

2013

## "(A) boot stamping on a human face--forever:" Gender, Sex, and Human Rights in Science Fiction

Rosemary Karin Limburg  
*Bard College*

---

### Recommended Citation

Limburg, Rosemary Karin, ""(A) boot stamping on a human face--forever:" Gender, Sex, and Human Rights in Science Fiction" (2013). *Senior Projects Spring 2013*. Paper 227.  
[http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj\\_s2013/227](http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2013/227)

This Access restricted to On-Campus only is brought to you for free and open access by the Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects at Bard Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Projects Spring 2013 by an authorized administrator of Bard Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [digitalcommons@bard.edu](mailto:digitalcommons@bard.edu).

**“[A] boot stamping on a human face—forever:”**  
**Gender, Sex, and Human Rights in Science Fiction Literature**

Senior Project submitted to  
The Division of Social Studies  
of Bard College

by Rosemary Limburg

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York  
May 2013

I dedicate this to Mr. Saylor, my tenth grade English teacher, who taught me about symbolism and how to appreciate analyzing a novel.

I would like to acknowledge all the hard work that my advisers, Professors Stevens and Keenan, put into this project. They always had great advice and suggestions. I would also like to thank Olivia Madden for listening to my crazy ideas all year and helping me sort the good from the bad. My parents have also been immensely supportive and I love them dearly for giving me the opportunity to study at a place like Bard College. I should also remember the Inquiring Minds Bookstore in Saugerties where I wrote most of this project. Also, thanks to my sea foam green tea thermos. Thank you for being with me the whole way. Thank you all so much for all your patience and care.

## Table of Contents

Intro .....	1
Chapter One	
Vying Humanities .....	11
Chapter Two	
Perverted Societies .....	37
Chapter Three	
Consuming Reality .....	65
Conclusion.....	86
Bibliography .....	91

## Introduction

### ***Setting the Stage***

#### *Thought-Experiments*

“The purpose of a thought experiment, as the term was used by Schrodinger and other physicists, is not to predict the future—indeed Schrodinger’s most famous thought-experiment goes to show that the ‘future,’ on the quantum level, *cannot* be predicted—but to describe reality, the present world. . . . Science fiction is not predictive; it is descriptive.” (Introduction to Le Guin’s *Left Hand* xii)

Science fiction literature (SF) is not concerned with speculating about the future. Rather, it is interested in depicting the present. Ursula Le Guin suggests that SF achieves this by representing the everyday, by “inventing persons, places, and events which never did and never will occur” (Intro *Left Hand* xiii).

In this paper I examine three SF novels: George Orwell’s *1984*, Le Guin’s *The Left Hand of Darkness*, and Philip K. Dick’s *The Simulacra*. Orwell, Le Guin, and Dick all place these narratives in a time after the novel’s publishing, the future. If these stories were merely musings on the future, they would be of no interest to me. I am interested in what these stories say about the now. How these authors define humanity and the rights important to maintaining their concept of humanity is the issue.

I use *1984*, *Left Hand*, and *The Simulacra* to explore issues of government control. The ways in which these governments control the populations they are responsible for has its roots in the time when the novels were written. All these authors are inspired by something they see in the world. They catch on an issue and write about it, either to mediate on, or warn about, a situation.

### *Why a Novel?*

SF writers are attracted to novels because this medium allows them creative freedom in representing the present. Le Guin believes that by “inventing persons, places, and events which never did and never will occur” authors can draw on the real world to express a fictive one (Intro *Left Hand* xiii). I think that these three authors turn to SF novels because it allows them to communicate concerns about the present in a comfortable fashion.

A reader can meditate on the dangers of totalitarianism in *1984*, the repression of sexual self in *Left Hand*, and the implications of media use by governments in *The Simulacra* safely. A reader can learn about his or her current reality without admitting that the novels are telling the “true.” Le Guin suggests that “writers, at least in their braver moments, do desire the truth” but that the writers are “liars” and “insane” (Intro *Left Hand* xiii). She suggests this because of the propinquity between the fictive and real in the novels. A novelist builds a world in his or her novel by drawing on the real to breathe life into the imaginary. This helps the reader contextualize the unfamiliar by connecting it with the familiar. The real world is less terrifying if it is wrapped up in characters, their invented motives, and the dangers of a written world. Essentially, I think Orwell, Le Guin, and Dick chose the format of a novel for the expression of their concerns because it allows them to address the real world by constructing fantastical ideals upon it.

SF in particular is useful for this goal, because the stories of this genre generally occur in the future. The reader is separated from the discomfort of reality by time as well as imagination. Perhaps it is soothing to think that the world has not yet

deteriorated into the anti-utopia presented in a novel. Due to the structure of the novel the audience assumes that somehow everything will work itself out in the end.

These three authors play on this layout. Orwell does this by creating a understandable protagonist, Winston. Winston is relatable because he desires to return to the reader's present and holds more in common with the reader than the Party. Yet, Winston fails. He is converted. Hope is dashed and the Party triumphs (297). Le Guin allows Genly to overcome his discomfort with androgyny but the reader is left with the feeling that Genly can never return home. At the end of the novel, when he is reunited with other permanently gendered and sexed beings, he sees them as animals and must retreat (296). Dick ends the novel with the disillusionment of the public, a battle between the military and the police, and a foreboding sense that the human race, as the reader conceives it, is falling<sup>1</sup> (230).

### *Recurring Sources*

There are a couple of theorists that are important to my analysis in more than one chapter such as Isaiah Berlin and Michel Foucault.

Isaiah Berlin's concept of liberty<sup>2</sup> is helpful. Berlin suggests that freedom exists in two senses: "negative" and "positive" (Berlin 194). These do not refer to bad or good, simply different definitions of liberty. Negative freedom refers to a "liberty from" (199), whereas the positive sense ascribes a "freedom to" (203). The "liberty from" formula

---

<sup>1</sup> Though it does not figure into my analysis, I am interested by Dick's "chuppers." The chuppers are a "radiation-spawned race" which are relegated to unpleasant areas where no one else wants to live (104-106). It is a widely held theory in the novel that chuppers are "throwbacks" to "Neanderthals" (107). Dick ends the novel at a chupper meeting where the "human" characters says, "I think . . . we're going to have to become accustomed to them [the chuppers]" (230). Dick suggests that humanity itself is changing, and that though "we've been the dominant species . . . It's over." (227).

<sup>2</sup> Or freedom, as Berlin uses them interchangeably (194).

becomes “coercion” because Berlin sees it as “warding off interference” by control (199). It becomes the duty of the government to control men in such a way that they cannot interfere with one another. The logic behind “freedom to” leads to a justification of control by those who know better than an individual who does not know their “‘true’ self.” The “true self” is identified with “higher nature” or the “ideal” self. In this sense, it is for the good of mankind that some are oppressed<sup>3</sup> “in the name of some goal” (204), such as the Party’s desire for power.

The Party understands power in a negative<sup>4</sup> way because It believes It knows best, and this domination by forced uniformity becomes a means to an end. Berlin’s positive freedom also appears in my third chapter because the USEA indulges the wants of its public, controlling the populace by giving them what they want.

Foucault’s concept of “*perpetual spirals of power and pleasure*” comes up in my first and third chapters as well. In *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* Foucault says, “The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species” (43). The naming and study of sexual “aberrations” created a form of power through ordering. I would argue that this power fits into Berlin’s negative type because the assumption behind this cataloging is that the observed do not know how to properly exercise their freedom. Therefore, the observer must free the observed from the burden of liberty. If the observer succeed the observed would not be freaks. Foucault suggest that this type of power adds a dimension of “pleasure” because closer observation and conversation were necessary to properly catalog all the species. This greater contact allowed a “sensualization of power and a gain of pleasure” (43-44). This

---

<sup>3</sup> Berlin uses “oppressed” when human beings are stopping other human beings from something (Berlin 195).

<sup>4</sup> Are you sure its “positive” and not “negative”? Or can a power use both?



became an “impetus” for the “very exercise of power,” for the desire for pleasure could lure individuals into exercising power. He also claims that the questioned felt a pleasure: “fixed by a gaze, isolated and animated by the attention they received.” The pleasure felt by the questioner and the questioned begets a cycle Foucault refers to as “*perpetual spirals of power and pleasure*” (Foucault’s emphasis 45).

This appears in my analyses of *1984* and *The Simulacra*. I use the suggestion that the Object of power experiences pleasure from their objectification to complicate the power relationships I describe.

Foucault’s Panopticon is important in chapters one and two. The Panopticon was originally conceived of by Jeremy Bentham as a prison. Later, Foucault played with the theory of power behind the concept in his *Discipline and Punishment*. The Panopticon is a building design which calls for a tall, dark-windowed tower in the middle of walls honeycombed with cells (200). The principle behind the design is that the person in the tower can see all the prisoners but the prisoners cannot see each other or the watcher. The observer is not really relevant, for the prisoners know that they may always be watched and therefore “[assume] responsibility for the constraints of power . . . he [the prisoner] inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subject” (202-203). Meaning, the prisoner will act as if he is always being watched, he will become the model of good behavior.

The Party uses a similar principle through the numerous telescreens (3), surveillance devices based on televisions. This is just one more way to force uniformity; the public becomes in effect a self-policing force. The Orgoreyn government in *Left*

*Hand* utilizes a group called the Sarf to monitor and restrict public knowledge, mostly through radio broadcasts (142-143).

### *Chapter One: Vying Humanities*

Orwell, witnessed several wars and was concerned by “the danger that lies in the structure imposed on Socialist and Liberal capitalist communities by the necessity to prepare for total war with the USSR . . .” (Deutscher in Khouri 145). Enlivened by fear of the future implications of Stalinist Russia and the repression involved in its control, Orwell wrote *1984* as a warning. He uses these fears to build a world where totalitarianism is fetishized (Khouri 144). Orwell works with the general concept of dominating governments, utilizing the cultural memory and assumed knowledge of the reader. He works directly addresses what the reader knows.

Winston, the protagonist of *1984*, lives in a totalitarian society controlled by the Party in Oceania, what used to be London. The Party controls every aspect of life by use of the telescreen and taught mind policing. Through the telescreen, every citizen of the Party is monitored potentially every moment. Winston’s job at the Ministry of Truth involves falsifying newspapers to align with the Party. The past becomes malleable, the Party must always be right and the past is rewritten to reflect its glory.

Winston struggles with the Party’s domination. He wishes to recover the “private loyalties” and “mere impulses” (165) stomped out by Big Brother, the Party’s figure head. I argue that the Party redirects these loyalties and impulses for its own use. The sentimental love Winston remembers for his mother must be rerouted to Big Brother and the sexual desire he feels for Julia should be directed to the Two Minute Hate (11)

and Hate Week (56). Ultimately, *1984* is a struggle between two definitions of liberty and the forms of humanity derived from them. The Party supports a negative freedom, wanting to clear its charges from the weight of free thought and action. Whereas, Winston desires to be different, to freely experience life opposed to Party rule; this is liberty in a positive sense.

### *Chapter 2: Perverted Societies*

Observing the sex and gender inequality in her society, Le Guin sought to “eliminate gender; to find out what was left” (Gender Redux 10) in *Left Hand*. Le Guin wanted to examine what was human without the static of gender. To this end, she created Gethen and populated it with androgynous beings who have the potential to become sexed and gendered male or female a few days a month. Then she sent our narrator Genly Ai, an Envoy from the Ekumen, to Gethen. Genly is sexed and gendered male, he comes from a society similar to the reader’s in which gender roles are supposed to align with sex. During his time on Gethen, Genly is interred at a Voluntary Camp in Orgota. People who are “mental or social defects” are sent to the camps to die of cold (170). At the camps Genly witnesses kemmer represent drugs, which remove the ability of Gethenians to become gendered, sexed, and experience sexuality. In this way, chemical castration and loss of potential potency are used to control.

Here, Le Guin draws on similar material as Orwell, fear of totalitarian government. Yet, she focuses on the internment camp aspect, such as the Russian gulag. She is also drawing on the tension between genders. By drawing on these cultural memories and concerns and allowing them to influence the construction of a

complex society, Le Guin connects the reader to the text. Le Guin works by defamiliarizing the subject matter for the reader. She tweezes out the issues and knowledge of the reader until the reader is able to view the main question from a distance.

In this chapter, I examine Le Guin's attempt to write an androgynous race in English, which has inherently sexed and gendered undertones. She chooses masculine pronouns for all of the Gethenians. I suggest that this genders the characters male for the readers undermining her experiment.

Also, even though she attempts to "eliminate gender" (Gender Redux 10), Le Guin reinstalls the male and female genders with kemmer<sup>5</sup>, rather than creating a third gender or a new form of reproduction that would not require two person intercourse. Her decision to return to a two sex and gender system undercuts, for me, the importance of the male/female relationship. I suggest that if Le Guin reinstitutes the dual sex arrangement then the gendering of either male or female must be important to Le Guin. Or how Le Guin believes we culturally define human beings.

### *Chapter 3: Consuming Reality*

Dick attempts to address the pervasive nature of the media and how it can be used for government control. In *The Simulacra*, Dick writes a world filled with simulacra, simulations or imitations of life. In this world, Germany became the fifty-third member of the United States of Europe and America (USEA) in 1994 (21). The President is called the der Alte and, unbeknownst to the public, he is a simulacrum (32). A new der Alte is

---

<sup>5</sup> The period of two to five days in which a Gethenian takes on a male or female sex and the gender that accompanies it.

elected every four years, not only to lead the country, but to be Nicole's husband (16). Nicole is a dynamic woman whose image saturates public state controlled media.

For me, more than these other novels, Dick works with pieces of the familiar which he then distorts and follows to their logical conclusion. The lengths to which Dick draws his conclusions feels almost farcical.

I examine the image of Nicole in the context of Laura Mulvey's theory on the "male gaze." Mulvey considers cinema and postulates a private voyeuristic viewing which privileges the male and give him power over the image of the female.

I suggest that Nicole's image is used to control the male population because, as one of the characters asserts, Nicole is a woman "on whom an entire nation, almost an entire planet, dwelt obsessively" (18). I analyze two male character's specifically, Ian Duncan and Richard Kargosian. Both of these characters are sexually attracted to the image of Nicole and are invested in the image, and the reality they construct around her image. Ian says that Nicole is "more real than anything else . . . [e]ven than myself, my own life" (122). A psychoanalyst explains that Kongrosian "has a delusion that's so overpowering. He experiences Nicole Thibodeaux as real. Whereas actually she's the most synthetic object in our milieu" (99-100). The reality these characters construct around Nicole's image becomes more concrete to them than the actual reality that they physically inhabit. In this fashion the image of Nicole becomes a control mechanism for the USEA government.

Ultimately, I decide that the government of the USEA is moving towards the Party in 1984. However, at the point during which Dick's novel takes place, the image of Nicole is used for reasons more political than dehumanizing. The Party's system works

because there is no alternative available. Any attempt to resist is sought out and squashed. In America circa 2040, people are not observed in the same way, dissent is possible.

### *Human Rights in My Project*

I am interested in these novels as a representation of the present. How these authors depict the present is important because it allows the reader a comfortable space in which to consider current issues. I focus on how governments use sex and gender to control people and what these techniques convey about humanity, or the conditions on which one is human.

I also look ways in which “human rights” are violated in these texts. Berlin’s concept of the “dominant self” (204), as something that all relate to is important to my understanding of human rights. What makes us human has to do with what we cannot give up, what we all hold in common, what we are afraid of losing because it is integral to our understand of ourselves and the human race. However, the concept of human rights is still developing. As these authors write about human rights or what they consider important to being human they contribute to the growing discourse of human rights.

My close readings and analysis suggest that the potential to choose is important to human rights. All three authors present situations in which the characters are restricted in their decisions by governments. The consensus appears to be that governments have the potential to violate the private sphere and an individual’s right to choose or act within that space.

## Vying Humanities

### ***Setting the Stage***

Before diving into my analysis, I would like to introduce some theorists and their ideas. By doing so, I hope to set up some of the concepts I am working with in this analysis. The rest of this chapter consists of interweaving my close reading of Orwell's *1984* and these theorists. I am largely interested in how the Party utilizes power over, and derived from, pleasure. I argue that the Party controls the acts of sex and sentimental or familial love by transferring these emotions and acts out of the private arena and into the public, where Hate takes the place of sex and Big Brother is loved by all.

