Women in Action! Modern Gender Gap in Political Participation in South Korea *

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Abstract

To what extent do women and men behave differently in political participation? Although the extant literature finds a traditional gender gap in political participation, with males displaying a higher likelihood of involvement than their female counterparts, an increasing number of recent political movements regarding gender equality raise a possibility of more active political participation among female voters. This study explores whether and why females actively participate in political activities such as petitions and protests in South Korea where feminism and its backlash have been strongly debated recently. Using an online survey, we find that women are more likely to participate in signing petitions than men. Regarding street protest participation, there is no systemic difference between men and women. Also, the active participation of females in petitions is stronger among younger generations and those with higher levels of gender sensitivity.

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1 Introduction

One of the enduring questions in social science is what drives active political participation, including activities such as voting, which is often considered elite-directed, and more challenging forms of engagement like petitions and protests that confront existing power structures. While many attributes of participants have been explored, gender has received relatively less interest, largely because most research has consistently found a traditional gender gap in political participation, with men typically exhibiting higher levels of engagement compared to women (Campbell A, 1960; Dalton, 2014; Schlozman and Verba, 1994; Verba and Schlozman, 1997)

Does this traditional gender gap in participation persist even these days? The recent surge in interest in gender equality and associated social movements, such as #MeToo and Time's Up, necessitates a reexamination of the conventional notion that men participate more than women. Since #MeToo movement, many women resonated all these movements and actively expressed their thoughts, especially in the online sphere.

Against this backdrop, this paper tackles the conventional finding on the traditional gender gap in participation. It seeks to investigate the theoretical reasons behind the recent trend of increased political participation among women compared to men. We first begin by reviewing three theoretical explanations for historically lower participation among women: psychological factors such as traditional gender norms, economic factors related to resource constraints, and political factors involving a lack of mobilization. We then argue that these factors have evolved, leading to higher participation rates among female voters.

To support our argument, we focus on South Korea, which provides a compelling case for examining how trends in political participation have changed, particularly in light of the country's rapid economic and democratic development. More significantly, South Korea is currently experiencing a gender conflict related to feminism and its backlash, especially among younger generations.

Drawing on data from a recent online survey conducted in 2024, we find that female voters are more likely to sign petitions, while no significant gender differences are observed in street protest participation. Additionally, we explore the heterogeneous effects of respondents' age and gender sensitivity, finding that younger women and women with higher gender sensitivity are more likely to participate in petitions.

This paper will contribute to the literature on political participation in several ways. First, it challenges the conventional notion that men are more likely to participate than women. Although some studies have observed an increase in female participation, evidence from new democracies remains scarce. Second, this paper offers a comprehensive understanding of how gender dynamics influence political engagement, particularly in the context of evolving psychological, economic, and political

factors. Finally, this study highlights the influence of age and gender sensitivity on women's political activities.

2 Theoretical Argument

Why do some individuals engage in political participation while others do not? Which factors drive individuals to become politically active? Previous studies on gender and political participation suggest that women are generally less likely to participate in political activities than men. The reasons for this lower participation among women can be attributed to three key factors: psychological influences, such as gender norms; economic constraints, related to access to resources; and political factors, particularly the lack of mobilization motives.

Firstly, disparities in political participation between men and women are often the result of political socialization (Campbell A, 1960; Dalton, 2014; Lane, 1959). In many societies, cultural expectations tied to traditional gender norms tend to position women in domestic and caregiving roles, leaving them with less time and energy for political involvement. These social norms reinforce the notion that political engagement is primarily a male domain, which in turn leads to lower political ambition and participation among women. As a result, women are often socialized into believing that politics is not their sphere, which diminishes their interest in and sense of efficacy regarding political participation (Dalton, 2014: 64). This socialization process creates a perception of political inefficacy among women, discouraging them from engaging in political activities, particularly those that are contentious or confrontational.

The second factor contributing to women's lower participation in politics is resource constraints. Historically, women have had limited resources for political engagement(Burns and Verba, 2001; McAdam, 1992; Schlozman and Verba, 1994; Verba and Schlozman, 1997) These resources can be material, such as money, or immaterial, such as time and knowledge. Individuals with greater resources are more likely to participate actively in political activities because these resources help to overcome barriers to participation. In this context, women often have fewer resources available for political engagement compared to men.

