# BRAZIL

## Geralians

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

* Geralians, also known as Gauchos or Sulistas, are descendents of European (mostly German and Italian) immigrants who settled in southern Brazilian states of Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, and Santa Catarina (Minahan 2002: 655; Roth 2015: 417f).

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2016: 159), Geralian nationalism finds its roots on “cultural differences and frustration with Brazil’s inefficiency and corruption, and Gaucho wealth flowing to finance development in other poorer regions”.
* The Pampas Independence Movement (*Movimento pela Independencia do Pampa*, or MIP) was founded in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. The movement advanced a plan for an independent Republic of the Pampas (also referred to as the Rio-Grandese Republic) in southern Brazil. The claims are focused on Rio Grande dol Sul, but some nationalists would also like to include the adjacent states of Santa Catarina and Paraná (Minahan 1996: 193ff; Minahan 2002: 665ff; Blount 1993; Brooke 1993; AGC O Canal da TV 1993).
* A 1991 poll demonstrated overwhelming support in the region for some form of political and economic autonomy and 2/5 of those surveyed favored complete independence.
* In 1992, separatists launched the modern southern Brazilian separatist movement, *O Sul E o Meu Pais* (The South is My Country), which aims to create an independent state of Brazil’s three southernmost states, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. According to Roth (2015: 418), this movement remains active but has relatively limited public support. Lynch (2017) also reports that the movement remained ongoing. [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Founded in 1990, the Movement for the Independence of the Pampas (MIP) called for an independent Republic of the Pampas in southern Brazil. In 1992, separatists launched the modern southern Brazilian separatist movement. The organization that grew out of that congress, *O Sul E o Meu Pais* (The South is My Country), aims to create an independent state of Brazil’s three southernmost states, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul (Roth 2015: 417; Pampa Livre n.d.). [1990-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* In 1990, the Pampas Independence Movement (Movimento pela Independencia do Pampa, or MIP) advanced a plan for an independent Republic of the Pampas (also referred to as the Rio-Grandese Republic) in southern Brazil. The claims are focused mostly on Rio Grande dol Sul, but some nationalists would also like to include Santa Catarina and Paraná. In 1992, separatists launched the modern southern Brazilian separatist movement. The organization that grew out of that congress, *O Sul E o Meu Pais* (The South is My Country), aims to create an independent state of Brazil’s three southernmost states, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. According to Roth (2015: 418), this movement remains active today. Based on this account, we code Rio Grande do Sul as the dominant claim in 1990-1992 and Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul as the dominant claim in 1993-2020. We code these claims based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Roth (2015: 418), the Pampas Independence Movement (Movimento pela Independencia do Pampa, or MIP) declared the independence of the Republic of Pampa Gaucho in 1992, but to little effect [1992: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The south of Brazil was inhabited by the indigenous Tupí Guaraní people prior to the arrival of European settlers. With the conquest of the Americas in the early 16th century, the Tupí Guaraní were decimated by diseases brought by the European explorers and their lands claimed by Spanish settlers, who established a number of coastal settlements in the 1540s. Over the following two centuries, European settlers migrated south from Portuguese territory and north from Spanish territory, settling in the interior Pampas (fertile low grasslands found in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay). The region was divided in 1756 and the Uruguay river became the boundary between Spanish and Portuguese territory. In 1777, a treaty granted the coastal region to Portugal, since most such areas were inhabited by Portuguese-speaking settlers - the ancestors of modern Geralians (Minahan 2016: 159; Rosenfeld 2013).
* Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1822 and a constitutional monarchy was established as the Empire of Brazil. However, resistance to imperial rule by republicans was considerable throughout the 1800s. Geralians in the far-southern Rio Grande do Sul state united to demand autonomy within Brazil and a rebellion erupted in 1835, culminating with the successful establishment of the *República Rio-Grandese* (also known as the Pampas Republic). The Republic flourished between 1846 and 1845, when it was suppressed by the monarchy (Roth 2015: 417).
* Immigration from Europe surged after the suppression of the Geralian republic, which doubled the Geralian population between 1872 and 1890. Discontent with the inefficiency and corruption of the Brazilian state, combined with cultural and ethnic differences, stirred regionalist rebellions in 1893, 1923 and 1930 (Minahan 2016: 159).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Pampa Livre, one of the main movements mobilizing for Geralian secession, claims to have collected over one million signatures to push for a referendum on independence in 1992, but that the Brazilian police stole the petitions in an attempt to quash the movement (Pampa Livre n.d.; Roth 2015: 417). We found no evidence to support the movement’s claims but even if they were true, this would not constitute a restriction as defined here.
* In October 2016, *O Sul é o Meu País* held an unofficial vote on independence across the states of Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. According to the movmenent, 95.74% of the 600,000 participants voted in support of the separation of the three aforementioned states from the rest of Brazil. The organisers were “not legally permitted to use the term plebiscite for the vote, as this implied that the vote would have some form of legal standing”, and “the orgnisers were also banned from holding the vote on the same day as the municipal electoral vote in the State of Santa Catarina” (Lynch 2017). This was not, therefore, an officially sanctioned independence referendum, and so we do not code a concession. A second edition of the vote took place less than a year later. 96% of the 364,000 participants expressed their support for independence (Sperb 2017). Again, this appears to have been a unilateral referendum and so no concession is coded.

