# BOSNIA

## Bihacs (Western Bosniaks)

Activity: 1993-1995

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The short-lived movement was initiated by Fikret Abdić, a member of the Bosnian state presidency and a Bosniak businessman, who opposed the division of Bosnia into three ethnically-based territories and declared the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia in September 1993. 1993 is thus coded as start date. The Autonomous Province set up a 400-strong Constituent Assembly and elected Abdić as president. Bosnian troops entered the territory and serious fighting around the city of Cazin killed more than 50 people (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
  + According to UCDP, the start date for the armed conflict was on October 5, 1993, just a few days or weeks after the autonomy declaration, and the movement emerged in the midst of an ongoing civil war, so it is best qualified as violent from the start.
* Cooperating with separatist Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia, Abdić managed to gain and maintain control over large parts of the Bihac area throughout 1994 and despite another offensive by the Bosnian army in August. In July 1995 the status of the Bihacka Krajina was unilaterally upgraded from 'Autonomous Province' to 'Independent Republic.' The movement was eventually defeated in August 1995 when troops of the Bosnian and Croatian government launched another offensive and Abdić, having lost the support of his allies, admitted defeat. The movement ended in 1995, and seems not to have re-emerged. The movement’s leaders were charged with war crimes in 2002 and 2018 (O’Shea 2011; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [start date: 1993; end date: 1995]

**Dominant claim**

* The 1993 Owen-Stoltenberg plan proposed the division of Bosnia into three ethnic entities. Under this framework, the Western Bosniaks would not have had autonomy but only the Bosniaks as a whole. Strong opposition against the proposed division of Bosnia into three ethnic entities emerged in Bihac; in September the Bihac leader Fikret Abdić declared Bihac’s own autonomous region (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The aim of this declaration was to separate Bihac from a to-be autonomous Bosniak entity. Thus we code a claim for sub-state secession (even though technically no such Bosniak entity had existed at the time). [1993-1995: sub-state secession claim]
  + In line with this coding, Radan (2002: 191) argues that the “demand for autonomy was not aimed at secession, but at recognition as a separate administrative unit within Bosnia-Hercegovina.”
* In 1995, Abdić declared independence (see above). Thus the movement turned into one for secession (Radan 2002: 192). The movement ended shortly thereafter. Following the first of January rule, we do not code a switch to a claim for independence in 1995.

**Independence claims**

* As per the Sovereignty declarations section below, the 1995 declaration of independence of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia constitutes an independence claim. We code for an end in the same year due to the short-lived nature of the event, and the fact that the autonomous province ceased to exist in the same year. [start date: 1995; end date: 1995]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Bihacs and their leader Fikret Abdić is part of the Bihac pocket in northwestern Bosnia, bordering Croatia (see above). We code this claim as ambiguous, as we were unable to find a precise definition of the area claimed by the movement. We rely on a map from Wikipedia, which offers the best available approximation (Wikipedia 2020).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Opposing the division of Bosnia into three ethnically based territories, Fikret Abdić declared the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia in September 1993. He wanted Bihac to have equal status with the proposed three ethnically based entities (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Thus the aim of this declaration was to separate Bihac from a to-be autonomous Bosniak entity. [1993: sub-state secession declaration]
* In July 1995, when Abdić was about to lose the war, he unilaterally upgraded the status of the Bihacka Krajina 'Autonomous Province' to 'Independent Republic’ (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1995: independence declaration]
  + The declaration was issued in July 1994 according to Pavokvic & Radan (2007: 151). Pavkovic & Radan cite Radan (2002: 192) – but Radan (2002: 192) writes that the declaration was in July 1995 too.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Bihacs were involved in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war that is coded as a civil war by Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). Disaggregated data from UCDP/PRIO suggests there were around 1,050 battle-related deaths in 1993-1995, suggesting the HVIOLSD threshold was met. [1993-1995: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* There were numerous peace initiatives in the context of the Bosnian civil war. According to Goodby (1996: 519), there were two sets of negotiations that came close to successful conclusion prior to the Dayton Agreement/Washington Agreement process in 1995/1994: the Carrington-Cutileiro plan and the Vance-Owen plan (see below). Another important proposal was the 1994 proposal by the International Contact Group. This proposal is discussed in some more detail too. Other sets of negotiations/peace initiatives include a late June 1991 proposal by Bosnian Muslims to divide Bosnia into three entities, a Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian block and an August 1992 plan by the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Bosnian offshoot of the Croatian HDZ that would have implied the establishment of 12 autonomous cantons in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We do not code concessions or restrictions in these contexts (and possibly other, similar events) because the plans/initiatives did not exceed proposal or negotiation stage.
* In early 1992, an EC-sponsored peace plan (the Carrington-Cutileiro plan) proposed the establishment of a loose federation, whereby significant powers would be transferred to the district level. Each district would be classified as Muslim, Serbian or Croat, even if no ethnic group constitutes a majority. March 18, 1992, all three sides (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) signed the agreement (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Pacheco 2007).
* However, only ten days after the signing of the Carrington-Cutileiro plan, the Bosnian president, Izbetgovic, withdrew his signature and declared his opposition to any type of division of Bosnia (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Pacheco 2007). Izbetgovic argued that he had been forced to sign the agreement because the EC had made his agreement a precondition for diplomatic recognition. However, according to Goodby (1996: 510-511), the main cause for Izbetgovic’s backtracking was the lack of U.S. support for the proposal. The U.S. was against the division of Bosnia because of the precedent this would set in terms of the feasibility of violent border changes. We do not code a (prior) concession or restriction due to the lack of implementation.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1992/1993 Vance-Owen plan proposed the division of Bosnia into ten autonomous cantons. By late January 1993, Vance and Owen had managed to secure the agreement of all three warring parties. The plan was also supported by the UN. March 3, 1993, Bosnian President Izetbegovic signed a cease-fire document and on March 25 an agreement on interim governmental arrangements. The Bosnian government also agreed to a revised map of the provincial boundaries. While Karadzic had initially supported the plan, the Bosnian Serbs’ self-styled National Assembly rejected the plan. Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan in a referendum widely referred to as a sham (Goodby 1996: 512-515).
* The Vance-Owen plan was declared dead in June 1993 because of Serbian opposition. The subsequent peace initiative, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, proposed the division of Bosnia into three ethnic entities. This is significant as under this framework, Western Bosniaks would not have had autonomy but only the Bosniaks as a whole. Strong opposition against the proposed division of Bosnia into three ethnic entities emerged in Bihac; in September the Bihac leader Fikret Abdić declared Bihac’s own autonomous region (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). It has to be noted, that the Bosnian government had never formally agreed to the proposal (contrary to what is claimed by the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). For instance, Goodby (1996: 509) argues that the plan had never been seriously discussed. And according to Vetter (2009: 555) the Bosnian parliament formally rejected the plan in late September 1993.
* The Bosniak-Croat conflict ended in February 1994 with the signing of the Washington agreement. The agreement led to the foundation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (today one of two entities constituting Bosnia, the other being the Republika Srpska). Under the Washington Agreement, the Federation was to be divided into ten autonomous cantons. Thus both the Croats and the Bosniak Muslims were granted significant autonomy (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Cantonization of the Bosnian Federation also meant that the Western Bosniaks would gain autonomy. What today is the canton of Una Sana more or less coincides with the territory claimed by the Bihac movement. Bihac is Una Sana’s capital. [1994: autonomy concession]
  + Note: in July 1994 the International Contact Group (UN, EU, U.S., UK, Russia, France, and Germany) presented a plan to divide Bosnia into a Bosniak-Croat Federation (with 51% of the territory) and a Serbian Republic (with 49% of the territory). The plan focused on the territorial set-up and did not contain details on the constitutional arrangement. The proposal implied a loss of territory for the Serbs if compared to the territory they de-facto controlled. The plan was accepted by the Bosnian government and the Croats, but rejected by the self-styled Bosnian Serb government in early August (Goodby 1996: 515; Sudetic 1994).
* The Dayton Agreement of 1995 ended the war in BiH and laid the foundation for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Agreement established a power-sharing arrangement according to which Bosnia’s presidency rotates between representatives of the three constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Furthermore, the Dayton Agreement defined BiH’s current internal division into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, both equipped with very significant autonomy (Bieber n.d.; Minority Rights Group International). The cantonal system within the Federation (that had been promised under the Washington Agreement) was upheld. The Dayton Agreement led to the formation of a highly decentralized federal system with a very high degree of autonomy. The Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks were all recognized as Bosnia’s constituent peoples (Caspersen n.d.). We do not code another concession because the situation appears to have remained simila for the Bihac region.

