# CAMEROON

## Bakassis

Activity: 2008-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Bakassi Penninsula was a disputed territory between Nigeria and Cameroon that caused interstate tensions and border clashes throughout the 1990s. In 2002, the ICJ ruled that the Penninsula was to be ceded from Nigeria to Cameroon. The process of transfer began in 2006 and was formally completed in 2008. Though the territory was disputed, those living in Bakassi consider themselves Nigerians and thus protested their change in nationalities. In 2006, hundreds of Bakassi residents formed the Bakassi Movement for Self Determination (BAMOSD) a militant group aiming at complete secession and the formation of a new state, the Democratic Republic of Bakassi. BAMOSD refused to accept Cameroonian sovereignty but also refused relocation within Nigeria (BBC UK, 8/7/2006). Since Bakassi was not under Cameroonian sovereignty until 2008, we code the Bakassi movement as of 2008, but we note prior non-violent activity (see Bakassi under Nigeria). BAMOSD remains active as of 2012 but another group, the Bakassi Freedom Fighters, surrendered under amnesty in 2009. In 2012, the Bakassi Self-Determination Front (BSDF) was founded to declare an independent Bakassi (Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination; BBC News 2006; Chinwo 2009; Johnson 2013).
* The passing of the ICJ deadline for appeal in October 2012 and the gradual realization that the matter of Bakassi was sealed led to a decline in Bakassi irredentism and sovereigntist protests. (Roth 2015: 249).
* On 15 August 2013 the Cameroon government gained full sovereignty over Bakassi. While militant activity in Bakassi gradually subsided, the cause of the conflict remains unresolved and so sporadic incidents of violence can be seen in the time period of 2012 to the present evidenced in such instances as 13 February 2015, in which militants killed a policeman and kidnapped another (Ngwane 2015).
* By 2018, a major rebellion had broken out in Cameroon’s Anglophone territories (which include Bakassi). There are reports of government crackdowns and violence committed against the Bakassi in this context. For example, in May 2019 it was reported that Cameroon police had destroyed the fishing community of Abana, killing at least 40 people.
* Roth (2015: 249) suggests that the movement is active and Iaccino (2016) also reports that BAMOSD continues to be active. [start date: 2006; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 2006 the Bakassi Movement for Self Determination (BAMOSD) was founded with the demand for a new, independent state, the Democratic Republic of Bakassi. This is confirmed by various sources, such as the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2010) or an article by the BBC (2006) on the residents of Bakassi declaring independence. On August 11, 2012, another organization called the Bakassi Self-Determination Front (BSDF) declared an independent Bakassi (Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination). Iaccino (2016) and Roth (2015: 249) both also suggest an independence claim. [2008-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 2006; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* Roth notes that there was a concurrent irredentist claim that was prominent from 2012 as some Bakassis wanted to return to Nigeria (Roth 2015: 249). However, this claim is ambiguous with one group making the case for Nigeria to annex the Bakassi regions to Nigerian courts (Odinkalu and Ebo’o 2012). However, this activity in 2012 comes from within Nigeria and other sources only briefly mention it. We do not code an irredentist movement due to the likely low political significance of this claim. [no irredentist claim]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Bakassis is the Bakassi Peninsula. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2010), BAMOSD wrote a declaration of independence. The decision to declare independence was taken in 2006, however, the actual unilateral declaration of independence of the Republic of Bakassi was made on August 6, 2008, just a few days before Bakassi peninsula was transferred to Cameroon on August 14, 2008. This is also confirmed by several news articles (see e.g. AllAfrica2008). [2008: independence declaration]
  + Note: contrary to Minahan (2016: 481) we do not therefore code an independence declaration in 2006.
* In August 2012, the Bakassi Self-Determination Front declared independence from Cameroon, hoisting a flag and setting up an FM radio station (Reuters 2012). [2012: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There has been violence stemming from the Bakassi movement, although the rebel groups have engaged mostly in kidnapping and holding hostages. On December 19, 2009, rebels killed one police officer during an attack and clashes in mid-February 2010 injured 24 civilians (CrisisWatch Database). Two soldiers were killed in February 2011 (Lexis Nexis). We also found no evidence for violence above the threshold in subsequent years (the civil war involving the Anglophones more generally is coded under the header of the Westerners movement). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1913, Germany and Britain signed an agreement concerning the border between British Southern and Northern Nigeria and German Kamerun. The agreement conceded the Bakassi Peninsula to Germany in exchange for Germany not threatening Calabar, a key trading post of the British. After WWI, German colonies were divided between France and Britain. The status of Bakassi, however, remained unclear and continued to be disputed (Ayim 2010).
* Between amalgamation in 1914 and independence in 1960, Nigeria had four constitutions: The Clifford Constitution (1922), the Richards Constitution (1946), the Macpherson Constitution (1951) and the Lyttleton Constitution (1954). The Richards Constitution of 1946 created the three regions (north, east, west), which later became self-governing with the passing of the Lyttleton Constitution in 1954 (Mathews 2002: 156). In 1960, when Nigeria gained independence from Britain, the newly independent country hence consisted of the Northern Region, the Western Region, and the Eastern Region. As envisaged by the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954, the three regions were given significant autonomy over internal affairs in the 1960 constitution (Diamond 1988: 72f). The creation of the three regions also meant that the Bakassi peninsula would be integrated into the Ibo-dominated Eastern Region of an independent Nigeria (Minahan 2002: 1446).
* A decentralization process started in 1999 in Nigeria with the inception of the Fourth Republic. According to Suberu (2001), 1999 brought the devolution of significant policy-making competences to constituent states and representation of constituent states in the federal government through the establishment of a robust upper legislative chamber. However, the Bakassi made up only 8% of their state’s population, so we do not code this as a (prior) concession.
* In 1994, Cameroon turned to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to settle the dispute about Bakassi. Following a judgement of the ICJ in 2002, which was based on a colonial agreement of 1913 between Britain and Germany, sovereignty over the Peninsula was transferred from Nigeria to Cameroon. The transfer began in 2006 and was formally completed in 2008. The transfer was rejected by the Nigerian government (Kinni 2013) and BAMOSD, which refused both Cameroonian sovereignty and relocation within Nigeria.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In the Greentree Agreement of 2006, where the terms of the transfer of Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon were established, the Bakassi people were promised a set of concessions related to cultural and minority rights. It states: “In particular, Cameroon shall: (a) not force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula to leave the Zone or to change their nationality; (b) respect their culture, language and beliefs; (c) respect their right to continue their agricultural and fishing activities; (d) protect their property and their customary land rights; (e) not levy in any discriminatory manner any taxes and other dues on Nigerian nationals living in the Zone; and (f) take every necessary measure to protect Nigerian nationals living in the Zone from any harassment or harm” (Greentree Agreement 2006).
  + Yet, the promises on cultural rights in the Greentree agreement have not been kept. The assurances were weak by design (Open Society Justice Initiative 2012) and Cameroonian security forces’ post-transfer treatment of anglophone Bakassians has been characterized by harassment, maltreatment by the bureaucracy in the context of basic rights such as the attainment of passports, and not least, ethnically targeted killings (e.g. Kinni 2013: 3-10, 17; CRAI 2017). The problems began with the authorities reneging on the terms of the agreement immediately after the transfer (Kinni 2013: 2, 11-12). We do not code a concession.
  + In fact, there could be grounds to code a restriction based on the argument that the Bakassis’ cultural rights were reduced compared to when they were under Nigeria; however, the evidence is insufficient.

