# CHILE

## Aymara

Activity: 1997-2020

**General notes**

* The Aymara are the second largest indigenous group in Chile, living in the north of the country and numbering 156,000 according to the 2017 census (IWGIA, 2021). Many Aymara also live in neighbouring Bolivia.

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to a World Bank report written in 2000, there are several Aymara organizations with the biggest being the Aymara People National Council (Consejo Nacional Aymara, CNA) that “represents more than 200 local and regional Aymara organizations addressing from cultural issues to agricultural production to political rights” (Gacitúa-Marió, 2000: 177). The World Bank report goes on to quote a 1997 CNA report, stating that demands for autonomy are centered around “the recognition of the Consejo Nacional Aymara (as a legislative body), changes in the electoral law to ensure indigenous representation in the local and regional governments, and changes in the judicial system to transfer the resolution of certain legal conflicts to traditional local authorities.” (Gacitúa-Marió, 2000: 193). This is corroborated by a 2017 Minority Rights Group International report that states that the trend of little political mobilization among the Aymara “started to change in the mid-1990s, and today Aymara political organizations take an active role in bilingual education projects and debates over the ownership of natural resources.” This is triangulated with the PhD thesis of indigenous Aymara student, Dante Choque Cáseres (2018), who states that the CNA was established in 1997 (Choque Cáseres, 2018: 142). Thus, we code 1997 as the start date.
* Field research conducted in 2008/2009 by Daniella Jofré as part of a PhD submitted at the University of Toronto in 2014 details meetings at CNA offices in which indigenous Aymara resistance strategies against mining projects were discussed, denoting that the organization was still active in 2009. During the recent Constituent Assembly process in 2021, one of the indigenous seats was filled by a representative of the CNA (Millaleo, 2021). Thus, the CNA is the foremost Aymara organization. According to this Aymara member of the constituent assembly, “We are seeking guarantees of an equal and intercultural relationship that recognizes us as peoples with the right to self- determination. The State must recognize us as subjects with political rights, the right to govern ourselves and the right to participate in decision-making at the municipal and regional levels, in Congress and in the courts” (Acevedo, 2021). Based on this account, we code the movement as ongoing in 2020. [start date: 1997; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Aymara make claims for regional autonomy. According to a World Bank report, the Aymara’s claims are focused on “the recognition of the Consejo Nacional Aymara (as a legislative body), changes in the electoral law to ensure indigenous representation in the local and regional governments, and changes in the judicial system to transfer the resolution of certain legal conflicts to traditional local authorities” (Gacitúa-Marió, 2000: 193). This is corroborated by a 2017 Minority Rights Group International report that states that the trend of little political mobilisation among the Aymara “started to change in the mid-1990s, and today Aymara political organisations take an active role in bilingual education projects and debates over the ownership of natural resources.” [1997-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* We were unable to find a precise definition of the territory claimed by the group. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s settlement area using GREG (Weidmann et al. 2010). The group’s settlement area is the far north of Chile in Arica y Parinacota Region and Tarapacá Region. Choque Cáseres (2018: 141) reviews the 2012 census data and finds that of the 114,532 Aymara, 49,945 Aymara lived in Arica y Parinacota and 35,450 in the contiguous Tarapacá Region. Arica y Parinacota is the furthest north, bordering Peru and Bolivia while Tarapacá, to the immediate south of Arica y Parinacota also borders Bolivia.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence above the threshold and therefore code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After coming under Spanish colonial rule in the 16th century (Minahan, 2016: 49) the wars of independence in the early 1800s placed borders through Aymara populations, with most Aymara now residing in modern-day territory of Peru and Bolivia (Minahan, 2016: 49). The Aymara of the far north of Chile came under the administration of the Chilean government in the late 19th century after the war against Bolivia and Peru ended with the Aymara populated provinces of Arica and Tarapacá conceded to Chile (Perrier, 2006: 32). The following century saw the Aymara of this now Chilean province subjected to a process of “Chileanization” similar to the one experienced by Mapuches (Salazar and González, 2021: 2).
