices	Devices	Protect		•	•	N	If remote wipe is a necessary capability needed for the enterprise,			
.11		a from enterpris	se-owned portab				when				
.11	on Portable End-User Devices Remotely wipe enterprise dat deemed appropriate such as	a from enterpris	se-owned portab				when	capability needed for the enterprise, this feature needs to be verified before purchasing. Some IoT devices that support EMM / MDM allow for remote wipe. It is not a			

E O 5

Account Management

Overview

Use processes and tools to assign and manage authorization to credentials for user accounts, including administrator accounts, as well as service accounts, to enterprise assets and software.

IoT Applicability

IoT devices will have a series of accounts already created and in use when the device is purchased and shipped. Account management is applicable to the mobile applications, devices, and cloud platforms all used for IoT. Additionally, enterprises and potentially individual users may also create new accounts. All of these accounts need to be actively managed. It is uncommon for IoT devices to feature dedicated administrative accounts that are separate from user accounts, for managing IoT devices. In some situations, especially with enterprise or consumer-grade IoT devices, control or pseudo-administrative access can be obtained through management applications on mobile devices.

IoT Challenges

When evaluating IoT components for use in the enterprise, investigate the supported features associated with administrative accounts. This should include the type of authentication credentials and protocols supported by the device and its associated ecosystem. This will most likely include passwords and the strength of the authentication implementation. For administrator accounts, attempt to ensure that at a minimum, strong password requirements are used, and account access is audited. In addition, when feasible, attach the IoT component to a directory, allowing for the use of domain administrator accounts when needed. This will allow for the ability to more easily restrict the use of administrative privileges.

Administrators should be extremely careful when first working with a completely unmanaged device. Some IoT devices are beginning to support some form of Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) or Unified Endpoint Management (UEM). These technologies allow specific policies and configurations to be sent to an IoT device. General administrative activities can also be performed, such as restarts and diagnosing problems. Administrative accounts can be set up for each device, with credentials managed through that technology portal.

IoT Additional Discussion

Many IoT devices are deployed in insecure areas (e.g., roadside units, or RSUs, in the transportation sector). These devices are sometimes deployed with shared accounts that are used by technicians to manage the devices. Consider alternative methods for restricting administrative access to these types of devices. For legacy devices without privileged access capability, a compensating control may need to be applied, such as additional physical security. Newly designed IoT devices and subsystems should integrate use of this Control.

Attackers may attempt to obtain administrator rights to IoT devices via operating system (OS) or firmware level vulnerabilities so they can hide themselves from the user. This entire Control is difficult to enforce on a rooted device that has its security architecture broken. Although this security architecture bypass may provide a user with root access, they often have default administrator credentials that do not frequently change. Furthermore, if an administrator is able to change their password, it is recommended they comply with the password recommendations set forth by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-63-3. This means that in most situations, memorized secrets (i.e., passwords) chosen by a subscriber (i.e., human) should be at least eight characters long. To the extent practical in IoT, multi-factor authentication (MFA) should always be used. With that said, the overall goal would be to implement authentication solutions that prevent credential theft. This more abstract goal supports PKI, WebAuthn, and MFA solutions that might only be a password and PIN, which is not preferable to the first two options.

CIS Control 5: Account Management SAFEGUARDS APPLICABILITY IMPLEMENTATION GROUPS NUMBER TITLE/DESCRIPTION ASSET TYPE SECURITY FUNCTION INCLUDED? JUSTIFICATION **Establish and Maintain an** If an IoT management system or UEM 5.1 Users Identify Yes **Inventory of Accounts** integration is available, which is rare, an inventory of the account accessing Establish and maintain an inventory of all accounts managed in the enterprise. that system should be maintained. The inventory must include both user and administrator accounts. The inventory, Local administrative accounts are at a minimum, should contain the person's name, username, start/stop dates, and often not available to be easily department. Validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at inventoried within IoT. a minimum quarterly, or more frequently. 5.2 **Use Unique Passwords Protect** Yes Administrative accounts for management, and any account Use unique passwords for all enterprise assets. Best practice implementation includes, used on the device, should use at a minimum, an 8-character password for accounts using MFA and a 14-character unique passwords. password for accounts not using MFA. 5.3 **Disable Dormant Accounts** Respond Yes In a manner similar to traditional systems, dormant accounts should be Delete or disable any dormant accounts after a period of 45 days of inactivity, disabled after a pre-defined time of where supported. inactivity wherever this is practical. **Restrict Administrator** Administrative accounts for **Privileges to Dedicated** Users Yes management should have dedicated **Protect Administrator Accounts** passwords. Scheduled auditing of administrative accounts should be Restrict administrator privileges to dedicated administrator accounts on enterprise regularly performed to assess if assets. Conduct general computing activities, such as internet browsing, email, and admin accounts/privileges are still productivity suite use, from the user's primary, non-privileged, account. required. Unfortunately, this is not supported on all IoT devices. 5.5 Establish and Maintain an If a management technology such Users Identify Yes **Inventory of Service Accounts** as UEM is used, this could obviate the need for local administrative Establish and maintain an inventory of service accounts. The inventory, at a minimum, accounts. All management accounts must contain department owner, review date, and purpose. Perform service account should be inventoried alongside any reviews to validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a necessary mobile / cloud applications minimum quarterly, or more frequently. needed to make the device function. Some IoT management technology 5.6 **Centralize Account Protect** Yes Users Management can integrate with identity service providers, or may provide their own Centralize account management through a directory or identity service. identity service. This is difficult to accomplish on IoT.



Access Management Control

Overview

Use processes and tools to create, assign, manage, and revoke access credentials and privileges for user, administrator, and service accounts for enterprise assets and software.

IoT Applicability

IoT devices require access management, but often in a different manner than traditional user account management. This is due to the fact that users do not often access an interface, or there is no user account needed to interact with the device (e.g., "Turn on the lights"). The Access Management Control is meant to manage how a user accesses a device all the way through revoking access credentials and privileges. Thorough implementations of CIS Control 5 and Control 6 involve written policies addressing these areas before devices are provided to users. Although that's not always practical for IoT when devices have already been purchased, set up, and are running on an enterprise network.


IoT Challenges

It can be challenging to manage accounts on a device with preset user accounts developed by different vendors. Realistically, it may not be possible to manage all accounts on a device from all of the independent companies involved in development. The accounts may not be properly documented upon receipt of a device, athough obtaining a thorough inventory of identifiable accounts is important. It is difficult to identify all root accounts that a developer may use, and it may be preferable to use devices that can disable all accounts that the organization has not explicitly approved. Realistically, it will not be possible to manage all accounts and credentials on an IoT device, yet best efforts are worth the effort.

IoT Additional Discussion

Registering devices within an enterprise directory system such as Active Directory (AD) or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) may be a valid method for restricting access and for effectively monitoring who has authenticated to the devices. However, this is only applicable for those devices that can be configured for AD. Enterprises should ensure that IoT implementation plans include strategies for authentication and monitoring the accounts used to access devices. This data should then be fed back to the Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) for monitoring and control when IoT devices are incorporated into the enterprise network. Administrators should regularly review user accounts on all systems utilized by the enterprise. Privileges should be adjusted accordingly on a regular basis with over-privileged users addressed and accounts deactivated when necessary.

