# CROATIA

## Istrians

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* Croatia had declared independence in June 1991; however, subsequently suspended its independence for three months under the Brioni Accord signed in July 1991. In achieved independence in late December 1991. No states officially recognized Croatia until the end of 1991, with Germany and Iceland being the first to extend recognition on December 19, 1991.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) was formed in 1990, one year prior to Croatian independence. Thus, we code the movement as of 1991 and note prior nonviolent activity.
* According to Ashbrook (2006: 638), the IDS worked “toward the regionalization of Croatia and securing increased autonomy for Istria within a democratic Croatian state”. The autonomy claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 139) and Beovic (2013). The party won 72% of the votes in the county in the 1993 parliamentary elections and has been represented in the national parliament since 1992. The IDS and its splinter party, the Istrian Socialdemocratic Forum, have remained active since (e.g., Minahan 2016: 187; Roth 2015: 136)
* In the pre-election campaign in 2015, IDS president Boris Miletić stated that their political goal was to see Istria as an autonomous region and to implement decentralization that would ensure an increase in revenues of local and regional Istrian self-government units. Ivan Jakovic, who represents IDS in the European Parliament, stated in 2017 that there certainly were people who would like to see an independent Istria: "But that was never our policy. We want the greatest possible autonomy for Istria, but not an independent state" (DW News 2017). [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Ashbrook (2006: 638), the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) worked “toward the regionalization of Croatia and securing increased autonomy for Istria within a democratic Croatian state”. The autonomy claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 817), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 139) and Beovic (2013) and also represented by the Istrian Socialdemocratic Forum (ISDF), a splinter party of the IDS. Autonomy has remained the movement’s dominant claim in recent years. In 2017, Ivan Jakovic, who represents IDS in the European Parliament, stated that there certainly were people who would like to see an independent Istria, “but that was never our policy. We want the greatest possible autonomy for Istria, but not an independent state” (DW News 2017). [1991-2020 autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Istrians consists of the Istrian homeland, as indicated in Roth (2015: 137). The claim does not precisely follow the administrative boundary of present-day Istria County, as a northern piece of land forms part of Slovenia now. We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 137) using GADM for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, hence the entire movement is coded with NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After centuries of divisions and shifting borders, the Istrian peninsula was divided between the state of Venetia and Austria. The northwestern districts became part of the Venetian state. The southeastern districts were under Habsburg control and became a separate crownland in the Ausrian Empire. The northern districts were passed to Austria in 1797 with the Treaty of Campoformio and – apart from a short interlude of French rule under Napoleon between 1805 and 1813 – remained a Habsburg possession until 1918 (Minahan 2002: 815; Ashbrook 2006: 622).
* After the First World War and the defeat of the Habsburg Empire, Trieste and the Istrian peninsula were awarded to Italy (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 299). The region was placed under Italian administration in 1920 and with the fascist takeover in 1922, a policy of denationalization and Italianization was initiated. Slav languages were banned in 1926 and immigration from southern Italy was supported (Minahan 2002: 816; Beovic 2013: 29).
* After the Second World War, the Istrian territory was contested by Tito’s Yugoslavia and Italy. Apart from the city of Trieste and the surrounding Muggia, the Istrian peninsula fell to Yugoslavia.
* In 1989, reformist Croatian-nationalist forces took over the Croatian government (Gagnon 1994: 152). According to Minahan (2002: 817), “[t]he new Croatian government, under a resolutely nationalist administration, began to limit local government autonomy, passing laws that threatened Istrian culture.” Since we do not code changes in municipal autonomy, we do not code an autonomy restriction. However, basing on Minahan (“threatened Istrian culture”) we code a cultural rights restriction, pegging it to 1990, the year the highly nationalist Croatian constitution was promulgated (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147; also see Hayden 1992: 657; Stojanovic 1995: 345-346; Minority Rights Group International). [1990: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1993 Croatia introduced a new system of 20 counties (among which Istria) plus the city of Zagreb. According to the national Law on Local and Regional Self-Government, the counties are granted a “significant say in their constitutions, powers, and level of regional and local autonomy” (Ashbrook 2006: 644). However, the new administrative division did not result in regionalization/decentralization and the counties were primarily “executors of central government policy at the regional level rather than […] self-governing units” (Jordan 2001: 255).
* The regime change in 2000, following the death of Tudjman in 1999, led to more moderate policies of the Croatian authorities towards its minorities, in particular the Serbs but also other minorities (Zakosek 2008: 606). In particular, in May 2000, Croatia passed a language law that while retaining Croatian in the Latin script as the only official language allowed for the official use of other languages under conditions specified by the law as well as another law that provides for education in minority languages (U.S. Department of State 2001). Note that the Istrian movement consists of both Croats and Italians. In 2002 Croatia adopted a constitutional law on national minorities that Minority Rights Group International describes as a “generally good legal framework for the protection of minorities”. Minority Rights Group International reports that implementation of cultural rights has been slow and patchy, but that that there have been important changes in both legislation in practice (also see Caspersen 2003). We code a cultural rights concession in 2000 to coincide with the regime and the adoption of the first new minority laws. [2000: cultural rights concession]
* The Croation Government launched a decentralization initiative in July 2001 with the aim to extend competencies of local units and to change the sources of financing public functions by transferring from the state government budget to regional and local government budgets. According to Alibegović and Slijepčević (2012: 2), the initial steps were not followed by necessary political measures, which is why the level of decentralization “has stayed broadly unchanged.” While the Croatian provincial system in theory allows for regional autonomy in decision making, the provinces including Istria more often than not act as implementers of government planning and policy (Skelin Horvat 2013). Therefore we do not code this as a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Croatia attained independence in late December 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Istrians |
| *Scenario* | No match/n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Croats; Italians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34401000; 34404000 |