* Significant Aymara migration from rural, highland areas to more urban areas in the valleys and on the coast means, particularly the city of Arica occurred in the middle of the 20th century, changing the demographic makeup of Chilean Aymaras (Perrier, 2006: 33, Salazar and González, 2021: 3)
* The left-wing government of Salvador Allende (1970 – 1973) granted recognition to the Aymara for the first time in Chilean history through the Indigenous Law in 1972, which created the Institute of Indigenous Development (Perrier, 2006: 35, Richards, 2013: 36). The following years of dictatorship under Pinochet, however, meant that this law was never fully implemented and any gains by indigenous peoples of Chile were quickly reversed (Perrier, 2006: 35).
* In 1993, the Chilean Government passed the Indigenous Law, designating the Aymara as one of eight groups indigenous to Chile, recognising indigenous cultures and languages and providing some legal protections (Danver, 2015: 589, Cunningham, 2014: 205). This law also created the National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI), which became responsible for the protection of indigenous lands, although disillusionment with this institution was widespread due to its perceived powerlessness in the face of government policies, particularly concerning infrastructure construction on indigenous land (Carter, 2010: 71). Despite this, the institutions created by the Indigenous Law catalysed increased mobilisation of indigenous groups, including the Aymara, and allowed organisations to gain funding for cultural initiatives (EPR Atlas, 2021: 382, Perrier, 2006: 40) Due to its lack of substance in power over land and territory, this is coded as a cultural rights concession as this was where the law was most impactful in terms of Aymara recognition [1993: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2007, President Michelle Bachelet created new administrative regions – Arica y Parinacota, comprising of the two heavily Aymara populated provinces of Arica and Parinacota and Tarapacá. This elevated the status of the provinces to their own region, the highest level of regional autonomy within Chile’s governance structure, and meant greater representation in the House of Representatives, and after 2015, the Senate (Choque Cáseres, 2018: 141). Still, given Chile’s unitary structure, actual autonomy conferred was limited.
* In 2009, President Bachelet approved legislation granting consultation rights to indigenous groups over a series of political reforms intended to meet indigenous demands. These consultation plans included Aymaras, who would be consulted on issues such as the constitutional recognition of indigenous people, and the creation of a Ministry of Indigenous Peoples and at least two representative councils for indigenous communities. There is evidence that the Aymara participated in five consultation processes that took place on some or all of these issues, but Tomaselli (2019: 119) claims that these consultations were “failures”, since they did not improve indigenous participation or representation and failed to meaningfully enhance the exercise of indigenous rights. In particular, Aymaras complained about the lack of adequate representation in these consultation processes. We do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* While the establishment of the Arica y Parinacota and Tarapacá Regions gave greater representation to the Aymara, meaningful autonomy over decision-making remains too limited to warrant an autonomy code. [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Aymara |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Other indigenous groups |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 15503000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the Aymara as part of the ‘Other indigenous groups’ cluster. According to EPR, all indigenous groups were powerless in Chile during the movement’s duration (“The Mapuche as well as the other indigenous groups are not represented in the executive branches of government, neither on the national nor on the subnational level”). [1997-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* The Aymara are the second largest indigenous group in Chile, living in the north of the country and numbering 156,000 according to the 2017 census. According to the 2017 census, Chile’s total population was 17,574,003. [0.0089]

