AFGHANISTAN

Hazaras

Activity: 1960-2020

General notes

- The Hazaras are a small ethnic group of mixed Turkic and Mongol descent, primarily living in the central highlands of Afghanistan between the Pashtun and Tajik regions. Though the Hazaras made up 67% of the Afghan population in the 19th century, massacres and loss of political autonomy in 1893 decreased the Hazara population drastically due to deaths and refugee flight to the Turkestan region. Today, the Hazaras make up about 9% of the total Afghan population and are concentrated primarily in Hazarestan and secondarily in Badakhstan, both of which are mountainous regions that remain isolated from the urban population. The Hazaras are a minority not only in size but also in religion and language, as they are primarily Shi'i Muslims who speak a dialect of Farsi called Hazaragi. Due to more than a century of discrimination and repression, the Hazaras have evolved from a group of people that included landed gentry as well as peasants to today's unskilled laborers living in poverty. Persecution historically came largely from the Sunni population even though a minority of Hazaras follow the Sunni sect, and today the Hazaras and victims of repression by the Pashtun elite in Afghanistan. Political, social, and religious repression have only increased with the Taliban's rise to power due to the Hazaras' religious beliefs and physical features (National Geographic: 2). When the Taliban was overthrown and Hamid Karzai became president, the Hazaras were afforded more opportunity in Afghanistan although they remain the clear lower caste in Afghan society.
- The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published in August 2018 reports that Hazaras continue to face continuing societal discrimination, extortion forced recruitment and forced labour, physical abuse, and detention. Hazaras, who are predominantly Shi'ites, have historically been marginalized and discriminated against by the Sunni majority population. While they were reported to have made significant economic and political advances since the 2001 fall of the Taliban regime, in recent years there has reportedly been a significant increase in harassment, intimidation, kidnappings and killings at the hands of Taliban, Daesh (ISIL) and other anti-government elements (UNCHR 2018: 93-94).

Movement start and end dates

- According to Minorities at Risk, past and recent goals of the Hazara include political participation and economic development. Besides these, the Hazaras also aimed to increase self-determination by lobbying for more religious and cultural autonomy. According to Minority Rights Group International, "[t]he Hazaras have voiced their dissent to the policies of overt discrimination against them since the 1970s though a united political party of the Hazara opposition movement Hizb-e Wahdat (Party of Unity) was only established in 1988." Minahan confirms this, but suggests an earlier start date in the 1960s: "Economic deprivation and religious persecution stimulated the political mobilization of the Hazaras in the 1960s and 1970s, in a movement that concentrated on gaining political autonomy within the Afghan kingdom" (Minahan 2002: 728-729).
- In the late 1970s, the Hazaras were able to liberate Hazarastan and in the 1980s, won autonomy from the Afghan government. Hizb-e Wahdat was then involved in a war to overthrow the Taliban from the late 1980s until early 2000s, and today maintains one seat in the Afghan parliament. Non-zero protest scores in Minorities at Risk from 2002 until 2006 point to continued activity.
- According to Minority Rights Group International, continued discrimination led to the emergence of the Enlightenment Movement (Junbesh-e Roshanaye) in 2016, which protested against

discrimination. The movement formed in response to growing frustration and discontent among the Hazaras regarding their share of national resources and foreign aid and in particular in protest against the government's decision to change the route of a major power transmission line which would bypass Hazara-dominated territories (BBC 2016; Bose et al. 2019: 12 ; Paiman 2020). The Enlightenment movement does not seem to have made claims for self-determination; however, according to Minahan (2016:172) the Hazaras activists continue to seek increased self-rule. On this basis, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1960; end date: ongoing]

Dominant claim

- According to Minahan, the Hazara movement for self-determination is "a movement that concentrated on gaining political autonomy within the Afghan kingdom" (Minahan 2002: 728-729). Evidence for the autonomy claim is provided by the Minorities at Risk Project, which states that the Hazaras "rebelled for political autonomy" and by the fact that the Hazaras were also part of the Tajik dominated Northern Alliance whose primary demand was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs. [1960-2020: autonomy claim]

Independence claims

- While the Hazara movement's primary focus is increased internal autonomy, several sources suggest that some Hazaras have also demanded independence. The clearest evidence for this is a declaration of independence made in the year 2000 in the context of repressive Taliban rule (Minahan 2002: 730; Roth 2015: 310). However, both Minahan and Roth argue that it was just a small number of activists who had declared independence. Minahan (2016: 172) notes that some Hazara seek independence while Roth (2015: 310) suggests that the movement is "dormant". Overall, there seem to have been some claims for independence; however, the political significance of such claims is unclear. [no independence claims]

Irredentist claims

NA

Claimed territory

- The territory claimed by the Hazaras is their traditional homeland, the mountainous Hazarajat region in central Afghanistan (Minahan 2002: 726). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 302).

