# CHAD

## Northerners

Activity: 1966-1979

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Minahan (2002: 1391) suggests that several Muslim leaders first demanded the secession of the Northern provinces and the establishment of an independent Islamic Republic of North Chad in 1966. The Front de Libération du Tchad (FROLINAT) assumed the leadership of the diverse Northern groups and the nationalists’ demands for autonomy, a larger share of power, and a fairer distribution of development funds were rejected by the Southern-dominated government. (Minahan 2002: 1391; Minority Rights Group, 2020; Orobator 1984: 302; Joffe 1990: 159).
* In 1978 FROLINAT forces gained control of most of northern Chad, but the French intervened and forced negotiations. A government of national reconciliation, including Muslim leaders, fell apart and war resumed in 1979. In March 1979 FROLINAT forces took control of the capital and drove the Southerners from power. It seems that no further demands for more autonomy were made once the Northerners were in power (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Minahan 1996, 2002).
* It should be noted that not all sources agree that FROLINAT had secessionist aspirations. Specifically, Lemarchand (1986:31) argues against the idea that the northern insurrection was an attempt at secession, suggesting that secession had at no time been seen as a viable alternative for the north. That said, Orabator (1984: 302) provides corroborating evidence of FROLINAT’s secessionist aspirations; though, Orobator claims that secession was only a goal in the initial phase of the civil war.
* On this basis, we code movement activity from 1966-1979 while noting that this decision is somewhat ambiguous. [start date: 1966; end date: 1979]