**Regional autonomy**

* Since 1946, Brazil has had a federal decentralized form of government with 26 semi-autonomous and self-governing states. The Constitution endows regional governments with significant decision-making power, including fiscal and administrative autonomy, and relative financial independence (Constitution of Brazil 1988). According to Hudson (1997), the autonomy of Brazilian states was more limited under the military regimes from 1965 onwards, but they regained their autonomy in 1982. Lynch (2017) and Lewan (1992) confirm that Geralians largely control the regional governments of Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná and Santa Catarina. We therefore code Geralians with regional autonomy throughout. [1990-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Geralians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Whites |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 14001000 |

**Power access**

* The EPR coding notes suggest that goverments were generally dominated by Whites except for 2003-2010, when Whites shared power with Afrobrazilians. The sources we consulted suggest that the Geralians/Gauchos were generally less well-represented in the government compared to the (more numerous) Whites from the north; still, we found found several examples of Geralian/Gaucho representation in the national government including Tarso Genro (born in Rio Grande dol Sul, served in various ministerial positions between 2004 and 2010 including as Minister of Justice), Olivia Dutra (born in Rio Grande do Sul and Minister of Cities between 2003 and 2005), and Rafael Valdomiro Greca de Macedo (born in Paraná, Minister of Sport and Tourism in 1999-2000).
* With the election of Jaír Bolsonaro in 2018, the representation of southern Brazilians appears to have increased. 7 of 22 ministers of Bolsonaro’s original cabinet were from Rio Grande do Sul or Paraná (Poder360 2018).
* On this basis, we code the Geralians as junior partner between 1990 and 2018, and, following the 1st of January rule, as senior partner between 2019-2020. [1990-2018: junior partner, 2019-2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 655), there were 20.105 million Gauchos in Brazil in 2002. The World Bank pegs Brazil’s population in 2002 at 179.5 million. [0.112]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 655), the Geralians/Gauchos make up 81% of Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, and Santa Catarina, and almost all Geralians live in the region. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 656) explains that the Geralians’ “ties to Europe remain stronger than elsewhere in Brazil, particularly among Italians and Germans” but it is overall doubtful whether this connection is sufficiently strong to qualify as “strong ethnic bonds” especially as the Geralians speak Portuguese as their primary language and not German and/or Italian (though it is worth noting that according to Minahan, the latter are “widely spoken as second languages and in homes”). According to Roth (2015: 418), the Geralians share their predominantly German and Italian descent with neighboring areas of Argentina as well as Paraguay, though it is again doubtful that these bonds qualify as “strong ethnic bonds”. [no kin]