**Regional autonomy**

* Following the Greentree Agreement, Cameroon established a new administrative sub-division (*arrondissement*), Kombo-Ambedimo in the Ndian Division of South-West Cameroon, which now comprises the Bakassi Peninsula (Open Society Justice Initiative 2012). While the 10 ‘regions’ of Cameroon are semi-autonomous, the country’s ‘divisions’ and – still less – ‘sub-divisions’ enjoy very little meaningful autonomy. In fact, according to Cameroon’s constitution (e.g. Part X: Article 59), the President reserves the right to disband councils at all three levels. No special treatment of the Bakassi people is in place. [2008-2020: no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 2008, the first year of the Cameroon-Bakassi dyad, the Bakassi people were transferred from Nigeria to Cameroon (see Historical Context). [2008: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bakassi |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* Anglophone residents of the Bakassi Peninsula hold no political power and have no influence on decision making at the national level of executive power in Cameroon. In fact, even their local political leaders have often been forced upon them by external elites: as Kinni (2013: 18-19) notes, “the Mayors of Isangele, Kombo Itindi, and those parachuted as Mayors of Kombo-A-Bedimo and Atabong East (Idaboto I and II) [i.e. Bakassi municipalities] are not resident in the Bakassi region, but in Kumba and Ekondo Titi and even Yaoundé” – a consequence, he notes, of the Biya regime “applying the ideology of Cameroonity to exclude the legible natives.” However, besides Kinni’s description of the *de facto* systematic lack of political representation at the local level, we found no evidence that the Bakassi people are subjected to “active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state with the intent of excluding them from political power” (cf. Vogt et al. 2015). Hence, we code the Bakassi as ‘powerless’ rather than ‘discriminated’. [2008-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We could not find estimates of the number of self- or other-identified Bakassis, and so we have to rely on the region's population. The Bakassi Peninsula has a population of approximately 300,000 (BBC 2008). (To the same effect, another source indicates that there are 300,000 “Nigerians” on the Peninsula, amounting to 90% of its population (VOA News 2013)). This information matches with Minahan (2016: 54). According to the World Bank, Cameroon had a population of 19.25 million in 2008, suggesting a relative group size of 1.56%. [0.0156]

**Regional concentration**

* We could not find any sources indicating the percentage of Bakassi outside the claimed territory. It is likely that such data does not exist, given the regional identity-character of this movement. Reports have indicated that considerable numbers of anglophone Bakassi people have moved to the neighbouring Cross-River State of Nigeria following the 2006 Greentree Agreements (Open Society Justice Initiative 2013). However, as with other regional identity groups it makes most sense to code them as concentrated. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Bakassi are related to Nigeria’s Oron people, who likely number >100,000 (see Oron in Nigeria). [kin in adjacent country]

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## Bamileke

Activity: 1960-1971; 1992-2008

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first openly nationalistic organization advocating self-determination, the Union Bamileke, was formed in 1948 while Cameroon was still under colonial rule (Minahan 2002: 263). Note: French Cameroon became independent in 1960 and British Cameroon was joined to it in 1962 to form a united country. In the late 1940s, there were strikes and demonstrations demanding a united Bamilekeland. Bamileke claims included the reunification of East and West Cameroon. In 1954 British Cameroon was added to Nigeria. According to Minahan (2002: 264), the Union of Cameroonian Peoples (UPC), an organization that recruited heavily from Bamillekes, began an armed struggle for the independence of Cameroon in 1955. In partial agreement with this, UCDP/PRIO codes an extra-systemic conflict involving the UPC over Cameroon from 1957-1959. Keesing’s, too, suggests violence in the pre-independence phase: Keesing’s reports separatist violence in 1959 resulting in at least 200-300 deaths. We begin to code the movement in 1960, the year of Cameroon’s independence. However, because there was (anti-colonial) activity from 1948 we peg the start date to 1948. We denote violent prior activity due to the armed conflict from 1957 (or possibly 1955)-1959.
* In 1961 British Cameroon (including a significant Bamileke population) joined Cameroon after a plebiscite. However, this did not whet the appetite of the Bamilekes, who continued to contend for an independent Bamilekeland (Minahan 2002: 264). The Bamileke rebellion was defeated in 1963, with French military assistance. The revolt resurfaced in the late 1960s, though with lower intensity. It ended in 1971 when “the Bamileke rebellion became a liberation movement, supported by many Marxist and socialist states” (Minahan 2002: 265). Thus, we code an end to the first phase of activity in 1971. [start date: 1948; end date: 1971]
* Organized Bamileke activity geared towards self-determination resurged in 1992 with the introduction of multi-party elections (Keesing’s; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR). Cooperating with the South Anglophones, Bamileke groups demanded a return to the pre-1972 federal system, among other things. Non-zero MAR protest scores extend until 1998, and no subsequent separatist sentiments were found in Lexis Nexis or Keesing’s. Following the 10 years inactivity rule, the end date is coded as 2008. [start date 2: 1992; end date 2: 2008]