**Dominant claim**

* FROLINAT was established in 1966 with the goal of seeking secession from Chad (San Akca 2016: 110; Orobator, 1984:302; Minahan, 2002:1391).
  + It should be noted that not all sources agree that FROLINAT had secessionist aspirations. Specifically, Lemarchand (1986:31) argues against the idea that the northern insurrection was an attempt at secession, suggesting that secession had at no time been seen as a viable alternative for the north. That said, Orabator (1984: 302) provides corroborating evidence of FROLINAT’s secessionist aspirations; though, Orobator claims that secession was only a goal in the initial phase of the civil war.
* [1966-1979: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1966; end date: 1979]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Northerners consists of the Chadian prefectures of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, Kanem, Lac, Batha, Biltine, Ouaddai, Chari-Baguirmi, Guera, and Salamat (Minahan 2002: 1388). We code this claim based on this description using GIS data on admin units from GADM. Notably, the contemporary admin units match the historical ones from 1966 (Deiwiks et al. 2012).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving FROLINAT in 1966-1979, hence the HVIOLSD code. We mark the violence as ambiguous since the war also involved control of the central government (Fearon and Laitin 2003; UCDP/PRIO). The evidence is limited but overall suggests that the movement could have emerged as violent, with no prior nonviolence. [1966-1979: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The North Chadian homeland lies in the Sahara, occupying the arid Tibesti mountains in the north, bush lands and savannah in the south, and the Ennedi Plateau (Minahan, 2002:1388). The North Chadians comprise ‘dozens of distinct peoples representing several cultural and linguistic groups united by religion and history’ (Minahan, 2002:1388).
* France established the boundaries of Chad ‘late in the imperial scramble for Africa, arriving in 1891 and gaining control over the desert peoples of the northern tier only in 1914’ (Minority Rights Group, 2020). Chad became a separate colony in 1920 (Minority Rights Group, 2020).
* Under French colonial rule, educational opportunities were not extended to the north, and the Logonese people of the south dominated the civil service and the colonial military, creating antagonism between the north and the south (Minahan, 2002:1390-1; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:62). The north ‘served as a pool of labour’ (Minority Rights Group, 2020). During the 1950s, the Logonese increasingly governed Chad under the supervision of the French colonial authorities (Minahan, 2002:1391). Those in the North, who were predominantly Muslim, were ‘excluded’ from power as Chad approached independence (Minahan, 2002:1391; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:62; Orobator, 1984:300).
* Chad became an independent republic in 1960 (Minahan, 2002:1391; Minority Rights Group, 2020). The first postcolonial government was led by François Tombolbaye, a southerner, and his government was rejected in the north (Minahan, 2002:1391; Orobator, 1984:300). Tombolbaye rendered Chad a one-party state in 1962 (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:62; Orobator, 1984:301).
* The French maintained a strong military presence in the country, overseeing a fragile peace, until 1965 when the Chadian government requested the withdrawal of France (Minahan, 2002:1391).
* Under Tombolbaye, ‘Northern Muslims were treated harshly, and the Muslim sultans lost their traditional authority’. In their place, government officials, usually from the south – and from the Sara tribe in particular – enforced government measures with a heavy hand, displaying a ‘contemptuous disregard for Muslim traditions’ (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000:62). Indeed, Hewitt and Cheetham (2000:62) describe the army, which was dominated by southerners, as having been ‘notorious for its brutality’ and as having ‘behaved like an occupying army in Muslim areas’ (see also: Minority Rights Group, 2020). [1960: autonomy restriction]
* In 1965, a revolt broke out in central Chad after Muslims protested against the imposition of taxes and were fired upon by soldiers (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:62; Minority Rights Group, 2020; for further information on these land taxation laws and the rebellions they sparked, see Orobator, 1984:301).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The French attempted to broker several truces and ceasefires between the government and the northerners, and intervened in 1968. Nevertheless, in 1970, rebellion proliferated across the region. Libyan troops intervened in 1971, supplying arms to the northern rebels (Minahan, 2002:1391; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:62).
* Following France’s intervention, Hewitt and Cheetham (2000:62) report that France ‘pressured Tombolbaye into restoring the authority of the Muslim chieftains and making other reforms’. A date is not provided but, as the French intervened in 1968, it can be assumed this restoration took place in 1968, and involved the devolution of some form of governance. [1968: autonomy concession]
* In 1975, Tombolbaye was overthrown by southern rivals, and a new government installed (Minahan, 2002:1391; Minority Rights Group, 2020; Orobator, 1984:302). The new government adopted the following policies: firstly, the government patronised northerners with official positions; secondly, a provisional government was created comprising 50% northerners; thirdly, Tombolbaye’s party was disbanded; fourthly, amnesty was granted to political prisoners (most of whom were northerners and had been jailed for resisting Tombolbaye); and, fifthly, FROLINAT leaders were awarded political appointments (Orobator, 1984:304). None of these acts, however, increased the self-rule of the northerners in the north of the country and we do not code a concession.
* By 1978, FROLINAT forces had secured control over most of the north of Chad; the French intervened once more, however, forcing negotiations (Minahan, 2002:1391; Hollick, 1982:298). Minority Rights Group (2020) describes Tombolbaye’s successor, Félix Malloum, ‘cut[ting] a deal’ with a splinter faction of FROLINAT led by Hissène Habré in 1978. A government of national reconciliation, including leaders from the north, was created but this administration fell apart and the rebellion resumed in 1979 (Minahan, 2002:1391; for a similar narrative, see also: Orobator, 1984:304-5 and Hollick, 1982:298). Due to the short-lived nature of this government, and as inclusion in the central government does not increase the extent of self-rule of groups, we do not code a concession.
* In March 1979, FROLINAT forces seized the capital, N’Djamena, and drove the southerners from power (Minahan, 2002:1391). At this stage, the Northerners had achieved a semblance of control over Chad and the movement ended.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Northerners |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Arabs; Muslim Sahel groups; Toubou |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 48301000; 48302000; 48306000 |

