# CONGO-ZAIRE

## Bakongo

Activity: 1969-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Bundu dia Kongo (Kingdom of Kongo), a nationalist politico-religious group founded in 1969, has been demanding autonomy for Bas-Congo Province in southwestern DRC. The Bas-Kongo province is inhabited primarily by the Bakongo. Bundu dia Kongo demands that its adherents renounce western and eastern religions and has sometimes pushed them into committing acts of violence. It seeks the restoration of the ancient Kongo kingdom within its pre-colonial boundaries, which encompassed parts of today's Angola, the Republic of Congo and Gabon. The center of the kingdom was located in Bas-Congo Province and in neighboring Bandundu Province of modern-day DRC (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2002).
* The movement is ongoing as of 2020 (Roth 2015; 273). According to UCDP/PRIO, Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) attempted ot occupy media headquarters in 1998 to proclaim the independence of Kongo provinces. In 2008, the group changed its name to Bundu dia Mayala after BDK became a banned organization under Congo law. In 2020, Ne Muanda Nsemi, the BDK/BDM leader, declared Kongo Central independent and proclaimed himself president of the “Federal Republic of Kongo Central (Human Rights Watch 2020; UCDP/PRIO). [start date: 1969; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Tull (2010: 647), the BDK staged demonstrations in July 2002 demanding greater autonomy for the province. This renewed activism reached its pinnacle in 2008. Mangu (2008: 511) confirms the claim for autonomy within the DRC. Further evidence is provided by a report of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), where the BDK is described as seeking “the establishment of a decentralized political and administrative system which would give the Kongo people more control over their political and economic destiny” (IRB 2011).
* However, there are also several sources arguing that BDK actually seeks secession: Kim (2016: 37), for example, states that the BDK was formed in 1969, “arguing for the independence of the Bakongo state” and “the reestablishment of the pre-colonial Kongo Kingdom.” According to Turner (2010), there was also a more recent claim for independence by the BDK, which “is agitating for secession from DRC and reunification of the Kongo people of Angola, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon”. Global Security (2017) also describes the BDK as secessionist, with the goals of creating an “independent ethnic Kongo kingdom […] controlled by the Kongo people during the 15th century.” In 2020, the current leader of BDK declared Kongo Central independent and proclaimed himself president of the “Federal Republic of Kongo Central” (UCDP/PRIO; Human Rights Watch 2020).
* In sum, it is hard to identify a dominant claim. The Institute for Security Studies has come to the same conclusion, when it stated that “it is really hard to have clarity on whether BDK wants federalism or secession.” Following the coding instructions, we code the more extreme claim, which is independence. [1969-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1969; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Bundu dia Kongo’s claims are derived from the ancient Kongo Kingdom, which stretches across parts of Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) and the Republic of the Congo. However, following SDM coding rules, we only code those areas within Congo-Zaire. This area includes the province Kongo Central, formerly Bas-Congo, which we code based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* At a demonstration in July 2002, 14 protestors were shot to death, but this does not meet the LVIOLSD threshold.
* LVIOLSD coding is used for 2007-2008: In 2007, around 100 BDK members died when policemen clashed with the BDK in the Bas-Congo province, where the BDK had begun to set up a government; in 2008, more than 100 died during the conflicts. In agreement with this, UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over the Kongo Kingdom in 2007-2008.
* According to UCDP/PRIO, the LVIOLSD threshold was next met in 2017, when the Makesa (armed wing of Bundu dia Kongo) attacked a prison to free Ne Muanda Nsemi. After this, the conflict appears to have de-escalated; UCDP/PRIO does not report any deaths in 2018-2019.
* According to UCDP/PRIO, the LVIOLSD threshold was again met in 2020 due to clashes after Ne Muanada Nsemi had declared Kongo Central independent and proclaimed himself president of the “Federal Republic of Kongo Central.” UCDP/PRIO does not record any fatalities in 2021. [1969-2006: NVIOLSD; 2007-2008: LVIOLSD; 2009-2016: NVIOLSD; 2017: LVIOLSD; 2018-2019: NVIOLSD; 2020: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the thirteenth century, a number of small, autonomous Kongo states united to form the Kongo kingdom. The kingdom expanded and evolved into a sophisticated state system. The Portuguese, at first welcomed by the Kongos, soon turned to the lucrative slave trade, which disrupted a wide area of the Congo Basin. In 1665, the Portuguese invaded the kingdom and made it disintegrate into a number of small, warring states (Minahan 2002: 1011).
* The Berlin Conference in 1885 resulted in arbitrary partition of the Kongo territory. Portugal was given Cabinda and the territory south of the Congo River, while Belgium took the northern part of the kingdom. Claims for a united Kongo kingdom resurfaced at various points in time, e.g. in 1921 with the irredentist movement of Simon Kimbangru or in the late 1940s with the formation of the Association for the Maintenance, Unity, and Expansion of the Kikongo Language (ABAKO).
* The Belgians granted independence to the entire Belgian Congo as the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 1960. The Alliance of Bakongo (ABAKO) led by Joseph Kasavubu won a sweeping victory in the first elections in the Kongo areas. Joseph Kasavubu, a Bakongo, became the first President of the independent DRC and Patrice Lumumba (MNC-L) its first Prime Minister (Minahan 2002: 1013). In May 1960, the Belgian parliament adopted the ‘Loi Fondamentale’, which provided for a significant degree of provincial autonomy and allowed the provinces to elect their own government and assembly. However, Bakongo can only be considered autonomous with the administrative restructuring of the country in 1962, which split the six old provinces into 21 new provinces, among which also Kongo Central, the homeland of the Bakongo, which previously had been included into the larger province of Léopoldville (Young 1966: 37, Weiss and Nzongola-Ntalaja 2013). With this restructuring, the Bakongo were granted their own autonomous province. The 1964 constitution institutionalized this decentralized form of government. We code a prior concession in 1962. [1962: autonomy concession]
* Mobutu’s coup d’état in November 1965 ended regional autonomy and initiated a period of extreme centralization in which provinces had a purely administrative function. The new regime reestablished most of the colonial provinces and only left the Bakongo and the Luba-Kasai retain their own province. However, since Mobutu centralized power, deprived the provinces of their governments, and replaced them with a non-native administrator loyal to the regime, the Bakongo also lost regional autonomy (Turner 2007). [1965: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* A new constitution adopted in 2006, was seen as a compromise between centralists and advocates of a federalist structure. The central government was given the right to supervise the decentralized entities and the president of the republic could nominate governors and vice-governors. On the other hand, there were also federalist elements, such as the “division of competencies between the central government and the provinces, and the administrative autonomy of the provinces”. The regions were granted responsibility for education and were given financial means including land tax, taxes on rental income and motor vehicle taxation (Turner 2007: 2). Furthermore, the 11 provinces were split into 26 provinces. This administrative reorganization did not affect the Bakongo province, which continued to exist in the borders of 1963. However, its name was changed from Bas-Zaire to Bas-Congo (Weiss and Nzongola-Ntalaja 2013). Note: the federalist elements of the 2006 constitution were already included in the Transition Constitution of 2003 following the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria Agreement) that ended the Second Congo War. However, decentralization has not been implemented. The ICG notes that from 2008-2010, the government had not progressed towards drawing the boundaries of the 26 provinces and the provinces still do not receive 40% of the provincial revenue as stated in the decentralization process. In fact, the provinces continue to receive less than 10% and these funds are considered grants from the government rather than any control over provincial revenue (International Crisis Group 2010: 13). In July 2015, the government reorganized territory of the country into 26 terrirorial units (25 provinces and the capital city of Kinshasa). However, the legal framework for decentralization seems still unfinished (Zongwe 2019: 24). Based on this, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bakongo |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bakongo |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 49003000 |

