# CHINA

## Eastern Mongols

Activity: 1946

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Eastern Mongols refers to Mongols in the eastern regions of Inner Mongolia. Eastern Mongol leaders declared the Eastern Mongolian People’s Autonomous Government (SMHRIC 2013) on January 19, 1946. On May 26, 1946, the self-declared government was dissolved. Subsequently, the Eastern Mongols movement merged with the Southern Mongols movement to form the Southern Mongolian Joint Autonomous Movement (see Southern Mongols under China). We code the movement separately from the Southern Mongols because the Eastern Mongols made separate claims and were represented by separate organizations. We peg the start date of the Eastern Mongols movement to 1946, and we code as terminated in 1946 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 1996, 2002; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center 2013; Wikipedia). [start date: 1946; end date: 1946]

**Dominant claim**

* The independence declaration suggests an independence claim. Minahan (2002: 559) suggests that the aim was to create an independent Eastern Mongolia. [1946: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1946; end date: 1946]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Eastern Mongols consists of the northeastern districts of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and the northwestern part of the province of Jilin and Heilongjiang in the People's Republic of China (Minahan 1996: 159; Minahan 2002: 556). We code this claim based on this description, using the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In January 1946 Eastern Mongol leaders declared the independent People’s Republic of Eastern Mongolia (Minahan 2002: 559). [1946: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Eastern Mongols were involved in the civil war coded in Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). We could not find casualty estimates specific to the Eastern Mongols, though the account in Minahan (2002: 559) suggests involvement in the ongoing civil war. Clearly, the Eastern Mongols were minor players in the violence. Thus, 1946 is coded as LVIOLSD. We code this conflict as “ambiguous” since the civil war was primarily over control of the central government. [1946: LVIOLSD]
  + It is not fully clear whether the movement was violent from the start, but our best guess based on the available evidence is that there was no nonviolent claim-making prior to the start of the movement.

**Historical context**

* Eastern Mongolia was ruled directly by the Manchus government who led the Qing dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China. The Eastern Mongol princes announced their intention to secede in 1911 when Chinese Revolution attempted to overthrow the Manchus government (Minahan 2016: 137). China responded by revoking Eastern Mongolia’s autonomy at some point during the First World War. In 1928 there was another declaration of independence. In 1933 the Eastern Mongol homeland became part of Manchukuo, a Japanese puppet state. In 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and it officially occupied Manchukuo after Japan’s surrender in World War II. In August 1945, the National Government of the Republic of China and the Soviet signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. In 1946, Stalin ordered the Soviet and Mongol military units to withdraw (Minahan 2002: 558-559).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Minahan, in 1946 the Eastern Mongols tried to negotiate autonomy with both the Communists and the Nationalists, but they were rebuffed (Minahan 2002: 559). We do not code a concession or a restriction since the Eatern Mongols’ status remained unchanged.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

* It is not fully clear whether the entity proclaimed by the Eastern Mongols in 1946 constitutes a de facto state. But since the movement ended before the end of 1946 this question is irrelevant (due to the 1st of January rule we do not code de facto independence anyway).

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Eastern Mongols |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* EPR codes a Mongolian group, but this group is coded irrelevant in 1946. Yet it is clear that the Mongols were not included in the central executive. [1946: powerless]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 556) gives an estimate of 2.15 million Eastern Mongols in 2002. We cannot simply apply the 2002 estimate since the number of Mongols in China has increased significantly since 1946 (relatively speaking). Instead we use the 2002 ratio of Eastern Mongols to all Mongols in China and apply this rate to the EPR’s estimate of all Mongols in 1946:
* [0.0009]

**Regional concentration**

* From the sources we consulted it is clear that as of today, the Eastern Mongols form but a minority in their own homeland. The situation in 1946, the year this movement was active, is less clear, but it appears likely that the threshold to code the group as concentrated was met at the time.
  + According to Minahan (2002: 556), the Eastern Mongols are concentrated in eastern Inner Mongolia and the northwestern part of the province of Jilin. According to Minahan, the Eastern Mongols form but a minority in the region as of 2002 (24%). However, this estimate refers to the situation in 2002, while the movement was active in 1946. Minahan (2002: 560, 2016: 137) suggests that the Easern Mongols’ minority status within their homeland is a relatively recent development and due to Han immigration from the 1950s onwards. He does not give exact figures though.
  + Information provided by MRGI conforms with Minahan. MRGI suggests that Han migration has “long made the Mongols a minority in their own land.” Also in agreement with Minahan, MRGI furthermore notes that the Mongols’ minority status within their own land resulted from government policies from the beginning of the 20th century, which became large scale in the 1950s. MRGI gives some more detailed figures, which suggest that the Eastern Mongols crossed the threshold for territorial concentration in 1946: “In 1949, Mongols were probably 20 per cent of the population, though about 50 per cent in the eastern part of the region. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Mongols in Mongolia (see e.g. EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Hong Kongers

Activity: 2014-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Hong Kong was returned to the People’s Republic of China in 1997 as an autonomous state. In its early post-1997 era, the “one country, two systems” approach broadly worked, with Hong Kong enjoying relative freedom and economic prosperity (Roth 2015). Over the years, Bejing increasingly encroached into Hong Kong’s internal affairs. As a result, enthusiasm for the union with China waned and autonomy and pro-independence sentiment brewed (Minahan 2016).
* The first evidence for organized separatist activity we could find is in 2014 in the context of the Umbrella Revolution, a historic 79-day-long protest. The main purpose of the protests was opposition to China’s mingling and interventions in the election of the Hong Kong chief executive, but during and after the Umbrella Revolution, there were also claims made for increased autonomy from China and even outright independence (Kaeding 2019; Minahan 2016).
* It is important to note that there had been protests also before 2014, but these were targeted mainly against Beijing’s mingling with Hong Kong’s internal affairs and the aim was to retain Hong Kong’s existing status rather than gain increased autonomy. This includes protests against the proposed national security law in 2003 and assemblies against the government’s plan to carry out moral and national education that promotes the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese nationalist ideology (Yeung 2008). 2014 is therefore coded as the movement’s start date.
* On March 28, 2016, the Hong Kong National Party was formed, the first party to openly advocate independence (Kaeding 2019). It was banned by Hongkong’s authorities on September 24, 2018 (BBC 2018).
* In 2019, Hong Kongers began to protest against the proposed amendments to Hong Kong’s anti-extradition law. The protests were gradually silenced by the Covid-19 pandemic and a crackdown by Bejing. Key demands included universal suffrage for the election of the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive (Ngai 2020), which equates to an increase in Hong Kong’s autonomy. Beijing claimed that protesters’ demands included outright independence (Ngai 2020; The Guardian 2019); however, leaders of the protest movement clarified that they did not advocate independence (Think China 2019).
* Despite Bejing’s crackdown, the movement was ongoing as of 2020, yet the intensity has declined since the adoption of Hong Kong’s National Security Law in 2020. [start date: 2014; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Claims for both autonomy and outright independence have been made, but the leaders of the major protest movements have made clear that their goal is autonomy and not independence (Think China 2019). [2014-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Both claims for internal autonomy and outright independence were made starting in 2014 (Kaeding 2019). Yet, CFR (2022) notes that outright independence has always been a minority position. In 2018, the Hong Kong National Party (the main organization aiming for independence) was banned (BBC 2018). After that, organized claims for independence have been completely marginalized (Think China 2019). [start date: 2014; end date: 2018]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Hongkonger is an enclave surrounded by the South China Sea on China’s southeastern coast, including Kowloon, Hong Kong Island, and the New Territories, which form the HKSAR (Minahan 2016: 174; Roth 2015:346, 356). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist mobilization above the 25-deaths threshold. The two largest protests in 2014 and 2019 respectively led to zero and 15 deaths. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Hong Kong had been part of China since the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC). In 1839, at the end of the Qing dynasty, the United Kingdom waged the First and Second Opium War, defeated the Qing government, and occupied the island of Hong Kong. The Qing government was forced to cede Hong Kong in a series of treaties. According to these treaties, the UK gained a perpetual lease over Hong Kong. During the Second World War, Japan invaded China and occupied Hong Kong between 1941 to 1945. Subsequently, the UK continued to hold Hong Kong until 1997, when it was returned to China. According to the 1997 Basic Law, Hong Kong, became a special administrative region of China (HKSAR) with a high degree of autonomy (Hong Kong Government).
* Over the years, Bejing has attempted to Hong Kong’s autonomy. In 2003, Bejing proposed a national security law that would have prohibited treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Chinese government. The proposal was shelved after protests. In 2012, Bejing attempted to amend Hong Kong schools’ curricula to foster Chinese national identity. After protests, the proposal was postponed indefinitely (Council on Foreign Relations 2022).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2014, China attempted to intervene in the election of the Hong Kong chief executive. According to Bejing’s proposals, Hong Kongers would be able to vote for the city’s chief executive but only from a Beijing-approved short list of candidates. The proposal led to mass protests. The proposal was voted down by Hong Kong’s legislature in 2015 (Council on Foreign Relations 2022). However, after the 2014 protests, Bejing “became more directly involved in micro-managing HKSAR internal matters” (Fong 2020: 85). We therefore code a restriction, pegging it post-SDM emergence as the restriction occurred after the first protests. [2014: autonomy restriction]
* On June 30, 2020, Bejing adopted the Hong Kong National Security. Hong Kong’s autonomy was significantly restricted as a result (Lo 2021). Since then, authorities have arrested dozens of pro-democracy activists, lawmakers, and journalists; curbed voting rights; and limited freedoms of the press and speech (Council on Foreign Relations 2022). [2020: autonomy restriction]
* In 2021, Bejing made it easier for pro-Beijing candidates to be appointed as chief executive and as LegCo members. Beijing ruled that only “patriots” who “respect” the Chinese Communist Party can run in elections (Council on Foreign Relations 2022). This constitute an autonomy restriction, but we do not code 2021.

