# BOLIVIA

## Cambas

Activity: 1950-2020

**General notes**

* Bolivia consists of 9 departments, four of which (Santa Cruz, Pando, Beni, and Tarija – the Bolivian *media luna*) are associated with the regionalist Cambas autonomy movement. Changes in these four regions’ status are coded as concessions/restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (1996: 479-480) there was significant contention for independence in Santa Cruz in the early 20th century, but the first evidence of self-determination activity we found was in 1950, when the newly-created white/mestizo dominated Santa Cruz Civic Committee (*Comité Pro Santa Cruz*) mobilized Cruceños against the state abandonment of Santa Cruz and for increased departamental autonomy (Eji 2017). We therefore peg the start date to 1950.
* Until 1957, the movement primarily mobilized in favour of the implementation of a law from 1938, which stipulated that 11% of a region’s oil production royalties would be paid back to the department for local use, but which had not been implemented (Séptimo Día 2017). Minahan (1996: 478; 2002: 367) and Eju (2017) note continued self-determination activity on behalf of the movement thereafter. The Committee articulated demands that an autonomous region should be able to keep two-thirds of non-trade tax revenues collected in the region. They criticized that measures of fiscal decentralization favored municipal, not regional, governments. Other demands include regional legislatures with law-making abilities, regional control over land tenure, and greater regional control over public security.
* The movement appears to have gained strength in recent years. A referendum was held in July 2, 2006, where 71% of Santa Cruz residents voted in favor of autonomy (56% of Bolivians rejected it).
* There is analogous agitation for autonomy in three other departments (Beni, Pando, and Tarija); however, due to the strong link with the Santa Cruz movement and the overlapping goals we code them all together.
* The movement remained active between 2006 and 2020. During this period, the Santa Cruz Civic Committee continued to organize social mobilizations and strikes in favour of self-determination (Eaton 2011; Eju 2017; Sputnik 2018; Vázquez 2019). Significantly, the movement was at the forefront of mobilizations against the 2019 re-election of Evo Morales (Vázquez 2019). [start date: 1950; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Cambas movement is sometimes accused of secessionism. Secessionist claims have also been made, in particular by the small *Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación* (Camba Nation Liberation Movement, MNCL). However, the dominant claim throughout is for territorial autonomy within Bolivia (Eaton 2007: 88; 2011; 2013). [1950-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* An organization called Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación (MNCL) made independence claims (Nación Camba n.d.; Tórrez 2008). We could not find clear evidence regarding the organization’s date of formation. Based on Ballvé (2005), the MNCL must have existed by 2005 and have had 40,000 members at the time. According to the WayBack Machine, the group’s now defunct website was accessible already in January 2004, and the website does contain claims for independence.
  + Evidence on the MNCL from recent years is more thin. According to our research, the group’s website was last functional in late 2022 while the last article on their website appeared in May 2015. Even more importantly, the evidence we suggested that the MNLC had shifted its claim to autonomy by late 2014 while threatening secession only if their autonomy demands will not be met. Specifically, according to an article on their website from December 2014: “This leadership will be accentuated as the 21st century passes, which will be the century of the people of Santa Cruz. If the above is ignored and a satisfactory distribution of political power is not resolved (e.g. federalism, full autonomy), with the passing of time, secession projects could arise, as in other countries” (Dabdoub Peña 2014). [start date: 2004; end date: 2014]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* By far the most active part of this is SDM is located in Santa Cruz department, especially in the movement’s earlier years. However, as demonstrated by the 2007 autonomy declarations and unofficial referendums in 2008, there is analogous agitation also in the other three media luna departments (Beni, Pando, and Tarija). Therefore, we code all four departments as the claimed territory based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 2005, Santa Cruz moved close to declaring autonomy unilaterally, but stopped short of a unilateral declaration (in particular, they moved to create a departmental assembly, which is illegal under Bolivia’s constitution, and symbolically declared its own president as governor of Santa Cruz in January 2005; Eaton 2007: 87). The military warned that a unilateral declaration of autonomy would be considered a breach of the constitution. With tensions coming to a new head after Morales assumed power, the four *media luna* provinces unilaterally declared autonomy statutes in December 2007 (DeMoura 2007). The autonomy statutes were ratified in unofficial referendums in the spring of 2008 in all four departments (Beni, Tarija, Pando, and Santa Cruz). [2007: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence associated with the Santa Cruz movement could be found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* During the early colonial period, the region of Santa Cruz was largely ignored. In 1776, it was separated from the Andean provinces and brought under the Viceroyalty of La Plata, governed from Argentina. Due to the region’s isolation from the centers of Spanish power, the Cambas rebelled against the Spanish in 1809, and declared a republic in Santa Cruz. After the rebellion was suppressed, the Cambas joined the Kollas of the Andean highlands and fought for Bolivia’s independence until 1825 (Minahan 2016: 86; Roth 2015: 415).
* As a consequence of La Paz emerging victorious from Bolivia’s so-called federal war shortly before the end of the 19th century (this war was fought between two of Bolivia’s regions, La Paz and Chiquisaca), the Bolivian state was sharply centralized. Regions that previously enjoyed some sort of political independence were stripped of their autonomy, and henceforth governed by centrally appointed governors (Eaton 2007: 75).
* In the 1930s, when Bolivia and Paraguay were at war, Paraguay supported the creation of a Camba Republic in the Santa Cruz region (Roth 2015: 415).
* In 1938, the government issued a law that stipulated that 11% of a department’s oil production royalties would be paid back to the department. Yet, the law was not implemented, which triggered social mobilization in the 1950s in the department of Santa Cruz (Eji 2017).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover the movement in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Eaton (2007: 76) reports that the 1952 revolution “produced a new spate of centralizing changes that accentuated even further the political and functional dependence of regional departments on the center”. Eaton gives only one concrete example – the abolishment of direct elections of mayors in the department’s capitals (these were re-introduced in 1985). According to the coding rules, changes in municipal autonomy are not generally coded; however, Eaton’s narrative does suggest other measures that reduced autonomy also at the regional level. [1952: autonomy restriction]
* In 1957, following a series of Cruceño mobilizations, the Bolivian government agreed to implement the 1938 Law that assigned 11% of a department’s oil production royalties for departmental use. [1957: autonomy concession]