Sovereignty declarations

- There was a declaration of independence made in the year 2000 in the context of repressive Taliban rule (Minahan 2002: 730; Roth 2015: 310). However, both Minahan and Roth argue that it was just a small number of activists who had declared independence. [no sovereigny declaration]

Separatist armed conflict

- There is evidence that the Hazaras engaged in a violent uprising after the Soviet invasion in 1979. Specifically, according to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Hazaras rebelled for political autonomy and were able to liberate Hazarajat. The rebels set up their own government and established control over large parts of the provinces of Bamiyan, Ghowr and Uruzgan. The government withdrew in 1981 and granted autonomy. Yet, we were unable to find any casualty estimates specific to the Hazaras for this period and, notably, UCDP/PRIO does not code any Hazara group as involved in armed conflict until 1984. According to Ibrahimi (2009: 7), the Kabul government and the Soviet army refrained from large-scale military offensives in the region. Overall, it is possible that the 25 deaths threshold was met, but the evidence is too thin. We code NVIOLSD.
- UCDP/PRIO suggests that a group called Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan was involved in an armed conflict in 1984. Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan had many Hazara supporters, but we found no evidence to suggest that the group made self-determination claims for the Hazara as defined here. As the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia explains, "Although Hazarajat was dominated by the Hazara ethnic Afghan-minority, which largely follows Shia Islam, Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan did not originate from the Hazara community. Consequently, support for the group was not Hazara-dominated; its members were urban, politicized and educated individuals recruited from the full range of Shia Afghans." We code NVIOLSD.
- UCDP/PRIO suggests that a group known as Hizb-i Wahdat, also known as the Unity Party, started an insurgency in 1989, which continued until 1995. Hizb-i Wahdat was comprised mainly of Hazaras and aspired at an Islamic regime in Afghanistan, but also had ethnic nationalist motives, thus we code the episode as ambiguous due to mixed motives. Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code two civil wars during this period, but disaggregated data from UCDP suggests that there were just 25 deaths in 1989-1991. In 1992-1994, there were 1,018 battle-related deaths over the three-year period and 168 in 1995, which fulfills the criteria for HVIOLSD.
- The MAR rebellion score is 7 from 1996-1998 and 6 from 1999-2001, pointing to large-scale violence. This is because the Hazara were involved in the civil war against the Taliban, which is coded in Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). The main incompatibility concerned the government, but "There is nevertheless evidence that self-determination was an issue in the conflict: from 1996-2001 the primary demand of the Northern Alliance, of which the Uzbeks were members, was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs." We code 1996-2001 as HVIOLSD while applying an ambiguous code.
    - Note: we found no disaggregated casualty figures, but the the rebellion was led by repressed minorities including the Hazaras. UCDP reports more than 20,000 battle-related deaths for the 1996-2001 war. In light of this, we code this period as HVIOLSD. We note this coding decision is ambiguous.
- According to Minority Rights Group International, extremist violence has been targeted against Hazaras. On 23 July 2016, a rally of the Enlightenment Movement at Deh Mazang Square in Kabul was targeted by a suicide bomber, which killed 85 protesters and injured more than 400 others. There is further evidence of attacks on Hazaras in 2017 and 2018 (Minority Rights Group International). However, we found no evidence to suggest that the Hazaras were involved in separatist armed conflict after 2001. [1960-1988: NVIOLSD; 1989-1991: LVIOLSD; 1992-1995: HVIOLSD; 1996-2001: HVIOLSD; 2002-2020: NVIOLSD]

Historical context

- Of mixed Turkic and Mongol origin, the Hazaras are believed to have settled in Afghanistan in the thirteenth century. Surrounded by hostile nations trying to subjugate them, the Hazaras retained their military tradition. During the rule of Shah Abbas Safavid of Persia, the Hazaras adopted Shia Islam in the early seventeenth century. Until today, this has led to close ties to neighboring Iran. Due to them being both an ethnic and a religious minority, the Hazaras have

faced long-term persecution and their political, economic and cultural status has been precarious in modern times. Pashtun and Sunni expansionism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and their discrimination of non-Sunnis forced the Hazaras into their current location in the mountains. Nevertheless, they managed to remain independent for the most part until the nineteenth century (Emadi 1997; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).