**Power access**

* During the period this movement was active, EPR codes the following groups in Chad: Sara, Muslim Sahel groups, Arabs, and Toubou. At the time, the Sara (or the Southerners) dominated Chad. The North Chadians consist of all three remaining groups. During 1966-1975, all North Chadian groups are coded as powerless in EPR. During 1976-1978 (the period of the Malloum government), the Muslim Sahel groups and the Toubou are coded with junior partner, while the Arabs are coded as powerless. The former two make up the majority of the group, so we code the period with junior partner (EPR notes that many Muslim groups from the north are now included in the government). 1979 is not coded due to a state collapse due to the overthrow of the Malloum regime. However, Malloum was ousted only in February 1979, so following the 1st of January rule 1979 the 1975-1978 code should just be continued. [1960-1975: powerless; 1976-1979: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1388-1389), the Sudanic Arabs are the largest group associated with this movement (in relative terms), followed by several Sahelian Muslim groups (which in combination make up the majority though), including the Masalits and the Mimi. Minahan also lists the Toubous. The combined population of the three EPR groups matches roughly with the figure given in Minahan (3.3 million according to Minahan; combined population share according to EPR is 45% of Chad, which in combination with the 2002 population of Chad (9 mio according to the World Bank) yields a population of 4 million. [0.45]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1388), the North Chadians made up 80% of North Chad in 2002 and >90% of North Chadians resided in North Chad at the time. This matches with EPR, which includes three northern groups (Arabs; Muslim Sahel groups; Toubou) and codes all of them as regionally concentrated. MAR also codes regional concentration. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* All three northern groups coded in EPR have numerically significant transborger ethnic kin – Muslim Sahel groups (Zaghawa in Sudan), Arabs (Arabs in various countries), and the Toubou (Toubou in various countries). This broadly matches with Minahan (2002: 1389), who suggests that “Sudanic Arabs” form the largest part of the separatist group. Minahan also notes ties close ties to Arabs from Libya. On this basis, we code transborder ethnic kin in a neighboring country; however, it should be noted that MAR does not code ethnic kin. [kin in adjoining state]

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## Southerners

Activity: 1979-2011

**General notes**

* The south is mainly Christian, and consists of half the population (Minority Rights Group, 2020). The south is more densely populated than other parts of the country and ethno-linguistic groups include Sara (30% of Chad’s population), Toubouri and Massa (5%), Mboum/Laka (3-4%), and Moundang (2-3%). Minahan (2002: 1103) groups the south together under the banner of “Logonese”.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Marshall & Gurr (2003: 61) suggest that the movement started in 1979. In agreement with this, both Horowitz (1985:278) and Mays (2002: 39) claim that, in 1979, secessionist claims began to be put forward by the Sara (also see Decalo 1980: 54). Keesing’s reports that a secessionist movement among the southern Chadians was formed in 1980 (thus suggesting a slightly later start date) and that it right away engaged in skirmishes against the northern rebels (suggesting that the movement was violent from the start). We code the start date in 1979, the first year we found evidence for separatist mobilization.
* From around 1984, southern warlords launched an armed insurgency against the government, which was viewed as secessionism by Habré (Minority Rights Group, 2020; also see Minahan, 2002: 1106).
* MAR gives non-zero scores in 2001 and 2006, and an umbrella group of exiled armed movements and political parties, including former Southern Chadian separatists, reopened dialogue with the government in 2002. However, it seems that the 2002 dialogue and the 2006 non-zero protest score pertains to a fight over power in the government rather than the issue of autonomy. The last clear evidence for separatist mobilization we have found is in 2001, when demands for regional autonomy and a federal structure were included in the 2001 presidential platform of Ngarlejy Yorongar, a southern Chadian politician (MAR). According to Soares and Otayek (2007: 88), “secessionist sentiments” increased again with the beginning of exploitation of oil fields in 2004, but there is no evidence that these sentiments turned into an organized claim. MAR (2009) suggests that “demands for increased regional autonomy within a federalist structure have not been expressed in recent years.” Based on a lack of activity, we code the end of the separatist movement as 2011, following the ten-years rule. [start date: 1979; end date: 2011]

