# COLOMBIA

## Cacaricans

Activity: 2000-2020

**General notes**

* “The Cacarica river basin is inhabited mainly by descendants of Africans originally brought over and subjected to slavery in the Americas during colonial times” (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2013).

**Movement start and end dates**

* The communities of Colombia’s Cacarica River Basin have fought for their right to self-determination and collective land rights since being forcibly displaced in 1997 due to paramilitary abuses and military operations. The relevant organization, the Self-Determination, Life and Dignity Community (CAVIDA) was formed in 2000. The start date is pegged to 2000.
* There is evidence of continued activity on behalf of CAVIDA as of 2020, thus we code the movement as ongoing (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020; Martinez, 2007; WOLA, 2013). [start date: 2000; end date: ongoing]

**Dominat claim**

* The Self-Determination, Life and Dignity Community (CAVIDA) was formed in 2000 as a reaction to indigenous communities having been displaced from the Cacarica River Basin by paramilitary and military forces. CAVIDA was established to defend collective land rights and advocate for Cacarica’s self-determination (Engle, 2010: 263, WOLA, 2013). Engle (2010: 263) reports that self-determination in this context does not refer to “a right to secession or separation from the state.” [2000-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Cacarica is the Cacarica River Basin, which lies within the Chocó department in northwestern Colombia. We code this claim based on a map by the International Center for Transitional Justice (2021).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There has been some one-sided violence against the Cacarica communities as well as casualties stemming from rebel and drug-trafficking violence that take place on Cacarica land. However, the Cacarica protesters have not been associated with any violence. Thus, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After the abolition of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century, former slaves, which were brought to Colombia in the 1700s, were seeking land and migrated from the southern Pacific side of Colombia to the southern part of the Departemento del Choco in northwestern Colombia. Some of them settled in the Cacarica River Basin where they organized themselves into communities (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2013: 29).
* Starting in the nineteenth century, the Colombian government pursed the white supremacist policy of ‘blanqueamiento' (whitening) of society (Minority Rights Group International). This xenophobic and discriminatory policy has been “expressed through the encouragement of race-mixing and the societal privileging of lighter skin” (Minorities at Risk Project).
* In 1986, a decentralization reform was adopted. The reform made governors and mayors politically more autonomous from the central government, also with regard to the management of resources (Falleti, 2010: 148). It is unclear in how far this affected the level of Cacarica self-determination. However, since the reform took place more than ten years prior to the start of the Cacarica movement and there were other more recent policies that affected their level of self-determination, this reform is not further investigated.
* A new constitution came into force in July 1991. The new constitution declared Colombia and ethnically and culturally plural society and granted property rights and cultural protections to the afro-colombian and indigenous communities (Ng’weno, 2004). The constitution “gave place to a more comprehensive recognition of indigenous languages and cultures, their rights over their territories, and political representation for indigenous peoples and Afrocolumbians in the Congress” (EPR). In addition to the recognition of language and culture, article 329 of the 1991 constitution granted the right to collective ownership of traditional lands and administrative autonomy of indigenous territories (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, n.d.). Unlike in the case of the indigenous peoples (which EPR codes as regionally autonomous as of 1992), the Afro-Colombian population of which the Cacarica form part was not granted any form of regional autonomy by the 1991 constitution (and is thus also not coded as regionally autonomous by EPR). However, with so-called ‘Community Councils’, which should guarantee the administration of legally recognized Afro-Colombian territory, they were granted some autonomy on a local level (EPR, citing UN expert on minority issues, 2011). We code a concession due to the increase in local autonomy. [1991: autonomy concession]
* In 1967, the Colombian Congress followed ILO Convention 107 and adopted Law 31, thereby “recognizing the right of black communities for collective ownership of the territories they occupied ancestrally and, consequently, the right to use and exploit its lands and woods” (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2013: 54). In 1993, similar legislation was promulgated with the passing of Law 70 which granted collective land titles to black communities in rural areas along the rivers of the Pacific Basin. The law also included the right to the management of resources found within the territory. This new law, according to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2013: 114), granted “special protection” to the communities of the Cacarica River basin. This is coded as a prior concession. There is no indication that Law 70 is a direct result of Law 31 of 1967, which is why we code the concession in 1993. [1993: autonomy concession]
* Despite these laws, the Cacaricans have suffered large-scale forced displacement. Approximately 3,500 inhabitants (MRGI estimates 4,000 people) of the Cacarica river valley were displaced and 85 people were killed during ‘Operation Genesis’ in 1996 and 1997 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2013: 44). The brutal operation was carried out by the army’s 17th Brigade (with the support of paramiliatary groups) in order to exploit resources and advance the economic interests of both government and private companies. In line with our codebook, this episode of forced displacement is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1996: autonomy restriction]
* In December 1999, the “Return Agreement between the Communities displaced from the Cacarica river basin provisionally settled in Turbó, Bocas de Atrato and Bahía, and the national Government” was signed, which allowed the displaced members of Cacarica communities to return to their territory. The government provided technical and financial support for the implementation of the return process, initiated housing projects, and provided identity documents (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2013: 53). It also granted the Cacarica with collective land titles over 103,024 hectares of claimed territory. Although the government was accused by the victims of only partially complying with the agreements it had made, this is coded as a concession, as the agreement reversed the forced displacement and allowed the displaced to return, while recognizing the community’s collective land rights. [1999: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Cacarica River Basin is a highly fertile territory, which makes it suitable for agriculture, cattle farming, illicit crops, and mining. Given the high degree of state abandonment of this territory and its strategic location between South and Central America, the region has been targeted by illegal armed groups as a corridor for the trafficking of drugs and weapons (Salamanca Sarmiento, 2020). Since 2016, CAVIDA has been denouncing the increased presence and control of paramilitary groups in their territory, including some military activity that has eroded the self-determination of the Cacarica (Bienfait, 2017). However, there is no evidence of state actor participation in this violation of Cacarica land rights. Therefore, we do not code a restriction.