**Dominant claim**

* Bamileke demands for self-determination were already made prior to the independence of Cameroon. The main organization was the Union Bamileke that formed in 1948 and that demanded a united, independent Bamilekeland. This demand continued also after Cameroon gained independence (Minahan 2002: 264). The second period of activity started in 1992 when Bamileke groups, together with the English-speaking Anglophones of the two western provinces, demanded greater autonomy and a return to the pre-1972 federal system (Minahan 2002: 265). This demand is confirmed by Minorities at Risk. [1960-1971: independence claim][1992-2008: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1948; end date: 1971]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Bamileke nationalists consisted of the provinces of Ouest and Littoral in Cameroon (Minahan 2002: 261). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Violent conflict emerged while Cameroon was still a colony in 1957 and continued after Cameroon’s independence in 1960. UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict involving the UPC in 1960-1961. It seems likely that there were casualties also in 1962-1963: Minahan (2002: 264 reports that the “five-year rebellion” that ended in 1963 “cost over 70,000 lives”. However, we found no evidence to suggest that the 25-deaths threshold was met. We do not code HVIOLSD despite Minahan’s report of 70,000 casualties since Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) do not code a war. We code the episode as ambiguous due to mixed motives since UCDP/PRIO suggests the conflict was mainly over thegovernment. [Pre-independence-1961: VIOLSD; 1962-1971: NVIOLSD]
* We found no evidence for separatist violence during the second phase. [1992-2008: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The most numerous of all ethnic groups currently living within Cameroon’s borders, the Bamilekes are an agglomeration of roughly 90 related tribe groups that speak Bantu. Bamileke settlement in western Cameroon spans back more than 2,000 years. In the late 18th and early 19th century, however, the Muslim Fulanis conquered much of the territory and subjugated the Bantu-speakers. Then came German colonial rule, which was likewise brutal towards the Bamileke. Between 1885 and 1914, Bamileke rebellions against the colonial administration were frequent (Minahan 2002: 263).
* When Germany was stripped of much of its colonial holdings after WWI, the British and French divided the territory without regard for Bamileke settlement, splitting the population evenly. Disregard for the new regime grew, but only after WWII did the Bamileke nationalists form an organization – the Union Bamileke, formed in 1948 (Minahan 2002: 263).
* What Bamileke separatists often call ‘Bamilekeland’ expanded rapidly throughout the 20th century, reflecting what they claim is the traditional homeland. However, the Cameroonian government has not acknowledged such a homeland (Minahan 2002: 261).
* There were no concessions or restrictions against Bamileke in the ten years leading up to Cameroon’s independence in 1960, when the dispute’s beginning is coded. In 1951 there was an attempt by British and French authorities in the Kameruns (at this point, two separate mandates) to address Bamileke demands. However, the negotiations ended without any agreements (Minahan 2002: 264).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1972 the Cameroonian government, under the leadership of Ahidjo, revised the constitution and abolished the federal state. Ahidjo had built a reputation for extensive repression of ethnic dissent, outlawing all political organisations except the French/Muslim-based ruling party six years earlier (Minagan 2002: 264). Following a hotly disputed 1972 referendum (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2017: 6). a highly centralized one-party system was installed in its stead (Minahan 2002: 265; MAR 2004). As such, what was already a very limited degree of regional autonomy in Bamileke-settled areas disappeared completely. We would code an autonomy restriction, but the SDM was no longer active by then.
* In 1992, following a supposedly free election reelecting Biya (which was boycotted by the opposition parties), resurging Bambileke separatist activity led to a government crackdown. Minahan (1996: 62; 2002: 265) suggests that the Bamileke provinces were put under military rule. MAR (2004) notes a ban on demonstrations and widespread intercommunal violence striking Bamileke. However, there is nothing to indicate that Bamileke’s *ethnic* rights were affected. The military rule was of a general repressive character, putting limitations on dissent indiscriminately.
* In May 1993, the Cameroonian government presented a draft bill with some democratization and decentralization measures. However, Bamileke (as well as Southerners’) demands for a federal state are rejected; in consequence, opposition leaders, notably John Fru Ndi, rejected the plan. No meaningful changes were introduced in the end (MAR 2004).