The third factor limiting women's participation is the lack of mobilization motives. As Klandermans (1997) suggested, the first step toward participating in contentious politics is to empathize with the underlying issues or theme of the protests. The smaller number of female participants in the past may be attributed to insufficient motivations and mobilization efforts aimed at encouraging women to engage in political activities, such as petitions and protests.

Despite these established findings, recent developments in the global political landscape prompt a

re-examination of the traditional gender gap in political participation. Many women, particularly from younger generations, have been galvanized by social movements advocating for gender equality, such as #MeToo and Time's Up. In the online sphere, they have actively expressed their views and demanded social and political changes to address gender inequality.

We argue that these recent movements indicate significant changes in the three theoretical factors that historically contributed to women's lower political participation. First, psychological factors, such as traditional gender norms, have weakened. For instance, Schussman and Soule (2005) found that American women no longer perceive protest behaviors as improper or incompatible with their gender roles. Second, in economically advanced democracies, the gap in educational attainment between men and women has nearly disappeared. While there remains a gender gap in labor income, it has been narrowing. Finally, we contend that the most significant change lies in mobilization motives. Women are increasingly motivated to participate in and mobilize others around gender-related issues, leading to greater political involvement.

Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Females are more likely to participate than men.

We also argue two heterogeneous effects on women's political participation: generational effects and gender sensitivity. First, age has traditionally been considered a significant factor in explaining political participation. Political participation, defined as voluntary activities by citizens typically related to government, politics, or the state (van Deth, 2014) :353, can be classified as either elite-challenging or elite-directed, depending on the target(Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). The relationship between age and political participation varies across different types of activities. Existing research indicates that younger individuals are more likely to engage in elite-challenging political participation, such as protests, while older individuals are more inclined toward elite-directed political participation, such as voting (Marien Sofie and Quintelier, 2010; Katsanidou, 2016). This pattern is attributed to the fact that younger people are generally more focused on social change and exhibit higher levels of political activism compared to older individuals(Marsh, 2007). Additionally, young people are more inclined to participate in political activities because they typically face fewer family or employment constraints (Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991). They are less likely to encounter significant life events such as marriage, job changes, or having children, which can reduce the time available for engaging in protests(Stoker and Jennings, 1995).

Moreover, younger generations have played a leading role in recent gender-related social movements, such as #MeToo and Time's Up. South Korea follows this trend, with younger women in their 20s leading recent social movements related to gender issues, as we will discuss further in the case selec-

tion section. In summary, the second hypothesis regarding the heterogeneous effects of participants' generations is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Younger females are more likely to participate in political activities.

Another heterogeneous effect on female participation is gender sensitivity. It refers to the awareness and understanding of gender imbalances and the ability to identify elements of gender discrimination in everyday life. We propose that a higher level of gender sensitivity will lead to increased political participation by raising awareness of gender inequalities and motivating individuals to engage in political activities aimed at addressing and remedying these disparities. For instance,Jeong (2022, 103) suggests that individuals with a high level of gender sensitivity can comprehend gender as a socially constructed concept, recognize attitudes and behaviors associated with inequality and discrimination stemming from gender dichotomy and hierarchy, empathize with individuals of different gender identities and sexual orientations, and take action to promote equality in everyday life. In this context, individuals with heightened gender sensitivity are more inclined to participate in efforts to reduce gender inequality.

Specifically, women with a high level of gender sensitivity are more likely to perceive gendered inequalities in society as restrictive political opportunity structures[1]. These structures provide different opportunities for women and men to engage in contentious political activities (Fonow, 1998). Thus, women with higher gender sensitivity will want to engage in political activities. Supporting our argument, (Dodson, 2015) analyzed the interactive effects between gender and gender stereotypes on various forms of political participation, such as demonstrations and petitions[2]. However, we contend that the moderating effects of gender sensitivity will be more pronounced than those of gender stereotypes because gender sensitivity encompasses not only an awareness of gender inequality but also a motivation to take action against it. In summary, the third hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Women with higher levels of gender sensitivity are more likely to engage in political participation.