**Regional autonomy**

* Even though the Cacarica were granted land ownership over 103,024 hectares of land in 1999, there is no evidence that administrative powers or competencies were devolved to suggest some degree of Cacarica regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Cacaricans |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Afrocolumbians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 10003000 |

**Power access**

* The communities of the Cacarica River Basin constitute part of the umbrella "Afrocolombians" group coded by EPR. The Cacarica only make up a small share of the Afrocolombians. Hence, the EPR coding of the umbrella group is only of limited use. The 1991 constitution granted indigenous peoples and Afrocolombians political representation in the Congress through an ethnic quota. However, only in 2007 was the first Afrocolombian (Paula Marcela Moreno Zapata) appointed as minister in the central government (Minority Rights Group International). However, Paula Marcela Moreno Zapata was not of Cacarica origin. The Cacarica thus do not have access to central executive power. This leaves ‘powerless’ and ‘discriminated’ as the two remaining options. In the first two years of the movement’s activity, a discriminated coding is certainly adequate, given the forced displacement of the Cacarica that lasted from 1997 until 2001 and the occupation of the Cacarica territory (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2013: 52). The remaining years are also coded as discriminated. Minority Rights Group International states that there is “oppression and multiple discrimination” in terms of race, religion, language, and political and socio-economic status for the Afro-Colombians. Amnesty International (2017) also states that, since their return, the Afro-descendant communities of the Cacarica River basin “have continued to face constant threats and other human rights violations.” [2000-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* Since we could not find an estimation of the Cacarica population, we derived it from the population of the communities that together form the Community Council of the Communities of the Cacarica River basin. According to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2013: 30), the Community Council of the Communities of the Cacarica River basin is composed of the following communities: Balsagira, Balsita, Bocachica, Bogota, Bocas del Limón, Peranchito, Quebrada Bonita, Quebrada del Medio, La Honda, Las Mercedes Barranquilla, La Virginia Perancho, Las Pajas, Montañita Cirilo, Puente América, Puerto Berlín, Puerto Nuevo, San Higinio, San José de Balsa, Santa Lucía, Teguerre Medio, Varsovia, Vijao Cacarica and Villa Hermosa la Raya. Taken together, these communites had a population of 57,935 people in 2010 according to the Colombian Census (although it is not certain that all inhabitants of these communities are really Cacarica). Given Colombia’s population in that same year (45,509,600), we code a group size of 0.127%. [0.00127]

**Regional concentration**

* We found no data on self-identified Cacaricans, but given the regionalist character of this movement, the criteria for regional concentration are most likely fulfilled. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Cacarica consitute a subgroup of the EPR group ‘Afro-Columbians’, which is coded as having no transborder kin. MAR does code ethnic kin ties to Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Venezuelans; consistent with general practice we do not code ethnic ties between Black populations in the Americas (see U.S.). We could find no other evidence for kin outside of Colombia. [no kin]