**Regional concentration**

* We do not code the Aymara as regionally concentrated because, while over 50% live in a contiguous area of the northern provinces, the population figures of the Aymara amount to less than 50% of the total population in these provinces. Choque Cáseres (2018: 141) reviews the 2012 census data and finds that of the 114,532 Aymara, 49,945 Aymara lived in Arica y Parinacota and 35,450 in Tarapacá Region, two regions contiguous with each other, thus meeting the condition that at least 50% of group members reside in a geographically contiguous territory. However, according to Salazar and González (2021) who analysed the 2017 census results for the Arica y Parinacota Region, which is home to the largest number of Aymara, “36% of the population identifies as belonging to some Indigenous group, in which the Aymara ethnicity predominates at 75.3%” (Salazar and González, 2021: 6) Thus, less than 50% of the local population are Aymara, and we do not code the group as regionally concentrated. [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are significant Aymara populations in Bolivia (>1.5 million), Peru (>0.5 million), and Argentina (ca. 20,000) (e.g., Minahan, 2016: 48). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Easter Islanders (Rapa Nui)

Activity: 1994-2020

**General notes**

* The Rapa Nui (also known as Pascuenses) are the indigenous inhabitants of the Easter Island, a Chilean territory in the Pacific Ocean, over 3,000 kilometers from mainland Chile. As of 2013, 2,553 people self-identified as Rapa Nui (Minority Rights Group International).

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1994, the Rapa Nui demanded control of their own affairs in order to save the remnants of their culture through their Council of Elders. We peg the start date to 1994. Previously, the Rapa Nui had petitioned to emigrate to Tahiti in the 1930s, but were subsequently more engaged in gaining Chilean citizenship. The Rapa Nui Parliament was founded in 2000 (a more radical grouping that emerged from the Council of Elders). The Rapa Nui Parliament demands more autonomy over its own lands, both political and cultural. The Parliament requested secession in a letter to President Sebastián Piñera in 2010. In 2012, they crowned their own king, Valentino Ririroko Tuki (Caroll, 2010; Minahan, 2002; MRGI; TVNZ, 2010). Minority Rights Group International notes that the Council of Elders continued to be active in 2015, so we code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1994; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Since 1994, the Council of Elders has demanded increased control of internal Rapa Nui affairs to preserve their culture and territories (Minahan, 2002: 1574). In 2000, a more radical group emerged from the Council of Elders, the Rapa Nui Parliament, which has made continuous claims for autonomy, though there is evidence of independence claims being made too (Roth 2015: 410). However, MRGI suggests that the claim for autonomy is dominant, noting that “Rapanui people do not seek complete independence from Chile”. [1994-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* In 2012 a lawsuit filed by the King of Rapa Nui claimed that mistreatment of Easter Islanders by Chile made its control over the islands null. However, this is a very marginal position with strictly limited public support (Roth, 2015: 410). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