* In 1994 and 1995, there were decentralization reforms, but powers were devolved not to the regional level, but to the municipal level. In effect, this further reduced the competencies of regional governments. According to Eaton (2007: 81): “Most importantly, this 1995 law amended the 1967 constitution, which had called for the conversion of departments from mere administrative units into actual governments with their own directly elected representative assemblies (asambleas departamentales). The 1995 law downgraded these assemblies to mere councils (concejos departamentales), which would be indirectly elected by municipal councils, and stipulated that departmental authorities would serve not as leaders of their own governments but rather as representatives of the national executive branch at the regional level (poder ejecutivo a nivel regional). Thus, while the law strengthened the role of the regions in administering nationally determined policies, it erased from the constitution the possibility of direct elections for regional authorities.” Coming to power in 1997, Hugo Banzer – who was born in Santa Cruz and opposed municipalization – issued several decrees in the late 1990s aiming to constrain municipal autonomy, but the regions’ (lack of) autonomy was left untouched (Eaton 2007: 81). We code an autonomy restriction due to the 1995 autonomy downgrade. [1995: autonomy restriction]
* In June 2004, several hundreds of thousands of residents of Santa Cruz participated in a demonstration demanding autonomy for the departments. Movement participants subsequently collected roughly 500,000 signatures, demanding a referendum on autonomy, and organized a large-scale civic strike in November 2004 to substantiate their demand (Eaton 2007: 84). The central government was fiercely opposed to the vote on autonomy. In January 2005, there was another large-scale rally in Santa Cruz with more than 350,000 participants. The central government gave in to the demand in June 2005. Shortly before his fall from power, President Carlos Mesa agreed to schedule a nation-wide referendum on autonomy (Eaton 2011: 296). Moreover, the beleaguered interim President agreed in April 2005 to institute elections for regional prefects. The regional elections – the first of their kind in Bolivia – were held in December 2005. We code an autonomy concession in 2005 due to the granting of a referendum on autonomy and the introduction of direct elections to regional prefects. [2005: autonomy concession]
* Evo Morales assumed power in January 2006 as the first indigenous President in the history of Bolivia. He kept the promise made by the former president, and the autonomy referendum was held in July 2006. Morales initially said he would vote in favor of autonomy, but then campaigned against the referendum, though he promised that his party would respect the results in Santa Cruz and initiate a debate on autonomy in the constitutional assembly, which was elected on the same day as the autonomy referendum. Significant controversy emerged over the interpretation of the referendum results. While an overall majority of 56 per cent voted against autonomy, in Santa Cruz 71 per cent of voters endorsed the proposal. Similarly, there were majorities in favour in the three other *media luna* departments, too. The ballot question, based on the wishes of the initiators, suggests that every province voting yes would be granted autonomy. However, Morales refused to implement the outcome (Eaton 2013: 14) and the National Electoral Court rejected the arguments of the *media luna* departments that the votes of each department had to be considered separately: it ruled that the referendum was rejected because the referendum was a national process whose results had to be judged nationally. The final decision on departmental autonomy was thus to be made by the constituent assembly, which was elected the same day. The fact that Morales’ Movement for Socialism won a slight majority in the assembly, however, made it somewhat unlikely that powers would be devolved (Eaton 2011; Breuer 2008: 21). We consider this an autonomy restriction since the ruling appears to stand in direct contrast to the previously agreed upon ballot question. [2006: autonomy restriction]
* In the first years of his presidency, Evo Morales sought to recentralize authority and resources relative to the departments. This becomes clearest with regard to the sharing of revenues between departments and the national centre and the associated decrease in regional economic autonomy. “In November 2007, the president decreed a 70% reduction in the departments’ share of revenues from the direct tax on hydrocarbons. […] When opposition governors complained, the president responded by calling them oligarchs and by directing his new Ministry of Transparency to launch investigations into charges that governors had misused IDH transfers to reward business partners. Morales also favored a draft of the new constitution that would limit the authority of departmental governments” (Eaton 2013: 13-14). [2007: autonomy restriction]
* Santa Cruz representatives were marginalized in the constitutional convention that took place between 2006-2007, and in 2008, the four *media luna* departments held unofficial referendums on their self-proclaimed autonomy statutes. Strikes organized by the movement prevented Morales from scheduling a national referendum on the draft constitution drafted by the constitutional assembly. After weeks of violence, unofficial autonomy referendums in the four *media luna* departments, and negotiations with leaders of the conservative autonomy movements, Morales agreed on October 21, 2008, to a series of concessions, including the establishment of regional legislatures and protections for wealthy landowners. According to Eaton (2013: 16): “Three features of this regional compro­mise deserve special emphasis, though the president agreed to nearly 100 changes in his preferred constitutional draft. First, at the procedural level, Morales reversed his position on the eastern departments’ autonomy refer­enda in May/June 2008, allowing the statutes approved in those votes to stand as long as they were adjusted to fit within the new constitution (Ayo 2010). Second, the president agreed to transform departmental councils into assem­blies with full legislative powers, a core demand of the eastern opposition that has moved Bolivia in the direction of federalism (Barrios 2010). Third, in response to eastern concerns about new constitutional limits on the size of landholdings (5,000 hectares), Morales agreed to make these limits nonretro­active, a dramatic concession that prevents expropriation by the national gov­ernment of virtually all existing lowland agribusinesses” (Urioste 2009). The revised constitution was approved in a January 2009 referendum (though Santa Cruz voted against it; see Eaton 2011: 297). With this, Bolivia became the most decentralized of Latin America’s non-federal states, even if the specific form is still evolving and the distribution of powers is somewhat ill-defined. Subsequently, the five Andean departments as well as several indigenous communities voted on their autonomy in December 2009 (Centellas 2010). Departmental (and indigenous) autonomy was further elaborated with Bolivia’s Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization, passed in July 2010 (Aguirre 2012: 55; Faguet 2013). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 2009. [2009: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* We code regional autonomy after the adoption of the 2009 constitution (see above and below). [2010-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* With the 2009 constitution and the subsequent successful autonomy referendums in the five Andean departments and the 2010 Framework for Autonomy, Bolivia moved strongly in the direction of a federal state (Eaton 2013; Faguet 2013). Regional elections were introduced, and administrative and (limited) legislative competencies were devolved. Hence, we code a major change in 2009. It has to be noted, however, that the exact division of powers remains somewhat ill-defined, and overall, the competencies attributed to departments remain somewhat limited. Bolivia cannot be considered a federal state, even if it is the most decentralized unitary state in the region. [2009: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Cambas |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Whites/mestizos |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 14504000 |