**Regional autonomy**

* Hongkong was granted a high degree of autonomy in 1997 and has retained a significant level of autonomy until the adoption of the National Security Law in 2020 and further restrictions imposed in 2021. In 2022, only a single, pro-Bejing candidate was allowed to run in the chief executive elections (Council on Foreign Relations 2022; Dieter 2020). Hong Kong continues to have a degree of of autonomy (Lam 2021, Yuen and Cheng 2020), but it is hard to see this as “meaningful”, given Bejing’s continued interferences. Therefore, we code an end to autonomy in 2020. This is reflected as a major change, but is not reflected in the regional autonomy variable because the latter captures the situation on January 1. [2014-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1997 the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China (HKSAR) was established, but this was before the SDM’s start date.
* [2020: autonomy revocation]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Hong Kongers |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Chinese (Han) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 71003000 |

**Power access**

* Bejing’s executive was led by Chinese mainlanders throughout the duration of this movement, including Xi Jinping (President) and Li Keqiang (Premier). [powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2016: 174), there were 7-8 million Hong Kongers in 2015 (we use 7.5 mio) . China’s population in 2015 according to the World Bank was 1.371 billion. [0.0055]

**Regional concentration**

* The population of Hong Kong is estimated to be around 7 million (World Bank), including 2.5-2.8 million immigrants (Statista). Therefore, Hong Kongers make up over 60% of the population in their land. There are around 500,000 Hong Kongers in mainland China, suggesting that a majority of the Hong Kongers lives in Hong Kong (Census and Statistics Department 2007). [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are > 100,000 Hong Kongers in the U.S., Canada, and the UK. Smaller communities can be found in Taiwan, Australia, and the Netherlands, among others (Wikipedia 2022). [kin in non-adjacent country]

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## Hui (Dungans)

Activity: 1953-1958

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Hui formed the Chinese Islamic Association in 1953 (China Islamic Association). According to Minahan (2002: 747-748), pressed by the attempted collectivization of the Ningsia Plateau and suppression of Muslim religious rights, Hui nationalists declared Ningsia independent of China on August 9, 1953, as the Chinese Islamic Republic. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1953.
* In 1957, pro-Kuomingtang Hui nationalists protested against the Communists’ rural socialization and they kept protesting until 1958, when the leaders of the protesters were captured or escaped outside mainland China (Goodman 2008: 66). In a bid to undermine Hui nationalists, the government reconstituted an autonomous Hui region in 1958. This appears to have ended the Hui self-determination movement. While the Hui have been politically active in the 1990s (i.e. have non-zero MAR protest scores), it does not appear that they have been campaigning for greater political autonomy ever since (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR 2009). Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1958. [start date: 1953; end date: 1958]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1953 Hui nationalists proclaimed an independent republic (see above). Furthermore, according to Minahan (2002: 747-748), in 1957 Hui nationalists demanded the “socialist self-determination preached by the communist leaders”, which appears to indicate contention for independence. [1953-1958: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1953; end date: 1958]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Hui is the Ningxia Plateau, south of the Alashan Desert (Minahan 2002: 747). We code this claim using data from the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In August 1953 the Chinese Islamic Association declared the Hui-populated districts south of the Alashan Desert independent of China as the Chinese Islamic Republic (Minahan 2002:747). [1953: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* While the above narrative from Minahan (1996: 395-397) indicates that the Hui separatists did engage in violence, neither MAR nor UCDP/PRIO include this violence in their list of armed conflicts. Neither were we able to find information regarding the number of people who died and in order to classify this violence as either LVIOLSD or HVIOLSD, we would need to have such information. Hence, for the moment we code 1953-58 as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Hui people first settled in the south of the Alashan Desert and established a separate state ruled by Hui sultans, which was only nominally under the rule of the Chinese Empire. However, when the Manchu rulers took over the Hui homeland in 1648, the Hui were not able to defend their land. Manchu rule was very repressive. The Hui were persecuted, many fled to other parts within China. By the 18th century the Hui were dispersed throughout China. Today, the largest part lives in Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region in the Northwest of China (Minahan 2002:744-746). In 1911, during the Chinese Revolution, the Hui Nationalists took advantage of the political situation and created an autonomous government in Ningsia, the heartland of the Hui. However, the independence did not last long. Troops loyal to the new republic took over shortly after (Minahan 2002:746). In the 1920s and 1930s the central government was weak due to the civil war. A separate Ningsia province was established in 1928, which gave the Hui some limited autonomy (Minahan 2002:747). Minahan (2002: 747) suggests that the Hui were granted increased autonomy in 1949, but this information could not be confirmed (see e.g. Encyclopedia Britannica).
* No concession or restriction in the ten years before movement onset was found.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1954 Ningsia was incorporated into the province of Gansu. However, at the same time autonomous Hui prefectures were established (Encyclopedia Britannica). Thus, it is not clear whether this constitutes a concession or a restriction.
* In 1958, the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia was established (Minahan 2002: 747; Encyclopedia Britannica). [1958: autonomy concession]
* The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) “abandoned the relatively conciliatory policy towards nationalities in favour of a more homogeneizing approach” (Edgar 2014: 533). There was assimilationist pressure with regard to language and severe repression of religious practices (Minahan 2002: 748; Bovingdon 2004: 19). [1958: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Autonomy might apply, but only from 1959 when the movement was no longer active.

**De facto independence**

* The Chinese Islamic Republic that was proclaimed in 1953 lasted for a single month, before it was retaken by the Communists (Minahan 2002:747). Hence, we do not code de facto independence.

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1958, the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningsia was established (Minahan 2002: 747; Encyclopedia Britannica). Note that it is possible that the Hui had enjoyed some autonomy already before 1958 (there were autonomous prefectures since 1954). [1958: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Hui (Dungans) |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Hui |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 71005000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1953-1958: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.0061]

**Regional concentration**

* MAR, but not EPR, code the Hui as dispersed. Minahan (2002: 744) suggests that only about a third of the Hui lives in the Hui region, where they in addition do not comprise a majority. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minorities at Risk and Minahan (2002: 744) suggest that the Hui have close kindred across a border. There are Huis in Kyrgyzstan and in Kazakhstan. None exceeds the 100,000 threshold (each roughly 40,000), however. [no kin]