Kathryn Grossman suggests that: "The real corruption of the utopian impulse resides . . . in its exclusion of the concept of difference" (53). Everyone must be the same, for all desires separate from those of the Party hinder its power. It is to this end that what Winston identifies as human, impulses and instincts, are crushed. Anything outside of Party regulation threatens the uniformity it fosters with *doublethink*. Oceania is working on a Newspeak<sup>6</sup> dictionary which seeks to whittle down the language until there is "exactly *one* word" to express everything (Orwell's emphasis 52). Conformity will be assured because no one will be able to conceive of anything other than this *one* word.

With the Party seeking to build a world with freedom from independent thought, all the aspects of Winston's humanity will be lost. Bernard Crick suggests that the tragedy of *1984* is the loss of "mutual trust" (151). I understand this to be synonymous

---

<sup>6</sup> A language built by combining words and ideas. It is the language of the Party (Orwell 52).

with what I mean by “mere impulses” or acts having “value” in themselves (165). Crick’s mutual trust is an aspect of instinctive human interaction, which is extinguished by Big Brother. Crick suggests that Winston’s affair with Julia is an affair of mutual trust rather than love because they do not betray one another until the very end (151). I agree with Crick on this point: it is only when their trust, which I refer to as their “truth,” is broken that Julia and Winston give in to the Party. However, I do think that the term “love” describes Winston’s emotions for Julia because mutual trust is part of my understanding of love. Also, mutual trust and love are both connected because they are threatened by the Party. The Party’s accomplishment is the desecration of the trust Winston and Julia had in each other and themselves.

The destruction of mutual trust, instincts, and love are the mechanisms of Party’s control. Daphne Patai suggests that *1984* should be read as an elaborate game in which the Party (with O’Brien as its face) is the principle mover and Winston is a pawn. Furthermore, she posits that Winston is shaped by the Party to be a suitable opponent because power means nothing without resistance. Patai suggests that the pleasure of exercising control is lost with resistance (Patai 858). Perhaps this pleasure is part of the reason the Party operates as it does, through constant observation in a Panopticonic way. The Panopticon was originally conceived of by Bentham as a prison.

I think that the threat of constant observation helped erode mutual trust. The individual came to believe that they may always be observed, so the survival of the individual took precedence over connections with others, thereby preventing the growth of what Winston considers part of humanity.



## ***Two Humanities***

"'You are rotting away,' he [O'Brien] said; 'you are falling to pieces. What are you? A bag of filth. Now turn around and look in that mirror again. Do you see that thing facing you? That is the last man. If you are human, that is humanity. Now put your clothes on again.'" (272)

"Humanity" for the Party and "humanity" for Winston are two very different things. Winston is the "last man," the sole representative of humanity: tortured by the Party until he is disgusting with dirt, bruised, and thin with hunger, until he no longer physically resembles the man earlier introduced (271). The Party values humanity insofar as humanity serves the Party's purposes, defining humanity by its mental controls. The Party believes that humanity is animalistic and cannot survive without these reins. Big Brother's humanity exists only within the bounds of the Party for the Party.

Using Berlin's terms, the Party believes in the negative sense of liberty while Winston prefers the positive. The Party attempts to free men from concern by fostering an unquestioned control over them, down to policing the thoughts they can think by manipulating language. Opposite this, Winston desires liberty to experience, to feel, and to remember whatever the Party fears.

O'Brien seems to question Winston's humanity by saying, "If you are human" (272). He is suggesting that the dirt and Winston's divergent desires negate his humanity in the Party's ideal. This attaches the two kinds of liberty to the two forms of humanity practiced under them. Winston believes in a humanity based on instinct and the Party wants an obedient uniform population. *1984* is a struggle between two types of liberty and the humanity that flourishes under each.

If Winston is the last human being then humanity is disgusting, dirty, and diseased. O'Brien forces him to undress and "see [him]self as [he is]" (270). The descriptive language is foul: "ingrained dirt," "filthy yellowish rags," "grime," "skin peeling," "rotting," and "emaciation" (271-272). Winston does not recognize the man in the mirror. Winston does not believe the last man to be himself. The "horror" (271) Winston feels suggests he still believes that humanity should be clean, healthy, and strong, unlike his reflected figure.

This same horror, the belief that the Party simply cannot succeed because it should not, forces Winston to admit his faith in the "spirit of Man" (270). "Man" is capitalized, suggesting a broader meaning of humanity rather than an individual man. Berlin refers to this idea when he says the "real self" is "something larger than the individual" (204). The "real self" here simply refers to the part of the self attuned to a "higher nature" (204), something all people hold in common. Capitalization draws attention to the word, turning it into a title. Winston attempts to mark the word's importance with an emphasis that Orwell implies, rather than forces on the reader with an in depth explanation. This "spirit" becomes a more universal idea that is accessible to the reader. This is in contrast of the spirit of Man to Winston's tortured body. The Party uses Winston's damaged body to make its opinion of his ideas clear.

Before forcing Winston in front of the mirror, O'Brien makes a speech about the Party's eternal nature and ability to regulate and create as it pleases (266-268). Winston's outraged response is that the Party will not succeed. He says, "Life will defeat you" (269). "Life" is capitalized here because it starts a sentence, but it carries a similar insinuation as "Man." This suggests that "life" for Winston is key in opposition to

the Party. It is part of "life" and "human nature," part of freedom, to rebel against what the Party stands for, a crippling of free will and self-determination. Winston does not use "life" to simply mean the "act of living." He instead refers broadly to the acts that occur during life which give life value. Winston believes that "private loyalties" (164) and "love" are important motivations for living. Although not capitalized, private loyalties and love carry an import similar to that of the spirit of Man in that all of these extend beyond Winston to a wider human race. These tenets have slipped outside of Party control because they are innately common to all. These will stop the Party.

The Party's humans do not want free will or the ability to experience life separate from the Party experience. Having succumbed to Party dogma, can these people actually experience freedom? If the Party is successful, then no, they cannot. Those infatuated with Big Brother want freedom from free will. Berlin asks, "What is freedom to those who cannot make use of it?" (196). This is the Party's humanity, unable to appreciate freedom, in opposition to Winston's individual and self-defining concept of what it is to be human. O'Brien reminds Winston of the Party's control over Oceania's population, which is exerted by taught mental control techniques such as *doublethink* and *crimestop* (35). Winston believes that some portion of humanity will awaken to the Party's deeds and rise up, overthrowing It. He posits that it is human nature to do so. This fits with another of Berlin's statements that "there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated" (196). Winston is arguing that this desire for "personal freedom" still exists and people will act to reclaim it.

O'Brien counters with the fact that the Party "create[s] human nature," by use of *doublethink*, and in that creation "Humanity is the Party" (269). Since the Party controls humanity, humanity exists only within the Party to serve its functions. Winston is a flawed product in the Party because he refused the Party's domination, which leads to its attempts to remake him in its image. However, Winston has his own "human nature" and it demands rebellion against Party domination. He desires to fight oppression and create himself. Therefore, he is not the human product the Party desires. O'Brien goes further to suggest that humanity requires this control because humans are "helpless . . . animals" (269). Forcing Winston admit his dirtiness, his weakness, O'Brien strips him down to his basest primal nature. O'Brien is the perfect product of the Party. He represents its humanity. O'Brien tries to make Winston admit that Winston is a helpless animal and that he needs the Party. Winston must become like O'Brien a creation of the Party.

Winston's insistence on the "spirit of Man" implies independence from Party control, detached from the Party's image of humanity. However, Winston collapses and sobs after accepting the skeletal reflection as himself (273), suggesting that Winston is broken by the horror of his appearance and the reality of Party control. Winston's collapse means victory for the Party. The aberration has recognized the futility of his resistance. He is almost ready to be remade.

The Party's torture has destroyed Winston physically and tries to do the same to him mentally. Winston suggests that the mind, "the few cubic centimeters inside your skull" (27), is the last private place. The Party is obsessed with making its population believe it is always observed (5). In the Party's world everything becomes public. In

torturing Winston, O'Brien brings the intolerably dirty insanity of Winston's mind out into physical view so it cannot be ignored by Winston. The private space of Winston's mind becomes public and he can see his "disease," as conceived of by the Party. If this is so, then to a degree the "spirit of Man" may be broken. Yet Winston is not yet totally shattered, because he has not yet betrayed his lover, Julia (273). If the Party can change him, can make him betray Julia, It will have proved Its power and dominance. Winston's humanity is inferior, an animal reaction that can be eviscerated. This overpowering of Winston's concept of human nature fits with O'Brien's expressed sentiment that, "If you want to picture the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face – forever" (267). The Party's domination is the "boot" and Winston's spirit of Man is the "human face." The crushing will be eternal. There will be no recovery once the Party has won.

However, Winston is less interested in his physical decline than his unbetrayed love for Julia. The Party squashes the ability to form "private loyalties," feel "impulses" (164), and experience love emotionally and physically. This suggests that the spirit of Man for Winston is more emotional than physical. However, the Party rejects the human ability to feel anything other than what It deems appropriate and therefore denies Winston's version of humanity. Therefore, Winston's humanity is the fallacy of an insane man (296). The Party must destroy Winston's "real self" and replace it with Its own vision of self which is dedicated to the Party. He must be educated.

### ***Sentimental and Sexual Love***

"The terrible thing that the Party had done was to persuade you that mere impulses, mere feelings, were of no account, while at the same time robbing you of all power over the material world. When once you were in the grip of the

Party, what you felt or did not feel, what you did or refrained from doing, made literally no difference. Whatever happened to you vanished, and neither you nor your actions were ever heard of again. You were lifted clean out of the stream of history. And yet to the people of only two generations ago, this would not have seemed all-important, because they were not attempting to alter history. They were governed by private loyalties which they did not question. What mattered were individual relationships, and the completely helpless gesture, an embrace, a tear, a word spoken to a dying man, could have value in itself. The proles, it suddenly occurred to him, had remained in this condition. They were not loyal to a party or a country or an idea, they were loyal to one another. For the first time in his life he did not despise the proles ... The proles had stayed human." (Orwell 164-165)

In the face of the Party, in the face of coming time, a single, individual act can mean nothing. An individual act cannot affect history. However, whether that individual's actions carry major impact is not the point. The point is in why people love or share chocolate (163), in the moments people act on "mere impulse," in casual emotions, in "mutual trust," in sentimental moments when an individual acts instinctively and something of what Winston considers humanity shines through. In the past (the reader's present) acting on these instincts was considered normal. However, the Party seeks to repress these impulses by making them appear useless; by doing so, They curtail an individual's ability to live parts of the human experience as Winston views it, which is to live according to human nature and the spirit of Man.

Winston misses the ability to feel compelled by simple emotions, as opposed to Party interests. Such behaviors that would be natural to the peoples of "two generations ago" are unsafe now. Performing actions that cannot be explicitly explained away for the good of the Party is dangerous. He thinks of meaningless acts as that "have value in [themselves]" (165) as a thing of the past. Winston uses the word "mere" twice in reference to "impulses" and "feelings." Impulses imply an underlying

unconscious desire to act, an urge. A feeling may drive an impulse. It is taken for granted that people feel for, even those under Party control feel, they hate and fear (11). These are emotions the Party stokes with the Two Minute Hate (11) and Hate Week (56). "Mere" is not used to delineate that something is in fact small or insignificant, but to convey a personal meaning. However, despite personal importance, impulses and emotions matter little to the Party. Perhaps Winston uses "mere" in acknowledgement of that unimportance to the Party while admitting that impulses and emotions are truly potent to the individual. Nowhere does Winston describe hate as mere. Hate is a strong emotion, both privately and to the Party's scheme. The Party perverts the human capacity for emotion and replaces the sentimental reactions with hate, serving the Party's purpose. This is part of the Party's method for creating "humanity." Eventually all casual emotion will be eviscerated. No one will feel freely, rebellious human nature will be extinct, and Grossman's fear of uniformity will come to pass.

Sentimental or sexual love is unorthodox and useless to the Party. Hate, however is very useful. Julia thinks that the Party disallows sex because "When you make love you're using up energy; and afterwards you feel happy and don't give a damn for anything" (133). Julia goes so far as to suggest that depriving people of sex makes them "hysterical" and that hysteria is translated "into war fever and leadership worship" (133). The energy not used for sex is used for hate. "Making love," sex, is replaced by active hating, such as in the Two Minutes Hate or Hate Week. Hate takes the place of love.

The animal "impulse" of sexuality is separate from the "feeling" of love, but neither is supported by the Party. Winston's epiphany about the prole's humanity occurs while he is in the secret room with Julia above the antique shop (160).

Grossman connects the secret room to Winston's mother because both recall the past, or what Grossman refers to as the "Golden Country," paradise (57). His affair with a fellow Party member is reminiscent of a time when marriage was less about producing followers of Big Brother (67) and more about the "private loyalties" (164) between family members, which Winston identifies with his mother.

The private loyalty and love that Winston feels for his mother is the sexless, familial love a son feels for his mother. Unaware in his youth of the importance of loving for its own sake, he acted as a selfish, hungry child. He stole food from the meager plates of his dying sister and mother, threw tantrums (162), and took advantage of his mother's love. During Winston's childhood, the Party was not yet all-powerful. The instinctive loyalties and mutual trust tied to family life were not yet eradicated. In a vivid memory, presented as a dream, Winston stole chocolate from his sister and ran. His mother cradled his sister. "Something in the gesture told him that his sister was dying. He turned and fled down the stairs, with the chocolate growing sticky in his hands." Feeling shame, he returned to an empty apartment. He never saw his mother or sister again (163). In remembering this episode Winston uncovers the sentimental love that he felt for his mother and regrets that he did not appreciate her "nobility" or "purity" (164) while she was with him. The focus on the melting of the desired material, points out that the physical might not last. This connects the stolen chocolate to the intensely physical description of Winston's tortured disfigurement. However, the recovery of this event suggests that the imprint of maternal, instinctual love endures. If true, this undermines the conviction that the Party controls all aspects of humanity. Winston's memories have escaped being expunged and he still feels freely outside of Party goals.



The sentimental love of Winston's mother is transformed in his physical "desire" (126) for Julia. Winston's love is a connection between Winston's mother and Julia. This connection is similar to the relation between the word "love" and the phrase "making love." Our protagonist experiences a mental love for his mother, but the affection he expresses for Julia is physical. Love is the link between them although the expression of the emotion differs. An evolving understanding of love accommodates the addition to sex in Winston's relationship with Julia. Winston uses his physical and emotional love for Julia to undermine the Party. With two female targets, love takes on a femininity that must be discarded when it is transferred to Big Brother.

Goldstein could not relocate his love to Big Brother. Symbolically, Goldstein perpetrates the truest betrayal to the Party: he refuses to love Big Brother. An explanation for the moniker of "Big Brother" is not given, but it suggests a protective familial member. "Big" alludes to strong and "Brother" is obviously a farther usurpation of family bonds. Grossman suggests that "Behind Big Brother evidently lurks a very large father," pointing to the paternalistic nature of Oceania. However, Grossman also suggests that O'Brien acts maternally towards Winston and that "his warmth and protectiveness merely reflect the peculiar maternal power of Oceania/Big Brother" (Grossman's emphasis 54). If Big Brother can be perceived as maternal, then the transfer of Winston's familial love for his mother ought to be to Big Brother.

While torturing Winston, O'Brien says that Party scientists are working to "abolish the orgasm," eliminating sexual pleasure and love. Under its domination the only affection and bliss will come from loving Big Brother (Orwell 267). As O'Brien attempts to shepherd him back to "sanity," he must remove the sexual aspect from Winston's

love by forcing him to betray Julia. This disconnected love can then be used for the Party's good. The last line of the novel is "He loved Big Brother" (297). O'Brien succeeded. Love, Winston's rebellion against the Party, is twisted to serve that Party the familial love of Winston's mother is redirected towards "Big Brother." The Party indeed creates humanity (269) because It harnesses humanity's instinct to love, Winston's "spirit of Man" (170).

As part of this taming, the Party prefers sex to occur in a setting which It determines, one approved by a board and promoted for Its interests. Since a prole cannot become a Party member, the only way to perpetuate the Party is by members having families. Therefore, these mutual and private alliances, such as between Winston's mother and her children or what Winston and Julia share, are threatening because they step outside of Party approved families. If one is dominated by private loyalties it is difficult to be completely "orthodox" (135). Such loyalties question Party dogma and Its practices, such as *doublethink* and believing absolutely that Big Brother is always correct in every time and place.

