# ANGOLA

## Bakongo

Activity: 1990-2009

**General notes**

* The Bakongo SDM goes by the name of ‘Kongo’ in Minahan (2002) but ‘Bakongo’ in Minahan (2016).

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Cabindans are a subgroup of the Bakongo, but these two groups form separate self-determination movements. While the Cabindans are seeking greater autonomy/independence from Angola just for Cabinda, the Bakongo SDM we code here advocates an independent Bakongo federation including Cabinda.
* The main organization associated with the Bakongo movement is the Movimento para Auto-Determinacao de Bakongo (MAKO), which was formed in 1990 according to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1999) (also see MRGI). MAKO fights “for the self-determination of the Kongo people of Angola and for the independence of the Bakongo's traditional territory, which encompasses the current Angolan provinces of Uige and Zaïre, and part of the provinces of Bengo and Cuanza Norte (northern Angola)” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). In 1994, a subgroup of MAKO split off to found the Kimvuka Kia Lukuku Lua Kongo (KIMVUKA). In 1998, the leader of KIMVUKA founded the Angola Bakongo Community (CANGOBAK), which aims to fight for “the self-determination of the Bakongo people in Angola and in the “Kongo” territory…”.
* The inclusion of this movement is ambiguous because most of both MAKO’s and KIMVUKA’s activities are mostly by diaspora members in Europe (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999, 2001). However, MAKO was formed in Angola in Mbanza Lambu (Zaire province) according to Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board (1999) and there is also some evidence that the movement has an armed branch called Forças Armadas de Libertação do Kongo (FALKO). Marshall & Gurr (2003) and Hewitt et al. (2008) both also code the movement. We include the movement, but note that this decision is ambiguous. Since MAKO was founded in 1990, we peg the start date of the movement at 1990 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999, 2001; Keesing’s; MAR; MRGI; Refworld 2001).
* The main organization associated with this movement – MAKO – has been dissolved, and the main separatist militants are now fighting under the Cabindan rebel group FLEC (MRGI). The exact date when MAKO was dissolved remains unclear. We also found no evidence on activities for the other two organizations associated with this movement (KIMVUKA and CANGOBAK) after the late 1990s. The last evidence of activity we found stems from a 1999 report (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001). Following the ten-year rule, we code an end to the movement in 2009. [start date: 1990; end date: 2009]

**Dominant claim**

* The Bakongo separatist claim is represented by the ‘Movimento para Auto-Determinacao de Bakongo’ (MAKO, founded 1990), the ‘Kimvuka Kia Lukuku Lua Kongo’ (KIMVUKA, founded in 1994), and the Angola Bakongo Community (CANGOBAK, founded in 1998), the three main organization associated with the Bakongo movement. According to Minority Rights Group International, MAKO was established to advocate “an independent Bakongo federation including Cabinda”. Since the KIMVUKA and the CANGOBAK also advocate “independence for the traditional territory of this ethnic group of northern Angola” (IRB 1998), we code independence as the dominant claim throughout. [1990-2009: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1990; end date: 2009]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Bakongo claims relate to the ancient Kongo Kingdom, which straddles the borders of present-day Angola, Congo DRC and Congo-Brazzaville (Roth 2015: 273). However, in line with the SDM coding rules, we only code areas within Angola as part of the Angolan Bakongo claim (including Cabinda), based on the corresponding map in Roth (2015: 270).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* EPR codes the Bakongos as involved in the civil war over Cabinda in 1991, 1994, 1997 and in 2002; however, the goals of the relevant rebel group, FLEC-R, involve independence for Cabinda and not Bakongo areas as a whole. The Bakongo’s MAR rebellion score is 6 in 1998 and 7 from 1999-2001, indicating large-scale guerilla activity and involvement in a civil war, respectively. In addition, the rebellion score is 8 in 2002 but this seems to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7). Again, this is likely related to the Cabinda rebellion. For example, Marshall & Gurr (2003) and Hewitt et al. (2008) both consider the movement nonviolent. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Bakongo – often referred to as ‘the Kongo’ – migrated to their present location, a territory intersecting present-day Angola and Congo-Kinshasa, in the thirteenth century. The Kongo Kingdom was established around 1400 and remained in existence until 1914 (Danver 2015: 49).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* A widespread repression campaign against the Bakongo followed the 1993 election in Angola. While the Bakongo-based FNLA party won only 2.5% of the vote, thus being on the sideline of the MPLA-UNITA conflict that followed the election, Bakongo people were ethnically targeted my state forces (as well as members of other ethnic groups). As Minahan (2002: 1014) summarizes: “On 22 January 1993, the military, national police, and Mbundu civilians massacred Kongos in several cities, reportedly in a deliberate attempt to destroy the cohesion of the Kongos.” The crackdown worsened the situation for the Bakongo people drastically, eroding their sense of safety. However, we do not code a restriction since there were no changes in ethnic rights.
* While Angola remains “one of the most politically and administratively centralised in Africa” (Orre and Pestana 2014: 2), there were attempts to open up for more local self-rule in the 2000s. A national strategy for decentalisation was broadcasted in 2001, but with no policy content. This changed in 2007. According to Orre and Pestana (2014: 2), a “significant institutional innovation came in the 2007 legislation on the ‘local state administration’ (decree 2/07). It now called such councils *Conselhos de Auscultação e Concertação Social* (CACS), and the ambition was to roll them out to all provinces, municípios and even comunas.” Yet, we do not code this as a self-rule concession since the government has since reneged on its promises and never implemented changes that affect actual self-rule. In the authors’ words: “It has not been fully realised. Defined as advisory organs to the local Executive, the CACS have no decision-making powers.” (*ibid.*)