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## Indigenous Peoples

Activity: 1970-2020

**General notes**

* Minority Rights Group International reports that based on research from the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), there are 305 documented indigenous groups on Brazilian territory and that over 274 indigenous languages are spoken by these groups. Many of the social and cultural traditions of these groups are local and tribal-based. The largest groups include the Tikúna and the Guarani Kaiowá, who number over 40,000 people. Other large indigenous groups include the Kaingang (37,470), Makuxí (28,912), Terena (28,845), Yanomámi (21,982), Potiguara (20,554), Xavante (19,259), Pataxó (13,588), Sateré-Mawé (13,310), Mundurukú (13,103), Múra (12,479), Xucuru (12,471) and Baré (11,990).

**Movement start and end dates**

* Several of the numerous indigenous groups in Brazil have sought increased autonomy. Since these groups are very small and it is difficult to identify every indigenous group that has sought autonomy, we follow Marshall & Gurr (2003: 63) and code a single indigenous movement.
* Although the consolidation of a nation-wide indigenous movement only took place in 1980 with the creation of the Union of Indian Nations (UNI), Marshall & Gurr (2003: 63) note organized self-determination activity since the early 1970s. Furthermore, MAR codes non-zero protest scores since 1970. Thus, 1970 is coded as start date. There movement was ongoing as of 2020, with indigenous groups mobilizing mostly in defense of their land rights (IWGIA 2020; Benassatto & Boadle 2019; MRGI). [start date: 1970; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Neves (2007: 105), indigenous peoples in Brazil seek “official recognition of their lands” and to reclaim “control of their territories and the natural resources within them”. This is confirmed by numerous other sources (e.g. Cultural Survival, 2013, Minority Rights Group International) and has not changed in recent years, with several indigenous groups continuing to demand land rights (e.g., Tavares 2019; Bottino 2022). [1970-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* We were unable to find a specific definition of the territory to which this group’s claims are tied to. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s ethnic settlement area as indicated by the GeoEPR dataset, which serves as an approximation.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Only a single source would suggest a LVIOLSD code: MAR.
  + The 5-year MAR rebellion score of the Amazonian Indians is 3 (“local rebellion”) in 1980-1984. The MAR coding notes do not make clear the specific event(s) this is due.
  + The MAR rebellion score of the Amazonian Indians is 3 (“local rebellion”) in 1993; again, it is not clear what this is referring to. The coding notes suggest this code was likely given in relation to a conflict between indigenous people and non-indigenous settlers, which does not qualify as LVIOLSD as it is not directed against the state: “A Ka'apor village was burned down and 300 Indians were expelled from their homes by ranchers. After this event, the government and the Indians joined forces to evict non-indigenous settlers from the land. Violent conflict was reported in this region between the indigenous and non-indigenous people.”
  + The MAR rebellion score of the Amazonian Indians is 3 (“local rebellion”) in 2003; it is not clear what this is referring to.
  + In line with general practice, all five years are coded with LVIOLSD. 1985-1992 are again coded as NVIOLSD.
* We researched the two ambiguous periods highlighted by MAR, but could not find any separatist violence above the threshold. Notably, MAR’s spin-off self-determination project (Marschall & Gurr 2003) does not report any separatist violence (only “militant politics”). We code all years with NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* With the arrival of Portuguese conquerors in the 1500s and the subsequent exploitation of Brazilian natural resources, indigenous people were often enslaved or killed. Within a few decades, hundreds of indigenous communities were relocated to settlements created by Jesuit missionaries and thousands died of epidemics brought by the Europeans. The expansion of the colonial frontiers over the following three centuries and the growth in global demand for cotton, sugar and coffee further decimated indigenous communities and fostered the encroachment of their lands. A small number of remote communities in the Amazon managed to retain their cultures because of their relative isolation from colonial structures (Mares de Souza 1994; Minority Rights Group International).
* The origins of the movement can be traced back to the mid 1700s with the struggle of Sepé Tiarajú against the local Portuguese colonialists – and the letter he wrote to the King of Spain Felipe VI: “Our wealth is our freedom. This land has an owner and he is neither Portuguese nor Spanish, but Guarani” (Tavares 2019).
* Brazil gained indepdendence from Portugal in 1822. By 1845, indigenous slaves had been freed and an administrative body had been created to regulate indigenous matters. In 1850, a series of laws were introduced to protect indigenous lands by recognizing them as national reserves. These laws granted limited land rights to native communities inhabiting such reserves and forbade non-indigenous people from settling on land designated for indigenous people (Minorities at Risk). According to Minority Rights Group International, the creation of these reserves was done without any cultural considerations, causing the forced displacement of thousands of indigenous people into overcrowded territories that were frequently not the object of their claims.
* Brazil’s rapid development the 19th and 20th centuries was poorly regulated due to corruption, discrimination and the unchecked power of the country’s business elite. Unrestricted resource exploitation resulted in land expropriation, environmental degradation and the displacement of communities from native lands (Minority Rights Group International).