**Power access**

* The Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) joined the national government in 2000 but, dissastified with the coalition government’s treatment of Istria, left the government in 2001. The IDS was again part of the government coalition from 2011 onwards. We code the Istrians as junior partners throughout since there were also several Istrian ministers in non-IDS cabinets. [1992-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002), there were approximately 412,000 Istrians in 2002. However, this includes Istrians in Croatia and Slovenia. An estimation for the Istrian population in Croatia alone is not provided. This is done in Minahan (1998), where it is stated that there were 245,000 Istrians in 1998. Hence, we rely on the number provided by Minahan (1998), which is also more in line with information given by the Croatian census from 2001, according to which the population of the Istrian Region amounts to 206,344. Given Croatia’s total population of 4.501 million in 1998, we code a population share of 0.0544. [0.0544]
  + This figure has remained broadly accurate. The 2021 Croatian census pegs Croatia’s population at 3.89 mio and Istria’s at 206k, suggesting a population share of ca 5.3%.

**Regional concentration**

* Minahan (2002: 813) reports that the majority of the Istrians live in Istria and that they form an absolute majority there. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Istrians in Slovenia, but drawing on the figure provided in Minahan (1998) (see above for why we use this source) they are not numerically significant. There are also Istrians in Italy, but their number is yet lower.
* Note: Most Istrians are also Croats, but we do not code Croats in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against a Croat-dominated government. [no kin]

**Sources**

Alibegović, Dubravka J. and Suncana Slijepčević (2012). “Decentralization in Croatia: Problems and Possible Solutions.” *EUGOV Working Paper 33.*

Ashbrook, John (2006). “Locking Horns in the Istrian Political Arena: Politicized Identity, the Istrian Democratic Assembly, and the Croatian Democratic Alliance.” *East European Politics & Societies* *20*(4): 622-658

Beovic, Danijela (2013). *Europe’s Rising Regionalism and the Quest for Autonomy: The Case of ‘Istrian Identity’.* PhD Dissertation, Central European University

Caspersen, Nina (2003). “The Thorny Issue of Ethnic Autonomy in Croatia: Serb Leaders and Proposals for Autonomy.” *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 3: 1-28.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

DW News (2017). “The Western Balkans: A Region of Secessions.” <https://www.dw.com/en/the-western-balkans-a-region-of-secessions/a-40793126> [July 9, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gagnon, V. P. (1994). “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia.” *International Security* 19(3): 130-166.

