# CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## Czechs

Activity: 1992

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Most Czechs were not very receptive to Slovak demands for increased sovereignty (or even independence), and increased autonomy for the Czech Republic was a non-issue (Hilde 1999: 659). In 1992, and especially in the context of the June 1992 elections, opposition against the Slovak proposals strengthened, and the view that the federation should be dissolved if the Slovaks continue contending for increased sovereignty became widespread (Hilde 1999: 661). On June 13, 1992, a group called the Czech Initiative launched a petition calling for an independent Czech state. In only four days, 50,000 had signed the petition (Hilde 1999: 661). Since this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we have found, we peg the start date to 1992. Czechoslovakia’s nonviolent “Velvet Divorce” on December 31, 1992 resulted in the creation of independent Czech Republic and Slovakia, hence the end of the movement in 1992 (Banks et al. 1997; Goldstone 1998; Hilde 1999; Ulc 1996). For a more detailed account of the Velvet Divorce, see the entry for the Slovak self-determination movement. [start date: 1992; end date: 1992]

**Dominant claim**

* Most Czechs were not very receptive to the Slovak demands for increased sovereignty (or even independence), and increased autonomy for the Czech Republic was a non-issue (Hilde 1999: 659).
* Contention for the break-up of Czechoslovakia was not very pronounced on the Czech side. According to Gurbal (2001: 17), Vaclav Klaus, the Prime Minister of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, “wanted to preserve the federation” (in stark contrast to Slovakia’s Vladimir Mecia, who “insisted on a confederation”). A government poll indicated that while over 80 percent of Czechs considered the dissolution inevitable, only 36 percent were actually in favor of dissolution (New York Times 1992).
* Nevertheless, there was some contention for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia also on the Czech side. In 1992, and especially in the context of the June 1992 elections, opposition against the Slovak proposals strengthened, and the view that the federation should be dissolved if the Slovaks continue contending for increased sovereignty became widespread (Hilde 1999: 661). On June 13, 1992, a group called the Czech Initiative launched a petition calling for an independent Czech state. In only four days, 50,000 had signed the petition (Hilde 1999: 661).
* According to Hilde (1999: 649), “the Czech political right ultimately abandoned its traditional support for the common state” and “after the June 1992 elections the Czech right became the driving force behind the Velvet Divorce.” [1992: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1992; end date: 1992]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Czech Initiative encompassed the Czech Socialist Republic within Czechoslovakia, which corresponds to today's Czech Republic (Hilde 1999). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* From the tenth century until 1918, the Bohemians and Moravians were under the control of the European empires and its principalities periodically achieved a significant degree of autonomy (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). The Lands of the Bohemian Crown were declared hereditary property of the Habsburg family in 1620.
* Czechoslovakia, a federated union of Czechs and Slovaks that united Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, was established as one of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War and the Treaty of St. Germain. The Czechs were the dominant group in the new state. The coexistence was interrupted during the Second World War when Bohemia and Moravia were proclaimed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the “Slovak Republic”, a Slovak fascist puppet state under Nazi suzerainty, was established (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minorities at Risk Project; World Directory of Minorities).
* After the war, the Czechs were granted some self-government in a federal state under the agreement of Kosice. Only three years later, Czechoslovakia came under Soviet influence and became a communist state in 1948. The 1960 Constitution articulated extreme centralism (Minahan 2002; World Directory of Minorities).
* After the Prague Spring 1968, the Constitutional Law of Federation was adopted by the National Assembly. Czechoslovakia was divided into two federal states with considerable autonomy within the usual constraints of the Brezhnev era (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; World Directory of Minorities). Against the general opinion that regards decentralization under communism as toothless, Brancati (2009) states that Czechoslovakia established a decentralized system in 1968 and was thus “highly decentralized at the time it democratized”. Under this system, the national government was divided into two legislative bodies — the House of People (Sněmovna Lidu) and the House of Nations (Sněmovna Národů). Each region had its own legislature, known as a National Council (Národní Rada), and the division of authority between the national and regional legislatures was extensive. Not only did regional legislatures wield a veto power over the national constitution, but the country's two national legislatures were also divided almost evenly between the Czech Lands and Slovakia, and decision rules within the latter allowed parties from either region to thwart that of the other.
* In April 1990 the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic was created by passing of the Constitutional Law 101/1990 (Crampton 2002). Furthermore, a new power-sharing law was adopted in December as constitutional amendment 556/1990. It reduced the power of the central organs and “eliminated the exclusive prerogative of the federation in foreign policy and defense, which opened up the future possibility of separate international treaties and even the creation of republic-level armed forces” (Rychlik 2000: 54). Based on this, we code an autonomy concession in 1990. [1990: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In November 1992, the republic was dissolved by the Czechoslovakian National Assembly, making the Czech Republic independent as of January 1, 1993 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000). [1992: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* In line with the reasoning of Brancati (2009), we code the Czechs as regionally autonomous following the 1968 federal reform. This is confirmed by EPR, which also codes the Czechs as regionally autonomous after 1968. [1992: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1992: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Czechs |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Czechs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 31501000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1992: senior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.625]