Legacy IoT systems with stand-alone consolidating or command and control hosts should leverage system tools, augmenting them with manual recording and audit processes as required, to enable this Control. Cloud-based applications supported by the enterprise should be monitored and have their credentials disabled during employee separation. Enterprise applications should be analyzed and reviewed for proper authentication techniques. Special attention should be paid to areas where integration occurs between third-party services and when identities are federated. Logging should be enabled within back-end management services to monitor activity, with the logs regularly reviewed.



AFEGUA	RD			IMPLEM	ENTATION (GROUPS	APPLICABIL	тү		
UMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION		
.3	Require MFA for Externally- Exposed Applications	Users	Protect	•	•	•	No	Where possible, MFA should be performed for IoT cloud-based		
	Require all externally-exposed where supported. Enforcing Natisfactory implementation of	applications. Generally, IoT apps are not hosted on-premises, and this Safeguard is out of scope.								
.4	Require MFA for Remote Network Access	Users	Protect	•	•	•	No	The scope of this guide primarily focuses on IoT devices used within		
	Require MFA for remote netw	ork access.						the enterprise.		
.5	Require MFA for Administrative Access	Users	Protect	•	•	•	Yes	To the extent practical in IoT, MFA should always be used, although this is not always supported on		
	Require MFA for all administrassets, whether managed on-		IoT. Standards such as the IETF Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments offer more robust solutions than traditional MFA. ¹							
6	Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Authentication and Authorization Systems	Users	Identify		•	•	No	Although an important Safeguard, lo specific authentication systems are not commonplace.		
	Establish and maintain an inv systems, including those host update the inventory, at a mir	ed on-site or at	a remote service	e provi						
.7	Centralize Access Control	Users	Protect		•	•	No	A majority of IoT devices do not		
	Centralize access control for a provider, where supported.	all enterprise as	sets through a d	irector	y servi	ce or \$	SSO	allow for a centralized point of authentication. For instance, IoT devices utilizing a cloud platform will not allow enterprises to insert themselves into the authentication process.		
6.8	Define and Maintain Role-Based Access Control	Data	Protect			•	No	Most IoT devices do not provide role based accounts.		
	Define and maintain role-bas	enting								

¹ https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ace/documents/

TONTRO CONTRO

Continuous Vulnerability Management

Overview

Develop a plan to continuously assess and track vulnerabilities on all enterprise assets within the enterprise's infrastructure, in order to remediate, and minimize, the window of opportunity for attackers. Monitor public and private industry sources for new threat and vulnerability information.

IoT Applicability

While vulnerability management is applicable to IoT devices, it is a much more difficult challenge when compared to traditional desktops, servers, or even mobile. Just as with other devices on a network, regularly scheduled vulnerability assessments should be conducted to determine non-secure configurations that lead to elevated threats to the enterprise. These security flaws should be remediated quickly, and the processes used for remediation should be fed back into the processes used for deployment of new IoT devices.


IoT Challenges

Active vulnerability assessments of IoT devices in an operational environment may be dangerous to the health and proper functioning of the device. Improper vulnerability scans may lead to system instability or failure. Ideally, how the device will react when scanned is known by the IT administrator before the scan is initiated. As an alternative, passive vulnerability assessment can be a less intensive method to identify vulnerabilities identified without the risk of harming the IoT device and affecting other network operations. These assessments can be done manually or with automated tools sold by a third-party vendor. Although many IoT devices will be deployed internally, and not directly exposed to the internet, routine scanning for externally exposed assets is prudent. Tools like Shodan or Censys can detect externally exposed devices and help administrators either remove or properly configure them.

IoT Additional Discussion

Before putting an IoT device into operation, a process should be developed for managing IoT device vulnerabilities. This may be a subset of a larger vulnerability management plan, or dedicated to IoT. Different approaches may be needed for certain types of IoT devices, such as those residing outside the enterprise, on-site with clients, or functioning in a critical infrastructure sector. Topics for an IoT vulnerability management plan include: patch management, time to remediate, and disclosing issues with clients. For the subset of IoT devices that receive security patches from their vendor, they should be kept up-to-date. Outdated firmware often contains exploitable vulnerabilities that an attacker could leverage to access enterprise data.

A laboratory testing environment may be appropriate for regularly scheduled assessments against new threats and new IoT firmware configurations. Collaborative threat laboratories (e.g., sponsored by an Information Sharing & Analysis Center [ISAC] or other industry body) and IoT vendor laboratories may be the best venues for implementing this Control. As with other hardware and firmware vulnerabilities, these new vulnerabilities should also be evaluated against the enterprise's risk appetite to determine when a particular device or device class can no longer be supported on the network, or when it must be isolated.



SAFEGUARD				IMPLEN	IENTATION	GROUPS	APPLICABIL	гү	
IUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION	
7.3	Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management	Applications	Protect	•	•	•	No	Many IoT devices cannot be updated via a centralized tool. If updates are	
	Perform operating system up management on a monthly, o	available at all, devices generally need to be individually updated. It is often difficult to separate operating system level patches from the application providing the device's primary function.							
7.4	Perform Automated Application Patch Management	Applications	Protect	•	•	•	No	Many IoT devices cannot be updated via a centralized tool. If updates are	
	Perform application updates management on a monthly, o			tomate	d patc	h		available at all, devices generally need to be individually updated. It is often difficult to separate operating system level patches from the application providing the device's primary function.	
'.5	Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Internal Enterprise Assets	Applications	Identify		•	•	Yes	Enterprise IoT assets used internally should be scanned in an automated manner to the extent practical.	
	Perform automated vulnerabi more frequent, basis. Conduc SCAP-compliant vulnerability								
7.6	Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Externally-Exposed Enterprise Assets	Applications	Identify		•	•	Yes	Enterprise IoT assets used externally should be scanned in an automated manner to the extent practical.	
	Perform automated vulnerabili a SCAP-compliant vulnerabili frequent, basis.								
7.7	Remediate Detected Vulnerabilities	Applications	Respond		•	•	Yes	Forcing platform updates at a specific time is not always possible, although	
	Remediate detected vulnerab monthly, or more frequent, ba	some devices can be configured for automated firmware updates. This should lead to a timely update process. This is the best way to ensure vulnerabilities are remediated on IoT devices.							

SONTROL SONTROL

Audit Log Management

Overview

Collect, alert, review, and retain audit logs of events that could help detect, understand, or recover from an attack.

IoT Applicability

IoT device logs are structured in a variety of file formats because there are no uniform standards for storing and transferring IoT data. Some industries and use cases may have standards available. Administrators in these sectors should understand these formats in order to properly implement this Control.

Each device manufacturer is free to create their own format, making integrations from multiple vendors within the same network difficult. Furthermore, IoT devices may not be configured to log events; they may store logs locally on the device; or they may be sending them off to a local gateway or cloud platform. Enterprises should ensure that IoT devices create detailed logs and many IoT devices have this capability, but this capability needs to be verified before purchase. Additionally, a trusted method of extracting and parsing audit logs from relevant components should be available. However, this may prove challenging in some instances where OS and application logs are not enabled or available. To the degree possible, the default stance should always be to attempt to collect these logs.