Finally, we anticipate that the effects of gender, generation, and gender sensitivity on political participation will vary depending on the type of activity. Recent studies have demonstrated that the forms of political participation differ by gender (Coffé, 2010; Dodson, 2015; Roth and Saunders, 2019). For instance, Dodson (2015) found that women are more likely to engage in non-confrontational

[1]Political opportunity structures are defined as "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others"(Kitschelt, 1986, 58)

[2]Dodson (2015) focuses on gender stereotypes without considering broader concepts such as hostile and benevolent sexism or attitudes toward sexual violence.

activities, such as petitions, whereas men are more inclined to participate in confrontational activities, such as marches or demonstrations. Similarly, Coffé (2010) showed that women are more likely to participate in voter turnout and private activism, such as signing petitions, while men tend to engage in more direct political activities, like contacting politicians or the media. Roth and Saunders (2019) confirmed that these patterns persist in the context of Western democracies.

The theoretical explanation for this gender difference in participation types largely revolves around resource constraints. As mentioned earlier, despite advancements in women's education and workforce participation, they continue to bear a significant share of domestic responsibilities. This ongoing burden makes women more likely to opt for forms of political participation that are less time-consuming and demanding. Petitions and protests differ significantly in terms of the resources they require; petitions generally involve lower participatory costs, needing less time and energy compared to protests. Signing a petition is typically a low-cost activity that demands minimal time and effort. Furthermore, as we will explain later, the highly efficient online petition systems in Korea make it even easier for women to participate in petitions. Therefore, we expect the effect of female participation to be more pronounced in petitions than in protests.

Hypothesis 4: The effects of females' participation will be stronger in petitions than in protests.

3 Case Selection

Previous research on political participation in South Korea suggests that men are more likely to engage in political activities such as protests, petitions, and boycotts than women (Lee, 2010; Park, 2005). While some studies indicate that the traditional gender gap in political participation has narrowed since the early 2000s (Cha, 2022; Yoo, 2021), few have thoroughly examined whether and how female participation might now surpass male participation.

Currently, South Korea is experiencing a significant gender conflict related to feminism and its backlash. Within this context, petitions have become an increasingly prominent form of political expression, particularly following the introduction of the "Blue House Online Petition" system by the Moon Jae-in administration in 2017. Under this system, petitions that receive over 200,000 signatures within one month are guaranteed a response from the cabinet[3]. Between August 18, 2017, and December 31, 2021, a total of 3,072 petitions were submitted, with 269 of them surpassing the 200,000-signature threshold.

Notably, the most frequently cited themes in these high-ranking petitions were "human rights and gender equality" and "political reform"(Nam, 2022). According to Nam (2022), 460 petitions specif-

[3]The online petition system is http://webarchives.pa.go.kr/19th/www.president.go.kr/petitions

ically addressed human rights and gender equality, making it the most frequent theme over the five years analyzed. Furthermore, petitions related to gender equality received significant public support, often surpassing the 200,000-signature mark. These issues included the abolition of abortion laws[4], mandatory feminist education[5], re-investigation of sexual crimes, and efforts to combat gender-based employment discrimination[6]. Given the direct relevance of these issues to women, we can infer that women are more inclined to participate in petitions.

In addition to the Blue House system, the Korean National Assembly launched its own e-petition platform in January 2020. Under this system, a legislative committee reviews petitions that gather over 50,000 signatures within one month and determines whether they should be brought to a plenary session[7]. Although petition systems are widely recognized as a popular means of political participation, participants often face challenges in achieving their desired outcomes (Bochel, 2020). However, in contrast to the traditional view of petitions, South Korea's government and legislative bodies impose a legal mandate to respond to petitions that meet the minimum signature thresholds. This system particularly encourages greater participation by women in petitions, given their relevance to issues of gender equality and human rights.

4 Empirical Analysis

4.1 Data and Measurement

The data were collected from an online survey of 2,048 South Koreans aged 18 and above, conducted through Qualtrics from February 27 to April 7, 2024. To ensure the sample's representativeness, we employed quota sampling based on respondents' gender, age, and region. The final number of observations used in the analysis is 2,001 due to non-responses to the question of political ideology and partisanship.