**Regional autonomy**

* Due to de facto independence. [1994-1995: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* 1994-1995 (see below; 1994 not 1993 because of first of January rule). [1994-1995: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Bosnia attained independence in 1992, implying a host change. But this was before the start date and is hence not coded.
* Fikret Abdić declared an autonomous Bihac in September 1993. By the end of 1993 he had established a de-facto autonomous entity. According to UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: “At the end of September 1993, Bosnian army troops stormed Cazin, Abdić's stronghold, after President Izetbegovic ordered military intervention […] Croatian and Bosnian Serbs fought alongside Abdić’s troops in December [1993]. The Croatian Serbs were eager to ensure their supply routes going through the Bihac area, while the Bosnian Serbs were involved in their own conflict with the Bosnian government. By the end of 1993, Abdić and his allies had managed to gain control over large parts of the Bihac area. The tactical alliance continued to hold off the Bosnian government troops from the Bihac enclave throughout 1994. However, in August, the Bosnian army carried out an offensive and captured the Bihac area. Fighting continued with Abdić’s forces retaking some towns by the end of the year.” The Bosnian army, in alliance with Croatian forces, won the upper hand only in 1995. “On 6 August 1995, Bosnian and Croatian government troops launched a major offensive on Abdić /Serb positions around Bihac. Without the support of his allies, Fikret Abdić had to admit defeat” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1993: establishment of de facto independence; 1995: revocation of de facto independence]
* After the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the new Constitution of BiH was ratified and since then, the Croats share territorial autonomy with the Bosniaks (Moslems) in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of a total of 10 cantons. The canton of Una Sana more or less coincides with the territory claimed by the Bihac movement. Bihac is Una Sana’s capital. [1995: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bihacs (Western Bosniaks) |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bosniaks/Muslims |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34601000 |

**Power access**

* The Western Bosniaks form part of the EPR group “Bosniaks/Muslims”. The Bosniaks/Muslims are coded as senior partner throughout. The Western Bosniaks make up around 11 per cent of the EPR group. We apply a powerless code because the leaders of the Bihac movement self-excluded themselves from the central government and had de-facto independence. Fikret Abdić, the leader of the Western Bosniak movement had been a member of the Bosnian state presidency before the start of the movement. Abdić had been dismissed from the presidency before the onset of the movement. In 1993-1995, the Bosniaks were represented by Alija Izetbegović and Duraković represented the Bosniak entity in the 7-members presidency. Neither Duraković nor Izetbegović were from Bihac. [1993-1995: powerless]

**Group size**

* The territorial scope of the movement is not clearly defined. A term that is often used to describe the region is the “Bihac pocket” (O’Shea 2011; Human Rights Watch 2004), which includes the towns of Bihac, Velika Kladusa, Cazin, and Bosanska Krupa plus surrounding territories. We found no data on how many would identify as Western Bosniaks. For the group size estimate, we rely on the 1991 census, and count the number of Bosniaks in the four districts that contain the above-mentioned four towns: Cazin, Velika Kladusa, Bosnanska Krupa, and Bihac. This yields an estimate of 200,000 Bihacs in 1991 (see below). BiH’s total population according to the 1991 census was 4,377,033. [0.0457]

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **District** | **Total** | **Bosniaks** | **Bosniaks %** |
| Cazin | 63409 | 61693 | 97.3% |
| Velika Kladuša | 52908 | 48305 | 91.3% |
| Bosanska Krupa | 58320 | 43104 | 73.9% |
| Bihać | 70732 | 46737 | 66.1% |

**Regional concentration**

* While we found no data on self-identified Western Bosniaks, figures from the 1991 census suggest that the Bihac area was dominated by Muslims/Bosniaks (see above). [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR, the Bosniaks have kin in Croatia, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Of these, only the community in Yugoslavia was numerically significant (pprox.. 300,000). It is not clear how many would see themselves as Western Bosniaks, but given the small size of the Bihac pocket, the numeric threshold is likely not met. Note: We do not consider the Bosniaks more generally as kin because this is a movement by (Western) Bosniaks against a Bosniak-dominated government. [no kin]