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## Southern Mongols

Activity: 1945-1949; 1981-2006

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* A puppet Mongol state collapsed with the Japanese defeat in 1945. Southern Mongols (or Innter Mongols) then erected a provisional government and organized a referendum on unification with Mongolia. We peg the start date to 1945.
* In 1946, the Eastern Mongols movement merged with the Southern Mongols movement to form the Southern (Inner) Mongolian Joint Autonomous Movement (see above). We code a separate Eastern Mongol movement in 1946 because the Eastern Mongols made separate claims and were represented by separate organizations.
* The Chinese Communists, embroiled in the civil war, appealed to Joseph Stalin, who asserted his influence with the Mongolian government, effectively blocking Southern Mongol unification with Mongolia and forcing the withdrawal of the Mongol army from the region. The Chinese Communists moved into the region in 1947 and quickly suppressed the Southern Mongol self-determination movement. The movement appears not to have disappeared, however. Minority Rights Group International reports that there was another attempt to erect an independent Inner Mongol state in 1949. We found no evidence of further activity. It appears the movement was crushed, thus we code an end to it in 1949 (Han 2011; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 1996, 2002; MRGI). [start date 1: 1945; end date 1: 1949]
* Minahan (2002: 1783) reports that “nationalism reemerged during the violence and destruction and violence of the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1967” but that “strict censorhip kept details from reaching the West”. This is not coded as we lack conclusive evidence.
* The Southern Mongol self-determination movement appears to have resurfaced in the early 1980s. In Hohhot, the capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 3,000 students protested for increased autonomy in 1981 (Han 2011: 58, MRGI), hence we code 1981 as the second start date.
* In 1992, the Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance was established, which sought greater autonomous rights for ethnic Mongolians and promoted Mongolian language, history and culture. In December 1996, two Mongol activists belonging to this Alliance were sentenced to 10 and 15 years in prison for separatism. This act of repression provoked international outcry among human rights groups and brought the cause of the Southern Mongols to the world stage.
* We could not find any evidence for separatist mobilization in China itself after 1996 (cf. Roth 2015: 351), though there is overseas activity: the Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC), based in New York, and the Inner Mongolian People’s Party (IMPP) in Princeton, New Jersey. The SMHRIC fights for human rights concerns, but also has self-determination aims that include indigenous rights and cultural problems. Finally, it wishes to ultimately “establish a democratic political system in Southern Mongolia” (SMHRIC). The IMPP fights for the liberation of Inner Mongolia (Southern Mongolia) (Han 2011; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Inner Mongolian People’s Party ; Minahan 1996, 2002; MRGI; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center 2013).
* In 2020, the Inner Mongolian Autonomus Region announced the use of new Madarin textbooks. This measure triggered Mongol prostests regarding language rights (Radio Free Asia 2020). However, could not find any claims for territorial self-determination.
* We require domestic mobilization for inclusion in the dataset. Since we found no clear evidence regarding the movement’s end date, in line with the 10-years rule, we code an end to the movement ten years after the last evidence of separatist mobilization in 1996, i.e., in 2006 [start date 2: 1990; end date 2: 2006]

**Dominant claim**

* The Inner Mongols erected a provisional government and organized a refendum on unification with Mongolia (in 1945) (Minahan 2002: 1782). Minority Rights Group International reports that there was another attempt to erect an independent Inner Mongol state in 1949 and Hewitt & Cheetham (2000. 193) suggest that activity towards secession and unification with Mongolia continued in subsequent years. Thus, we code an irredentist claim throughout the first period of activity. [1945-1949: irredentist claim]
* Evidence on the exact claim is scarce for the second period, but autonomy appears to be dominant. Han (2011: 58) reports that there were protests for increased autonomy in 1981. In 1992 the Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance was established,which seeks greater autonomous rights for ethnic Mongolians and promotes Mongolian language, history and culture. Minahan (2002: 1784) also reports a claim for increased autonomy. [1981-2006: autonomy claim]
  + Note: there is also agitation for unification with Mongolia. According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 193), an organization established in Japan called the Southern Mongolian Freedom and Democracy Movement Foundation demanded the unification of the two Mongolias. As argued above, the autonomy claim appears to be dominant.

**Independence claims**

* MRGI suggests that there was an attempt to erect an independent Inner Mongol state in 1949.
* We found no evidence for a politically significant independence claim after 1949 (cf. Han 2011). Minahan (2002: 1784) reports that organizations located abroad have made claims for outright independence but, as a general rule, we do not consider claims by expatriate groups. [start date: 1949; end date: 1949]

**Irredentist claims**

* The movement’s goal in the initial years was a merger with Mongolia (see above). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 193) suggest that there were irredentist claims also after that; however, the onlyl organization mentioned is based in Japan. We do not, as a general rule, consider claims by expatriate groups. [start date: 1945; end date: 1949]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Southern Mongolians consists of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China (Minahan 1996: 527). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* There was an irredentist referendum in 1945. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 193) note a “Declaration of Inner Mongolian Liberation” issued in 1945. [1945: irredentist declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Southern Mongols were involved in the civil war coded in Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). We could not find casualty estimates specific to the Southern Mongols, but the above narrative suggests the Communists moved into the area in 1947 and crushed the movement. We code 1945-1946 as NVIOLSD and 1947 as LVIOLSD. We do not code HVIOLSD even if Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war because it is not clear whether casualties are sufficient to warrant a HVIOLSD code (the civil war coded in SSW2019 includes other conflicts too). This case would profit from more research. We apply an “ambiguous” coding since the civil war was primarily over control of the central government. 1948-1949 is coded with NVIOLSD. [1945-1946: NVIOLSD; 1947: LVIOLSD; 1948-1949: NVIOLSD]
* No violence stemming from either group was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding from 1981 onward. [1981-2006: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + Northern (or Outer) Mongolia declared independence from China in 1912 (Minahan 2002: 1781). In 1915, the Russian and Chinese governments forced several Mongol leaders to sign the Kiakhta Agreement, which effectively divided historical Mongolia between Russia and China. The Eastern Mongols invoked a Manchu decree from the 17th century and informed the Chinese government of their intention to secede. The Chinese government responded with brutal reprisals (Minahan 2002: 1781-1782).
  + The Japanese (who occupied the neighbouring Manchukuo, a Japanese puppet state) tried to use Mongol nationalism against China in the early 1930s. China responded by granting autonomy to Inner Mongolia in 1933. The Japanese took control of Eastern Mongolia. In the context of chaotic conditions, the Southern Mongols declared their independence in 1935 (Minority Rights Group International). In January 1938, the Japanese took control of the region and erected a puppet state. The Mongol puppet state collapsed with the Japanese defeat in 1945 (Minahan 2002: 1282).
* 2nd phase:
  + In the 1950s Inner Mongolia was successively expanded to include more Mongol territories. It reached its climax in 1956 (Encyclopedia Britannica). The expansion started in 1950 (Qinggeltu 2003).
  + The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) “abandoned the relatively conciliatory policy towards nationalities in favor of a more homogenizing approach” (Edgar 2014: 533). There was assimilationist pressure with regard to language and severe repression of religious practices (Minahan 2002: 748, 1959; Bovingdon 2004: 19; Minority Rights Group International). Note that Minahan (2002: 1783) pegs the restriction at 1957 rather than 1958 and so do Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 193) who note that China began to restrict the use of Mongolian in public schools in 1957.
  + There was significant repression against ethnic minorities during the the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The situation for China’s ethnic minorities improved gradually after Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 (Edgar 2004: 533; also see Minahan 2002: 748; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 193). The autonomous regions’ powers were restored. In particular, the 1978 constitution restored some of the powers the autonomous regions had lost during the Cultural Revolution (Sautmann 1999: 288). But legal revisions have followed policy changes rather than vice versa (Bovingdon 2004: 17). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 1976 to coincide with the end of the Cultural Revolution. [1976: autonomy concession]
  + Furthermore, we code an autonomy concession in 1979. In the 1950s Inner Mongolia was successively expanded to include more Mongol territories. During the Cultural Revolution, Bejing reversed its previous policy and split off territories mainly in Inner Mongolia’s east and west. In 1979 the territories were restored to Inner Mongolia (Encyclopedia Britannica; Minahan 2002: 560, 2016: 137). [1979: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The revocation of de-facto independence in 1947 is not coded as China never granted de-facto independence.
* In 1947, the Inner Mongolian Autonomus Region was established (Encyclopedia Britannica; Minahan 2002: 1783). Note: this concession must have occurred after the Communists’ invasion in 1947 and, therefore, after the onset of separatist violence we code in 1947. [1947: autonomy concession]
  + Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 193), in contrast, state that the autonomous region was established in 1949.
* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 193) note that in 1949, a policy of Sinization began, in part by encouraging the migration of ethnic Han into the area. We do not code a restriction because this statement is rather ambiguous. Sinization was much more acute under the Great Leap forward and the Cultural Revolution, and we also note restrictions in this context (see above).
* In the 1980s, the scope of the autonomous regions’ autonomy was increased. The 1982 constitution reinstated all (or most of) the rights of autonomous provinces that were abolished during the Cultural Revolution (Carlson 2004: 18). The 1984 Regional Autonomy substantiated the autonomy rights. According to Minority Rights Group International, the law increased autonomy mainly in education and culture and other “soft” issues (see Sautmann 1999: 293). Based on this, we code an autonomy concession in 1982 to coincide with the constitution. [1982: autonomy concession]
* In 1990, Han became the mandatory language of primary and secondary schools (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 193). [1990: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2000, the Chinese government instituted regulations intended to “manage religion and guide it in being subordinate to the central task of economic construction, the unification of the motherland, and the objective of national unity”, leading to policies prohibiting religious education and limiting religious ceremonies (Chido 2008). Many Southern Mongols adhere to Mahayana Buddhism, also called Tibetan Lamaism (Minahan 2002: 1780). [2000: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2001 the 1984 regional autonomy law was revised, though little changed (Smith 2004: 14).