The dependent variables are the self-reported frequency of two types of political participation: signing petitions and attending street protests. For the question regarding how often survey respondents participate in signing a petition, the variable is coded as follows: 0 for those who never participated, 1 for those who participated rarely, 2 for those who participated sometimes, and 3 for those who participated very often. The same coding scheme applies to the variable measuring street protest participation. Figure 1 presents the histogram of two dependent variables. Approximately 35% of respondents have no experience with petitions, and more than half of respondents have not participated in protest. Con-

[4] $https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id = 20171127500051$

[5] $https://www.khan.co.kr/national/national-general/article/201802060040001$

[6] https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html$_dir$/2019/11/14/2019111402860.$html?utm_source = bigkindsutm_medium = originalutm_campaign = news$

[7] The petition is here https://petitions.assembly.go.kr/about/process

Figure 1: Distribution of Political Participation



Figure 2: Distribution of Political Participation



Table 1: Measurement of Gender Sensitivity

Dimension	Item
Hostile Sexism toward Women	(1) Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality."
	(2) Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.
	(3) Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.
Benevolent Sexism toward Women	(4) Women should be cherished and protected by men.
	(5) (new) It is better for women to do delicate and emotional work than for men.
	(6) Women have a quality of purity that few men possess.
Hostile Sexism toward Men	(7) Most men sexually harass women, even if only in subtle ways, once they are in a position of power over them.
	(8) Men will always fight to have greater control in society than women.
	(9) (new) Men easily use violence when problems arise in romantic relationships.
Benevolent Sexism toward Men	(10) Men need the care of women.
	(11) It is better for men to do difficult and dangerous work than for women.
	(12) (new) Men have a quality of strength that few women possess.
Gender Stereotype	(13) The ideal family is one in which the man earns the money and the woman takes care of the housework.
	(14) Men have better leadership than women.
	(15) Few females are elected to the governmental cabinet or CEO positions because there are few women with outstanding abilities.
	(16) Men are good at math and women are good at English.
Attitudes on Sexual Violence	(17) Sexual crimes are also caused by the victim's clothing or behavior.
	(18) A comment like "Your body line is good" is not sexual harassment.
	(19) Intimate partner violence is a private matter, so there is no need for third parties to intervene.

versely, about 34% of respondents have signed petitions while only 12% have participated in protest. Given the higher cost of street protests compared to petitions, the difference is not surprising. Figure 2 presents the histograms by gender. The ratio of females signing petitions is approximately 38.4%, which is higher than the male participation ratio of 30%. In terms of protest, the participation rate is similar for both genders, but the ratio of never-participating females (61.2%) is higher than that of males (55.2%).

To explore the reasons behind higher female participation, we investigate the moderating effects of two factors: generation and gender sensitivity. Generation is measured on a 5-point scale: 1 for teens, 2 for twenties, 3 for thirties, 4 for forties, and 5 for fifties, with 6 for those aged sixty and above.

Gender sensitivity is defined as a combination of three dimensions: sexism, gender stereotypes, and attitudes regarding sexual violence. First, sexism is measured using the first 12 items in Table 1. We

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Petition	2,001	1.027	.894	0	3
Protest	2,001	.557	.745	0	3
Sexism	2,001	2.62	.453	1	4
Sexism against Men	2,001	2.534	.513	1	4
Sexism against Women	2,001	2.706	.516	1	4
Female	2,001	.497	.5	0	1
Political Interest	2,001	2.925	.834	1	4
Ideology	2,001	5.245	1.961	0	10
Party Identification					
People Power Party	2,001	.264	.441	0	1
Minjoo Party	2,001	.356	.479	0	1
Other Parties	2,001	.097	.296	0	1
Independents	2,001	.283	.451	0	1
Generation	2,001	4.127	1.426	1	6
Education	2,001	4.584	.972	1	6
Household Income	2,001	5.645	2.716	1	11
Socioeconomic Status	2,001	2.561	.838	1	5
Residence					
Seoul	2,001	.245	.430	0	1
Gyeonggi and Incheon	2,001	.359	.480	0	1
Chungcheong	2,001	.088	.284	0	1
Jeolla	2,001	.066	.248	0	1
Gyeongsang	2,001	.205	.404	0	1
Gangwon and Jeju	2,001	.036	.186	0	1

use 9 questions from the scales of hostile and benevolent sexism toward women (Glick, 1997) and men (Glick, 1999), and add three new questions to balance the target gender. Second, to measure gender stereotypes, we add items from (13) to (16) in Table 1, which are common in Korean gender stereotypes. Third, attitudes towards sexual violence, which we believe are crucial for gender sensitivity, are measured using items from (17) to (19) from Table 1. In the main analysis, we use the mean value of all 19 gender sensitivity questions. As a robustness check, we employ IRT (Item Response Theory) calculation, a mathematical model that describes the non-linear relationship between a latent variable and an individual's responses to a survey question (Ellis, 1989). IRT is known to outperform other methods in capturing the effect of an underlying latent construct on variables, especially when individual responses to a particular survey question are given on ordinal scales (Bartholomew, 2011; Ellis, 1989).