* Roth (2015: 410) notes that in 2012 a speaker in Easter Islands parliament proposed joining with French Polynesia, however we found no indications that this went hand in hand with sustained mobilization for secession and the merger with a different state. [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Rapa Nui consists of the Easter Island. The island is situated in the Pacific and is administratively part of the Valparaiso Region as the Province Isla de Pascua in Chile. The only settled area is Hanga Roa, which is also the island’s capital (Minahan, 2002: 1570). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Protests have become more violent in recent years and have resulted in injuries, but we found no instances of deaths. Thus, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Rapa Nui became known as Easter Island after the first European, a Dutch Admiral, arrived in 1722, giving its name. Before then, this extremely isolated island was completely self-governing. Periods of European colonization followed, including a declaration in 1770 that the island belonged to the King of Spain by a Spanish expedition (Minahan, 2002: 1872). A devastating round of slave raids from Peru between 1859 and 1862, and the subsequent introduction of smallpox to the island, decimated the population (Minority Rights Group International). By 1877, the population had reduced to just 111 people, down from several thousand (Minority Rights Group International).
* In 1888, Rapa Nui/Easter Island was annexed by Chile and in 1896 was formally incorporated into the jurisdiction of Valpraiso, 3,600km away (Minahan, 2002: 1573) While the Chilean government promised respect for their land and culture, in reality the Rapa Nui were confined to a small walled village, Hanga Roa, and most of the land and remaining animals were rented out to a private sheep ranching company (Minahan, 2002: 1573)
* In the 1950s, the Chilean government did not renew the lease for the company, and took full control of the island through martial navy law (EPR Atlas 2021: 382).
* The Rapa Nui received official citizenship rights in 1966 through the Ley Pascua, which also recognised cultural distinctiveness of the Rapa Nui in terms of criminal justice.
* In 1993, the Chilean Government passed the Indigenous Law, recognising the Rapa Nui as one of eight groups indigenous to Chile, recognising indigenous cultures and languages and providing some legal protections (Danver, 2015: 589, Cunningham, 2014: 205). This law and the institutions created by it also catalysed mobilisation of indigenous cultural organisations, including the Rapa Nui (Perrier, 2006: 40, EPR Atlas, 2021: 382) [1993: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Between 1994 and 2012, no major concessions or restrictions were granted or implemented, despite various claims and growing movement momentum. In 2010, Rapa Nui protesters occupied various sites to protest the failure to succeed in their land claims. Chilean police flown from the mainland violently broke-up the occupations with rubber bullets and batons, injuring several people. (Minority Rights Group International) A case was filed at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which in 2011, ruled in favour of the islanders in terms of preventing violence, guaranteeing the safety of demonstrators, and urging the Chilean Government to launch an investigation into the incident (Minority Rights Group International).
* There were two autonomy/land rights concessions in 2017:
  + Rapa Nui National Park, which covers over 40% of the island’s territory, was partially conceded in 2017 to an indigenous organisation, *Ma’u Henua,* that nowjointly administrates the park with the national agency (Lipo et al, 2020: 26). While criticised for not consulting the relevant Rapa Nui organisations, it nevertheless represents a partial concession in that tourist revenue is collected and managed by the islanders, and natural resource management is more in their control.
  + Also in 2017, the Chilean government created Latin America’s largest marine protection zone around the Easter Island, following consultation processes with the Rapa Nui. According to Chile’s environmental minister, “This consultation was intended to respect the will of the Rapa Nui people, regarding creating a marine protected area that respects the ancestral use of the sea and its fishing habits”, given that rising tourism and industrial-scale fishing was seriously threatening the health of these waters, and with it, a large means of subsistence for the Rapa Nui (Al Jazeera, 2017). [2017: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* We code the Rapa Nui as having no regional autonomy as the Easter Island is mostly governed from the Chilean mainland jurisdiction of Valparaiso, despite the limited autonomy gained in 2017 in terms of land management. [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Easter Islanders (Rapa Nui) |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Other indigenous groups |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 15503000 |

**Power access**

* Rapa Nui (Easter Island) is an island in the southeastern Pacific Ocean (see Minahan, 2002: 1570). EPR includes the Rapanui as a separate group until 1966 and thereafter includes them under the umbrella group “Other indigenous peoples”. According to EPR, none of the groups included under this banner were meaningfully represented in Chile’s central government between 1994 and 2020: “The Mapuche as well as the other indigenous groups are not represented in the executive branches of government, neither on the national nor on the subnational level.” [1994-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1570), there were approx. 10,000 Rapa Nui in Chile in 2002. This matches with EPR, which codes a relative group size of around 0.03%. By contrast, MRGI suggests a lower population of around 2,500 self-identified Rapa Nui in Chile in 2013 (or around 0.01%). According to MRGI, “This does not indicate a high death rate, but rather shows the changing nature of ethnic categorisation and census-taking. (Some indigenous organisations complained of statistical genocide but local leaders seemed to concur that the later figure was more realistic.)” We draw on MRGI. According to the World Bank, Chile’s population stood at approx. 17.5 million people in 2013. [0.0001]

**Regional concentration**

* Minahan (2002: 1570) suggests that the Rapanui make up 85% of the population of Rapa Nui, but that more than two-thirds of the Rapanui live not on the island but in mainland Chile. However, MRGI suggests that Minahan over-estimates the number of Rapanui esp. in mainland Chile (see above) and that the majority of the Rapanui live on Easter Island (Rapa Nui) while only “a few hundred live on mainland Chile and in Tahiti”. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for numerically significant ethnic kin. [no kin]