**Power access**

* The Cambas movement seeks autonomy for the four eastern departments (Tarija, Pando, Beni, and Santa Cruz). These departments, as well as the movement are dominated by whites/mestizos. The movement uses an ethnically inclusive rhetoric. While the movement managed to co-opt some lowland indigenous leaders, it is better associated with whites/metsizos in the four eastern provinces (see Eaton 2007: 91-92). Hence, the Lowlanders form a regional branch of the EPR group of the Whites/mestizos.
* EPR codes the Whites as dominant up until 2005, as junior partner 2006 onwards, and as dominant again in 2020. However, the EPR code relates to all white Bolivians, and not necessarily to whites in the eastern departments.
* Eaton (2007: 77-78) argues that Santa Cruz elites traditionally exerted very substantial influence on the national executive, resulting for instance in financial resources being disproportionately transferred to the eastern departments. EPR downgrades Whites/mestizos as a result of Morales coming to power in 2006, but Eaton (2007) argues that the influence of Santa Cruz elites had decreased already under the interim presidency of Mesa (2003-2005). Mesa cooperated with Morales, and no representatives of Santa Cruz’ powerful agricultural sector were invited into the presidential cabinet – a primer in democratic Bolivia. Morales appointed many white cabinet members, but most white ministers appear to stem from the western departments, in particular La Paz. We found no evidence for a white-mestizo minister from the eastern departments (Nemecia Achacollo, the agricultura minister under Morales, stems from Santa Cruz, but is indigenous). This suggests a powerless code. In line with this, Eaton (2007) argues that the agro-petro elite of Santa Cruz lost much of its voice after 2003. In light of this evidence, we code the Cambas as powerless from 2004 onwards. Following Eaton’s (2007: 77f) claim that the elites of the eastern departments had substantial influence at the national level during most of the 20th century, we code a senior partner status between 1950 and 2003.
* EPR again upgrades Whites/mestizos as dominant in 2020 owing to the coming to power of Jeanine Áñez as interim president in 2019. Áñez, a white Bolivian from the eastern department of Beni, appointed up to 13 cabinet members from the *media luna* departments during her government between 2019 and 2020, most of them from Santa Cruz (Manetto 2019; Carrasco 2020). We therefore code Cambas as senior partner in 2020.
* [1950-2003: senior partner; 2004-2019: powerless; 2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* The group size estimate is calculated as follows. According to the 2001 Census, the population of Santa Cruz is 2,029,471, the population of Beni 362,521, the population of Pando 52,525, and the population of Tarija 391,226. This yields a combined 2,835,743. Since the movement should be associated with whites in the eastern provinces, we subtract from this the number of Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups, which EPR pegs at 3% of Bolivia’s total population. According to the 2001 Census, Bolivia’s population amounted to 8,274,325, hence the relative group size estimate results if we divide (2,835,743 - .03 x 8,274,325 = 2,587,000) by 8,274,325: 0.3127159. [0.3127]
  + Note: the figure we use is a bit higher than the one provided in Minahan (1996: 478): 1.8 million. However, note that Minahan counts but two departments, Santa Cruz and El Beni, and we count four. The figure we use is also a bit higher than the figure cited by Minahan (2002) – 2.5 mio, but Minahan (2002) also counts only Santa Cruz and El Beni while we include two more departments.

**Regional concentration**

* As noted above, the number of Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups in the four departments amounts to 248,000, or 8.74% of the population in the four departments. Most of the remaining population, a clear majority, is Camban. Supporting comes from Minahan (1996: 478), according to whom the Cruzians make up 78% of the population of the Santa Cruz area with 3% Guarani, 17% other Bolivians, and 1% Brazilians. Minahan (2002: 366) reports that Cambans make up 74% of their homeland and that 70% of Cambans live in their homeland. Note that Minahan (1996; 2002) includes only two of the four *media luna* departments (Santa Cruz and El Beni); however, Santa Cruz is by far the largest department of the four (see above). [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Cambas are a regional branch (eastern departments) of the EPR group of the Whites/mestizos. We found no evidence for numerically significant (>100k) transborder ethnic kin. [no transborder kin]

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## Lowland Indigenous Peoples

Activity: 1982-2020

**General notes**

* Indigenous peoples in lowland Bolivia include the Chiquitano, Ese-Ejja, Guaraní, Moxeño, Guarayo, Arawak and Ayoreo, in addition to a number of smaller groups (MRGI; MAR).