The model includes control variables for factors that could influence political participation, such as political interest, self-reported ideology, party identification, and socioeconomic and demographic features. Political interest is measured using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 'not interested at all' to 'very interested.' Self-reported political ideology is measured on an 11-point scale, ranging from most conservative (0 points) to most liberal (10 points). Party identification is indicated by three dummy variables: Minjoo Party, Other parties, and independents, with People Power Party as the

Table 3: Gender Gap in Political Participation

	Model 1 Petition	Model 2 Protest	Model 3 Petition	Model 4 Protest
Female	0.259***	0.004	0.620***	0.170*
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.080)
Generation	-0.068**	-0.041**	-0.019	-0.018
	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Female × Generation			-0.087***	-0.040*
			(0.017)	(0.015)
Political Interest	0.299***	0.183***	0.299***	0.183***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Ideology	0.034*	0.031**	0.034*	0.031**
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Party Identification(Reference=People Power Party				
Minjoo Party	0.090	0.153**	0.084	0.151**
	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.044)
Other Parties	0.139	0.145	0.142	0.147
	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.076)	(0.083)
Independents	-0.202***	-0.060	-0.205***	-0.061
	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.043)
Education	0.021	0.050***	0.017	0.048***
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.011)
Household Income	0.034***	0.007	0.033***	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Socieconomic Status	-0.033	0.074***	-0.034	0.074***
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.012)
Residence (Reference = Seoul)				
Gyeonggi and Incheon	0.024***	-0.082***	0.025***	-0.082***
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.012)
Chungcheong	0.028	-0.171**	0.025	-0.172**
	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Jeolla	0.067	-0.027	0.074	-0.024
	(0.118)	(0.028)	(0.124)	(0.030)
Gyeongsang	0.014	-0.118**	0.009	-0.120**
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.036)
Gangwon and Jeju	0.043	-0.073	0.039	-0.074
	(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.072)	(0.090)
Constant	-0.084	-0.412***	-0.275	-0.500***
	(0.232)	(0.096)	(0.228)	(0.100)
Observations	2001	2001	2001	2001
Adjusted R^2	0.156	0.117	0.160	0.118

Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the 17 province level.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

reference category[8]. Demographic variables include household income (measured on an 11-point scale with responses ranging from less than 1 million won to over 10 million won, segmented into 100,000-won units), and educational level (measured on a 6-point scale from less than elementary school scored as 1, junior high school education as 2, high school education as 3, vocational college education as 4, undergraduate education as 5, to postgraduate education or higher as 6). Fixed effects for regions were included to control for regional characteristics that could affect the dependent variable. As the sample allocation by region has issues of dependence among respondents in the same region and high independence across different regions, cluster-robust standard errors at the province level were used to address this issue.

Table 2 displays summary statistics of all variables used in the empirical model.

Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Female and Generation



4.2 Empirical Results

Table 3 reports OLS regression models exploring the gender gap in political participation. The dependent variables are petition experiences in Models (1) and (3) and protest experiences in Models (2) and (4).

The gender gap in political participation reveals an interesting contrast. In Model (1), women are more likely to sign petitions than men, contrary to the conventional idea that men participate in political activities more than women. In terms of protest participation, no significant gender differences exist, as shown in Model (2). Given the conventional finding that men participate more in protest, the lack of significant differences between women and men in protest participation is also noteworthy.

In hypothesis 2, we posited that young females are more engaged in political activities to voice their concerns on gender-sensitive issues such as gender violence and welfare policies for child care. Models (3) and (4) of Table 3 display the interaction effects to test it. The interaction coefficients in the third row indicate how the associations between gender and political participation vary with respondents' age. In Model 3, the coefficient for females is positive and significant (β = 0.620, SE = 0.068, p < 0.001) and the coefficient on its interaction with generation is negative and significant (β = -0.087, SE = 0.017, p < 0.001). Model 4 follows a similar pattern. Younger females participate

[8]Respondents were first asked if they felt close to any party. For those who did not answer, we asked again if they felt relatively close to any party

more in petitions and protests, and among older females, the positive association between gender and participation attenuates.

