

October 11th, 2018

Australian Cyber Conference

SANS

Continuous Security: Exploring the DevOps Toolchain

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APPLICATION & SOFTWARE SECURITY

PLATFORM SECURITY

DEV531

Defending Mobile Applications
Security Essentials

DEV541

Secure Coding in Java/JEE
GSSP-JAVA

DEV544

Secure Coding in .NET
GSSP-NET



software-security.sans.org

C U R R I C U L U M

Get the right training to build secure applications.

C O R E

STH.DEVELOPER

Application Security Awareness
Modules

DEV522

Defending Web Applications
Security Essentials
GWEB

DEV534

Secure DevOps:
A Practical Introduction

DEV540

Secure DevOps and Cloud
Application Security

S P E C I A L I Z A T I O N

SEC542

Web App Penetration Testing
and Ethical Hacking
GWAPT

SEC642

Advanced Web App Penetration
Testing and Ethical Hacking

A S S E S S M E N T

AppSec CyberTalent
Assessment

sans.org/appsec-assessment

Eric Johnson

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 - Coder: static analysis engine, cloud automation, security tools
 - Security assessments: DevSecOps, cloud, source code, web apps, mobile apps
- Application Security Curriculum Manager, SANS Institute
 - SANS Certified Instructor
 - Contributing author of DEV540, DEV531, and DEV544
- Education & Training
 - Iowa State M.S. Information Assurance, B.S. Computer Engineering
 - AWS Certified Developer, CISSP, GSSP-Java, GSSP-.NET, GWAPT
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Agenda

- ***Introduction***
- Pre-Commit
- Commit

Introduction

1. State of DevOps
2. Security Challenges
3. DevSecOps Toolchain

Current State of DevOps

High velocity and low cost of change enables DevOps organizations to run continuous experiments, respond to customers, pivot quickly


- Deploy 46x more frequently,
- 440x shorter lead times (<1 hour vs <1 month)
- Recover from failures 96x faster
- Spend 50% less time remediating security issues



Current State of DevOps Security

But... HPE study of DevOps teams in 2016 found that

- **Security is being short-changed**
 - Only 20% do security in development/delivery
 - 38% still depend on pen testing or other pre-production gate reviews
 - 25% rely on network defenses
 - 17% are doing nothing for security
- **Security is seen as somebody else's problem**



DevOps culture **conflicts with traditional security culture:**

- Top down risk management instead of team-based decision making
- Need to know restrictions vs extended information sharing
- Zero failure vs fail fast and fail forward
- Limiting change – Security is always ready to say “No!”

Resources to help understand (and create) DevOps culture

- The Phoenix Project
- Five Dysfunctions of a Team
- Lean Enterprise
- Building a DevOps Culture

There are different, but compatible, memes around including security in DevOps. They all share common principles and goals:

- Make security a first-class problem and the security team a first-class participant in DevOps
- Increase trust and transparency between dev, ops, and sec
- Integrate security practices and ideas into DevOps culture, and DevOps into security culture
- Wire security into DevOps toolchains and workflows to incrementally improve security

DevSecOps Toolchain

PRE-COMMIT

COMMIT (CI)


ACCEPTANCE

PRODUCTION

OPERATIONS


DevSecOps cycles through 5 key phases:

- SANS DevSecOps Toolchain poster lists several OSS tools for each phase
- Written by Ben Allen, Jim Bird, Eric Johnson, & Frank Kim
- <https://sans.org/u/zAi>



DevSecOps Security Controls

Breaking down the security controls in each DevSecOps phase:



Agenda


- Introduction
- ***Pre-Commit***
- Commit

Pre-Commit Stage

1. Threat Modeling
2. IDE Security Plugins
3. Pre-Commit Hooks
4. Peer Code Reviews

DevSecOps Pre-Commit Phase

Applying security controls before code is written and committed:



#1

Threat Modeling

Rapid Risk Assessments

Start with a high-level risk assessment for new systems/services

- Classify the data: legal and compliance requirements, sensitivity, etc.
- Focus on platform, language, and framework risks: is the team using well-understood tools, or something new, novel?
- Determine a risk rating and next steps: threat modeling, control gate requirements, security training ...

Re-run risk assessment if/when team makes major change to design or data

PayPal risk questionnaire for new apps/services

Mozilla Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) model – 30-minute review

Threat Modeling in DevOps

Iterative and lightweight threat modeling based on risk: early in design, or as major changes are made

Examine trust boundaries and assumptions in architecture

Ask these questions when you are making changes:

1. Are you changing the attack surface (new entry/exit points, new user role...)?
2. Are you changing the technology stack or application security controls?
3. Are you adding confidential/sensitive data?
4. Have threat agents changed – are we facing new risks?