**Dominant claim**

* As with the Northerners, the Southerners were primarily interested in the control of the central government. However, there were also secessionist claims by the movement. Horowitz (1985: 278) mentions the proclamation of Sara secession in 1979. The same can be read in Mays (2002: 39), who writes that Wadal Kamougue, vice-president of the Transitional Government of National Unity, threatened to lead a secession during the second reconciliation conference in 1979. The claim de-radicalised later, but it is hard to identify the exact year. According to Minorities at Risk, demands for regional autonomy and a federal structure were included in the 2001 presidential platform of Yorongar. We thus code a switch from independence to autonomy in 2002, following the first of January rule. [1979-2001: independence claim][2002-2011: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Although there is some indication of secessionist sentiment re-emerging (Soares and Otayek 2007: 88), we found no evidence for organized secessionist claims post-2001. [start date: 1979; end date: 2001]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Southerners consists of the Chadian prefectures of Logone Occidental, Logone Oriental, Mayo-Kebbi, Tandjilé, Mandoul and Moyen-Chari (Minahan 2002; MRGI). Mandoul was part of the Moyen-Chari region until 2002 (Law 2012). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code civil wars in 1980-1982, 1982-1987, 1990-1994, 1998-2003, and 2005-2010. However, as the coding notes make clear, those civil wars were mostly fought between different northerner factions over governmental control and did not involve southern claims for territorial self-determination.
* UCDP/PRIO suggests an armed conflict involving a rebel group known as FAT (Forces Armées Tchadiennes) in 1982. According to UCDP/PRIO: “FAT mainly functioned as a regional force in Chad’s five southern prefectures, where it claimed to be representing primarily the Sara ethnic group. Kamougue also stated that his primary goal was to work for unity in southern Chad in order present a united front against Habré. It was also suggested that Kamougue sought to secede from Chad and create an independent “Republic of Logone”, which would have included the cotton producing areas of southern Chad and the north of the Central African Republic.” UCDP suggests FAT was defeated in September 1982. We use an ambiguous code due to mixed motives.
  + Note: Marshall & Gurr (2003) suggest separatist violence involving the Southerners in more years: 1979-1986. Yet, FAT is the only southern rebel group with separatist motives we could find in UCDP/PRIO during those years. The situation in Chad at the time was complex and unclear, and it is possible that Marschall & Gurr picked up additional violence above the threshold; however, we found no clear evidence.
* UCDP/PRIO code an armed conflict involving a group known as CSNPD (Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy) in 1992-1994. CSNPD is based in the country’s south and aimed for federalism, among other things (UCDP/PRIO treats this as a conflict over government).
  + Additional information: “The expulsion from the Central African Republic occurred during a critical time for CSNPD. In February 1994, the group singed a first peace agreement with the government of Chad, an agreement mediated by the Central African Republic. After the conclusion of the accord, Moise Kette continued to insist on the organization of a referendum on federalism in Chad – a condition not foreseen in the agreement. As a consequence, the agreement was never fully implemented, and violence continued. Under increased pressure – notably the deprivation of its rear bases – CSNPD agreed on 11 august 1994 on a new peace agreement, again mediated by the Central African Republic. This agreement led to frictions within CSNPD, culminating in the creation of FARF (Armed Forces of the Federal Repbulic) by former CSNPD member Laokein Barde who continued the armed struggle.”
  + UCDP/PRIO associates 11 deaths with FARF in 1994 and two in 1995. In 1996, UCDP/PRIO records no deaths associated with either group.
* Qualitative accounts point to a de-escalation in 1995/1996 as well: According to Minahan (2002: 1107), in 1996, most southern rebel groups agreed to peace talks with the government and many signed deals (Minahan 2002:1107). On this basis, we code 1992-1994 as LVIOLSD (applying a mixed motives coding) and 1995-1996 as NVIOLSD.
* In 1997-1998, UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict involving FARF (Forces armées pour la République fédérale), which among other things advocates federalism and is associated with the Kanembu, a major southerner ethnic group. As the group also advocates for regime change, we code the violence as over mixed motives.
* We found no reports of separatist violence since 1999, hence a NVIOLSD classification for those years.
* [1979-1981: NVIOLSD; 1982: LVIOLSD; 1983-1991: NVIOLSD; 1992-1994: LVIOLSD; 1995-1996: NVIOLSD; 1997-1998: LVIOLSD; 1999-2011: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* France established the boundaries of Chad ‘late in the imperial scramble for Africa, arriving in 1891 and gaining control over the desert peoples of the northern tier only in 1914’ (Minority Rights Group, 2020). Chad became a separate colony in 1920 (Minority Rights Group, 2020).
* Under French colonial rule, the Logonese people of the south dominated the civil service and the colonial military, creating antagonism between the north and the south (Minahan, 2002:1390-1; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:62). During the 1950s, the southern Chadians (or: Logonese) increasingly governed Chad under the supervision of the French colonial authorities (Minahan, 2002:1391).
* Chad became an independent republic in 1960 (Minahan, 2002:1391; Minority Rights Group, 2020). The first postcolonial government was led by François Tombolbaye, a southerner, and his government was rejected in the north (Minahan, 2002: 1391; Orobator, 1984: 300). Tombolbaye rendered Chad a one-party state in 1962 (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:62; Orobator, 1984:301).