Hayden, Robert M. (1992). “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics.” *Slavic Review* 51(4): 654-673.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 139.

Jordan, Peter (2001). “Regional Identities and Regionalization in East-Central Europe.” *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* *42*(4): 235-265.

Minahan, James (1998). *Miniature Empires: A Historical Dictionary of the Newly Independent States*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 813-818.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples.* http://www.minorityrights.org/2647/croatia/croatia-overview.html & http://www.minorityrights.org/2651/croatia/serbs.html [December 18, 2014].

Pavkovic, Aleksandar, and Peter Radan (2007). *Creating New States. Theory and Practice of Secession.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Regione Istriana: “Population in the Istrian Region according to the Census from 2001.” http://www.istra-istria.hr/index.php?id=608 [March 20, 2015].

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Skelin Horvat, Anita (2013). “Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use.” *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies* 3: 47-64.

Stojanovic, Svetozar (1995). “The Destruction of Yugoslavia.” *Fordham International Law Journal* 19(2): 337-362.

Total Croatian News (2017). “Could Istria Follow Catalonia on Road to Independence?”. <https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/22793-could-istria-follow-catalonia-on-road-to-independence> [Februar 15, 2023].

U.S. Department of State (2001). “Croatia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.” <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid=716> [December 18, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Zakosek, Nenad. (2008). “Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia.” *Democratization* 15(3): 588-610.