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- OWASP User Security Stories
 - <https://github.com/OWASP/user-security-stories>
- OWASP Application Security Verification Standards
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Security_Verification_Standard_Project
- Mozilla's Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA)
 - https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/risk/rapid_risk_assessment.html
- OWASP Threat Dragon
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Threat_Dragon



Threat Modeling Example

Mozilla's rapid risk assessment guidance and Google Doc provide a blueprint for 30 minute RRAs:

RRA for <service name>	
Service Owner(s)	
Owner's Director	
Service Data Classification	
Highest Risk Impact	
Service Notes	
<i>How does the service work? Do we have diagrams, demos, examples? Is the service in production yet? Can we break this service down per components?</i>	
RRA Request bug: <u>Vendor questionnaire</u> (if vendor):	

#2

IDE Security Plugins

IDE Security Plugins

Immediate, incremental scanning in each developer's IDE catches security mistakes as code is being changed/saved by the developer

- Security becomes part of the engineering workflow
- Shifting as far left as possible in the kill chain
- Must have low false positive rates (important)
- Run high value rules and disable noisy rules that distract engineers

IDE Security Plugin Tools

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- **FindSecurityBugs** plugin for Eclipse and IntelliJ
 - <http://find-sec-bugs.github.io/>
- **Puma Scan** plugin for Visual Studio
 - <https://github.com/pumasecurity/puma-scan>
- Microsoft's **DevSkim** for VSCode, Sublime, Visual Studio
 - <https://github.com/Microsoft/DevSkim>
- **SonarLint** plugins for Visual Studio, IntelliJ, and Eclipse
 - <https://www.sonarlint.org/>

PRE-COMMIT

A large blue arrow pointing right, divided into two sections. The top section is white and contains the text "PRE-COMMIT". The bottom section is dark blue and contains the text "IDE SECURITY PLUGINS".


```
graph LR; A[IDE SECURITY PLUGINS] --> B[PRE-COMMIT]
```

IDE SECURITY
PLUGINS

Note: IDE plugins are also available for most commercial SAST products

IDE Security Plugin Example

Puma Scan identifying a JSON deserialization vulnerability:



The screenshot shows a Microsoft Visual Studio interface with the title bar "WidgetTown - Microsoft Visual Studio (Administrator)". The code editor window displays C# code for a REST client. A tooltip from the Puma Scan plugin highlights a specific line of code:

```
20     {
21         //Disable certificate validation for test / dev environments
22         handler.ServerCertificateValidationCallback += (sender, cert, chain, sslPolicyErrors)
23         using (var client = new HttpClient(handler))
24         {
25             var request = client.GetAsync(string.Format("{0}{1}", BASE_URL, endpoint)).Conti
26             {
27                 var result = response.Result;
28                 var json = result.Content.ReadAsStringAsync();
29                 json.Wait();
30                 item = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<T>(json.Result
31                     , new JsonSerializerSettings()
32                     {
33                         TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.All
34                     }
35             )
36             TypeNameHandling.All = TypeNameHandling.Objects | TypeNameHandling.Arrays
37             Always include the .NET type name when serializing.
38             The Newtonsoft JSON DeserializeObject method can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code and perform denial of service attacks if the TypeNameHandling setting is set to a value other than None.
39             Show potential fixes (Alt+Enter or Ctrl+.)
```

The tooltip provides a detailed explanation of the security risk:

TypeNameHandling.All = TypeNameHandling.Objects | TypeNameHandling.Arrays
Always include the .NET type name when serializing.
The Newtonsoft JSON DeserializeObject method can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code and perform denial of service attacks if the TypeNameHandling setting is set to a value other than None.
Show potential fixes (Alt+Enter or Ctrl+.)

