# AZERBAIJAN

## Armenians

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The National Unification Party (NUP) was formed in Yerevan in 1966, hence the start date. The NUP called for an independent Armenia which would include Western Armenia, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians in Azerbaijan began to make irredentist demands in 1987 when dissidents known as the Karabakh Committee organized a petition drive to voice that demand. On February 28, 1988, the Karabakh Soviet of People's Deputies passed a resolution supporting the transfer of Karabakh to Armenian control. A million Armenians marched in Yerevan in support of the transfer of territorial control and Gorbachev promised action on the issue. This initial activity was still under the roof of the Soviet Union (see Armenians under Russia). However, the Armenian movement in Azerbaijan remained active when the USSR dissolved in 1991. In late 1991, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh established an unrecognized de-facto state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 28-29, 32-33, 201-202; Minahan 1996: 38-40; Minahan 2002: 901-906; MAR; Marshall & Gurr 2003: 57; International Crisis Group). The de-facto state and movement remained active as of 2020 (International Crisis Group 2021; Minahan 2016: 40; Persson et al. 2021; Roth 2015: 192). On this basis, we code the movement as active since 1991, though we note that the movement was both active and violent prior to Azerbaijan’s independence. We code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1966; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The official stance of Nagorno-Karabakh is that they want to gain recognition as an independent state. The official claim has remained the same throughout 1991-2020, including after the 2020 war (Minahan 2016: 40; International Crisis Group 2021; Roth 2015: 192ff). However, the International Crisis Group (2005a) argues that the preferred outcome in Nagorno-Karabakh is either unification with Armenia or full independence. Caspersen (2012) argues that the effective aim is merging Karabakh with Armenia, and Cornell (1999: 44) notes that by all standards, Karabakh is de-facto integrated with Armenia already. We code the more radical irredentist claim throughout. [1991-2020: claim for unification with Armenia]

**Independence claims**

* The National Unification Party (NUP) was formed in Yerevan in 1966, hence the start date. The NUP called for an independent Armenia which would include Western Armenia, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians’ official claim throughout 1991-2020 remained independence (see above). [start date: 1966; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* In 1987, Armenians in Karabakh began to make claims for unification with Armenia (see above). After Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, this became an irredentist claim as defined here. [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Armenians is the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh, an area which forms the autonomous district of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 901; Roth 2015: 193). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* September 2, 1991, the Armenian leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh declare their Oblast an independent Soviet Republic. This is coded as an independence declaration since Azerbaijan had already declared its independence (in at least implicit agreement with Moscow) on August 30. [1991: independence declaration]
* January 6, 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan (Minahan 1998: 2; MAR). [1992: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* A low-intensity separatist war emerged while NK was still part of the USSR. This war escalated after Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991. The HVIOLSD coding for 1991-94 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). [1991-1994: HVIOLSD (prior LVIOLSD)]
* In 1994 a cease-fire was reached. Yet according to MAR, the truce has been violated occasionally: “The cease-fire agreement that theoretically terminated the Azeri-Armenian war was by no means a peace treaty, for tensions and rhetoric remain high on both sides, and the truce has been a number of times, with border incidents and other isolated skirmishes still an occasional feature in the region, resulting in deaths for both Azeris and Armenians.” In keeping with this, UCDP/PRIO records 18 battle-related deaths in 1995, 5 in 1996, and more than 25 in both 1997 and 1998. Given sustained violence, we code LVIOLSD in 1995-1998. [1995-1998: LVIOLSD]
* UCDP/PRIO reports consistently below 25 deaths in subsequent years and none at all in 2002-2003. [1999-2004: NVIOLSD]
* The UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset reports best estimates of 25 battle-related deaths in 2005 and 30 in 2008. There was sustained violence in 2006-2007, though below the threshold according to UCDP/PRIO (7 and 12 deaths, respectively).
* There continued to be violence in subsequent years.
  + 2009 saw 7 casualties according to UCDP. The CrisisWatch Database reports over 25 deaths in 2010 while UCDP/PRIO suggests 20.
  + UCDP/PRIO suggests 21 battle-related deaths in 2011.
  + The UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset v. 5 reports a best estimate of 25 in 2012.
  + 2013 saw just 7 deaths according to UCDP/PRIO, but 2014 saw 46, followed by 72 in 2015, 141 in 2016, and 36 in 2017.
  + 2018 saw 17 deaths according to UCDP/PRIO and 2019 11. After this, the conflict escalated significantly (see below).
* Overall, 2005-2019 saw significant numbers of casualties every year. According to the evidence we collected, the 25 deaths threshold was not met in some of the years, but there was clearly sustained fighting. Therefore, we maintain the LVIOLSD code throughout.
* UCDP/PRIO codes a high-intensity internationalized civil war over Artsakh in 2020. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) do not include this case as a civil war based on the argument that Karabakh, for practical purposes, was part of Armenia at the time. However, Armenia has not formally annexed Karakh and from the point of international law, Karabakh remains part of Azerbaijan. The casualty threshold for HVIOLSD is clearly met (UCDP best estimate is c. 7,500 battle-related deaths in 2020). On this basis, we code HVIOLSD in 2020. In 2021, UCDP/PRIO records 40-43 battle-related deaths. [2005-2019: LVIOLSD; 2020: HVIOLSD (continued LVIOLSD in 2021]

