

I don't do title slides

I don't do title slides

or matching socks



TRUST

& how the net works



The OSI layers

Application

Presentation

Session

Transport

Network

Data Link

Physical

The OSI layers

Application

Presentation

Session

Transport

Network


Data Link

Physical


electrical or EM signals



The OSI layers




Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) frame



Note: Wireless (IEEE 802.11) is similar


The OSI layers




IP frame

Version	Header Length	Type of service	Total Packet Length (in Bytes)							
Identification			X	D	M					
Time to Live (TTL)	Protocol		Header Checksum							
Source Address										
Destination Address										
Options (if any)										
Payload										


The OSI layers




TCP frame




The OSI layers




The OSI layers






The OSI layers




The OSI layers




Tunneling: VPNs




The OSI layers




LAN




LAN




LAN




LAN



LAN




LAN





LAN

- Person-in-the-middle:
read/modify





LAN

- Person-in-the-middle: read/modify
- Spoofing: impersonate



LAN

- Person-in-the-middle: read/modify
- Spoofing: impersonate
- Various DNS: phishing and more



To do

To do



Get off your
flatmate's wi-fi

To do

~~Get off your
flatmate's wi-fi
hack their router,
take control~~

To do



Do not connect
to untrusted
networks

The OSI layers

Application

HTTP, DHCP, DNS, ...

Presentation

TLS, ...

Session

Transport

TCP, UDP, ...

Network

IP, IPsec, ICMP, ...

Data Link

Ethernet, Wi-Fi, ...

Physical

electrical or EM signals

Encryption: a) privacy



Encryption: a) privacy




Encryption: b) authentication


Encryption: b) authentication



Encryption: b) authentication



Encryption: b) authentication



Encryption: b) authentication



Encryption: b) authentication and integrity



Encryption: b) authentication and integrity ⇒ TRUST



Encryption protocols:

Encryption protocols: **SSL/TLS**

Encryption protocols: **SSL/TLS, PGP**

Encryption protocols: **SSL/TLS, PGP, ???**

Encryption protocols: **SSL/TLS, PGP, ???**

CLIENT

SERVER

SSL/TLS



CLIENT

SERVER

SSL/TLS

Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert



CLIENT

SSL/TLS

SERVER



PUB



PRIV

Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert

Here's my cert and public key, send me the PMK

CLIENT



SSL/TLS

SERVER



Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert

Here's my cert and public key, send me the PMK



CLIENT

SSL/TLS

SERVER



Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert

Here's my cert and public key, send me the PMK

Here's the encrypted PMK, decrypt it with your private key



CLIENT

SSL/TLS

SERVER



Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert



Here's my cert and public key, send me the PMK



Here's the encrypted PMK, decrypt it with your private key



CLIENT

SSL/TLS

SERVER



Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert



Here's my cert and public key, send me the PMK



Here's the encrypted PMK, decrypt it with your private key



Shared secret



Shared secret

CLIENT

SSL/TLS

SERVER



Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert



Here's my cert and public key, send me the PMK



Here's the encrypted PMK, decrypt it with your private key



Encrypted data

Shared secret



Shared secret

CLIENT

SSL/TLS

SERVER



Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert



Here's my cert and public key, send me the PMK

AUTHENTICATION

Here's the encrypted PMK, decrypt it with your private key



Encrypted data



Shared secret

Shared secret

CLIENT

SSL/TLS

SERVER



Here're my KEX algorithms, give me your cert

Here's my cert and public key, send me the PMK

Here's the encrypted PMK, decrypt it with your private key

AUTHENTICATION

INTEGRITY

Encrypted data




Shared secret

Shared secret

SSL/TLS certificates

SSL/TLS certificates



SSL/TLS certificates



Did Not Connect: Potential Security Issue

Firefox detected a potential security threat and did not continue to `secure.bank` because this website requires a secure connection.

Websites prove their identity via certificates. Firefox does not trust this site because it uses a certificate that is not valid for `secure.bank:58443`. The certificate is only valid for `shady.hacke.rs`.

Error code: `SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN`

[View Certificate](#)

[Go Back](#)

SSL/TLS certificates



Did Not Connect: Potential Security Issue

Firefox detected a potential security threat and did not continue to [secure.bank](#) because this website requires a secure connection.