**Power access**

* We draw on EPR. [1969-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR. [0.103]

**Regional concentration**

* In the province of Kongo Central, the Bakongo make up 66% of the population, which is almost the entire Bakongo population in the DRC. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are kin groups in neighboring Angola and the Republic of the Congo, as also coded by EPR and MAR. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher (2014). *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Global Security (2017). “Bundu dia Kongo (Kingdom of Kongo) (BDK).” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/bundu-dia-kongo.htm [July 14, 2017]

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements.* Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 327.

Human Rights Watch (2020). “DR Congo: Bloody Crackdown on Political Religious Group”. [https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/19/dr-congo-bloody-crackdown-political-religious-group#](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/19/dr-congo-bloody-crackdown-political-religious-group) [September 5, 2022]

International Crisis Group (2010). “Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda.” *Africa Briefing.* http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B73%20Congo%  
20-%20A%20Stalled%20Democratic%20Agenda%20ENGLISH.pdf [March 23, 2012].

IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2011): “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Information on the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) movement.” http://www.refworld.org/docid/4db7c1382.html [July 14, 2017].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. <http://www.keesings.com> [March 1, 2016].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [March 23, 2014].

Mangu, André Mbata B. (2008). "Law, religion and human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo." *African Human Rights Law Journal* 8(2): 505-525.

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 64.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1009-1016.

Minorities at Risk Project (MAR) (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Groups*. <http://minorityrights.org/directory/> [March 1, 2016].

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Tull, Denis M. (2010). “Troubled state-building in the DR Congo: the challenge from the margins.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 48(4): 643-661.

Turner, Thomas (2007). “Congo-Kinshasa leans towards federalism.” *Federations Magazine* *7*(1): 4-5.

Turner, Thomas (2010). “Independence Day: Fifty Years after Lumumba Speech, DRC's Riches Still Not Benefiting her Children.” https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics\_online/0046 [July 14, 2017].