**Historical context**

* In 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was created. In 1988, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the union, which is tantamount to a reduction in the center’s control of the regions, and thus a concession. [1988: autonomy concession]
* In early 1989, Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under direct rule by Moscow and its leaders were replaced by outsiders. Thus, we code an autonomy restriction. Note though that this also meant that Azerbaijan’s control over Nagorno-Karabakh was suspended, a core demand of the movement.
  + A second reason we code a restriction in 1989 is Azerbaijan’s angry reaction to the loss of control over Karabakh and its imposition of an economic blockade over Karabakh in 1989. [1989: autonomy restriction]
* In November 1989 Karabakh was returned to Azeri administration after a short interlude of direct rule by Moscow (see Armenians under Russia). We do not code the end of short-term impositions of as concessions (see codebook). Azerbaijan was also ordered to end its rail blockade; again, in line with the codebook, we do not code this as a concession (Rutland 1994: 850).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Following Azerbaijan’s declaration of independence on October 18, 1991, the Parliament of Azerbaijan abolished the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh on November 26, 1991. Under Soviet rule Nagorno-Karabakh had enjoyed the status of an Autonomous Oblast under Azeri control. Not only was autonomy abolished, also all administrative divisions were abolished and the territory was split up and redistributed amongst the neighboring administrative rayons (Caspersen 2012). In response, authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence and staged a referendum on independence. While Azerbaijan was formally still part of the Soviet Union in November 1991, we still code this under the header of Azerbaijan since the Soviet Union had been very close to dissolution since the August putsch, and Azerbaijan therefore in many ways already an independent state. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + We code the onset of a full-scale separatist civil war in 1991. There was low-level armed conflict already, which makes it difficult to settle on a start date for HVIOLSD. Sambanis & Schulhofer use April 1991 as the start date for the civil war. However, the violence appears to have escalated markedly after the abolishing of Karabakh’s autonomous status, suggesting that the restriction contributed to an escalation (see e.g.: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/388). This makes it likely that the restriction precede the escalation to full-scale civil war.
* Full-scale war broke out, resulting in the occupation of most of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian mediation between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the de-facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh led to the signing of a ceasefire in May 1994. The so-called Bishkek Protocol, in addition to the ceasefire, includes a reference that Nagorno-Karabakh is granted wide-ranging autonomy, the withdrawal of Armenian troops, and the return of refugees on both sides (International Crisis Group2005a). However, the autonomy proposal was not implemented. We do not code a concession.
* The 1994 ceasefire remained unstable at best, regularly broken and not internationally observed (Waal 2010; Cornell 1999: 41). Every year since saw casualties at the Karabakh-Azerbaijan border. Repeated rounds of negotiations over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh followed the 1994 cease-fire, whereby the OSCE has acted as main mediator. The negotiations remained without a tangible result, that is, no formal agreement was reached even on the basic principles (Zourabian 2006). The Azeri side has repeatedly offered the Karabakhis autonomy, but Azerbaijan has not detailed what this autonomy would look like (International Crisis Group 2005) and unlike, for example, Moldova which has unilaterally raised the status of Transdniestria in its 1994 constitution, the Azeri constitution does not include a reference to an autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the blockade begun in 1989 is upheld. Traveling from Azerbaijan to Nagorno-Karabakh is impossible, the border is shut. Also the economic blockade is upheld (International Crisis Group 2005b: 24; International Crisis Group 2007).
  + The most significant occurred in July 1997, when the OSCE mediation team presented a possible peace deal, with Nagorno-Karabakh gaining far-reaching autonomy (International Crisis Group 2005a: 13). Azerbaijan’s Aliyev appears to have agreed to the proposals, and he reaffirmed his willingness to grant Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of autonomy (MAR). The plan was, however, rejcted by Nagorno-Karabakh and not implemented.
  + In 1999, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan appeared to reach an agreement on a territory swap, with Armenia gaining Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan gaining Armenia’s Meghri region. However, Azerbaijan never publicly offered such a territorial swap (International Crisis Group 2005a: 14).
  + In 1999 and 2001, it looked like a deal was near, but the hopes were dashed. In 2002, Azerbaijan publicly rejected the option of attributing Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia (International Crisis Group 2005a: 14)
* Linked with big hopes, the Prague Process began in 2004, facilitated by the Minsk Group of the OSCE, led by France, Russia, and the US. In 2005 the mediators proposed core principles for a comprehensive settlement, including a withdrawal of Armenian forces, the return of IDPs, a vote on the future status of Karabakh, and an interim international security arrangement for Karabakh until the vote is held. At around this time, Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev again promised the Karabakhis far-reaching autonomy, though reaffirming Azerbaijan’s claim on Karabakh (International Crisis Group2005a: 13): “Our position remains unchanged – our lands must be returned and our territorial integrity restored. Our greatest concessions are security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and our readiness to grant the highest degree of autonomy that exists in the world.” There was no implementation, however.