**Regional autonomy**

* While the 1961 constitution of Cameroon proclaimed a federal state, abolished in 1972, the Bamileke have never enjoyed regional autonomy. On the first count, the 1961-1972 federation comprised only two large states – the East and West Cameroon – which entailed that Bamilekeland was subsumed under a larger administrative entity that did not correspond to the Bamileke’s settlement area. As Minahan (2002: 264) notes, the federal design “failed to address Bamileke demands for a separate autonomous state.” On the second count, even if the East Cameroon federal state had corresponded to Bamilekeland, the processes necessary for local self-rule were absent throughout the federal period. Right after the dust had settled from the Bamileke revolt in the early-1960s, President Ahidjo outlawed all political organizations except his own in 1966 (Minahan 2002: 264-65). The conclusion that the Bamileke did not have regional autonomy between 1960 and 2012 is consistent with EPR (Vogt et al. 2015). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Cameroon attained independence in 1960, implying a host change. [1960: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bamileke |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bamileke |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 47101000 |

**Power access**

* We adopt EPR data. [1960-1971, 1992-2008: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1960-1961: 0.3125; 1962-1971, 1992-2008: 0.25]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes regional concentration, but EPR applies a lower bar. MAR also codes regional concentration while noting that >75% of the Bamileke live in a regional base where they are numerically predominant in the local population. Accodring to Minahan (2002: 261), they make up roughly 86%. While Minahan (2016: 63) notes that the Bamileke have “expanded outside their historical homeland”, he refers to a more limited territory than what we have coded (i.e. he refers to the city of Douala, the largest city in the Littoral region, which we consider Bamileke-claimed territory. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code kin where MAR does, at least in newer iterations. However, while there is a Bamileke diaspora, we found no evidence for numerically significant (>100,000 members) ethnic kin (e.g., Minahan 2002: 261ff). [no kin]