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## Chocoanos

Activity: 1975-1995; 2009-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Since the creation of the department of Chocó in 1945, Chocoanos have suffered from extreme neglect, prejudice and racial discrimination from Colombia’s social, economic and political structures. The Chocó region is at present one of the poorest and most marginalized in Colombia, and state abandonment continues to perpetuate the precarious living conditions of its population (Minahan 2016: 105; SDG Fund, n.d.). The first evidence for separatist activity we found is in 1975, when the *Movimiento Anexionista* (Annexionist Movement)was formed to advocate for Chocó’s federalization or its annexation to neighboring Panama (Gaitán, 2009; Tobón et al., 2005).
* According to Caicedo (2002), the movement gained some visibility in the late 1970s among communities in urban Chocó, who sought solutions for the region’s alienation and the exploitation of its natural resources, but was dissolved in the early 1980s due to the lack of popular support for its separatist agenda. We do not code an end in the early 1980s because around the same time, in 1985, Eulides Blandón, a well-known advocate of Chocoano rights known as ‘Kunda Kinte’ created the *Movimiento Tigritudes*, a separatist movement with an anti-colonial ethos (Díaz, 1994). There is little information on the movement’s activities, the degree of support it gathered, or the date of its dissolution. It is noteworthy, though, that Kunta Kinte was killed by state forces in 1991 in unclear circumstances (ibid). We code the end of the first phase in 1995, following the 10-year rule. [start date 1: 1975; end date 1: 1995]
* The movement re-emerged in 2009, when a group of students, academics and intellectuals established the *Movimiento Popular Revolucionario por la República Independiente del Chocó* (RICHO, Popular Revolutionary Movement for the Independent Republic of Chocó) (Urrego, 2010; Nyahliel, n.d.). Its mission is to “Build an independent, revolutionary, and autonomous Republic on the Pacific coast, in which Afro-Chocoans, Indigenous, and mestizos can enjoy equity and justice at the territorial, economic, legal, and governmental levels, and where any form of slavery and/or colonialism is totally eradicated” (Ibid: 161).
* The movement has substantial popular support and press coverage. We found evidence of continued movement activity as of 2020 (Urrego, 2010; Condoto Soy Yo, 2009; Serna Arriaga, 2021). In particular, the movement was active in promoting the popular mobilization of 40,000 people on July 20th 2016 – the date of Colombia’s independence celebration – against the state’s neglect of Chocó (Torres Cepeda, 2016). [start date 2: 2009; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The *Movimiento Anexionista*, active between 1975 and the early 1980s, made claim for Chocó’s federalization or its annexation to neighboring Panama (Gaitán, 2009; Tobón et al., 2005). The Movimiento Anexionista died down in the early 1980s, and the dominant claim subsequently shifted to the establishment of an independent republic. [1975-1985: irredentist claim; 1986-1995, 2009-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date 1: 1985; end date 1: 1995; start date 2: 2009; end date 2: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. [start date: 1975; end date: 1985]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Chocoanos consists of the current department of Chocó in western Colombia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence and hence code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* According to Minahan (2016: 105), the Chocó region was ignored by Spanish colonizers, as it was seen as a “wild jungle with little treasure or interest”. In the early 1700s, plantation agriculture was introduced in the region and African slaves were imported in mass to work the land. With the abolition of slavery in Colombia the mid-nineteenth century, many former slaves and their descendents settled in Chocó, forming a large majority of the regional population.
* In the nineteenth century, the Colombian government pursed the white supremacy policy of ‘blanqueamiento' (whitening) of society (MRGI). This xenophobic and discriminatory policy was “expressed through the encouragement of race-mixing and the societal privileging of lighter skin” (MAR).
* In 1967, the Colombian Congress followed ILO Convention 107 and adopted Law 31, “recognizing the right of black communities’ for collective ownership of the territories they occupied ancestrally and, consequently, the right to use and exploit its lands and woods” (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2013: 54). [1967: autonomy concession]
* 2nd phase:
  + In 2000, the Colombian government initiated a series of mega-projects for the mass expansion of palm oil plantations across Chocó. According to Leech (2009), the government granted significant incentives to large corporations for palm oil production since 2000 to cover the growing global demand for the product. Perdomo Peralta (2018) reports that the industry’s development was only possible through systematic land theft, which led to the displacement of thousands of Chocoanos. [2000: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1986, the Colombian government pursued reforms aimed at decentralization. The reforms gave the regional leaders of Chocó increased administrative autonomy. In particular, they were given more control over the region’s budget and its natural resources (Falleti, 2010: 148). [1986: autonomy concession]
* A new constitution was drawn up in July 1991. The constitution recognized Colombia as an ethnically and culturally plural society and granted property rights and cultural protections to marginalized Afrocolombian and indigenous communities (Ng’weno, 2004). The constitution “gave place to a more comprehensive recognition of indigenous languages and cultures, their rights over their territories, and political representation for indigenous peoples and Afrocolumbians in the Congress” (EPR). An ethnic quota of two seats was introduced in Congress for Afrocolombians. Still, there is no evidence that the recognition of linguistic and cultural rights effectively increased the level of Chocoano self-determination. We therefore do not code this as a concession.
* The 1991 provision also provided for the creation of ‘Community Councils’ to administer legally recognized Afrocolombian territories. This provision was implemented in 1993 (Latinno, n.d.). We do not code a concession because the change refers to the municipal level.
* In 1993, Law 70 was promulgated, granting collective land titles to the black communities in the the rural areas along the rivers of the Pacific Basin, including Chocoanos. The law also included the right to the management of resources found within the territory (Ng’weno, 2004). Whereas the 1967 law recognized the ownership of territories occupied by black populations across Colombia, the 1993 law was specifically targeted to the black communities in the Pacfic Basin. [1993: autonomy concession]
* A peace agreement was signed between the government and the rebel group FARC in 2016. The agreement included an Ethnic Chapter, which outlined a set of ‘principles, safeguards and guarantees’ for Colombia’s ethnic minorities, such as the Chocoanos (MRGI). However, implementation of the agreement has been uneven and it is unclear whether the steps taken so far to implement its provisions in Chocó have meaningfully increased the level of Chocoano self-determination as of 2020, so we do not code a concession.
  + With the demobilization of FARC combatants, other illegal armed groups rushed to fill the power vacuum left by the FARC in territories they previously controlled, many of them in Chocó. This is explained by the structural absence of state institutions in many of the rural, islolated territories of the department (Asprilla, 2022). Minority Rights Group International notes that despite the peace agreement and its ethnic component, violence intensified in many areas of Chocó after 2016, reporting that “The greatest number of victims were civilians and the majority of these drawn from Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, who as a result of the conflict became victims of severe human rights violations, including forced displacements and disappearances, kidnappings, massacres, selected and systematic killings of their leaders, and the illegal usurpation of their lands, amongst other crimes.” However, it appears that illegal armed groups have been behind the rights violations of Chocoanos after 2016 and not the state. We therefore do not code a restriction.