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## Mapuche

Activity: 1978-2020

**General notes**

* The Mapuche are the largest indigenous group in Chile but have very little political power. Increasing police violence against protests and other political activism under the anti-terrorist law has fuelled grievances. Levels of poverty and other social indicators such as life expectancy are lower than the rest of the country.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Mapuche People’s Liberation Organization was formed in 1978, hence the start date of the movement (Minahan, 1996, 2002). In other sources, that organization is referred to as Centros Culturales Mapuche, which was later renamed Adma Pu (Neira and Rodríguez, 2015: 600, Carter, 2010: 68). Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1975-99 indicate that the movement has been active from 1978 onward (also see Henao, 2012; Hewitt & Cheetham, 2000; Indigenous Peoples Issues and Resources; Marshall & Gurr, 2003; Minahan, 1996, 2002; MAR; Requejo & Nagel, 2011; States News Service, 2013; The Guardian, 2013; UNPO 2008).
* Under a 1993 law, Chile has gradually returned land to its indigenous peoples (The Economist, 2009). Protests and mobilization have continued in recent years, so we code the movement as ongoing (NY Times 8/11/2004; VOA 3/7/2005; IPS 1/28/2006; IPS 1/8/2007; IPS 1/3/2008; US State News 5/21/2009; IPS 2/11/2010; IPIR 5/29/2011; AP 10/16/2012; States News Services 10/29/2013; Simón and González Parra, 2022; Molina, 2020; Gaitán Barrera, 2014; González, 2020). Note: see Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 185) for a short overview of the claims and status of Mapuches in Chile. [start date: 1978; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* There are various Mapuche demands and a lack of agreement on the means to achieve these goals. According to Minorities at Risk, the most militant group (‘All Lands Council’), demands a completely autonomous Mapuche region in a “bi-national” Chile. According to Minahan (2002: 1184), the claim for an independent Mapuche territory was supported by most Mapuche organizations in the early 1990s, which was also illustrated by a 1991 threat of a secessionist uprising in case a total of 600,000 acres of land taken from the Mapuche since 1881 were not returned. Secessionist claims were also made earlier, when the Mapuche People’s Liberation Organization adopted a program aimed at eventual independence of Araucania in 1984 (Minahan, 2002: 1184). Minahan’s (2002) assessment runs counter the information provided by Minorities at Risk, where it is stated that most Mapuche seek “land reform and political autonomy.” Further evidence in this regard is provided by Hewitt and Cheetham (2000: 185) and a 1992 declaration in which Mapuche leaders “denied wanting to establish an independent state and reaffirmed their aims of cultural autonomy and territorial rights while remaining ‘obligatory’ Chilean citizens” (Minority Rights Group International). A Mapuche political party, Wallmapuwen, was registered in 2008 which seeks autonomy and to establish Wallmapuwen (Mapuche Land) with a regional executive and legislature within the structure of the Chilean state (Minority Rights Group International). Finally, there are also groups that do not demand autonomy but only demand “formal recognition of their language, traditions, and cultures, including bilingual education” (Minorities at Risk Project).
* Overall, the evidence is not fully clear regarding the dominant claim at different points in time. Based on the available evidence and following Minahan (2002) in particular, we code independence as the dominant claim after the Mapuche People’s Liberation Organization’s adoption of a program advocating secession in 1984. We retain the independence claim until the public statement by Mapuche leaders in 1992 suggesting a preference for internal autonomy. In all other years, we code a claim for increased autonomy, thus following MAR, MRGI, and other sources. [1978-1984: autonomy claim; 1985-1992: independence claim; 1993-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan (2002: 1184) suggests that the Mapuche made claims for independence during the 1980s and 1990s, starting with the 1984 program by the Mapuche People’s Liberation Organization which had advocated an independent Araucania. In 1992, Mapuche leaders publicly stated that they are not pursuing outright independence (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 185).