IoT Challenges


Having logs from IoT devices is one measure of success but means little to an enterprise's cybersecurity posture if they are not being reviewed on a regular basis. Another challenging area related to IoT security is how to integrate large amounts of security data from diverse enterprise devices into an enterprise's Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system. The creation of custom connectors should be investigated when IoT components do not provide standards-based log output. Just as important is a focus on

how to make sense of the IoT log data when combined with standard network data captured by the SIEM. The establishment of rules that correlate this diverse data effectively will be an interesting challenge moving forward. Cloud-based analysis may be a potential solution to these challenges.

Developers may be concerned about writing logs too often to flash memory, which can potentially lead to excessive wear on the flash memory modules. This is an open problem, and developers must attempt to strike their own balance based on customer need.

IoT Additional Discussion

Legacy IoT systems are designed for reliable operations and rapid recovery. Accordingly, some of these systems include the ability to generate logs. Command and control subsystems may use alternative, out-of-band logging of activities that should be considered when assessing the implementation of this Control, or the need for separate, compensating controls.



SAFEGUAF	RD			IMPLEN	IENTATION (GROUPS	APPLICABIL	ΙΤΥ			
NUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION			
3.5	Collect Detailed Audit Logs	Network	Detect		•	•	Υ	This is always a concern for any typ			
	Configure detailed audit logg event source, date, username and other useful elements the	of information system.									
3.6	Collect DNS Query Audit Logs	Network	Detect		•	•	N	This is a network-level mitigation, or			
	Collect DNS query audit logs	rted.	of scope for IoT.								
3.7	Collect URL Request Audit Logs	Network	Detect		•	•	N	There is nothing specific to IoT within			
	Collect URL request audit log	js on enterprise	assets, where ap	propri	ate an	d supp	orted.	this Safeguard.			
3.8	Collect Command-Line Audit Logs	Devices	Detect		•	•	Υ	Log management at scale can provide useful information about the			
	Collect command-line audit I logs from PowerShell®, BASH	state and health of fielded devices. This information should be stored ar processed via a single resource.									
3.9	Centralize Audit Logs	Network	Detect		•	•	Υ	loT devices do not make log			
	Centralize, to the extent poss enterprise assets.	centralization easy. This should be done to the extent practical.									
.10	Retain Audit Logs	Network	Protect		•	•	N	There is nothing specific to IoT within			
	Retain audit logs across ente		this Safeguard.								
.11	Conduct Audit Log Reviews	Network	Detect		•	•	Υ	Administrators and IT professionals			
	Conduct reviews of audit log- indicate a potential threat. Co		should review audit logs for unexpected accesses to enterprise resources.								
3.12	Collect Service Provider Logs	Data	Detect			•	Υ	If this information is available, it			
	Collect service provider logs, collecting authentication and and user management events		should be collected and analyzed.								

EDUTION

Email and Web Browser Protections

Overview

Improve protections and detections of threats from email and web vectors, as these are opportunities for attackers to manipulate human behavior through direct engagement.

IoT Applicability

IoT devices generally do not use email or external web browser applications or interfaces. Some stand-alone IoT management systems may leverage standard web browser technologies for visualization and a common user experience. The majority of IoT devices will use email and browsers in a "headless" fashion.

IoT Challenges

Some devices will run a web server in order to support Representational State Transfer (RESTful) web services. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to apply hardening guidance such as the CIS Benchmarks to IoT devices using web technologies. Embedded devices are commonly built without any way of modifying internal firmware.

IoT Additional Discussion

IT equipment that is used to transfer or bridge data between an IoT network and an IT corporate or other non-IoT operational network may incorporate email or web browser functionality. These applications should be protected according to best practice. In cases where web browser technologies are incorporated in stand-alone IoT networks, a risk analysis should be performed to address the need to update the applications when patches and new versions are released.

SAFEGUAI	RDS			IMPLEN	IENTATION	GROUPS	APPLICABIL	ΙΤΥ			
NUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION			
9.1	Ensure Use of Only Fully Supported Browsers and Email Clients	Applications	Protect	•	•	•	Yes	Although browsers and email clients should be kept up-to-date, it is difficult to do this for IoT devices.			
	Ensure only fully supported by the enterprise, only using the through the vendor.	Enterprises should attempt to verify that updates are regularly applied to IoT devices.									
9.2	Use DNS Filtering Services	Network	Protect	•	•	•	Yes	In order for this mitigation to be put			
	Use DNS filtering services or malicious domains.	into place, it would have to be done at the network level.									
9.3	Maintain and Enforce Network- Based URL Filters	Network	Protect		•	•	Yes	Network-based proxies, firewalls, and other proxies can be			
	Enforce and update network- connecting to potentially mal include category-based filteri lists. Enforce filters for all ent	configured for IoT devices, or specifically support capabilities to filter IoT traffic. Content blockers can be developed for certain applications.									
9.4	Restrict Unnecessary or Unauthorized Browser and Email Client Extensions	Applications	Protect		•	•	No	This is generally not possible with common IoT devices.			
	Restrict, either through unins browser or email client plugir										
9.5	Implement DMARC	Network	Protect		•	•	No	Although DMARC is an important			
	To lower the chance of spoof DMARC policy and verification Framework (SPF) and the Do	n, starting with	implementing th	e Send	der Pol		nt	Safeguard, DMARC is implemented in DNS and mail servers, and therefore not applicable to individual IoT devices.			
9.6	Block Unnecessary File Types	Network	Protect		•	•	Yes	This is generally not possible with			
	Block unnecessary file types	attempting to e	nter the enterpris	se's em	ail gat	eway.		common IoT devices.			
9.7	Deploy and Maintain Email Server Anti-Malware Protections	Network	Protect			•	No	This is generally not possible with common IoT devices.			
	Deploy and maintain email se scanning and/or sandboxing.	1									

10 10 Indiana

Malware Defenses

Overview

Prevent or control the installation, spread, and execution of malicious applications, code, or scripts on enterprise assets.

IoT Applicability

Malware affects IoT devices in similar ways to other platforms, as seen with high-profile attacks utilizing distributed denial of service (DDoS) and explored in greater detail in the paper *DDoS* in the IoT: Mirai and Other Botnets. Both malware and exploits are now tailored to IoT devices and platforms, which highlights the need for a robust strategy to defend against malware and malicious code.

IoT Challenges

Given the limited processing ability and limited power capacity of many IoT components, host-based malware protections may consume too much processing capability and energy to work effectively, necessitating alternative protections. Using commercial, network-based malware detection systems (e.g., in-line monitoring) may not be feasible due to latency requirements or the use of non-IP protocols, but this is changing. IoT-specific network monitoring devices are beginning to be available for both enterprises and consumers. Continuous monitoring at corporate or other gateways through which IoT device information (updates and/or data) flows may be used to detect adversary malware or to correlate observed activity with known, legitimate, and/or planned activity.


IoT Additional Discussion

Traditional anti-malware techniques are not feasible on IoT devices. At the very least, preventing IoT devices from being publicly exposed to and facing the internet will act as a potential barrier. Segmenting IoT devices to their own dedicated network may be a prudent strategy if possible.