**Regional autonomy**

* The autonomy that was granted to Chocoanos in 1986 and 1993 is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Chocoano |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Afrocolumbians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 10003000 |

**Power access**

* Chocoanos are part of the umbrella "Afrocolombians" group coded by EPR. Since Chocoanos make up a small share of the total Afrocolombians population, the EPR coding of the umbrella group is only of limited use. The 1991 constitution granted indigenous peoples and Afrocolombians political representation in Congress through an ethnic quota. However, the first Chocoano to reach a position in the Colombian executive since 1953 was Luis Gilberto Murillo, appointed Minister for the Environment in 2016 (La República, 2016). Chocoanos therefore do not generally appear to have access to central executive power. Moreover, Minority Rights Group International highlights the oppression and multiple forms of discrimination experienced by Afrocolombians in racial and socio-economic terms, which has resulted in underrepresentation for the group in the power structures of Colombia. Despite this, we code the group as powerless because there is no evidence of overt practices of political discrimination against them. [1976-1995: powerless] [2010-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to a 2018 census, there are 337,696 Afrocolombians in the Chocó department (DANE, 2018), but this does not take into account Chocoanos outside of Chocó. Minahan (2016: 104) estimates the Chocoano’s population at 500,000-1 million in 2015. We use 0.5 mio as it’s a middle-ground estimate. Colombia’s population in 2015 was 47.5 mio according to the World Bank. [0.0105]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 2018 census, nearly 85% of the inhabitants of Chocó are Afrocolombians (DANE, 2018). Given the predominance of Afrocolombians in the Chocó department and the regional character of the movement, the criteria for regional concentration are most likely fulfilled. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* Chocoanos are a subgroup of the EPR group ‘Afro-Columbians’, which is coded as having no transborder kin. MAR does code ethnic kin ties to Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Venezuelans, but we do not code ethnic ties between Black populations in the Americas (see U.S.). We could find no other evidence for kin outside of Colombia. [no kin]