* According to Wizenberg (2019), the Brazilian military dictatorship that held power between 1964 and 1985 promoted the colonization of indigenous territories, exploited natural resources in indigenous land at an unprecedented rate, built prison camps for indigenous people and killed at least 8,000 indigenous people. Other sources confirm that the military dictatorship carried out a genocidal policy of ethnic cleansing against indigenous people in Brazil (Birú 2021; Benítez 2016). As it is not clear when these policies were iniitated, we code a (prior) restriction in the year the military junta came to power, 1964. [1964: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1972, the Brazilian government inaugurated the Trans-Amazonian Highway, a 2,000-mile highway that runs across the Amazon rainforest. In addition to constructing the highway, the government opened the adjacent rainforest lands to settlement by northern Brazilians, with the aim of exploiting the region’s timber and mineral resources (Mongabay n.d.). According to Roman (2022), the project was developed with no consideration for the indigenous communities living in the region; the settlement process and the environmental degradation that followed caused thousands of indigenous Amazonian people to be forcibly displaced over the next three decades. [1972: autonomy restriction]
* The Brazilian Constitution was redrafted in 1988. The new Constitution recognized the cultural, legal and territorial rights of indigenous peoples, and also provided for the creation of consultation mechanisms on the use of resources in indigenous land. We code a concession due to increased land rights while noting that several sources suggest that implementation was uneven and overall limited (e.g., MAR; UN Human Rights Council 2016; Minority Rights Group International; IWGIA 2016; U.S. Department of State 2019; Cultural Survival 2013). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Additional information: on the issues of self-determination and land tenure, there is evidence that the government has demarcated and granted land titles to numerous indigenous communities since 1988 – notable examples include the allocation of important swathes of land to the Kayapó Menkragnotí in 1992, the Tikuna in 1993, the Pankararu in 2018, as well as the establishment of the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Reserve in 2005, which validated the land claims of the Macuxi, Wapichana, Taurepang, Ingaricó and Patamona peoples. Yet, there were significant delays in the land regulation procedures, in part because the state agency representing Brazil’s indigenous communities is considerably underfunded, understaffed, and the appointment of its directors is often politically motivated (UN Human Rights Council 2016; Neves 2007; Minority Rights Group International). For example, the recognition in 2018 of Pankararu lands was achieved following a legal case that spanned over 30 years. Moreoever, on the Constitutional right to prior consultation, the UN Human Rights Council (2016) reports that consultation processes are rarely carried out. Lastly, problems also persist when land tenure was legally recognized: consulted sources frequently highlight the historic lack of political will to enforce the constitutional protections for indigenous people, since corruption, discrimination and the unrestricted power of Brazil’s business elite fosters impunity for land expropriation and for the illegal exploitation of natural resources. This is further complicated by the fact that the constitution only guarantees the right of indigenous people to inhabit ancestral lands, while the state retains legal ownership of such territories (Neves 2007; MAR).
* Between 2011 and 2019, the hydroelectric Belo Monte Dam was built on the edge of indigenous territory. According to Minority Rights Group International, tens of thousands of indigenous people have been displaced as a result of construction work and by the dam’s operation, with some estimates ranging as high as 50,000 people. News reports suggest that the construction was initiated in 2010. [2010: autonomy restriction]
* In 2016 Michel Temer became president of Brazil, which initiated what has been termed the “systematic rollback of indigenous rights and protections” (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Under Temer, indigenous land demarcation processes stalled and no new demarcations were issued. The state agency representing Brazil’s indigenous communities, FUNAI, had its funding halved in 2017 and its activities were significantly curtailed (Arsenault 2017; MRGI). Temer’s government also introduced a new land demarcation rule in 2017, which stipulated that “authorities can only designate lands as belonging to indigenous people if they were occupied in 1988, when Brazil's Constitution came into effect” (Deutsche Welle 2018). This not only made the recognition of new indigenous land claims virtually impossible, it also facilitated the expropriation of land that had already been granted to indigenous communities. [2017: autonomy restriction]
* The rights Brazil’s indigenous peoples were further undermined after Jair Bolsonaro became president in 2019. On the first date of his mandate, Bolsonaro moved FUNAI from under the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Agriculture, which is controlled by farming interests (IWGIA 2020; Branford and Torres 2019; Stargardter & Boadle 2019). In doing so, his administration effectively weakened FUNAI’s ability to defend the rights and autonomy of indigenous people. Bolsonaro also vowed to halt the recognition and demarcation of indigenous land, and by 2020, had not granted a single new land title to indigenous communities (Human Rights Watch 2022). In 2019, mining activities in indigenous territories increased by 91%, while deforestation increased by 25% (Alcántara 2021). Finally, in 2020 FUNAI issued a new regulation stipulating that non-indigenous individuals can register land claims in indigenous territories awaiting demarcation. According to Human Rights Watch (2022), 239,000 hectares of land were claimed from indigenous peoples between 2020 and 2022 in this way. [2019: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* EPR does not code regional autonomy in any year for Brazil’s indigenous people. Minorities at Risk confirms that indigenous lands are “not completely autonomous – the land is owned by the state, but held solely for use according to indigenous traditions”. This means that all resources in indigenous territories belong to the state. Even though the 1988 Constitution gave indigenous people the right to prior consultation about the use of resources on their lands, the UN Human Rights Council (2016) reports that formal consultation rarely takes place (see above). We therefore consider that indigenous people in Brazil do not enjoy a meaningful and significant level of autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Indigenous Peoples |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Indigenous peoples |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 14003000 |