## Serbs

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* Croatia had declared independence in June 1991; however, subsequently suspended its independence for three months under the Brioni Accord signed in July 1991. In achieved independence in late December 1991. No states officially recognized Croatia until the end of 1991, with Germany and Iceland being the first to extend recognition on December 19, 1991.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Following an economic and political crisis in Yugoslavia that made it clear that the federal republic could no longer stay united, and after an upsurge of Croatian nationalism aimed at securing Croatian independence, Serbs in Croatia began to agitate for autonomy from an independent Croatian state. Huszka (2014: 71) reports that the Croatian Serbs stepped up their demands for political autonomy in 1989 and that the Milosevic regime orchestrated the first Serbian demonstration in the Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia in July 1989, thus the start date.
* In February 1990, the Serb Democratic Party (Croatia) was founded, which advocated the merger of Serbian territories in Croatia with Serbia. In October 1990 the Croatian Serbs unilaterally declared an autonomous entity within Croatia, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina. The so-called Log Revolution ensued: Serbs erected barricades on important roads in opposition.
* In March 1991 the Krajina Oblast together with other unilaterally declared Croatian Serb Autonomous Oblasts that had been formed in the meantime (the SAO of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem and the SAO Western Slavonia) declared their secession from Croatia. We code the movement from 1991 onwards to coincide with Croatia’s independence (before that it’s coded in Serbia/Yugoslavia). We note prior non-violent activity.
* With Croatia’s independence declaration in June 1991, the Yugoslav Army and Serb militia groups in Croatia set out to seize control of Serb-inhabited territory inside Croatia and unite the territory with Serbia as a defense against potential repression. The Krajina de facto entity was abolished and reintegrated with Croatia in 1995.
* The Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) was formed in 1997 and has continued to be active and participate in elections by 2022. The SDSS’ aims include cultural and language autonomy as well as regionalism (Gurr 2000; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Hewitt et al. 2008; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; MAR 2009; Samostalna Demokratska Srpska Stranka). [start date: 1989; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* During the Croatian war (1992-1995) that erupted after Croatia’s independence, the Serbs had the explicit goal of seceding from Croatia and ultimately joining Serbia. Based on the international Law of Self-Determination that legitimized the claims of other minorities to secede from Yugoslavia, the Serbs argued that they have the right to choose to remain part of Yugoslavia and join the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia (Stojanovic 1995: 345; also see Gagnon 1994: 154; Caspersen 2003). Irredentist claims were raised already before Croatia’s independence, thus we code an irredentist claim from 1991-1995. [1991-1995: irredentist claim]
* After the war, the Croatian Serbs tended to tone down their demands. Minorities at Risk notes that some Serbs in Croatia still want to secede; we could not find corroborating evidence for organized claims for outright secession post-1995, however. Be that as it may, the dominant demand clearly shifted to cultural autonomy (which is not coded) and territorial autonomy (Jacobs 2011). The two main parties currently representing the Serbs in Croatia are the Serb People's Party (SNS, founded in 1991) and the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS, founded in 1997). Since 2003, the SDSS has three seats in the Croatian parliament while the SNS has none (the Croat Constitution grants three seats to the Serb minority (Croatian Parliament 2014; Minorities at Risk Project). One of the political aims of the SDSS is the promotion of cultural and educational autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia as well as regionalism and decentralization (SDSS 1997). Decentralization has remained part of SDSS’ platform in 2022. [1996-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (SAO Krajina) established on 21 December 1990 and its successor, the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) which existed within the newly independent Croatia during the Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995) were quasi-independent proto-Serbian states with substantial Serb populations. We deem the movements behind the states are irredentist, rather than independentist as their real intention was to join Serbia (United Nations 2007: 45ff). A referendum held in May 1991 had the overwhelming support of 99.8% voting in favour of joining the Republic of Serbia (and the preservation of Yugoslavia) (United Nations 2007: 46). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. [start date: 1992; end date: 1995]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Croatian Serbs consists of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina and the Oblasts of Eastern Slavonia and Western Slavonia. We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 137).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The assembly of the Kraijna SAO declared that the Kraijna is part of the Republic of Serbia: On Decemeber 19, 1991, the parliament of the SO Krajina proclaimed the Republic of Serbian Krajina and declared it as part of the Republic of Serbia (Ustav Republike Srpske Krajine 1991). [1991: irredentist declaration]
* The SAO of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia and the SAO of Western Slavonia followed suit in February 1992 (Caspersen 2003: 10). [1992: irredentist declaration]
* In the autumn of 1992, the parliament of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republika Srpska parliament in Bosnia adopted a Declaration on Unity, “thereby signaling its clear refusal to be part of Croatia” (Caspersen 2003: 11). Consequently, in June 1993, a referendum was held in RSK where voters were asked whether or not they want to unify with the RS and later with the rest of Serbia. The vast majority voted in favor. We found no declaration, however. Only in May 1995 (when the territory was about to be re-taken by Croatian forces), the Krajina parliament voted to join with Republika Srpska. We code an irredentist declaration, though noting that this is not completely unambiguous. [1995: irredentist declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Ethnic Serbs in Croatia participated in the Croatia-Yugoslavia war of 1991; however, that violence is coded as part of the Croatian war of independence. In late 1991, a cease-fire was declared and violence between local Serbs and Croatia over eastern Croatia emerged soon thereafter (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Doyle & Sambanis (2006) code a war in 1992-1995.
* The MAR rebellion score is 3 (“local rebellion”) in 1996, but we found no evidence for more than 25 deaths. We found no evidence for separatist violence in subsequent years, thus 1996-2020 are coded with NVIOLSD. [1991: NVIOLSD; 1992-1995: HVIOLSD; 1996-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1941 Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia and established a puppet Croatian ‘Ustasha’ state. Under the Ustasha regime, the Croatian Serbs were severely discriminated against (Minority Rights Group International). After the war, Croatia was integrated into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as one of six federal republics. The Croatian Serbs were not granted autonomy, but the Serbs were recognized as one of five constituent nationalities. During Yugoslav times, Serbs in Croatia were overrepresented in the government and public administration. For instance, although constituting 12 percent of the population of Croatia, the Serbs made up 50 percent of the police in Croatia in 1984 (Stulhofer 1993). In the late 1960s/early 1970s, Yugoslavia underwent rapid decentralization. Thus Croatia gained increased autonomy (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000). However, the decentralization reforms mainly raised the status of the republics’ constituent nations (Croatians in Croatia etc.).