The Party also attempts to allocate sexual energy to aid Big Brother. The words "orgasm" and "climax" are used to describe the rising frenzy during the Two Minutes Hate (15) and hate for Eurasia and Eastasia (180). Orwell describes part of Hate Week as "the great orgasm was quivering to its climax and the general hatred of Eurasia had boiled up into . . . delirium" (180). The language here is specifically sexual, suggesting that loathing provides an outlet for sexual energy but in a way the Party controls. Orwell uses "orgasm" and "climax" to suggest not only sexual energy but sexual pleasure, a physical sensation. The Party turns the ordinarily private act of intercourse into a public activity, blurring public and private boundaries. If there is a safe and orthodox way to

experience sexual pleasure then amorous relations like Winston and Julia's are discouraged.

### *Love's Relation to Private and Public*

"Private" refers to a personal, individual act; something beyond Party control, such as Winston's conceptions of love, both sexual and sentimental. In traditional thinking, public is linked to private, as opposite spheres. There are private and public interests, the private being the individual and the public being the Party. An individual is able to own objects and spaces and to have personal concerns. Berlin claims that "a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that of public authority" (196). The Party eliminates the private and forces all activities that the reader might think of as private into the public sphere.

Two pages into the novel the telescreen appears, with its purpose to constantly observe Inner and Outer Party members (3). Under perpetual watch, everything visible or audible is public, and there is little or no private space. This is achieved by using the telescreen as a Panopticon, which taps into the power of observation and the pleasure that Foucault notes in its operation. Winston thinks, "Nothing [is] your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull" (27). So constructed, the private does not exist in a physical form. No longer spatial, it is a mere idea as it can only exist in one's mind. In this way, only emotions, conceived of in the mind, may be private.

But if the Party controls the mind with taught mental techniques like *doublethink* and *crimestop* then is that space even private? Only in such cases where a member is unorthodox and no longer adheres to Party doctrine is privacy possible. Winston occupies this ambiguous space, Winston's understanding of the "spirit of Man,"

divergent from the Party's understanding of man, allows him privacy and demands he fight to remain individual within the Party. Even if everyone in Oceania is not under constant observation, that possibility exists and they must act as such. Winston mentions the need to minutely control facial contortions and wear proper expressions (5). The actual or imagined monitoring restricts behavior and forces people to act as if there is no private sphere, only the public. The threat of constant observation forces the population to enact Party ideals. Even if people are originally play-acting, eventually the play will become reality. After a lifetime of pretending, no one will be able to distinguish the lie from the truth.

### *Love and Betrayal*

If the Party can infiltrate a member's mind, like when It tortures Winston or teaches *doublethink*, then They can destroy the anomaly. They can break Winston and his ideas, obliterating his reasons for rebellion. Indeed, Winston and Julia agree that the Party cannot make them "betray" each other. It cannot force them to stop loving (166) or abandon their mutual trust. Betrayal is an exchange, a turning over or abandonment of an idea. To betray something or someone implies that it was important to an individual before the something or someone was discarded. Julia explains, "They can make you say anything -*anything*-but they can't make you believe it. They can't get inside you" (166). They cannot invade the sole private space left to the Party members of Oceania.

To betray is to revile fundamental beliefs that once defined a relationship or an individual. This would be a betrayal of Winston's hopes for humanity as well as his

personal relations. During the Two Minute Hate, an image of Goldstein appears and blasphemes against Big Brother. He claims that the Party, and its revolution, "betrayed" its original ideals for power (12). It is unclear if Goldstein actually uses this word or if Winston uses it in summary for the rebel leader's speech (11). Interestingly, this is the first use of the words "betrayed," "betray," or "betrayal" in the novel. Therefore, Winston may be considering this first instance when he uses betrayal in conversation with Julia (166). Betrayal then is tied to fundamental ideas of an action, such as the revolution of the Party or Winston's love for Julia.

In the Ministry of Love, everyone is made to confess, to betray, to give up their secrets and admit things that never happened (19). The Party can make a person say anything, but that does not make it true. The Party generally squashes unorthodox thinking by teaching its members to utilize *doublethink*, but if someone refuses to believe a lie then they cannot betray the truth.

Having emotions and refusing to denounce them is a true rebellion, or so Winston feels. The love that Winston and Julia proclaim is their truth, something they cannot betray, a "private loyalty." This becomes key to Winston's understanding of the concept of their humanity as something "beyond" them. In that privacy is something they personally understand as independent of the Party. Therefore the Party has no power over it. In theory, even if an agent of the Ministry of Love made them say they hated each other, they would still love one another. The word is separate from the act. This love is a "mere feeling" (165) and keeping the trust between Julia and Winston makes them more human. It proves that they, like the proles, can still have "impulses"

and hold onto "individual relationships" (165) instead of giving into the Party. The spirit of Man, and the sentiment it represents, live as long as their truth is unbroken.

However, Julia and Winston do betray each other. O'Brien announces that Julia "betrayed" Winston (259). She has fallen to the Party's desire to "create human nature" (269) and is remade. O'Brien uses "betrayed," echoing Winston and Julia's conversation in their secret room. The reader is made aware that O'Brien likely listened into their dialog and knows the importance, and nuances, of the term "betrayed" for Winston. O'Brien is conveying to Winston that he is alone, betrayed. There is no one to whom he can turn. What does it mean to love someone who has betrayed you? The Ministry of Love has changed Julia, gotten "inside" (166) her. She is no longer the woman Winston loves, yet he still loves her. Therefore, Winston's humanity is not yet defeated and neither is the spirit of Man. He is still able to fight the Party's attempts to "cure" him (253).

Foucault might suggest that the Party needs Winston's resistance to feel the pleasure of its power. Patai goes further and claims that Big Brother created Winston for this purpose. If this is true, then Winston is still a product of the Party, just in a separate function. This would undermine Winston's rebellion, making it a part of the system Winston seeks to defy. However, this does not make his struggle wholly meaningless, Orwell is still conveying something important about humanity and the terror of totalitarian governments.

Winston holds onto the truth of his humanity, his ability to love, till the last possible moment. However, that moment does come: when he is confronted by ravenous rats, he buckles and cries out, "Do it to Julia . . . I don't care what you do to

her. Tear her face off, strip her to the bones . . . " (286). Here is his violent betrayal of his found humanity and his movement towards the Party's ideal. "Tear" implies a physical damage. There must be a physical reciprocator of his mental betrayal in a threat to Julia's face; much as Winston's tortured and starved body parallels his inward sickness. The physical proof of Winston's weakness proved the Party's power and dominance over past "nobility," the ideal Winston fought for.

The oppression of the impulse to love is a calamity that forces the lovers to refute their own humanity—the same humanity that Winston claimed would stop the Party. Julia may have said that "They can make you say anything" but that does not mean They change you (166). When Julia and Winston meet after their releases, they confess their respective betrayals and admit that in the moment committing them, the words were true (292). In begging for the horror to be transferred to the other person, their love and trust died. They "don't feel the same towards the other person [Julia towards Winston and Winston towards Julia] any longer" (292). It is a triumph of the Party over Winston's "spirit of Man" (170). This is the Party's tactic.

In the Ministry of Love O'Brien tells Winston that only those who are truly "cured," who truly believe in the Party, are allowed to die (255). "Cured" suggests an illness, a need to be fixed, and the required attentions of others to do so. Using this word allows O'Brien to work himself into Winston's mind as a savior and suggest that all O'Brien does is for Winston's good.

What if O'Brien is lying about Julia betraying Winston? At that moment in time, Winston could not have known whether that was true or not, yet he believed it. This suggests either that he expected her betrayal or that he trusts O'Brien. Patai suggests

that Winston is O'Brien's "accomplice" because Winston tries to be a worthy opponent. Furthermore, she postulates that Winston is a willing player in "the game" and knows what the outcome will be (862-863). If this is the case, then Winston has always known that Julia would betray him. When betrayal is expected, he trusts O'Brien, a Party member who is torturing him, more than his lover. This could link back to Grossman's assertion of "maternal" and "protective" qualities. Throughout the novel, well before they actually communicate, Winston says that O'Brien is a man one can "talk to" (11), implying trust. This belief allows the Party to put Winston in a containable, personally solitary situation in order to reconstruct him for its aims. Perhaps he never trusted Julia in the same way—this leaves the question of their "truth," his love for Julia, open to debate. Perhaps Winston is unable to not believe O'Brien because of these conceptions. If Winston trusts O'Brien, his torturer and handler, as O'Brien turns out to be (238), more than Julia, then Winston's humanity proves frailer than the Party's humanity. This suggests that the population does need to be under Party control. The population will react to freedom and the feeling of freedom like frightened animals.

### *Unthinking Family and Sacrifice*

The humanity of Winston's mother is bound up in her ability to hold true to "mere emotions" and "private loyalties" (165). Until roughly half way through the novel, Winston thinks he killed his mother (160) because he forced his mother to make a choice, a "sacrifice" (30). Until he realizes that impulses are part of being human, he cannot understand that it was her decision, an exercise of her free will and humanity to protect him as she starved (162). Even before this epiphany, his mother's "sacrifice . . .



to a conception of loyalty that was private, unalterable" (30) is key to Winston's guilt-ridden memories of her death. He dreams of her and his child sister as sinking into darkness, dying for his sake (29). His mother did not make a calculated decision to starve so he might eat; she simply did it because he was her son whom she loved.

Unthinking sacrifice is also connected to Winston's conception of love and humanity. If experiencing humanity involves impulses and emotions, it also involves unconscious sacrifice. When Winston and Julia<sup>7</sup> say they will not betray each other (166), they are promising to sacrifice themselves for an idea, declaring that they cannot be changed and that their love is unalterable. The two promise the sacrifice of their lives, minds, and selves before betrayal of their love and humanity. Preserving these grander aspects of human nature, which will refuse command by the Party, are more important than their individual lives.

However, when those moments calling for sacrifice come, those moments of fear, of "despair" (285), neither is equal to upholding their promises of love. O'Brien makes it clear that the Party builds its understanding of power and control on failed regimes of the past (253). The Party has read how empires have fallen to private devotions. Therefore, all private adoration must become public.

### *Sanity and Self Certainty*

---

<sup>7</sup> I do not think that "love" means for Julia what it means for Winston. The Party could not destroy the cells of which its original society was built, but it could stop people from marrying for love or engaging in intercourse for pleasure. As such acts distract from the substitute sentimental love of Big Brother. These vestiges of family purpose are the only reason Julia is able to love. She is ten or fifteen years younger than Winston therefore the family structure and its experience of sentimental love may have changed since his day.

O'Brien does not want Winston to die a "martyr" for his cause (254). Before Winston can die he must be "sane," must come to believe the party and all that it stands for (255); including the "mere"ness of impulses which betrays Winston's concept of humanity. Having mental control and acting in a manner accepted as a societal norm is considered as sanity or acting in a sane manner. O'Brien seeks to make Winston "sane." This is defined by forced conformity, the "curing" of the mental disorder of unorthodoxy. Winston knows he is unorthodox, and himself describes it as "luna[cy]" (80). Writing in his diary, Winston "wondered, as he had many times wondered before, whether he was himself a lunatic. Perhaps a lunatic was simply a minority of one. . . . being a lunatic did not greatly trouble him; the horror was that he might also be wrong" (80). An insane view may be equally valid but because it is not widely held it is seen as wrong or unacceptable; the private may be valid, but it is wrong because it lacks public consensus. To O'Brien, sanity is conformity. He wants Winston to integrate back into the Party by using Their mental controls. Winston's insanity is caused by his recognition of inconsistencies in his work, his memory, and Party records. If Winston can stop seeing these disparities, he will no longer question the Party and be "cured."

By repressing his memories and mental impulses, Winston can, and in the end is, orthodox and "sane" by Party standards. By the end of the novel he loves Big Brother (297). Most of Winston's memories are of his mother and childhood. Towards the end of the novel he remembers a happy afternoon playing with his mother. His immediate reaction is to "push the picture out of his mind" as a "false memory," meaning that false memories were not a problem as long as he recognized them as bogus (296).

Orwell likely uses the term "sane" because his audience will consider the Party and its ideals insane. Perhaps by equating sanity to orthodoxy Orwell meant to make Winston's world all the more ridiculous and frightening, which is how Orwell's readers would consider the Party's infringements on the private, Winston's torture, and the world he inhabits. Since it is commonly accepted by Orwell's audience that people have rights to privacy, love, personal loyalties, and self, they would be shocked by the Party.

Winston considers "impulse" and its personal urges as part of being human. These are things that are no longer possible, as they are crushed out by the Party. When Winston uses the word "friend" to describe someone he corrects himself: "'friend' was not exactly the right word. You did not have friends nowadays, you had comrades . . ." (48). "Nowadays" implies that friendship, like love and private loyalty, is relegated to the past, the past which the reader inhabits as the present. Having friends is something that people in our current reality and world find normal. One could see friendship as an exercise in mutual trust. Not having a single friend is odd. In Winston's world the word "friend" has not simply been traded in for "comrade": the meanings are different. Borrowed from the Russian Communist revolution, "comrade" implies an active rejection of human relationships, favoring an imagined equality over private alliances. No one has a friend. Everyone has comrades. This supports the public love of Big Brother over private relationships.

Party members, both Inner and Outer, refer to one another as comrade, but the proles are simply proles, short for proletariat, the working man. Generally, proles are thought of as animals or little better, "natural inferiors who must be kept in subjection" by the Party and its members (71). The Party's world is constructed by levels of

perceived oppression and presumed freedom. The Inner Party has the most freedoms and controls the Outer Party and proles; the Outer Party is perceived to have greater independence than the proles because the Inner Party has the ability to determine humanity. The proles are animals because the Inner Party says so, and the Outer Party are humans for this same reason.

Finally broken by the Party, Winston has given up this drive. Winston can now be reconstructed for Party use, the public good. He has been "cured." He is "sane." In his sanity he reverts to a drone, the epitome of true orthodoxy. Big Brother is always right.

### *Proles and Passion*

When Winston realizes that the proles have in fact kept their humanity (165), his certainty that "if there is hope it lies in the proles" (69) is reified. It is the ability to love, to have families and truly experience them for their own sake rather than the Party's, that grants this humanity. Winston sees personal desire and striving for it as human. Losing that drive removes humanity. Recognizing the proles' drive, he sees himself as less human than peoples he recently thought of as beast-like. These pieces of inner humanity, though found in the proles, are attributed to Winston's mother (Hester 256) because of his memories of her.

Crick suggests that humanity is ascribed to the proles because "Orwell did not believe that poverty and class oppression . . . had dehumanised people completely. Rather these forces had created a genuine fellowship and fraternity in the common people . . ." (152). This supports Winston's realizations concerning the proles.

Only proles are allowed to be prostitutes (65). Since proles are largely considered inferior and animal, having sex with a prole for pleasure is a demeaning and demeaned act. Passion has no place in a society that allows only one sexual outlet in the form of its most defiled member. The various love affairs that Julia claims (125) undermine the class structures by bringing the animal act of sex for pleasure into the equation. If there exists one affair like Julia and Winston's then there may be others. This form of rebellion may be wide spread, but no one would know due to the Party's rhetoric and domination, which implies a crack in Party control. However, if Julia and Winston love each other, is their sexual relationship a rebellion against the class structure, against the beast-nature of the proles, or simply against Party rules? Does one really have more power than the other?

If their fight is against the Party's imposed class system, then they are attempting to alter the future, as opposed to "alter[ing] history," from its set course under Big Brother. *The book*<sup>8</sup> points out that, "there have always been three kinds of people in the world, the High, the Middle, and the Low" (184). The success of 1984's ruling groups is due to the fact that They admit that the High is going to stay in that position and do everything They can to do so (216). Splitting societies into high, middle, and lower class is not unusual. However different societies may create unique cultural barriers between each. Ignorance about the proles is what divides them from Party members. Since prostitutes only exist in this lowest class, Party members must sink to this level for sexual pleasure. This points to sexual love as unnecessary, dirty, and animal while making the Party appear the only option for maintaining humanity. This is part of the way in which the Party removes sexual love from the equation and replaces it with hate.

---

<sup>8</sup> A pamphlet supposedly written by Goldstein until O'Brien suggests that it was written by the Party (260).