**Regional concentration**

* According to EPR, Czechs make up almost 100% of the population of today’s Czech Republic and Slovaks 80% of the population of Slovakia. While EPR’s estimate relates to the situation after 1993, there is no evidence that the situation would have been dramatically different before that. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* No evidence found (see e.g. MAR; EPR). [no kin]

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## Hungarians

Activity: 1989-1992

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* A Hungarian movement was active in Czechoslovakia at least since 1947, when Hungarian nationalists formed the Cultural Alliance of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia (CSEMADOK). However, during the communist era the Hungarian claims were limited to cultural rights and inclusion at the center.
* In spring of 1968 CSEMADOK proposed the setting up of nationality bodies alongside the Slovak parliament and government, the establishment of a Hungarian-language school system, ranging from the primary level to institutes of higher education institutions, and a modification of the territorial administration division. CSEMADOK’s draft proposal was sharply criticized by the Czech and Slovak sides.
* After the 1989 Velvet revolution, nationalist sentiment began to flourish among the Hungarian population. While only a small portion of ethnic Hungarian leaders advocated secession from Slovakia, many ethnic Hungarians made claims for a greater degree of autonomy and self-determination within the Hungarian areas in southern Slovakia, especially with respect to language, education, and cultural issues. Based on this, we code the start date in 1989. In the wake of the regime change, they set up four political parties, including Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Co-existence Party and Hungarian Civic Party, which merged in 1998 to become the Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP) (AAJ News 2007; Magyar Közösség Pártja Marshall & Gurr 2003; MAR 2009). The Hungarian movement continued to be active in Slovakia (see Hungarians under Slovakia). [start date: 1989; end date: host change]

**Dominant claim**

* While there have been some calls for secession, Minorities at Risk notes that most Hungarians favor autonomy; hence, we code a claim for autonomy throughout. We found no evidence for a Hungarian proposal to break up the Slovak entity, thus we code an autonomy rather than a sub-state secession claim. [1989-1992: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* Hungarian irredentism in Slovakia should be understood within the greater context of Hungarian irredentism (the “Greater Hungary”, “Historic Hungary”, or “Whole Hungary” ideology), i.e., as a claim for a merger with Hungary. Historically, this ideology has its roots in the 1930s in the aftermath of the Trianon Treaty (Balogh 1983). Hungarian groups at the time co-operated with far-right clerico-fascist Slovak parties (such as the Slovak People’s Party) and generally were pro-fascist or fascist (Ďurkovská et al. 2012). Füzesi (2006: 3) reports evidence of Hungarian irredentism between 1920-1940, but suggests that it was effectively “absent in the post-communist era” after 1989. We found no party or political actor making claims for outright secession, either. It is conceivable that some ultra-nationalist Hungarian leaders made irredentist claims at the time, but these appear not to have had much political significance or reflection in the goals of collective political actors. There was, however, a short-lived irredentist movement after the break-up of Czechoslovakia (see Hungarians in Slovakia). [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* The Hungarians have sought to improve the political autonomy in Hungarian inhabited regions in southern Slovakia. These areas do not have an official status, although it includes the districts of Dunajskâ Streda and Komârno, where the Hungarians form a clear majority (Bakker 1998: 424f). Beyond this, we were unable to find a specific definition of the territory to which Hungarian claims relate. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s ethnic settlement area as indicated by the GeoEPR dataset, which serves as a useful approximation.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical Context**