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## Southern Cameroonians

Activity: 1980-2020

**General notes**

* In SDM 1.0 the group was called Westerners since the group is concentrated in the two western provinces of Northwest and Southwest (Minahan 2002: 1772). South Cameroonians appears to be more common, though. The group is sometimes also referred to as Anglophones or Ambazonians.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1980, Cameroon’s Anglophones launched an organization, the Cameroon Action Movement, that advocated a return to the federal system (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 59). Thus 1980 is coded the start date.
* In March 1990 the Social Democratic Front (SDF), an Anglophone opposition party, was inaugurated. By the mid-1990s the SDF was advocating autonomy for the Anglophone region, though it seems that self-determination for the Westerners was not an issue for the SDF at its founding.
* According to a January 1992 news report, “after 30 years of silent submission, the ‘Anglophone’ (English-speaking) minority of Cameroon have decided to fight for their rights. Since the beginning of last week, the Cameroon Anglophone Movement has been circulating a pamphlet calling on English-speaking Cameroonians to stage nationwide demonstrations Feb. 11 to press for a return to the federal system of government abolished in 1972.”
* While the SDF seems to have advocated just more autonomy for the region, the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) and some other smaller groups took a harder line by advocating secession with, if necessary, the use of violence.
* In September 1993 rumors spread that the Bamenda All-Anglophone Conference, an additional Southwestern movement, and two self-determination movements in the Northwest and Southwest provinces planned to proclaim on October 1 the independence of their respective provinces.
* The Southern Cameroons National Council continued to make claims for increased self-determination in the 2000s (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; IRINnews 2007; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2002; MAR; Southern Cameroons National Council).
* In the 2010s, Anglophone activities increasingly called for outright secession (Girardin 2021: 307).
* In 2016, English-speaking lawyers and teachers began strike action in protest against the increasing use of French in courts and schools, which led to deadly confrontations. In 2018 and 2019, the Anglophone crisis continued and escalated into a a large-scale armed conflict between the government and secessionist groups (MRGI; Quartz Media 2017; UCDP/PRIO).
* In March 2019, various Anglophone organizations agreed to form the Southern Cameroons Liberation Council (SCLC), a united front consisting of both separatists and federalists. The SCLC’s stated goal was to “ensure a smooth coordination of the activities leading to the total liberation of our homeland” (National Times 2019; also see Cameroon News Agency 2019).
* The separatist war was ongoing as of 2021 (UCDP/PRIO). [start date: 1980; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The beginning of separatist activity was in 1980, when the Cameroon Action Movement (CAM), which demanded the return to the federal system that was abolished in 1972, was established (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 59). Autonomy was also the goal of the Anglophone Social Democratic Front (SDF), which was inaugurated in 1990, and the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), which initially also demanded the restoration of the federal system.
* In the mid-1990s, there seems to have been a radicalization of the claim, with an increasing number of representatives demanding outright independence for the English-speaking South-West Province.
  + For example, Minorities at Risk mentions the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), which was formed in 1994 and which, together with leaders of the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), in 1995 demanded at the United Nations the establishment of an independent republic of Southern Cameroons (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001). This is confirmed by Hewitt and Cheetham (2000: 60), who add that the Southern Cameroon National Congress (SCNC) is “avowedly secessionist.”
  + According to Konings and Nyamnjoh’s (2017: 216-17) account, also the Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), the Ambazonia Movement (AM), and – from 1993 onwards – the Anglophone Standing Committee/All Anglophone Conference (AAC) advanced outright secession from the early 1990s onward.
  + According to the BBC (2001), the secessionist campaign was “gathering momentum” in the late 1990s.
* However, it seems that overall, the claim for increased autonomy remained dominant. This assessment is supported by Krieger (2008), Koning and Nyamnjoh (1997: 216), as well as Minorities at Risk, which in 2006 stated that the “major Anglophone demand is to return to the 1972 federal political structure, thereby obtaining substantial autonomy from the dominant Francophone political culture.”