If two Party members of equal standing can engage in pleasurable intercourse rather than resorting to prole prostitutes, then the need to demean oneself for coitus is eliminated. This does not change the Party on a large scale as Winston might want, but it does undermine Party considerations of physical passion.

This also does not really change the perceived nature of the proles, except to admit the fact that animalistic aspects such as sex are common to all persons that are unrepressed by, or escape from, Party dogma. The proles are not animals but are just as human as any of Orwell's readers. This implies hope for Winston's humanity because the proles are proof that freedom still exists. Winston may argue that proles are more human because proles are able to act on impulse freely. The sex drive is an "animal impulse" only because it can be engaged in without thought, as two bodies reacting. However, if Winston sees these impulses as a key to humanity, then perhaps the proles are more human than the other classes because Winston seeks to regain his humanity through the act of sex.

If the Party forbids sex between its members, then Julia and Winston are certainly and simply breaking its rules. Breaking them in this manner implies the importance of the Party's purpose in attempting to end amorous sexual relations and the relationship between sex and Winston's humanity. The writing in Winston's diary with which the novel opens is also an act of rebellion (7). The Party casts passionate relations as a lower class phenomenon even as Winston elevates it to a staple of humanity.

If enough people can relearn and remember these desires, then humanity can be salvaged and the Party's oppression overthrown. However, this theory is not proven within the novel. Winston is ultimately broken and, since he is the protagonist, the

reader is not allowed to see a triumph over the Party. Before having sex with Julia for the first time, Winston thinks, "Not merely love of one person, but the animal instinct, the simple undifferentiated desire: that was the force that would tear the Party to pieces" (126). "Desire" suggests a physical reaction to emotion, bridging sentimental love and love making. The impulse to consummate, to form a private relationship is what will destroy the Party. Desire must thus be removed for the good of Big Brother.

The existence of *doublethink* leaves open the possibility that all Party members could have, at some point, had these same realizations and forgotten them as a defense mechanism and in deference to Party dogma. Winston is constantly worrying about the past and its existence (7). His job at the Ministry of Truth is to modify past documents to align with current Party activity. He creates a reality wherein the Party is eternally right (40).

In a society that is constantly updating its history, the past, the reality of "two generations ago" (165) exists only in memory. The Party teaches various techniques to its members in order to protect them from inconsistencies. Even if Winston is convinced that human traits have been lost with the rise of the Party, no one within the Party will readily remember them. This lack of memory secures Big Brother's authority. No one will know to even question Him. By failing to practice *doublethink* Winston has betrayed Big Brother. O'Brien aims to force Winston into seeing his utter aloneness. He is betrayed by Julia, who may not have understood the truth of love as Winston did. However, there is no one in the practicing Party who will ever understand for more than a second what Winston thinks he has learned.

If the Party finds love and passion to be against its interests then *doublethink* can be used to reinforce the idea that no other family structure ever existed. There was

never a time in history where people married for other than Party interests. Only the proles do so, and the proles are animals. If Winston was "sane" (253) then he would not even have considered love for anyone but Big Brother.

### *Conclusion*

Even though Winston breaks, the implications of his ideals and actions are still valid. His understanding of relations, and the emotions that impel them, are anything but "mere" (165). To Winston, these "impulses" (165) are part of what makes an individual human. The Party seeks to suppress these urges to better control the mind of an individual and harness their energy (133) for Oceania. They refuse Winston's ability to love outside of Party interests. By doing so, the government limits Winston's ability to experience humanity (though ways like love for his mother and Julia) as he wishes to, thus restricting his growth, identity, and ultimately his life. Winston's sentimental love and physical desire are rebuked by the Party. He is not allowed to successfully maintain his love. The only way Winston is allowed to love, to be human, is under Party doctrine: namely, to love Big Brother (297).



## Perverted Societies

### ***Setting the Stage***

In the previous chapter I introduce sex as a control mechanism. Using Ursula Le Guin, I explore gender through its function in Le Guin's *The Left Hand of Darkness*. My conclusion is that ultimately, this novel displays an inability to escape gender because of gender dynamics inherent in English, even though Le Guin sets this out as her mission (Gender Redux 14). This suggests the subtle and inescapable nature of the control that gender exercises on the reader's life, similarly to how the Party insinuates its domination.

Aware of the separation and discrimination between genders and sexes, Le Guin wrote *Left Hand* as a "thought-experiment" (Gender Redux 9). Le Guin suggests that:

One can send an imaginary, but conventional, indeed rather a stuffy, young man from Earth into an imaginary culture which is totally free of sex roles because there is no, absolutely no, physiological sex distinction. I eliminated gender; to find out what was left. Whatever was left would be, presumably, simply human.

It would define the area that is shared by men and women alike. (10)

Le Guin created an androgynous society by removing overt gender to determine if there are really any differences, other than conditioned ones, between men and women (9-10). Judging by her process, in which she creates a race which spends most of its time androgynous, she refers to gender first as a physical aspect. Remember that, traditionally, gender derives from the physical sex of an individual. In eliminating the

corporeal sex, she wanted to find the common ground, the equality, alluded to be the concept of androgyny.

Pamela Annas suggests that female science fiction writers use “androgyny as a metaphor,” attempting to overcome “contradictions” such as gender or sex inequality. Annas sees the shift from “sexual polarization to androgyny” in feminist literature to be evidence of a desire to move from “dualism to a dialectical synthesis” (146). The “dialectical synthesis” refers to settling an argument by conversation. A “synthesis” is a combining of separate entities to create something new, such as combining the male and female in the androgynous. Androgyny becomes a mechanism by which feminist writers can engage in the conversation about the divide between male and female then play with the solution of mixing the two. Humanity is considered a duality because it is commonly divided into the dual sexes, and gender as it ideally aligns with sex, of male and female. Le Guin’s use of androgynous implies the “potential” (*Left Hand* 94) of Gethen’s to be both male and female.

Until Genly’s appearance on Gethen, the concept of gender was irrelevant to Gethen society. People were sexed for a few days out of the month. During this time, Gethenian’s “perform” gender. The rest of the month there is no typically performed gender. Candace Zimmerman and Don West explore the concept of “doing” or performing, gender. They point out in *Doing Gender* that gendered behavior is performed constantly and the expectations concerning the performance in a given circumstance are normally determined by one’s sex categorization. People should be able to look at someone and put them in one of two categories, male or female (129-131). However, there was no gender to perform on Gethen, androgyny was the rule.

And perverts, those in permanent kemmer were the sexual exception. Zimmerman and West assert that gender performance is supposed to align with sex. However, there is no socially acceptable way for perverts on Gethen to perform a gender because gender is an alien concept. This would create a sense of cognitive estrangement for the reader who may find it difficult to wrap his or her head around the fact that there is no “his or her” on Gethen.

Le Guin also raises the question of duality. Here I find Simone de Beauvoir’s conception of the Other helpful. She states that “Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought” (676). People construct themselves in relation to others (677). The Other can be “strangers” to a small, tight-knit village. Or Other could speak to the way in which “Jews are ‘different’ for the anti-Semite, Negroes are ‘inferior’ for American racists, . . . proletariats are the ‘lower class’ for the privileged” (676). These are some of Beauvoir’s examples of the Other: anything strange, “different,” anything not “myself.” Essentially, this relationship sets up a hierarchical power structure in which *Myself* is privileged over the Other.

Beauvoir then applies this concept of the Other, to women. She begins her argument in language, saying that the “man represents both the positive and the neutral” and man “designates human beings in general”; “whereas woman represents only the negative” within the English language (675). From here, Beauvoir claims the man establishes himself as the Subject, the One, which acts on his Other, his object, the woman (676). Annas suggests that Le Guin uses androgyny to explore various dimension of the “I-Other duality” (150).

This also distances Genly from Gethen culture. Maria Lugones' concept of "world traveling" addresses Genly's need to overcome his prejudices. Lugones writes about the need of women from different classes and races to unite and attempt understanding of each other, to love one another by visiting each other's "worlds". Lugones uses the term "world" to describe a society or part of a society (153). It is a space constructed and inhabited by a woman, touching on the various aspects of her life. Lugones suggests that a Caucasian woman inhabits a different world than a Hispanic or lesbian woman; she may travel between different "worlds" or cultures on a daily basis (153-154). If women can accept other women by experiencing their worlds, and in this way grow to love, understand, and accept them, then women can be unified, crossing race and class barriers.

***Androgyny: Alliance of the One and the Other***

"Light is the left hand of darkness  
and darkness the right hand of light.  
Two are one, life and death, lying  
Together like lovers in kemmer,  
like hands joined together,  
like the end and the way."  
(Tormer's Lay recited by Estraven 233)

Ursula Le Guin's populates *Left Hand Of Darkness* with a mostly "human" race; meaning they are similar to what the reader regards as human, themselves; the caveat being that two to five days out of the month these androgynous beings take on either a male or a female sex. "Androgynous" is the word Le Guin uses to describe the sexual

state of Gethenians in her introduction to *Left Hand* (xv). "Androgyn" is a combination of "andro," meaning man, and "gyn," meaning woman. "Feminists believe that the concept of androgyny offers us a means of transcending the duality of gender differences imposed by culture" (Krishnaraj WS11). This would fit with Genly's assertion that Gethenians are "as obsessed with wholeness as we [a sexed population like the reader's] are with dualism" (233). Le Guin fashions a race which is a combination of male and female attributes and has the potential to take on either sex, she attempts to create these "whole" beings in a critique of the division between male and female which is present in the reader's society.

The poem recited by Estraven, the Gethen narrator who comes to be friends with Genly, plays to this unity: "Light is the left hand of darkness/ and darkness the right hand of light" (233). This suggests that darkness and light, normally posed a duality are actually a unity. Whereas dark and light might be two *different* sides of a coin, Gethenians focus on the fact that it is the *same* coin, not the difference in the sides. The Gethenian interest in unity is a reflection of Le Guin's concern about division. However, Estraven suggests that Gethenians are still dualists because "there is *myself* and *the other*" (Le Guin's emphasis 233). Le Guin likely uses Estraven's "*myself* and *the other*" to refer to ideas such as Beauvoir. Of course Estraven would not immediately connect the Other to an opposing sex because until Genly arrived, there were no constantly sexed or gendered beings. The Other was a political term, referring to an opposing people, like Orgota.

Genly replies, "I and Thou. . . . Yes, it does, after all go even wider than sex" (233). However, by saying this, Genly brings sex back into the equation, implying

Beauvoir's use of the woman as the Other and man as the One. He emphasizes that sex is a hierarchy.

This structure, based on dividing male and female, is hierarchical. In a patriarchal society this power dynamic generally favors the man over the woman. As woman tries to reinvent the hierarchy, perhaps attempting to earn as much or more income than her husband or demand that he participates equally in domestic activities, she struggles against cultural norms. Androgyny might be presented as a way for male and female to balance and accept the better traits of both, a "completing" or unifying (Krishnaraj WS11).

#### *Explaining Kemmer: Performing Gender on Gethen*

Entering kemmer, individuals undergo a hormonal transformation in response to someone else's transformation as they enter kemmer at the same time. "When the individual finds a partner in kemmer, hormonal secretion is further stimulated . . . until one partner becomes male or female . . . genitals engorge or shrink accordingly . . . and the partner, triggered by the change, takes on the other sexual role" (90). A person can be male one cycle and female the next. "No physiological habit is established, and the mother of several children may be the father of several more" (91). There is no need for a gendered role, only a sexual one. An Investigator stresses that, ". . . you cannot think of a Gethenian as 'it.' They are not neuters they are potentials, or integrals" (94). The "potential" to be both a man and a woman and neither is difficult for the people of a society so based on gender, as the reader's, is immense. This allows Le Guin to address certain questions about gender in the reader's society and stretch the

possibilities. Le Guin removes gender from the game, and creates a space for the concept of androgyny to take on a physical form

*A Space for Sex: Creating Cognitive Dissonance*

Further, by the observations of one of the Ekumen's Investigators, "The structure of their societies, the management of their industry . . . the size of their settlements, the subjects of their stories, everything is shaped to fit the somer-kemmer cycle,"<sup>9</sup> so the majority of society is based around the potential phase. Yet, "[e]veryone has his holiday once a month . . ." no one works during kemmer (93). When the period of gendering and sexual drive occurs, society provides "plenty of room: but a room, as it were, apart" (93). Though space is granted, open sexuality is not the norm and is accepted only during the short period of kemmer. Further, it suggests that sex is dirty, and that while giving into this natural desire is acceptable, the rest of society should be separated and sterilized; which is why anyone who is constantly sexed is "disgusting" (36), a "pervert" (36).

The reaction that Gethenians have to gendered and sexed peoples is what sections of the reader's society might feel towards anyone divergent from the heterosexual norm: bisexual, gay, lesbian, or transgender. Genly notes that perverts, those in permanent kemmer on Gethen, are "tolerated with some disdain, as homosexuals are in many bisexual societies" (63). Through Genly, Le Guin draws this comparison herself. Lewis Call refers to Darko Suvin's concept of "cognitive estrangement" and rightly claims that "The function of such passages is to confront the

---

<sup>9</sup> There are different stages in kemmer, the one referred to as somer-kemmer is the period of the month when one is sexually inactive.

reader with a system of values and standards that is radically Other” (94). Considering this similarity between the reader’s and the Gethenian society, to be afraid of gendered or sexual oddities, Le Guin forces a dissonance between Gethen and the reader’s societies. This creates an uncanny feeling in the text because the reader recognizes the societal response to sexual and gender “freaks.” The reader is distanced from the society within the text and forced closer to the narrator of Genly, who is experiencing Gethenian society as the oddity.

Le Guin chooses words like “disgusting” and “pervert” to alienate the reader from the Gethenians. This reminds the reader that he or she is the Other to Gethenians, placing the reader in the object role. Yet she provides a “normal person” in the similar sexual state as a likely reader for the audience to further experience this distancing. The reader is constantly reminded that all of the dialogue takes place in Gethen, not English so the narrative is a translation. For example, when speaking about a woman from Chime<sup>10</sup>, the narrator “had to use the word that Gethenians would apply only to a person in the culminant phase of kemmer, the alternative being their word for a female animal” (36). Therefore it is up to Le Guin to provide the narrator with a sufficient vocabulary.

For example the word “pervert” in most “real” societies, that is societies outside *Left Hand* that the reader might inhabit, “pervert” is not a term looked on kindly. It implies an inappropriate sexual promiscuity which likely infringes on others. The pervert might be overly interested in sexuality or not have his or her sexuality under control. The use of this word fits well with the Gethen understanding of Genly or the reader who is stuck in “permanent” kemmer (36). The reader must assume that this word

---

<sup>10</sup> One of several alien worlds Le Guin creates.



encompasses, as much as possible, the connotations of the substituted Gethen word. So not only is the audience removed because of disgust by the texts' inhabitants, but also because the reader must rely on the knowledge of the narrator to provide a close translation.

### *The Power of Language: Inescapable Gendering*

If Le Guin's translation is imperfect it is because of the language she is forced to use. As Beauvoir points out our language constructs "man" as the "positive" and "neutral" "Subject" whereas "woman" is the "negative" and "Other" (675-676). As narrator Genly catches himself "having said *he* and *his*" (*Left Hand* 5). Coming from a sexed and gendered society, Genly cannot think of these active beings as passive Objects. Or perhaps he must see the androgynous Gethenians as masculine to treat them as equal Subjects, to deal with them as people. However, he does ascribe certain feminine characteristics to physical attributes like his "landlady." "He [the landlady] was so feminine in looks and manner that I once asked him how many children he had" (48). Accustomed to societies with two sexes and genders, Genly finds himself reading certain expectations of male or female into Gethenian characters. Even as Genly asks his landlady, "how many children he had" Genly uses "he" to describe a being Genly considers feminine rather than "she." Genly then seeks to find a reason for this perceived femininity. The only truly feminine acts a Gethen might engage in are pregnancy and birth. During pregnancy the body adjusts and remains female until the baby is born and the temporary female lactates for six to eight months (91). It seems obvious to Genly that such an "innately" feminine figure should be a mother. The

landlady's answer is that "He had never born any. He had, however, sired four" (48). Genly was wrong, the landlady had never born a baby, never experienced a prolonged female state. Any feminine attributes were only in Genly's mind.