* The French maintained a strong military presence in the country, overseeing a fragile peace until 1965 when the Chadian government requested the withdrawal of France (Minahan, 2002:1391).
* Under Tombolbaye, ‘Northern Muslims were treated harshly, and the Muslim sultans lost their traditional authority’. In their place, government officials, usually from the south – and from the Sara tribe in particular – enforced government measures with a heavy hand, displaying a ‘contemptuous disregard for Muslim traditions’ (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000:62).
* In 1965, a revolt broke out in central Chad after Muslims protested against the imposition of taxes and were fired upon by soldiers (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:62; Minority Rights Group, 2020; for further information on these land taxation laws and the rebellions they sparked, see Orobator, 1984:301).
* With the emergence of FROLINAT (see the entry above, ‘Northerners’), civil war broke out, and French forces propped up Tombolbaye’s government (Minority Rights Group, 2020). Tombolbaye was overthrown by southern rivals in 1975, leading to a military junta under Félix Malloum, also a southerner (Minority Rights Group, 2020).
* In 1978, ‘Malloum cut a deal with the leader of one faction of the splintered FROLINAT, Hissène Habré’ (Minority Rights Group, 2020). Under this deal, Habré became Prime Minister, but his forces deposed Malloum the next year, ‘sparking a chaotic scramble for power’. Goukouni Oueddei, a northerner ‘maintained a tenuous hold on power until overthrown by Habré’s army in June 1982’. Habré formed a ‘Documentation and Security Directorate’ (DSD); the purpose of the Directorate was to ‘target and execute’ opponents and southern ethnic groups perceived as being ‘hostile to his regime’ (Minority Rights Group, 2020). By the 1990s, southerners ‘retained posts in the civil service and the army, but had been effectively sidelined from political power’ (Minority Rights Group, 2020).
* Minority Rights Group (2020) claims that opposition to the new northern government in the south centred in the southernmost prefecture of Logone Occidentale and the neighbouring Logone Orientale. Minority Rights Group (2020) describe major bloodshed in 1979, during which southerners were killed in the capital, and then between 5,000 and 10,000 Muslims were killed in the south (see also: Minahan, 2002:1106).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Since the north seized the country, the southerners have ‘lacked effective state power’ and have borne much of the brunt ‘of the violence and intimidation’ unleashed by armed groups in Chad (Minority Rights Group, 2020). However, government crackdowns do not constitute a restriction.
* In 1986, several Logonese groups in the south joined a reconciliation government but this government was driven from power in December 1990 by Muslim forces led by Idriss Deby (Minahan, 2002:1106). Moreover, inclusion in the central government does not constitute a concession according to the Coding Instructions.
* Under President Habré, 40,000 Chadians are said to have been killed, many of them southerners. Habré ‘attempted to wipe out the southern elite’ and ‘embarked on a scorched earth rural strategy in a region he viewed as secessionist’ (Minority Rights Group, 2020). As noted above, government crackdowns do not constitute a restriction.
* Under President Idriss Déby (in office between 1990 and 2021), more than 2,000 were killed in the south by government forces between 1990 and mid-1995 (Minority Rights Group, 2020). As already noted, government crackdowns do not constitute a restriction.
* In 1994, the Chadian government and southern rebels signed a peace agreement. The government agreed to withdraw the Republic Guard from the south, grant full amnesty to the rebels, and recognise the then-major revel movement as a legal political party. Other rebel groups in the south refused to participate in the agreement (Minahan, 2002:1106). These moves did not, however, increase the level of self-governance of southerners and we therefore do not code a concession.
* In 1995, the government announced that Arabic would become the only language of instruction in schools and that Islamic shari’a would become the source of law throughout the country; this prompted clashes between ‘southern farmers and northern traders’ which rapidly proliferated (Minahan, 2002:1107). [1995: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1996, most southern rebel groups agreed to peace talks with the government and many signed deals (Minahan, 2002:1107). However, by 1997, fighting had resumed (Minahan, 2002:1107). Due to the brief nature of these agreements, and as the peace deals do not appear to have increased the level of self-governance of the south, we do not code a concession.
* In the late 1990s, southern rebellions subsided but ‘grievances about lack of participation in government persisted’ and, in 1999, 13 southern armed opposition groups banded together to form an alliance, the Coordination des Mouvements Armés et Politiques de l’Opposition (CMAP) (Minority Rights Group, 2020). There was sporadic fighting between Deby and CMAP in 2001 and 2002 (Minority Rights Group, 2020). However, Minahan disagrees and claims that in 1998 there was a spate of executions of rebel southerners, with entire villages destroyed for having suspected rebel ties (Minahan, 2002:1107). As noted above, we do not code a restriction as government crackdowns are not included in the coding instructions.
* In 2006, the government adopted a law which ‘includes the promotion of tolerance and respect for other cultures as one of the objectives of the educational system’. However, Minority Rights Group (2020) claims that ‘discrimination against minorities in Chad’ continued despite the introduction of this law; therefore, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