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## Croats

Activity: 1992-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Bosnian offshoot of Croatia’s HDZ, HDZ BiH, was formed in August 1990. Initially the HDZ adopted a relatively moderate position. Then, in late 1991, hardliners with irredentist intentions took control of HDZ BiH and began to make self-determination claims. November 18, 1991, they formed the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna (HZHB), claiming the right to “a separate or distinct political, cultural, economic and territorial [entity] in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina“ (ICTY 2001; Caspersen n.d.). The foundation of the HZHB was a direct consequence of the Bosnian independence declaration in late 1991. Accordingly, the start date is coded as 1991 und thus still under the header of Yugoslavia. The movement remained active in independent Bosnia (we note prior non-violent activity and code the movement from 1992 onwards).
* The 1994 Washington Agreement disestablished the HZHB and reintegrated the Croats into Bosnia. The 1995 Dayton accords created a confederal Bosnian state with a collective presidency.
* Although recognized as a constituent people, Croats continued to demand more rights and autonomy (in particular: their own federal entity like the one run by the Serbs, the Republika Srpska), though nonviolently. This is reflected in non-zero MAR protest scores and newspaper articles from 2011 and 2013 (Balkan Insight 2013; SE Times 2011).
* The Croat nationalist HDZ BiH party remained active in the 2010s. Its main demands are twofold. First, the party demands an electoral reform that would create a Croat-majority electoral district (International Crisis Group 2021). Currently, ethnic Bosniaks dominate electoral districts that elect Croatian representatives, including the Croat seat of the three-member presidency. In the 2018 presidential elections, Zeljko Komsic, a non-HDZ moderate who advocates for Bosnia’s unity, won the Croat seat with the backing of Bosniak votes and sparked protests among Croatian nationalists (RFE/RL 2018). The proposed electoral reform would allow the Croats to elect their representatives at all levels without the influence of Bosniaks (Gadzo 2022; Sito-sucic 2022). Second, the party demands the creation of their own federal entity (Jukic 2014; Hina 2018; Rose 2017). [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Caspersen (n.d.): “[O]nce Yugoslavia started unraveling, the Bosnian Croats were deeply divided over what course to pursue: one faction supported Bosnia’s independence while the other demanded unification with Croatia.” The Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna was founded in late 1991 in order to establish the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna that was proclaimed as an autonomous sub-state within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but its ultimate goal was reunification with Croatia. The Bosnian Croats agreed to dismantle their de-facto entity in the 1994 Washington Agreement. De-facto independence did not end until 1995, after the Dayton Agreement (see above). Thus we maintain the irredentist claim for 1995. [1992-1995: irredentist claim]
* In the negotiations leading to the Dayton Agreement, the Croats demanded their own federal entity. The fact that the Dayton Agreement foresaw two entities (Republika Srpska (Serb majority) and the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina (shared between Moslems and Croats) constituted a major blow to the Bosnian Croats. Since then, many Croats have claimed that BiH should be split into three entities, and that the third entity should represent the Croats (see e.g. Kumar 1997; Tuathail et al. 2006: 65). Meanwhile, support for unification with Croatia remained strong with 79% according to a 1997 opinion poll cited by Gromes (2010: 363). Many regarded federalism as a second-best option. [1996-2000: irredentist claim]
* Support for unification with Croatia decreased over the next years. Gromes (2010: 364) reports a 2005 survey in which “only” a third of Bosnian Croats considered Croatia their home. In 2000 HDZ BiH staged a referendum on whether there should be a third Croat entity within Bosnia (the proposal was widely supported). In 2001, the HDZ BiH-led Croat National Congress (HNS) announced its decision to separate from the Bosniak-Croat Federation and establish “Croat self-government” (International Crisis Group 2001). The political changes in Croatia in 2000 and subsequent decrease in the support for radical Croat nationalism weakened the Bosnian Croat agitation for their own entity (Minority Rights Group International).
* In the 2000s, the HDZ BiH abandoned its claim for a third entity and embarked on a more moderate course under international pressure (Caspersen n.d.). However, this did not end claims for a separate federal entity. In 2006, HDZ BiH’s radical members formed their own party, the HDZ 1990, which remained committed to the creation of a third Croat entity (Caspersen n.d.). Furthermore, HDZ BiH began to again make demands for a separate federal entity in the 2010s (Jukic 2014; Hina 2018; Rose 2017). [2001-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* We treat the de facto independent Herceg-Bosna entity as a claim for a merger with Croatia (see above).
* In February 2017 the Croatian Peasant Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HSS BiH) argued that the 1994 Washington Agreement that abolished the Herzeg-Bosnia state and established the Croat-Bosniak Federation must be cancelled. It asserted that Croats in Bosnia were “tricked” and that they must recede to the *status quo ante* and re-establish Herzeg-Bosnia (Starmo 2017). The basis of this claim was allegedly *not* made in opposition to the agreements: “We stand for the implementation of the Washington and Dayton agreements. One was violated, the other was devastated”. “[I]f an international agreement is violated, the violated party has the right to return to the initial state, that is, the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. There is no need to say what those borders are, those are the borders that are clear […]” (Radio Ijubuski 2017).
* It is difficult to decide what the exact claim was here (Outright independence? A merger with Croatia? A third federal entity?). We therefore do not code this claim. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

* There was considerable support for – as well as political movements pushing for – irredentism and reunion with Croatia, which we code as the dominant claim between 1992 and 2000. After 2000, public support for a merger with Croatia decreased, and the main organizations associated with the movement, HDZ-BiH and HDZ 1990, focused their claims on internal autonomy and the establishment of a separate Croat federal entity. There was probably still irredentist sentiment, but in terms of claims made by political organizations, the only clear evidence we could are statements from Croat politicians in Croatia (e.g. Franjo Tuđman the president of Croatia pushing for the reunion of Bosnian Croat areas with Croatia). [start date: 1992; end date: 2000]
  + Additional information: It is notable to mention that the ‘Greater Croatia’ idea has had a logn history behind it, possibly dating back to the late 17th century (Allcock et al. 1998: 105). Ante Starčević (1823-1896) is credited with advancing the idea of Croatian nationalism and of a ‘Greater Croatia’ (Lampe & Mazower 2006: 55f). Post-1918 the Croat Peasant Party (HSS), the Croat Party of Right, and the Catholic clericalist Croat People’s Party increasingly radicalized the Croat movement – and Croatia was presented as “an occupied land” in need of “an uncompromising and revolutionary struggle” (Lampe & Mazower 2006: 58). The subsequent [fascist puppet] ‘independent’ State of Croatia (1941-1945) as well as nationalist radicalization of the Croat communities since the mid-1920s (Meier 1999: 125; Lampe & Mazower 2006) all likely played a role in the eventual calls for integration of southern Bosnia into Croatia.

**Claimed territory**

* During the war (1992-1994), the claim related to the self-declared “Community of Herceg-Bosna.” The exact contours of this territory are not clear as claims changed as a result of war dynamics and displacement. We code this claim according to the map provided in Wikipedia (2020) and flag it as ambiguous.
* After the end of the war in 1994, Bosnian Croats have called for the establishment of their own territorial entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina that unites all Croat-majority areas. We code this claim based on Harland (2017).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Pavkovic & Radan (2007: 151), the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna declared independence on July 2, 1992. Independence was, however, not the actual goal: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has concluded that the intention was to secede from Bosnia and become part of a ‘Greater Croatia’. [1992: irredentist declaration]
* In November 2000, the HDZ organized a referendum on whether “Croats should have their own political, educational, scientific, cultural and other institutions on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (the vast majority of voters were in favor of this third Croat entity at a par with the Federation and the Republika Srpska). The referendum was not recognized and declared illegal by the international community (Kasapovic 2005: 18). March 3, 2001, the HDZ-led Croat National Congress (HNS) proclaimed its separation from the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the establishment of a third, Croat entity within Bosnia (International Crisis Group 2001; Caspersen n.d.; Gromes 2010: 365). The HDZ BiH (the main Croat party in BiH), backed by its “mother-party”, the HDZ of Croatia, adopted a declaration on the sovereignty of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a consequence of this referendum, the HDZ BiH and other Croatian parties decided to withdraw from the institutions of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and established the “Croat Self-Government” independently of the Bosniaks (Bieber 2001: 1-2). [2001: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Croats were involved in the 1992-1995 civil war coded by Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). Disaggregated data from UCDP suggests that the Croat war ended in March 1994 (UCDP/PRIO). UCDP records 88 battle-related deaths in 1992, 7,824 in 1993, and 675 in 1994. Therefore, the HVIOLSD threshold is clearly met. [1992-1994: HVIOLSD; 1995-2020: NVIOLSD]
  + Note: MAR would suggest a different end date (1995), but UCDP’s detailed qualitative account suggests that significant violence took place in 1992-1994 only.