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## Indigenous Peoples

Activity: 1970-2020

**General notes**

* There are nearly 2 million indigenous people in Colombia belonging to 115 different groups. These include the Wayuu, Zenu, Inga, U’wa, Pasto, Emberá, Cumbales, Guambiano and Paez (Nasa) populations, as well as numerous small native communities in the Tayrona and Amazonian regions of Colombia.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Colombia’s indigenous people inhabit 27 of the 32 departments of the country, with large concentrations in the regions of the Amazon, Orinoquia, Pacific coast, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Perija mountains, Guajira Peninsula, and the Andean range (MAR). According to a 2018 Census, there are 1,905,617 self-identified indigenous people in Colombian territory (4.4% of the total population), belonging to 115 different groups (DANE, 2018). The largest groups are the Wayuu (380,460), Zenu (307,091), Nasa (243,176) and Pastos (163,873). Largely isolated from other sectors of society, indigenous groups have historically suffered from discrimination and exclusion from Colombia’s social, political and economic structures (Osorio, 2016). According to MAR (2009), their overarching demands are territorial autonomy, protection from resource exploitation that damages their local environment and communities, and security from attacks and occupation by militant groups.
* There is evidence of organized indgenous movements as early as 1910, but contemporary indigenous mobilization in Colombia only consolidated in the early 1970s, when the first autonomous indigenous organizations began to mobilize in defense of their autonomy, culture, identities and land rights (MRGI). In October 1970, indigenous activists in the Cauca region invaded lands that they claimed ancestral ownership of, in a practice that would gain popularity over the following two decades (Revolución Obrera, 2022). That same year saw the creation of the Jambaló Indigenous Union, the first coherent indigenous organization we found evidence of after 1945. We therefore peg the start date of the movement to 1970.
* During the 1970s and 1980s, a number of indigenous movements were consolidated, including the Indigenous Council of the Cauca Region (CRIC), the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia (OIA), the Regional Indigenous Organization of Putamayo, and the Indigenous Authorities of the Southwest (AISO) (MAR). The National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), the largest and most significant indigenous collective in Colombia, was founded in 1982 and has been active since (ONIC, 2022; Guérin, 2018). [start date: 1970; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to MAR (2009), the major claims made by Colombia’s indigenous peoples are territorial autonomy, land rights, protection from resource development that damages their local environment and communities, and protection from attacks and occupation by militant groups. This is confirmed by Osorio (2016) and Guérin (2018). [1970-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Given the dispersion of indigenous populations across Colombia, we were unable to find a specific definition of the territory to which the self-determination claims are tied. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the settlement area of the corresponding EPR group.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In 1984, the civil war between the government and the non-indigenous FARC armed movement led to the creation of the Quintín Lame Armed Movement, which sought to defend indigenous land and lives from the hostilities until its demobilization in 1991 (MAR). Sources confirm that the group occasionally engaged in offensive violent activities, such as killings, ambushes, kidnappings and sieges (Boudreaux, 1991; Verdad Abierta, 2015); however, we found no evidence to suggest that the number of casualties crossed the 25-deaths threshold in any year.
* Though the 1991 Consitution improved the rights, legal protection and autonomy of indigenous communities, organizations continue to mobilize and protest demanding the fulfilment of Constitutional provisions, the cessation of resource exploitation in indigenous territories, and for protection from armed groups (MAR). Continued mobilization by indigenous organizations has often been faced with violence and repression from state authorities (Turkewitz and Villamil, 2020), but we found no indications for reciprocated separatist violence above the threshold and so code all years as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Spanish conquest of the Americas caused the physical and cultural decimation of indigenous people, their enslavement and forced displacement from ancestral lands. By the 17th century, the indigenous population in the Americas had been reduced by 90% (MRGI).
* From the 19th century onwards, the government of the newly-established Colombian state pursued the white supremacist policy of *blanqueamiento* (whitening) of society (MRGI). This xenophobic and discriminatory policy was “expressed through the encouragement of race-mixing and the societal privileging of lighter skin”, which further secluded native communities in the post-independence period (MAR).
* Colombia’s indigenous population suffered from discrimination under Law 89 of 1890, which gave the legal status as children or ‘minors’ (Van de Sandt, 2007). As a result of this law, the state was given administrative control over the *resguardos* (indigenous reservations) that had been created and granted to native groups by Spanish colonists for social control, exploitation and segregation. Under this law, which was in place until 1991, “indigenous peoples were not recognized as equal citizens within the Colombian state and were not granted individual or collective civil, political, cultural, social and economic rights under Colombian law” (MRGI).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1989, Colombia signed Convention C169 of the International Labour Organization, which asserted the right of indigenous peoples to non-integration and forbade states from pursuing assimilationist policies (Guérin, 2018). The Convention was enshrined in Colombian law in 1991, though it is unclear if the law increased the level of self-determination for indigenous people in practice. We therefore do not code this as a concession.
* A new Constitution came into force in July 1991. The Constitution made indigenous people “more visible in national life and sought to guarantee their fundamental human, political, social, economic and cultural rights” (MRGI). In addition to recognising their linguistic and cultural rights, the new Constitution gave Colombia’s indigenous populations the right to collective ownership of traditional lands and administrative autonomy of indigenous territories, introducing the concept of *Entidades Territoriales* (autonomous indigenous territories) (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, n.d.). The Constitution also granted indigenous people the right to exercise “jurisdictional functions within their territorial areas in accordance with their own rules and procedures, which must not be contrary to the Constitution and laws of the Republic” (Van Cott, 2000: 214). [1991: autonomy concession]
* In 2000, the Colombian government initiated a series of mega-projects for the mass expansion of palm oil and banana plantations in lands inhabited or claimed by Emberá, Paéz and Guambiano communities. According to Leech (2009), since 2000 the government has granted significant incentives to large corporations to expand the production of banana and palm oil across the country to cover the growing global demand for these products. Minority Rights Group International reports that the development of these monoculture industries led to significant land theft of thousands of hectares of indigenous territories while posing serious threats to the livelihoods of the Emberá, Paéz and Guambiano peoples. [2000: autonomy restriction]
* Until 2015, when the practice was outlawed, the government’s anti-narcotics strategy involved the indiscriminate aerial fumigation of coca crops in indigenous territories. Since 2003, several communities have demonstrated against the use of aerial fumigation, highlighting the continued loss of other, subsistence crops, the irreversible damage caused to fertile land, the serious health implications for local communities, and the displacement of entire populations caused by this practice (García, 2005; MRGI). Although the government planned to resume aerial spraying in 2019, resumption had not taken place in 2020 (Arciniegas, 2021). We code a restriction in 2003, as this is the earliest evidence we found of systematic aerial spraying in indigenous territories. [2003: autonomy restricion]
* In 2014, the government passed Law 1953, which devolved additional administrative powers to indigenous populations in their territories. According to Baena (2015), this law strengthened the exercise of territorial autonomy of indigenous people across Colombia. [2014: autonomy concession]
* A peace agreement was signed between the government and the rebel group FARC in 2016. The agreement included an Ethnic Chapter, which outlined a set of ‘principles, safeguards and guarantees’ for Colombia’s indigenous populations (MRGI). However, implementation of the agreement has been uneven and it is unclear whether the steps taken so far to implement its provisions in and around indigenous territories have meaningfully increased the level of indigenous self-determination up until 2020, so we do not code a concession.
  + Moreover, with the demobilization of FARC combatants, other illegal armed groups rushed to fill the power vacuum left by the FARC in territories they previously controlled; many of them in land claimed or inhabited by indigenous people, predominantly in Chocó, Antioquia, Cauca and Norte de Santander (MRGI; Guérin, 2018). Minority Rights Group International notes that despite the peace agreement and its ethnic component, violence intensified in many indigenous territories after 2016, claiming that “The greatest number of victims were civilians and the majority of these drawn from Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, who as a result of the conflict became victims of severe human rights violations, including forced displacements and disappearances, kidnappings, massacres, selected and systematic killings of their leaders, and the illegal usurpation of their lands, amongst other crimes.” For instance, WOLA has reported that armed groups use Emberá communities as human shields when confronted with state forces (MRGI). However, it appears that illegal armed groups have been behind the violation of indigenous rights after 2016, and not state actors. We therefore do not code a restriction.