* According to Minahan (2016: 260), militant nationalists adopted a program for an independent Wallmapu in the 2010s. However, the party which made this claim suggests that the plan is for internal autonomy and not outright secession (MRGI). [start date: 1984; end date: 1992]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Despite the group’s clear political demands, we were unable to find a precise definition of the territory claimed by the group. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s settlement area according to GeoEPR, which offers the closest approximation in this case. This area also matches the Mapuche’s homeland territory as defined in Minahan (2002: 1180).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The MAR rebellion score for Chile’s indigenous peoples is 3 in 2001-2003. The MAR coding notes make clear that this has to be attributed to the Mapuches: “Mapuche indigenous groups continued to rebel violently against occupations of their land (REB01-03 = 3)”. However, qualitative evidence suggests that the number killed has remained in the single digits (IPS 2/12/2001; IHS Global Insight 1/31/2002; IPS 10/1/2003). We do not code LVIOLSD.
* Protests continued up until 2020, occasionally involving violence (NY Times 8/11/2004; VOA 3/7/2005; IPS 1/28/2006; IPS 1/8/2007; IPS 1/3/2008; US State News 5/21/2009; IPS 2/11/2010; IPIR 5/29/2011; AP 10/16/2012; States News Services 10/29/2013; Montes, 2013; Miroff, 2014; Simón and González Parra, 2022). Moreover, one-sided violence, state repression and targeted killings against Mapuches were frequent throughout this period (although note that indigenous violent retaliation is not uncommon) (Molina, 2020; Telesur, 2018a). However, we found no evidence that the 25-deaths threshold was met in any of those years. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Mapuche of central Chile and Argentina were never fully subjugated by Spanish colonisers who arrived and announced their claim to Chile in 1536 (Danver, 2015: 589). The Spanish Treaty of Quillin, 1614 established Mapuche sovereignty over 24 million acres of land, although conflict and invasion from the Spanish did continue (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000: 653) and Mapuche culture and language was significantly impacted.
* The establishment of the Chilean Republic in 1810 marked the end of formal Mapuche independence, and while the Argentine army invaded and took control of Mapuche lands in Argentina, in Chile, the Mapuche continued to resist until it took the entire Chilean national army defeated the Mapuches in 1881 (Minahan, 2002: 1183). They were moved into reservations and forced to assimilate into Chilean national culture, language and identity (Danver, 2015: 589)
* The first formal Mapuche organisation, the Caupolican Defender of the Araucania, was founded in 1910 (EPR Atlas: 382). This and other organisations emphasise the distinctiveness of the Mapuche vis-à-vis the national identity of Chile (EPR Atlas: 382). However, the continual sale of Mapuche land over the several decades and increase in population resulted in poverty, hunger and disease. Urban migration followed as Mapuche searched for work and livelihoods (Minahan, 2002: 1183)
* The left-wing government of Salvador Allende (1970 – 1973) offered concessions to the Mapuche in terms of land restitution. This process involved the acceleration of land reform policies initiated by Allende’s two predecessor governments. According to Richards (2013: 35), 163 properties, constituting 152,000 hectares of land, were restored to Mapuche communities between 1962 and 1973. The highest proportion of land restitution occurred between 1970 and 1973, hence the start date of this autonomy concession (MAR). [1970: autonomy concession]
  + Related to this: the Indigenous Law of 1972, also under Allende’s government, created the Institute of Indigenous Development, recognised the Mapuche as indigenous peoples, and promised further restoration of Mapuche lands (Richards, 2013: 36).
* General Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 coup and subsequent dictatorship saw the Mapuche lose almost all the lands they had regained during the 1960s and early 1970s, as well as face violence and persecution (Minority Rights Group International). This counter-reform period culminated in 1979 when Pinochet passed Decree 1568 that broke up Mapuche communities’ land into individual plots as part of neoliberal economic strategy, with many Mapuches losing their lands to non-indigenous buyers (Carter, 2010: 67). This counter-reform period meant that the Mapuche retained only 16% of the land they had reclaimed between 1962 and 1973 (Richards, 2013: 35). Cultural and linguistic rights were also severely restricted during this period, with their language not being allowed to be spoken in public, traditional customs banned, and education of their history and culture prohibited from being taught in schools (Minahan, 2002: 1184). This, like the above, was a process that lasted several years but began at the beginning of Pinochet’s rule, so is coded as beginning in 1973. [1973: cultural rights restriction; autonomy restriction]