**Historical context**

* Since 1946, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia and the Croatians were recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. However, in the initial years of Yugoslavia’s existence, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s administration was dominated by the local Serbs. In the late 1960s/1970s, Yugoslavia was decentralized. In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter a possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). With the 1971 constitutional reforms and the 1974 constitution Yugoslavia became ever more decentralized (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000; Hamourtziadou 2002: 147). Critically, the 1974 constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina foresaw a strict system of proportional representation of all three peoples in the republican administration and the party (Bieber & Keil 2009).
* In early 1992, an EC-sponsored peace plan (the Carrington-Cutileiro plan) proposed the establishment of a loose federation, whereby significant powers would be transferred to the district level. Each district would be classified as Muslim, Serbian or Croat, even if no ethnic group was in the majority. March 18, 1992, all three sides (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) signed the agreement (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Pacheco 2007).
* However, only ten days after the signing of the Carrington-Cutileiro plan, the Bosnian president, Izbetgovic, withdrew his signature and declared his opposition to any type of division of Bosnia (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Pacheco 2007). Izbetgovic argued that he had been forced to sign the agreement because the EC had made his agreement a precondition for diplomatic recognition. However, according to Goodby (1996: 510-511), the main cause for Izbetgovic’s backtracking was the lack of U.S. support for the proposal. The U.S. was against the division of Bosnia because of the precedent this would set in terms of the feasibility of violent border changes. We do not code a prior concession or restriction due to the lack of implementation.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* There were numerous peace initiatives in the context of the Bosnian civil war. According to Goodby (1996: 519), there were two sets of negotiations that came close to successful conclusion prior to the Dayton Agreement/Washington Agreement process in 1995/1994: the Carrington-Cutileiro plan (see above) and the Vance-Owen plan (see below). Another important proposal was the 1994 proposal by the International Contact Group. This proposal is discussed in some more detail too. Other sets of negotiations/peace initiatives include a late June 1991 proposal by Bosnian Muslims a plan to divide Bosnia into three entities, a Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian block and an August 1992 plan by the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Bosnian offshoot of the Croatian HDZ that would have implied the establishment of 12 autonomous cantons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
* The 1992/1993 Vance-Owen plan proposed the division of Bosnia into ten autonomous cantons. By late January 1993, Vance and Owen had managed to secure the agreement of all three warring parties. The plan was also supported by the UN. March 3, 1993, Bosnian President Izetbegovic signed a cease-fire document and on March 25 an agreement on interim governmental arrangements. The Bosnian government also agreed to a revised map of the provincial boundaries. While Karadzic had initially supported the plan, the Bosnian Serbs’ self-styled National Assembly rejected the plan. Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan in a referendum widely referred to as a sham (Goodby 1996: 512-515). We do not code a concession due to to the lack of implementation.
* The Vance-Owen plan was declared dead in June 1993 because of Serbian opposition. The subsequent peace initiative, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, proposed the division of Bosnia into three ethnic entities. The plan would have given Serbs more than half of Bosnia’s territory. There was strong opposition against the proposed division of Bosnia into three ethnic entities in Bihac; in September the Bihac leader Fikret Abdić declared Bihac’s own autonomous region (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). UCDP argues that the Bosnian president, Izetbegovic, had agreed to the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. In contrast, Goodby (1996: 509) argues that the plan had never been seriously discussed. According to Vetter (1999: 555) the Bosnian parliament formally rejected the plan in late September 1993.
* In February 1994, the Washington agreement was signed. Subsequently the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was created (today one of two entities constituting Bosnia, the other being the Republika Srpska). Under the Washington Agreement, the Federation was to be divided into ten autonomous cantons. Thus the Croats were granted significant autonomy (note that due to the war, Bosnia has become ethnically segregated to a large extent; Croats form the majority in three cantons and only two cantons are mixed) (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Implementation was patchy (Caspersen n.d.), but there was some and the Washington Agreement was significant at it “stopped the bloodshed” (Caspersen n.d.). [1994: autonomy concession]
  + Note: in July 1994 the International Contact Group (UN, EU, U.S., UK, Russia, France, and Germany) presented a plan to divide Bosnia into a Bosniak-Croat Federation (with 51% of the territory) and a Serbian Republic (with 49% of the territory). The plan focused on the territorial set-up and did not contain details on the constitutional arrangement. The proposal implied a loss of territory for the Serbs if compared to the territory they de-facto controlled. The plan was accepted by the Bosnian government and the Croats, but rejected by the self-styled Bosnian Serb government in early August (Goodby 1996: 515; Sudetic 1994).
* The Dayton Agreement of 1995 ended the war in BiH and laid the foundation for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Agreement established a power-sharing arrangement according to which Bosnia’s presidency rotates between representatives of the three constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The Parliament and Constitutional Court have precisely determined shares of seats guaranteed to each ethnic group (U.S. State Department Human Rights Report 2010). Furthermore, the Dayton Agreement defined BiH’s current internal division into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Croats had demanded their own third entity within the state of BiH but were not granted one (Tuathail et al. 2006: 62). The cantonal system within the Federation (promised under the Washington Agreement) was upheld though. The Dayton Agreement led to the formation of a highly decentralized federal system with a very high degree of autonomy. Furthermore, the Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks were recognized as Bosnia’s constituent peoples (Caspersen n.d.). We do not code another concession because no significant new powers appear to have been granted to the Croats.
* In December 1997 the ‘Bonn Powers’ were introduced. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) received the right to remove those politicians from office who were seen as violating the Dayton provisions. Furthermore, the OHR received the power to impose institutional reforms and legislation when the BiH legislative bodies failed to do so. Since then, the OHR has imposed more than 750 decisions. The Bonn Powers led to centralization (Gromes 2010: 364-365) and are thus coded as an autonomy restriction. In particular, High Representative Paddy Ashdown made broad use of the powers from mid-2002 through 2005 to strengthen central institutions, particularly in the areas of criminal justice and the economy (Minority Rights Group International). [1997: autonomy restriction]
* Starting in 2000, the Dayton compromise has been reformed and Bosnia’s central government has successively gained new competencies (Bose n.d.). Up until 2005-2006, the federal entities transferred a number of competencies up to the national level, including power over customs, police issues, the secret service, the judiciary and the prosecution of war crimes, human rights protection. Dozens of new agencies have been established at the national level. Critically, at the end of 2005, the entities also transferred the responsibility over defense policy (Gromes 2010: 365). To reflect this, we code an autonomy restriction in 2000. Furthermore, we code another restriction in 2005, when defense was centralized and given the high salience of the latter decision. [2000: autonomy restriction] [2005: autonomy restriction]
  + There were other vital developments in 2000: in 2000 the High Representative changed the Federation’s electoral rules “in order to simplify voting procedures and facilitate some cross-constituency voting. Thus, instead of each constituency electing its own representatives to the House of Peoples and the Presidency of BiH, now both Bosniaks and Croats were allowed to vote for candidates from both communities. Given that Bosniaks demographically dominate the Federation BiH, this in reality provided them with an opportunity to influence the election of the Croat representatives in the Presidency BiH and affect the vote for the House of Peoples of the Federation BiH […] This in effect meant that the OSCE decision affected representation and protection of the vital interests of Croats at the Federation BiH and the state level” (Kostic 2009: 43). The change in the electoral law was harshly opposed by Croats and led to the staging of the referendum in November on the Croatian entities’ separation from the Federation to create their own entity within Bosnia.
* In 2010, the Croat Caucus to the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH requested the Constitutional Court to address the non-balanced character of electoral districts in Mostar city. The Constitutional Court satisfied the request and struck down several electoral rules. As a result, the 2012 and 2016 Mostar municipal elections were not held, and the Bosniak and Croat parties agreed on new electoral rules in 2020 (Weber Bodo 2020). It is difficult to fit this with our definitions of autonomy or cultural rights concessions, and so we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* De facto independence until 1995 and regional autonomy after 1995’s Dayton Agreement (see below). [1992-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