Relevant events after the end of the movement:

* In 2018, the amendment of Religious Affairs Regulations came into effect, which aimed to significantly increase official oversight over religion under the mainstream voice of anti-terrorism and anti-separatism (Cao 2018; Lavička 2021). The law included more restrictive policies on religious matters such as religious assets, publishing of religious material and provision of information services.
* In 2020, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region announced the use of new Mandarin textbooks in primary and secondary schools. The autonomous government and the central government suggest that this measure does not restrict Mongolian language teaching (Baotou China 2020). The measure triggered Mongol protests related to language rights (BBC 2020; RFA 2020).

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1945 a de-facto independent state was erected, thus we code regional autonomy in 1946 and 1947. In 1947 the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was established (see above). [1946-1949: regional autonomy]
* Autonomy was abolished during the Cultural Revolution but re-instated after the Cultural Revolution. However, the actual extent of autonomy enjoyed by ethnic minorities in China is questionable. Many are skeptical about autonomy solutions in China (e.g. Ghai 2000). According to Minority Rights Group International the 1980s autonomy increase was mostly theoretical (also see Bovingdon 2004, in particular page 293). We do not code regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

* In 1945 the Southern Mongols erected a provisional government with the intention to join it to Mongolia (they also organized a referendum). Given the civil war the center appears to have had no influence in Inner Mongolia. However, Stalin managed to block the unification. Still the provisional government appears to have lasted until 1947 when the Communists came in. Thus, we code de-facto independence in 1946 and 1947 (1st of January rule). [1946-1947: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* There was a puppet state controlled by the Japanese until 1945. One could code a host change in 1945, but we do not code one because Japan’s sovereignty over the territory was not recognized.
* In 1945 the Southern Mongols erected a provisional government with the intention of joining it to Mongolia (they also organized a referendum). Given the civil war the center appears to have had no influence in Inner Mongolia. However, Stalin managed to block the unification. Still the provisional government appears to have lasted until 1947 when the Communists came in. Thus, we code the establishment of a de-facto independent state in 1945. [1945: establishment of de-facto independent state]
* [1947: abolishment of de-facto independent state]
* In 1947 the Inner Mongolian Autonomus Region was established (Encyclopedia Britannica; Minahan 2002: 1783). [1947: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Southern Mongols |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Mongolians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 71009000 |

**Power access**

* The Mongolians are not covered by EPR before 1950. We found no evidence to suggest that the Southern Mongols were included in the center’s executive between 1945-1949. For the remaining period, we draw on EPR. [1945-1949, 1981-20063: powerless]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR and use the 1950 group size estimate for 1945-1949. [1945-1949: 0.0025; 1981-1982: 0.0028: 1983-1990: 0.0034: 1991-2000: 0.0042; 2001-2006: 0.0046]

**Regional concentration**

* We consulted three sources: Minahan, MRGI, and census results. These sources suggest that while the majority of the Southern Mongols lives in their homeland (Inner Mongolia), the Southern Mongols’ population share has decreased substantially since 1945 due to Han in-migration. On the basis of these sources, it appears clear that the Southern Mongols do not cross the threshold in the second period of activity (1981 onwards). According to Minahan, the Mongols form but 20% of Inner Mongolia as of 2002, and according to the 2020 census the figure is 18%. MRGI suggests that Han migration has long “made the Mongols a minority in their own land.”
* 1945-1949 is less clear.
  + According to MRGI, the Mongols’ minority status within their own land resulted from government policies from the beginning of the 20th century, which became large scale in the 1950s. The figures provided by MRGI make it likely that the group concentration threshold was not met in at least some of 1945-1949: According to MRGI, the Mongols made up only 20% of Inner Mongolia’s population in 1949, though they probably made up about 50% in the eastern provinces. Since the Mongols in the eastern parts of Inner Mongolia do not form a majority of all Southern Mongols (see under “Eastern Mongols” ), MRGI would suggest that the spatial concentration threshold was not met.
  + Minahan (2002: 1782), on the other hand, would suggest that the threshold is met. According to Minahan, in 1947 only 14% of the local population was Han Chinese, though by 1951 the Southern Mongols were outnumbered two to one, and their share continued to fall in the following years. Minhan’s figures are incompatible with MRGI since it is very unlikely that the Hans’ share increased from 14% to approx. 80% within but two years. We do not follow Minahan in this case as the figures he provides appear to be wrong. According to Banister (2001: 276), for example, it is the Mongols that made up 14% of Inner Mongolia’s population in 1947, and not the Hans’.
* [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Mongols in Mongolia (see EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Tibetans