#3

Pre-Commit Hooks

Pre-Commit Hooks

- Git Hooks automatically run scripts at different points in workflows
 - Local: **pre-commit**, prepare-commit, commit, post-commit, post-checkout, pre-rebase
 - Server-side: **pre-receive**, update, **post-receive**
- Implement team-wide workflow policies, or check code for problems
- CAUTION: Repo owner can alter/uninstall hooks – so hooks cannot be enforced

Pre-Commit Hook Frameworks / Tools

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- Open source frameworks to manage hooks for different languages + tools
 - Yelp pre-commit framework
 - Overcommit
- Pre-commit tools for scanning code:
 - AWS Labs git-secrets (<https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets>)
 - Talisman (<https://github.com/thoughtworks/talisman>)
 - Autho repo-supervisor (<https://github.com/autho/repo-supervisor>)



PRE-COMMIT



PRE-COMMIT HOOKS

Pre-Commit Hook Example

AWS git-secrets blocking a commit that contains an access key and secret key id:

```
1 $ git commit -m "testing git-secrets"
2
3 Web/Licensing/appsettings.json:5:
4     "AccessKey": "AKIAJNQ7C2FCRR6B4VWA" ,
5 Web/Licensing/appsettings.json:6:
6     "SecretKey": "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"
7
8 [ERROR] Matched one or more prohibited patterns
```

#4

Peer Code Reviews

Disciplined peer code reviews are a fundamental engineering practice in DevOps: Google, Amazon, Facebook, Etsy, Twitter...

- Review for functional correctness (especially in high-risk code) and defensive coding
- Ensure that code takes advantage of secure framework capabilities and security libraries
- Watch out for hard-coded secrets, back doors, hand-rolled crypto!
- Leverage Static Analysis (SAST) to enforce good practices and catch common security/coding mistakes
- CAUTION: Developers need secure coding training, so they know what to look for

Peer reviews should focus on high risk code, which may perform any of following functionality (not inclusive):

- Infrastructure Code
- Pipeline definitions
- Authentication
- Access control
- Output encoding
- Input validation
- Automated security / compliance tests
- High risk business logic
- Data entitlement checks
- Handling confidential data
- Cryptography

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- Code review workflow tools enforce specific manual code review workflows and make it easy to involve multiple reviewers
 - Bitbucket/GitHub/GitLab pull request comments
 - Review Board or Gerrit (open source)
 - Atlassian Crucible
 - SmartBear Code Collaborator
 - Phabricator (from Facebook)



PRE-COMMIT

PEER CODE REVIEWS

Peer Code Review Example

Gitlab pull request requiring peer review approval:

The screenshot shows a GitLab interface for a project named 'WidgetTown'. The top navigation bar includes links for Project, Activity, Repository, Pipelines, Graphs, Issues (0), Merge Requests (1), and Wiki. The 'Merge Requests' tab is active, showing a single merge request titled 'Type name handing' (Edited 2 minutes ago). The request is to merge the 'TypeNameHandling' branch into the 'master' branch. Action buttons include 'Accept Merge Request', 'Check out branch', and 'Download as'. Below the merge request title, there's a note about accepting it via command line and social sharing icons for thumbs up, thumbs down, and add. At the bottom, there's a discussion section with 0 comments, 3 commits, and 18 changes, and a rich text editor for writing a message.

Type name handing

Edited 2 minutes ago

Request to merge [TypeNameHandling](#) into [master](#)

[Accept Merge Request](#) Remove source branch Modify commit message

Check out branch Download as

You can also accept this merge request manually using the [command line](#).

Discussion 0 Commits 3 Changes 18

[Write](#) Preview

This code change introduces a deserialization vulnerability.

Agenda


- Introduction
- Pre-Commit
- **Commit**

Commit Stage

1. **Static Code Analysis**
2. **Security Unit Testing**
3. **Container Security**
4. **Dependency Management**

DevSecOps Commit Phase

Applying automated, fast, accurate security controls in the CI pipeline:



#1

Static Code Analysis

Static Code Analysis in the Pipeline

Limited opportunity to provide fast and clear feedback during commit and build:

- Automatically diff and scan changes, provide clear information on new findings to developers, feedback button to reject false positives
- Incremental scanning if possible – deep scanning takes too long for CI/CD, especially on large code bases.
- Run deep scans out of band
- Run scans in parallel with unit testing for speed
- Return results directly to engineers (IDE / backlog list)
- Minimize false positives by turning off rules / writing custom rules

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- FindSecurityBugs (Java)
 - <http://h3xstream.github.io/find-sec-bugs/>
- Phan (PHP)
 - <https://github.com/etsy/phan>
- NodeJsScan (JavaScript)
 - <https://github.com/ajinabraham/NodeJsScan>
- Brakeman (Ruby)
 - <http://brakemanscanner.org/>
- Bandit (Python)
 - <https://github.com/openstack/bandit>

COMMIT (CI)