**Regional autonomy**

* The Bakongo never enjoyed regional autonomy, which is consistent with EPR coding. As noted by Orre and Pestana (2014: 2), the "Angolan local governance system is one of the most politically and administratively centralised in Africa." A promise of decentralisation was given in 2010 but with no following-up as of 2014 (*ibid*.). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bakongo |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bakongo |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 54001000 |

**Power access**

* We draw on EPR data for the power access coding. [1990-2009: powerless]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR data for the group size. [0.13]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1009), there were a total of 1.58m people living live in South Congo in 2002, 86% of whom are ethnic Bakongos (including Cabindans). According to Minahan, 76% of Bakongos in Angolo lived in South Congo, which consists of the three Angolan provinces Cabinda, Uige, and Zaire. This matches with information in MAR according to which >75% of Bakongos live in their regional base where they make up >75% of the local population. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes numerically significant (>100,000) ethnic kin in Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Zaire (DRC). Minahan (2002: 1009) leads to the same conclusion. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Cabindans

Activity: 1975-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The separatist struggle in Cabinda began in 1961 with the formation of three nationalist groups, which advocated separate independence for the enclave and merged in 1963 to form the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) (Minahan 2002: 350). Self-determination activity continued in subsequent years and carried over into independent Angola. In February 1975 the new Angolan government entered into negotiations with the Cabindan separatists, but rejected their demands (which included independence). In August Cabindan leaders declared independence (Minahan 2002: 351). We code the movement from 1975, the year of Angola’s independence, but note prior activity. In line with the above narrative, 1961 is used as start date.
  + Note: it is not entirely clear to what extent the FLEC participated in the Angolan independence war (1961-1974). UCDP does not list the FLEC as a participant. In the coding notes, UCDP notes that the FLEC was militarily insignificant, and was not even included in the independence negotiations. Thus, it appears that the FLEC was not involved in separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold before 1975, and for this reason we note prior non-violent activity.
* The movement was ongoing as of 2020 (Google News 2013; Hewitt et al. 20008; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; IRINnews 2002; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; MAR; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; US State Department 2019; Girardin 2021). [start date: 1961; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The main separatist organization has always been the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC), which split for some time into FLEC and FLEC-FAC. In August 1975, right after Angolan independence, FLEC declared independence (Minahan 2002: 351). The independence claim seems to have been dominant throughout, with the Cabindans refusing “to renounce their goal of complete independence” according to Minahan (2002: 353). Minorities at Risk confirms the claim for independence, as do many other sources (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2004; UNPO 2004; AFP 2019: Economist Intelligence Unit 2020; Cabinda: FLEC 2022) [1975-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1961; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Cabinda is the current Cabinda province in Angola Minahan (2002: 348). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On 1 August 1975, Cabindan leaders declared the independence of Cabindas, with Luis Franque (the leader of FLEC) as its first prime minister. Strictly speaking, Angola gained independence only in November 1975; however, we still code this declaration because Portugal was on its way out by then. [1975: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO reports significant reporting difficulties and suggests that it is likely that violence above the 25 deaths threshold first emerged before the first year coded by them (1991).
  + An indication that this could be so is that the MAR anti-government rebellion score is 4 in 1975-79, indicating a “small-scale guerilla activity”.
  + Further indications that there was significant violence is provided by the University of Central Arkansas conflict database, which suggests that 400 FLEC rebels clashed with government troops in November 1975. Further clashes are reported in 1977, which led to “several deaths”. 9 casualties are reported for 1979. It is not clear (and seems unlikely) that this is a full listing of all fatalities and the description suggests that violence was significant. Given that UCDP/PRIO reports reporting difficulties, we apply a tentative LVIOLSD code in 1975-1979.
  + The 1980s were a period of relative calmness. The University of Central Arkansas does not report any killings and the MAR anti-government rebellion score is only 1 (out of 7). In February 1985 a cease-fire agreement was signed and talks began, but no formal resolution was reached, and by the late 1980s FLEC existed in little more than name only. [1975-1979: LVIOLSD; 1980-1988: NVIOLSD]
* Then, however, the rebellion resurfaced. UCDP/PRIO indicates 1991 as the start date of LVIOLSD. Yet, news reports archived in Lexis Nexis indicate that in 1990 13 persons were killed in clashes between the government and FLEC, while that in 1989, 57 persons were killed in clashes between FLEC and Angola’s armed forces. Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) report 24 deaths in 1993. We therefore peg the start date of the LVIOLSD at 1989 and code it ongoing to 1993. The death toll in 1990 and possibly 1993 is below our threshold for LVIOLSD, but there are reporting problems and there was sustained violence. [1989-1993: LVIOLSD]