* It is also the impression left by an extensive report authored by the International Crisis Group in 2017. Even in the context of the 2017 Anglophone crisis, the secessionist position is portrayed as a radical, marginal flank (2017: 12, 15). The Social Democratic Front – the dominant political party in the Westerner homeland – has consistently rejected the secessionist option, instead advocating either two-part or four-part federation (International Crisis Group 2017: 7), and the majority of Westerners are said to support federalism (2017:18). [1980-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Independence claims ran concurrent to dominant autonomy claims from the mid-1990s. The earliest found claim for independence came from the AAC from 1993 (Konings and Nyamnjoh’s 2017: 216-17). Independence claims have persisted since (Girardin 2021: 307). [start date: 1993: end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Southern Cameroonians have claimed the Northwest and Southwest provinces of Cameroon. Our coding of this claim does not include the Bakassi peninsula until 2008, when Nigeria completely transferred sovereignty over this area to Cameroon. We code the claim without Bakassi up to 2008 and including Bakassi from 2009 onwards, based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Westerner secessionists declared the independence of the Southern Cameroons in 1999 and again as the Republic of Ambazonia in 2009, both times over radio (Minahan 2016: 397; International Crisis Group 2017: 7). [1999, 2009: independence declaration]
* Independence was again declared in October 2017 (Al Jazeera 2017). [2017: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Westerners’ MAR rebellion score is 3 in 1992 (“local rebellion”); however we found only two deaths and thus do not code LVIOLSD: in October 1992, illegal protest and demonstrations by members of CAM resulted in two deaths.
* There was some violence in subsequent years. For example, in 2004, a member of the SCNC was killed by plain-clothed attackers, suspected to be security forces; two students in April 2005 were killed by security forces during a protest for better education; the Administrative Secretary of the SDF was killed in May 2006 by an unknown group, and two more students were killed in November 2006 during a riot at Buea University.
* Since strike action began in October 2016 at least six demonstrators have been shot dead and hundreds arrested. The strike was started by English-speaking lawyers and teachers, who were protesting against the increasing use of French in the courts and schools. Images of students being teargassed and beaten in November 2016 at the English-speaking University of Buea spread rapidly on social media (MRG 2021).
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) do not code the civil war in South Cameroon (2017 onwards), but this appears to be a mistake. According to UCDP/PRIO, there were 35-44 battle-related deaths in 2017; 747-1,007 in 2018, 557-645 in 2019; 377-457 in 2020, and 510-644 in 2021. As the cumulative number of deaths over three years exceeds 1,000 in 2017-2019, we code ongoing HVIOLSD starting in 2017. [1980-2016: NVIOLSD; 2017-ongoing: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Southern Cameroonians are an agglomeration of English-speaking Bantu peoples living mainly in the two westernmost regions of today’s Cameroon. They likely originated further north but fled Muslim invaders in the Middle Ages. The major subgroups include the Kakas, Tikar, Ambas, Berbers, Bamilekes (see separate notes), Ibos, and Ibibos (Minahan 2002: 1773). In the 15th and 16th century, these groups joined forces and formed a confederation of ‘southern highlands’. While they share elements of language and cultural history, however, the Westerners’ tradional political geography – being divided into separate small kingdoms ruled by *fons* – led to a multitude of nationalist identities, stymieing a unified push for Westerner sovereignty. In result, the confederation disintegrated in the 18th century (*ibid.*).
* In 1884, at a time when British colonial forces were still mainly present along the coast (in part due to high Malaria mortality further north), several chiefs signed a protectorate agreement with German colonial explorers. This was the beginning of German Kamerun. The regime quickly grew unpopular, however, due to forced labour and the curtailment of powers traditionally enjoyed by local chiefs. Sporadic rebellions from the Westerners followed in effect up until WWI. During that war, Britain and France took German Kamerun and divided the territory among themselves in 1916. This dividing line, which cut through several tribal settlements, was renewed following WWII (Minahan 2002: 1774).
* In 1953, the British-controlled southern and northwestern regions were transferred to Nigeria. While Northern Cameroons was given its own state in the Nigerian federation, Southern Cameroons was incorporated into the Eastern Region. Yet, following protests from the South, the latter was constituted as a state in 1954. As the French government announced a plan for Cameroonian independence in 1958, discussions began in the two (now Nigerian) British Cameroons over the possibility of re-joining independent Cameroon. In February 1961, British authorities offered both regions a referendum on the matter. The North (predominantly Muslim) chose Nigeria while the South (sharing ethnic bonds with transborder populations) chose Cameroon. In turn, the new Cameroon was divided into a two-part federal structure: the old, francophone East Cameroon and the new, anglophone West Cameroon. Each had their own prime minister and legislature, but they shared one presidency.