Notice that Genly uses the feminine "landlady" rather than the masculine "landlord." This is an example of how Genly's desire to see gender affects his use of language. Just as Genly cannot help but see the feminine in his landlady, Le Guin could not escape the sexing of English. In her short piece "Is Gender Necessary? Redux" which was published in *Dancing at the Edge of the World*, Le Guin admits that "the Gethenians seem like *men*, instead of menwomen" (14). She believes part of this masculinizing of her androgynous characters occurred because she "refus[ed] to mangle English by inventing a pronoun for 'he/she'." However, she wishes that she had used "they/them/their" more frequently as an attempt to avoid "he/his" (15). This is present in her redux of this article because in a couple places she asks that the reader replace "he" with "they" (12). Also, she believes that Estraven seems masculine because of he plays "almost exclusively in roles that we are culturally conditioned to perceive as 'male'—a prime minster . . . , a political schemer, a fugitive, a prison breaker, a sledge hauler." Le Guin admits that these roles suggest Estraven's masculinity to the reader, rather than allowing the reader to see Estraven as a mother or in some role that the reader would consider feminizing (15). Though in a screenplay and later readings of *Left Hand* she uses a/un/a's for Gethenians not pregnant or in kemmer (15). This is similar to Piercy's use of "person/per" in *Woman on the Edge of Time* (Annas 154). Authors must modify conversational English to create an androgynous society. This points to the restrictive nature of the sexes as it is rooted in English. How

can people readily think as androgynies if there is no way to do so in the linguistic route of sexed and gendered language?

Call suggests that Le Guin had “no clear alternatives” other than masculine pronouns for Gethenians because of the language she wrote in. Further that “if the audience perceives the activities of Prime Minister Estraven as ‘male,’ that says more about the audience than it does about Estraven” (95). If a prime minister, schemer, or sledge hauler are masculine roles, this says more about the reader’s conception of masculinity and its performance than about Le Guin’s writing. Similarly to Le Guin’s inability to escape the masculine and feminine dynamics in language, the reader is unable to read *Left Hand* without seeing gender in androgynous beings. Even if Le Guin succeeds in representing an androgynous society, the reader cannot fully wrap his or her mind around the fact that their gendered selves have no place in the narrative except as aliens.

Le Guin provides layers of distance between the reader and the text by way of using mostly genderless characters and reminding the reader that the story takes place in an alien language, on an alien planet. For what purpose? Le Guin attempts to emulate the holes society creates between genders and the societal realities of male and female. Along with the gulfs between social expectations and the desires of the individual, there is a displacement of anyone that does not fit into the defined categories of man and woman. Zimmerman and West stress that, normatively, gender should align with one’s sex and that “gender activities emerge from and bolster claims to membership in a sex category [male or female]” (127). Anne Fausto-Sterling asserts that the two-sex system is so deeply engrained in Western culture that she had to

“invent conventions- *s/he* and *his/her*- to denote someone who is clearly neither male nor female” (24). Even as Le Guin toys with androgyny and equality of genders and sexes, she still returns to the male and female. She is faced with a structure which resists her tool. Presenting her thought experiment as a novel, her experiment is primarily linguistic and she must cope with a language inherently divided into two genders. She does not create a new sexuality on Gethen to address this shortcoming of English. Kemmer produces male and female sexes, not some third ambiguous form. This may, once again be a simple restriction of language: how can someone describe a third sex that does not exist in language that denies the possibility?

*Thought Experiments: Looking for an Answer*

Le Guin plays with sexual inequalities of the reader's world within the text. One of the Investigators posits that because everyone might be mother or father to a child, no one is as “‘tied down’ here as women, elsewhere, are likely to be – psychologically or physically. Burden and privilege are shared equally . . . Therefore nobody here is quite so free as a free male anywhere else” (93). Here Le Guin implies that the “*shar[ing]*” of the “burden” assists equality. This is a common tenet of modern feminism: that if the man in a heterosexual relationship assists the female in her traditional “duties” then gender equality can be reached.

Pat Mainari wrote a piece which considers arguments that she has with her husband over sharing tasks normally applied to women, such as housework. She suggests that the man believes these chores to be inferior, that he has “historical, psychological, anthropological, and biological justification for keeping you [the woman,

the wife] down" (2). Mainari implies that the stigma of household work as woman's work is based on the fact that men simply do not want to do it, the task is considered inferior. Therefore the woman performing that task is inferior. This piece was published in 1969, the same year as *Left Hand*. It makes sense that similar concerns would be present though addressed in different ways. Mainari's attempts to share housework are similar to the "balancing" that Le Guin alludes to ("Is Gender Necessary?" 11). Both ask for an equality between male and female by a removal of gender stereotypes and sex distinction.

### *Equality and Humanity in Gender*

There is a scene where Genly is trying to explain the differences between a man and a woman, and Estraven asks, "Equality is not the general rule, then? Are they mentally inferior?"(234). This suggests that Estraven feels that equality is based on comparable intelligence, or sentience. Perhaps this is why Genly is so confusing to Gethenians: he is obviously competent and there is physical proof that he is an alien (13) therefore he is not insane. Yet, King Agraven tells Genly, "you're not human" (33). He is not "human" in the sense of Gethen biology. He is alien in that respect. So, Genly is human by his intelligence yet "not human" by his biology. This leaves him in a vacillating space. The Gethenian governments grant him rights because of his emissary status. The pervers, Gethenians in permanent kemmer, are "tolerated with some disdain" and called "*halfdeads*" (Le Guin's emphasis 63). In response to Estraven's question, Genly says no but that "women are more alien to me than you are. With you I share one sex, anyhow." This implies the depth of the gender divide within

the Ekumen. How can an organization, like the Ekumen claim to bring societies together as “mankind” (16) when the worlds within it are still so deeply divided?

Annas suggests that Genly cannot “judge them [Gethenians] as human beings without first defining them as men or women”; whereas Gethen’s inhabitants consider him “without sex based preconceptions. They judge him solely as a human being” (151). This implies that, to Genly, gender must align with sex for an individual to be human. Within this concept are undertones of heteronormativity. If sex coordinates gender, then female and male are attracted, always. Same-sex couples are unlikely because they do not fit the two-gender model. Gender and sex definition become integral to sexuality<sup>11</sup>. This is an interesting inversion of Mary Wollstonecraft’s suggestion that men see “females rather as women than human creatures” (40). Gender and sex come first before personhood, which men and women hold in common. The ability of men to see “females” (presented here as the biological state) as women (the gendering brought on by societal pressure) rather than “human creatures” plays into the understanding the women as objects. They are not even human. Womanhood is separated from humanity.

If humanity and gender can be independent then Genly’s inability to see Gethens as human without gender is even more intriguing. If Gethen’s are ungendered, then Genly is free to attach gender as he pleases to them, until he does so they are not human. Whereas Wollstonecraft’s woman is inhuman because of her gender, her sexuality takes priority over her common humanity. Genly is scared of the possibility that Gethens cannot be fit into a man or woman category. Genly’s heterosexual life has not prepared him for dealing with beings living in the harmony of androgyny. Perhaps

---

<sup>11</sup> Here I refer to the act of having sex rather than the possession of a physical sex.

this fear is why Genly uses the male pronouns “he” and “his” and is so eager to ascribe Gethen’s the subject, active gender of man.

Is this gendering necessary to the Gethenian understanding of humanity? No, because the only Gethen narrator sees humanity as a matter of intelligence. However, gender seems to be crucial to Le Guin because she does not create a third gender, or a sexless, genderless form of reproduction. She ungenders Gethens for most of the month only to gender and sex them later. As the need for sexuality is tied to humanity, so is gender linked to performance in the sex act. Does Le Guin return Gethen’s to heterosexually gendered couples as a statement of gender’s import to human nature, or because it did not occur to her to totally rewrite human sexuality?

After Estraven rescue’s Genly from the Voluntary Farm, they spend weeks on the ice. Estraven enters kemmer and, responding to Genly’s constant masculine sex, becomes a woman. Genly is then finally confronts his fear of the androgynous being, that is neither man nor woman and cannot be easily fit into a sex category.

And I then saw . . . what I had always been afraid to see, and pretended not to see in him: that he was a woman as well as a man. . . . what I was left with was, at last, acceptance of him as he was. Until then I had rejected him, refused him his own reality. . . . I had not wanted to give my trust, my friendship to a man who was woman, a woman who was a man. (*Left Hand* 248-249)

Genly finally learns to accept that Estraven is both a man and a woman, learns that this is also human. It was this inability to accept that kept Genly from fully trusting Estraven, even as Estraven was the “only one who had entirely accepted me as a human being” (248). Perhaps Estraven can recognize Genly as human because he has experienced

both sexes. Until Genly can accept this possibility, the ability of a person to be both man and woman, he overlays Gethenians with gender. After this point, the exercise of gendering becomes unnecessary. He can allow androgyny to be “real” because he can no longer deny it, is no longer scared of it. Thus Genly overcomes his fear of the Other.

In the end, Genly is offset by the “troupe of great, strange animals, of two different species; great apes with intelligent eyes” which join him as fellow Envoy’s of the Ekumen (296). Sexed people are now alien to him. After accepting Gethen androgyny, living within it for so long, his own kind are shocking. He sees the women and men as “animals” rather than people. Perhaps he sees them arrival as the Gethen’s saw him. Maybe he has now successfully preformed what Lugones refers to as “‘world’ traveling” (152).

This is exactly what Le Guin forces Genly to do. He must literally travel to another world and learn to accept the “world” of its inhabitants. He overcomes his fear and becomes “playful”<sup>12</sup> in the androgynous world. If he can overcome the need to permanently sort gender and sex in only one of two categories then perhaps so can the reader. However, a temporary gendering and sexing is necessary for the survival of a race: to reproduce, Gethens couple with their opposite sex. Therefore, gender and sex cannot be refused utterly, without them humanity would become extinct. For the reader, this implies that women can be recognized as human beings beyond their gender. The human component then becomes of primary importance to gender.

### ***Not a Utopia***

#### *Struggle for Dominance*

---

<sup>12</sup> Lugones uses this term to describe a person’s ability to interact and move through a “world” (152-153).



Despite the utopian undertones some feminist writers give androgyny, Le Guin does not present the androgynous society as a utopia. There are still power issues which might lead to war. Le Guin sets the novel at a time when Orgota is “on the verge of achieving the world’s first war” (*Gender Redux* 11). One of the issues Le Guin targets is that “Men have reserved the structures of social power for themselves” (12). When Le Guin poses the question “Is the book a Utopia?” she replies “no” because she does not have a practical solution to the issues of the gender inequality she investigates. She simply suggests that an androgynous, a united, an equal society would search for “balance and integration” rather than “struggle for dominance” as we do today (16).

Therefore, she allows Orgota to tip this balance. Her androgynous society is not infallible. Orgota becomes nationalizes everything, all belongs to the state (*Left Hand* 115). This could be an extension of unity, with no divisions between individuals. However, Genly observes, “All start equal. But obviously they don’t go on so” (115). A desire for power and domination is slinking into Gethen. Equality is no longer the rule to the degree that the government can repress kemmer. The potential for sex, gender, and sexuality is removed. This is an exertion of repression by a government over its people.

Orgota then begins to act as a bureaucratic authoritarian government rather than the freer Hearth-driven monarchy of Karhide. Le Guin laments that she “took the easy way in using such familiar governmental structures as a feudal monarchy and a modern-style bureaucracy,” because she doubts that a true Gethen government rising out of the hearth system would resemble these (*Gender Redux* 14). However, the fact

is that she did use these systems and the reader can relate the actions of Orgota to modern systems. I claim that Orgota is an authoritarian structure because it has developed the Sarf, part of the Permanent Bureau of Internal Administration, to censor the radio and therefore control the public and its knowledge (*Left Hand* 142-143).

This plays into the power dynamic created by Foucault's Panopticon. Yet there is a suggestion of communism because the state employs all citizens (118). These are both features of governments in recent history. For me, this is reminiscent of the Russian Stalinist regime because of its repression and censorship and nationalistic tendencies, which Orwell also touches on.

This movement of Orgota from the looser government of Karhide to an orderly bureaucracy comes with a loss of liberty. The radios are censored and people sent away to Voluntary camps for various reasons. They might be "mental or social defects" (170), have gotten into trouble with an overseer (171), or be deemed a political danger like Genly.

Genly observes that:

Prisoners who had been there for several years were psychologically and I believe to some extent physically adapted to this chemical castration. They were as sexless as steers. They were without shame and without desire, like the angels. But it is not human to be without shame and without desire. . . . This was the first case I had seen of the social purpose running counter to the sexual drive. Being a suppression, but something more ominous, perhaps, in the long run: passivity. (*Left Hand* 177)

The government of Orgoreyn administers kemmer represents to its prisoners at the Voluntary Farm in the Pulefen Commensality. Genly presents a rational explanation for the suppression: a single Gethen in kemmer without a partner would become disruptive (177). However, the willingness to repress the sexuality of a population points to the disregard that those in power hold towards a populace they are supposed to be governing. The narrator here, Genly Ai, senses “something more ominous” in this behavior.

One could see this castration as parallel to the manner of Le Guin’s experiment. Le Guin writes a largely genderless and sexless people. The Orgoreyn government chemically removes sex and gender. The difference being that Le Guin allows a potential for gender, sex, and sexuality, whereas Orgota severs the possibility of kemmer. It is this removal of potential which is disquieting; since the ability to copulate, to act on gender and sex ties to humanity. Therefore, the effacement of this ability dehumanizes the drugged.

### *Shame, Desire, and Humanity*

Genly suggests that part of being human is the “shame and . . . desire” that has been taken from the Pulefen workers. If the drug, which represses kemmer, gendering and sexuality, also takes this necessary “desire” and “shame,” then this drugging is not only an abuse but a refusal of the worker’s right to human experience. Michael Warner suggests that sex is inherently linked to shame and that normative, heterosexual behavior is enforced by shaming (1). Through this, sex and sexuality become tied to shame. Though there are no genders or sexes on Gethen, Warner’s basic premise,

that sex and shame are linked is important here. Genly comes from a heterosexual society and would be aware of sexual shaming that comes in reinforcing norms. He observes that “it is not human to be without shame and without desire” (177). In Genly’s mind the concept of shame is so deeply attached to sex that one cannot be human without this shame and desire. This reinforces Annas’ idea that Genly cannot consider the Gethens human without first ascribing a sexuality (Annas 151). The shameless state of the drugged Gethens seems inhuman because they lack shame and sexual desire, which leads to gendering. Therefore, shame and desire are linked to sexuality and humanity. To oppress kemmer is to refute the humanity of the individual. Le Guin asserts in a revision: “When Gethenians have to make love, they do make love, and everybody expects it and approves of it” (Gender Redux13). There is no shame present in Gethen kemmer norms. However, Genly cannot help but attach it.

Kemmer is a “festivity of passion” (*Left Hand* 93); when Gethen’s experience the sexual drive it “dominates him absolutely” (Gender Redux 12). Le Guin suggests that sexual desire is nonexistent during most of the month for Gethens, but during that short festival sexual desire should not be repressed. It is the only time when Gethens can become man or woman, can conceive or spawn life. By creating the concept of kemmer, Le Guin pins down sexual freedom to a moment, a moment which can be controlled more readily than the reader’s lifetime of sexual impulses.

The Orgoreyn government’s willingness to forcibly repress kemmer is unsettling because it suggests that a government would take away part of its people’s humanity: in this case, their sexual freedom. This could be a response to Mill’s assertion that government is inherently male, patriarchal, because men have historically run these

governments. Mills also calls on the patriarchy's ability to subjugate and control as an example of its masculine qualities. If this is the case, then Orgota is becoming more masculine as it seeks greater control over its population. This points to Le Guin's reasons for writing Orgota at this moment readying for war: to assert the delicate balance struck in androgyny or unity.

Le Guin may also be suggesting that gender is not the only issue. If Orgota can seek dominance even without gender and sex polarities, then it is an inherently human desire to subjugate. Perhaps this returns to Foucault's "*perpetual spirals of and pleasure*" (45) in that the desire to control gives pleasure, and Foucault suggests that humans will always seek out pleasure.

### *Loss of Potential*

Further terrifying is Genly's suspicion that continued drugging leads to "passivity" (177). This passivity links to the loss of potential because both dismiss actions, either rebellious or sexual. An implication of this connection to drugging and docility is that sexuality provides a ground for vitality, self awareness, and a desire to keep that self liberated. Wollstonecraft asserts that women have been so long subjugated that they are now "weak" and "helpless" (42-43). This fits with Zimmerman and West's argument that gender comes from constantly performing a role (127), if a woman performs that passive role in society for long enough she will believe herself to be helpless. Genly's concern with passivity suggests that these prisoners, now de-sexed and dehumanized, are also being feminized in their weakness. The inability to be gendered and sex-defined creates a kind of "impotence." In both sexual and action based senses.