* Following Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) we code 1994-1999 as HVIOLSD. [1994-1999: HVIOLSD]
* UCDP/PRIO estimates over 25 deaths in 2002-2004, 2007, and 2009. Data on battle-related deaths from UCDP/PRIO suggests that there was sustained fighting in-between those years, with 5 and 2 deaths in 2000 and 2001, respectively, 8 and 3 in 2005 and 2006, respectively, and 8 casualties in 2008. This is also supported by MAR, whose rebellion score is 4 (“small-scale guerilla activity”) or higher in all of those years. Given sustained fighting and reporting difficulties, 2000-2009 is coded with LVIOLSD. [2000-2009: LVIOLSD]
* After 2009 the conflict appears to have de-escalated; while intermittent fighting continued, we found no evidence of violence above the threshold. 2010-2015 is coded with NVIOLSD. [2010-2015: NVIOLSD]
* UCDP/PRIO reports >25 deaths in 2016-2017. In 2018, the rebel group (FLEC-FAC-TN) was negotiating with the government and UCDP/PRIO, but limited violence continued (1 death). In February 2019, FLEC-FAC-TN announced the resumption of the “intensive armed struggle” in Cabinda after several members of the group were arrested and UCDP reports >25 deaths in 2019 and 2020 (also see Africa Report 2022; US State Department 2019). UCDP/PRIO does not record fatalities in 2021. [2016-2020: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Cabindans are a Bantu people that inhabit the Cabinda exclave of Angola, bordering the two Congos. While the group is often categorized as a sub-group of the Bakongo group, the Cabindans have historically tended to distance themselves from the Bakongo populations in neighbouring countries (Minahan 2002: 348). In 1883, Portuguese forces occupied the exclave as “Portogese Congos” and governed it as one of the most neglected and exploited colonial holdings in the era (*op cit.*: 350). In 1933, the Portuguese constitution recognized Cabinda’s status as distinct from Angola.
* Nationalism in Cabinda arose in the early 1960s, as the inhabitants feared domination from Angolan tribes. The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) was formed in 1963 and has been the main umbrella ever since (though it was soon split into various factions). When oil was discovered in 1966, demands for self-determination accentuated. As the Portuguese colonial army was defeated in 1974, the Angolan status of Cabinda was one of the only policies agreed upon by MPLA, FLNA, and UNITA – the three rival organizations vying for power in Angola. The Alvor Agreement between these groups and Portugal which set the terms for Angola’s independence, without Cabindan representation in the negotiations, ascertained that Cabinda would remain a part of Angola.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Following Angola’s independence grab in 1975, FLEC denounced the Alvor Agreement, declared independence and formed a provisional government under the leadership of Henriques Tiago and Luiz Branque Franque. In November that year, Cabinda was invaded by the MPLA, acting as the Angolan government, which overthrew the local government and placed Cabindans under military rule (Lyle 2005: 704-705). The occupation forces “began a witch hunt of FLEC and its supporters in Cabinda, committing numerous human rights abuses including arbitrary detentions, summary executions, public shootings, and forced removal to labor camps in Bentiaba and Kibala” (Reed 2009: 49). Among other atrocities, the government was charged with “wiping out an entire village” using rockets (MAR 2004). The overthrow of local government institutions was a clear case of an autonomy restriction, decreasing the Cabindan people’s level of self-rule. The military campaign took place after Angolan independence (i.e. the event which marks the beginning of the Cabindan SDM in Angola, as Cabinda was put under Angolan sovereignty per the Alvor Agreement of January 1975), and autonomy was revoked as a result of the military campaign which gave way to a civil war (see above). [1975: autonomy restriction]
* Before the 1993 election in Angola, the proposed plan for a democratic transition would have entailed regional autonomy for the Cabinda region. However, as the country lapsed into a new civil war, the change was never implemented (Minahan 2002: 253). We therefore code no autonomy concession in 1993.
* In 2006, a peace deal was signed between the Angolan government and the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (Britannica 2022). Statements from the Forum’s leader, Antonio Bembe, suggested that he had been promised an autonomy deal: “We're going to sign a ceasefire with the Angolans who in return have accepted the principle of granting special status to Cabinda” (Reuters 2006). However, while the agreement was indeed followed by lower levels of violence for a few years (until the conflict again intensified in 2010), there have been no signs of concessions on cultural rights or autonomy (Amundsen 2022: 12-13). Part of the reason seems to be that Bembe’s authority was never recognized by the warring factions of FLEC. The FLEC leadership in exile denounced the peace deal (AllAfrica 2006), and according to a UN official, the peace process had backing from “the major part neither of FLEC, nor of the civilian dialogue movement” (IRIN News 2006). The 2008 Angolan election was largely boycotted in Cabinda on FLEC’s orders (UCA 2022). While the peace agreement did suggest that “special economic rights” would be granted (UCA 2022), we do not code a concession since there have been no signs of actual increases in rights or autonomy in Cabinda.
* There is evidence that Cabindan civil society activists and suspected FLEC supporters were frequently prosecuted, detained and torutured in the 2010s. However, we found no evidence for restrictions as defined here (cf. HRW 2016; US State Department 2019). After taking office in 2017, the president, João Lourenço, pledged to give Cabinda province more attention and investment, but this commitment was undermined in 2019 when a group of civil society activists from the province were jailed (The Economist 2020).