- After the Second Anglo-Afghan War ended in 1880, Pashtun Abdur Rahman Khan started to extend his influence from Kabul by force and brought Hazarajat under his control in 1893. The Hazaras revolted, but their revolt was crushed by Pashtun tribes. More than half of the Hazara population was massacred, many were enslaved, the land occupied and autonomy lost, when Hazaras were declared infidels and Jihad was started by Sunnis on all Shi'as of Afghanistan. Once the largest Afghan ethnic group (approximately 67 percent) before the nineteenth century, massacres and migration made the Hazaras a minority of around 10 percent as of today. The Hazaras remained de-facto slaves until 1919 when Afghanistan was declared independent. Religious, economic and political persecution continued into the twentieth century, also as a consequence of the process of "Pashtunization" (Emadi 1997; Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International).

Concessions and restrictions

- During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Hazaras rebelled for political autonomy and were able to liberate Hazarajat. The rebels set up their own government and established control over large parts of the provinces of Bamiyan, Ghowr and Uruzgan (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). An agreement with the Soviet government was signed that allowed them "to live a relatively independent existence in their mountain homeland" in exchange for not attacking the government (Minahan 2002: 729). The Minorities at Risk Project also confirms that the government granted the Hazaras a "high degree of independence". Information, however, differs with regard to the timing. Most sources state that autonomy was installed during the early 1980s. Canfield (2004) mentions 1981 as the year the communist government effectively withdrew from Hazarajat and autonomy came into effect. We thus code an autonomy concession in 1981. [1981: autonomy concession]
- With the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Hazara's precarious situation returned. During the civil war that followed, Afghanistan was essentially divided into several regions, each under the control of autonomous military forces. Hence, we only code an end to autonomy in 1996, when the Taliban overran the Hazara territory, declared the Hazara infidel and murdered many (Canfield 2004; Minahan 2002). [1996: autonomy restriction]
- The US invasion of 2001 removed the Taliban and resulted in the reestablishment of Hazara autonomy, as also illustrated by the EPR upgrade to regional autonomy as of 2002 (first of January rule). The Bonn Agreement of 2001 installed an interim power sharing government at the center. Although the agreement did not involve federalist principles per se and the establishment of regional autonomy was partly also the result of a power vacuum, we still code an autonomy concession as the agreement implicitly left "broad autonomy" (Roeder and Rothchild 2005) to the regional warlords outside Kabul. Furthermore, the 2001 Bonn Agreement also mandated the 2004 Constitution which recognized the Hazaras as an Afghan ethnic minority, gave them the full right to Afghan citizenship and some degree of self-determination (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International; see also Desaultes-Stein 2005). [2001: autonomy concession]
    - According to Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, the 1996-2001 civil war ended in October 2001. The Bonn Agreement was concluded in December 2001, and thus after the war.

Regional autonomy

- EPR codes the Hazaras as regionally autonomous from 1979 until 1996 and again from 2002 onwards. We adopt this coding with one exception: As outlined above, and following the first of January rule, we code the start of the first phase of regional autonomy in 1982. [1982-1996: regional autonomy]

- The second phase is in line with the EPR coding of autonomy, as outlined above. [2002-2020: regional autonomy]

De facto independence

NA

Major territorial changes

- [1981: erection of regional autonomy]
- [1996: revocation of regional autonomy]
- [2001: erection of regional autonomy]

EPR2SDM

Movement	Hazaras
Scenario	1:1/No match/1:1
EPR group(s)	Hazaras
Gwgroupid(s)	70007000

Power access

- We draw on EPR. EPR codes a state collapse in 1993-1996; instead, we code the Hazara as powerless, in line with Germann & Sambanis (2021). Note: we extend the discriminated code to 1979 so as to be consistent with the January 1 rule (the situation changed as a result of the Soviet invasion in 1979). [1960-1979: discriminated; 1980-1992: junior partner; 1993-1996: powerless; 1997-2001: discriminated; 2002-2005: junior partner; 2006-2014: senior partner]
- From 2015- 2021 EPR codes Hazara as junior partner. [2015-2020: junior partner]
- Since the Taliban takeover in 2021, Hazaras no longer have representation in the 33-member Taliban cabinet, nor as provincial and district governors (34 provinces, 387 districts), mayors, or police chiefs. Hazaras do not occupy any senior government positions in the three largely Hazara-populated provinces of Bamiyan, Daikundi, and Ghazni (Akbari 2022).