Trapped in the back of a truck on the way to the Farm he observes that “These were Orgota, people trained from birth in a discipline of cooperation, obedience, submission to a group purpose ordered from above. The qualities of independence and decision were weakened in them” (*Left Hand* 173).

This is very similar to the idea that genders can be learned and, in the cases of children, must be learned. West and Zimmerman, with Sandra Bem, suggest that “children learn that the recognition and use of sex categorization in interaction are not optional but mandatory” (141). The children must engage in “self-regulating” gender and sex roles if they hope to escape being a “baby” (141-142). This concept of learned and self-controlled action is akin to how “people [are] trained from birth” to obey the Orgoreyn government. By allowing Genly to see this passivity, and lack of potential sex and gender, as feminine, Le Guin follows the tradition of Wollstonecraft, Mill, and most feminist writers by suggesting that women must be active not passive.

Interestingly, Genly describes the “chemical[ly] castrat[ed]” workers as “sexless as steers” (177). Steers are desexed, or fixed, male cattle. The narrator’s use of this comparison suggests that once a being is rendered without hope of sexuality, gender, or sex, they are somehow animal<sup>13</sup>-like, which is interesting given Genly’s description of his crew as “great *apes* with intelligent eyes” (my emphasis 296). Yet, animals do have genders, even on Gethen (36). Therefore, there must be some quality that makes the steer even, baser, more animal. The reader should remember that steer are not born naturally, they are made. They are fixed in their new natures by an act of another. This comes back to Beauvoir’s suggestion that women are defined by men as the Other

---

<sup>13</sup> Similarity to *1984* and the way the Party treats the proles as animals and the implications of this treatment.

(677). The castrated are defined in their roles by the concepts of others, of Ones, being forced on them, the objects.

Being neutered, the prisoners are no longer androgynous. The androgynous state was a natural unity of the sexes; the neuter is a forced removal of the possibility of sexuality. This removes the “potential” or “integral” (94) part from the Gethenian. They no longer have the sexual freedom of kemmer. They are deprived of part of the “shame” and “desire” key to their humanity. The prisoners only reach this state through government power, implying that Orgota can remove their sexuality and render them animal like. This animal like state is not natural.

By fixing the prisoners, the Orgoreyn government forces them into an animal state and makes them labor till they die (189). With the ability to experience kemmer removed, the workers are animals and without any rights that might be guaranteed under the Orgoreyn government. This understanding links humanity, again, with sexuality, or perhaps the liberty to act on that sexuality. Since the prisoners must labor till death, the potential for future activity is also repudiated, further demonstrating the emasculation of the captives.

Perhaps this tells us more about Genly’s perspective than it does Orgota’s. Genly also says that, “Some Gethenians . . . are like animals, with deep bright eyes that do not change expression when you speak” (15). Genly treats the Gethenians as intelligent beings different from himself; yet, he cannot shake an animal quality he occasionally sees in Gethenians. With the understanding of this connection for Genly, perhaps he cannot, on some level, see Gethenians as anything but animals. If this is so, then the observations concerning the desexing of Gethenians and the removal of

their rights and humanity by it, is tied more closely to Genly than to the Orgoreyn government. Annas says that Genly needs to sort Gethens into sexes before they become human to him; perhaps in knowing their potential for sexuality is removed, he can only see them as animals.

### *The Conditioned Versus The Natural*

When Genly tries to explain the differences between a man and woman to Estraven, he is stumped. "I suppose the most important thing, the heaviest single factor in one's life, is whether one's born male or female. In most societies it determines one's expectations, vocabulary . . . It's extremely difficult to separate the innate differences from the learned ones" (234). Genly is aware that some differences are imposed by society and others by nature, yet he cannot distinguish which is which. He also admits to the importance of being born one of two sexes. Zimmerman and West suggest that some behaviors are so engrained in societal expectations that they appear natural, as "essential natures" (142). Perhaps this is why Genly cannot distinguish between the conditioned and the natural, because the conditioned has been enforced for so long that it appears natural. Mill also says "that unnatural generally means only uncusomary, and that everything which is usual appears natural. The subjection of women of women to men being a universal custom, any departure from it is quite naturally appears unnatural" (200). Genly's assertion that "It's extremely difficult to separate the innate differences from the learned ones" (234) is an expression of learned behaviors appearing natural.



If behaviors are performed as natural, then the male comes to believe that his gender naturally follows his sex; that he has no other choice. Genly clearly recognizes himself as male and as different from the androgynous population. “I suffered as a human male among human beings who were, five-sixths of the time, hermaphroditic neuters” (48). Genly is constantly aware of his male status because he is surrounded by genderless beings; even if he overlays Gethens with gender, he knows this is only in his mind. Further, though Genly is not strictly wrong in calling Gethens “hermaphroditic neuters” the term is different from Le Guin’s use of “androgyny”; though hermaphrodites have both male and female organs (Fausto-Sterling) like Gethens (90), “neuter” implies an act of de-sexing. Whereas the Gethens are not neutered, they are simply androgynous, always in balance between male and female until the moment when one set of organs demands they play the role of man or woman in coitus.

Though the Gethen understanding of self is probably less tied to sex or gender and more the Hearth and Domain (2,3), the want to keep that self is likely present. It may be this want that creates the patriotism brought up several times in the novel. The gendered self is lacking, therefore the self in connection to family<sup>14</sup> and country is exaggerated. Le Guin does not fully define hearth and Domain in the context of Gethen society; yet again, she is able to draw on the reader’s understanding of “hearth” and its connection to “home” to suggest that the hearth is a form of family living system. Then the Domain encompasses the hearth and Domains make up a country.

### *Patriotism and Fear of the Other*

---

<sup>14</sup> To Hearth and Domain.

Attempting to discuss patriotism with Genly, Estraven says: “No, I don’t mean love, when I say patriotism. I mean fear. The fear of the other. And its expressions are political, not poetical: hate rivalry, aggression. It grows in us that fear” (18). The reader learns that Estraven believes patriotism is based on fear not love. It is “fear of the other” that drives unification. This once more returns to Beauvoir’s concept of One/Other, Subject/Object (676-677). If there is no gender, there can be no inferior sex or a subordinate gender to perform. Therefore, Le Guin had to provide Karhide with an “Other” to fear.

Perhaps she feels that the Self versus Other paradigm is inescapable and therefore she had to give Karhide and Orgeyn political Others in each other. Beauvior cites forms of Other besides gender, such as political or racial. By using the political in place of the gendered Other, Le Guin suggests that One/Other is part of the human condition. Throughout this novel, the countries of Orgota and Karhide are in constant competition. Further, it is fear of the Other that drives this competition. The Other is not Myself, therefore I should fear It. “No, I don’t mean love, when I say patriotism. I mean fear. The fear of the other” (18). Fear drives patriotism, forces the need of the One to divide and define from the Other. This fear eventually leads to war, a domination of the Other.

Once Estraven loses his position as prime minster, Tibe, a power hungry politician, takes his place. Genly observes that:

[h]e [Tibe] was after something surer, the sure, quick, and lasting way to make people into a nation: war. His ideas concerning it could not have been too precise, but they were quite sound. The only other means of mobilizing people

rapidly and entirely is with a new religion; none was handy; he would make do with war. (102)<sup>15</sup>

This “mobilizing” is similar to the unification of patriotism. Both require large groups of people to share an ideology or concern, and, in this case, both are driven by fear. Tibe calls for war, war against Orgota. Even in fear, there is unity. There must be a unifying of purpose for war, garnered by fear or love (18).

### *Conclusion*

In “Gender Redux”, Le Guin asks, “is gender necessary?” I believe that the answer is “yes.” Le Guin creates an androgynous world, attempting a thought experiment in which gender is removed to determine what is left. However, with kemmer, she returns Gethen’s to temporary sex and gender performance. This suggests that gender and sex are important to Le Guin’s definition of humanity, or at least the perpetuation of the human race.

To carry her thought experiment further, it would have been more effective to create either a third gender or another form of reproduction. Also, Le Guin writes in English, which naturally divides into two genders and sexes. The language restricts Le Guin with pronouns and undertones of power attached to masculine words. English’s structure and Le Guin’s decision not to form a third gender or new means of generation allows gender, sex, and sexuality (as the reader knows it) back into the equation. This return suggests that this performance does indeed matter. Even if Le Guin is unable to escape gender and sex completely, only because of language and the heterosexual

---

<sup>15</sup> This strike a chord with *1984* because the constant fear that the inhabitants of Oceana live in and the way that they hate any nationality not their own.

concepts buried within it, this failure might imply that gender and sex are important because of their imbedding in language and culture. However, I think that the language is not completely at fault. Yes, English disallows Le Guin the luxury of a neutered case, but she could still have made an altered sex or method of reproduction. This points to the import of the two gender/sex dynamic to the normative human

## Consuming Reality

### ***Setting the Stage***

In the previous chapter, I explore the subtle control gender exerts because Le Guin's language undermines her stated goal of creating a world without gender. With this understanding of gender's power, I turn to Philip K. Dick's *The Simulacra* to probe how the government Dick creates uses gender as a control mechanism. Dick works to extend what feminist theorists refer to as the "male gaze" from an unconscious "pleasure in looking" (Mulvey 835) into a conscious toll on oppression.

In her article "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Laura Mulvey follows Freud and suggests that there is an "erotic basis for pleasure in looking at another person as an Object" (835). Further, Mulvey uses the term "male gaze," suggesting a masculine aesthetic and audience. This aesthetic follows a visual pattern similar to the active male and passive female established in the earlier chapter by Beauvoir. Beauvoir suggests that in English "he" is the positive, the neutral, the Subject and that "she" is the negative, the Object (675). As the Subject "he" is active and the Object "she" is passive. Using this device, Mulvey claims "pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female." The male gaze is the Subject viewing the Object. Mulvey also implies a pleasure derived in the male viewer from seeing a woman as a sexual Object. Mulvey suggests that in cinema, a woman's body becomes a spectacle. She is defined by her "to-be-looked-at-ness" (Mulvey's emphasis 837). The understanding of woman as "something" to be looked at further Objectifies her. It removes all agency.

Mulvey's argument looks specifically at the cinema, constructs a darkened theater which caters to "voyeuristic phantasy." Voyeurism refers to the gaining satisfaction or sexual excitement from the viewing of an image. The audience is separated from one another by the dark, so each experiences the movie privately. They are watching for his (or her) personal pleasure. Mulvey claims that the cinema is designed to "give the spectator the illusion of looking in on a private world." She emphasizes the viewer's alienation from other audience members and from the Object of his desire, the woman he cannot obtain on the screen (835-836). This privacy is important because it removes all contact between the watcher and the world he physically inhabits. The world he mentally occupies takes precedence over the physical, the actual. Voyeurism then fetishizes the Object. Fetishistic looking identifies a body with that of a viewer and finds sexual pleasure in it (849-840). It is the addition of the symbolic that turns the image into a fetish. From woman to a fetish, the audience "builds up the beauty of the Object, transforming it into something satisfying in itself" (840).

I think that Michael Taussig uncovers a danger of fetishization. While writing about violence and healing in South America, Taussig considers photographic nudes taken of native women by colonizers. Taussig suggests that the photographers desperately try to quantify their findings as "science" rather than "pseudo-" or "protoscience" they turn the photographed bodies into Objects. Clinical descriptions distance the body from the observer to such a degree that the body lost its humanity. He refers to this as the "colonizing eye" and sees "the same display of the body as artifact to be scrutinized for the mystery of its meaning—i.e., its meaning to us" (113).

This stripping of humanity from the image is similar to what happens to Mulvey's women as they are looked at; they become nothing other than a pleasurable image, an Object.

Taussig considers this a form of cannibalism, because of the way the eye devours and consumes the image of another human being (113). When a human body is cannibalized, it is only a body and no longer human. In this vein, the "scrutinized" naked images lose their humanity by the distance the viewer allows between themselves and the subject of the photo. Then the picture is only of a body not a person.

When the personhood of the pictured is lost, a space is opened for voyeurism. In her book *A Different Kind of War Story*, Carolyn Nordstrom claims that discussing violent images, stories, or situations is difficult because too much emotion or detail can make it a "pornography of violence" (18). She speaks to the fear of readers believing she takes pleasure in the violence she observes and is concerned by the enjoyment that others may find in it. The phrase "pornography of violence" suggests a sexual gratification from violence, known as voyeurism.

After establishing the male gaze and its consequences, I discuss the simulacra, for which the book is named. According to Jean Baudrillard, and his article on simulacra in science fiction, there are three kinds of simulacra. One is "based on image, imitation" of the natural. Another is "based on energy and force" with the goal of the "liberation of indeterminate energy." The third is the "simulation simulacra" which is interesting in creating a "hyperreality, total control" (309). Most of Baudrillard's discussion is on whether SF imitates reality or if reality imitates SF and is not directly related to this paper. However, his three kinds of simulacra may be of use. I will use

his concept, yet I think that Dick mixes the first and third kinds of Baudrillard's simulacrum.

### *Actual Versus Constructed Reality*

In this paper, I use reality to refer to two different phenomenons. Actual reality refers to the physical world that a person or character inhabits. Whereas constructed reality refers to the world a character creates for his or herself. For example, the image of Nicole that Ian has built for himself is part of his constructed reality. Nicole is the first lady and her husband, the president is elected every four years (16). She appears frequently on TV and Ian has been watching Nicole his entire life. Based on the presented image, Ian has constructed an ideal of Nicole. In his actual reality, he has no contact with Nicole, and knows little about her. Ian's obsession with Nicole is a manifestation of his desire to fully realize his constructed reality. In the end, the constructed may trump the actual because a person may feel more at home in a world of their own making, in which they have power. This plays into Mulvey's concept of the male gaze because the gaze creates a private world in which the constructed reality holds sway.

### *The Image*

She [Nicole] glanced up . . . Now she smiled in greeting. "Good afternoon," she said. "Did you two have lunch? . . ." . . . "We ate, Mrs. Thibodeaux," Al said. . . . *We ate Mrs. Thibodeaux*, Ian Duncan thought crazily. Isn't it actually the other way around? Doesn't she, sitting here in her blue-cotton pants and shirt, doesn't she devour *us*? (*The Simulacra* 166)

Nicole asks if the two men would like lunch. Al replies that they already had lunch. Hysterical with fear, Ian removes the comma and changes Al's meaning. Suddenly,



there is a suggestion of cannibalism, of devouring, of the consumption of a human being by a human being.

### *The Pleasure of Looking*

Ian has been watching Nicole Thibodeaux on TV all his life. He decided that he wanted to meet her in person. However, when confronted by the real Nicole, not the image, he is terrified that the woman he obsessed over will not be what, or who, he thought. All Ian wants “is the image” of Nicole (164). An image is more easily consumed than a real woman with power because it is a picture rather than a physical being. Thinking of Mulvey, the reader should remember that as a man, Ian’s gaze operates on a classically masculine aesthetic. As the viewer, Ian can exert the power of his imagination and expectation on Nicole. In the above excerpt, Ian realizes that he does not have the power he presumed because Nicole becomes an actuality which does not match his fantasy. This is a cry of concern because the power structure established by the active male viewer and the passive female Object is disrupted. Ian is losing his grip on the Nicole he saw. He must now grapple with the way in which she sees him. Ian’s fear forces him to confront the possibility that she is, in fact, “devouring” him.

### *Visual Cannibalism*

The objectification of women and removal of their humanity, such as Taussig describes, is a violence. I apply this concept to Nicole because she is regarded as an image. As she is constantly devoured by the male gaze, she is objectified and is less a

person than a concept. Voyeurism can allow a viewer to own or obsess over an image, rather than confront the actuality of the person in the picture.