* “By the end of 1989, reformist forces had taken over the Croatian party, and both the Slovene and Croatian parties had scheduled multi-party elections for the spring of 1990” (Gagnon 1994: 152). In 1990, Croatia enacted two amendment packages to the Constitution of the Socialist Croatian Republic. First, in January 1990, it legalized multi-party elections. Second, it dropped communist and Yugoslav symbols, language and the Cyrillic script in July 1990 (Widner 2004). Thus, the Croatian authorities no longer promoted the use of the Serbian language. Furthermore, “[i]n December 1990 the Croatian government promulgated a new constitution proclaiming Croatia the state of the Croat nation (thereby demoting the Croatian Serbs, formerly a constituent nation, to minority status)” (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147; also see Hayden 1992: 657; Stojanovic 1995: 345-346; Minority Rights Group International). “The Republic of Croatia is established as the nation state of the Croatian nation and state of members of autochthonous national minorities: Serbs...“ (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 1990: 2). Thus, in 1990 the Croatian Serbs’ cultural rights were restricted. [1990: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Croatia’s independence could be seen as a restriction. The Badinter Commission had ruled on the right to self-determination of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs as well as other issues related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Prior to that commission, Bosnian and Croatian Serbs thought they had a legitimate/legal right to secession. The perception was that this right was taken away from them. Nonetheless, we do not code a restriction (in line with the codebook). Formally the Serbs did not actually have a right to secession, thus technically speaking nothing was taken away from them.
* “To satisfy the requirements for international recognition, the Croatian parliament on 4 December 1991 passed the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms, […] this law was amended in May 1992 and autonomous status was granted to the regions of Knin and Glina” and “the Croatian government had nevertheless accepted some form of territorial autonomy for Krajina.” (Caspersen 2003: 11). There were no steps towards implementation as the Serb de-facto independent entities maintained their secession claim and refused to reintegrate. But in line with the codebook, this autonomy offer to a de-facto independent state is nonetheless coded. [1992: autonomy concession]
  + Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl peg the onset of the separatist war to February 1992 while the concession was made only in May 1992. This concession therefore occurred after the onset of separatist war.
* In 1995 autonomy was put back on the table. The Croatian government agreed to an international plan that would have involved significant autonomy for the Serbs “as a starting point for negotiations”. Croatia was however relucatant to accept an autonomy plan since it believed it could strike a military victory (Caspersen 2003: 13-14). In November the so-called Erdut Agreement was signed that guarantees the Serbs “the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms” and the Serb community was furthermore given the right to “appoint a joint Council of Municipalities” (Caspersen 2003: 16). The agreement also guaranteed some cultural rights, such as Serb minority institutions as schools, kindergartens as well as limited local self-government (Djuric n.d.). Croatia did not implement the agreement. Instead, it began to undercut the autonomy and political representation that was promised in the 1991 law (as amended in May 1992). The provisions for special status districts and proportional representation were suspended until the next census (Caspersen 2003: 17).
* The regime change in 2000, following the death of Tudjman in 1999, led to more moderate policies of the Croatian authorities towards the Serbian minority (Zakosek 2008: 606). According to Minorities at Risk, “[m]uch has changed, however, in the post-Tudjman era. The Croatian government has been eager to demonstrate its commitment to EU membership and has implemented policies to comply with previous agreements and facilitate the return of Serb refugees. These policies include greater allocation of reconstruction funding and a landmark decision in the courts to facilitate repossession of Serb property lost during the conflict in the 1990s. In response to this, Serbs have begun returning.” In May 2000, Croatia passed a language law that while retaining Croatian in the Latin script as the only official language allowed for the official use of other languages under conditions specified by the law as well as another law that provides for education in minority languages (U.S. Department of State 2001). In 2002 Croatia adopted a constitutional law on national minorities that Minority Rights Group International describes as a “generally good legal framework for the protection of minorities”. In 2005, he Republic of Croatia ratified a bilateral agreement with Serbia and Montenegro on the protection of the Serbian/Montenegrin national minority in the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian national minority in Serbia and Montenegro (Minority Rights Group Internationall). Minority Rights Group International reports that implementation of cultural rights has been slow and patchy, but that that there have been important changes in both legislation in practice (also see Caspersen 2003). We code a cultural rights concession in 2000 to coincide with the regime and the adoption of the first new minority laws. [2000: cultural rights concession]
* In 2001 the “Law on Local and Regional Self-Government” was adopted. The law implied limited decentralization but mostly of an administrative sort (Bakaric et al. 2007: 77-80; Caspersen 2003: 20). Autonomy seems too limited to code a concession.
* It has to be mentioned that there continues to be discrimination against Serbs. The most often named problem is the return of property that many Serbs abandoned during the war.
* Article 12 of the above-mentioned Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities states that members of a national minority are entitled to equal official use of the language and script they use in the area of their local self-government unit when they constitute at least one third of the population (Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih manjina 2002). Attempts to install bilingual signs by the government led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) were met with opposition and eventual destruction (Ponoš 2021: 20). Croatians protested Cyrillic signs in 2013, with 20,000 people taking to the streets and veterans threatening to remove the signs by force if implemented (Croatians protest against Cyrillic signs 2013). In 2014, a proposal was even brought forward as a referendum to exempt the region of Vukovar from being required to use the minority language (Serbian) and to also increase the threshold of the minority requirement to 50 percent. The Constitutional Court rejected this claim and ordered the administration of Vukovar to regulate the issue of language use at the local and state level (Crni´c-Groti´ 2019: 57). Despite claims that this represents the intransigence towards increased cultural autonomy for Serbs (Paravina 2022) we do not code this as being a cultural rights restriction placed upon the Serbs as the constitutional court rejected the proposed referendum and the attempt to restrict cultural rights of Serbs was not initiated by the central government.