A primary IoT malware attack vector is via the firmware update process. Intelligent device purchasing and supply chain risk management can help to address the risk of IoT-based malware. Periodic validation of IoT device operation via alternative information channels (e.g., analog records, operational anomaly detection through long-term analytics) may be helpful but will require collection and long-term storage of what is normally perishable data.

In certain industries where availability is the overriding concern (e.g., healthcare, energy), IoT devices may be uniquely vulnerable to DDoS. Anti-malware tools and techniques should be properly regression-tested to ensure that availability and reliability of the system will not be adversely affected. Additionally, all anti-malware tools should be configured such that a false positive detection will not negatively impact the availability or reliability of any critical processes. The MUD framework can be leveraged here to allowlist specific actions IoT devices can take, and then be used to prevent those activities from taking place. Testing may need to occur whenever a change is made to the anti-malware firmware such as a configuration change, firmware hotfix, or repository update. It is important to understand the attack patterns used to affect IoT devices in your industry.

Another product category that can assist in defense against malware is threat intelligence focused towards IoT devices. These services review Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and provide a risk rating or threat score to analysts based on behavior and other factors. Finally, allowlisting of firmware can provide malware protection by preventing malicious code from executing in the first place.



SAFEGUAF	RDS			IMPLEN	ENTATION (GROUPS	APPLICABIL	ΙΤΥ			
UMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION			
.0.2	Configure Automatic Anti- Malware Signature Updates	Devices	Protect	•	•	•	Yes	Malware developers adapt to new defenses and find new infection			
	Configure automatic updates	vectors for attacking IoT devices. This means that malware signatures change over time. Updating managed anti-malware software will keep the defenses up-to-date against new threats.									
.0.3	Disable Autorun and Autoplay for Removable Media	Devices	Protect	•	•	•	No	IoT devices typically do not have these features enabled. If this is			
	Disable autorun and autoplay		necessary, verification of these features in IoT devices should be conducted before purchase and implementation.								
L 0.4	Configure Automatic Anti-Malware Scanning of Removable Media	Devices	Detect		•	•	No	IoT devices do not typically have physical ports for removable devices and cannot perform			
	Configure anti-malware softw		scanning activities.								
.0.5	Enable Anti-Exploitation Features	Devices	Protect		•	•	No	These are either enabled by default on the operating system or they			
	Enable anti-exploitation featu such as Microsoft® Data Exec (WDEG), or Apple® System In	are not. Unfortunately, IoT devices typically do not have these features enabled. If these important antiexploit technologies are necessary, verification of these features in IoT devices should be conducted before purchase and implementation.									
.0.6	Centrally Manage Anti-Malware Software	Devices	Protect		•	•	Yes	Effective anti-malware IoT products that also integrate with solutions			
	entermany manage anti-manware software. entermany manage anti-manware software. entermany manage anti-manware software. entermany manage anti-manware software.		already being used within an enterprise are often hard to come by. Regardless of whether the solution is centrally managed or not, a plan for dealing with malware, including incident response, should be in place prior to the introduction of IoT.								
.0.7	Use Behavior-Based Anti- Malware Software	Devices	Detect		•	•	Yes	On-device IoT malware solutions utilizing behavior-based techniques			
	Use behavior-based anti-mal	ware software.						are unlikely to be available. Network-based malware detection mechanisms using behavioral techniques are a more reasonable IoT solution.			

1 1 1

Data Recovery

Overview

Establish and maintain data recovery practices sufficient to restore in-scope enterprise assets to a pre-incident and trusted state.

IoT Applicability

Many IoT devices may provide onboard storage for data and logs, though some IoT devices do not. Devices that store data may transfer it to dedicated network storage locations for near-term or permanent storage. This can be done periodically or in near real-time. When taking an inventory of the types of IoT devices to be used within an enterprise, it is important to understand whether data is at risk of being lost at any given point in the architecture and whether to devise a plan for ensuring that data can be recovered in case of component failure. The recovery of information stored on IoT management platforms is an important consideration and these systems should be incorporated into your enterprise implementation of CIS Control 11.


IoT Challenges

Creating backups of IoT data can be very difficult as traditional backup strategies simply will not work. For instance, even simple utilities such as *rsync* will not be available and are therefore not a valid option. Native backup capabilities may be provided by the device manufacturer, and this functionality should be understood before purchase and implementation. Native capabilities will differ, and may automatically back up to the cloud or a phone, and enterprises should understand how backups function before usage in the enterprise.

IoT Additional Discussion

When IoT message traffic is perishable and temporary, the value of data recovery is limited to maintenance actions. Data recovery capabilities may be required for operational data at consolidation and action points for compliance or maintenance purposes. IoT devices often maintain data until an online connection (e.g., via Bluetooth, LoRaWAN Wi-Fi, cellular, etc.) is established with a gateway application. In these instances, sensitive data may continue to be resident on the device and may require a recovery capability.

Enterprises should verify and review backup settings from the device manufacturer, including any associated service within the IoT ecosystem, to make sure the proper information is backed up. Proper authentication mechanisms should be in place to protect any enterprise data backed up to a cloud platform. IoT devices may also unintentionally back up information to any desktop environment they are connected to, or even gateways and mobile devices. The creation of these backups should be prevented unless specifically authorized by the enterprise.



CIS Control 11: Data Recovery SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION GROUPS APPLICABILITY NUMBER TITLE/DESCRIPTION ASSET TYPE SECURITY FUNCTION IG1 IG3 INCLUDED? JUSTIFICATION **Establish and Maintain an** Ransomware and its related offshoots **Isolated Instance of Recovery** Data Recover (e.g., destructive malware) typically Yes perform malicious activities on the device itself. This includes Establish and maintain an isolated instance of recovery data. Example implementations preventing access to the device, include version controlling backup destinations through offline, cloud, or off-site yet it rarely affects third-party cloud systems or services. storage providers. Recover 11.5 Test Data Recovery Data Yes Employees and administrators should regularly perform tests of accessing Test backup recovery quarterly, or more frequently, for a sampling of in-scope and restoring backed up data. enterprise assets. Regular recovery exercises help the enterprise go through the motions of accessing and using backed up data.

12

Network Infrastructure Management

Overview

Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report, correct) network devices, in order to prevent attackers from exploiting vulnerable network services and access points.

IoT Applicability

This Control is not directly applicable to IoT devices but is relevant for the security of certain types of IoT gateways (e.g., small office, home office [SoHo] routers used as IoT and LoRaWAN gateways) as well as for the secure usage of general network devices. Guidance on Wi-Fi security is provided by the CIS Controls, but it applies to all computing devices and not necessarily IoT. When there is a plan to undertake a medium- to large-scale deployment of IoT devices within an enterprise, take the opportunity to review the configurations for firewalls, routers, and switches to ensure that additional vulnerabilities are not introduced through misconfiguration or poor network architecture.

IoT Challenges

Legacy IoT systems may favor proprietary byte-oriented protocols, but legacy systems that migrate to TCP/IP (e.g., Modbus TCP) are often fragile and insecure. The absence of commercially available network devices for legacy networks limits the value of this Control for those networks.