Group size

- We draw on EPR. [0.11]

Regional concentration

- According to Minahan (2002: 726), the majority of the Afghan Hazaras is located in Hazarajat, where they comprise approx. 56% of the local population. This amounts to around 2,548,000 people (in 2002), which is more than 50 per cent of the around 4 million Hazarsa in the whole country in that same year. MAR also suggests that they are spatially concentrated in Hazarajat. [regionally concentrated]

Kin

- EPR does not code ethnic kin. According to Minahan (2002: 726), however, there are 610,000 Hazaras in Iran and 105,000 in Pakistan (in 2002). [kin in neighboring country]

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Tajiks

Activity: 1979-1992; 1996-2002

General notes

NA

Movement start and end dates

- Since 1979 is the first year for which we were able to find reports of Tajik separatist activity, we peg the start date of this movement at 1979. The movement was violent from the start (see below). We code no self-determination activity for 1993-95 because the Tajiks, as represented by the Jam'iyat-i-Islam party and under the guidance of Burhanuddin Rabbani, gained control of the country's government in 1992 and remained in control of the central government until Rabbani was overthrown in 1996 by the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. The movement re-emerged after that, with immediate violence. We found no evidence for claims for autonomy by Tajik actors after the 2001 Bonn Agreement, which conferred a degree of autonomy.
- MAR denotes non-zero protest scores in 2003 and 2004, but no self-determination activity was found. This coincides with Marshall & Gurr (2003) who see the conflict as contained. The end of the movement is thus coded as 2002. We could also code the end of the movement in 2001; however, the Bonn Agreement it occurred in December 2001 after the 1996-2001 civil war in October 2001. To reflect the case history, we code the autonomy concession in 2002 and not in 2001 (see below) and therefore also code the movement as active until 2002.
- Burhānuddin Rabbānī continued to lead Jamiat-e Islami until his assassination in 2011 and his son Salāhuddīn Rabbānī was subsequently elected as the party's leader until he was replaced in 2020 (Shaheed 2020). Salāhuddīn Rabbānī chaired the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) in negotiations with the Taliban from 2012 to 2015 and was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan from 2015 to his resignation in 2019 over interference from the Presidential Palace (Ghubar 2019). However, although the party continues to exist, no further claims for increased self-determination as defined here were found after 2001/2002. [start date 1: 1979; end date 1: 1992; start date 2: 1996; end date 2: 2002]

Dominant claim

- According to the Minorities at Risk Project, the Tajiks are represented by a variety of organizations and parties, including Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society), Nazhat-e Milli (National Movement), Zazman-i Inqilabi Zahmatkishanan-i Afghanistan (Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of Afghanistan, SAZA), Congra-i Milli (National Congress), and Hizb-e Afghanistan-e Nawin (New Afghanistan Party). Minorities at Risk considers Jamiat-e Islami the dominant party. During the reign of the Taliban, Jamiat united with other factions to form the Northern Alliance. The Tajiks dominated the multi-ethnic Northern Alliance. The primary demand of the Northern Alliance was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs. So while the Northern Alliance was seeking control of the central government, it was also aiming to structure the state in a way that would provide for a greater degree of ethnic political autonomy. The dominant Tajik claim is hence political autonomy within Afghanistan. There have been claims for uniting with Tajikistan. However, all sources confirm that the dominant claim was political autonomy and participation, also for the first period of activity. [1979-1992: autonomy claim] [1996-2002: autonomy claim]

Independence claims

NA

Irredentist claims

- We found some loose references for demands for a merger with Tajikistan, but nothing concrete. [no irredentist claims]

Claimed territory

- The Tajiks predominantly seek power at the center, but there are also claims for increased autonomy for the northeastern provinces where they form a majority: Balkh, Samangan, Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan, Panjshir, Parwan, and Kapisa. We code this claim based on the latter claim, using the Global Administrative Areas Database (GADM 2019).

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Separatist armed conflict

- A rebel group called Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan rose up against the new Communist regime in 1979, leading to more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in that year (UCDP/PRIO). Jam'iyyat-i Islami's members were predominantly Tajik and remained active throughout the 1979-1992 civil war (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The HVIOLSD coding for 1979-1992 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
- Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan joined the Northern Alliance shortly after the Taliban take-over (September 1996) in October 1996. The Tajiks were the dominant members of the alliance, which was involved in a full-scale civil war between 1996 and 2001 (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).
- We code the HVIOLSD phases of the movement as over mixed motives because of Fearon and Laitin's classification of the civil war as a "center insurgency," which indicates that there were issues besides self-determination relevant to the conflict. Specifically, from 1996-2001 the primary demand of the Northern Alliance was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs. So while the Northern Alliance was seeking control of the central government, it was also aiming to structure the state in a way that would provide for a greater degree of ethnic political autonomy. [1979-1992: HVIOLSD; 1996-2001: HVIOLSD]
    - Note: we found no evidence for nonviolent activity before the two periods of activity (1979 onwards/1996 onwards). The first claim emerged in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The invasion took place in late December, so any violence must have occurred almost immediately, assuming Marshall & Gurr and Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl are right that the Tajiks were engaged in separatist armed conflict in this year.
    - Similarly, regarding the second period the available evidence suggests violence emerged immediately and was a result of turning tables in the ongoing civil war; effectively, the former rebels (the Taliban) became the goverment and the former (Tajik-dominated) government the rebels (see SSW2019 coding notes).