However, Nicole's image is being used as a control mechanism. Does the fact that the violence done to her is a means to an end negate the removal of her humanity as a wrong? Here we should remember Foucault's "*perpetual spirals of power and pleasure*" and that both the subject and object of power feel pleasure for its exercise. This complicates the issue of Nicole's objectification because she is no longer a helpless victim but rather a party to her dehumanizing. She is used in this way to control the public, something that all the governments in these novels do. This is simply a different system which relies upon the desires of the public itself. The public is also violated because of this method: the government effectively uses the population's desires and in this way undermines them. In Dick's world, the government's manipulation of the public's needs and the male gaze drives many into a neurotic state. This is a violence done to the public because their sanity is toyed with by a government that should be protecting them.

### *Obsession*

Sitting alone in his apartment, Ian watches as "On the screen bloomed now lovely, tranquil features, the pale skin and dark, intelligent eyes, the wise yet pert face of the woman who had come to monopolize their attention, on whom an entire nation, almost an entire planet, dwelt obsessively" (Dick 18). Focusing on Nicole's physical features as she appears on his TV screen, Ian presents her visual appeal as part of the obsession, pointing to the importance of Mulvey's concept of the "to-be-looked-at-ness"

and the pleasure of looking. He becomes obsessed with her physical features rather than the actual woman. Later in the scene he thinks “Nicole . . . you’ve got me trapped” (18), Ian cannot take his eyes off the screen and begins to fantasize about actually meeting her. Ian wants to shatter the privacy of his darkened theater which would draw him closer to the actual reality of Nicole and lead to hysteria. It is the desire to have contact with Nicole, to break the isolation of his gaze, which propels Ian’s plot line through the rest of the novel and drags Al, a close friend of the Nicole obsessed Ian, into the action.

It is not only Ian obsessed with Nicole. The last remaining psychoanalyst, Dr. Egon Superb, observes that fixation with Nicole amounts to a “national neurosis<sup>16</sup>” (100). During an event, a Skypilot, the spiritual adviser of a residential building, prays that “lastly, if it be thy [God’s?<sup>17</sup>] will, that Nicole Thibodeaux be free of sinus headaches which have caused her not to appear on TV lately, and that those headaches not have anything to do with that time two years ago. . .” when she hit her head and was in the hospital “which we all recall” (13). Nicole’s wellbeing is invoked in a religious meeting; this implies that she is of vital importance to the people of the building. Further, that she is imbedded in the public consciousness to a degree that her sinus headaches: “disrupt our [the population’s] law abiding, orderly lives” (13). Later in the novel, Ian blames the anxiety present in his building on Nicole’s sinus headaches (54). This suggests a connectedness between the wellbeing of the public and the object of its obsession, its fetish.

---

<sup>16</sup> When I use the term “neurosis” I do so in a Freudian sense. Freud understood neurosis as the “frustration of basic instincts” (Landry 2).

<sup>17</sup> I use a question mark here because God is not explicitly mentioned in the text but given the context of the meeting, the prayer, and the religious leader I assume some version of God plays in.

### *Masculine Society and Neurosis*

Mulvey looks at the gaze as a masculine/feminine phenomenon. This concept of masculine power can be transferred from Ian to the public. Not only because the audience is the consumer, and therefore the active absorbing the passive, but because Ian thinks of the public as an overwhelmingly masculine entity. Before Nicole's image appears on the screen, he tries to puzzle out how the United States of Europe and America became a matriarchy:

[W]hen did our society become matriarchal . . . Each year der Alte<sup>18</sup> [the President] became more obscure, the First Lady became better known, more liked, by the public. It was the public which brought it about. Was it a need for mother, wife, mistress, or perhaps all three? Anyhow they got what they wanted; they got Nicole and she is certainly all three and more besides. (16-17)

This implies that the public, as a whole, is masculine because they needed a "mother, wife, [or] mistress." This sets up the public as a masculine entity, which fits cleanly with the male gaze. The desire for a "wife" or "mistress" is a masculine want, in the heterosexual society that Dick uses for this novel. This is what Nicole comes to symbolize, she is the need for a woman, a feminine to the public's masculine. Dick's interest in this power relation may be why we never see any women watching TV, we only see men partaking in Nicole's visual.

---

<sup>18</sup> In German, der Alte means "the old man." This points to trappings of a patriarchal government to the point where the "elected" leadership office is defined by gender.

Taussig notes that naked images of men are not used as nudes of women are. When pictured, men are always clothed (114). This speaks to the power dynamic between the photographer, the subject, and the viewer. The photographer has a place of power, what Susan Sontag refers to as the “imperial rights of the camera—to gaze at . . .” (2), and therefore presumed male. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for a male photographer to sexualize a male subject. The observer also has power over the image by virtue of the gaze; because of this the potential viewer is gendered male. With this in mind, the subject can be nothing other than a passive female: Nicole.

However, the public does not necessarily need to be all sexed males to take the place of power in this relationship. If the public views Nicole, then they are the active Subject and she the Object. The sexedness of the gaze becomes unimportant and only the power dynamic, which implies the masculine/feminine relationship, is necessary.

This passage may tell the reader more about Ian than about the public. It is only through his reading of events and history text (16) that the reader receives this explanation. This suggests that Ian is a sexually frustrated individual, he longs for his mother, cannot have her; desires a mistress or a wife but can obtain neither. Therefore, he turns to the image, the fetish, of Nicole to satisfy himself.

However, Dick suggests to the reader that this desire for Nicole is larger than Ian because Superb diagnosis it as a “national neurosis . . . [t]he psychological fault of our times” (100). This suggests that the desire for a sexualized mother, mistress, and wife are pandemic. Dick also provides characters other than Ian who are obsessed with Nicole. This also casts the population as largely motherless, to the point where the government must provide a substitute. Sigmund Freud’s *Oedipus Complex* suggests

that boys hold a repressed desire to have intercourse with their mothers and kill their fathers (*Sigmund Freud's Psychological Development Theory* 1). I am interested in the first part of this theory because it simply explains the character's sexual obsession with Nicole. This could be why "mother" fits so readily with the sexual "wife" and "mistress."

Richard Kongrosian, the psycho-kinetic<sup>19</sup> pianist who often preforms Nicole, has issues similar to Ian's. Kongrosian suffers from various physiological issues, the latest set are brought on by commercials for deodorant. He believes that he smells so horrible that human contact is dangerous (62). Later in the novel, Kongrosian's atrocious odor leads him to believe he is invisible (127). The commercial has this effect because Kongrosian believes himself to be "an anankastic, a person for whom reality had shrunk to the dimension of compulsion; everything he did was forced on him" (62). The commercial becomes part of Kongrosian's constructed reality and he must react, taking to heart the suggestion that his stench keeps people at bay. The pervasive images of Nicole have also become a part of this reality. To the point where Dr. Superb can claim, "That man . . . has a delusion that's overpowering. He experiences Nicole Thibodeaux as real" (100). If the image is the reality for Kongrosian, than actually meeting the flesh and blood Nicole would do nothing to shake the impression of the picture. Whereas Ian is terrified that his constructed and the actual realities will not meld, Kongrosian is unconcerned because the image and illusion he has built override the actual reality.

Kongrosian struggles with the sexual desire for Nicole more than Ian does. Kongrosian says, "sometimes I think the actual basis of my psychological problem is

---

<sup>19</sup> The same nuclear event that created the chuppers also lead to some psychic and telekinetic abilities. In Kongrosian's case he can play the piano with his mind.

that I'm unconsciously in love with Nicole. . . . The incest or taboo barrier . . . has been called out by the direction my libido has taken, because of course Nicole is a mother figure. (99). Here, he does not say: "Nicole is *my* mother," but he recognizes her as a "mother figure." This recognition is so strong that he rationalizes his psychological problems as a kind of punishment for incestuous thoughts. He clearly sees Nicole in a sexual light, perhaps as a mistress since he has a wife (1). However, he cannot separate the sexualized Nicole from her maternal aspects. The need for mother and mistress are compounded and disturbing to Kongrosian.

The system of government in Dick's *The Simulacra* is founded on control and deception. However, this control is not achieved by mere force. It is achieved by making the public think they are getting what they want. If the public want a "mother, wife, mistress," then that is what they shall have. The government achieves this in the form of Nicole. She is the perfect woman, created by the media for the consumption of the masses. Further, she is what the public wants. This is an example of Berlin's positive freedom because the government encourages the population rather than restricting it. The government is also encroaching on the private space that Berlin believes is important to development. This impinging interferes with the population's ability to develop without being contorted by government founded neurosis.

### *Flipping the Gaze*

The only way that the public can have contact with Nicole is by succeeding in talent shows. Ian settles on the classical jug act that he and Al used to perform, in which they play classical music like Beethoven on jugs, as a means to meet Nicole (19).

He sees this as a way to prove he is not a “failure.” Ian says that he does not “know if I can go on living like this,” feeling “trapped” (52). He thinks that only playing for Nicole can help him. It is the fruition of this endeavor which forces Ian into the spot where he wonders who is “devouring” whom (166). The only way he can meet Nicole is to provide her with entertainment, to become the Object of her gaze. This is a flipping of the passive/female and active/male structure. In this way, he is feminized and Nicole’s power is exaggerated. This is part of the reason Nicole is unnerving; she is a woman with power, not a passive Object. Meeting the actual Nicole forces Ian to reconsider his thoughts about her. The reality he constructed concerning Nicole may not be the actual reality.

Ian is denied the pleasure he hoped the meeting would bring. Nicole is still separated from him by a clear barrier for her protection. I find this situation interesting in conjunction with Mulvey’s cinema because of the partition screen. On TV, Ian creates Nicole for himself based on the image and his assumptions. He can do this because of his separation from Nicole and sees her as a face beneath the glass of his screen. Now he is on one side of a clear screen with Nicole on the other. The sound is funneled into his side by speakers (166), much as it was on his TV. Now that they are on opposite sides of the same screen, Nicole views Ian as much as he sees her. Before she had been the passive Object now she is the active Subject. In a sense reaching through the screen to canalize Ian as he has her, he no longer has the private pleasure of looking. Now he is “looked at.” This links back to Mulvey’s interest in privacy and voyeurism.



This complicates the simple relationship of audience to Object because the Object is now equally Subject. The dichotomy of passive and active is shattered, yet Ian is still refused access to Nicole.

Before the meeting, Ian becomes aware of the dangers that meeting Nicole could entail. For example, when Ian is confronted with the idea that Nicole is actually ninety rather than the twenty-something she appears to be on TV he exclaims, "What's unreal and what's real? To me she's more real than anything else; then you, even. Even myself, my own life" (122). She has become his reality and it is only by her acknowledgement that he too can have a place in his constructed reality. Ian cannot believe that Nicole is not the twenty-something he believes because "The facts, Ian realized, mean nothing when you can see with your own eyes she's as young-looking as ever. And we see that every day" (120). The visual reality, the fetish, is more important to him than the actual reality.

The truth becomes terrifying. Ian has a nightmare in which "A hideous old woman with greenish, wrinkled claws scrabbled at him," he knows that this old woman is Nicole. He's not sure he could "live through" seeing her now that his faith is shaken in the illusion of his perfect Nicole. He asks: "Can't we go back to just seeing her on the TV screen? That's good enough for me, now. I want that, the image. Okay?" (164); Ian admits that all he wants is the image of Nicole. The image provides safety. As long as he is not confronted with the real woman, she can remain the possessable Object. She can be in her twenties and not an old woman. Nicole can be his "mother, wife, mistress, or all three" (17). In the end, Ian does not want the truth. Ian is scared of the

actual real. He wants the image, the illusion, the constructed real, the possible lie he has believed all his life.

*“Weak-fibered men”*

Desire for the “woman who had come to monopolize their [the population’s] attention, on whom the entire nation, almost the entire planet, dwelt obsessively” (18) becomes a controlling mechanism for the government. By giving the public what they think they want, the government can use the matriarch, Nicole, to their advantage. Men become obsessed with her. They are emasculated by a system run by a woman they desire; the men then blame themselves for their desire and their “weak[ness]” (100). Chic, a character who makes simulacra and ends up visiting Dr. Superb<sup>20</sup>, says, “It’s because of weak-fibered men like me that Nicole can rule . . . I’m the reason why we’ve got a matriarchal society . . . ” (100). He blames himself and “weak-fibered men” like him for allowing Nicole dominance, a traditionally masculine role. “I’m like a six-year old kid,” (100) he laments, emphasizing that he is not only weak, but also a child, unable to do anything without his mother, Nicole. Suggesting that only in childhood is control by a woman acceptable, in adulthood it is simply emasculating. Chic essentially says that all the men under Nicole’s sway are infantile and emasculated. Superb tries to sooth Chic by saying that most men in their society have this issue (100).

How can a man escape the crushing of *The Simulacra’s* matriarchal system? Two possibilities avail themselves: one is joining the Sons of Job which is a anti-government group run by Bertold Goltz (100); the second is emigrating to Mars (50).

---

<sup>20</sup> Chic visits Dr. Superb after his brother’s wife, Julie, leaves Vince (Chic’s brother) rather arbitrarily for Chic (28).

Both free him from Nicole's gaze. Ian connects Mars with "getting away from the Party—and from her [Nicole]" (19). The concept of becoming a "real man" is found in both these options. Chic suggests that by joining the Sons of Job he "could be a real man" (100). A papoola, a simulacrum based on extinct Martians and used to sell spaceships, suggest to a passing family that "You [could be] your own boss, there, free to work your farm land, believe your own beliefs, become *yourself*" (50). Mars becomes a place to exercise agency, a space to "become *yourself*," away from subtle government domination. The papoola then addresses the husband directly asking if "you have the courage to break free. Can you do it? Are you a real man?" (51). This ties masculinity to the ability to "become *yourself*," the ability to exercise individual identity and power. This is an attempt to recover the active/masculine dynamic, which has been underlined and undermined by the government's manipulation.

### *Emasculation*

Twice in the novel the concept of "emasculatation" by a system is suggested. The first is in connection with a member of a large powerful company, a "cartel." The narrator suggests that, "spiritual—moral—emasculatation was a present-day prerequisite for participation in the *Ge* class, in the ruling circles" (33). This suggests that one must forsake their identity to be a successful cog in the "ruling circles." This ties masculinity to identity, the self. The masculine self is threatened by Nicole's ability to control them and the power they know she exerts over them.

The second time concerns Hermann Goering, a member of the Nazi party brought to present day for consultation on the best way to control the Third Reich and

Hitler (159). Nicole thinks that Goering is “Emasculated by the power-arrangement of the Third Reich; unable to do anything on his own, as a unique individual . . .” (160). This reinforces the idea that emasculation is sexual only in the loss of potency as an active agent. If the active is male, then rejecting independent enterprise makes one submissive, feminized. These men are enfeebled because they give up their rights as individuals to fit into the system.

Emasculation then connects masculinity to identity and individuality. However these are not exclusive to men, women have them too. If “emasculate” does not refer specifically to a loss of masculinity, but a loss of agency, then anyone could undergo emasculation, including the female population under Nicole.

However, the women do not seem impotent. There are examples of strong women who terrify the men of this novel. Molly, the daughter of Nat’s boss, is described as “exceptionally harsh and aggressive, almost masculine woman,” lacking “her father’s personal, emotional touch” (39). Described as a “masculine woman,” Molly’s femininity is questioned. Indeed her father possesses more of the “emotional touch,” generally associated with the female (Mill 202). Julie’s “terribly tough” personality scares Chic (30). Like Nat, Chic is uneasy with a woman’s lack of emotion. The narrator says that Julie’s dismissal of her ex-husband “chilled Chic because it was a cold, cruel, utterly dismissive sigh. . . . with . . . little spilled emotion” (30). Both these men are concerned by the lack of emotion, of the feminine in Molly and Julie. These women seem less concerned with acting in accordance with the system, with the gender expectations, than the men do. Molly and Julie do not waste time on emotions they do not feel, even though it would comfort the men in the novel. They do not seem emasculated but

liberated. Perhaps a matriarchy has allowed women to claim more power or at least assures women their right to identity. However, it is not done away with sexism; if it had, the men would not have these moments of unease.

However, Dick's use of "emasculate" has sexual undertones. He is once more playing on the association of men with power. When they are removed from that power they are feminized. This returns to the disquieting nature of Nicole. She is presented as the ultimate feminine, the Object of masculine obsession. Yet she is more masculine because she appears to be running the system, the one in power.

### *Power of Knowing*

What if climbing up the class structure is an attempt to regain power, masculinity, and identity through knowledge? Perhaps some of this power is claimed through rising in class structure. In *The Simulacra*, those in-the-know enjoy being on top of the hierarchy.