**Regional autonomy**

* The 1991 Consitution gave indigenous peoples in Colombia collective ownership of indigenous territories and the right to exercise customary law within these, and the exercise of autonomy was strengthened in 2014 (see above). Although Minority Rights Group International reports that implementation of these provisions has often been patchy, the establishment of autonomous indigenous territories was a significant improvement for indigenous self-determination. Note that EPR codes the 1991 Constitution as the start of regional autonomy for the indigenous peoples. We therefore code regional autonomy for indigenous people since 1992. [1992-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Indigenous Peoples |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Indigenous peoples |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 10002000 |

**Power access**

* We use data from EPR, which codes indigenous peoples as discriminated between 1970 and 1991 and as powerless thereafter, presumably following the entry into force of the new Constitution. [1970-1991: discriminated] [1992-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to a 2018 Census, there are 1,905,617 self-identified indigenous people in Colombian territory, representing 4.4% of the total Colombian population. [0.044]

**Regional concentration**

* There are indigenous populations scattered across 27 of the 32 departments of Colombia. With the exception of the Guajira, Cauca and Amazonas departments, indigenous people are an ethnic minority across the country and as such do not fulfill our criteria for regional concentration (DANE, 2018). [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes ethnic kin in Brazil and Ecuador. In keeping with this, we found evidence that some of the sub-groups associated with this SDM can also be found in other countries including Ecuador, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela; however, their number does not exceed 100,000. [no kin]