* Similar promises were made in 2006, when Azerbaijan promised autonomy akin to Russia’s Tatarstan (BBC 2006). The negotiations, however, again ended in deadlock. In 2006, the Minsk co-chairs believed that a solution is near, and put significant international pressure on the parties. France’s President, Chirac, met with both the Azeri and the Armenian presidents, the US Secretary of State, Rice, phoned them, and also Putin intervened. 2006 was widely perceived as a window of opportunity for reaching an agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh (International Crisis Group2007). However, the mood soured after meetings between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in February, June, and November 2006. The troop withdrawal and the modalities of the referendum (Armenia and Karabakh want a vote in Karabakh, including independence as an option, and Azerbaijan wants a national vote, see International Crisis Group2005a, 2007) proved to be critical stumbling blocks. No agreement was reached, given a lack of political will to compromise on both sides.
  + Additional information: both Armenia and Azerbaijan invest heavily in an arms race, but Azerbaijan believes it will eventually outpace Armenia (given its isolation) and be able to dictate a solution. Azerbaijan has repeatedly threatened military action. Armenia, on the other hand, believes that time is on its side and that the status of Karabakh will eventually be accepted as a fait accompli (International Crisis Group2007).
* In 2007, the OSCE proposed another peace settlement, the Madrid Principles, linked with big hopes (International Crisis Group 2009). Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on certain principles, but no agreement could be reached regarding the modalities of the Armenian troop withdrawal and the modalities of a future decision on the status of Karabakh.
* There was increasingly vitriolic rhetoric surrounding the conflict between 2008 and 2015, with Azerbaijan and Armenia being drawn into an arms race (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). 2014 saw an, upsurge in violence, which continued into 2015-2017. 2016 saw the worst fighting since the 1994 ceasefire. Emboldened by its military successes, Azerbaijan called for the international community to take tougher, coercive action against the Armenian “annexation” of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2017 Nagorno-Karabakh renamed itself from the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” to the “Republic of Artsakh” (the former being a mix of Russian and Turkic, the latter Armenian). According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, that name change also reaffirmed the Armenians’ claim to territories outside of Nagorno-Karabakh proper.
* In Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the most direct reactions to the 2016 fighting was a referendum on the breakaway republic’s constitution on 20 February 2017. Aside from changes in the political system, the most conflict-related consequence of the referendum was the official change of the republic’s name from the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” to the “Republic of Artsakh”. The old name “Nagorno-Karabakh” had been a mix of Russian and Turkic, meaning “Mountainous Karabakh,” while “Artsakh” is Armenian. Furthermore, “Artsakh” also implied a broader territorial claim, as it also referred to the territories occupied by the breakaway republic outside of Nagorno-Karabakh proper (that is, the territories on the Armenian-controlled side of the Line of Conflict) (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* In 2020, the conflict escalated substantially, leading to the second major war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan made substantial territorial gains, regaining most of the [occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian-occupied_territories_surrounding_Nagorno-Karabakh) and large parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, including the culturally significant city of [Shusha](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shusha). Russia brokered a ceasfire in late 2020. Armenia agreed on Azerbaijani control over the areas Azerbaijan re-took on behalf of the Republic of Artsakh (BBC News 2020; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). According to the International Crisis Group (2021): “Immediately after the 9 November ceasefire, Russian peacekeepers deployed to the Lachin corridor that connects Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, which allowed most Armenians displaced by the war to return. Within two weeks of the ceasefire, Armenia withdrew its troops from the remaining adjacent territories, leaving them in Azerbaijan’s hands, and halted its military supply of Nagorno-Karabakh […] Most of the territory newly under Azerbaijani control is empty, as any ethnic Armenians who had lived there have fled, and Azerbaijan has yet to develop plans for resettlement.” We would code a restriction due to the displacement of Armenians from territories gained by Azerbaijan in the 2020 war. However, since we code an onset of full-scale separatist war in 2020 and the displacement occurred as a result of the war, we would only reflect the restriction in 2021 in the dataset, and this version of SDM does not cover the period after 2020.
* According to the International Crisis Group (2020): “Baku, which before the war talked of offering various sorts of autonomy to a Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani control, now appears to reject anything save, perhaps, some local control over schools and the right to use the Armenian language.”