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* [www.ucdp.uu.se/database](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database) [September 5, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Weiss, Herbert, and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (2009). “Decentralization and the DRC: An overview.” *New York: Center for International Cooperation*.

Young, Crawford (1966). “Post-independence Politics in the Congo.” *Transition* 26(1): 34-41.

Zongwe, Dunia (2019). “Democratic Republic of the Congo.” *Autonomy Arrangements in the World (Online Compendium)*.

## Banyamulenge

Activity: 1966-1989

**General notes**

* The Banyamulenge are a community of ethnic Tutsis in South Kivu. Like other Banyarwanda (Hutus, Tusis, and Batwa who live along the Rwandan border in North and South Kivu), the Banyamulenge speak Kinyarwanda. Many Banyarwanda, including many Banyamulenge, found themselves on the Congelese side of the Rwandan border as a result of colonial border-drawing. The Tutsi population in DRC increased in the late 1950s as large numbers of Tutsi refugees fled persecution in Rwanda and crossed to the DRC; there were also substantial refugee flows as a result of the 1994 genocide. Banyarwanda are widely seen as foreigners and many were excluded from citizenship when the DRC became independent. The Banyamulenge live in the Mulenge area in south Kivu. The Tutsis in South Kivu started to call themselves Banyamulenge (people from Mulenge) instead of Banyarwanda (people from Rwanda) in the 1970s. The term is sometimes also used for Congelese Tutsi more generally. The South Kivu region is multi-ethnic and the Banyamulenge constitute only a minority. The majority ethnic groups are the Bashi and Barega (Check 2011; MRGI).

**Movement start and end dates**

* Many Banyumelenge initially joined the Simba rellion that was launched in Kivu in 1963, but later switched sides as groups associated with Simba attacked their community. The central government rewarded the Banyumelenge’s loyalty by appointing group members to high positions in the regional capital, Bukavu, and Banyumelenge subsequently also tended to have better access to education, social services, the army, and employment opportunities. In an effort to protect their community, Banyamulenge leaders also started to make claims for an autonomous entity. The first evidence for separatist activity we could find is in 1966, when Banyamulenge asked local political and military authorities to create a new politica-administrative zone on the Hauts Plateux of the Uvira area (the Collectivité des Hauts Plateux d’Itombwe). The request was turned down. Banyamulenge continued to make claims for their own autonomous administrative entity in Itombwe throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Vlassenroot 2013: 27).
* We found no evidence for organized separatist claims beyond that. Lacking a clearer indication, we code the movement’s end date in 1989. The Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda more generally continued to play an important role in Congolese politics in the 1990s and beyond; however, conflicts in the 1990s and beyond were focused mostly on the issue of citizenship and expulsions. In addition, Banyarwandas were involved in conflicts over land in the 1990s, but these were predominantly intercommuncal conflicts involving other ethnic groups such as the Hunde. It seems possible that claims for territorial self-determinatin were made in this context by the Banyarwanda and also other groups, but we found no specific evidence of claims for increased territorial self-determination made against the state (cf. MRGI). [start date: 1966; end date: 1989]