The certificate is only valid for `shady.hacke.rs`

Websites provide certificates that prove their identity. This site's certificate is not valid for `secure.bank`.


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
[View Certificate](#)

[Go Back](#)

WHAT HAPPENED HERE?!




WHAT HAPPENED HERE?!



- ALIEN-IN-THE-MIDDLE

WHAT HAPPENED HEREPI



- ALIEN-IN-THE-MIDDLE
- SECURE.BANK WAS HAXED
BY ALIENS

WHAT HAPPENED HEREPI

- 
- Russian or Chinese gov
 - 12-yo accidentally found the admin portal



- ALIEN-IN-THE-MIDDLE

- SECURE.BANK WAS HAXED BY ALIENS

WHAT HAPPENED HEREPI

Aliens on the LAN




- ALIEN-IN-THE-MIDDLE


- SECURE.BANK WAS HAXED
BY ALIENS




Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing




Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing




Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing




Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing




Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing




Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing



Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing



Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing



To do




Do not use
untrusted
devices

To do




Do not ignore
certificate
warnings



**I NEVER
IGNORE
CERTIFICATE
WARNINGS**

Person-in-the middle: ARP spoofing



Google

|



Google Search

I'm Feeling Lucky

Not Secure


Google

|



Google Search

I'm Feeling Lucky



To do






**WHAT IF THERE'S
ANOTHER WAY TO
GET HACKED?**

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)




secure.bank




hache.rs

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)



secure.bank



Psst, tell him to
send some \$\$\$




hache.rs

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)



secure.bank

Hey, send him \$\$\$




hache.rs

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)

Do you really
mean that?



secure.bank




hache.rs

The web “Origin”


$\{hostname\} : \{port\}$

The web “Origin”



The web “Origin”


paypal.com



paypal.com

The web “Origin”

paypal.com




paypal1.com

Even if you are using a
broken font which thinks
they're the same

The web “Origin”

paypal.com




paypa1.com

And yes, even if they
resolve to the same IP
address

The web “Origin”

secure.bank:443



secure.bank:8443

Same-origin policy (SOP)

Same-origin policy (SOP)




You're not from our
Origin, we don't trust
you!

SOP: it was never gonna work




Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)

Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)




secure.bank




hache.rs

Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)



secure.bank




Psst, tell him to
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
hache.rs

Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)



secure.bank

Hey, send him \$\$\$




hache.rs

Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)

Who's asking?




secure.bank




hache.rs

Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)



secure.bank




hache.rs

Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)

Nah, that origin
is phishy...




secure.bank




hache.rs

Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)



secure.bank

K, nevermind



hache.rs

CORS and HTTP

CORS and HTTP

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: secure.bank

Cookie: SESSION=xbatmanxwashingxhisxtights

CORS and HTTP

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: secure.bank

Cookie: SESSION=xbatmanxwashingxhisxtights

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

CORS and HTTP

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: secure.bank

Cookie: SESSION=xbatmanxwashingxhisxtights

Origin: hacker.rs

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

CORS and HTTP

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: secure.bank

Cookie: SESSION=xbatmanxwashingxhisxtights

Origin: hakers

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: secure.bank

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: false

...

CORS and HTTP

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: secure.bank

Cookie: SESSION=xbatmanxwashingxhisxtights

Origin: hacke.rs

hacke.rs tells the browser
whether to include cookies or not



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: secure.bank

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: false

...

CORS: what should browsers do

Server allows		Browser must
Origin	Credentials	Give JavaScript Access

CORS: what should browsers do

Server allows		Browser must
Origin	Credentials	Give JavaScript Access
<i>{not as requested}</i>	No	
	Yes	

CORS: what should browsers do

Server allows		Browser must
Origin	Credentials	Give JavaScript Access
{not as requested}	No	No
	Yes	

CORS: what should browsers do

Server allows		Browser must
Origin	Credentials	Give JavaScript Access
<i>{not as requested}</i>	No	No
	Yes	
*	No	
	Yes	

CORS: what should browsers do

Server allows		Browser must
Origin	Credentials	Give JavaScript Access
<i>{not as requested}</i>	No	No
	Yes	
*	No	Yes, if no cookies needed
	Yes	