* The Centros Culturalas Mapuche, an anti-dictatorship, Mapuche organisation whose ultimate objective of autonomy for their own people was formed in 1978. It was later renamed Adma Pu (Neira and Rodríguez, 2015: 600).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1993, the Chilean Government passed the Indigenous Law, designating the Mapuche as one of eight groups indigenous to Chile, recognising indigenous cultures and languages and providing some legal protections (Danver, 2015: 589, Cunningham, 2014: 205) This law also created the National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI), which became responsible for the protection of indigenous lands, although disillusionment with this institution was widespread due to its perceived powerlessness in the face of government policy, particularly concerning infrastructure construction on indigenous land (Carter, 2010: 71). Despite this, the institutions created by the Indigenous Law catalysed increased mobilisation of indigenous groups, including the Mapuche, and allowed organisations to gain funding for cultural initiatives (EPR Atlas 2021: 382, Perrier, 2006: 40). Due to its lack of substance in power over land and territory, this is coded as a cultural rights concession as this was where the law was most impactful in terms of recognition of the Mapuche. [1993: cultural rights concession]
* In 1993, the Chilean Government also repealed the land division law, Decree 2568, to end the breaking up of Mapuche communal lands that Pinochet had initiated (MRGI). At the same time, the government created the Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (National Corporation of Indigenous Development, CONADI). Minority Rights Group International reports that because of the creation of CONADI, “a significant amount of land has been returned to indigenous communities, particularly to the Mapuche”. [1993: autonomy concession]
  + The above developments were based on a pact, the Nuevo Imperial Agreement, between the coalition of leftist political parties and the indigenous organisation, Ad Mapu, that would also guarantee constitutional recognition. Until 2020, this recognition had not come to fruition (Carter, 2010: 71; MRGI).
* A bilingual education programme implemented in 1995, sponsored by UNICEF, was introduced to teach Mapuche children aged 2 to 5 years old their native language, custom and history (Minahan, 2002: 1185). [1995: cultural rights concession]
* In 1997, construction initiated for a hydroelectric plant in Alto Bío Bío, a swath of land inhabited and claimed by Mapuches. After Mapuche mobilization, CONADI ordered construction to halt on the grounds that the project did not meet the required environmental and social standards. As a result, President Eduardo Frei removed CONADI’s director and the environmental authorities opposing the project. Shortly after, construction restarted. The operations of the hydroelectric would eventually flood thousands of hectares claimed by Mapuches, including a number of sacred Mapuche sites, and hundreds of indigenous people were displaced from their territories (Vergara, 2013). We code a restriction in 1997, the year construction of the hydroelectric began. [1997: autonomy restriction]
* In 2009, President Bachelet approved legislation granting consultation rights to indigenous groups over a series of political reforms intended to meet indigenous demands. These consultation plans included Mapuches, who would be consulted on issues such as the constitutional recognition of indigenous people, and the creation of a Ministry of Indigenous Peoples and at least two representative councils for indigenous communities. There is evidence that Mapuches participated in at least five consultation processes that took place on some or all of these issues, but Tomaselli (2019: 119) claims that these consultations were “failures”, since they did not improve indigenous participation or representation and failed to meaningfully enhance the exercise of indigenous rights. We do not code a concession.
* According to Minority Rights Group International, “In November 2011, Mapuche protestors in the southern region of Araucanía once again clashed with Chilean police to demonstrate against plans to build an airport on Mapuche land. In January 2012, the Santiago Court of Appeals rejected the Mapuche claim and ruled that the airport project could go ahead. The decision was criticised for not adequately taking into account the consultation requirement of ILO Convention 169”. Pino (2014) confirms that the airport began operating in 2014 without the consent of the Mapuche communities who inhabit and claim the land where the airport was developed. We code a restriction in 2012, when the airport’s construction began. [2012: autonomy restriction]