**Dominant claim**

* Claims are focused on the creation of an autonomous zone on the Hauts Plateux of the Uvira area (the Collectivité des Hauts Plateux d’Itombwe) (Vlassenroot 2013: 27). [1966-1989: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Claims are focused on the creation of an autonomous zone on the Hauts Plateux of the Uvira area (the Collectivité des Hauts Plateux d’Itombwe) (Vlassenroot 2013: 27). We code this claim based on GADM. The coded territory corresponds to the Uvira region shown in map 2 of Vlassenroot (2013: 4).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Banyarwanda played a major role in the (center-seeking) Congolese civil wars in the 1990s and beyond, but we found no indications for separatist violence against the state above the threshold, and so code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Like other Banyarwanda (Hutus, Tusis, and Batwa who live along the Rwandan border in North and South Kivu), the Banyamulenge speak Kinyarwanda. Many Banyarwanda, including many Banyamulenge, found themselves on the Congelese side of the Rwandan border as a result of colonial border-drawing. The Tutsi population in DRC increased in the late 1950s as large numbers of Tutsi refugees fled persecution in Rwanda and crossed to the DRC; there were also substantial refugee flows as a result of the 1994 genocide. Banyarwanda are widely seen as foreigners and many were excluded from citizenship when the DRC became independent. The Banyamulenge live in the Mulenge area in south Kivu. The Tutsis in South Kivu started to call themselves Banyamulenge (people from Mulenge) instead of Banyarwanda (people from Rwanda) in the 1970s. The term is sometimes also used for Congelese Tutsi more generally (Check 2011; MRGI).
* The South Kivu region is multi-ethnic and the Banyamulenge constitute only a minority. The majority ethnic groups are the Bashi and Barega (Check 2011; MRGI).
* Many Banyumelenge initially joined the Simba rellion that was launched in Kivu in 1963, but later switched sides as groups associated with Simba attacked their community. The central government rewarded the Banyumelenge’s loyalty by appointing group members to high positions in the regional capital, Bukavu, and Banyumelenge subsequently also tended to have better access to education, social services, the army, and employment opportunities. In an effort to protect their community, Banyamulenge leaders also started to make claims for an autonomous entity (Vlassenroot 2013: 27).
* In 1962, Kivu province was divided into three provinces: North Kivu, South Kivu, and Maniema. According to Jackson (2006), Banyarwanda leaders bitterly contested this as they expected that this would diminish their influence on the provincial administration. It is possible that this could be seen as a restriction as defined in the codebook, but overall the connection to the Banyamulenge (who form a minority in one of the three new provinces) is too ambiguous.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* A request for an autonomous entity made by Banyamulenge in 1966 was turned down (Vlassenroot 2013: 27).
* In 1979, a compromise was reached on the creation of a groupement in Bijombo, an administrative entity subsumed under a collectivité, which originally comprised 18 villages, 12 of them headed by a Munyamulenge chief. However, an ethnic Vira was appointed as the head of the entity (Vlassenroot 2013: 28). We do not code a concession.
* Another key issue was the citizenship status of the Banyamulenge. The 1964 constitution stated that only Banyamulenge who had been a member of a tribe or part of a tribe established in the Congo before 18 October 1908 were eligible for citizenship (MRGI). The central government distributed identity cards to Banyamulenge in 1969, but the administrator in Itoombwe refused to give these identity cards to Banyamulenge, who he considered foreigners (Vlassenroot 2013: 28). In 1971, the central government issued a decree providing that people originating from Rwanda or Burundi and established in Congo on 30 June 1960 were eligible for citizenship; but in 1972, the date was moved backward to 1 January 1950. The Mobutu regime was unable to implement the decree, however (Check 2011: 2). In 1981, dramatically more restrictive rules were adopted by the Zairian parliament according to which tribes had to have been established in Zaire already in 1885 (MRGI). We do not code changes in nationality laws as they relate to political inclusion and government access and not ethnic rights as defined here.

**Regional autonomy**

* The South Kivu region is multi-ethnic and the Banyamulenge constitute only a minority. The majority ethnic groups are the Bashi and Barega (Check 2011; MRGI). We found no evidence for regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Banyamulenge |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Tutsi-Banyamulenge |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 49013000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code the Banyamulenge specifically but also Tutsis, including the more numerous Tutsis in North Kivu. According to EPR, Tutsis in DRC were powerless from 1966-1989. However, as noted above, many Tutsis including many Banyamulenge were refused citizenship in 1960 and while there were some expansion laws in subsequent years, these were not implemented. In 1981, nationality laws again became highly restrictive. This suggests that Banyamulenge were systematically excluded from political power in the center. [1966-1989: discriminated]

**Group size**

* No precise demographic data for DRC is available and estimates of the Banyamulenge population range from 30,000-400,000. We here draw on an estimate by Prunier (2009), according to which there were 50-70,000 Banyamulenge at the time of writing. The World Bank estimates the DRC’s population as ca 60 mio around 2008/9. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* The evidence is highly limited as no precise demographic data for DRC is available. The sources we consulted universally stated that Banyamulenge are located in the South Kivu province (Check 2011: 3), specifically in the area around Mulenge/Itombwe Mountains (MRGI). Additional research suggests that the Banyamulenge are more specifically settled primarily on the high plateau of Itombwe, where also Bembe people reside. Overall, the evidence is not clear, but regional concentration seems the most plausible. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* There are Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Check, Nicasius Achu (2011). “The Banyamulenge and the Unmaking of the Congolese State: Issues and Prospects.” *Policy Brief 63.* Africa Institute of South Africa.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Jackson, Stephen (2006). “Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Politics of Autochthony in Eastern D.R. Congo.” *African Studies Review* 49(2): 95-123.

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Groups*. <http://minorityrights.org/directory/> [November 9, 2021].

[Prunier, Gérard](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%A9rard_Prunier) (2009). [*Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*](https://archive.org/details/africasworldwarc0000prun). Oxford: OUP.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* https://ucdp.uu.se/?id=1&id=1 [November 9, 2021].

Vlassenroot, Koen (2013). *South Kivu. Identity Territory, and Power in the Eastern Congo.* Rift Valley Institute.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Luba

Activity: 1960-1962

**General notes**

* The Luba are also referred to as Luba-Kasai or Kasaians.