See below. [1992-1995: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Bosnia attained independence in 1992, implying a host change. [1992: host change (new)]
* Herzeg-Bosna was proclaimed in late 1991. The local Croats began to engage in ethnic cleansing. The entity functioned as a de-facto independent state (even if it never formally declared independence; the 1991 proclamation spoke of an autonomous entity within Bosnia – but the ICTY has ruled that the actual intention was to merge with Croatia). “The de-facto entity adopted the Croatian currency, state symbol and educational curriculum, and it moreover implemented a policy of persecution against the Bosniak population” (Caspersen n.d.). Herzeg-Bosna was formally reintegrated into Bosnia after the 1994 Washington Agreement. Yet the institutions of the Federation have only been introduced slowly and under strong international pressure. According to Caspersen (n.d.): “although ‘Herceg-Bosna’ had officially ceased to exist in 1994, when the Washington Agreement was signed, a de facto Croat entity continued to exist” (also see International Crisis Group 1998: 3). Thus, de-facto independence did not end in 1994. We peg the end of de-facto independence in 1995 since according to Caspersen (n.d.): “[a]t Dayton, the Bosniak-Croat Federation was reaffirmed: the Croats abandoned their separate entity, Herceg-Bosnia, at least for the foreseeable period, and the Bosniaks agreed to equal representation and to devolution of power” (also see Bieber 2002: 211). It has to be noted though that the Croats continued to maintain “parallel” structures for a while. [1995: revocation of de facto independence]
* After the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the new Constitution of BiH was ratified and since then, the Croats share territorial autonomy with the Bosniaks (Moslems) in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of a total of 10 cantons with 3 Croat majority cantons. [1995: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bosnian Croats |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Croats |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34603000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1992-1995: junior partner; 1996-2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1992-1995: 0.173; 1996-2020: 0.154]

**Regional concentration**

* The Croats form a minority in Bosnia. According to the 1981 census, there were 758,000 Croats in BiH (18.4% of total population). This share decreased in the 1991 census: 761,000 Croats in Bosnia, 17.4% of the total population.
* BiH is famous for its checkered ethnic geography, and the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) live in varying proportions throughout the country. Larger concentrations can be found in southwestern Bosnia and northern Bosnia.
* Taking today’s administrative units as reference point, most Croats lived in parts of today’s Federation of BiH (approx. 78% in 1991, see Federal Statistics Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008: 20). According to data from the 1991 census, the Croats made up an absolute majority in three of the Federation’s 10 cantons: Posavski, West Hercegovina, and canton 10. Only 25% of all Bosnian Croats lived in these three cantons, and while canton 10 and West Herzegovina are contiguous (both in southwestern Bosnia), Posavino lies at the other end of BiH. Out of the remaining seven cantons, one has a Croat plurality (Herzegovina Neretva, 41% Croats) in the 1991 census, and one a very significant Croat minority (Central Bosnia, 39% Croats) (Federal Statistics Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008: 21). These two cantons are contiguous to canton 10 and West Herzegovina; if the four cantons are combined, we get a territory in which 51% of all Bosnian Croats lived and the Croats made up 48% of the local population. This is below the threshold for territorial concentration, yet only very marginally.
* Given that it is so close, we accessed district (municipality) level census data from the 1991 census. We found that the Bosnian Croats can be considered spatially concentrated, if only very marginally.
  + We found that the Croats formed an absolute majority in 14 municipalities, a plurality in another 8 municipalities, and a significant majority (> approx. 30%) in another 9 municipalities. Most municipalities lie in the country’s southwestern part and form an adjacent area (5/45 are non-adjacent and lie in the country’s northern part). 53% of all Bosnian Croats reside in the area, and the Croats make up 51% of the local population.
  + For the detailed census figures see below. Note that we counted Sarajevo as one municipality, while in the census it is counted as 10. Total number of municipalities was thus 100.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Total** | **Croats** | **% Croats** |
| **Southwestern Bosnia** | |  |  |
| **Absolute majority** | |  |  |
| Grude | 16358 | 16210 | 99.1% |
| Posušje | 17134 | 16963 | 99.0% |
| Široki Brijeg | 27160 | 26864 | 98.9% |
| Čitluk | 15083 | 14823 | 98.3% |
| Ljubuški | 28340 | 26127 | 92.2% |
| Neum | 4325 | 3792 | 87.7% |
| Tomislavgrad | 30009 | 25976 | 86.6% |
| Livno | 40600 | 29324 | 72.2% |
| Kreševo | 6731 | 4714 | 70.0% |
| Prozor | 19760 | 12259 | 62.0% |
| Čapljina | 27882 | 14969 | 53.7% |
| Kiseljak | 24164 | 12550 | 51.9% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Relative majority** | |  |  |
| Fojnica | 16296 | 8024 | 49.2% |
| Busovača | 18879 | 9093 | 48.2% |
| Vitez | 27859 | 12675 | 45.5% |
| Vareš | 22203 | 9016 | 40.6% |
| Novi Travnik | 30713 | 12162 | 39.6% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Municipalities with significant Croat minority** | | | |
| Gornji Vakuf | 25181 | 10706 | 42.5% |
| Kupres | 9618 | 3813 | 39.6% |
| Žepče | 22966 | 9100 | 39.6% |
| Travnik | 70747 | 26118 | 36.9% |
| Jajce | 45007 | 15811 | 35.1% |
| Bugojno | 46889 | 16031 | 34.2% |
| Mostar | 126628 | 43037 | 34.0% |
| Stolac | 18681 | 6188 | 33.1% |
| Kakanj | 55950 | 16556 | 29.6% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Northern Bosnia** | |  |  |
| Orašje | 28367 | 21308 | 75.1% |
| Odžak | 30056 | 16338 | 54.4% |
| Bosanski Šamac | 32960 | 14731 | 44.7% |
| Bosanski Brod | 34138 | 13993 | 41.0% |
| Derventa | 56489 | 22952 | 40.6% |