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## Raizals

Activity: 1960-2020

**General notes**

* The Raizals are an English-Creole speaking, Protestant Afro-Caribbean group located mainly in the Caribbean San Andrés Archipelago. The archipelago is under Colombian sovereignty based on a 1928 treaty (though de-facto for much longer). It is also claimed by Nicaragua (Romero, 2008). Beginning in the late 19th century, this remote archipelago has increasingly been Colombianized (implying centralization and the promotion of the Spanish language and Catholicism), which met some opposition by the English-Creole speaking, mainly Protestant Raizals (Ross, 2007: 18-19). Assimilation pressure went as far that the teaching of English in schools was prohibited in schools. Furthermore, migration (at its height in the 1950s/1960s) reduced the native Raizals to a minority (Ross, 2007: 24; Mow, n.d.). According to Romero (2008), the Raizals nowadays make up roughly a third of the local population, though note that Romero pegs the total population at approximately 100,000 while Mow (n.d.) pegs it at approximately 80,000.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Raizals began to mobilize for self-determination after the Second World War. According to Ross (2007: 24), “Islanders not only demonstrated against the ‘abuses’ of the government but also tried to have the matter raised at an international level by appealing to the British Queen, the Vice-President of the U.S.A., and the United Nations with the argument that they should have the status of a ‘Self-governing Territory of Colombia.’ None of these calls were met with a positive response. In Colombia’s capital city, Bogotá, the ‘Club Archipiélago Unido’ met throughout the 1960s and 70s and acted as a pressure group to defend Islander culture under the slogan “La isla para los isleños” (Clemente, 1991: 254). Their main aims were the removal of the Mission Territory status of the islands, the election of Mayors and the development of education programmes in traditional Islander activities such as fishing. They also advocated for setting up schools and social centres through community action. They focused on the issues of identity and the preservation of the traditions and ecology of the islands. Based on Ross (2007: 24), we code 1960 as the start date since he reports that the Club Archipiélago Unido met throughout the 1960s (see above); we lack a clearer indication regarding the movement’s start date.
* The movement continued to gain traction throughout the 1970s. According to Ross (2007: 25), “[b]y the end of the 1970s these feelings had developed into a clear resistance to Colombianization with the appearance of publications and organisations such as the Islander Civic Movement, founded in 1978, and followed in the 1980s by MAR (Movimiento Autónomo Regional) and SOS (Sons of the Soil)”. The Islander Civic Movement proposed a return to traditional Islander culture, the officialization of English, bilingual education and television programmes, the restoration of civic pride and consciousness and the right to self-government (Clemente, 1991: 163). MAR and SOS continued the resistance in these areas but focused particularly on controlling immigration and establishing political autonomy.
* In 1991, the archipelago gained some limited autonomy but the reform did not succeed in taming the simmering conflict as political power went mainly to the majority of “non-native” Colombians (Ross, 2007: 5). Furthermore, since 1991, immigration from the mainland has been limited. Further legislation in 1993 aimed to protect the island’s environmental and cultural identity (Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board, 2001).
* Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board (2000) makes mention of an ongoing separatist movement among Raizals; they report a protest that took place in July 1999, which was organized by the *Movimiento por la Autodeterminación de la Isla* (Movement for the Island’s Self-Determination, MAI), an organization they claim is led by local pastors, priests, and other native leaders. Another 2001 report by Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board suggests that the SOS (which was formed back in the 1980s, see above) continued to exist.
* Mow (n.d.: 9) gives further evidence of an ongoing separatist movement: “many native islander groups, aware of the struggle between the two worlds and the consequences of the complete loss of their identity and extinction as an ethnic group, have risen up against the growth and socio-economic system imposed by the Colombian government and have made serious attempts to reaffirm and protect their people. Pastors of Baptist and Adventist churches are leading an initiative to take an active stand on issues related to native rights, equity, land and sea tenure, and self-determination.”
* Martinez & Nelson (2008: 787) report that “Afro-descendants” on San Andrés founded an umbrella organization, the Archipelago Movement for Ethnic-Native Self-Determination (AMEN-SD).
* A 2008 article in the NY Times reports a separatist movement in San Andrés (Romero, 2008). According to this, AMEN-SD symbolically declared independence in June 2007.
* AMEN-SD and the emerging movement R-Youth remained active until at least 2016, and thus code the movement as ongoing (Barras, 2016; Semana, 2015).
* Note: in 2012 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favor of Colombia’s sovereignty over the island but assigned a 200 nautical miles (370 km) maritime economic exclusion zone to Nicaragua (The Economist, 2012). [start date: 1960; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim appears to be for autonomy. Barras (2016) claims that both AMEN-SD and R-Youth openly reject the idea of independence. Rather, as an R-Youth spokesperson argued, “we want Raizals to be recognized as the rightful owners of this territory. With political power we want to improve the island” (Barras, 2016). Previously, the movements MAR and SOS had also mobilized in favour of establishing political autonomy (Clemente 1991:163). In June 2007, AMEN-SD issued a symbolic independence declaration, but the claim for autonomy seems dominant. [1960-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Despite the decalaration of independence in 2007, the group making this declaration (AMEN-SD) maintained its claim for increased autonomy, making the move less politically significant and more symbolic (Romero, 2008; Barras, 2016). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Raizals consists of the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to a 2008 NY Times article by Romero (2008), the Archipelago Movement for Ethnic Native Self-Determination for the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providence and Kethlena (AMEN-SD) symbolically declared independence in June 2007. The declaration of independence is also annexed to a 2013 letter addressed to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Navi Pillay) in which AMEN-SD call for the Commissioner’s attention to their cause (AMEN-SD, 2013). We do not code this since the declaration was only symbolic.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence above the threshold, hence the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the remote San Andrés Archipelago has increasingly been Colombianized (implying centralization and the promotion of the Spanish language and Catholicism), which met some opposition by the English-Creole speaking, mainly Protestant Raizals (Ross, 2007: 18-19). The Colombian state did not recognize indigenous Raizals and reduced them to the status of children or “minors” in a 1890 law (EPR, citing Minority Rights Group International). De facto a part of Colombia, the archipelago also came under de-jure Colombian sovereignty by the 1928 Esguerra-Bárcenas treaty between Colombia and Nicaragua (MRGI). Assimilation pressure went as far that the teaching of English in schools was prohibited. Furthermore, migration (at its height in the 1950s/1960s) reduced the native Raizals to a minority (Ross, 2007: 24; Mow n.d.).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* A new constitution came into force in July 1991. The constitution “gave place to a more comprehensive recognition of indigenous languages and cultures, their rights over their territories, and political representation for indigenous peoples and Afrocolumbians in the Congress” (EPR). In addition to the recognition of language and culture, article 329 of the 1991 constitution granted the right to collective ownership of traditional lands and administrative autonomy of indigenous territories (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, n.d.). Unlike in the case of the indigenous peoples (which EPR codes as regionally autonomous as of 1992), the Afro-Colombian population of which the Raizals form part was not granted any form of regional autonomy by the 1991 constitution (and is thus also not coded as regionally autonomous by EPR). However, with so-called “Community Councils”, which should guarantee the administration of legally recognized Afro-Colombian territory, they were granted some autonomy on a local level (EPR, citing UN expert on minority issues, 2011). Furthermore, the right of mainland Colombians to migrate, settle and work on the archipelago was also restricted by Decree No. 2762 of 1991. This restricion was confirmed by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in 1993 and 1999 (Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board, 2001). We code a concession due to the increase in local autonomy. [1991: autonomy concession]
* 1993 legislation aimed to protect the island’s environmental and cultural identity (Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board, 2001). The 1993 law appears to be an outflow of the changes in 1991, thus we code a single concession in 1991.
* In 2012, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a ruling over a decades-long territorial dispute regarding the San Andrés Archipielago between Colombia and Nicaragua. The ruling reaffirmed Colombia’s sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, but granted Nicaragua a 200 nautical miles maritime economic exclusion zone to Nicaragua (The Economist, 2012). Colombia’s defense in the ICJ did not include Raizal representation, and the arguments put forward by Colombia failed to mention that Raizal subsistence depends largely on access to these waters, effectively denying the right of Raizals to have a say on decisions that directly affect them (Ortíz, 2013). As a response to the ICJ’s ruling, the Colombian government set in motion the San Andrés Plan. Among other things, the Plan increased spending in public infrastructure, created new jobs, and granted subsidies to local fishermen as a form of reparation. However, the Plan also strengthened the presence of Colombian armed forces across the Archipielago, which some Raizals saw as an imposition of the government that eroded their territorial rights and self-determination (González Palacios, 2016). Overall, there could be grounds to code a restriction due to the ICJ ruling, but we consider this too ambiguous.