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2002), the Lubas started to make claims for increased autonomy around June 1960, when the DRC gained independence from Belgium. We code the start date in 1960 while noting that the movement could have been active already in 1959 when the DRC was still a Belgian colony. The Lubas attempted to secede in 1960 leading to war. The rebels were defeated in 1962 (Roth 2015: 270; UCDP/PRIO). We find no further evidence of separatist activity following the defeat of the rebels, and they seem to have abandoned their goals, perhaps because the Luba were severely repressed under Mobutu (but were privileged from 1996 onward under the Kabila regimes). Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1962. [start date: 1960; end date: 1962]

**Dominant claim**

* Prior to independence, Albert Kalonji proposed a federation of autonomous states in the Congo. However, when the Belgian authorities ignored the suggestion and granted independence to a unified Congo, Luba nationalists - inspired by the secessionist Katanga - declared the independence of Kasai in 1960. The central government re-conquered South Kasai and the Luba abandoned their demand for secession in 1963 (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project). [1960-1962: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1960; end date: 1962]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Luba is the former province Kasai, which consisted of today’s provinces of Kasai, Kasai-Central, Kasai-Oriental, Lomami and Sankuru (Bartholomew 1956) We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Albert Kalonji declared the independence of Kasai on 9 August 1960 (Minahan 2002: 950). [1960: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The movement appears to have been nonviolent initially, but the conflict soon escalated when after Luba nationalists had declared the independence of Kasai, either in August or September 1960, depending on the source. Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war in 1960-1965. As is explained in their coding notes, the war combines several rebellions with different goals, one of which was the war over Kasai. Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) cite estimates suggesting that the war led to 1,000-7,000 deaths on the Luba side alone, so we code HVIOLSD from 1960 to 1962, the year in which the Luba abandoned their demand for secession. [1960-1962: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Prior to colonization, the Luba state controlled extensive territories in what today is Congo, Zambia, and Angola. Conflict with the Lunda kingdom in Katanga, internal dissension, and civil war disintegrated the kingdom into a number of small successor states. These were colonized by the Belgians in 1885. The Lubas, fiercely resisting occupation at first, soon adapted to European culture and education and became a politically and economically privileged group, which in turn produced resentment by the Lunda in the southern portions of the Katanga Province. The Luba moved into the local administration and began working on Belgian farms and industries (Minahan 2002: 948; Minorities at Risk Project).
* The Belgians granted independence to the entire Belgian Congo as the Democratic Republic of Congo on 30 June 1960. In May 1960, the Belgian parliament adopted the ‘Loi Fondamentale’, which provided for a significant degree of provincial autonomy and allowed the provinces to elect their own government and assembly once the country has become independent (Young 1966: 37). [1960: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In late 1961, the central government regained control over secessionist South Kasai and imprisoned Albert Kalonji. This is not coded as a restriction.
* The administrative restructuring of the country in 1962 split the six old provinces into 21 new provinces. The Kasai province was split into the five provinces Lomami, Sankuru, Sud-Kasai, Luluabourg, and Unité-Kasaienne (Young 1966: 37, Weiss and Nzongola-Ntalaja 2013). We could not find evidence that this ended the autonomy of the Kasai province. Autonomy was ended with Mobutu’s coup d’état in November 1965 that initiated a period of extreme centralization in which provinces had a purely administrative function. Hence, no restriction is coded in 1962.

**Regional autonomy**

* Due to de facto independence in 1960-62. [1960-1962: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Kasai was declared independent on 9 August 1960 (Dufresne 2011; Williame 1973). As this was in such short temporal proximity to Congo-Zaire’s independence, which came at the end of June, we do not apply the first of January rule. In 1962, Kasai was re-integrated. [1960-1962: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Zaire attained independence in 1960, implying a host change. [1960: host change (new)]
* [1960: establishment of de-facto independent state]
* [1962: abolishment of de-facto independent state]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Luba |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Luba Kasai |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 49005000 |

**Power access**

* We rely on EPR. [1960-1962: powerless]

**Group size**

* We rely on EPR. [0.07]
  + Note: there are also Lubas in the Shaba province (see MAR), which EPR considers a separate group. The attempted secession was by the Lubas in Kasai, so we only associate the movement with the Luba-Kasai group in EPR.
  + Note as well: Minahan (2002: 947) combines the Luba and Lulua tribes as a single stateless nation; according to Minahan, they made up about 11.5 million in 2002, or about 23% of the DRC's population (using the WB estimate of the 2002 population of the DRC as a baseline, 50 million). However, Minahan (2002: 950) also notes that the self-declared (South) Kasai republic was associated with the Lubas in the Kasai region.