STATIC CODE
ANALYSIS

Weaponizing the toolchain (continued):

- Flawfinder (C)
 - <http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/>
- Puma Scan (C#)
 - <https://github.com/pumasecurity/puma-scan>
- Gosec (Go)
 - <https://github.com/GoASTScanner/gas>

COMMIT (CI)

STATIC CODE
ANALYSIS

Static Code Analysis Example in CI

Invoking a scan and capturing vulnerability data in a Jenkins CI pipeline:

The screenshot shows a Jenkins web interface displaying the results of a static code analysis scan. The URL in the browser bar is `jenkins.pumademo.com/job/Puma Scan/1/warnings40Result/new/`. The main page title is "MSBuild Warnings - New Warnings". The left sidebar includes links for "Back to Project", "Status", "Changes", "Console Output", "Edit Build Information", "Delete Build", and "MSBuild Warnings". The central summary table shows the following counts:

Total	High Priority	Normal Priority	Low Priority
63	0	63	0

The "Details" section contains a table of warnings, with the "Warnings" tab selected. The table has columns: File, Namespace, Line, Priority, Type, and Category. One specific warning is highlighted in yellow, showing the file `RestClient.cs:22` with the message: "SQL Injection - ADO.NET method is passed a dynamic SQL statement." The full table data is as follows:

File	Namespace	Line	Priority	Type	Category
DataAccess.cs:25	WidgetTown.Utilites	25	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0107
RestClient.cs:22	WidgetTown.Utilites	22	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0113
AccountController.cs:95	WidgetTown.Controllers	95	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0018
AccountController.cs:208	WidgetTown.Controllers	208	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0019
AccountController.cs:283	WidgetTown.Controllers	283	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0109
CartController.cs:60	WidgetTown.Controllers	60	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0019
ContestsController.cs:38	WidgetTown.Controllers	38	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0023
ContestsController.cs:39	WidgetTown.Controllers	39	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0019
ContestsController.cs:63	WidgetTown.Controllers	63	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0019

#2

Security Unit Testing

Take advantage of engineering teams that are “test obsessed”:

- Get off the "happy path"!!
- Leverage “Evil User Stories”, “Abuse Cases”, and OWASP ASVS requirements to come up with test cases
- Ensure high levels of unit test coverage for high risk code
- **Red means STOP** – ensure team does not ignore/remove broken tests
- Write unit tests first when fixing vulnerabilities
- Use Unit tests to alert on changes to high risk code

Security Unit Testing Tools

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- JUnit (Java)
 - <https://junit.org>
- XUnit (C#, F#, VB)
 - <https://xunit.github.io/>
- Mocha (NodeJS)
 - <https://mochajs.org/>
- RSpec (Ruby)
 - <http://rspec.info/>
- PyUnit (Python)
 - <https://wiki.python.org/moin/PyUnit>

The diagram consists of two orange arrows pointing right. The top arrow is white on the left and orange on the right, containing the text 'COMMIT (CI)'. The bottom arrow is orange on both sides, containing the text 'SECURITY UNIT TESTING'.

COMMIT (CI)

SECURITY UNIT
TESTING

Security Unit Testing Example | Happy Path

The following code stays on the happy path by downloading Bob's license file:

```
1 [Theory]
2 [InlineData("bob@app.com", "L1ttleB0bbyTable$", "1", HttpStatusCode.Found)]
3 public async Task DownloadTest(string username, string password, string id,
4                                 HttpStatusCode responseCode)
5 {
6     ...
7     var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, $"/download/{id}");
8     request.Headers.Add("Cookie", $"app-portal=${authCookie};");
9     var response = await _client.SendAsync(request);
10    Assert.Equal(responseCode, response.StatusCode);
11 }
```

Security Unit Testing Example | Evil Path

The following code performs an abuse case where Alice attempts to download Bob's license file:

```
1 [Theory]
2 [InlineData("bob@app.com", "L1ttleB0bbyTable$", "1", HttpStatusCode.Found)]
3 [InlineData("alice@app.com", "NotB0bbysPwd$", "1", HttpStatusCode.Forbidden)]
4 public async Task DownloadTest(string username, string password, string id,
5                               HttpStatusCode responseCode)
6 {
7     ...
8     var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, $"{"/download/{id}"}");
9     request.Headers.Add("Cookie", $"app-portal=${authCookie};");
10    var response = await _client.SendAsync(request);
11    Assert.Equal(responseCode, response.StatusCode);
12 }
```