Activity: 1945-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The start of the current phase of activity can be pegged to the early 20th century. The British dispatched forces to occupy Tibet in 1903-1904 and opened the area to trade by signing a treaty *Convention of Lhasa* with the Tibetan government. China objected to this and therefore, in 1906, the British negotiated with China and signed a follow-up treaty without Tibetan participation that recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. In 1910 China sent forces to enforce treaties. The Dalai Lama and many followers fled to British India. The overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911 seriously weakened Chinese control of Tibet. The Dalai Lama returned from exile in 1912 to declare Tibet’s independence (Wiki; Minahan 2002: 1892; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 293-294), thus the start date. We found no clear evidence for nonviolent separatism prior to 1912, but this would profit from more in-depth research.
* COW codes two incidents of war with Tibet in the period, one in 1912-1913 and the other one in 1918. Minahan (2002: 1892) in addition reports a brief border war in 1930-1931 that ended in loss of territory to China; Minahan does not report casualty estimates, but his account is rather detailed and appears correct, as he correctly reports both the 1912-1913 and 1918 incidents. In the rest of the 1930s and 1940s, China, weakened by its civil war, left Tibet in relative peace (Minahan 2002: 1892). Based on this, we code from 1945 but note prior activity. There was separatist violence in 1912-1913, 1918, and 1930-1931, but not immediately before 1945, thus we indicate prior non-violent activity.
* In 1950 China invaded Tibet. In 1951, the Communists signed an agreement, the 17-Point Agreement for the Liberation of Tibet, with the Dalai Lama, which put Tibet formally under the jurisdiction of China. After that, there was relative peace for the next few years. The Dalai Lama was allowed to remain as the head of the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama went as far as to declare in 1955 that the Chinese communists, since that they could be of great help to backward Tibet, ought to be welcomed, provided that they respect the Tibetan people’s own culture, honor the wishes of the Tibetan people and do not obstruct or do damage to the high principles of the Tibetan nation.
* Chinese attempts to transform Tibet into an atheist and socialist region of China and increasing migration of Han Chinese to Tibet led to discontent. In February 1956, major revolts broke out in various places in the Kham and Ambo regions of eastern Tibet. Though somewhat coordinated, the Tibetan fighters were not organized into a cohesive army, but rather led by local chieftains. Throughout 1957 and 1958 the revolt spread westward, gradually approaching the capital. The capital, Lhasa, fell to the Chinese in March 1959. While some rebels continued to fight in the mountains, the fall of Lhasa was the end of the conflict.
* The main target of the rebellion was the Chinese army, who retaliated with large-scale massacres, brutal tortures and the systematic burning of monasteries. Throughout 1957 and 1958 the revolt spread westward, gradually approaching the capital. The capital, Lhasa, fell to the Chinese in March 1959. While some rebels continued to fight in the mountains, the fall of Lhasa was the end of the conflict. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama and other Tibetan principals went into exile in India, where the Dalai Lama set up a government-in-exile (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2002; MAR; Patterson 1960)
* Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1970-2006 indicate an ongoing movement. Protests continued after 2006 (e.g., Free Tibet; MRGI; VOA). Roth (2015: 352) suggests that the movement has remained active as well (also see: Wikipedia; SCIO 2009). [start date: 1912; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Tibetans’ claim has unambiguously been for independence until the late 1980s (see e.g. Minahan 2002). [1945-1988: independence claim]
* In 1988 the Dalai Lama renounced the claim for independence and instead began to advocate full internal autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). At the same time, several groups continue to make claims for independence. But since the Dalai Lama is the most authorative representation of the self-determination movement, we code autonomy as the dominant claim from 1989 onwards. [1989-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The dominant claim was for independence until 1988. Several groups continued to make claims for independence after that (see e.g. Griffiths 2015). [start date: 1912; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Tibetans includes Inner Tibet (also called the Xizang Autonomous Region of China) but claims are also made for “Greater Tibet”, which additionally incorporates China’s provinces Qinghai and the western districts of the Sichuan provinces (Minahan 1996: 556). We code this claim based on the map shown in Roth (2015: 346).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Tibet declared independence in 1912 or 1913 but this is out-of-sample.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD code in 1950-1951 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). [1945-1949: NVIOLSD; 1950-1951: HVIOLSD; 1952-1955: NVIOLSD]
* Following Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) we code 1956-1959 as HVIOLSD.
* Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) suggest continued violence in 1960-67 (this is in line with MAR, where the quinquennial rebellion score is >=3 (out of 7) from 1960-1969). We were not able to find any suggestions for a substantial insurgency and casualties after 1959 in qualitative sources, however (e.g., University of Central Arkansas n.d.). We do not code LVIOLSD in 1960-1967. [1956-1959: HVIOLSD; 1960-1967: NVIOLSD]
* We found reports of violence in 2008 onward:
  + In 2008, Tibetan protests led to a total of 19 casualties (according to government sources) or more than 200 (according to Tibet’s government-in-exile). UCDP/PRIO and other sources (e.g., HRW 2010) treat this as one-sided violence committed by the Chinese state against protesters, so we do not code LVIOLSD.
  + According to MRGI: “During the period February 2009 to August 2017, some 150 Tibetans have self-immolated in protest of ongoing rights violations and marginalization.” By 2022, the number of self-immlations had increased to 159 (Campaign for Tibet). MRGI explains that “Many report the violent crackdown on Tibetans in 2008 and subsequent Chinese policies as the reason for their self-immolation, such as Lobsang Palden who self-immolated in 2014 in Ngaba county on ‘Martyrs’ Street,’ renamed for its frequent self-immolations. Many have called out their support for the Dalai Lama or for the release of the Panchen Lama, who was disappeared in May 1995.” As we found no evidence of reciprocated violence leading to 25+ casualties in a calendar year, we do not code LVIOLSD. [1968-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Tibet has a varied history; at times it was independent and at times under Chinese and/or British rule (or influence).
  + During the Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Tibet was ruled as an independent kingdom and kept a tribute relationship with China, including the exchange of official titles and special treatments and significant economic contacts (Powers 2004: 56-60).
  + After Ming, in the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), Tibet was highly influenced by the Qing government. In 1642, Gushi Khan, who conquered Central Tibet, gave the rights of ruling Tibet to the Fifth Dalai Lama (Petech 2013). Nominal Chinese rule over Tibet was established in the 18th century.
  + In 1906, the British signed a treaty with China without Tibetan participation that recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.
  + In 1910, the Qing government sent forces to enforce this claim in 1910 – the Dalai Lama and many followers fled to British India.
* Tibetan soldiers eventually succeeded in driving the Chinese from Tibet. The thirteenth Dalai Lama returned to Tibet and declared it independent in 1912 or 1913 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 293-294). A brief border war in 1930-31 ended in additional loss of territory to China (thus we code a prior restriction). We have not identified a concession or restriction in the ten years before movement onset.
* Note: it is questionable whether Tibet could be considered an independent state at the time (this is a matter of significant contention with the Tibetans claiming they were independent and the Chinese that Tibet was not). Gleditsch & Ward (1999) list Tibet as an independent country from 1913-1950, but Tibet had very limited international recognition. The UK recognized Tibet as an autonomous entity under Chinese suzerainity. Chinese influence over Tibet was however very limited. Thus, Goldstein (1998) describes Tibet as de-facto independent.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In October 1950 China invaded eastern Tibet. This ended Tibet’s (de facto) independence. An appeal to the UN was denied. In 1951 the Chinese forced the Dalai Lama to sign an annexation treaty (Minahan 2002: 1891-1892). The 17-Point Agreement for the Liberation of Tibet put Tibet formally under the jurisdiction of China while guaranteeing the Dalai Lama the right to continue administering Tibet and hence a certain degree of autonomy (Goldstein 1998: 85; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 294). But Tibet’s autonomy clearly became more limited, and some parts of Tibet were incorporated into neighbouring Chinese provinces. Note: this restriction was followed by an outbreak of separatist violence. [1950: autonomy restriction]
* According to Minahan (2002: 1892), Mao launched a massive migration campaign in 1954 with the intention that Han Chinese would outnumber the Tibetans by 5:1. In line with the codebook, such relocation policies are not coded.
* The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) “abandoned the relatively conciliatory policy towards nationalities in favour of a more homogenizing approach” (Edgar 2014: 533). There was assimilationist pressure with regard to language and severe repression of religious practices (Minahan 2002: 748, 1959; Bovingdon 2004: 19; Minority Rights Group International). [1958: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1959 the 14th Dalai Lama was driven into exile (Minahan 2002: 1893; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 295). The monastic system was dismantled, feudalism and serfdom abolished and communes instituted in monastic and pastoral areas (Goldstein 1998: 86). This ended much of the autonomy Tibet had previously enjoyed. [1959: autonomy restriction]
  + The dalai lama was driven into exile in March 1959 and, therefore, at the very tail end of the 1956-1959 war (i.e., before war termination).
* The end of the Great Leap Forward in 1961 led to more relaxed policies again. [1961: cultural rights concession]
* In 1965 the Tibet Autonomous Region was formed, which formally ended Tibetan self-rule and made Tibet an autonomous Chinese province. Tibet’s autonomy appears unchanged relative to 1959 (see above).
* In 1966 the Cultural Revolution began, a period of extreme assimilation pressure with intensified persecution of religion and campaigns to eradicate traditional cultures. All religious activities were prohibited (Bajoria 2008) and most of Tibet’s monasteries were destroyed (Minorities at Risk Project). The Cultural Revolution also meant the loss of much of the autonomy of ethnic minorities, as signified for instance by the 1975 constitution (Sautmann 1999: 288). [1966: cultural rights restriction, autonomy restriction]
* The situation for China’s ethnic minorities improved gradually after Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 (Edgar 2004: 533; also see Minahan 2002: 748). The autonomous regions’ powers were restored. In particular, the 1978 constitution restored some of the powers the autonomous regions had lost during the Cultural Revolution (Sautmann 1999: 288). But legal revisions have followed policy changes rather than vice versa (Bovingdon 2004: 17). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 1976 to coincide with the end of the Cultural Revolution. [1976: autonomy concession]
* In the 1980s, the scope of the autonomous regions’ autonomy was increased (Tibet enjoyed the status of an autonomous region since 1965). The 1982 constitution reinstated all (or most of) the rights of autonomous provinces that were abolished during the Cultural Revolution (Carlson 2004: 18). The 1984 Regional Autonomy substantiated the autonomy rights. According to Minority Rights Group International, the law increased autonomy mainly in education and culture and other “soft” issues (see Sautmann 1999: 293). Based on this, we code an autonomy concession in 1982 to coincide with the constitution. [1982: autonomy concession]
* In the late 1980s Bejing imposed martial law in Tibet (Carlson 2004: 24); this is not coded in line with the codebook.
* Despite some improvements, the Tibetans have remained severely repressed. The number of Tibetans employed by the local authorities is gradually decreasing. Official bilingualism appears not enforced. In sum, there appear to be many instances of restrictions. The evidence about specific events is scarce, however. We have found sufficient evidence for three post-Cultural Revolution events that can be coded as cultural rights restriction. In 1994 the “Tibetans began resisting against a new series of restrictions on the practice of cultural and religious life. Restrictions included the display of photographs of the Dalai Lama except inside temples, limitation of the numbers of monks in each temple, elimination of the Tibetan tradition of polyandry, banning of Tibetan language schools and the use of Tibetan language in postsecondary institutions, and others.” Moreover, “[i]n 1994 Beijing also controversially handpicked Urgyen Trinley as the successor of the Dalai Lama” (Minorities at Risk Project). [1994: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2000, the Chinese government instituted regulations intended to “manage religion and guide it in being subordinate to the central task of economic construction, the unification of the motherland, and the objective of national unity”, leading to policies prohibiting religious education and limiting religious ceremonies (Chido 2008). [2000: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2001 the 1984 regional autonomy law was revised. However, little changed (Smith 2004: 14).
* In 2004, the Chinese government promulgated new stringent national religious regulations, effective March 1, 2005. According to a 2005 Human Rights Watch Report, “the government's unstated aims are twofold: to make it more difficult than ever for a religious body or a church, mosque, temple, monastery, or congregation to exist without State approval; and to solidify oversight of the personnel, finances, and activities of every approved religious body or site.” [2004: cultural rights restriction]
* A further significant event appears to be the imposition of a Mandarin language exam as a prerequisite for state employment in 2006. Many Tibetans do not speak Mandarin, thus effectively excluding them from state employment. Furthermore, Tibetan appears to have been replaced with Mandarin as the language of instruction in secondary and tertiary education in recent years (Minority Rights Group International). [2006: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2012, travel restrictions were imposed on Tibetans that have led to a near-complete restriction on the freedom of movement, especially for foreign travel (MRGI). As MRGI explains: “Such restrictions discriminate against Tibetans and directly target their religious and cultural rights, in denying their ability to legally participate in important Buddhist observances in India.” [2012: cultural rights restriction]
* The U.S. State Department (2022) reports that a campaign was initiated in 2016 “to evict monks and nuns from monasteries and to prohibit them from practicing elsewhere”. The campaign was ongoing by 2021. [2016: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2018, the amendment of Religious Affairs Regulations came into effect, which aimed to significantly increase official oversight over religion under the mainstream voice of anti-terrorism and anti-separatism (Cao 2018; Lavička 2021). The law included more restrictive policies on religious matters such as religious assets, publishing of religious material and provision of information services. Furthermore, in the same year, some district departments released a ban on illegal Tibetan preaching (Human Rights Watch 2019). [2018: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Until October 1950 Tibet was de facto independent. Tibet retained some autonomy until 1959 (see above). [1945-1959: regional autonomy]
* Autonomy was re-established after the Cultural Revolution; however, many are skeptical about autonomy solutions in China (e.g. Ghai 2000). According to Minority Rights Group International the 1980s autonomy increase was mostly theoretical (also see Bovingdon 2004, in particular page 293). We do not code autonomy.