**Regional autonomy**

* Karabakh’s autonomous status was abolished in late November 1991, which led to an escalation in violence. As a result, the Armenians became de facto independent. We code autonomy from 1992 onwards due to de facto independence but not in 1991 to reflect the case dynamics. The Armenians lost control over substantial parts of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) in 2020, but retained their de facto control over a smaller territory (International Crisis Group 2021; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1992-2020: regional autonomy].

**De facto independence**

* Caspersen (2012: 12) suggests that de facto independence was achieved in 1994 and has remained in place ever since. EPR also considers the Armenians in Azerbaijan as having separatist autonomy, but in contrast to Caspersen, pegs the onset of de facto independence already at 1991. Cornell (1999: 33) notes that Armenian forces have gained the upper hand relatively quickly and controlled substantial parts of Karabakh already in 1992 and to some extent already in 1991. In 1993 there was a UN Resolution that demanded the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories in Azerbaijan, thus supporting the view taken by Cornell and EPR. Overall, de facto independence began in 1991. Following the first of January rule, we code de facto independence from 1992 onwards. The Armenians lost control over substantial parts of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) in 2020, but retained de facto control over a smaller territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1992-2020: de facto independence].

**Major territorial changes**

* Azerbaijan attained independence in 1991, implying a change of the host state. [1991: host change (new)]
* [1991: abolishment of regional autonomy]
* [1991: erection of de facto independent state]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Armenians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Armenians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 37304000 |

**Power access**

* We draw on EPR. Note that self-exclusion = powerless in our coding scheme. [1991-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR. [0.013]
  + Note that the 2020 war resulted in mass displacements, with many of Azerbaijan’s Armenians fleeing to Armenia. If sustained, this should result in changes to the group size. However, these would only be reflected from 2021, given the 1st of January rule.

**Regional concentration**

* According to the Soviet Union’s 1989 census, there were 391,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 145,000 in Nagorno-Karabakh, where the Armenians made up 75% of the local population (HRW 1994). This suggest that in 1989, the Armenians were not concentrated because less than 50% resided in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the Karabakh war led to ethnic cleansing; very few Azeris remained in Nagorno-Karabakh, and very few Armenians remained in Azerbaijan proper (see e.g. The Economist 2011). We code the Armenians as concentrated from 1991 since the war had started already before Azerbaijan’s independence. [regionally concentrated]
  + The Armenians have remained concentrated in Nagorno-Karabakh.According to the 2009 census, there are approximately 120,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan (from 400,000 in 1989). Apart from some smaller Armenian communities scattered throughout Azerbaijan, most Armenians are concentrated in the break-away region of Nagorno-Karabakh (Minorities at Risk). In the latter, the Armenians make up over 95% of the population (Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the United States).