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 947), the Luba make up 83% of the population in their homeland (which today is split up into the five provinces Lomami, Sankuru, Kasai-Oriental, Kasai-Central, and Kasai), which amounts to around 70% of the entire Luba population in the DRC. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* Neither MAR nor EPR codes ethnic kin in another country. Minahan (2002: 947) mentions Luba-Kasai subtribes in Angola and Zambia. However, we could not find evidence that these groups are large enough to be coded here. [no kin]

**Sources**

Bartholomew, John (1956). *Congo and Angola, Plate 91*. Houghton Mifflin Co., John Bartholomew & Son LTD.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher (2014). *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dufresne, André (2011). “Les Timbres-poste du Sud-Kasaï”. *Philatélie Québec* (292): 25–31. <http://www.philateliequebec.com/Numeros2011/Janvier11_Revue292.pdf> [Setpember 14, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements.* Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 327.

Keesing’s Record of World Events. <http://www.keesings.com> [March 1, 2016].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [March 23, 2014].

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 533-535.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 947-953.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Groups*. <http://minorityrights.org/directory/> [March 1, 2016].

Sambanis, Nicholas, & Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonas (2019). “Sovereignty Rupture as a Central Concept in Quantitative Measures of Civil War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(6): 1542–1578.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* [www.ucdp.uu.se/database](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database) [March 1, 2016].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Weiss, Herbert, and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (2009). “Decentralization and the DRC: An overview.” *New York: Center for International Cooperation*.

Williame, Jean-Claude (1972). *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Young, Crawford (1966). “Post-independence Politics in the Congo.” *Transition* 26(1): 34-41.