**De facto independence**

* Whether Tibet can be considered an independent state prior to China’s 1950 invasion is controversial. Given Tibet’s limited recognition as an independent state we consider Tibet a de-facto independent state until 1950, when de facto independence was abolished by way of China’s invasion. [1945-1950: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Whether Tibet can be considered an independent state prior to China’s 1950 invasion is controversial. Given Tibet’s limited recognition as an independent state we consider Tibet a de-facto independent state until 1950, when de facto independence was abolished by way of China’s invasion. [1950: abolishment of de-facto independent state, establishment of regional autonomy]
* Initially Tibet enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. In 1959 Tibet’s autonomy was significantly decreased and the Dalai Lama exiled. [1959: abolishment of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tibetans |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Tibetans |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 71010000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1945-1966: powerless; 1967-1976: discriminated; 1977-2000: powerless; 2001-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR. [1945-1964: 0.0048; 1965-1982: 0.0036: 1983-1990: 0.0038: 1991-2000: 0.0041; 2001-2010: 0.0043: 2011-2020: 0.0047]

**Regional concentration**

* Most Tibetans reside in today’s autonomous Tibet region, formerly Outer Tibet, and adjacent Chinese provinces, formerly Inner Tibet. The Tibetans make up the majority of the autonomous region, but according to Minahan (2002: 1889), only about 30% of the Tibetans live there. As regards the other regions (Inner Tibet), Minahan notes that Han Chinese outnumbered Tibetans in all regions except for the autonomous region by the early 1980s. This suggests that since the early 1980s the Tibetans can no longer be considered concentrated. [1940-1979: regionally concentrated; 1980-2020: not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there are numerically significant Tibetan kin groups in Bhutan (Bhutanese and Ngalops (Drupka)). MAR V also provides evidence of “close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base“ without listing the countries these groups live in. Minahan (2002: 1889) mentions large kin groups in India (approximately 150,000 – this population is the result of emigration after the Dalai Lama’s emigration to India in 1959) and further communities in Nepal, the United States, Europe and Canada. Finally, the Buddhist Ladakhis, mainly in India (see the respective movement) have Tibetan origin and retain close ethnic ties to the Tibetans (Minahan 2002: 1063). [1945-2020: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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## Uyghurs