* Decalo (1980: 54) suggests that, with the fall of Malloum in 1978, ‘the total social, economic, and political disengagement of the Sara from Ndjamena’ began. Indeed, he goes as far as to describe the south as having been ‘transformed’ into ‘a de facto state within a state’ at this point. However, we found no corroborating evidence suggesting de facto independence.

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Southerners |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Sara |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 48304000 |

**Power access**

* During the period at which this movement was active, EPR codes the following groups in Chad: Sara, several Muslim Sahel groups (Hadjerai, Zaghawa, Bideyat, and Tamas), Arabs, and Toubou. The Sara are the largest group associated with the Southerners movement and make up about 24% of Chad's population. EPR does not code the other Southerner groups. The “No match” category does not fit this case, so we assign it to the 1:n category even though only one group is coded. Since the Saras are by far the largest group associated with the movement and since the EPR coding notes often note that the code for the Saras applies to Southerner groups more generally, the power access code can be directly adapted from this group. [1979-1982: powerless; 1983-2011: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to MAR, the "Southern Chadians make up approximately 33 percent of the country’s total population and live in Chad’s five southern prefectures[…] Predominantly Christian or animist, they include the Sara, Massa and Moundang in Mayo-Kebbi." This matches with Minahan, who suggests that there were 2.92 million southern Chadians in Chad in 2002, which compares with a country population of 9 million according to the World Bank. [0.3244]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1103), the South Chadians (Logonese) made up 86% of south Chad (Logone) in 2002 and >90% of South Chadians resided in Logone at the time. This matches with EPR, which codes the only southern sub-group it includes, the Sara, as regionally concentrated. MAR also codes regional concentration. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* EPR codes kinship ties to the Sara in CAR, who make up 10% of the CAR’s population according to EPR (which amounted to 2-4 million over the course of the movement’s duration according to the World Bank). MAR also codes ethnic kin, but only in a non-adjoining country. Chad and CAR are neighboring states and it is not clear what country MAR is referring to. [kin in adjacent state]

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