* The war shook up Bosnia’s ethnic demography. There is no reliable data on the ethnic demography of BiH after the war. However, with high certainty the war resulted in increased group concentration, not less, due to ethnic cleansing. According to MRGI, for example, “[a]lthough there are still other areas of Croat concentration in central and the northern Posavina areas of Bosnia, the war led to greater migration to Hercegovina [in Bosnia’s southwest], and emigration to Croatia.”
* To back this up, we consulted post-war municipality level estimates provided by Bochsler & Schläpfer (2015). Bochsler & Schläpfer provide estimates for the Federation only, thus excluding the Republika Srpska. According to this data, there were 346,000 Croats in the Federation in 2008, 193,000 (or 56%) of them in a spatially contiguous territory formed out of 13 municipalities in southwestern Bosnia, where the Croats made up 84% of the local population. Note: we lack data for the Republika Srpska, but the number of Croats there is likely to be minimal. See below for the detailed figures.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Canton** | **Total** | **Croats** | **% Croats** |
| **Southwestern Bosnia** |  |  |  |  |
| CITLUK | Herzegovina-Neretva | 15932 | 15502 | 97.3% |
| PROZOR / PROZOR RAMA | Herzegovina-Neretva | 16229 | 12048 | 74.2% |
| CAPLJINA | Herzegovina-Neretva | 23433 | 17074 | 72.9% |
| STOLAC | Herzegovina-Neretva | 13308 | 7966 | 59.9% |
| KUPRES (FBIH) | Kanton 10 | 3472 | 3056 | 88.0% |
| TOMISLAVGRAD | Kanton 10 | 27440 | 23123 | 84.3% |
| LIVNO | Kanton 10 | 32161 | 25067 | 77.9% |
| DRVAR | Kanton 10 | 11462 | 7938 | 69.3% |
| GLAMOC | Kanton 10 | 4776 | 2366 | 49.5% |
| POSUSJE | West-Herzegovina | 16072 | 16072 | 100.0% |
| SIROKI BRIJEG | West-Herzegovina | 26252 | 25902 | 98.7% |
| LJUBUSKI | West-Herzegovina | 23951 | 23431 | 97.8% |
| GRUDE | West-Herzegovina | 15558 | 14290 | 91.8% |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Other municipalities with significant Croat populations** | | | | |
| DOBRETICI | Central Bosnia | 651 | 651 | 100.0% |
| KRESEVO | Central Bosnia | 5666 | 3699 | 65.3% |
| KISELJAK | Central Bosnia | 20734 | 10045 | 48.4% |
| VITEZ | Central Bosnia | 25070 | 11574 | 46.2% |
| JAJCE | Central Bosnia | 24394 | 9654 | 39.6% |
| BOSANSKO GRAHOVO / GRAHOVO | Kanton 10 | 2085 | 2085 | 100.0% |
| DOMALJEVAC SAMAC | Posavina | 4406 | 4406 | 100.0% |
| ORASJE | Posavina | 20182 | 15335 | 76.0% |
| ODZAK | Posavina | 15925 | 9954 | 62.5% |
| USORA | Zenica-Doboj | 6988 | 4807 | 68.8% |
| ZEPCE | Zenica-Doboj | 31089 | 13538 | 43.5% |

* According to the latest census, which was conducted in 2013, there were 544,780 Croats in Bosnia. Most of them, or 497,883 lived in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This population is regionally concentrated as 374,255 of Croats reside in four geographically contiguous cantons, namely Srednjobosanski Kanton, Hercegovačko Neretvanski Kanton, Zapadnohercegovački Kanton, Kanton 10. The population of Croats in these four contiguous contons equals 75% of the total Croat population in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (excluding the Republika Srpska), and 69% of the total Croat population in Bosnia and Herzegovina (including the Republika Srpska). Moreover, the 374,255 Croats that reside in these four cantons make up 57.1% of the cantons’ total population (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016). See below data for individual cantons. [regionally concentrated]

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Canton number | Canton name | Total population | Croat population | Share of Croats |
| 1 | UNSKO-SANSKI KANTON | 273,261 | 5,073 | 1.9% |
| 2 | POSAVSKI KANTON | 43,453 | 33,600 | 77.3% |
| 3 | TUZLANSKI KANTON | 445,028 | 23,592 | 5.3% |
| 4 | ZENIČKO-DOBOJSKI KANTON | 364,433 | 43,819 | 12.0% |
| 5 | BOSANSKO-PODRINJSKI KANTON | 23,734 | 24 | 0.1% |
| 6 | SREDNJOBOSANSKI KANTON | 254,686 | 97,629 | 38.3% |
| 7 | HERCEGOVAČKO NERETVANSKI KANTON | 222,007 | 118,297 | 53.3% |
| 8 | ZAPADNOHERCEGOVAČKI KANTON | 94,898 | 93,725 | 98.8% |
| 9 | KANTON SARAJEVO | 413,593 | 17,520 | 4.2% |
| 10 | KANTON 10 | 84,127 | 64,604 | 76.8% |
|  | Total in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina | 2,219,220 | 497,883 | 22.4% |

**Kin**

* The Croats in Croatia form numerically significant kin (EPR). Since Croatia had effectively been independent when the Bosnian Croat movement emerged, we code kin in adjoining country with 1 also in 1991. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Serbs

Activity: 1992-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Serb Democratic Party was established in Bosnia in 1990 (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 150). In spring 1991 the SDP set up “Serbian Autonomous Regions” in Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia and declared them no longer under the authority of the republican government (Gagnon 1994: 159), thus the start date.
* In November 1991, a referendum was organized in the Serbian part of Bosnia on a merger with Serbia. Fighting between Serbs (including from Croatia and Serbia proper) had spilled over into Bosnia prior to Bosnia’s independence. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, violence flared up in early March 1992, thus shortly after the Bosnian independence referendum of February 29/March 1. According to Correlates of War (Russet et al. 1968; Sarkees & Wayman 2010), Bosnia’s date of independence is in early April 1992. Gleditsch & Ward (1999) peg the date of independence to late April 1992. Based on this, we code the movement from 1992 and note prior violent activity.
* Violence escalated markedly after independence, which was perceived by the Serbs as a violation of their rights and an uneven application of the right to self-determination. The 1995 Dayton accords created a confederal Bosnian state with a collective presidency, marking the end of the war.
* There continues to be a strong secessionist movement among Serbs. As an example, we note that in 2011, Republika Srpska’s Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, threatened to organize a unilateral referendum on secession (International Crisis Group 2011). Dodik continued to threaten to organize a unilateral referendum in subsequent years (Girardin 2021; Sahadžic 2021). The secessionist rhetoric got especially strong after High Representative Valentin Inzko imposed a law setting criminal penalties for denying genocide established by Bosnian or international courts. In December 2021, Republika Srpska’s National Assembly passed resolutions revoking consent for the transfer of powers to the state in three areas: indirect taxation, justice and defence (International Crisis Group 2022a). In January 2022 Republika Srpska celebrated the Serb Republic’s national holiday despite the formal ban, which had been imposed by Bosnia’s top court in 2015 (Dawn 2022; Reuters 2022). On this basis, the movement is coded as ongoing. [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claims**

* According to Bieber (n.d.), “Bosnian statehood does not enjoy strong support among Bosnia Serbs and many prefer RS becoming independent or joining Serbia.” According to MAR, “[t]hrere remains a relatively strong secessionist element among Bosnian Serbs.” Gromes (2010: 364) cites a 1997 survey according to which 94% of Serbs wanted to merge with Serbia. He also (Gromes 2010: 365) cites a 2005 survey according to which 46% of Bosnian Serbs regarded BiH as their home – but noting that this “remained the only time after Dayton that a majority of the Serbs demonstrated an acceptance of the common state.” Republika Srpska’s Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, has “claimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina [is] a virtual state, which exists only due to the international community.” He has threatened to organize a unilateral referendum on secession (International Crisis Group 2011). There is also contention against centralization of powers within BiH (International Crisis Group 2011), but the dominant claim has been for joining Serbia (International Crisis Group 2011: 11). The public support for RS joining Serbia rose from 64% in 2005 to 81% in 2010. This rise is attributed to growing tensions between the RS and Bosnia’s central government (International Crisis Group 2011: 11). Merger with Serbia continued to be the dominant claim also after 2010 (International Crisis Group 2022a). [1992-2020: irredentist claim]