CORS: what should browsers do

Server allows		Browser must
Origin	Credentials	Give JavaScript Access
<i>{not as requested}</i>	No	No
	Yes	
* 	No	Yes, if no cookies needed
	Yes	
<i>{as requested}</i>	No	
	Yes	

CORS: what should browsers do


Server allows		Browser must
Origin	Credentials	Give JavaScript Access
{not as requested}	No	No
	Yes	
* 	No	
	Yes	Yes, if no cookies needed
{as requested}	No	
	Yes	

CORS: what should browsers do

Server allows		Browser must
Origin	Credentials	Give JavaScript Access
{not as requested}	No	No
	Yes	
* 	No	
	Yes	Yes, if no cookies needed
{as requested}	No	
	Yes	Yes


CORS: what do browsers actually do

CORS: what do browsers actually do



Microsoft's done it again:
IE and Edge are
kinda broken

CORS: what do browsers actually do



CORS: what do browsers actually do



Also, Google and Mozilla
messed up too,
separately (no collusion)

CORS: what do browsers actually do



Recent Firefox and
Chrome are even
more broken

CORS: what do browsers actually do



**WAIT
WHAT?!**

It's a bug and...

It's a bug and...

I FOUND IT,
IT IS MINE!



Now gimme moneyz

Chromium bug #930057 **CVE-2019-5814** ⇒ **US\$1,000**

Mozilla bug #1526218 **CVE-2018-18511** ⇒ **US\$3,000**

Now gimme moneyz


Chromium bug #930057 **CVE-2019-5814** ⇒ **US\$1,000**

Mozilla bug #1526218 **CVE-2018-18511** ⇒ **US\$3,000**

Mozilla bug #1528909 **CVE-2019-9797** ⇒ another **US\$3,000**



Not sure if the web app is broken




Or my browser is a malware

To do



Don't “multi-tab”

To do



Don't "multi-tab"
Log out before
closing the tab


SOP bypass

SOP bypass via DNS rebinding

In DNS we trust

DNS rebinding


hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7




secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding

hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7




What's the IP
address of
secure.bank ?



secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding

hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7



What's the IP
address of
secure.bank ?

It's 1.2.3.4



evil
DNS server



secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding

hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7




Establish login session

secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding: later...

hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7



What's the IP
address of
secure.bank ?




evil
DNS server



secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding: later...

hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7



What's the IP
address of
secure.bank ?

It's 1.3.3.7




evil
DNS server



secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding: later...


hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7



secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding: laterer...

hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7



What's the IP
address of
secure.bank ?




evil
DNS server



secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding: laterer...

hacke.rs: 1.3.3.7



What's the IP
address of
secure.bank ?

It's 1.2.3.4




evil
DNS server



secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

DNS rebinding: laterer...

hache.rs: 1.3.3.7




Evil scripts get private data




secure.bank: 1.2.3.4

WHAT HAPPENED HERE?!




WHAT HAPPENED HERE?!




- ROGUE DHCP SERVER (SETUP BY ALIENS)

WHAT HAPPENED HERE?!




- ROGUE DHCP SERVER (SETUP BY ALIENS)
- MULTICAST DNS OR NETBIOS (INVENTED BY ALIENS)

WHAT HAPPENED HERE?!




- ROGUE DHCP SERVER (SETUP BY ALIENS)
- MULTICAST DNS OR NETBIOS (INVENTED BY ALIENS)
- DNS CACHE POISONING

WHAT HAPPENED HEREPI!




- ROGUE DHCP SERVER (SETUP BY ALIENS)
- MULTICAST DNS OR NETBIOS (INVENTED BY ALIENS)
- DNS CACHE POISONING


WHAT HAPPENED HEREPI




Rogue DHCP




Rogue DHCP



Rogue DHCP



Rogue DHCP




To do



3rd party DNS

,,

To do



3rd party DNS
„
with DNSsec or
DNS over TLS



**ARE YOU
DONE YET**

What happens when you type in the address bar?

What happens when you type in the address bar?

Use default
search engine

Establish
connection

Does it start with a
schema (e.g. http://)?

Use default
search engine

Establish
connection

Does it start with a schema (e.g. http://)?

no

Is it more than one word?