**Regional autonomy**

* Coinciding with de facto independence. [1991-1995: regional autonmy]

**De facto independence**

* De facto independence had existed since 1990 (before Croatia attained independence) and lasted until 1995 (the Croatian army re-took the area) (Minority Rights Group International; BBC; Zakosek 2008: 607). [1991-1995: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Croatia attained independence in late December 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]
* As of summer 1990, the Croatian authorities had lost control over the municipalities with a Serb majority (see e.g. Grandits and Leutloff 2003). In October 1990 the Croatian Serbs unilaterally declared an autonomous entity within Croatia, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina. Soon thereafter, Serbian autonomous oblasts were declared in other regions of Croatia (the SAO of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem and the SAO Western Slavonia). The three SAOs merged to form the Krajina Republic in 1991 and declared their independence from Croatia. Thus, de-facto independence had existence before Croatia’s independence. De-facto independence lasted until 1995 (the Croatian army re-took most of the area, a rump remained in eastern Slavonia under UN administration until 1998) (Minority Rights Group International). [1995: abolishment of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Serbs |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Serbs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34402000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-exclusion = powerless. [1991-2020: powerless]
* Following the 2020 Elections Boris Milošević,a member of the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) and President of the Serb National Council, was elected as one of the four Deputy Prime Ministers. This suggests Serbs’ inclusion status might have changed in 2020, but this would only be reflected in 2021 due to the 1 January rule.