**Power access**

* EPR only codes the indigenous peoples from 1978 onwards. Whites dominated the Brazilian polity until the 2000s (see EPR coding notes), so we code the indigenous peoples as powerless throughout. [1970-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We use data from EPR. [0.004]

**Regional concentration**

* Given the large number of indigenous groups in Brazil, it is not fully clear whether the indigenous groups as a whole can be considered regionally concentratred. Overall, though, the evidence we were able to find suggests that regional concentration is given. First, EPR codes Brazil’s indigenous peoples as regionally concentrated in the north and northeast, but EPR applies a lower bar. Second, MAR also codes regional concentration while noting that group members make up the predominant proportion of the local population and that only 25-50% of group members live outside of the regional base (so likely less than 50%). Third, MRGI suggests that around two-thirds of Brazil’s indigenous peoples are concentrated in the north and northeastern regions, though MRGI is not clear whether indigenous peoples are located in a continguous area where they make up the majority. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minority Rights Group International, the most numerous groups associated with this movement include the Tikúna (46,045), Guarani Kaiowá (43,401), Kaingang (37,470), Makuxí (28,912), Terena (28,845), Yanomámi (21,982), Potiguara (20,554), Xavante (19,259), Pataxó (13,588), Sateré-Mawé (13,310), Mundurukú (13,103), Múra (12,479), Xucuru (12,471) and Baré (11,990) (2010 Census). Several of these groups have kin in other countries and on this basis both EPR and MAR code ethnic kin. However, according to the sources we consulted, none of the kin groups crosses the 100,000 threshold. [no kin]

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