Use default search engine

Establish connection

Does it start with a schema (e.g. http://)?

no

Is it more than one word?

yes

Use default search engine

Establish connection

Does it start with a schema (e.g. http://)?

no

Is it more than one word?

no

Does it resolve to an IP address?

yes

Use default search engine

Establish connection

Does it start with a schema (e.g. http://)?

no

Is it more than one word?

no

yes

Does it resolve to an IP address?

no

Use default search engine

Establish connection

Does it start with a schema (e.g. http://)?

no

Is it more than one word?

Prepend http://

no

Does it resolve to an IP address?


yes


Use default search engine


yes


no


Establish connection























BLAH
BLAH
BLAH



What happens when you type in the address bar?



What happens when you type in the address bar?



The image shows a terminal window with a browser history and a network capture.

Browser History:

- memes
- memes - DuckDuckGo Search
- memes 2019
- memes funny


Terminal Command:

```
anikolova ➤ ttys009 ➤ ~ ➤ sudo tshark -i en0 dst port 53
```


Capturing on 'Wi-Fi'

```
1 0.000000 192.168.1.121 → 192.168.1.111 DNS 65 Standard query 0xc9b0 A memes
```


A yellow oval highlights the DNS query line: "1 0.000000 192.168.1.121 → 192.168.1.111 DNS 65 Standard query 0xc9b0 A memes".



What happens when you type in the address bar?



What happens when you type in the address bar?



The image shows a terminal window with a background of a search interface. The search interface has a dark theme with a white bar at the top containing navigation icons (back, forward, clear) and the search term 'memes'. Below this are four search results:


- memes - DuckDuckGo Search
- memes 2019
- memes funny

The terminal window itself has a dark background and displays the following command and output:

```
anikolova ➤ ttys009 ➤ ~ ➤ sudo tshark -i en0 dst port 53
Capturing on 'Wi-Fi'
1  0.000000 192.168.1.121 → 192.168.1.1  DNS 71 Standard query 0x9691 A memes.local
2  0.080878 192.168.1.121 → 192.168.1.1  DNS 71 Standard query 0x0001 A memes.local
```

A yellow oval highlights the second DNS query in the terminal output, which corresponds to the 'memes 2019' search result in the background search interface.

What happens when you type in the address bar?



To do



TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the LAN

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Any machine can choose its IP or MAC address

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the LAN

Any machine can choose its IP or MAC address:

⇒ impersonate a machine we trust

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the LAN

Any machine can choose its IP or MAC address:

- ⇒ impersonate a machine we trust
- ⇒ person-in-the-middle

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the LAN

Any machine can choose its IP or MAC address:

- ⇒ impersonate a machine we trust
 - ⇒ person-in-the-middle
- ⇒ DNS rebinding

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the LAN

Any machine can choose its IP or MAC address:

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- ⇒ DNS hijacking

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the LAN

Any machine can choose its IP or MAC address:

- ⇒ impersonate a machine we trust
 - ⇒ person-in-the-middle
- ⇒ DNS rebinding
- ⇒ DNS hijacking

(If wireless) any machine can read the traffic of any other

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

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Bad sites *can* be dangerous!

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI)!

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Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI)!



TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI):

⇒ phishing

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI):

- ⇒ phishing
- ⇒ hack accounts on other sites

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI):

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- ⇒ hack accounts on other sites
- ⇒ install evil browser extensions or other software

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI):

- ⇒ phishing
- ⇒ hack accounts on other sites
- ⇒ install evil browser extensions or other software
- ⇒ attack other machines on the LAN

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI):

- ⇒ phishing
 - ⇒ hack accounts on other sites
 - ⇒ install evil browser extensions or other software
 - ⇒ attack other machines on the LAN
- ⇒ hack accounts on vulnerable sites

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI):

- ⇒ phishing
- ⇒ hack accounts on other sites
- ⇒ install evil browser extensions or other software
- ⇒ attack other machines on the LAN
- ⇒ hack accounts on vulnerable sites

because

Good sites *can* be vulnerable

TL;DR: (Dis)trust on the net

Bad sites *can* be dangerous (even if you don't enter PPI):

- ⇒ phishing
 - ⇒ hack accounts on other sites
 - ⇒ install evil browser extensions or other software
 - ⇒ attack other machines on the LAN
- ⇒ hack accounts on vulnerable sites