- Note as well: we found no disaggregated casualty figures, but the Tajiks were major players in those wars. SSW report an overall deaths count of 1.24 million for the 1979-1992 war while UCDP reports more than 20,000 battle-related deaths for the 1996-2001 war. In light of this, we code both periods as HVIOLSD.

Historical context

- Many Tajiks settled in Northern Afghanistan in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century when many Tajiks fled the conquest of their homeland by the Russians. They constitute the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after the Pashtuns. Persian-speaking Sunni Muslims, the Tajiks have ruled Afghanistan for a brief period in 1929, when Habibullah Kalakani was in power for nine months.
- King Zahir Shah, who ruled from 1933 to 1973, tried to modernize Afghanistan. According to the Minority Rights Group International, the Tajiks were "closely linked" to the regime. A constitution was passed in 1964, which established a national legislature and made Pashtu and Dari the official languages of Afghanistan (Katzman 2013:1).
- After the Soviet Union have pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, the country descended further into civil war. Burhānuddin Rabbāni, a Tajik leader, became president under the Peshawar Accord and stayed in power from 1992 until 1996, but since there was no strong central government capable of controlling the territory, autonomy concessions (or restrictions) are difficult to identify. The increased access to the central government is not coded as a concession as defined in the codebook as it concerns the access dimension.
- According to Bleuer (2007), the Taliban strongly opposed any regional autonomy for the non-Pashtun groups. Regional autonomy arrangements, as they had existed prior to 1996, were abolished. We thus code an autonomy restriction in 1996, noting though that, as the dominant ethnic group of the Northern Alliance, the Tajiks did in fact continue to control 10 percent of the Afghan territory in the Panjshir Valley and some pockets of Hazarajat highlands, a fact which is reflected in the coding of the de-facto independence. We treat this as a prior restriction since the SDM emerged in response to the Taliban take-over (see above). [1996: autonomy restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- The Soviet invasion in 1979 led to the destruction of the political system and a "power vacuum" that opened opportunities for minorities to organize militarily. This development resulted in "full political and administrative autonomy" (Bleuer 2007: 22) also for the Tajiks. It is, however, difficult to identify the year in which an autonomy concession has taken place, since there does not seem to be an official agreement but rather an implicit concession. The Minority Rights Group International, which also states that the Tajiks exercised full administrative and political autonomy, merely points to the close link between the Tajiks and the Soviet occupiers. Lacking any information on the exact date of the granting of autonomy, we code the concession in 1980, the year after the invasion. [1980: autonomy concession]
- The Tajiks gained control over the government in 1992 and 2001. From 1992 to 1996 the central government was led by Burhannudin Rabbani, a Tajik. Also in the interim government that was founded in December 2001 following the US invasion, the Tajik controlled key cabinet positions at the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defense. However, both these events are not coded here since they concern the group's access to central state power.
- The US invasion of 2001 removed the Taliban and resulted in the reestablishment of autonomy. The Bonn Agreement of 2001 installed an interim power sharing government at the center. Although the agreement did not involve federalist principles per se and the establishment of regional autonomy was partly also the result of a power vacuum, we still code an autonomy concession as the agreement implicitly left "broad autonomy" (Roeder and Rothchild 2005) to the regional warlords outside Kabul. [2001: autonomy concession]
    - According to Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, the 1996-2001 civil war ended in October 2001. The Bonn Agreement was concluded in December 2001, and thus after the war.