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) specifies the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) standard, which allows IoT devices to advertise their capabilities via the local network.¹ Using MUD, IoT devices can solely transmit and receive information they need to


¹ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8520/

properly operate. This can be enforced via context specific policies. Practical examples of how to use this technology can be found in this guide from the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence.¹

IoT Additional Discussion

Newer IoT devices often use RESTful APIs that require supporting web services to be implemented securely. In addition, many IoT devices implement IPv6 communications and sometimes use protocols such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) to support the ability for constrained IoT devices to connect to the internet. The introduction of IPv6 opens a whole new set of security considerations across network devices for operation in a secure manner.

As discussed in other Controls within this guide, the use of segregation strategies is strongly recommended to keep IoT components operating in their own zones or on their own separate networks. In cases where there must be a connection point between an IoT segment and the corporate network, boundary defense mechanisms must be put in place. Firewalls, IDS, and IPS can provide assurance that a compromise of the less-trusted IoT network will have limited effect on the more secure corporate network.



¹ https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1800-15.pdf

SAFEGUAF	RDS			IMPLEN	IENTATION (GROUPS	APPLICABIL	ITY		
NUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION		
12.4	Establish and Maintain Architecture Diagram(s)	Network	Identify		•	•	No	Architecture diagrams should be created and kept up-to-date. This		
	Establish and maintain archit documentation. Review and uenterprise changes occur that	documentation should include all types of IoT devices.								
12.5	Centralize Network Authentication, Authorization, and Auditing (AAA)	Network	Protect		•	•	No	If IoT devices support this functionality, it should be used, but this would be abnormal.		
	Centralize network AAA.									
12.6	Use of Secure Network Management and Communication Protocols	Network	Protect		•	•	No	IoT devices must be researched beforehand to understand if they are using secure		
	Use secure network manager Protected Access 2 (WPA2) I	-Fi	communication protocols.							
12.7	Ensure Remote Devices Utilize a VPN and are Connecting to an Enterprise's AAA Infrastructure	Devices	Protect		•	•	No	IoT devices do not contain this capability.		
	Require users to authenticate prior to accessing enterprise			d auth	enticat	tion se	rvices			
12.8	Establish and Maintain Dedicated Computing Resources for All Administrative Work	Devices	Protect			•	No	Many consider network segmentation for IoT devices a critical safeguard in the enterprise. This is especially true for IoT devices processing sensitive		
	Establish and maintain dedic separated, for all administrati computing resources should not be allowed internet acces	he	enterprise information.							

TONTROL 1

Network Monitoring and Defense

Overview

Operate processes and tooling to establish and maintain comprehensive network monitoring and defense against security threats across the enterprise's network infrastructure and user base.

IoT Applicability


This is a particularly important set of mitigations for IoT devices, and similar strategies intended for traditional network monitoring situations apply, with the exception of utilizing host-based solutions on IoT devices. Defenses and mitigations, such as network monitoring tools, email security, intrusion detection system (IDS) and intrusion prevention system (IPS) alerts, and logging of network-based events are all important and should be utilized to the extent possible. These can be implemented in segmented networks where IoT devices are utilized and routed instead of through the trusted enterprise network. Filtering IoT network to the extent practical is worthwhile, as is the usage of security information and event management (SIEM).

IoT Challenges

IoT devices are increasingly being used in stand-alone enterprise scenarios or connected to cloud-based platforms. Full infrastructures dedicated to IoT may be needed that supports capture, processing, and analysis of data from IoT endpoints in the cloud. In addition, IoT platforms may share and collate information from many different enterprises. For cloud-based systems that support IoT, consider cloud security best practices, and move to a data-centric security approach to support the sharing of IoT data across many different organizations. On-premises hosting of IoT information should be utilized where possible, but this is rarely the case. The CIS Controls Cloud Companion Guide offers additional guidance for securing cloud environments.

IoT Additional Discussion

In many instances, a decision will be made to place IoT devices outside of the trusted network boundary. Even with the few devices utilizing data-in-transit encryption with vetted algorithms and reasonable key sizes, certain types of traffic will be leaked. Examples of this type of information may include: diagnostic information about the device, OS traffic back and forth with the ecosystem provider, and wireless traffic using Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, LoRaWAN, and cellular networks. These types of information leaks allow passively sniffing malicious actors to fingerprint the device. Some devices may automatically attempt to access or connect to Wi-Fi networks to which they have previously been associated. Denylisting certain service set identifiers (SSIDs) on devices, like those from major retailers and cafes, can help prevent an IoT device from accessing a rogue version of that network and sending sensitive enterprise data over it. Many enterprises will use a combination of network segmentation approaches for better vetted devices that provide critical enterprise functions.



AFEGUAF	RDS		IMPLEN	IENTATION (GROUPS	APPLICABILI	ІТҮ				
IUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION			
13.5	Manage Access Control for Remote Assets	Devices	Protect		•	•	Yes	Administrators should attempt to obtain some degree of control			
	Manage access control for as Determine amount of access malware software installed; c configuration process; and en are up-to-date.	over the security and configuration of any IoT devices accessing an internal network.									
13.6	Collect Network Traffic Flow Logs	Network	Detect		•	•	No	Network traffic flow logs associated with IoT devices should be regularly			
	Collect network traffic flow lo network devices.	gs and/or netv	vork traffic to revi	ew and	l alert	upon f	rom	accessed and stored elsewhere in accordance with an enterprise's data retention policy.			
13.7	Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Prevention Solution	Devices	Protect			•	Yes	IoT devices are unlikely to support this capability as you cannot			
	Deploy a host-based intrusion appropriate and/or supported Detection and Response (ED	oint	install a host-based IPS onto an embedded device.								
13.8	Deploy a Network Intrusion Prevention Solution	Network	Protect			•	No	Enterprises can ensure that any relevant IPS is "IoT aware." This			
	Deploy a network intrusion p implementations include the equivalent CSP service.	S) or	Safeguard is better and more easil enforced when an IoT gateway is in use or when devices route traffic through the enterprise.								
.3.9	Deploy Port-Level Access Control	Devices	Protect			•	Yes	It is unlikely that this will be possible for most IoT devices, but			
	Deploy port-level access con network access control proto or device authentication.							the capability is available, it should be enabled. Note that 802.1x does not work on many IoT devices that do not support supplicant software. Network-level authentication can cause reliability issues if not strictly maintained.			
13.10	Perform Application Layer Filtering	Network	Protect			•	No	Although this Safeguard is quite useful, it is not specific to IoT.			
	Perform application layer filte application layer firewall, or g		implementations	include	e a filte	ring p	roxy,				
3.11	Tune Security Event Alerting Thresholds	Network	Detect			•	No	Customizing a SIEM's ruleset to accommodate IoT devices currently			
	Tune security event alerting t		utilized by an enterprise is prude								

10014 14

Security Awareness and Skills Training

Overview

Establish and maintain a security awareness program to influence behavior among the workforce to be security conscious and properly skilled to reduce cybersecurity risks to the enterprise.

IoT Applicability

Administrators and any employees responsible for deploying and managing IoT devices should be trained on risks and threats specific to IoT devices and platforms. The deployment of IoT components brings with it new operational capabilities as well as new system and security management requirements. Security awareness training should be tailored to all employees regularly using these devices to prevent unauthorized access of enterprise IoT devices and data.