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1982 various groups in eastern Bolivia combined to form the CIDOB (Indigenous Confederation of the East, Chaco and Amazon of Bolivia). As the organization’s central demands are territory and autonomy for the 200,000 lowland Indians who reside in three departments of the country’s eastern region, we peg the start date of the movement at 1982. CIDOB remains active as of 2020, continuously mobilizing indigenous communities in favour of their autonomy and land rights, and against the infrastructural development of their territories (Cabrera Barrientos 2020; Prensa Senado 2019; Keesing’s Record of World Events; MAR; MRGI). [start date: 1982; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* We code the onset of the self-determination movement in 1982, with the establishment of the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente de Bolivia (CIDOB). Numerous sources state that land rights and territorial autonomy were the primary goals of the movement (Yashar 2005: 24; Prevost et al., 2013; Cooke 2013: 75). Evidence of a more extreme claim could not be found. The claim for autonomy has neither ended nor has it been altered in recent years, as the study by Tockman (2016) and a 2012 interview with a CIDOB leader show. We thus code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. [1982-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* We were unable to find a specific definition of the territory to which this group’s claims are tied. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s ethnic settlement area as indicated by the GeoEPR dataset, which offers the best approximation available. According to Minorities at Risk (MAR), the Lowland Indigenous group in Bolivia consists mainly of Guarani and Arawaks, which also matches the representation in GeoEPR.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No reports of separatist violence were found during the period we cover, hence a NVIOLSD classification. MAR reports a rebellion score of 8 in 2003, but this appears to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7 and the coding notes do not make mention of a rebellion). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* With the arrival of European colonists in the mid-16th century, lowland indigenous tribes in Bolivia were quickly decimated by diseases and violence. The surviving populations that managed to resist the Spanish fled deep into the Bolivian rainforest, avoiding incorporation into the colonial regime (Postero 2017).
* Lowland indigenous groups remained largely isolated until the 19th century, when forestry and commercial agriculture began to expand to the areas inhabited by these tribes, further reducing their living space and forcing many communities to relocate deeper into the forest (Bamonte & Kociacich 2007).
* In the mid-20th century, contact between non-indigenous Bolivians and the lowland tribes intensified. Escaping poverty and the shrinking access to productive land, many indigenous people were employed in agriculture by wealthy landowners, often in conditions of semi-slavery (Sharma 2006; Braunstein & Meichtry 2008).
* In 1952, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) overthrew the Bolivian government in an episode commonly referred to as the Bolivian National Revolution. Among the social, political and economic reforms that the movement enacted throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the MNR substantially changed the formal status of indigenous people. On one hand, the citizenship of indigenous Bolivians was recognized for the first time, which granted them the right to political participation, education, health, and access to land (Van Cott 2007: 49). However, reforms were generally geared towards assimilating indigenous people into Bolivian socio-economic structures “through the elimination of their autonomous culture and living patterns”, with the aim of reducing indigenous agricultural land (MAR). Notably, education reforms sought to “castillinise” indigenous communities by prohibiting indigenous languages from schools (Contreras 1999).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In the late 1980s, the MNR adopted a series of economic policies that dissolved prior agreements concerning much of the communal land on which lowland indigenous people lived and worked. As part of these policies, many preexisting social programmes that supported indigenous people were cut and the right to land of these communities was seriously undermined, prompting social mobilization that spanned several months (MAR). [1988: autonomy restriction]
* In 1990, lowland indigenous groups mobilized in mass in the March for Territory and Dignity, which started in the Amazon rainforest and reached La Paz 35 days later. Indigenous people demanded the formal recognition of their territorial rights and the protection of their land from environmental degradation. In response to the march, the government recognized 1.5 million hectares in the Bolivian lowland as indigenous territory, constituting the first major recognition of indigenous land (MRGI). [1990: autonomy concession]
* In 1994, the Bolivian legislature passed Law 1585, or the Law of Constitutional Reform, which introduced a series of changes to the Bolivian Constitution, many relating to the rights of indigenous people. The reforms defined Bolivia as a ‘multiethnic’ and ‘pluricultural’ country, recognized the social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous people – including their land rights – and recognized the legal status of indigenous forms social organization, allowing indigenous authorities to exercise some juridical and administrative functions in their territories (Derpic 2002; Brysk & Bennett 2012). In addition, one of the reforms sought to decentralize the political system by giving local indigenous communities more political autonomy and independence from traditional political parties, which facilitated local indigenous participation and led to the creation of more successful indigenous parties (MAR). The political reform also gave local communities increased control over municipal expenditures and budgets, as well as some limited control over education, sanitation, infrastructure and irrigation spending (Altman & Lalander 2003). A number sources claim that implementation of the various constitutional reforms was limited by powerful international and local interest, and that they merely served to consolidate a neoliberal economic, social and political model in Bolivia (Ströbele-Gregor 1997; MRGI; Brysk & Bennet 2012). However, other sources report that the reforms of 1994 improved the capacity of lowland indigenous Bolivians to exercise their rights and autonomy, despite important shortcomings in their implementation (Derpic 2002; Gamboa 2010; Rousseau & Manrique 2019). [1994: autonomy concession]
* In 1994, the Law of Education Reform introduced the right to bilingual education for indigenous Bolivians. All thirty indigenous languages were introduced as languages of instruction in schools alongside Spanish, depending on the school’s location and demographic composition. Although many schools did not implement these reforms, especially in urban areas, there is evidence of implementation in a relatively high number of schools in lowland areas (Arrueta & Avery 2012). [1994: cultural rights concession]
* In 1996, a new Electoral Law sought to expand the political rights of indigenous people by establishing a system of proportional representation, which increased the number of indigenous representatives in the National Congress (Brysk & Bennett 2012). We do not code a concession because the law refers to representation in the parliament and not autonomy/cultural rights.
* In 1997, the government recognized Quechua and Aymara as official languages of Bolivia, alongside Spanish and Guaraní (Adelaar 2004). Guarani is spoken by many lowland indigenous peoples. Given the high-profile nature of this change, we code a concession, but it should be noted that protection of indigenous language rights in the Bolivian lowlands remained patchy at best after this (Iriarte 2018). [1997: cultural rights concession]
* In 2000, the government recognised a further 34 lowland indigenous languages as official languages of Bolivia (Adelaar 2004). Given the high-profile nature of this change, we code a concession, but it should be noted that protection of indigenous language rights in the Bolivian lowlands remained patchy at best after this (Iriarte 2018). [2000: cultural rights concession]
* The Bolivian constitution was redrafted in 2009. For the first time, a Bolivian consitution recognized and guaranteed the self-determination, governance and autonomy of indigenous people over their ancestral territories (Rousseau & Manrique 2019). The 2010 Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization stipulates that communities must fulfil a series of legal rules and procedures to be granted political and territorial autonomy, such as a population base of at least 1,000 individuals for lowland indigenous groups, the capacity for self-government, and the approval of autonomy of at least half of the community through a referendum (Tockman & Cameron 2018: 51). IWGIA (2021) has described this process as “endless”, highlighting that indigenous communities must navigate four branches of government over the course of years, if not decades, before they can exercise their constitutional right to autonomy and self-determination (Tockman & Cameron 2014: 46). As of 2021, only one lowland indigenous community, the Guaraní people of Charagua Iyambae, had completed the procedure and gained autonomy, while nine additional communities were in the process of doing so (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2021; Postero & Tockman 2020). Despite the difficult road to gaining autonomy, the 2009 constitution improved the lowland indigenous peoples’ autonomy rights, so we code a concession. [2009: autonomy concession]
* In 2010, the legislature passed the Law of Education Reform, with the hopes of futher supporting diversity in the classrooms and promoting the decolonisation of education in favour of the cultural rights of indigenous people. However, the law produced little change in the Bolivian schooling system and was branded to be largely rhetorical (Arrueta & Avery 2012). We do not code a concession.
* In August 2012, the Bolivian government passed an ambitious law on the linguistic rights of indigenous groups, which sought to “recover, vitalize, revitalize and develop the official languages at risk of extinction, establishing actions for their use in all instances of the Plurinational State of Bolivia” (CENEDA 2016). However, according to Iriarte (2018), implementation of this law has been extremely limited in the Bolivian lowlands. We do not code a concession.
* In mid-2014, a new mining law was enacted by the government. According to MRGI, the law “handed more power to mining interests while reducing the ability of indigenous communities to resist extractive activities in their territories”. Radhuber (2015: 103) similarly claims that the government’s increased support for the extractive industry, which operates mostly in the Bolivian lowlands, has further weakened the political influence of lowland indigenous groups. The above is confirmed by Cejis (2014), who argue that the mining law violates the indigenous right to prior consultation and may cause forced displacement among the lowland indigenous people, potentially threatening the land rights and survival of these groups. [2014: autonomy restriction]
* For decades, the Bolivian government held discussions regarding the construction of a highway to connect the departments of Cochabamba and Beni, and which would run across the Isiboro-Sicure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS), a protected territory home to 14,000 people of the Chimáne, Yuracaré and Moxeño-Trinitario tribes (Postero 2017: 129; Collyns 2017; MRGI). In early 2011, the country’s executive approved a Brazilian loan that would allow construction to start, but mass indigenous protests led President Evo Morales to sign a law in October 2011 that halted the project and reaffirmed the protected status of the TIPNIS (MRGI). However, in August 2017, Morales repealed the park’s special protections and authorized the drafting of plans for the highway, arguing that the project would benefit indigenous people and their development (Wilton 2019). Though progress has continuously been stalled and its timeline revised, the highway’s first segment has already been completed while the second and third segments are currently under construction. We code a restriction in 2017, when Morales reversed the protections granted to TIPNIS in 2011. [2017: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* The 2009 Consitution granted lowland indigenous people the right to self-determination and autonomy, but communities wishing to exercise their rights must complete a heavily bureaucratic process that constrains the capacity of many commnuities to gain autonomy (see above). Of the 58 lowland indigenous territories legally recongised by the state, only ten began the process of gaining autonomy between 2009 and 2014, and only one had successfully become autonomous in 2020 (INRA 2020; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2021; Postero & Tockman 2020). We therefore do not code the group as having regional autonomy in practice. [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lowland Indigenous Peoples |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 14506000 |