**Regional autonomy**

* The local autonomy that was granted in 1991 is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Raizals |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Afrocolumbians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 10003000 |

**Power access**

* According to Minority Rights Group International, the Raizals are descendants of original settlers, enslaved Africans, Amerindians and British emigrants. However, Minority Rights Group International lists them under the Afro-Columbian group and the Colombian authorities also consider them as part of the Afro-Colombian group. We thus link them to the EPR group ‘Afro-Columbians’. The Afro-Columbians are considered irrelevant until 1979 and from then on are coded powerless. EPR acknowledges that Afro-Colombians “face persecution, displacement and disappearances when their territories are in conflict with the state system” but following Van Cott’s (2007) argument that Colombia is one of Latin America’s countries most strongly committed to multiculturalism, EPR codes Afro-Columbians as powerless and not as discriminated.
* Yet, Minority Rights Group International reports that Raizals experience systematic “oppression and multiple discrimination” in terms of race, religion, language, and political and socio-economic status. Furthermore, citing OHCHR (2004), Minority Rights Group International states that Raizals suffer from cultural domination and religious aggression from “both mainland Colombians and the Catholic Church who are currently in control of the educational institutions and judicial systems […] The economy is in the hands of mainland Colombians who employ very few of the Raizales. The unemployment rate among the indigenous population is estimated at 70%”. We consider that Raizals experience even more discrimination at all levels of Colombian society than other Afro-Colombian groups, and therefore code them as discriminated. [1960-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* According to Romero (2008), the Raizals nowadays make up roughly a third of the local population of the San Andrés y Providencia Department, though note that Romero pegs the total population at approximately 100,000 while Mow (n.d.) pegs it at approximately 80,000. According to Minority Rights Group International, citing official statistics (OHCHR, 2004), the Raizal number 24,444. This number is in line with the proportion indicated by Mow (n.d.) and, relatively speaking, also very close to the number provided by Romero (2008). We go along with the information in Minority Rights Group International and, given Colombia’s total population in 2004 (45.53 million according to the World Bank), code a population share of 0.00053. This estimate is confirmed by the 2018 census, which estimates that there are 25,515 Raizals living in Colombia (MinSalud, n.d.) [0.0005]

**Regional concentration**

* Migration (at its height in the 1950s/1960s) reduced the native Raizals to a minority in their own homeland (Ross 2007: 24; Mow n.d.), and as of today, the Raizals make up roughly a third of the local population of the San Andrés y Providencia Department (see Romero 2008). [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes the Raizals as a subgroup of the EPR group ‘Afro-Columbians’ which are also coded as having no kin groups. MAR does code ethnic kin ties to Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Venezuelans; consistent with general practice we do not code ethnic ties between Black populations in the Americas (see U.S.). We could find no other evidence for kin outside of Colombia. [no kin]

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