* The British colonial influence had an enormous impact on the Westerners’ way of life, still to this day shaping their language, administration structures, education, arts, and politics. This constitutes the the main cleavage vis-à-vis the rest of Cameroon, which is influenced likewise by a French colonial heritage. In 1966, the muslim/francophone-dominated federal government outlawed all other political parties, effectively removing all power-sharing at the federal level (Minahan 2002: 1775).
* In 1972, the Cameroonian government imposed the use of French language in the Western provinces, a policy which led to effective discrimination of English-speakers in schools and state institutions (e.g. Minahan 2002: 1773). This was a case of cultural restriction. In the same year, Ahidjo centralized the state and repressed its federal elements, stripping the Westerner regions of remaining regional autonomy (International Crisis Group 2017: 5). [1972: cultural rights restriction, autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1983, to increase his central power, the newly instated president Paul Biya made two changes. First, he divided the anglophone region into two provinces – Northwest and Southwest (International Crisis Group 2017: 6). The move could be read as a divide-and-conquer policy; however, by this point, regional autonomy for Cameroonian administrative units was already practically nil (Minahan 2002: 1775). Hence, the policy did not lead to a considerable loss in regional autonomy. Second, however, Biya also promulgated an order modifying the anglophone General Certificate of Education (GCE) examination, instead making it similar to the French *Baccalaureate* (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997: 213)*.* When met with demonstrations and boycotts, the policy was enforced with police brutality (*ibid.*). Besides being symbolically salient, this was a clear restriction on Westerners’ cultural autonomy, upending anglophone Cameroon’s long-held right to preserve their ‘Anglo-Saxon’ special brand of education. [1983: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1984, Biya introduced two separate policies which attacked important cultural symbols and rights for the Westerners: he changed Cameroon’s official name to the Republic  
  of Cameroon (viz. the name of the former Francophone territory), and he removed the second  
  star from the flag, which had represented the Anglophone part of the country (International Crisis Group 2017: 6). While this was widely read as symbolic insult to Westerners, the policies did not decrease Westerners’ rights per se (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997: 213; Minahan 2002: 1776).
* In 1993, the Biya governments set out to standardize the Anglophone and Francophone school systems. However, following staunch local resistance – particularly from teachers’ unions – the government agreed in 1994 to establish an autonomous General Certificate of Education (GCE) examination board for English-speaking schools (Cunningham 2014: Appendix 4; International Crisis Group 2017: 6). Cunningham (2014) codes this as a concession, and this coding decision is appropriate. As Konings and Nyamnjoh (1997: 217) note, “this signified an important victory for the anglophones in their ten-year-old struggle against determined efforts to destroy the GCE.” [1993: cultural rights concession]
* The government responded with repression to the unrest that had broken out in 2016, banning civil society groups and shutting down the internet and telecommunications in Anglophone territories in 2017 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). While an instance of repression, bans of civil society organization and internet shutdowns are not restrictions as defined here.
* The government made several concessions related to language in 2017 including, *inter alia,* the recruitment of 1,000 bilingual teachers, a FCFA2 billion (~€3 million) grant to private schools and the redeployment of Francophone teachers away from Anglophone regions. Those concessions occurred in January-March 2017 after the outbreak of significant protests (International Crisis Group 2017: 12-13). UCDP/PRIO records the first instance of violent, reciprocated hostilities only in September 2017 and hence after the concessions (https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/14129). [2017: cultural rights concession]
* In 2018, a ministry of decentralisation was established with the aim of devolving further powers to regions (Chatham House 2020). We found no evidence for any concrete steps taken, however.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Southern Cameroonians |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders); Southwestern Anglophones (Bakweri etc.) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 47105000; 47106000 |