**Power access**

* We use data on representation in the central government from EPR. [1982-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We use data on relative group size from EPR. [0.03]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes regional concentration, but EPR applies a lower bar. MAR suggests that the Lowland Indigenous Peoples have a regional base in which they constitute the predominant proportion of the population but that less than 50% of group members reside there. MRGI suggests that the lowland indigenous peoples are more dispersed than the highland indigenous peoples. [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* Both MAR and EPR code ethnic kin in Paraguay; however, SDM’s numerical threshold is not met as according to MRGI, indigenous people in Paraguay numbered only approx. 86,000 in 2002. EPR also codes ethnic kin in Argentina; however, the 100,000 group members threshold is again not met as per MRGI/Encyclopedia.com, the indigenous peoples which are located in Argentina and are related to the Lowland Indigenous Peoples number just 4,000 (Guarani) and 21,000 (Chiriguano). Small numbers of Chiriguano, Ese Ejja, Ayoreo also live in Brazil, Peru, and Paraguay, respectively, but again the threshold is not met. [no kin]

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## Quechua-Aymara

Activity: 1952-2020

**General notes**

* The Quechua-Aymara are “the indigenous nation in the Andean region of western South America, the descendents of the people of the Inca Empire. The nation, unified by over four centuries of abuse, is made up of the majority Quechuas and the Aymaras, who inhabit the Altiplano, mostly in Bolivia” (Minahan 2002: 1552).
* Even though the two groups are somehow distinct (they speak different languages, they seldom inhabit the same territories and their political organization is different), they are coded as one because their self-determination claim has been articulated in a joint manner (MRGI). As stated by an indigenous leader, “We are a single Qullana people who speak Quechua and Aymara, at the moment divided into four Latin American states, which hurts us much; but the wound is still open and one day we will reconstitute the first great Collasuyu and soon the powerful Tawantinsuyu, dear brothers, remember that we are only one people” (AymaraNet 2000). In addition, the movement commonly refers to both groups as one, as demonstrated by a symbolic sovereignity declaration issued in 2001, where the movement proclaims, “We the Quechua-Aymara are the ancestral inhabitants of this territory called Qullasuyu…” (Jach’ak’achi Manifesto 2011).