**Regional autonomy**

* While the Cabindans’ level of self-rule was diminished in late 1975 (see Concessions and restrictions above), the population did not enjoy regional autonomy at any earlier point in that year. As the MAR project (2004) notes, even though “FLEC president Luis Ranque Franque declared the territory independent” on 1 August 1975, because the “MPLA troops [were] in control of the enclave, the declaration had little immediate impact.” And despite talk of the granting of “special status” during the 2006 peace process, no regional autonomy has been granted to the exclave since (see the last point in Concessions and restrictions above). [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* The only ambiguous period in regard to de facto independence is the weeks following FLEC’s independence declaration in August 1975. However, as MPLA forces were present in Cabinda throughout, denying FLEC “de facto exercise of control over significant shares” of the Canindan homeland (see Regional autonomy), we do not code any instance of de facto independence.

**Major territorial changes**

* When Angola gained its independence from Portugal in January 1975, sovereignty of the Cabinda was transferred from Portugal to Angola. [1975: host state change]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Cabindans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Cabindan |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 54002000 |

**Power access**

* We draw on EPR data for the power access coding. [1975-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR data for the group size. [0.02]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 348), approx. 83% of Cabindans live in Angola’s Cabinda province, where they make up 88% of the population. This matches with information in MAR according to which >75% of Cabindans live in their regional base where they make up >75% of the local population. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* No numerically significant kin according to Minahan (2002) and EPR. MAR codes the Bakongo in Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Zaire (DRC) as ethnic kin, but Minahan (2002: 349) explains that the Cabinda see themselves as a separate nation. [no kin]

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## Lunda-Chokwe

Activity: 2006-2020

**General notes**

* The Lunda-Chokwe people in Angola – alias Lunda Tchokwe, Ciokwe, Cokwe, Bajokwe, or Badjok – reside in the northeastern provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. This is the part of Angola that belonged to the Lunda Empire of the 17th and 18th century (Asante and Mazama 2009:165–166). The group is regionally concentrated to a large extent and numbered roughly 1,300,000 at the end of the 20th century (Britannica 2022).