**Kin**

* According to EPR (scenario 1:1) there are numerous Armenian kin groups in neighboring countries (Georgia, Russia, Armenia, Iran) and a non-adjoining country (Lebanon) throughout the movement’s period of activity. The presence of ethnic kin groups is confirmed by the Minorities at Risk data where the Armenians in Armenia and Georgia are listed as the two largest kin groups. All of these groups have populations larger than 100,000 thousand. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Kurds

Activity: 1992

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the early 1990s there was some contention for an autonomous Kurdish Republic in Azerbaijan. “Following the defeat of the Azeris in Nagorny-Karabakh by the Armenians, the Kurdish Liberation Movement declared the re-establishment of the Kurdish Autonomous Region, in early 1992” (McDowall 2004: 493; also see Müller 2000: 70; MRGI). With high certainty, the Kurdish contention was instigated by Armenia. The declared aim of the Kurdish activists was the re-establishment of ‘Red Kurdistan’, an allegedly autonomous area that had existed between 1923-1930. Müller (2000) convincingly argues that ‘Red Kurdistan’ never had autonomous status. The Kurdish contention was shortlived. Already in May 1992, Armenian forces drove a corridor through the proclaimed Republic in order to connect Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The local Kurds were expelled. Several sources (e.g. World Statesmen) report that the self-proclaimed republic was thereby dissolved. We found no further evidence of separatist activity. In 1993 Armenian forces occupied the rest of the proclaimed republic. As a result of displacement, Azerbaijan’s Kurds are now scattered across the country. MRGI reports “allegations of potential separatism”, but we found no evidence for separatist mobilization after 1992. We code the movement as active in a single year, 1992. [start date: 1992; end date: 1992]

**Dominant claim**

* The declared aim of the Kurdish activists was the re-establishment of ‘Red Kurdistan’, an allegedly autonomous area that had existed between 1923-1930 (Müller 2000: 70-71; McDowall 2004: 493). Müller (2000) convincingly argues that ‘Red Kurdistan’ actually never had autonomous status. [1992: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kurdish Liberation Movement is the former territory of Red Kurdistan, which existed between 1923-1930. Red Kurdistan was located within the Nagorno Karabakh territory in Azerbaijan. We code this claim based on a map in Roth (2015: 198), which corresponds to the following contemporary districts: Kalbajar, Lachin, Qubadli and part of Jabrayil. We used the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1992 Kurdish organizations proclaimed a Kurdish Republic (with tacit support from Yerevan) (McDowall 2004: 493; Müller 2000: 70). [1992: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We did not find any reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* A number of sources suggest that the Kurds had an autonomous district (‘Red Kurdistan’) between 1923-1930 (e.g. Minority Rights Group International). However, Müller (2000) argues convincingly that this is a myth. We found no evidence for concessions or restrictions in the years prior to movement onset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1992 there was a presidential decree on the ‘Protection of the Rights and Freedoms and on State Support for the Promotion of the Languages and Cultures of National Minorities, Numerically Small Peoples and Ethnic Groups living in the Republic of Azerbaijan’. According to Minority Rights Group International, there were basically no moves towards implementation. The Aliyev regime continued with policies favoring the interests of the majority group, the Azeris, and “remained vague in its provisions for ethnic minorities.” We do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Azerbaijan attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. But this was before the start date and is hence not coded.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kurds |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Azeris dominate Azerbaijan’s polity and no other group participates significantly in the national government (Cederman et al. 2010). [1992: powerless]

**Group size**

* Azerbaijan’s census counted approximately 13,000 Kurds, but this is likely an under-estimate (it is likely that some Kurds did not reveal their true identity). Müller (2000: 69) estimates that there are around 30,000 Kurds in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s population was 8.172 million in 2002 (World Bank). [0.0037]

**Regional concentration**

* Reliable data on the number of Kurds in Azerbaijan in the 1990s is impossible to get by b/c all recent censues are untrustworthy (Müller 2000). From the detailed account in Müller (2000, see in particular pp. 52, 71) we can infer that in 1926, the last census that provides reliable data according to Müller, Kurds formed a majority of the claimed territory, “Red Kurdistan”, but only as long as all with some sort of a Kurdish identity are counted. Actual Kurdish speakers formed a small minority with 8%. Müller contends that the number of Kurds in the area has remained stable in absolute terms or (more likely) decreased, while the Azeri population increased. This renders it unlikely that the Kurds formed a majority of the area in 1992 (nor any other area in Azerbaijan). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are numerically significant Kurd communities in numerous other countries, including Turkey, Armenia, and Iran (see EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