**Movement start and end dates**

* The start date (1952) follows this account in Minahan (2002: 1556): “In April 1952 the Quechua-Aymara in the mountains of Bolivia took up arms against the Bolivian government and the mining companies in the first widespread uprising.”
  + Tapia (2019) reports Quechua-Ayamara mobilization for autonomy already before this, most importantly, in 1914 when indigenous leaders signalled their intention of restoring a system of autonomous Quechua-Aymara government. However, Tapia suggests that prior attempts were localized mobilizations against wealthy landowners in individual estates. This is confirmed by MAR. We found no evidence of organized and unified Quechua-Aymara mobilization for self-determination as defined here before 1952.
  + It should be noted though that in 1945, the first National Indigenous Congress was organized with representatives of Quechua, Aymara and lowland indigenous groups, who primarily demanded improvements to indigenous quality of life, such as an end of the system of serfdom and improved education systems, but no claims for self-determination appear to have been made (Ahora El Pueblo 2022).
* In response to the 1952 rebellion, Bolivia adopted an agrarian reform that ended the traditional system of serfdom. The Quechua-Aymara continued to make claims for land rights and stronger environmental regulation as of 2020, and there were several instances of organized protest and mobilization during the period we cover (Mathias 2019; Hewitt et al. 2008; López 2014; Minahan 2002: 1551ff; MRGI; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; MAR). [start date: 1952; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Quechua-Aymara have been making claims for land rights, autonomy and stronger environmental regulation (MAR; MRGI; Laurenti Sellers 2017). [1952-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* While claims for “Aymara independence” have been made, a contextual reading suggests that claims are likely not for outright independence (Hilari & Hasegan 2020). It is also important to note that other Aymara groups – such as the Red Ponchos – support Aymara autonomy but are explicitly opposed to autonomist attempts in the eastern part Bolivia (e.g. Santa Cruz) as well as any outcome that would reduce the integrity of Bolivia as a state (Seitz 2009). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* We were unable to find a specific definition of the territory to which this group’s claims are tied. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s ethnic settlement area according to GeoEPR. This area broadly corresponds to Minahan’s description of the Quechua-Aymara homeland territory in the Andean regions with the cities of Cochabamba (Kuchawampa), Sucre, and Oruro (Ururu) as the major cultural centers (Minahan 2002: 1551).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1557), “in a symbolic declaration, the Quechua-Aymara of Bolivia proclaimed their self-determination in April 2001”, through a document called the Jach’ak’achi Manifesto. The Manifesto, which was issued as a form of protest over the precarious socio-economic situation of Quechuas and Aymaras in Bolivia, states: “Against a colonial and neoliberal Bolivian state (…) it is now time to denounce and to uphold the ancestral rights to self-determination and autonomy of our native Nations (…) for our territorial autonomy and for our spiritual cosmovision” (Jach’ak’achi Manifesto 2001). We do not code a declaration since the wording of the declaration seems to be more a call to action instead of a unilateral proclamation of autonomy.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The above-mentioned episode in 1952 is not coded as armed conflict in any of the major sources (UCDP/PRIO; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 209; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Hewitt et al. 2008; MAR). The case study by Kohl (1978) confirms Minahan’s account of a partly violent uprising by “peasants”, but cites no casualty figures. We do not code separatist violence.
* No violence past 1952 was found, and thus 1953-ongoing is coded as NVIOLSD. MAR reports a rebellion score of 8 in 2002-2003 for Bolivia’s Highland Indigenous Peoples, but this appears to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7 and the coding notes do not make mention of a rebellion). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The first great Andean empire, Tianhuacan, emerged among Aymaras in 600 B.C., but with its collapse in the 13th century A.D., a number of smaller Aymara kingdoms were created. In 1470, the kingdoms unsuccessfully rebelled against the growing power of the Quechua dominated Inca empire (Tawantinsuyu), which brought the Aymaras under Inca rule. The Quechua and Aymara traditions, which were already very similar, then became unified under the rule of the Incas (Minahan 2002: 1552-3).
* The first contact of Quechuas and Aymaras with the Spanish took place in 1524, and the Inca empire fell at the hands of the colonisers in 1533. Between 1561 and 1796, the Quechua-Aymara population declined by 75% due to diseases brought by the Spanish and the brutality of the colonisation process. By the year 1800, only 10% of the pre-conquest Quechua and Aymara population remained. During the colonial period, the Spanish created a highly stratified society with Quechuas and Aymaras living in servitude on large estates. Mestizo children become to represent a class between the white and indigineous population. The Spanish missionaries spread the use of Quechua during their efforst to extend Catholicism (Minahan 2002: 1554).
* At least 56 Quechua-Aymara rebellions took place between the 16th and 18th centuries against Spanish colonists. The most notable was the great rebellion led by Túpac Amaru II, which instigated a series of reforms in the colonial administration. Despite the revolts and widespread discontent, servitude of Quechuas and Aymaras continued into the independent Bolivia (1825) (Tapia 2019; Minahan 2002:1555).
* The Quechua-Aymara homeland was divided at the time of independence between Bolivia and Peru. Bolivia’s independence changed little for Quechuas and Aymaras, since colonial power was transferred to the Creole descendants and Mestizo (mixed) populations (Minahan 2002: 1555).
* During the Federalist War (1898-1899) between Liberals and Conservatives, the Liberals were able to engineer an uprising of the Aymara people under the leadership of Pablo Zárate Willka. After the Liberal win, Aymaras turned against their allies resulting in the largest 19th century rebellion. The rebellion was ultimately crushed and its leaders executed (Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture 2022).
* In the early 1900s, the Liberals implemented a series of land sale policies that benefited wealthy landlords in rural Bolivia. These policies resulted in scattered indigenous mobilization, and between 1901 and 1918, at least 50 indigenous revolts of varying intensity took place, most of them at a local level against landowners (Tapia 2019; MAR).
* Between the 1920s and the 1940s, the emerging indigenous campesino organisations formed a strong relationship with workers unions. During this period, there were several strikes primarily involving workers of Quechua and Aymara descent demanding better working conditions. The strikes were violently repressed by the Bolivian military in episodes known as the Uncia Massacre and Catavi Massacre (Tapia 2019).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1952, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) overthrew the Bolivian government in an episode commonly referred to as the Bolivian National Revolution. Among the social, political and economic reforms that the movement enacted throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the MNR substantially changed the formal status of indigenous people. On one hand, the citizenship of indigenous Bolivians was recognized for the first time, which granted them the right to political participation, education, health, and access to land (Van Cott 2007: 49). Moreover, the government adopted an agrarian reform that ended the traditional system of serfdom that Quechuas and Aymaras had been subjected to since colonial times (Minahan 2002: 1556). However, reforms were generally geared towards assimilating indigenous people into Bolivian socio-economic structures “through the elimination of their autonomous culture and living patterns”, with the aim of reducing indigenous agricultural land (MAR). Notably, education reforms sought to “castillinise” these communities by prohibiting indigenous languages from schools (Contreras 1999). Given that assimilation policies are at the core of the concept of cultural rights, we code a cultural rights restriction but note the ambiguity emerging from this code, since the MNR’s policies did represent an increase in the capacity of Quechua-Aymaras to exercise some citizenship rights. We code the restriction in 1953 as this is when the first reforms were introduced (Kohl 1997). [1953: cultural rights restriction]