#3

Container Security

Container Security Issues

- Lightweight isolation (do containers contain?)
- User namespaces is not enabled by default (added in Docker 1.10 Feb 2016)
- Untrusted content, compromised, and vulnerable images
- Docker Daemon presents its own attack surface
- Container sprawl and limited visibility, especially at scale
- Ephemeral run-time is difficult to track and manage

Container Security Resources

In-depth container security discussions could be a week-long discussion. Here are some resources to keep you busy:

- Docker Security Guidelines
- Docker Reference Architecture
- CIS Docker Benchmark
- NCC Group: Understanding and Hardening Linux Containers
- NIST SP 800-190 Application Container Security Guide
- CIS Kubernetes Benchmark

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- Docker Benchmark Inspec Profile
 - <https://github.com/dev-sec/cis-docker-benchmark>
- Anchore
 - <https://anchore.com/opensource/>
- Actuary
 - <https://github.com/diogomonica/actuary>
- Clair
 - <https://github.com/coreos/clair>
- Falco
 - <https://github.com/draios/falco>

```
graph LR; A[Docker Benchmark Inspec Profile] --> B[Anchore]; A --> C[Actuary]; A --> D[Clair]; A --> E[Falco]; B --> F[COMMIT CI]; C --> F; D --> G[CONTAINER SECURITY]; E --> G;
```

COMMIT (CI)

CONTAINER SECURITY

Container Security Example

Invoking an Anchore image scan and capturing vulnerability data in a Jenkins CI pipeline:

Policy

Anchore Policy Evaluation Summary

Show 10 entries Search:

Repo Tag	Stop Actions	Warn Actions	Go Actions	Final Action
docker.io/library/ubuntu:latest	0	14	0	WARN

Showing 1 to 1 of 1 entries Previous 1 Next

Anchore Policy Evaluation Report

Show 10 entries Search:

Image Id	Repo Tag	Trigger Id	Gate	Trigger	Check Output	Gate Action	Whitelisted
f975c50357489439eb9145dbfa16bb7cd06c02c31aa4df45c77de4d2baa4e232	docker.io/library/ubuntu:latest	b38090bac771995c5af3fc8c033b7d3d	dockerfilecheck	nohealthcheck	Dockerfile does not contain any HEALTHCHECK instructions	WARN	false
f975c50357489439eb9145dbfa16bb7cd06c02c31aa4df45c77de4d2baa4e232	docker.io/library/ubuntu:latest	CVE-2018-6829+gnupg	anchoresec	vulnmedium	MEDIUM Vulnerability found in package - gnupg (CVE-2018-6829 - http://people.ubuntu.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/CVE-2018-6829)	WARN	false
f975c50357489439eb9145dbfa16bb7cd06c02c31aa4df45c77de4d2baa4e232	docker.io/library/ubuntu:latest	CVE-2018-6829+gpgv	anchoresec	vulnmedium	MEDIUM Vulnerability found in package - gpgv (CVE-2018-6829 - http://people.ubuntu.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/CVE-2018-6829)	WARN	false

#4

Dependency Management

Dependency Management (Component Analysis)

Serious vulnerabilities can be inherited from open source libraries, docker images, and infrastructure templates:

- Use tools to automatically scan code base or build artifacts and identify external dependencies (build a “bill of materials”)
- Identify out of date components
- Check against public vulnerability database(s) for known vulnerabilities in these components
- Many commercial tools also check for licensing risks or violations
- Caution that some tools may not check transitive dependencies within components
- Integrate into CI/CD—automatically fail build if serious problems are found

Dependency Management Tools

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- OWASP Dependency Check (Java, .NET, Ruby, Python)
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check
- PHP Security Checker
 - <https://security.sensiolabs.org/>
- Bundler-Audit (Ruby)
 - <https://github.com/rubysec/bundler-audit>
- NPM Audit / Retire.JS (NodeJS)
 - <https://retirejs.github.io/retire.js/>
 - <https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/audit>



COMMIT (CI)

DEPENDENCY
MANAGEMENT

Example of Dependency Analysis in CI

Invoking a dependency check scan and capturing vulnerability data in a Jenkins CI pipeline:

DependencyCheck Result


Warnings Trend

All Warnings	New Warnings	Fixed Warnings
153	138	0

Summary


Total	High Priority	Normal Priority	Low Priority
153	24	111	18

Details



DevSecOps Toolchain Summary

Exploring further...



Thank you for attending!

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@emjohn20