## Lunda-Yeke

Activity: 1960-2020

**General notes**

* The Lunda-Yeke are also referred to as the Katangans.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1957, the Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga (CONAKAT) was founded, a political party formed from several Katangan ethnic associations. CONAKAT called for a federal Congo (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 151; Minahan 2002: 968-696). As this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, 1957 is coded as start date. Since Zaire did not become independent until 1960, we begin to code the movement in 1960 but note prior nonviolent activity. Katanga attempted to secede in 1960, leading to war. The war ended in 1963, when Katanga was forcibly reintegrated with the DRC (Minahan 2002: 969). Marshall & Gurr (2003) report that the movement remained active after that and, on this basis, we code the movement as ongoing throughout the rest of the 1960s, the 1970s, and 1980s. We should note, however, that we did not find reports of separatist activity until December 1993, when according to MAR the governor of Katanga and other political leaders declared the region autonomous and announced that the region would impose taxes on all goods entering and leaving the area (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 327 too note separatist activity in the 1990s). Minahan (2016: 211), Roth (2015: 272), and UCDP/PRIO suggest that the movement remained ongoing as of 2020. Roth (2015: 272) suggests that a new separatist outfit called Union of Forces for the Liberation of Katanga (ULFKA) was formed in 2011. Furthermore, the Kata Katanga Mai-Mais have waged a violent rebellion in recent years (see below). [start date: 1957; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1960, Katanga declared independence and there was a de-facto independent state until 1963. According to UCDP, there have been several outright secessionist organizations ever since the 1960s. Also Minahan (2002) argues that the dominant claim has been for secession from Zaire/DRC. Based on this, we code an independence claim throughout, even if in 1993, there was a declaration of autonomy rather than independence. [1960-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* CONAKAT declared independence of Katanga in 1960. Before that, it had sought a federal government for Congo. The declaration of independence was a reaction to the strong centralized government of the newly independent Congo (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 300). We therefore code the start date of the independence claim in 1960. [start date: 1960; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Katangans is the province of Katanga, which is also known as Shaba (Minahan 2002: 969-979). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Shortly after Congo’s independence, in July 1960, Katanga declared its independence (Minahan 2002: 2123; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 152). [1960: independence declaration]
* In December 1993, the Katanga government led by Karl-i-Bond declared regional autonomy and announced that “Katanga will impose taxes on all goods entering and leaving the area” (Minorities at Risk Project). [1993: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war in 1960-1965. As is explained in their coding notes, the war combines several rebellions with different goals, one of which was the war over Katanga that started in 1960 and was forcibly ended by Congolese troops with heavy assistance from UN troops in January 1963. UCDP/PRIO codes this conflict as a minor war, but Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) cite estimates suggesting there were more than 80,000 deaths. On this basis, we code 1960-1963 with HVIOLSD.
* In previous versions of this dataset, we coded another period of HVIOLSD in 1977-1978 due to the Shaba wars. We no longer do so because the rebel group’s (FLNC) sole aim was to overthrow the Mobutu government. The roots of FLNC can be traced to the Katanga secessionist rebellion in 1960-1963 in the sense that the FLNC was formed by former Katangan gendarmes that had received sanctuary in Angola after the defeat of Katanga in 1963. However, in 1977/1978 their goal was not secession but to overthrow the government (UCDP/PRIO). (By contrast, Minahan (2002: 970) reports that the FNLC’s aim was to resurrect the Katangan state, but we could not verify this claim. ) The 5-year MAR rebellion index remains at six until 1984, suggesting that low-level violent activity continued beyond 1978. The coding is not explained by MAR, but the violence was likely also related to the government, so we code NVIOLSD throughout 1977-1984.
* In December 1993 the Governor of Katanga and other political leaders declared the region autonomous and announced that the region would impose taxes on all goods entering and leaving the area (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 327 too note separatist activity in the 1990s). MAR reports that following the 1993 declaration of autonomy there have been repeated clashes between the army and militants who favor regional autonomy. However, MAR codes a rebellion score of zero and were not able to find reports of violence in either Keesing’s or Lexis-Nexis.
* Katanga secessionist attempts have continued under the Mai-Mai, which are multi-ethnic militias formed within communities. However, since not all Mai-Mai groups fought for self-determination, it is difficult to parse out the casualty estimates for only pro-autonomy or pro-secessionist groups. In 2005, there was an alleged secessionist attempt with no casualties reported. In 2011, the Union of Forces for the Liberation of Katanga was formed to fight for secession but no casualty estimates could be found for that group. After a prison raid released 1,000 ex-Mai Mai soldiers in September 2011, the Mai Mai Kata Katanga group was formed as distinct Mai Mai group that fought distinctly for self-determination (Lexis Nexis: Sydney MX (Australia) 9/8/2011). Death estimates could not be found for Kata Katanga in 2011, but there were at least 25 casualties in 2012 attributed to the group (Lexis Nexis: AP 1/25/2012). UCDP/PRIO codes a separatist armed conflict involving Kata Katanga in 2013-2014 and again in 2020. In 2021, the number of battle-related deaths dropped to 16. Based on this information, we code LVIOLSD in 2012-2014 and 2020. [1960-1963: HVIOLSD; 1964-2011: NVIOLSD; 2012-2014: LVIOLSD; 2015-2019: NVIOLSD; 2020-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Before colonization the Katangans used to have their own autonomous Kingdom. In 1885, the Katanga Kingdom was subdued by the Belgians. Katanga was fully integrated into the Belgian colony in 1933. The Lunda and Yeke lost much of their autonomy; incoming Luba-Kasais occupied most of the important administrative and business positions (Minahan 2002: 968; Minorities at Risk Project).
* The Belgians granted independence to the entire Belgian Congo as the Democratic Republic of Congo on 30 June 1960. In May 1960, the Belgian parliament adopted the ‘Loi Fondamentale’, which provided for a significant degree of provincial autonomy and allowed the provinces to elect their own government and assembly once the country has become independent (Young 1966: 37). Katanga was one of the six provinces. [1960: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 152), Zaire’s leadership at a 1961 conference agreed to a federal structure for Zaire, but only two months later renounced the agreement. We do not code a concession because the promise was not acted upon and it was taken back after only two months.
* The administrative restructuring of the country in 1962 split the six old provinces into 21 new provinces. The Katangan province was split into three provinces: Nord-Katanga, Lualaba, and Katanga-Oriental. The provinces did retain significant autonomy, however (Young 1966: 37, Weiss and Nzongola-Ntalaja 2013).
* In 1963, Katanga was forcibly reintegrated into Zaire (Minahan 2002: 969). We do not code this as a restriction because we only code non-violent restrictions and because Congo-Zaire did not revoke autonomy it had previously granted (Katanga’s sovereignty was de-facto).
* Mobutu’s coup d’état in November 1965 ended regional autonomy and initiated a period of extreme centralization in which provinces had a purely administrative function. The new regime reestablished most of the colonial provinces, but effectively deprived the provinces of their autonomy and replaced the pre-existing governments them with a non-native administrator loyal to the regime (Turner 2007). [1965: autonomy restriction]
* In December 1993, the Katanga government led by Karl-i-Bond declared regional autonomy and announced that “Katanga will impose taxes on all goods entering and leaving the area” (Minorities at Risk Project). Mobutu did not respond to this declaration and many considered this a tacit acceptance (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 971). However, despite a lack of response to Katanga’s declaration of regional autonomy in 1993, in 1994 Mobutu’s government rejected a charter from the Katanga government that outlined “the powers of the regional parliament” (Minahan 2002: 971). Since no change in the Katangans’ autonomy was involved, we do not code a restriction.
* The 2006 DRC constitution called for a decentralization process in which the 11 provinces of DRC would be reorganized into 26 provinces, and each province would have budgetary autonomy via control of 40% of the provincial revenue (AFDB 2009: 8; Weiss & Nzongola-Ntalaja 2013). In 2008, DRC passed a series of laws that aimed to implement the 2006 decentralization plans. “The laws relating to the (i) creation, organization and functioning of [decentralized territorial entities] within provinces; and (ii) setting-up of the Governor’s Conference (a body intended to facilitate consultation between provinces and the central authority) were enacted…” (AFDB 2009: 8). The law ratified the division of the 11 original provinces into 26 provinces, one of which would be Kinshasa. However, decentralization has not been implemented. The ICG notes that from 2008-2010, the government had not progressed towards drawing the boundaries of the 26 provinces and the provinces still do not receive 40% of the provincial revenue as stated in the decentralization process. In fact, the provinces continue to receive less than 10% and these funds are considered grants from the government rather than any control over provincial revenue (International Crisis Group 2010: 13). In July 2015, the government reorganized territory of the country into 26 terrirorial units (25 provinces and the capital city of Kinshasa). However, the legal framework for decentralization seems still unfinished (Zongwe 2019: 24). Based on this, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Katangans were de facto independent between 1960 and 1963 and after 1965 all regional autonomy was abolished. [1960-1965: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Katanga was declared independent on July 11, 1960, a few days after Congo-Zaire’s independence, which came at the end of June. Katanga operated as a de-facto independent state until 1963, when it was forcibly reintegrated (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 151). We do not apply the first of January rule because the establishment of de-facto independence more or less coincided with Zaire’s independence. [1960-1963: de-facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Zaire attained independence in 1960, implying a host change. [1960: host change (new)]
* [1960: establishment of de-facto independent state]
* [1963: abolishment of de-facto independent state]
* [1965: autonomy revocation]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lunda-Yeke |
| *Scenario* | 1:1/No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Lunda-Yeke |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 49011000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the group in 1960-1965 and then from 1998 onward, but considers the Lunda-Yeke irrelevant from 1966-1997. We code the Lunda-Yeke as powerless throughout this period. Evidence for this coding can be found in the coding notes of the Minorities at Risk Project. MAR reports that the Mobutu regime used the Lunda and Yeke as pawns by encouraging them to drive out the Luba-Kasai but without giving them representation within the central government. There is also no evidence of discrimination: Minahan (2002: 969) mentions a “terrorist campaign of murder, rape, and looting” by Luba rebels against the Katangans (Lunda-Yeke) as a result of ethnic rivalry, but there seems not to have been active discrimination by the central government. For all other years, the EPR codes are adopted. [1960-1964: powerless; 1965: junior partner; 1966-1997: powerless; 1998-2003: junior partner; 2004-2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR. [0.056]