Regional autonomy

- EPR considers the Tajiks regionally autonomous from 1979, the year of the Soviet invasion. This is confirmed by Bleuer (2007), who also states that the Tajiks, like the Uzbeks and Hazaras "had full political and administrative autonomy" in the 1980s. Following the first of January rule, we code regional autonomy from 1981 onwards. [1981-1992: regional autonomy]
- Given de-facto independence under Taliban rule, we code the Tajiks regionally autonomous from 1997-2001. In 1996, we do not code regional autonomy because the Taliban had revoked autonomy (see above). [1997-2001: regional autonomy]
- We again code autonomy in 2002 due to the 2001 Bonn Agreement. [2002: regional autonomy]

De facto independence

- According to Bleuer (2007), the Taliban strongly opposed any regional autonomy for the non-Pashtun groups. Accordingly, the Tajiks' autonomy was revoked in 1996. However, as the dominant ethnic group of the Northern Alliance, the Tajiks did in fact control 10 percent of the Afghan territory in the Panjshir Valley and some pockets of Hazarajat highlands. We thus code de-facto independence from 1997-2001. [1997-2001: de facto independence]

Major territorial changes

- [1980: erection of regional autonomy]
- [1996: revocation of regional autonomy; erection of de-facto independence]
- [2001: erection of regional autonomy; revocation of de-facto independence]

EPR2SDM

Movement	Tajiks
Scenario	1:1/No match/1:1
EPR group(s)	Tajiks
Gwgroupid(s)	70014000

Power access

- We draw on EPR, with the following exceptions:
    - The Soviet invasion in 1979, in whose context the SDM appears to have emerged, led to greater inclusion of the Tajiks, who up to this point had been powerless. To better reflect the case history, we deviate from EPR, we code the Tajiks as powerless in 1979, but follow EPR and code the Tajiks as junior partner in 1980-1992.
    - In 1996, the Tajiks lost power to the (mostly Pashtun) Taliban and the latter began to dismantle the autonomy of non-Pashtun groups (Bleuer 2007). As a result of this, a Tajik separatist movement emerged. Due to the 1st of January rule, EPR codes reflects these dynamics only in 1997, but this clearly misrepresents the case dynamics. We recode the Tajiks as discriminated in 1996. 1997-2001 = powerless due to self-exclusion/de facto independence. From 2002, the Tajiks had a major role in the government. [1979: powerless; 1980-1992: junior partner; 1996: discriminated; 1997-2001: powerless; 2002: senior partner]

Group size

- We draw on EPR. [0.25]

Regional concentration

- Reliable data on the Tajiks' settlement pattern is difficult to get by (there has not been a census since the 1970s), but weighing the evidence we could find, it is rather unlikely that the threshold for spatial concentration is met. [not concentrated]
    - According to Minorits Rights Group International, the Tajiks live spread across "different areas throughout the state", while larger concentrations can be found "in northern, northeastern and western Afghanistan." GeoEPR suggests a similar conclusion: There are larger Tajik concentrations in different areas of the country, but especially in the country's northeast.
    - The evidence we found suggests that the Tajiks do form absolute majorities in eight provinces in northeastern Afghanistan: Balkh, Samangan, Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan, Panjshir, Parwan, and Kapisa. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the threshold is met. There are approx. 8 million Tajiks in Afghanistan, and it is unlikely that there are more than 4 million in these eight northeastern provinces. Combined, these provinces have a population of around 5.2 million, and while the Tajiks do form a majority there, there are also significant Uzbek, Hazara, and Pashtun communities in the area.
    - A significant part of the Tajiks lives in Afghanistan's larger cities, which tend not to be part of the Tajiks' regional base in northeastern Afghanistan. In Kabul, the Tajiks comprise approx. 45% of the population. This means that Kabul (which does not overlap with other areas with larger Tajik concentrations, see GeoEPR) alone harbors approx. 1.6 of the approx. 8 million Tajiks. Other cities with significant Tajik communities are Herat, Mazar-el-Sharif (60%), and Ghazni (50%).

Kin

- EPR codes ethnic kin (Tajiks) in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the former Soviet Union, and Iran. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are mentioned by MAR as the two countries with the largest Tajik kin groups. [kin in neighboring country]

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Uzbeks

Activity: 1990-2016

General notes

NA

Movement start and end dates

- Minorities at Risk reports that Uzbeks political organizations first made demands for widespread political autonomy in the early 1990s, hence we code 1990 as the start date. MRGI similarly states that the Uzbeks made claims for autonomy during the Afghan civil war after the Soviet withdrawal (also see Marshall & Gurr 2003).
- After the end of the war against the Taliban in 2001, the Uzbek organization Junbish-I-Milli led by General Dostam became a political party. We found no evidence to suggest that Junbish-I-Milli made self-rule claims as defined here after 2001 (Junbish-i-Milli; Keesing's). The only evidence for continued activity after 2001 is from MAR. According to MAR, the Uzbeks expressed their grievances in 2005-2006 by calling "for a federal Afghanistan and autonomy for the northern provinces." Following the 10-year rule, we code the movement end date in 2016. [start date: 1990; end date: 2016]