* In June 2017, President Michelle Bachelet asked for forgiveness from the Mapuche for “errors and horrors” committed by the state. In her apology, Bachelet announced plans to give Mapuches more power and resources. Initially, she promised to draft a legislative project creating an Indigenous Peoples’ Ministry, and to dedicate resources to building roads, providing drinking water in remote Mapuche areas, as well as programs to more rapidly transfer land to Mapuches (De la Jara, 2017). In 2018, President Sebastián Piñera launched a plan that intended to implement some of his predecessor’s promises. Yet, as reported by Molina (2020), Piñera’s initiative quickly lost momentum and no meaningful steps were ultimately taken for implementation, so we do not code a concession.
* From 2017, the government of Sebastián Piñera strengthened the anti-terrorism law, increasingly securitizing the Arauncanía region where most Mapuches live. Military presence was scaled up significantly, which resulted in intensified violence against indigenous people in episodes such as Operación Huracán between 2017 and 2018, or the introduction of a ‘ley corta’ that allows for the use of highly intrusive investigative techniques (Telesur, 2018b; EPR Atlas: 386). According to a NACLA report of 2019, this novel counter-terrorism legislation has allowed human rights violations of the Mapuche to “reach new levels” (EPR Atlas: 386). Telesur (2018b) similarly reports that ever since 2017, increased repression in Mapuche territories has led to rights violations such as killings and arbitrary detentions. However, the securitization and militarization of certain Mapuche territories has also enabled land theft by large corporations, since the intensification in military operations and the subsequent clashes with indigenous authorities has caused the displacement of hundreds of Mapuches from the territories they inhabited (Telesur, 2018b; Cordero, 2021). In particular, the reformed counter-terrorism law criminalized Mapuche practices of land occupation (described by Mapuches as 'land recovery') as terrorist activity (Correa, 2017). The inclusion of land occupation within the law has permitted forced evictions to take place in territories claimed by Mapuches (even after years of being settled by indigenous people), further displacing populations and violating their territorial rights (Ibid). [2017: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* According to EPR, “The Mapuche as well as the other indigenous groups are not represented in the executive branches of government, neither on the national nor on the subnational level.” (EPR Atlas: 385) This corresponds with other sources where after 1993, very few gains have been made in terms of meaningful autonomy. Thus, while there have been some limited concessions in terms of land and cultural rights, these do not qualify the group for regional autonomy as defined in the codebook. [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Mapuche |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Mapuche |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 15502000 |

**Power access**

* We draw data on central state access from EPR. [1978-1990: discriminated; 1991-2018: powerless; 2019-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* We draw data on relative group size from EPR. [1978-2018: 0.075; 2019-2020: 0.099]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes the Mapuche as regionally concentrated whereas MAR, which applies a higher bar more similar to ours’, does not code a regional base. However, the latter code refers to all indigenous peoples and not just the Mapuches and the MAR coding notes explain that “while the majority of Mapuches live on reservations established by the government in the 1800s, approximately one-third live in urban areas.” According to Minahan (2002: 1180), approx. 85% of all Mapuche live in a contiguous area where they make up 76% of the local population. The area includes territories in Argentina, but the large majority of Mapuches live Chile. On this basis, we code regional concentration. ). [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are more than 100,000 Mapuche in Argentina according to Minahan (2002: 1180) as well as MRGI. ). [kin in adjoining country]

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