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## Lezgins

Activity: 1991-2004

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Movement activity for the Lezgins in Azerbaijan is coded as of 1991. However, the Lezgin national movement (Sadval) was founded already in 1990 (this is coded under Russia). Thus we note nonviolent activity prior to 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Lezgins began to protest what they consider an arbitrary boundary resulting from the Soviet Union’s collapse. Since the division of territories, the Lezgins have been unable to continue their traditional lifestyles. The Lezgins are herders who have spent centuries grazing their flock on Dagestani land and remaining on the Azerbaijani land during the winter. Grazing activity has decreased drastically as a result of the new international boundary. Similarly, burial grounds are located in Azerbaijan, and water-sharing traditions between the Lezghis have ended as a result of the formal split. In 1993, more than 10,000 protested near the Azeri-Dagestani border to demand the unification of the Lezgin people (Ormrod 1997: 135). The main organization associated with the movement, Sadval, has promoted an independent Lezgistan as well as autonomy for the Lezgins.
* According to MAR, Lezgin mobilization for self-determination subsided in 1994, when the war over Karabakh ended. MAR reports that Lezgin nationalism entered a “calm period” and that Sadval has recently abandoned the claim for an independent Lezgistan. Meanwhile, the movement continued its activities in Russia (Southern Dagestan is clearly the epicenter of the Lezgin contention, see MAR).
  + MAR codes non-zero protest scores for 1990-1998 and 2001-2002. The 2001-2002 protests, however, were over language rights (see the MAR Risk Assessment). We found no evidence for other protests over self-determination in more recent years, either.
  + Minahan (2002: 1089) reports that the Lezgin movement sent a letter to the Russian and the Azeri governments in 1996, calling for the unification of their nation. However, it is not clear whether Lezgins in Azerbaijan were involved. Again, the center of Lezgin self-determination agitation is clearly in Dagestan and not in Azerbaijan (MAR).
  + Sadval continues to exist but it does not appear to promote separatism.
  + In 2008, Moscow organized a conference (to put pressure on Azerbaijan) “designed to be a propaganda platform for advocating the creation of an independen Lezgin state or Lezgistan with accompanying territorial claims on the Lezgin-populated areas of northern Azerbaijan” (Melikishvili 2008). Whether Lezgins from Azerbaijan participated is not clear. In an interview, a leader of the Sadval organization states that Sadval gave up its work in Azerbaijan due to harsh repression, but that they are working to revive the movement (the interview was in 2012; see BBC Monitoring).
  + In a 2008 report BBC Monitoring stated Sadval was active in both Russia and Azerbaijan, but the report does not say whether Sadval made self-determination claims.
  + Roth (2015: 182) reports Lezgin separatist mobilization in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, but nothing beyond. The same applies to Minahan (2016: 242). Minority Rights Group International does not report evidence of separatist mobilization after 1994 while stating that “The high tide of Lezgin mobilization in Azerbaijan appeared to have passed towards the end of the 1990s.”
  + Coene (2010: 161) reports that Sadval dropped its claim for Lezgin independence in 1996; however, it is not clear whether Coene refers to Azerbaijan or to Russia and whether Sadval continued to make more moderate claims for autonomy.
* In sum, it appears there was no or limited Lezgin separatist mobilization in Azerbaijan after 1994. However, it is not fully clear that the movement ended in 1994. Based on this we code an end to the movement in 2004, following our ten-years rule. [start date: 1990; end date: 2004]

**Dominant claim**

* Sadval, the main organization associated with the movement, made claims for both autonomy and independence. Another organization, the Lezgin National Council, made claims for independence (MAR; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 174). It is not fully clear which claim was dominant, but it appears to be independence. Note that the epicenter of the movement lies in Southern Dagestan (where we also code an independence claim). [1991-2004: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* The initial claim was for autonomy; from December 1991 also independence was claimed (see Lezgins in Russia (USSR)). [start date: 1991; end date: 2004]