* In the late 1980s, the MNR adopted a series of economic policies that dissolved prior agreements concerning much of the communal land on which highland Quechuas and Aymaras lived and worked. As part of these policies, many preexisting social programmes that supported indigenous people were cut and the right to land of these communities was seriously undermined, prompting widespread social mobilization that spanned several months (MAR). [1988: autonomy restriction]
* In 1994, the Bolivian legislature passed Law 1585, or the Law of Constitutional Reform, which introduced a series of changes to the Bolivian Constitution, many relating to the rights of indigenous people. The reforms defined Bolivia as a ‘multiethnic’ and ‘pluricultural’ country, recognized the social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous people – including their land rights – and recognized the legal status of indigenous forms social organization, allowing indigenous authorities to exercise some juridical and administrative functions in their territories (Derpic 2002; Brysk & Bennett 2012). In addition, one of the reforms sought to decentralize the political system by giving local indigenous communities more political autonomy and independence from traditional political parties, which facilitated local indigenous participation and led to the creation of more successful indigenous parties (MAR). The political reform also gave local communities increased control over municipal expenditures and budgets, as well as some limited control over education, sanitation, infrastructure and irrigation spending (Altman & Lalander 2003). A number sources claim that implementation of the various Constitutional reforms was limited by powerful international and local interest, and that they merely served to consolidate a neoliberal economic, social and political model in Bolivia (Ströbele-Gregor 1997; MRGI; Brysk & Bennet 2012). However, other sources report that the reforms of 1994 improved the capacity of indigenous Bolivians to exercise their rights and autonomy, despite important shortcomings in their implementation (Derpic 2002; Gamboa 2010; Rousseau & Manrique 2019). [1994: autonomy concession]
* In 1994, the Law of Education Reform introduced the right to bilingual education for indigenous Bolivians. As a result, schools across Bolivia adopted Quechua, Aymara and Guaraní as languages of instruction, depending on the school’s location and demographic composition (Arrueta & Avery 2012). [1994: cultural rights concession]
* In 1996, a new Electoral Law sought to expand the political rights of indigenous people by establishing a system of proportional representation, which increased the number of indigenous representatives in the National Congress (Brysk & Bennett 2012). We do not code a concession because the law refers to representation in the parliament and not autonomy/cultural rights.
* In 1997, the government recognized Quechua and Aymara as official languages of Bolivia, alongside Spanish and Guaraní (Adelaar 2004). [1997: cultural rights concession]
* The Bolivian Constitution was redrafted in 2009. For the first time, a Bolivian Consitution recognized and guaranteed the self-determination, governance and autonomy of indigenous people over their ancestral territories (Rousseau & Manrique 2019). The 2010 Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization stipulates that communities must fulfil a series of legal rules and procedures to be granted political and territorial autonomy, such as a population base of at least 10,000 individuals for highland Quechua-Aymara indigenous groups, the capacity for self-government, and the approval of autonomy of at least half of the community through a referendum (Tockman & Cameron 2018: 51). However, IWGIA (2021) has described this process as “endless”, highlighting that indigenous communities must navigate four branches of government over the course of years, if not decades, before they can exercise their constitutional right to autonomy and self-determination (Tockman & Cameron 2014: 46). As of 2021, only three Quechua-Aymara communities, (Raqaypampa, Salinas de Garci Mendoza and Uru Chipaya) had completed the procedure and gained autonomy, while 21 additional communities were in the process of doing so (Suárez & Aruchari 2021; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2021). Despite the difficult road to gaining autonomy, the 2009 constitution improved the indigenous peoples’ autonomy rights, so we code a concession. [2009: autonomy concession]
* In 2010, the legitslature passed a new Law of Education Reform, with the hopes of futher supporting diversity in the classrooms and promoting the decolonisation of education in favour of the cultural rights of indigenous people. However, the law produced little change in the Bolivian schooling system and was branded to be largely rhetorical (Arrueta & Avery 2012), We do not code a concession.
* In August 2012, the Bolivian government passed an ambitious law on the linguistic rights of indigenous groups, which sought to “recover, vitalize, revitalize and develop the official languages at risk of extinction, establishing actions for their use in all instances of the Plurinational State of Bolivia” (CENEDA 2016). However, according to Iriarte, implementation of this law has been limited outside of Bolivia’s capital, La Paz. Semana (2016) confirms that meaningful steps have been taken for the law’s implementation in Bolivia’s largest urban centres, especially in the capital. We nevertheless code a cultural rights concession since the population of La Paz is majority Quechua-Aymara. [2012: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* EPR codes regional autonomy from 1994 onwards, but there is very limited evidence for regional autonomy until at least 2009, when Bolivia moved into the direction of a federal state with a new Constitution (Eaton 2013; Faguet 2013). However, the extent to which this provides the Quechua-Aymara with control of departments is ambiguous: according to the 2012 Census, only La Paz (51.7%) and Potosí (59.7%) have a Quechua-Aymara majority population, and various sources confirm that the Bolivian elite has historically been mestizo (mixed) or of European descent, even in the majority indigenous departments (Corr 2006; Kurmanaev & Krauss 2019). Therefore, we do not consider the devolution of competencies to departments in 2009 to have provided the Quechua-Aymara with autonomy.
* The 2009 Constitution also opened up another road to autonomy specifically for indigenous peoples. However, communities wishing to exercise their rights must complete a heavily bureaucratic process that constrains the capacity of many commnuities to gain autonomy (see above). Of the 347 Quechua-Aymara territories legally recongised by the state, only 24 began the process of gaining autonomy between 2009 and 2014, and only three had successfully become autonomous in 2020 (INRA, 2020; Laurenti Sellers, 2017). This suggests that Quechua-Aymara autonomy remains too limited to warrant an autonomy code. [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Quechua-Aymara |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Quechua; Aymara |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 14503000; 14505000 |