**Independence claims**

* The main claim of this movement is for irredentism, but there have also been claims for separate independence. In particular, Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence led to a series of secession claims made in retaliation to the possibility of Serbia losing the Kosovo territory. In February 2008, Milorad Dodik – Premier of RS – made statements “aimed to settle growing demands from radical Bosnian Serb groups who […] called on RS to follow the Kosovo example and declare independence” – while Dodik himself had floated the idea of independence since 2006 (Balkan Insight 2008). In the same month, Bosnian Serb lawmakers had threatened to hold a referendum on secession from Bosnia if Kosovo’s independence is recognized by the UN and the EU (Stanic 2008). In March 2008 Dodik made follow-up statements that Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence legitimized the right to secession of RS: “If this is so, then we do not see a single reason why we should not be granted the right to self-determination, the right envisaged in international conventions. If anyone were to forcefully try to rearrange Bosnia-Herzegovina and deny the Republic of Srpska, our answer would be swift and clear – a referendum on the RS state status” (B92 2008).
* Further independence claims include the 2011 referendum proposal on RS leaving Bosnian institutions (Crisis Group 2011); subsequent discussions on RS independence between 2012-2013 (Barlovac 2012; Bajrović & Tolj 2013); and the April 2015 resolution adopted by the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) to call a referendum on independence in 2018 (Zuvela 2015). In mid-2017 Dodik announced that the plans for an independence referendum in 2018 had been temporarily dropped (Beta 2017).
* We code an independence claim starting in 2006, but note that it is difficult to establish the long-term aspirations of a potentially independent RS, that is, whether proponents would want to immediately join Serbia or not. We peg the start date to be 2006, in-line with the first comments by Dodik, and code the claim as ongoing. We note, though, that Dodik has not mentioned the idea of an independent RS since 2018. [start date: 2006; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* Serb irredentism is linked to the Greater Serbia (Velika Srbija) nationalist-irredentist ideology which originates from the mid-19th century (Cole 2011: 335). Bosnian Serb nationalist Stevan Moljević proposed in 1941 a “Homogeneous Serbia” (Szajkowski 1993: 135). We code irredentism as the dominant claim throughout (see above). [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Bosnian Serbs corresponds roughly to the Republika Srpska, which consists of scattered Serbian Autonomous Oblasts (SAO) such as the SAO of Bosanska Krajina, the SAO of Romanija, the SAO of North-Eastern Bosnia and the SAO of Herzegovina (Roth 2015: 140). We code this claim according to Roth (2015: 137).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On April 7, 1992, “the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” was proclaimed, declaring it part of Yugoslavia (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 151; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 280). [1992: irredentist declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* A low-intensity war emerged while Bosnia was still part of Yugoslavia. Violence escalated markedly after Bosnia’s independence. The HVIOLSD coding for 1992-95 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) and is confirmed by UCDP/PRIO, which records more than 1,000 fatalities for the Bosnia-Serb dyad in all years. [1992-1995: HVIOLSD (prior LVIOLSD); 1996-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Since 1946, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia and the Serbs were recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. In the initial years of Yugoslavia’s existence, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s administration was dominated by the local Serbs. In the late 1960s/1970s, Yugoslavia was decentralized. In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter a possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). With the 1971 constitutional reforms and the 1974 constitution Yugoslavia became ever more decentralized (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000; Hamourtziadou 2002: 147). Yet over time the Bosnian Serbs lost their dominant status within Bosnia: the 1974 constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina foresaw a strict system of proportional representation of all three peoples in the republican administration and the party (Bieber & Keil 2009).
* In early 1992, an EC-sponsored peace plan (the Carrington-Cutileiro plan) proposed the establishment of a loose federation, whereby significant powers would be transferred to the district level. Each district would be classified as Muslim, Serbian or Croat, even if no ethnic group was in the majority. March 18, 1992, all three sides (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) signed the agreement (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Pacheco 2007).
* Only ten days after the signing of the Carrington-Cutileiro plan, the Bosnian president, Izbetgovic, withdrew his signature and declared his opposition to any type of division of Bosnia (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Pacheco 2007). Izbetgovic argued that he had been forced to sign the agreement because the EC had made his agreement a precondition for diplomatic recognition. However, according to Goodby (1996: 510-511), the main cause for Izbetgovic’s backtracking was the lack of U.S. support for the proposal. The U.S. was against the division of Bosnia because of the precedent this would set in terms of the feasibility of violent border changes. We do not code a prior concession or restriction due to the lack of implementation.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Bosnia’s independence (April 1992) could be seen as a restriction. The Badinter Commission had ruled on the right to self-determination of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs as well as other issues related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Prior to that commission, Bosnian and Croatian Serbs thought they had a legitimate/legal right to secession. The perception was that this right was taken away from them. Nonetheless, we do not code a restriction (in line with the codebook). Formally the Serbs did not actually have a right to secession, thus technically speaking nothing was taken away from them.
* There were numerous peace initiatives in the context of the Bosnian civil war. According to Goodby (1996: 519), there were two sets of negotiations that came close to successful conclusion prior to the Dayton Agreement/Washington Agreement process in 1995/1994: the Carrington-Cutileiro plan (see above) and the Vance-Owen plan (see below). Another important proposal was the 1994 proposal by the International Contact Group. This proposal is discussed in some more detail too. Other sets of negotiations/peace initiatives include a late June 1991 proposal by Bosnian Muslims a plan to divide Bosnia into three entities, a Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian block and an August 1992 plan by the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Bosnian offshoot of the Croatian HDZ that would have implied the establishment of 12 autonomous cantons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
* The 1992/1993 Vance-Owen plan proposed the division of Bosnia into ten autonomous cantons. By late January 1993, Vance and Owen had managed to secure the agreement of all three warring parties. The plan was also supported by the UN. March 3, 1993, Bosnian President Izetbegovic signed a cease-fire document and on March 25 an agreement on interim governmental arrangements. The Bosnian government also agreed to a revised map of the provincial boundaries. While Karadzic had initially supported the plan, the Bosnian Serbs’ self-styled National Assembly rejected the plan. Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan in a referendum widely referred to as a sham (Goodby 1996: 512-515). We do not code a concession due to the lack of implementation.
* The Vance-Owen plan was declared dead in June 1993 because of Serbian opposition. The subsequent peace initiative, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, proposed the division of Bosnia into three ethnic entities. The plan would have given Serbs more than half of Bosnia’s territory. There was strong opposition against the proposed division of Bosnia into three ethnic entities in Bihac; in September the Bihac leader Fikret Abdić declared Bihac’s own autonomous region (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). UCDP argues that the Bosnian president, Izetbegovic, had agreed to the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. In contrast, Goodby (1996: 509) argues that the plan had never been seriously discussed. According to Vetter (1999: 555) the Bosnian parliament formally rejected the plan in late September 1993.
* The Bosniak-Croat conflict ended in February 1994 with the signing of the Washington agreement. Subsequently the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (today one of two entities constituting Bosnia, the other being the Republika Srpska). Under the Washington Agreement, the Federation was to be divided into ten autonomous cantons. Thus both the Croats and the Bosniak Muslims were granted significant autonomy (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). We do not code a concession because the Washington Agreement did not involve the Serbs.
* In July 1994 the International Contact Group (UN, EU, U.S., UK, Russia, France, and Germany) presented a plan to divide Bosnia into a Bosniak-Croat Federation (with 51% of the territory) and a Serbian Republic (with 49% of the territory). The plan focused on the territorial set-up and did not contain details on the constitutional arrangement. The proposal implied a loss of territory for the Serbs if compared to the territory they de-facto controlled. The plan was accepted by the Bosnian government and the Croats, but rejected by the self-styled Bosnian Serb government in early August. A late August referendum among Bosnian Serbs came out against the plan (Goodby 1996: 515). The Bosnian Serb side argued that eventual acceptance would require adjustments to the plan: additional territory and recognition of Bosnian Serb “sovereignty” (Sudetic 1994). We do not code a concession due to the lack of implementation.
* The Dayton Agreement of 1995 ended the war in BiH and laid the foundation for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Agreement established a power-sharing arrangement according to which Bosnia’s presidency rotates between representatives of the three constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The Parliament and Constitutional Court have precisely determined shares of seats guaranteed to each ethnic group (U.S. State Department Human Rights Report 2010). Furthermore, the Dayton Agreement defined BiH’s current internal division into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, both equipped with very significant autonomy (Bieber n.d.; Minority Rights Group International). Finally, the Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks were recognized as Bosnia’s constituent peoples (Caspersen n.d.). [1995: autonomy concession]
* In December 1997 the ‘Bonn Powers’ were introduced. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) received the right to remove those politicians from office who were seen as violating the Dayton provisions. Furthermore, the OHR received the power to impose institutional reforms and legislation when the BiH legislative bodies failed to do so. Since then, the OHR has imposed more than 750 decisions. The Bonn Powers led to centralization (Gromes 2010: 364-365) and are thus coded as an autonomy restriction. In particular, High Representative Paddy Ashdown made broad use of the powers from mid-2002 through 2005 to strengthen central institutions, particularly in the areas of criminal justice and the economy (Minority Rights Group International). [1997: autonomy restriction]
* Starting in 2000, the Dayton compromise has been reformed and Bosnia’s central government has successively gained new competencies (Bose n.d.). Up until 2005-2006, the federal entities transferred a number of competencies up to the national level, including power over customs, police issues, the secret service, the judiciary and the prosecution of war crimes, human rights protection. Dozens of new agencies have been established at the national level. Critically, at the end of 2005, the entities also transferred the responsibility over defense policy (Gromes 2010: 365). To reflect this, we code an autonomy restriction in 2000. Furthermore, we code another restriction in 2005, when defense was centralized and given the high salience of the latter decision. [2000: autonomy restriction] [2005: autonomy restriction]
* In 2015, Bosnia’s Constitutional Court banned the January 9 holiday, which commemorates the date when Bosnian Serbs declared the creation of their own de facto state in 1992 and falls on a Serb Christian Orthodox religious holiday. According to the court, the holiday discriminates against the country’s other ethnic groups Muslim Bosniaks and Catholic Croats (Dawn 2022). [2015: cultural rights restriction]
* In July 2021, High Representative Valentin Inzko imposed a law setting criminal penalties for genocide denial; giving awards or naming public objects after persons convicted of genocide; and inciting hatred or violence against groups. The Republika Srpska National Assembly rejected the imposed law and prohibited RS officials from cooperating in its implementation (International Crisis Group 2022a). Still, this is hard to see as a restriction. We would still code a restriction in 2021 because in September 2021, Bosnia’s Constitutional Court ruled that Republika Srpska’s ownership of and right to mange manage forests and other natural resources on its territory should be transferred to the central government. The court’s argument was that forests (etc.) “represent public goods that are part of State Property which is within the exclusive competence of the State of BiH”. (International Crisis Group 2022b). However, the dataset only covers 1945-2020.
* In 2021, lawmakers in the lower house of the Serb autonomy, the Republika Srpska passed a non-binding resolution that would decouple the semi-autonomous republic from Bosnia's tax system, military, and judicial system (Quay 2021). As this move is unilateral, it cannot be seen as a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Throughout (first de facto independence and then far-reaching autonomy in the form of the Republika Srpska) (International Crisis Group 2022a; 2022b; Sahadžic 2021) [1992-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* De facto independence had existed already before Bosnia’s independence in April 1992 and lasted until the 1995 Dayton Agreement, when the Republika Srpska was reintegrated (Caspersen 2012: 12). [1992-1995: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Bosnia attained independence in 1992, implying a host change. [1992: host change (new)]
* [1995: revocation of de facto independence]
* [1995: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bosnian Serbs |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Serbs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34602000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Note that self-exclusion = powerless. [1992-1995: powerless; 1996-2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1992-1995: 0.313; 1996-2020: 0.308]