Good sites *can* be vulnerable

- ⇒ distribute malware

TL;DR: As a good user, you:

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- ◊ Get off your flatmate's wi-fi

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- ◊ Get off your flatmate's wi-fi (or hack their router and take control)

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- ◊ Do not use untrusted devices
- ◊ Do not ignore certificate warnings

TL;DR: As a good user, you:

- ◊ Get off your flatmate's wi-fi (or hack their router and take control)
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- ◊ Do not ignore certificate warnings
- ◊ Use HTTPS everywhere

TL;DR: As a good user, you:

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- ◊ Use 3rd party DNS with DNSsec or DNS over TLS

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TL;DR: As a good user, you:

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- ◊ Do not use untrusted devices
- ◊ Do not ignore certificate warnings
- ◊ Use HTTPS everywhere
- ◊ Log out of sites (or automatic cookie clearing)
- ◊ Use 3rd party DNS with DNSsec or DNS over TLS
- ◊ Don't use address bar search
- ◊ Keep your browser up to date, duh

TL;DR: As a good dev, you:

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- ◊ Configure Strict Transport Security

TL;DR: As a good dev, you:

- ◊ Configure Strict Transport Security
- ◊ Configure CORS, or use anti-CSRF tokens



https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html

TL;DR: As a good dev, you:

- ◊ Configure Strict Transport Security
- ◊ Configure CORS, or use anti-CSRF tokens
- ◊ Sanitise user input, duh

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https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Data_Validation

TL;DR: As a good dev, you:

- ◊ Configure Strict Transport Security
- ◊ Configure CORS, or use anti-CSRF tokens
- ◊ Sanitise user input, duh
- ◊ Do not cache user-dependent responses

DISCLAIMER


All hostnames, and breaches portrayed in this production are fictitious. No identification with actual domain names (current or expired), banks, cafes with open Wi-Fis, and products is intended or should be inferred. No meme or panda associated with this presentation received payment or anything of value, or entered into any agreement, in connection with the depiction of hacking activities. No poor honest tax payers were harmed in the making of any demos, or in the bug bounties depicted here.

DISCLAIMER

... That is to say, secure.bank and hacke.rs may be real websites, I did not visit them, nor should you.

And I even made sure my images are free for noncommercial use without the need for crediting. There's a first time for everything.

Check this out!



Same-Origin Policy: From birth until today

Check this out!



Do you really mean that?

Psst, tell him to set your password to 123

[https://research.aurainfosec.io/
same-origin-policy/](https://research.aurainfosec.io/same-origin-policy/)

Set my password to 123

Same-Origin Policy: From birth until today

Check this out!



CHC CHRISTCHURCH
HACKERS CONFERENCE

<https://2019.chcon.nz>

Check this out!



[**https://witestlab.poly.edu/blog/conduct-a-simple-man-in-the-middle-attack-on-a-wifi-hotspot**](https://witestlab.poly.edu/blog/conduct-a-simple-man-in-the-middle-attack-on-a-wifi-hotspot)

[**https://blog.netspi.com/exploiting-adidns**](https://blog.netspi.com/exploiting-adidns)

[**https://www.techrepublic.com/article/wpa-wireless-security-offers-multiple-advantages-over-wep**](https://www.techrepublic.com/article/wpa-wireless-security-offers-multiple-advantages-over-wep)


[**https://fabianlee.org/2018/02/17/ubuntu-creating-a-trusted-ca-and-san-certificate-using-openssl-on-ubuntu**](https://fabianlee.org/2018/02/17/ubuntu-creating-a-trusted-ca-and-san-certificate-using-openssl-on-ubuntu)



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AaylaSecura1138



aayla-secura



Glossary

DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol

DNS: Domain Name System

HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol

ICMP: Internet Control Message Protocol

IP: Internet Protocol

L2TP: Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol

LAN: Local Area Network

LLMNR: Link-Local Multicast Name

Resolution

NAT: Network Address Translation

NetBIOS: Network Basic Input/Output System

NIC: Network Interface Card/Controller

OS: Operating System

OSI: Open System Interconnection

PGP: Pretty Good Privacy

PPTP: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol

SSL: Secure Sockets Layer

TCP: Transmission Control Protocol

TSL: Transport Layer Security

UDP: User Datagram Protocol

VPN: Virtual Private Network