**Power access**

* The SDM dataset codes one western, anglophone self-determination movement (‘Westerners’), whereas EPR separates southwestern and northwestern Anglophones. Although there are important divisions between these two groups, they are united in their drive for separatism (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001). EPR codes both groups as junior partner throughout the movement’s history. The EPR coding notes include detailed justifications and clear evidence of Anglophone representation in the government. Following the election of a new prime minister Joseph Dion Ngute (an anglophone) in 2018 there has been an increase in the number of anglophone representation in junior ministerial positions. [1980-2020 junior partner]

**Group size**

* We use the combined group sizes of EPR’s southwestern and northwestern Anglophones (0.08 + 0.12 = 0.20).
* A report from International Crisis Group suggests a similar group size (ICG 2017: i). Minahan (2002: 1772) suggests a similar group size estimate as well (17-19%) while Minahan (2016) suggests an estimate closer to 15%.
* In principle, the population of the Bakassi Peninsula should be added after 2008 (see Bakassis), but they make up just 1.5% of Cameroon’s population (see Bakassis). As the EPR estimate seems relatively high compared to other sources, we leave the group size as is also after 2008. [1980-2020: 0.20]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes both the southwestern and northwestern Anglophones as regionally concentrated, but EPR applies a lower bar. MAR suggests that >75% of the Westerners/Anglophones live in a regional base where they make up the predominant part of the local population. Minahan (2002: 1772) leads to the same conclusion. According to him, moreover, the Westerners (Southern Cameroonians) make up 71% of the area’s population. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code ethnic kin, but MAR does, likely because some of the Anglophone sub-groups (e.g., the Ibos and the Ibibios) can also be found in neighboring Nigeria (cf. Minahan 2002: 1772-3). [kin in adjacent country]

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