**Power access**

* According to the account in Minahan (2002: 1556), the Quechua-Aymara rose up in April 1952 against the Bolivian government as part of a broader revolutionary movement. EPR coding notes suggest that the government was subsequently overthrown, which led to the introduction of voting rights for illiterates, which included a large portion of Quechuas and Aymaras. On this basis, EPR ends the discrimination code in 1953. In keeping with this narrative, we code the Quechua-Aymara as discriminated in the first year and powerless in subsequent years until and including 1992.
* Between 1993 and 1997, there was an Aymara vice president (Victor Hugo Cárdenas) and on this basis EPR codes the Aymara (but not the Quechua) as junior partner. Based on this, we code the Quechua-Aymara as junior partner; however, we note that only the Aymaras were included according to EPR and furthermore only start to code the group as junior partner in 1994 following the first of January rule.
* Between 1998 and 2005, both groups are again coded as powerless and from 2006 onwards the Aymara as senior partner and the Quechua as junior partner due to the election of Evo Morales, an ethnic Aymara whose government included several indigenous people. We code the group as senior partner following EPR, but only from 2007 onwards due to the first of January rule.
* EPR codes both the Quechua and Aymara as powerless in 2020. This is owed to the coming to power of Jeanine Áñez, a white Bolivian from the eastern department of Beni, as interim presient in 2019. Añez’ rise to power followed the resignation of Evo Morales, whose controversial re-election led to violent protests and to the loss of support of the military and police forces (Mathias 2019). Most of the ministers of Áñez’ cabinet originated from the overwhelmingly white *media luna* departments, and only one indigenous person served as minister under Áñez between 2019 and 2020 (Carrasco 2020; Collyns 2019). Quechua-Aymaras are therefore coded as powerless in 2020.
* [1952: discriminated; 1953-1993: powerless; 1994-1997: junior partner; 1998-2006: powerless; 2007-2019: senior partner; 2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to EPR, the Quechua make up 31% of Bolivia’s population and the Aymara 25%. This figure is relatively high – according to MRGI, for example, the Quechua and Aymara make up around 3.5 million people. This number is based on the 2012 Census, which puts Bolivia’s total population at 10 million, suggesting a total group size of 35% vs 56% according to EPR. As EPR explains, ethnic population figures are heavily debated in Bolivia, and there is a risk that indigenous status is under-reported since censuses are based on self-identification. However, Tapia (2019) explains that there is an important element of self-identification at the core of the Quechua-Aymara SDM, given that most of the population of Bolivia is to some extent ethnically indigenous. Therefore, we rely on the 2012 Census figure [0.35]

**Regional concentration**

* MAR codes the Quechua-Aymara as regionally concentrated and suggests that the Quechua-Aymara make up the predominant majority of the population in their regional base and that a clear majority live in the base (>75%). EPR also codes regional concentration. However, following our decision to code the group size based on the 2012 Census – whose figures are based on self-identification (see above) – it is less likely that our standard for regional concentration is met. According to the Census, only two of Bolivia’s nine departments have a Quechua-Aymara majority: La Paz (51.7%) and Potosí (59.7%) (INE, 2015). These two departments are not geographically contiguous. The Quechua-Aymara population in three other geographically contiguous departments falls narrowly below the 50% mark: Chiquisaca (44.3%), Cochabamba (45.1%) and Oruro (48.3%) (INE 2015). This remains unchanged for the period 2013-2020. [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes ethnic kin in Peru, Chile, and Ecuador (Quechua only). The Quechua number in the millions in Peru and Ecuador and according to Minahan (2002: 1551), there are approximately 500,000 Aymara in Peru and around 100,000 in Chile. There are smaller communities of Quechua-Aymara also in Colombia, Chile, and Argentina. [kin in adjacent country]

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