To understand the conditional effects of age among female participants, we present Figure 3 to display the marginal effects of gender and generation on petition and protest participation, with 95% confidence intervals. The left side of the figure shows how the marginal effects of females on petition participation vary with respondents' age. The youngest women have the highest probability of participating in petitions. Although the gender effect decreases with age, it remains significant until the fifties. With a 90% confidence interval, women of all ages participate more in petitions than men.

This finding has an important implication for recent studies on the gender gap in Korea. The existing studies on the modern gender gap and gender politics usually focus on individuals in their twenties or thirties, highlighting the conflictual political views between young women and young men, especially in their twenties. However, this empirical finding shows that older women also actively express their voices through petition participation.

The right side of the figure Figure 3 illustrates how the marginal effects of gender on protest participation vary with the respondents' age. Unlike petition participation, only among the youngest respondents does the gender variable show a significant difference in protest participation at a 90% confidence interval. Among women over twenties, there is no statistically significant difference in gender effects on protest participation.

Why do females participate more in petitions? Our hypothesis 3 suggests that females with high gender sensitivity engage more in petitions to express their concerns on gender issues. Table 4 presents interaction models testing this hypothesis. The dependent variables are petition experiences in Model (1) and protest experiences in Model (2). The interaction coefficients in the third row indicate how the associations between gender and political participation vary with the respondents' gender sensitivity. In Model 1, the coefficient for gender sensitivity is negative and significant, while the coefficient for females is negative but not significant. The coefficient for the interaction between gender and gender sensitivity is positive and significant for petition participation ($\beta = 0.182$, SE $= 0.069$, $p < 0.05$), indicating that among those with higher gender sensitivity, the positive association between gender and petition participation is stronger.

Figure 4 shows how the marginal effects of females on petition participation vary with the respondents' gender sensitivity. Females with the lowest level of gender sensitivity display no differences in petition participation compared to men. However, among those with higher gender sensitivity, females are more likely to participate in petitions. In terms of protest participation, no interaction effects are found by gender sensitivity.

Table 4: Interaction Effects of Gender and Gender Sensitivity

	(1) Petition	(2) Protest
Gender Sensitivity	-0.131*	-0.211**
	(0.051)	(0.053)
Female	-0.258	0.210
	(0.197)	(0.183)
Female × Sensitivity	0.182*	-0.058
	(0.069)	(0.062)
Political Interest	0.301***	0.181***
	(0.025)	(0.023)
Ideology	0.034*	0.033***
	(0.013)	(0.007)
Party Identification(Reference=People Power Party		
Minjoo Party	0.097	0.188***
	(0.050)	(0.044)
Other Parties	0.155	0.171
	(0.078)	(0.081)
Independents	-0.190***	-0.028
	(0.029)	(0.044)
Generation	-0.068**	-0.058***
	(0.022)	(0.012)
Education	0.022	0.060***
	(0.017)	(0.011)
Household Income	0.034***	0.008*
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Socieconomic Status	-0.034	0.060***
	(0.019)	(0.012)
Residence (Reference = Seoul)		
Gyeonggi and Incheon	0.024***	-0.080***
	(0.005)	(0.011)
Chungcheong	0.023	-0.163**
	(0.048)	(0.048)
Jeolla	0.068	-0.048
	(0.119)	(0.030)
Gyeongsang	0.015	-0.116**
	(0.025)	(0.038)
Gangwon and Jeju	0.055	-0.088
	(0.082)	(0.062)
Constant	0.269	0.208
	(0.260)	(0.182)
Observations	2001	2001
Adjusted R^2	0.158	0.136

Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the 17 province level.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Female and Gender Sensitivity



5 Conclusion

We have analyzed the gender gap in political participation such as signing petitions and doing protests. Contrary to the conventional idea that women are less engaged in political activities, women are more likely to participate in signing petitions while no systemic differences exist in protests. We have also analyzed moderating effects of age and gender sensitivity.

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