IoT Challenges


Ensuring that administrators and employees understand the threats IoT devices pose to their networks can be a challenging task. Special notice should be provided regarding any connection of insecure legacy devices to enterprise networks that handle sensitive enterprise information. Consumer IoT devices are often cheap, easily available, and become ubiquitous in daily living. Employees may attempt to bring unapproved devices into the office or remote locations to use. This could include connecting enterprise systems to these devices, or connecting the IoT devices directly to the network. Employees need to understand the security policies surrounding these actions.

IoT Additional Discussion

Enterprises need to work to understand if a skills gap exists for current staff. If so, then there is a need to work towards identifying appropriate training to fill those gaps. This isn't a one time activity; as time goes on, new threats will emerge that staff will need to learn and understand the impacts on enterprise IoT devices.

IoT introduces new concepts that include a heavy focus on RF communications, with a range of purpose-built protocols. Security engineering teams must understand the intricate details of these protocols to configure devices in a secure manner. In many cases, IoT subsystems must also be integrated into the larger enterprise through cloud-based APIs. This requires that security engineering teams be well-versed in the cloud-based technologies that support IoT.

Legacy operators are beginning to integrate IoT into their networks. When migrating to remote operations or reporting remote situational awareness, enterprises need to ensure their remote operators have the skills and training to address the additional risks of leveraging internet-facing IoT devices for their work.



AFEGUAF	RDS			IMPLEN	IENTATION (GROUPS	APPLICABIL	ΙΤΥ
UMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	ASSET TYPE	SECURITY FUNCTION	IG1	IG2	IG3	INCLUDED?	JUSTIFICATION
4.5	Train Workforce Members on Causes of Unintentional Data Exposure	N/A	Protect	•	•	•	Yes	This can be tailored to IoT-specific needs, such as what can happen if an insecure IoT device is connected
	Train workforce members to l Example topics include mis-c device, or publishing data to	to an enterprise network, or insecure data storage in an associated cloud platform.						
4.6	Train Workforce Members on Recognizing and Reporting Security Incidents	N/A	Protect	•	•	•	Yes	Employees can be trained on what successful attacks on IoT devices look like and to whom they should
	Train workforce members to I report such an incident.	be reported.						
4.7	Train Workforce on How to Identify and Report if Their Enterprise Assets are Missing Security Updates	N/A	Protect	•	•	•	Yes	This Safeguard can be tailored to users learning how to ensure IoT devices are up-to-date.
	Train workforce to understand or any failures in automated p notifying IT personnel of any							
4.8	Train Workforce on the Dangers of Connecting to and Transmitting Enterprise Data Over Insecure Networks	N/A	Protect	•	•	•	Yes	This Safeguard does not apply to IoT devices connected to enterprise networks.
	Train workforce members on over, insecure networks for entraining must include guidance network infrastructure.	nterprise activit	ies. If the enterpr	ise has	remo	te wor	kers,	
4.9	Conduct Role-Specific Security Awareness and Skills Training	N/A	Protect		•	•	Yes	Role-specific awareness training should include an IoT component.
	Conduct role-specific securit include secure system admin vulnerability awareness and padvanced social engineering							

15 CONTROL

Service Provider Management

Overview

Develop a process to evaluate service providers who hold sensitive data, or are responsible for an enterprise's critical IT platforms or processes, to ensure these providers are protecting those platforms and data appropriately.

IoT Applicability

The primary service providers for IoT devices will include the provider of cloud-based services to support IoT devices. These platforms will most often provide device management, monitoring, and access to data.


IoT Challenges

Small to medium-sized businesses may be unable to ensure that these large companies implement many of the practices necessitated by the Safeguards found within this Control. Monitoring the security posture of IoT cloud platform providers will often be infeasible from a technical standpoint, and contractual or legal assurances will be necessary. Before entering a Service Provider's ecosystem, it is a worthwhile activity to understand the authentication mechanisms available to customers. At the very least, multi-factor authentication should be supported, providing integration with whatever identity services the primary organization utilizes.

IoT Additional Discussion

This Control revolves around obtaining assurances from Service Providers as to their cybersecurity practices. Not all Service Providers will protect an enterprise's data in the same manner. Accordingly, a Service Provider's cybersecurity posture affects their ability to secure enterprise data entrusted to them. Obtaining ongoing information about a Service Provider's security posture will be difficult. Customer

breach notifications or even mentions in the media of a breach are solid points of data about security posture. If an enterprise is regularly breached, that may be a sign to use another IoT platform.



16 SN 16 SN

Application Software Security

Overview

Manage the security life cycle of in-house developed, hosted, or acquired software to prevent, detect, and remediate security weaknesses before they can impact the enterprise.

IoT Applicability

This Control can be applied in a few distinct ways as software security can apply to 1) developing IoT devices; 2) deploying cloud-based applications that IoT devices utilize; 3) writing mobile or other applications that govern the usage of an IoT device; and 4) creating an application that integrates with a device in some way, such as leveraging an API. Note that this guide is not focused on the development and manufacturing of IoT devices and instead guides enterprises on their usage of IoT. Device controllers are also out of scope for this Control.


IoT Challenges

Most enterprises will not be able to access the source code used within IoT devices on their networks. This includes the associated mobile applications and cloud platforms. In many instances, those responsible for application security for IoT devices would have to perform analysis on compiled binaries pulled from the devices, which can be an arduous and time-consuming task. Mobile applications may be more easily acquired, but the analysis would not be directly on the source, which increases the time and resources needed to perform the analysis. However, this can still be a valuable effort. For instance, privileged credentials for accessing an IoT device have been found inside of its corresponding mobile application. Or, in another instance, credentials can be shared between distinct devices from the same manufacturer.

IoT Additional Discussion

Enterprises may look to receive some level of assurance that device manufacturers of IoT components practiced software assurance fundamentals when developing the firmware that provides logic for these devices. There will likely be a number of proprietary applications (e.g., cloud service, mobile application) that communicate with the IoT components and devices located throughout the enterprise. For IoT devices, enterprises should understand which security best practices were employed by the manufacturer and help to push vendors toward secure software development methodologies. This should also be a part of acquisition requirements and evaluation before purchase.

Software being developed by enterprises to connect to IoT components should follow the same secure development standards that the enterpise is already using for other internally developed applications. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP®) provides a wide variety of guidance for assessing and developing IoT devices, and is a powerful resource for IoT security.