**Regional concentration**

* The Serbs form a minority in Bosnia. According to the 1981 census, there were 1.32 million Serbs in BiH (32% of total population). This share decreased slightly in the 1991 census: 1.367 million Serbs in Bosnia, 31.2% of the total population.
* BiH is famous for its checkered ethnic geography, and the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) live in varying proportions throughout the country. Larger concentrations of Serbs could be found in Bosnia’s west, northwest, and south (MAR). Nevertheless, a spatially contiguous exists that crosses the threshold for spatial concentration: today’s Republika Srpska. Data from the 1991 census shows that 64% of all Serbs in Bosnia resided in what would later become the Republika Srpska, and that the Serbs made up a (relatively narrow) absolute majority there (55.4%). Critically, Republika Srpska is not spatially contiguous, but separated into two by Brcko district, a multi-ethnic entity in northeastern Bosnia. In the 1991 census, the Serbs made up 21% of the district, Croats 25%, and Bosniaks 44%. If Brcko is added to the Republica Srpska, we get a spatially contiguous territory in which 65% of all Bosnian Serbs lived and the Serbs made up 54% of the local population (Federal Statistics Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008: 20).
* The war shook up Bosnia’s ethnic demography and resulted in increased group concentration, due to ethnic cleansing (see e.g. MAR). According to the 2013 census, there were 1,086,733 Serbs in Bosnia. Almost all of them, or 1,001,299 lived in Republika Srpska. As noted above, Republika Srpska is not spatially contiguous, but separated into two by the multiethnic Brcko district. If Brcko is added to the Republica Srpska, we get a spatially contiguous territory. This territory houses 95% of all ethnic Serbs in Bosnia. Ethnic Serbs take up 79% of total population in this territory (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016). [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR, there is kin (i.e. Serbs) in a number of other countries, in particular Serbia and Croatia, but also Slovenia, Macedonia, and (from 2006) Montenegro as well as (from 2008) Kosovo. MAR also notes the same kin. [kin in adjoining country]

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