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1991-1995: 0.122; 1996-2008: 0.045; 2009-2020: 0.043]

**Regional concentration**

* MAR codes the Serbs as concentrated in phase I-IV, but not concentrated in phase V. GeoEPR codes the Serbs as concentrated throughout. However, these data sets employ lower thresholds for territorial concentration. We code the Serbs as concentrated from 1993-1995 (i.e. during the war) and not concentrated thereafter. 1991-1992 are coded as not concentrated because we code an onset of violence in 1992 and because the change in spatial concentration (+/-) coincided with the war onset. [1991-1992: not concentrated; 1993-1995: concentrated; 1996-2020: not concentrated]
  + Based on the information we found, the Croatian Serbs cannot be considered concentrated before the war. Until the war, there were large populations of Serbs living in the Krajina region as well as in Eastern Slavonia. The 1991 census counted 581,663 Serbs in Croatia. Based on data from the ICTY, the Krajina region included approx. 250,000 Serbs and the Serbs made up a bare majority there (52%). Another 60,000 lived in Eastern Slavonia, but there the Serbs were in a minority (approx. 30%). Krajina and Eastern Slavonia are not spatially contiguous. The remaining Serbs lived scattered throughout Croatia. Although it is close, the Krajina region (the only region where Serbs comprised the majority) did not include the majority of the Serbs.
  + The situation changed with the onset of the war. According to the ICTY, Serb forces began to drive out non-Serb populations in late summer 1991 (August/September). Though there is no reliable data, it appears likely that our threshold was met during the war.
  + The share of Serbs in Yugoslavia decreased sharply as a result of the end phase of the Croatian civil war, according to EPR from 12% to 4.5% thereafter. From ethnic maps that we consulted it becomes clear that most of the Serbs that remained in Croatia/returned to Croatia live in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia region, but there does not appear to be a spatially contiguous territory in which they form the majority and where also the majority of Serbs lives. There are some areas where the Serbs continue to form the majority of the population, but these are scattered along the eastern border with BiH and Serbia, respectively.

**Kin**

* According to EPR, there is kin in a number of other countries, in particular Serbia and BiH, but also Slovenia, Macedonia, and (from 2006) Montenegro as well as (from 2008) Kosovo. MAR also notes the same kin. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

**Sources**

Al Jazeera (2013). “Croatians Protest Against Cyrillic Signs.” April 7. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/4/7 /croatians-protest-against-cyrillic-signs [July 1, 2022].

Bakaric, Ivana Rasic, Marijana Sumpor, and Jelena Sisinacki (2007). “Governance and Local Economic Development: In Search of an Appropriate Governance Structure for Croatia.” In: Sylvain Giguère, *Local Innovations for Growth in Central and Eastern Europe*, pp. 69-92. Paris: OECD.

BBC. “Croatia Profile.” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17217954> [August 10, 2014].

Bertsch, Gary K. (1977). “Ethnicity and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 433: 88-99.

Bideleux, Robert, and Jeffries, Ian (2007). *The Balkans: A Post-Communist History*. London: Routledge.

Caspersen, Nina (2003). “The Thorny Issue of Ethnic Autonomy in Croatia: Serb Leaders and Proposals for Autonomy.” *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 3: 1-28.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (1990). <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b551c.html> [September 8, 2014].

Crni´c-Groti´c, Vesna (2019). “Obveza zaštita manjina od Kopenhagena do danas. Godišnjak Akademije pravnih znanosti.” *Hrvatske* 10: 51–63.

Croatian Parliament (2014). “Act on Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament.” <http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=16930> [August 10, 2014].

Djuric, Ivana (n.d.). “Local Governance, Integration and Participation of Croatian Serbs: In Serach of Prosperous Model.” [http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/  
unpan004464.pdf](http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan004464.pdf) [August 18, 2014].

Gagnon, V. P. (1994). “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia.” *International Security* 19(3): 130-166.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Grandits, Hannes, and Carolin Leutloff (2003). “Discourses, Actors, Violence: The Organization of War-Escalation in the Kraijna Region of Croatia 1990-91”. In: Jan Koehler, and Christoph Zürcher (eds.), *Potentials of Disorder*, pp. 23-45. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gurr, Ted R. (2000). *Peoples versus States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, p. 201.

Hayden, Robert M. (1992). “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics.” *Slavic Review* 51(4): 654-673.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, pp. 76-77, 116, 161, 190-192, 270.