CIS Control 16: Application Software Security SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION GROUPS APPLICABILITY NUMBER TITLE/DESCRIPTION ASSET TYPE SECURITY FUNCTION IG3 INCLUDED? JUSTIFICATION **Perform Root Cause Analysis on** This is an important step to ensure **Applications Protect** Yes **Security Vulnerabilities** that vulnerabilities of the same type don't repeatedly occur in a codebase. Perform root cause analysis on security vulnerabilities. When reviewing vulnerabilities, root cause analysis is the task of evaluating underlying issues that creates vulnerabilities in code, and allows development teams to move beyond just fixing individual vulnerabilities as they arise. **Establish and Manage an** Third-party libraries, frameworks, **Inventory of Third-Party Applications** Protect Yes and other technologies leveraged **Software Components** by mobile app developers should be identified, understood, and Establish and manage an updated inventory of third-party components used in inventoried. development, often referred to as a "bill of materials," as well as components slated for future use. This inventory is to include any risks that each third-party component could pose. Evaluate the list at least monthly to identify any changes or updates to these components, and validate that the component is still supported. **Use Up-to-Date and Trusted** Inventoried third-party IoT products **Third-Party Software Applications Protect** Yes and services should be regularly Components reviewed for support, and updated. Use up-to-date and trusted third-party software components. When possible, choose established and proven frameworks and libraries that provide adequate security. Acquire these components from trusted sources or evaluate the software for vulnerabilities before use. 16.6 Establish and Maintain a Administrators and security **Severity Rating System** professionals will benefit from rating **Applications** Protect Yes and Process for Application mobile device vulnerabilities. The **Vulnerabilities** Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) does not differentiate Establish and maintain a severity rating system and process for application between system types and is vulnerabilities that facilitates prioritizing the order in which discovered vulnerabilities applicable to IoT devices and their are fixed. This process includes setting a minimum level of security acceptability for associated management systems. releasing code or applications. Severity ratings bring a systematic way of triaging vulnerabilities that improves risk management and helps ensure the most severe bugs are fixed first. Review and update the system and process annually. 16.7 **Use Standard Hardening** These templates are typically **Configuration Templates for Applications Protect** No unavailable for IoT devices. **Application Infrastructure** Use standard, industry-recommended hardening configuration templates for application infrastructure components. This includes underlying servers, databases, and web servers, and applies to cloud containers, Platform as a Service (PaaS) components, and SaaS components. Do not allow in-house developed software to weaken configuration hardening. Separate Production and Non-16.8 Non-production systems should not **Applications Protect** Yes **Production Systems** be exposed to untrusted parties, as they commonly store sensitive data, Maintain separate environments for production and non-production systems. but are often not hardened or running up-to-date software. 16.9 **Train Developers in Application** Classes and training materials are **Security Concepts and Secure Applications** Protect Yes easily available online and in-person Coding to educate developers on the common pitfalls of secure software Ensure that all software development personnel receive training in writing secure development for IoT platforms. code for their specific development environment and responsibilities. Training can include general security principles and application security standard practices. Conduct training at least annually and design in a way to promote security within the development team, and build a culture of security among the developers.

CIS Control 16: Application Software Security SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION GROUPS APPLICABILITY NUMBER TITLE/DESCRIPTION ASSET TYPE SECURITY FUNCTION INCLUDED? JUSTIFICATION 16.10 Apply Secure Design Principles Classes and training materials are **Applications Protect** Yes in Application Architectures easily available online and in-person to educate developers on the Apply secure design principles in application architectures. Secure design principles common pitfalls of secure software include the concept of least privilege and enforcing mediation to validate every development for mobile platforms. operation that the user makes, promoting the concept of "never trust user input." Examples include ensuring that explicit error checking is performed and documented for all input, including for size, data type, and acceptable ranges or formats. Secure design also means minimizing the application infrastructure attack surface, such as turning off unprotected ports and services, removing unnecessary programs and files, and renaming or removing default accounts. 16.11 Leverage Vetted Modules IoT developers should leverage vetted or Services for Application **Applications** Protect security technologies whenever Yes **Security Components** possible in lieu of building their own. Examples include known Leverage vetted modules or services for application security components, such as hardware, firmware, and trusted cloud identity management, encryption, and auditing and logging. Using platform features technologies. in critical security functions will reduce developers' workload and minimize the likelihood of design or implementation errors. Modern operating systems provide effective mechanisms for identification, authentication, and authorization and make those mechanisms available to applications. Use only standardized, currently accepted, and extensively reviewed encryption algorithms. Operating systems also provide mechanisms to create and maintain secure audit logs. 16.12 Implement Code-Level Security Static and dynamic analysis tools **Applications** Yes **Protect** dedicated to IoT devices are available. Checks Apply static and dynamic analysis tools within the application life cycle to verify that secure coding practices are being followed. 16.13 Conduct Application Firms specializing in penetration **Applications** Protect Yes **Penetration Testing** testing can be hired. Conduct application penetration testing. For critical applications, authenticated penetration testing is better suited to finding business logic vulnerabilities than code scanning and automated security testing. Penetration testing relies on the skill of the tester to manually manipulate an application as an authenticated and unauthenticated user. 16.14 Conduct Threat Modeling **Applications** Threat modeling should be conducted for IoT devices and associated Conduct threat modeling. Threat modeling is the process of identifying and addressing infrastructure. application security design flaws within a design, before code is created. It is conducted through specially trained individuals who evaluate the application design and gauge security risks for each entry point and access level. The goal is to map out the application, architecture, and infrastructure in a structured way to understand its weaknesses.

17 ONTRO

Incident Response Management

Overview

Establish a program to develop and maintain an incident response capability (e.g., policies, plans, procedures, defined roles, training, and communications) to prepare, detect, and quickly respond to an attack.

IoT Applicability


Traditional incident response guidance applies and can be tailored to IoT. This includes the need for planning, defining roles and responsibilities, and defining an escalation path. As with traditional systems, the need to identify, investigate, respond, and recover from incidents involving IoT devices is important. IoT brings unique aspects to the incident response process which can include working closely with the device manufacturer who likely administers the associated cloud platform.

IoT Challenges

There are often multiple types of compromise that could occur. For instance, devices with active network connections to enterprise systems could be accessed in an unauthorized manner. In a different type of compromise, enterprise data generated by the IoT device and stored in an online cloud-platform may be improperly accessed. That enterprise data may then be available for download by anyone. In both manners of compromise, response plans should be tailored to address the course of action to take when one or more IoT components are compromised. This should include considering the need to perform forensics on the compromised component as well as the need to quickly ensure that the device is taken offline to limit the spread of the incident. It should be noted that IoT forensics requires specialized knowledge to perform. When considering data forensics for IoT devices, there are a wealth of different types of data available to support the objective of the acquisition, be it eDiscovery, misuse, or evidence collection to support a criminal case.

IoT Additional Discussion

IoT systems are generally operational and come with a complete maintenance-oriented incident response and management subsystem of technology and business processes. Cybersecurity incident response and management controls should be integrated into these maintenance operations. Operations personnel and incident responders need to be trained on what unusual behavior looks like for an IoT device. As IoT extends to support new business processes, perform a mapping of IoT systems to those business processes. This will aid in determining the continuity of operations planning (COOP) approach to maintaining IoT operations. As with traditional incident response processes, this part of the response process should be tested or exercised regularly.