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for separatist mobilization we could find is in 2006, when the Movement of the Portuguese Protectorate of Lunda Tchokwe (MPPLT) was founded (Renascença 2021). According to VER Angola, an online newspaper, “independence of the Angolan provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul is claimed by two organizations [as of 2021]: the MPPLT … and Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês [the Sociological Legal Manifesto of the Lunda-Tchokwé People].” The latter organization is quite obscure: it has a very light footprint in open-source media, except for a manifesto published in the UNITA-affiliated blog KUP (2019). By contrast, the MPPLT is a large and active organization that has engaged in several protests and media appearances. In March 2019, the MPPLT released a communiqué to the President de Sousa of Portugal during his visit to Angola. The communiqué, which is available online (Ràdio Angola 2019), laid out the organization’s demands. This remains the most authoritative statement on the organizations demands (Renascença 2021); however, it remains ambiguous whether the group claims regional autonomy or full independence. A year later, though, the MPPLT specified in a press release that the “autonomy” of the Lunda region “is a divine and legitimate historical right of the Tchokwe people’” (VER Angola 2020). Meanwhile, the Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês demands “independence” in its manifesto (KUP 2019). It is worth noting though that in January 2021, protesters associated with the MPPLT were shot by Angolan police officers outside a police station in the mining town Cafunfu (Nationala 2021). The incident, which was widely publicized and condemned as a massacre, brought further attention to the Lunda-Chokwe movement. [start date: 2006; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The movement’s claims are difficult to establish, especially for the early period. The first somewhat clear statement only came in March 2019, when the MPPLT released a communiqué to the President de Sousa of Portugal during his visit to Angola. The communiqué, which is available online (Ràdio Angola 2019), remains the most authoritative statement on the organization’s demands (Renascença 2021); however, it leaves unclear whether regional autonomy or full independence is the organization’s desired goal. In the very same paragraph, both aims are referred to: “Lunda Tchokwe deserves *independence* as a function of the natural and juridical law of the protectorate treaties signed by the Lunda ancestors with the Portuguese, the *autonomy* similar to the islands of Madeira and Azores with Portugal is a sign of good will” (Ràdio Angola 2019: 8, emphases added). A year later, though, the MPPLT specified in a press release that the “autonomy” of the Lunda region “is a divine and legitimate historical right of the Tchokwe people’” (VER Angola 2020). Further evidence that the MPPLT does not aim at secession comes from a January 30, 2021, press release, in which the organization reiterated its commitment to the “emancipation of the Lunda Tchowke people in defense of their civil, poitical and natural rights *within* the CRA [i.e., the Angolan constitution)” (MPPLT 2021, emphasis by author).
* Note: a smaller organization, Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês, demands “independence” in its manifesto (KUP 2019). Overall, though, the autonomy claim seems dominant. [2006-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* While the movement’s primary representative – the MPPLT – makes somewhat ambiguous claims which we treat as an autonomy claim (see above), another, smaller organization called the Manifesto Jurídico Sociológico do Povo Lundês demands “independence” in its 2019 manifesto (KUP 2019). This is the first notion of an independence claim we could find. Note: the political significance of the organization was difficult to establish and, therefore, ambiguous. [start date: 2019; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Lunda-Chokwe claim a right to greater self-determination in the territory which today correspond to the Angolan regions of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul (VER Angola 2021). We code this claim based on GADM.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We did not find any evidence for separatist violence above the threshold and therefore code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Lunda-Chokwe are a Bantu tribe that settled the plateau region of southwestern Africa and created the Lunda Kingdom in the 1400s (Minahan 2016: 250). The kingdom grew larger, and in the 17th and 18th century it was known as the Lunda Empire (Asante and Mazama 2009:165–166). Declining in strength during the 1800s, the kingdom signed peace deals with the Portuguese colonial forces in the 1880s. In the early 20th century, the Chokwe clan became dominant and has since succeeded in merging Lunda and Chokwe customs and identity into one (Minahan 2016: 250). Following the end of the Angolan civil wars in the 1990s, tensions grew between the Lunda-Chokwe and more dominant coastal tribes in Angola (*ibid.*). Outside of Angola, there are large Chokwe groups in southwestern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and northwestern parts of Zambia (Britannica 2022).

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lunda-Chokwe |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Lunda-Chokwe |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 54003000 |

**Power access**

* We draw on EPR data for the power access coding. [2006-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* EPR suggests a group size of 9%. This broadly matches with Britannica (2022), which suggests a population of 1.3 mio at the end of the 20th century (Angola had a population of 14 mio in 1995 according to the World Bank). Minahan (2016: 249) suggests a population of 2-2.4 mio in 2015, when Angola’s population was 28 mio according to the World Bank. We follow EPR. [0.09]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Britannica (2022), the Lunda-Chokwe are highly regionally concentrated in the Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces. EPR also codes regional concentration, but EPR applies a lower bar. We could not find more detailed demographic figures. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes ethnic ties with the Lunda-Yeke in DRC and the Luanda in Zambia, which both cross the 100k numeric threshold. [kin in neighboring country]

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