**Irredentist claims**

* Evidence for irredentism within Azerbaijan is limited. Ormrod (1997: 135) suggests that in 1993, more than 10,000 protested near the Azeri-Dagestani border to demand the unification of the Lezgin people. Furthermore, Minahan (2002: 1089) reports that the Lezgin movement sent a letter to the Russian and the Azeri governments in 1996, calling for the unification of their nation. However, it is not clear that these claims should be read as demands for a merger with Russia. [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* Lezgin territorial claims initially included all of the Kurakh, Kasumkent, Magaramkent, Akhty, Derbent, and Dokuzpara rayons of Dagestan in today’s Russian Federation, as well as the Kuba, Khachmaz, and Qusar (Guzar) Rayons of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 1088f). Following Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, we only include the regions within Azerbaijan. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In 1993 six Lezgin protestors were killed by the Azeri police according to Minahan (2002: 1088). There have been allegations that Sadval was involved in a 1994 terrorist attack in Baku’s metro, which caused about a dozen deaths. This is insufficient to warrant a LVIOLSD code. Another terrorist bombing in 2001 appears not to have exceeded the LVIOLSD threshold, either. The whole movement is coded with NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Azerbaijan has long-standing assimilationist policies (Müller 2000: 71). 1990 Soviet legislation led to the recognition of Lezgin as an official language of Dagestan, but this concerns the Lezgins in Russia and is thus not coded (see Lezgins in Russia). We found no evidence for concessions or restrictions in the years prior the first year of activity.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1992 there was a presidential decree on the ‘Protection of the Rights and Freedoms and on State Support for the Promotion of the Languages and Cultures of National Minorities, Numerically Small Peoples and Ethnic Groups living in the Republic of Azerbaijan’. According to Minority Rights Group International, there were basically no moves towards implementation. The Aliyev regime continued with policies favoring the interests of the majority group, the Azeris, and “remained vague in its provisions for ethnic minorities.” We do not code a concession (for a dissenting opinion, see Cunningham 2014: 200).
* In 2002 a ‘Law on the State Language’ was adopted that contained “certain regrettable reductions in the legal guarantees for the protection of national minorities” (Minority Rights Group International). “Farsi-speaking Talysh in the south of the country, Caucasian Lezgins in the north, displaced Meskhetian Turks from Central Asia, and displaced Kurds from the Armenian-occupied Lachin region have all experienced discrimination, restrictions on the ability to teach in their first languages, and harassment by local authorities” (Minority Rights Group International). [2002: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Azerbaijan attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lezgins |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Lezgins |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 37302000 |

**Power access**

* We draw on EPR. [1991-2004: powerless]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR. [0.02]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1084), the Lezgins are concentrated in the North Caucasus in parts of the Dagestan republic and adjacent areas in Azerbaijan. He does not give figures specifically for Azerbaijan, but counting areas in both Dagestan and Azerbaijan the Lezgins make up a majority in Lezginistan (75% according to Minahan). MAR does not consider the Lezgins in Azerbaijan territorially concentrated, suggesting that they make up less than 25% of the population in their homeland. According to MAR: “In Azerbaijan, the traditional Lezgin lands are concentrated in the northeast, but there are Lezgins in other areas of the country as well (GROUPCON = 1) and consequently they do not have as strong a group identity as their brethren to the north. “ [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Lezgins in Russia (about 400,000 according to Minahan 2002: 1084, also see EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Talysh

Activity: 1993

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Prior to Azerbaijan’s independence, the Talysh lobbied for cultural freedom. This continued until the late 1980s and into the new Azerbaijani nation. After Azerbaijan’s independence, there has been some contention for increased self-determination in the form of autonomy or even independence (Minahan 2002: 1840). The first evidence of separatist mobilization is in June 1993, when Talysh nationalists declared an autonomous republic (Socor 2005). Already in 1992, the Talysh National Party had been formed (Minority Rights Group International), but it is not clear whether this party advocated separatist goals. The self-declared Talysh republic was quickly dissolved by Azeri forces (in August 1993). Those behind the declaration were arrested and three of them were later convicted of crimes against the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. This appears to have ended Talysh contention for self-determination activity. With Armenian support, the leader of the 1993 uprising, Hummatov, and some others continue to demand secession or autonomy, but there appears to be little local support and no real self-determination movement (Socor 2005; Goble 2013). The EPR coding notes suggest that the movement continued beyond 1993, but we found no supporting evidence. Minahan (2016: 410) provides no evidence of separatist mobilization beyond 1993. Roth (2015: 195f) reports some mobilization outside of Azerbaijan, but none in Azerbaijan itself, and he lists the Talysh as a “semi-active autonomy/independence annexation movement”. MRGI does not report evidence of separatist mobilization beyond 1993, either. The Talysh are a member of the Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO), but the member organization is based in the Netherlands and no evidence for mobilization in Azerbaijan is provided. Coene (2010: 161f) provides no evidence for separatist mobilization after 1993. A 2016 report by the Eurasia Review suggests that there were some limited calls for Talysh autonomy or independence in that year, but provides no evidence for political mobilization. According to the same report, political organization is unlikely due to Azerbaijani repression. On this basis, we code the movement as terminated in 1993. [start date: 1993; end date: 1993]