Hewitt, Joseph J., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) (2008). *Peace and Conflict 2008.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Huszka, Beata (2014). *Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict. Debate-framing and Rhetoric in Independence Campaigns.* London: Routledge.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (2002). “Case No. IT-02-54-T (Slovodan Milosevic).” <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-2ai020728e.htm> [November 5, 2015].

Jacobs, Frank (2011). “The Way We Were.” *The New York Times*. [http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/  
2011/11/21/the-way-we-were/?\_php=true&\_type=blogs &\_r=0](http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/the-way-we-were/?_php=true&_type=blogs%20&_r=0) [August 18, 2014].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [June 26, 2003].

Malesevic, Sinisa (2000). “Ethnicity and Federalism in Communist Yugoslavia and Its Successor States.” In: Yash Ghai (ed.), *Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States*, 147-172. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 57.

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2005). *Peace and Conflict 2005:* *A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

Meier, Viktor (1999). *Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise*. London: Routledge.

Minorities at Risk Project (MAR) (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples.* http://www.minorityrights.org/2647/croatia/croatia-overview.html & http://www.minorityrights.org/2651/croatia/serbs.html [December 18, 2014].

Paravina, Aleksandra (2022). “Croatian Serb Culture, Language, and Minority Education Rights.” S*ocial Sciences* 11: 275.

Pavkovic, Aleksandar, and Peter Radan (2007). *Creating New States. Theory and Practice of Secession.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Plebiscitrs (2008). “Open Letter on the Announcement by the Kosovo Parliament to Declare Independence”. *Plebiscitrs*. February 14. <http://plebiscitrs.org/sajt/index.php?option=com_novosti&id=172&catnovosti>= [March 19, 2023].

Ponoš, Tihomir (2021). Historic Revisionism, Hate Speech and Violence against Serbs in 2020, in Saša Miloševi´c (eds). Serb National Council Annual Report 2021. Zagreb: Serb National Council

Ramcharan, Bertrand G. (2015). *International Peace Conferences.* Nijhoff Law Specials. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff.

Ramet, Pedro (1984). *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Saideman, Stephen, and Ayres, R. William (2008). *For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Sambanis, Nicholas, and Moses Shayo (2013). “Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict.” *American Political Science Review* 107(2): 294-325.

Sambanis, Nicholas, and Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonas (2019). “Sovereignty Rupture as a Central Concept in Quantitative Measures of Civil War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(6): 1542–1578.

Samostalna Demokratska Srpska Stranka. <http://www.sdss.hr/> [December 11, 2013].

SDSS (1997). “Program Samostalne Demokratske Srpske Stranke.” <http://www.sdss.hr/index.php?i=1> [August 18, 2014].

Stojanovic, Svetozar (1995). “The Destruction of Yugoslavia.” *Fordham International Law Journal* 19(2): 337-362.

Stulhofer**,** Aleksandar.1993. “Testing the Theories of Ethnic Conflict: Occam’s Razor and the Case of Croatia.” <http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=51772> [August 10, 2014].

Total Croatian News (2019). “SDSS Leader Says Party’s Goal to Epand Freedoms.” <https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/35847-sdss?rCH=2> [July 1, 2022].

U.S. Department of State (2001). “Croatia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.” <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid=716> [December 18, 2014].

United Nations (2007). “Prosecutor v. Milan Martic – Judgement”. *United Nations*. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsbile for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991. IT-91-11T. June 12. <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf> [March 13, 2023].

Ustav Republike Srpske Krajine (1991). <http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Krajina-const.pdf> [August 18, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Widner, Jennifer (2004). “Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution, Croatia 1990.” <https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/croatia1990.html> [August 10, 2014].

Wikipedia. “Sebs of Croatia.” <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbs_of_Croatia> [Junly 1, 2022]

Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils B.Weidmann, Luc Girardin, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Andreas Wimmer (2011). “Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups across Space and Time: Introducing the GeoEPR Dataset.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(5): 423-437.

Zakosek, Nenad. (2008). “Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia.” *Democratization* 15(3): 588-610.