**Regional concentration**

* In the spatially contiguous Province of Katanga the Katangans make up 76% of the population. This amounts to around 3.27 million people (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the around 5,360,000 Katangans in the whole country in that same year (Minahan 2002: 966). [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There is kin (Lundas) in Angola and Zambia (see EPR). Additional evidence of the existence of ethnic kin is provided by the Minorities at Risk Project. MAR states that the “group has close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base” and also lists the Lunda in Zambia and the Lunda in Angola as the two largest kin groups from 1960 onwards. Finally, Minahan (2002: 966) also names Angola and Zambia as countries with settlements of approximately two million Katangans. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

African Development Bank (2009)*.* “Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic and Sector Work: Regional Economic Development in Bas Congo in the Context of Decentralization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).” http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/  
Documents/Project-and-Operations/DRC\_Etude%20decentralisation\_english\_\_01.pdf [March 23, 2012].

Association pour le Développement du Sanwi (APDS). “Territoire du Royaume Sanwi.” http://delegationroyaumesanwi.fr.gd/Territoire-Royaume-Sanwi.htm [November 5, 2015].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Goldstone, Jack A. (ed.) (1998). *The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions.* Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, p. 113.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, pp. 151-153, 299-300, 327.

International Crisis Group (2010). “Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda.” *Africa Briefing.* http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B73%20Congo%  
20-%20A%20Stalled%20Democratic%20Agenda%20ENGLISH.pdf [March 23, 2012].

IRI News (2013). “Conflict Cuts off Civilians in DRC’s Katanga.” May 2. <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97963/Conflict-cuts-off-civilians-in-DRC-s-Katanga> [June 19, 2014].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [April 17, 2002].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [June 20, 2003].

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 286-288.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 966-972.

Minahan, James (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Sambanis, Nicholas, & Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonas (2019). “Sovereignty Rupture as a Central Concept in Quantitative Measures of Civil War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(6): 1542–1578.

Turner, Thomas (2007). “Congo-Kinshasa leans towards federalism.” *Federations Magazine* *7*(1): 4-5.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2013). “DR Congo’s Neglected “Triangle of Death.” Protection report, April 10.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* https://ucdp.uu.se/?id=1&id=1 [November 9, 2021].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Weiss, Herbert F., and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (2013). “Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview.” http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new\_publication\_3/%7Bd6c  
11449-2260-e211-8eac-001cc477ec84%7D.pdf [March 23, 2012].

Young, Crawford (1966). “Post-independence Politics in the Congo.” *Transition* 26(1): 34-41.

Zongwe, Dunia (2019). “Democratic Republic of the Congo.” *Autonomy Arrangements in the World (Online Compendium)*.