Activity: 1945-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Uyghur homeland came under Chinese control in 1759, followed by repression of Uyghur culture, in particular religion (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 1961). The Uyghurs repeatedly revolted against Chinese rule (42 times between 1759 and 1862 according to Minahan 2002: 1960). COW, for instance, notes a rebellion from 1864-1871; in 1876 the Chinese government sent an army of 100,000, and the Uyghur uprising was suppressed by 1877 (Sarkees & Wayman 2010).
* In 1911 the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, and the Chinese Republic was installed. In subsequent years, the central government’s hold on the Uyghurs was relatively weak. According to Minahan (2002: 1961) the Uyghurs took advantage of China’s weak hold and launched a rebellion, initiating several decades of instability. However, we found no evidence of organized mobilization with separatist goals until the early 1930s: In 1933, the independent Islamic Republic of East Turkestan in was declared. We found no clear evidence for prior nonviolent activity, but the evidence is limited. China was able to retake the region only shortly thereafter, in 1934 (Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 310). In line with this narrative, COW notes a civil war over Xinjiang from 1931-1934. The revolt was suppressed in 1934, but activity appears not to have ended as a new revolt began in the years of 1936-1937 (Minahan 2002: 1961).
* In 1944, the Uyghurs established a de facto independent East Turkestan. Based on this, we code the movement from 1945, the earliest possible date. There appears to have been more or less continuous activity since 1931, thus the start date. Prior to the start of the dataset, the Uyghurs launched the Ili Rebellion in 1944 to fight for independence. Thus we note prior violent activity. Moreover there were rebellions in 1931-1934 and 1936-1937, and in previous years too (see above).
* Uyghur rebels declared the independence of the Republic of East Turkestan on January 31, 1945. The unilaterally declared East Turkestan was dissolved in 1949, after negotiations with the Chinese government. After reintegration in 1949, Uyghur leaders continued to press for far-reaching autonomy until 1954 (Bovingdon 2004: 12).
* After 1954, there was little or no separatist activity until the late 1950s/early 1960s, when the Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. The Soviet Union began to incite separatism in Xinjiang through propaganda. The Soviet Union also encouraged and may have even financed Kazakhstan-based ethnic guerillas to raid Xinjiang’s frontier posts (Sichor 2004: 139). In 1967 or 1968, the East Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party was founded, a clandestine group advocating an independent Uighur state that was presumably supported by the Soviets (Dillon 2004: 57-58). In the 1970s, another organization was formed, the Uyghur Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan, again most likely with Soviet assistance (Reed & Raschke 2010: 37).
* The movement is ongoing (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2005; Minahan 2016: 441; Raschke 2010; Roth 2015: 348; The Guardian 2013). [start date: 1931; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim is not fully clear, given the movement’s factionalization (Minahan 2002: 1963). In 1944, a de-facto independent East Turkestan state was erected, and there was an independence declaration in 1945 (see above). The independent Turkestan republic, was disbanded in 1949. According to Bovingdon (2004: 12), Uyghur leaders began to press for far-reaching autonomy. Based on this, we code an independence claim for 1945-1949 and an autonomy claim in 1950-1967.
* In 1967 or 1968, the East Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party was founded, a clandestine group advocating an independent Uighur state that was presumably supported by the Soviets. According to Chinese scholars, the Revolutionary Party was one of the most important Uyghur organizations (Dillon 2004: 57-58). There appear to have been significant organizations (many of which exile organizations) calling for outright independence ever since (Chung 2002; Hyer 2006; Reed & Raschke 2010: 37), though claims for autonomy have also been made (Human Rights Watch 2005; MAR). It is not clear which claim is dominant, so we code the more radical claim from 1968 onwards. [1945-1949: independence claim; 1950-1967: autonomy claim; 1968-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date 1: 1945; end date 1: 1949; start date 2: 1968; end date 2: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* In 1944, the Uyghurs, with the support of the Soviet Union, established the East Turkestan Republic. The East Turkestan Republic remained de-facto independent until 1949, when the communist People’s Liberation Army took over Xinjiang (Minahan 2002: 1961; MAR). The East Turkestan Republic is markedly smaller than the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which was established in 1955. According to Roth (2015: 349f), the Uyghurs’ claims are focused on the latter, larger territory. We code the Xinjiang Autonomous Region as the dominant claim using map material from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In January 1945 the Uyghurs declared the independence of the Republic of East Turkestan (Minahan 2002: 1961). [1945: independence declaration]
* In 2004, the East Turkestan government-in-exile declared independence (East Turkistan Government in Exile). We do not code this because it is a declaration issued by a diaspora organization in the US.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The 5-year MAR rebellion score is 7 from 1945-1954, pointing to involvement in an outright civil war. No other source would suggest a LVIOLSD code, and we were not able to find precise information on casualties. However, casualties in the 1944-1949 Ili Rebellion are described as very significant (Benson 1990). Based on this, we code LVIOLSD in 1945-1949. The Ili Rebellion had started in 1944; thus we code violence to have started before the first year we cover, 1945. We do not code low-level violence in 1950-1954 as case study evidence suggests that violence was too minimal after 1949.
* Degenhardt (1988: 57) reports that there were armed clashes between Uyghurs and Chinese officials and soldiers in April 1980. In January 1983 there was serious rioting in Kashgar after a Chinese student was reported to have murdered an Uyghur peasant; and in December 1986 there were student protests to demand greater local autonomy and increased opportunities for those of Uighur birth. We do not code violence because the 25-deaths threshold does not seem to have been met. [pre-1945-1949: LVIOLSD; 1950-1989: NVIOLSD]
* 1990-1997 is coded as LVIOLSD based on qualitative evidence.
  + Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 310-311) and Hewitt et al. (2008) all suggest armed conflict during those years.
  + UCDP/PRIO does not include this violence armed conflict. This is likely because precise information on casualties is hard to get by.
  + Still, case study evidence points to LVIOLSD. In 1990, there was an uprising in Barin (or Baren), which is associated with 23 deaths according to official sources (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barin\_uprising). In the mid-1990s there were several assassinations of pro-Chinese clerics, bombings, brief armed skirmishes and uprisings. Chinese authorities, in fact, have cited several thousand violent operations carried out by Uighur separatists. The Uyghurs have also been the victims of violent repression. For example, in February 1997 security forces fired on protestors, killing 167 persons. In October 1998, an unknown number of people were sentenced to death for participating in the February 1997 demonstration. The Regional Uighur Association reports that 61 Uighurs were executed by China for “separatism” in 1999; other groups report up to 90 or 100 persons executed. In September 1999, up to 100 people were killed in clashes between Uighurs and Chinese troops.
  + We code 1990-1997 with LVIOLSD. Information is extremely scarce due to the closedness of the Chingese regime; however, it is likely that the 25-deaths threshold was met in at least some of the years.
* Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) also code 1998-2003 with armed conflict; however, a 2005 report by Human Rights Watch suggests there was no significant militant activity between 1998 and 2005. This is confirmed by Clark (2008).
* In 2007, a raid on rebel training camps killed 18 Uighur separatists and one government policeman (VOA). Since the 25 deaths threshold is not met, we code 1998-2007 as NVIOLSD. [1990-1997: LVIOLSD; 1998-2007: NVIOLSD]
* UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over East Turkestan in 2008 (36 battle-related deaths).
* There continued to be significant violence in subsequent years. According to MRGI, “Since 2009, episodes of violent resistance have occurred by Uyghurs who have been systematically denied nonviolent avenues for redress. While violent crimes require a measured law enforcement response, human rights groups have argued that the repressive militarization of Xinjiang and indiscriminate policing only exacerbate the problem and have led to a spiral of violence. In March 2014, more than 30 people were killed outside of a train station in Kunming, Yunnan province by a group subsequently reported to be Xinjiang separatists. In May 2014, two cars loaded with explosives ploughed through a busy shopping street in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang province, killing around 30 people. Following the Urumqi bombing, China announced a year-long anti-terrorism crackdown with the Xinjiang party chief, Zhang Chunxian, acknowledging the necessity for ‘unconventional measures’ in the ‘people’s war’ against terrorism. Mosques and private residences were searched, residents harassed and intimidated with impunity by the police and arbitrary arrests and disappearances increased. In 2015, the Uyghur Human Rights Project reported that as many as 700 people had died in Xinjiang during 2013 and 2014.”
  + Minahan (2016: 441) reports that “violent confrontations between nationalists and Chinese police left many dead and injured between 2010 and 2015.”
  + Wikipedia reports various clashes, terrorist attacks, and one-sided violence between 2008 and 2017, noting that the violence peaked in 2014 while suggesting that the extent of violence is difficult to verify due to “due to restrictions on the access of independent observers and international journalists”.
  + UCDP/PRIO does code any of this while noting that, “in general, however, there has been a lack of reliable information regarding the perpetrators in a quite large number of attacks against both civilians and the government, specifically in the Xinjiang province. Therefore, it is possible that ETIM has been active to a greater extent than what is reported in the UCDP data or that other groups have been active in the area.”
  + According to BBC Chinese (2019), from 2009 to 2016, violent incidents happened almost every year and some of them happened in other Chinese areas. For example, in 2011, there were at least 49 deaths from Uyghur separatist attacks. In 2014, in Kunming, China, there were nearly 30 people died in because of the Uyghur separatist attack.
  + Almost 200 deaths were recorded during violent demonstrations in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2009 (MRGI; VOA 5/4/2011). UCDP/PRIO codes this violence as a non-state armed conflict between Uighurs and Han Chinese.
* Overall, there was significant violence throughout 2008-2017. Precise fatality numbers are unavailable. Based on the figures we were able to collect, the 25 deaths threshold is met in 2008, 2010, and 2013-2014. In light of reporting difficulties and given evidence of sustained fighting, we code LVIOLSD throughout 2008-2017. [2008-2017: LVIOLSD; 2018-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Uyghur homeland came under Chinese control in 1759, followed by repression of Uyghur culture, in particular religion (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 1961). In 1884 the Qing dynasty established a Xinjiang province but this does not appear to have implied significant autonomy (Encyclopedia Britannica). In 1911 the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, and the Chinese Republic was installed. The central government’s hold on the Uyghurs was relatively weak. The Uyghurs s took advantage of the political vacuum and, with support from the Soviet Union, declared the independence of the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan in 1933. China was able to retake the region only shortly thereafter, in 1934 (Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 1065). A new revolt began in the years of 1936-1937. In 1944, the Uyghurs established a de-facto independent East Turkestan. However, these are not center-initiated policies; we were unable to locate center-initiated concessions or restrictions in the years before 1945.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1949 the de-facto independent East Turkestan reintegrated with China, when the Communist People’s Liberation Army took over Xinjiang (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 310). Since China never granted de-facto independence, this is not coded as a restriction.
* According to Bovingdon (2004: 23-24), the Communist regime, in 1949, began a relocation policy whereunder Han Chinese were motivated to move into the Xinjiang region. Relocation policies are not coded, in accordance with the codebook.
* Initially the Communist government took a relatively favorable stance towards its ethnic minorities. In 1955, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region was established (Encyclopedia Britannica; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 310). [1955: autonomy concession]
* The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) “abandoned the relatively conciliatory policy towards nationalities in favour of a more homogenizing approach” (Edgar 2014: 533). There was assimilationist pressure with regard to language and severe repression of religious practices (Minahan 2002: 748, 1959; Bovingdon 2004: 19; Minority Rights Group International). [1958: cultural rights restriction]
* The end of the Great Leap Forward in 1961 led to more relaxed policies again. [1961: cultural rights concession]
* However, in 1966 the Cultural Revolution began, a period of extreme assimilation pressure with intensified persecution of religion and campagins to eradicate traditional cultures. The Cultural Revolution also meant the loss of much of the autonomy of ethnic minorities, as signified for instance by the 1975 constitution (Sautmann 1999: 288). [1966: cultural rights restriction, autonomy restriction]
* The situation for China’s ethnic minorities improved gradually after Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 (Edgar 2004: 533; also see Minahan 2002: 748). The autonomous regions’ powers were restored. In particular, the 1978 constitution restored some of the powers the autonomous regions had lost during the Cultural Revolution (Sautmann 1999: 288). But legal revisions have followed policy changes rather than vice versa (Bovingdon 2004: 17). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 1976 to coincide with the end of the Cultural Revolution. [1976: autonomy concession]
* In the early 1980s, the Chinese government loosened some of its control over religion and many mosques were rebuilt (Bovingdon 2004: 32-33; Minahan 2002: 748). Moreover, in 1981 the region’s four major languages, including Uyghur, regained official status (Minahan 2002: 1962). [1981: cultural rights concession]
* In the 1980s, the scope of the autonomous regions’ autonomy was increased. The 1982 constitution reinstated all (or most of) the rights of autonomous provinces that were abolished during the Cultural Revolution (Carlson 2004: 18). The 1984 Regional Autonomy substantiated the autonomy rights. According to Minority Rights Group International, the law increased autonomy mainly in education and culture and other “soft” issues (see Sautmann 1999: 293). Based on this, we code an autonomy concession in 1982 to coincide with the constitution. [1982: autonomy concession]
* Minority Rights Group International reports that since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has moved towards replacing Uyghur with Mandarin in education. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* In response to the 1990 Baren incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chinese government reversed its tolerance towards Islam. Several anti-Muslim policies were adopted. Among other things, around 10 per cent of Uighur clerics were stripped of their positions in 1991. Furthermore, 50 mosques were closed in 1990 and the construction of 100 more new mosques was cancelled out of fear that religion was “getting out of control” (Bovingdon 2004: 33-34; Human Rights Watch 2005). [1990: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: this restriction occurred after the onset of violence in 1990.
* In 2000, the Chinese government instituted regulations intended to “manage religion and guide it in being subordinate to the central task of economic construction, the unification of the motherland, and the objective of national unity”, leading to policies prohibiting religious education and reading banned versions of the Koran, and limiting religious ceremonies (Chido 2008). [2000: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2001, new regulations by the Xinjiang authorities further curtailed the practice of religion by narrowing the scope of “normal religious activities”, increasing control over registration and operations of religious organizations, and tightened control over religious publications. Furthermore, in 2001 schools across Xinjiang started to undergo “clean-ups”. Books with religious content were removed from libraries, teachers were investigated and fired, etc. (Human Rights Watch 2005). [2001: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2001 the 1984 regional autonomy law was revised. Little changed (Smith 2004: 14).
* We code a further cultural rights restriction in 2002 for two reasons. First, “[a] policy adopted in 2002 seems to require that Uyghur names be changed into Chinese pinyin” (MRGI). Furthermore, MRGI reports that “Xinjiang University, initially established in 1949 as a bilingual (Uyghur/Mandarin) university, has all but cast away instruction in Uyghur since 2002”. MRGI continues to explain the same more broadly applies throughout all levels of education, whereby “Uyghur language instruction is almost exclusively limited to literature, while all other classes are taught in Mandarin. Curriculum focuses on ‘patriotic education’ that leaves a marginal role for Uyghur culture and history.” [2002: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2004, the Chinese government promulgated new stringent national religious regulations, effective March 1, 2005. According to a 2005 Human Rights Watch Report, “the government's unstated aims are twofold: to make it more difficult than ever for a religious body or a church, mosque, temple, monastery, or congregation to exist without State approval; and to solidify oversight of the personnel, finances, and activities of every approved religious body or site.” [2004: cultural rights restriction]
* Xinjiang outlawed the wearing of beards and veils for all Uyghurs during Ramadan 2008, prevented officials, students, and teachers from fasting, and banned restaurant closures during typical fasting hours (Al Arabiya News; Styles 2013). [2008: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: This restriction was in response to an outburst of violence in early August 2008, which we code as a violence onset (see above), and was imposed during Ramadan, which started in late August 2008 (Al Arabiya News; Styles 2013).
* In 2014, China banned five types of passengers - those who wear veils, head scarves, a loose-fitting garment called a jilbab, clothing with the crescent moon and star, and those with long beards - from boarding buses in the northwestern city of Karamay, Xinjiang (Reuters 2014). [2014: cultural rights restriction]
* We code cultural rights restrictions in 2015, 2016, and 2017 based on the following accounts from MRGI:
  + “In 2015, Hotan initiated a ban on Uyghur parents giving their children Islamic names which have been used by Uyghur parents for generations and are an integral part of Uyghur identity. In April 2017, the policy was extended to the whole of the XUAR. Children named in violation of this policy may be barred from household-registration, denying free access to health and education.”
  + “Since 2015, increasingly repressive measures have been passed such as banning face veils in public, criminalizing men with beards, and forbidding Uyghur students from observing fast during Ramadan, and thousands of mosques have been demolished. Any type of unsanctioned religious activity in Xinjiang risks much more serious
  + “Beginning in 2016, previously prefecture-level travel regulations were imposed across all of Xinjiang, in violation of the freedom of movement and impacting Uyghur’s ability to participate in religion pilgrimage or seek employment opportunities. In 2016, the Xinjiang government announced a blanket recall of all passports, a measure already implemented under Chen Quanguo in Tibet.”
  + Furthermore, in 2017, the Xingjiang government adopted the Regulations of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on Deradicalization, which strengthened controls on religious activities (Sun 2021). [2015, 2016, 2017: cultural rights restriction]
    - Note: it is not clear whether the 2017 restriction was made during the ongoing violence in 2008-2017 (see above) or after, but the former seems more likely.
* In 2018, the amendment of Religious Affairs Regulations came into effect, which aimed to significantly increase official oversight over religion under the mainstream voice of anti-terrorism and anti-separatism. The law included more restrictive policies on religious matters such as religious assets, publishing of religious material and provision of information services (Cao 2018; Lavička 2021). [2018: cultural rights restriction]
* According to the U.S. State Department (2022): “Based on satellite imagery and other sources, researchers estimated authorities had destroyed, damaged, or desecrated approximately 16,000 mosques in the region (65 percent of the total), and demolished a further 30 percent of important Islamic sacred sites.” We do not code a restriction because the exact dates are unclear; however, the general pattern is well-covered by the many restrictions we code already.
* As part of its crackdown, China has held up to one million Uyghurs in “political education” camps in recent years (Human Rights Watch 2019; U.S. Department of State 2022). While a measure of repression, the set-up of concentration camps does not constitute a restriction as defined here.