Dick creates a world where social classes are blatantly divided by access to information, to "the secret, the Geheimnis." The *Ges*, the Geheimnistrager, posses the secret while the *Bes*, the Befehlstrager, are "mere carry-outers of instructions" (33). The *Ges* are above the *Bes* in this social structure because they are privileged to more information, more government secrets. They know that the President is a simulacrum, built to be whatever the public wants. This creates an illusion of public choice; the public thinks they are making a decision with their vote, but they are actually being manipulated by the government.

In this way, information is power. If power is linked to the active and the individual, then it may help reclaim masculinity, or at least authority in the power structure. The reader only sees men climb in the power structure when they learn that the der Alte is a simulacrum or that Nicole is not “Nicole” (110, 190). The reader never sees a woman climb the power structure. Perhaps the ascent is a masculine need and women are simply content to exercise their power on a personal level.

### *Simulacrum*

There are two main kinds of simulacra in Dick’s novel *The Simulacra*: the first are the kind obvious to the reader, like Al’s papoola (53) or the robotic president Kalbfleisch (32). These fit into Baudrillard’s first order of simulacra as they are “imitations” of living beings. The papoola is a model of an extinct Martian life form (53) and the president is based on human anatomy. However, they also foster a hyperreality because they blend together the false and the real. As the hyperreality blurs the false and real, the real is exaggerated. They are not actual living creatures yet people who see and do not know they are simulacrum perceived that way. Since the secret is that the president is a simulation (32-33), the unknowing public treats president Kalbfleisch as the man they voted into office. Throughout the novel people see the papoola and say ask if it is alive (53, 165, 167), this suggests that the simulation of the papoola is convincingly life like.

The second kind of simulacra Dick creates is Nicole. The papoola and Kalbfleisch are synthetic robotic life forms, imitations of living beings, unlike them “Nicole” is actually an actress playing the part of Nicole Thibodeaux. The actress’s name is Kate Rupert (170). However, even after the reader is made aware of this, Dick

still refers to her as “Nicole.” The role she plays overrides her identity as Kate Rupert. The construction of Nicole is more real than the actuality of Kate. Nicole becomes the physical reality. Theorist Max Deutscher suggests that actors are simulacra because: “The people who are actors, play at being people . . .” (518) just as the papoola and Kalbfleisch play at being alive, or how Kate Rupert plays at being Nicole Thibodeaux. This supports the conception of Nicole are a simulacra.

Nicole fits into Baudrillard’s first form of simulacra because even though “Nicole” was originally a real woman, she has become a role played by other women “who look enough like the original Nicole” (170). She is a character based on the conceptions held about the original Nicole. She also fits the second form because she assists the hyperreality of *The Simulacra*. She appears on TV, an image in order to placate the public while executing a government role. Nicole is a role, taken as an actual reality by the public. She is part of their reality, the actual and the constructed. In the end, her falsity emphasizes the harsh reality of government power.

The simulacra Dick uses are made for the purpose of confusing reality for the reason of control. The scene in which the reader learns that Kalbfleisch is a simulacrum occurs after a character watches him give a speech on TV. Then Dick cuts to the studio where the speech was filmed with a character saying, ““Shut it off” (32). Then the “Kalbfleisch simulacrum stopped. Its arms stuck out, rigid in their final gesture, the withered face vacuous. The simulacrum said nothing and automatically the TV cameras also shut off, one by one; there was no longer anything for them to transmit . . .” (32). This suggests that the president simulacrum exists only to control the public and further

the agenda of the council (170). When the cameras shut off, so does he. His arms do not even relax, they remain “stuck out,” trapped in place like a wax-work.

Kalbfleisch is not real, he is part of a reality that the state has constructed. The simulacrum inhabits an actual physical space but there is no actual person named Kalbfleisch. He does not have to be a real person. It is easier to control him if he is merely a simulation. Why then, is Nicole played by an actress? Perhaps it is because of the discomfort that Dick seeks to create. A simulacrum Nicole would not be as dynamic, as powerful and threatening, as a real woman. If Nicole is to unnerve and control the male public by obsession, then she must be the image of a real woman, not only the imitation of one. Even though “Nicole” is the imitation of the original Nicole, she is still a living woman. The council’s ability to control Nicole is secondary to Dick’s desire to provide the public with a proper Object for its gaze.

Whereas Ian is obsessed with the constructed reality of Nicole, Superb claims that she is “the most synthetic object in our milieu” (100). Here, Nicole is not even a woman, she is an Object. She is synthetic, a construction. The public interacts with Nicole on a visual level only; this returns us to the gaze. She is an Object created for the male gaze of the public. Yet, it is ultimately the government with all the apparent power. They control Nicole, and with her help, the public.

### *Conclusion*

However, at my most cynical I think that this is simply politics and not a violation of human rights. The government is working to keep a population under control, but it does not force them to consume the image. They can look away, as proved by



Superb's disillusionment. I believe the situation in *The Simulacra* concerns civil rather than human rights. Civil rights are those granted under law which governments are meant to maintain, such as the right to privacy. In 1984, the Party creates a Newspeak, which is based around the worship of Big Brother. The professions of the Outer Party center around maintaining Party dogma. Also, the Party can always be watching, in *The Simulacra* they only control what the population watches.

The difference between the Party and the government of the USEA is that the Party fosters a way of life, offering no alternative. Party members have no choice; there is a removal of potential difference. In the USEA there is a choice. The violation of human rights occurs not when an image becomes pervasive but when the government forces a way of life, when there is no option but to participate.

I think that the government in *The Simulacra* is heading in this direction, at least before the war between the army and police. If this is the case, this novel can be seen not only as a dramatization of the world of the reader, but also a warning. That media can be used by the government in a totalitarian vein to control the reality of its citizens. In effect, Dick populates *The Simulacra* with simulacra, to the point where reality is based on the falsities of construction. This confuses the actual and the constructed. The reader might wonder if the distinction between realities matters when the government can impede on the individual to the degree in Dick's world.

## Conclusion

### ***What These Novel's Share***

All three novels focus on individual potential and the suppression of it by government.

Orwell's Winston is denied the ability to have impulses and mutual trust. *1984* examines how sex and love can be used as control mechanisms because the Party directs sexual desire towards Hate and familial love towards its icon Big Brother. The totalitarian government in Orwell's novel seeks to eradicate the possibility of an "unorthodox" citizen.

LeGuin's Voluntary Camp prisoners in *Left Hand* cannot engage in the gendering and sexing that allows them to be human. Ultimately, even though Le Guin attempts to "eliminate gender" (Gender Redux 10), she returns to the two gender system with her concept of kemmer, suggesting that gender is important to a definition of humanity. When the Orgoreyn government uses kemmer repressing drugs, the government refuses its prisoners the potential of gender, sex, and sexuality.

Dick's characters in *The Simulacra* are losing the capability to look away from and see through the constructed reality of the state media. The government makes overt use of gender for control. The USEA government offers the public the female image it desires to the point of obsession and uses this obsession and eventual neurosis to control the population. However, the USEA has not yet reached the level of control that the Party has in *1984*, because its citizens still have the choice of looking away from the media.

### ***Human Rights in SF***

The governments in *1984* and *Left Hand's Orgoreyn* encroach on human rights by suppressing individual potential for love, sex and even gender. In *The Simulacra*, the USEA exploits gender and sexual desire for control.

SF seems suited to human rights discourse because it allows authors to tackle questions of the present in the guise of the future or another world. By building on the real world to forge a fictive one, writers can address current questions in a safe theoretical space. Also, they can draw out these questions to a conclusion which might seem unthinkable in the reader's world.

There is a long standing tradition of using SF to investigate questions of human rights. The book that is widely accepted as the first SF novel, *The World As It Shall Be* by Emile Souvestre, was published in 1846. Souvestre sends a young couple from the early 1800s to the year 3,000 so they can witness the glories that the future must bring (7). However, upon arriving in the future the couple are disturbed to find a world ruled completely by monetary gain, where no one marries for love (76), where children are separated from their mothers at birth (57), where minor criminals are imprisoned in a Panopticon (94) but major offenders live luxuriously (98), and where an old man is parted from his loyal dog because it offers no monetary advantage to anyone (90). The young couple are horrified by what they see as the total degradation of human society.

In 1906, David M. Parry wrote *The Scarlet Empire* in which his protagonist, John Walker, an American socialist, attempts to commit suicide because of his growing despair over capitalist society (4). Failing to drown himself, Walker ends up in the fabled under water city of Atlantis which appears to be a functioning socialist society (8-9). In Atlantis the quest for equality has been taken to such length that the inhabitants may speak only 1,000 words a day (unless given special permission) (10) and anyone who cannot survive on the meager rations is left to die because no one should have more food than another (68). In Atlantis the government decides who shall marry whom, following the practice that the ugly combine with the beautiful to eventually create a uniform aesthetic (322). There are numerous inspectors who monitor citizens to make sure they adhere various laws aimed at equability and uniformity such as the correct length of step (ten inches) (319). The starving are not given more than the prescribed amount of food. Those who fall in love and refuse to marry those assigned them are deemed insane, imprisoned, and killed. Essentially, Parry suggests that socialist ideal of equality is actually a threat to individual rights, lives, and identities.

### ***What is the Next Step?***

#### *In SF*

If I were to continue my study of human rights in SF, I would turn my focus to technologies and how they become a locus for domination. Using novels such as William Gibson's *Neuromancer* and M.T. Anderson's *Feed*, I would explore how technology, once it becomes a part of the body, can be used for control.

I see this as an extension of the government control that I explore in the previous chapters. Both Dick and Orwell suggest that communication and surveillance technology is integral to the government's ability to control its population. *Feed* explores the implications of becoming dependent on communication technology controlled by others. The feed is integrated into people's brains and streams advertisements and the sensation of physical pleasure directly into the brain. Some of the characters become addicted to this pleasure. If someone is addicted to technology, he or she is subject to control by those who control the technology. In *Neuromancer*, the technology itself becomes intelligent which suggests a myriad of scenarios in which the technology created by man comes to coercively control him.

### *In Magical Realism*

I would also look at human rights and human rights violations in magical realism. The genre of magical realism represents reality as fantastic or magical, a device that allows exploration of exaggerated events and extreme concepts.

Many magical realist texts confront human rights violations. For example the banana massacre in Gabriel Garcia Marquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude* is based on the 1928 strike against the United Fruit Company in Columbia. There were three or five casualties in the actual massacre, but Marquez magnified the trauma of the event by making the death toll closer to 3,000 (Posado-Carbo 395-396). In *Solitude* the reader witnesses the 200 car-long train heading towards the sea to dump the bodies like so many "rejected bananas" through the eyes of a lone survivor (312). When the survivor tries to communicate with others about the massacre, no one believes him or

remembers the dead (313-314). Marquez calls attention to the treatment of the banana workers and the hardship they suffered by exaggerating the losses and comparing the corpses to bananas. When no one believes the survivor, Marquez is alluding to the history of the “disappeared,” a term used to describe those who vanished under various South American dictatorships. Both of these are allusions to real world events that violated human rights.

### ***What is the Point?***

In this project, I have looked at human rights in SF novels. The three novels I chose to focus on brought forward the importance of sex and gender as objects of control or mechanisms for control by governments. The loss of individual control over sex and the deprivation of gender stand for a wider array of rights violations that are less physically intimate, but no less human. SF can be taken seriously as commentary on human rights and what it means to be human. Understanding SF as part of human rights discourse allows the reader to visit the possible outcomes of human rights violations in a digestible manner. By doing this, the reader learns about the world as it is the present and its future prospects.

## Bibliography

- Anderson, M. T. Feed. Cambridge, MA: Candlewick, 2002. Print.
- Annas, Pamela J. "New Worlds, New Words: Androgyny in Feminist Science Fiction." *Science Fiction Studies* 5.2 (1978): 143-56. *JSTOR*. Web. 27 Feb. 2013. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4239176>>.
- Baudrillard, Jean, and Arthur B. Evans. "Simulacra and Science Fiction." *Science Fiction Studies* 18.3 (1991): 309-13. *JSTOR*. Web. 13 Mar. 2013. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4240082>>.
- Beauvoir, Simone De. "The Second Sex." (1949): 673-705. Print.
- Berlin, Isaiah. "Two Concepts of Liberty." *Oxford University Press* (1969): n. pag. Web.
- Call, Lewis. "Postmodern Anarchism in the Novels of Ursula K. Le Guin." *SubStance* 36.113 (2007): 87-105. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Feb. 2013. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25195127>>.
- Crick, Bernard. "Nineteen Eighty-Four." *Cambridge University Press* (2007): 146-59. Web.
- Deutscher, Max. "Simulacra, Enactment and Feeling." *Philosophy* 63.246 (1988): 515-28. *JSTOR*. Web. 13 Mar. 2013. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3750634>>.
- Dick, Philip K. *The Simulacra*. New York: Mariner, 1964. Print.
- Fausto-Sterling, Anne. "The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough." *The Sciences* (1993): 24-28. Print.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*. Vol. 1. New York: Vintage, 1978. Print.
- Foucault, Michel. "Panopticon." *Panopticon*. N.p., n.d. Web. 4 Mar. 2013.
- Gibson, William, and Jack Womack. *Neuromancer*. New York: Ace, 2004. Print.
- Grossman, Kathryn M. "'Through a Glass Darkly': Utopian Imagery in Nineteen Eighty-Four." *Penn State University Press* 1 (1987): 52-60. *JSTOR*. Web. 7 Apr. 2013. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20718885>>.
- Hester, Erwin, and Daphne Patai. "Women in 1984." *Modern Language Association* 98.2 (1983): 256-58. *JSTOR*. Web. 14 Oct. 2012.

<<http://www.jstor.org/stable/462051>>.

Krishnaraj, Maithreyi. "Androgyny: An Alternative to Gender Polarity?" *Economic and Political Weekly* 31.16/17 (1996): WS9-S14. JSTOR. Web. 23 Feb. 2013.

<<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4404054>>.

Laundry, Peter. "Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)." Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Biographical Sketches, n.d. Web. 24 Apr. 2013.

<<http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Freud.htm>>.

Le Guin, Ursula. *Dancing at the Edge of the World: Is Gender Necessary? Redux*. New York: Grove, 1989. Print.

Le Guin, Ursula. *The Left Hand of Darkness*. New York: Ace, 1969. Print.

Lugones, Maria. "Playfulness, "World"-Travelling, and Loving Perception." *Feminist Social Thought: A Reader*. New York: Routledge, 1997. 148-59. Print.

Mainari, Pat. "The Politics of Housework." (n.d.): 1-2. Web. 18 Mar. 2012.

<<http://www3.niu.edu/~td0raf1/history261/nov1902.htm>>.

Marquez, Gabriel G. *One Hundred Years of Solitude*. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. Print.

Mill, John S. "Th Subjection of Women." *The Feminist Papers: From Adam to De Beauvoir* (1869): 196-238. Print.

Mulvey, Laura. "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema." *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings* (1973): 833-44. Web.

Nordstrom, Carolyn. *A Different Kind of War Story*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1997. Print.

Parry, David M. *The Scarlet Empire*. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1906. Print

Patai, Daphne. "Gamesmanship and Androcentrism in Orwell's 1984." *Modern Language Association* 97.5 (1982): 856-70. *Modern Language Association International Bibliography on InfoTrac*. Web.

<<http://www.jstor.org/stable/462176>>.

Posada-Carbo, Eduardo. "Fiction as History: The Bananeras and Gabriel Garcia Marquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 30.2 (1998): 395-414. JSTOR. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

<<http://www.jstor.org/stable/158531>>.

"Sigmund Freud's Psychosexual Development Theory." *Sigmund Freud's Psychosexual*



*Development Theory*. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Apr. 2013.  
 <<http://www.datehookup.com/content-sigmund-freuds-psychosexual-development-theory.htm>>.

Sontag, Susan. "A Photograph Is Not an Opinion. Or Is It?" *Where the Stress Falls: Essays* (2001): n. pag. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.

Souvestre, Emile. *The World As It Shall Be*. Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 1846. Print.

Taussig, Michael T. *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991. Print.

Warner, Michael. *The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000. Print.

West, Candace, and Don H. Zimmerman. "Doing Gender." *Gender and Society* 1.2 (1987): 125-51. *JSTOR*. Web. <<http://www.jstor.org>>.

Wollstonecraft, Mary. "The Vindication of the Rights of Women." (1792): 40-85. Print.