CIS Control 17: Incident Response Management SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION GROUPS APPLICABILITY NUMBER TITLE/DESCRIPTION ASSET TYPE SECURITY FUNCTION IG3 INCLUDED? JUSTIFICATION **Assign Key Roles and** Especially if an enterprise is Respond Ves Responsibilities supporting IoT devices, personnel should be dedicated to IoT. Assign key roles and responsibilities for incident response, including staff from legal, IT, information security, facilities, public relations, human resources, incident responders and analysts, as applicable. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard. 17.6 **Define Mechanisms for** Processes for reporting IoT incidents **Communicating During Incident** Respond Yes should be put in place that are Response mandated across the enterprise. This should include the time to report, Determine which primary and secondary mechanisms will be used to communicate types of anomalous events, and the and report during a security incident. Mechanisms can include phone calls, emails, or details of any relevant IoT incident. letters. Keep in mind that certain mechanisms, such as emails, can be affected during a security incident. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard. **Conduct Routine Incident** 17.7 IoT devices can be periodically Recover Yes **Response Exercises** assessed in order to test IoT incident response procedures. This also helps Plan and conduct routine incident response exercises and scenarios for key personnel to keep the necessary individuals involved in the incident response process to prepare for responding to real-world aware of the IoT procedures. incidents. Exercises need to test communication channels, decision making, and workflows. Conduct testing on an annual basis, at a minimum. 17.8 **Conduct Post-Incident Reviews** Recover Yes Make sure to interview personnel involved in IoT incident response in Conduct post-incident reviews. Post-incident reviews help prevent incident recurrence order to ensure that all necessary through identifying lessons learned and follow-up action. actions were performed, and that procedures are updated to include any new areas not initially envisioned. 17.9 **Establish and Maintain Security** Depending on their criticality to Recover Yes **Incident Thresholds** the enterprise, a security incident affecting IoT systems may be more or Establish and maintain security incident thresholds, including, at a minimum, less important to the enterprise. differentiating between an incident and an event. Examples can include: abnormal activity, security vulnerability, security weakness, data breach, privacy incident, etc. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.

Penetration Testing

Overview

Test the effectiveness and resiliency of enterprise assets through identifying and exploiting weaknesses in controls (people, processes, and technology), and simulating the objectives and actions of an attacker.

IoT Applicability

Using traditional penetration testing methods, to include identifying open ports, existing services, and vulnerable software versions may not necessarily apply to IoT. Legacy devices may need to be omitted from penetration testing activities, especially if they are supporting an important business function. Testing may bring them offline and unable to easily return to service without causing business or service interruption. IoT typically expands the threat model facing an organization in unique ways that sometimes cannot be easily rectified or mitigated.


IoT Challenges

Many IoT systems do not have mature IP stacks to scan. Errors in scanning may severely impact business operations. All such tests and scans should be tested thoroughly in a non-operational testbed (including architectural review or even code review if possible), preferably under simulated practical load-in operations. Strict rules of engagement must be applied that preclude any possibility of unintended, unexpected, or unwanted operational impact. A good example is a realistic, offline, threat-driven scenario. The usage of automated penetration testing tools with offline configurations can give a hint as to how the real environment will perform.

Penetration testers and red team members should pay extra care in securing authorization to perform vulnerability assessment and pen testing activities on cloud-based services supporting IoT devices and any mobile devices with an application supporting an IoT device. Specific user or service-level approval may be necessary, more than what is typically provided by the enterprise.

IoT Additional Discussion

Areas of focus for penetration testing could include sniffing wireless communications, reverse engineering firmware, and scanning for unknown services. The use of a test lab and devices for more thorough hardware examination is relevant to IoT. The Attify IoT Penetration Testing Guide can be a useful starting point to begin IoT penetration testing exercises. The use of IoT components within an enterprise should result in a tailoring of pen tests and red team exercises to focus specifically on methods to gain access to the network by leveraging weaknesses in the design, configuration, or deployment of those IoT components.



APPENDIX A

Acronyms and Abbreviations

6LoWPAN	IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network
ACK	Acknowledge
AD	Active Directory
AoC	Attestation of Compliance
API	Application Programming Interface
ARP	Address Resolution Protocol
CIS	Center for Internet Security
COOP	Continuity of Operations Planning
CSP	Cloud Service Provider
cTLS	compact Transport Layer Security
CVSS	Common Vulnerability Scoring System
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DEP	Data Execution Prevention
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DKIM	DomainKeys Identified Mail
DLP	Data Loss Prevention
DMARC	Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance
DNS	Domain Name System
DSS	Data Security Standard
dTLS	datagram Transport Layer Security
EDR	Endpoint Detection and Response
EMM	Enterprise Mobility Management
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
HART	Highway Addressable Remote Transducer
HIPAA	Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IG	Implementation Groups
loT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet Protocol
IPS	Intrusion Prevention System
IPSec	IP Security

ISAC	Information Sharing & Analysis Center
IT	Information Technology
JTAG	Joint Test Action Group
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC	Media Access Control (address)
MDM	Mobile Device Management
MFA	Multi-Factor Authentication
MUD	Manufacturer Usage Description
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
OS	Operating System
OSCOAP	Object Security of Constrained Application Protocol
OWASP	Open Web Application Security Project
PCI	Payment Card Industry
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
REST(ful)	Representational State Transfer
RF	Radio Frequency
RFID	Radio Frequency Identifier
RSU	Roadside Unit
RTOS	Real-Time Operating System
SIEM	Security Information and Event Management
SP	Special Publication
SPF	Sender Policy Framework
SoHo	Small office home office
SSID	Service Set Identifier
SYN	Synchronization
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UEM	Unified Endpoint Management
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
WAN	Wide Area Network
Wi-Fi	Wireless Fidelity
WPA2-PSK	Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 Pre-Shared Key

APPENDIX B

Links and Resources

- CIS Controls https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
- CIS Controls Cloud Companion Guide https://www.cisecurity. org/white-papers/cis-controls-cloud-companion-guide/
- CIS Controls Mobile Companion Guide https://www.cisecurity. org/white-papers/cis-controls-v8-mobile-companion-guide
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) https://www. first.org/cvss/
- DDoS in the IoT: Mirai and Other Botnets https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7971869
- ICS Cert https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/
- ICS ISAC http://ics-isac.org/blog/
- Gartner's IT Glossary https://www.gartner.com/en/informationtechnology/glossary/internet-of-things
- NIST SP 800-160 Revision 1 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ detail/sp/800-160/vol-1/final
- NIST SP 800-163 Revision 3 https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3
- OWASP IoT Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_ Internet_of_Things_Project
- OWASP IoT Testing Guide https://github.com/scriptingxss/ owasp-fstm
- The Internet of Things: An Overview https://www. internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ISOC-IoT-Overview-20151221-en.pdf
- Towards a Definition of the Internet of Things https://iot.ieee. org/images/files/pdf/IEEE_IoT_Towards_Definition_Internet_of_ Things_Issue1_14MAY15.pdf

APPENDIX C

Closing Notes

In this guide, we provide guidance on how to apply the security best practices found in CIS Controls Version 8 to IoT environments. The newest version of the CIS Controls and other complementary documents may be found at www.cisecurity.org.

As a nonprofit organization driven by its volunteers, we are always in the process of looking for new topics and assistance in creating cybersecurity guidance. If you are interested in volunteering and/or have questions, comments, or have identified ways to improve this guide, please write us at: controlsinfo@cisecurity.org.

All references to tools or other products in this guide are provided for informational purposes only, and do not represent the endorsement by CIS of any particular company, product, or technology.

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