Dominant claim

- The National Islamic Movement (Junbish-e-Milli Islami), led by General Abdul Rashid Dostam, is the primary representative of Uzbek claims for self-determination. According to the Minorities at Risk Project, the organization, apart form seeking greater political participation in the center, demands "greater control over Uzbek-majority areas". This claim for increased autonomy was reiterated in 2005/2006, when Uzbek leaders demanded a federal Afghanistan and autonomy for the northern provinces (MAR).
- Further evidence is provided by the fact that Uzbeks were also part of the Tajik dominated Northern Alliance whose primary demand was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs (Minority Rights Group International). [1990-2016: autonomy claim]

Independence claims

NA

Irredentist claims

NA

Claimed territory

- The Afghan Uzbeks have demanded greater autonomy for all Uzbek-majority areas in northern Afghanistan, which includes the provinces Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol, Samangan, and Faryab. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Separatist armed conflict

- UCDP/PRIO reports that a group called Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, which consisted mainly of Uzbeks, rose up against the government in 1993-1995. UCDP reports 85 battle-related deaths in 1993, more than 8,000 deaths in 1994, and more than 800 in 1995, suggesting that the criteria for HVIOLSD are met (start date in 1993 because cumulatively > 1,000 deaths in 1993). Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami is described as having had a diverse membership ranging from left-wing ideologues to Islamists and ethnic nationalists. 1990-1992 are coded as NVIOLSD. As there appear to have been mixed motives to these clashes (control of the central government was also an issue), we coded the them as "ambiguous."
    - Note: we found reports of violence before 1993. Specifically, according to Keesing's, in 1992 several hundred people were killed in clashes between Uzbek militiamen and government forces. Furthermore, the Uzbeks' MAR rebellion score is 7 from 1990-1992. Yet, we could not confirm whether issues related to territorial self-determination were a motive in this violence.
- Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami group later joined the Northern Alliance after the Taliban's take-over in 1996. This led to a new civil war. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006), we code 1996-2001 HVIOLSD. We also code the HVIOLSD period as "ambiguous" following Fearon and Laitin's classification of the conflict as a "center insurgency." There is nevertheless evidence that self-determination was an issue in the conflict: from 1996-2001 the primary demand of the Northern Alliance, of which the Uzbeks were members, was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs.
    - Note: we found no disaggregated casualty figures, but the the rebellion was led by repressed minorities including the Uzbeks. UCDP reports more than 20,000 battle-related deaths for the 1996-2001 war. In light of this, we code this period as HVIOLSD. We note this coding decision is ambiguous.
- MAR indicates a rebellion score of 3 ("local rebellion") in 2004. Hewitt et al. (2008) explain that: "Despite ongoing reintegration process for ethnic militants, renegade Tajik and Uzbek warlords continue to control regional enclaves and engage in episodic fighting." The number of casualties is not stated but the coding notes ("episodic") suggest the 25 deaths threshold was likely not met.
- [1990-1992: NVIOLSD; 1993-1995: HVIOLSD; 1996-2001: HVIOLSD; 2002-2016: NVIOLSD]

Historical context

- Most Uzbeks are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi tradition and are related to the people of modern Turkey and the Muslim population in the Central Asian countries to the north. The Uzbeks moved into the northern region of present day Afghanistan in the sixteenth century and ruled the region until 1751, when the King of Afghanistan and founder of the Durrani Empire, Ahmad Shah, took control of the region. The Uzbeks, however, managed to maintain numerous principalities (Khanates) that were to a large extent independent from Kabul. This autonomy was brought to an end with the occupation of the territory by Dost Muhammad Khan in 1850. A wave of Uzbek immigrants came to the region in the 1920s and 1930s when the Central Asian countries came under Soviet influence and Uzbek had to flee from repressive Soviet authorities who were seeking retaliation for the Uzbek's participation in the Basmachi Revolt (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International).
- During the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan (1979-1989), the Uzbeks were granted autonomy in exchange for support in the war against the Mujahidin. Minority Rights Group International calls it "full administrative and political autonomy". Hence, there was a (prior) concession, which