**Regional autonomy**

* 1945-1949 is coded with regional autonomy since the Uyghurs were de-facto independent (see below). [1945-1949: regional autonomy]
* In 1955, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region was established (Encyclopedia Britannica). Autonomy was abolished in 1966 (Cultural Revolution). [1956-1966: regional autonomy]
* Autonomy was re-established after the Cultural Revolution. However, the actual extent of autonomy conferred to ethnic minorities remains questionable. Many are skeptical about autonomy solutions in China (e.g. Ghai 2000). According to Minority Rights Group International the 1980s autonomy increase was mostly theoretical (also see Bovingdon 2004, in particular page 293). There appears to be some Uighur representation in the regional government, though they are “quite underrepresented”, especially in the party cadre, where the most important decisions are taken (Bovingdon 2004: 30). We do not code autonomy.

**De facto independence**

* In 1944 the Uyghurs, with the support of the Soviet Union, established the East Turkestan Republic. Most sources suggest that the East Turkestan Republic remained de-facto independent until 1949, when the communist People’s Liberation Army took over Xinjiang (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 1065). Hence, we code de facto independence from 1945-1949. [1945-1949: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* [1949: revocation of de-facto independence]
* In 1955, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region was established (Encyclopedia Britannica). [1955: establishment of regional autonomy]
* Upon the Cultural Revolution autonomy was fully abolished. [1966: abolishment of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Uyghurs |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Uyghur |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 71036000 |

**Power access**

* In principle a 1:1 case, the Uyghurs are not coded in EPR in 1946-1949 (that is, they are coded as irrelevant), and obviously not in 1945 since EPR does not go back to this year. In 1945 Uyghur rebels declared their own state, East Turkestan. The unilaterally declared East Turkestan was dissolved in 1949, after negotiations with the Chinese government. Thus, the period of 1945-1949 constitutes self-exclusion from the political center (de-facto independence). In the EPR2SDM coding scheme, this makes up a powerless status. The power status for 1950-2020 is directly extracted from EPR. [1945-1966: powerless; 1967-1976: discriminated; 1977-2000: powerless; 2001-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1945-1964: 0.0062; 1965-1982: 0.0058: 1983-1990: 0.0059: 1991-2000: 0.0064; 2001-2010: 0.0066; 2011-2020: 0.0076]

**Regional concentration**

* MAR and GeoEPR considers the Uyghurs concentrated, but they do not require that the Uyghurs make up an absolute majority of their regional base.
  + According to both Minahan and MAR, the overwhelming majority of the Uighurs live in Xinijang province. According to Minahan (2002: 1958), the Uighurs make up a relative majority in the province, yet not an absolute majority (46% Uighurs, 42% Han Chinese). This percentage is similar to the 2020 Chinese Census (45% Uyghurs, 42% Han Chinese). Minahan also notes that population estimates are difficult, and that the number of Uighurs may be higher. It is, however, widely established that the share of Uighurs in the region has decreased massively over the years; the Han share increased from single digits in the 1940s to approximately 40% from 1970 onwards (see Hannum & Xie 1998). Thus, even if census figures are not reliable, it may well be that the Uighurs lost their absolute majority in Xinijang as a whole. Nevertheless, they can probably be considered concentrated in the sense employed here. Both Minahan (2002: 1958) and Hannum & Xie (1998) suggest that there is a very significant level of ethnic concentrated residence in Xinjiang, with a higher percentage of Uyghurs in the less well-off eastern part of Xinjiang.
  + [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there were Uyghur kin groups in the Soviet Union and three of its successor states (Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan). All of them adjoin China, and at least the community in Kazakhstan is numerically significant (approximately 200-300,000 according to EPR). Further evidence for kin groups in adjoining states comes from Minahan (2002: 1958), who states that there are Uyghur communities in Pakistan, Russia, and the Central Asian states neighboring China (together with smaller communities in Europe, Turkey, Australia, Canada, United States). [kin in adjoining country]

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