**Dominant claim**

* The claim code reflects the proclamation of an autonomous republic in 1993 (see above). [1993: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* An autonomous Talysh republic was declared in 1993. The declaration is ambiguous whether the goal was for autonomy or indendence; we treat it as a declaration of autonomy (see below). More generally, support for outright independence appears insignificant (Socor 2005). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Talysh is the Talysh Republic (officially the Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic). This territory lies in southeastern Azerbaijan and is adjacent to the Iranian border (Roth 2015: 195f). Roth suggests that the Talysh Republic includes the following contemporary districts: Lankaran, Jalilabad, Masally, Yardymli, Lerik, Astara, and Lankaran City. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In June 1993 Talysh nationalists declared an autonomous republic. Whether the self-proclaimed republic was supposed to be independent or autonomous within Azerbaijan is not fully clear. Socor (2005) and Minahan (2002: 1841) suggest that independence was proclaimed. Goble (2013), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 289) and Minority Rights Group International remain ambiguous about the exact claim. The instigators of the 1993 event and their close associates (now grouped as the relatively obscure (see Socor 2005; Goble 2013) National Talysh Movement whose activity is not coded) claim they proclaimed an autonomus entity within Azerbaijan. A more neutral, usually well-informed source, Hunter (1997: 468), also reports that the proclaimed republic was supposed to be an autonomous area within Azerbaijan. So does BBC News (2003). Thus we code the declaration as an autonomy declaration. [1993: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There is no evidence of violence and casualties. The Talysh movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Talysh had their own, nominally autonomous republic under the Bolsheviks, the Mughan Soviet Republic. The Mughan republic was extremely shortlived: it only existed from March to June 1919 (Goble 2013). Azerbaijan has long-standing assimilationist policies (Müller 2000: 71).
* In 1992 there was a presidential decree on the ‘Protection of the Rights and Freedoms and on State Support for the Promotion of the Languages and Cultures of National Minorities, Numerically Small Peoples and Ethnic Groups living in the Republic of Azerbaijan’. According to Minority Rights Group International, there were basically no moves towards implementation. The Aliyev regime continued with policies favoring the interests of the majority group, the Azeris, and “remained vague in its provisions for ethnic minorities.” We do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

* It is not clear whether the self-declared autonomus republic had actual power over the Talysh territories. This does not matter as we code the situation on January 1st (the republic was proclaimed in June and dissolved in August).

**Major territorial changes**

* Azerbaijan attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. But this was before the start date and is hence not coded.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Talysh |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Azeris dominate Azerbaijan’s polity and no other group participates significantly in the national government (Cederman et al. 2010). [1993: powerless]

**Group size**

* Azerbaijan’s 1999 census counted approximately 76,800 Talysh, but this is likely an under-estimate (it is likely that some did not reveal their true identity). According to Minority Rights Group International, unofficial estimates go up to 300,000. The group size bases on Minahan (2002: 1837) who pegs their number at 140,000. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 289) report a similar number: 130,000. Azerbaijan’s population was 8.172 million in 2002 (World Bank). [0.0171]

**Regional concentration**

* As argued above, there is considerable ambiguity as regards the number of Talysh in Azerbaijan. We follow Minahan (2002: 1837), according to whom the Talysh are concentrated in the Lenkoran, Astara, and Massalin regions of southern Azerbaijan. Minahan does not give an estimate of the share of Talysh in this area, but only for the combined Talysh homeland (that comprises also parts of Iran). According to Minahan, the Talysh make up 64% of their spatially contiguous, cross-border homeland. This is the best estimate we could find, and based on this we code the Talysh as concentrated. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1837) there are approx. 200,000 Talysh in neighboring Iran. [kin in neighboring country]

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