we peg to 1980, the first year after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. [1980: autonomy concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- Bleuer (2007) states that the Uzbeks have enjoyed regional autonomy until the Taliban's invasion of northern Afghanistan. Attempts by Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to allow the Uzbek leader General Abdul Rashid Dostam continued autonomy in the north failed utterly. The Taliban invaded the territory, repressed the Uzbek population and closed the border with Uzbekistan which resulted in a significant reduction in trade and the socio-economic independence of the Uzbeks. De-jure, autonomy was ended in 1996, when the Taliban took Kabul and the government of Afghanistan. Hence, we code an end to autonomy in 1996. De-facto, however, autonomy continued for another two years since Dostum controlled significant areas in the north (Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab und Baghlan) until the final defeat in 1998 (Human Rights Watch; Minority Rights Group International). [1996: autonomy restriction]
- The US invasion of 2001 removed the Taliban and resulted in the reestablishment of Uzbek autonomy, as also illustrated by the EPR upgrade to regional autonomy as of 2002 (first of January rule). The Bonn Agreement of 2001 installed an interim power sharing government at the center. Although the agreement did not involve federalist principles per se and the establishment of regional autonomy was partly also the result of a power vacuum, we still code an autonomy concession as the agreement implicitly left "broad autonomy" (Roeder and Rothchild 2005) to the regional warlords outside Kabul. Furthermore, the 2001 Bonn Agreement also mandated the 2004 Constitution which further recognized the Uzbeks as an Afghan ethnic minority and gave them the full right to Afghan citizenship (Constitution of Afghanistan 2004). [2001: autonomy concession]
    - According to Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, the 1996-2001 civil war ended in October 2001. The Bonn Agreement was concluded in December 2001, and thus after the war.

Regional autonomy

- After the Soviet Union have pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, the country descended further into civil war. Burhānuddin Rabbāni, a Tajik leader, became president under the Peshawar Accord and stayed in power from 1992 until 1996. Uzbek leader General Abdul Rashid Dostam briefly supported Rabbāni until 1993 but later "returned to his stronghold in the northern provinces and effectively ruled them for the duration of Rabbani's rule" (Minorities at Risk Project). The Uzbek regional autonomy thus continued as under the Soviet rule. Since there was not a strong central government capable of controlling the territory, autonomy concessions (or restrictions) are difficult to identify less alone implement. However, since the Ubeks were part of the government (EPR codes them as junior partner from 1993 until 1996), their regional autonomy seems to be at least tolerated in not explicitly granted by the government. In line with EPR, hence we code regional autonomy from movement onset until the Taliban took power 1996. Note: we stop the regional autonomy code already in 1995 since the autonomy revocation gave way to a war. [1990-1995: regional autonomy]
- As mentioned above, autonomy was reestablished with the U.S. led invasion. Following the first of January rule and in line with EPR, we code regional autonomy from 2002 onwards. [2002-2016: regional autonomy]

De facto independence

NA

Major territorial changes

- [1996: revocation of regional autonomy]
- [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]

EPR2SDM

Movement	Uzbeks
Scenario	1:1
EPR group(s)	Uzbeks
Gwgroupid(s)	70016000

Power access

- We draw on EPR, with the following exceptions. EPR codes a state collapse in 1993-1996; instead, we code the Uzbeks as junior partner, in line with Germann & Sambanis (2021). More importantly, We code a civil war onset in 1996 based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The civil war refers to the rebellion that ensued after the Taliban had overthrown the government in 1996. The Taliban are dominated by Pashtuns, so EPR codes all other groups as excluded from 1997 onward. EPR's current coding misrepresents the case dynamics as the civil war was a reaction to the coup d'état by the Taliban. We therefore recode the Uzbeks as excluded in 1996 (discriminated, to be more exact, as in 1997). [1990-1992: powerless; 1993-1995: junior partner; 1996-2001: discriminated; 2002-2005: junior partner; 2006-2014: senior partner; 2015-2020: junior partner]

Group size

- We draw on EPR. [0.08]

Regional concentration

- Reliable ethnic demographic data for Afghanistan is unavailable (there has not been a census since the 1970s), but it appears likely that the threshold for spatial concentration is met. [concentrated]
    - GeoEPR considers the Uzbeks concentrated, but does not require that the group makes up an absolute majority of their regional base.
    - Both MAR and the Minorities Rights Group International describe the Uzbeks as regionally concentrated in the northern provinces.
    - MAR V codes the Uzbeks as "concentrated in one region" with more than 75% of group members living in that region. Bleuer (2012) suggests that the Uzbeks also make up an absolute majority there. According to Bleuer, there is a "dominant demographic status of the Uzbek language in the western areas of Afghan Turkestan". Afghan Turkestan includes the provinces of Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab and Sar-e Pol and roughly comprises the Uzbek settlement according to GeoEPR.

Kin

- EPR codes ethnic kin (Uzbeks) in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are also mentioned by MAR as the two countries with the largest Uzbek kin groups. [kin in neighboring country]

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