* After the Second World War, Hungarians were discriminated in Czechoslovakia (Minority at Risk Project). The 1945 Government Program of Kassa implied the loss of citizenship, and the Hungarian language was removed from the public sphere. Then, in 1949, the Hungarians were granted the right to native language education. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1956 for the first time made a brief mention of the Hungarian minority, and the 1960 Constitution promised to ensure for all minorities education and culture in their native language. The 1968 constitution guaranteed the Hungarians’ right to education in the mother language as well as representation in local bodies. In practice, however, these rights were ignored (Minority Rights Group International). In effect, Czechoslovakia’s federalization in 1968 implied greater scope for Slovak nationalism (Hungarians in Czechoslovakia mainly lived in the Slovak part). According to the Minorities at Risk Project, “[n]ew policies of assimilation included progressive Slovakization of education, elimination of Hungarian place-names from signs, bans on using Hungarian in administrative dealings and in institutions and workplaces, and pressure to Slovakize Hungarian names.”
* We did not find a concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, adopted in January 1991, prohibited all forms of discrimination and reaffirmed the right to education in the first language, which was already included in the 1968 constitution but not implemented. Similarly, while declaring Slovak the state language in Slovaka, Slovakia’s parliament in 1991 recognized the right of minorities to use their language in official venues where they exceed twenty per cent of the local population (Minority Rights Group International; Minorities at Risk Project). We do not code a concession given the lack of implementation.
* The 1992 Slovak constitution reaffirmed the Hungarians’ cultural rights; at the same time, however, the Slovak government embroiled in increasingly anti-Hungarian rhetoric and discrimination against Hungarians. There were no moves to implement the rights granted by the constitution (Neuwahl 2000), hence we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Slovakia gained independence in 1992/1993, implying a host change. [1992: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Hungarians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Hungarians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 31503000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1992: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.041]

**Regional concentration**

* MAR V codes the Hungarians as “concentrated in one region” with more than 75% living in that region. GeoEPR also codes the Hungarians as regionally concentrated in southern Slovakia. This is also confirmed by the Slovak censuses of 2001 and 2011. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes ethnic kin (Hungarians) in various countries (Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Ukraine). Also see MAR. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Moravians

Activity: 1968-1992

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* There is no clear indication when the first organization representing the Moravist Movement was founded. Minahan (2002) indicates the movement emerged in the 1960s. We peg the start date to 1968, the year the Moravians put forward a declaration that called for a tripartite federation of equal republics (Bohemia, Slovakia and Moravia-Silesia). After the overthrow of the Communist government, the Moravian movement gained momentum, but autonomy demands soon subsided as the country was divided into its Czech and Slovak halves (Jenne 2007; Minahan 2002; Moravana; Strmiska 2000). Still, there is continued activity in the Czech Republic after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (see Moravians under Czech Republic). [start date: 1968; end date: host change]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1968, Moravians put forward a declaration that called for a tripartite federation of equal republics (Bohemia, Slovakia and Moravia-Silesia). Strmiska (2000) confirms that this claim was also dominant in the last years of the existence of Czechoslovakia, when the management of the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy - Association for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS) gave priority to the issue of tripartite division of Czechoslovakia. [1968-1992: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Supporters of Moravism before 1992 primarily supported a tri-partite federation system (Bárta 1990; Pernes 1996: 221-244; Springerova 2004). While there are sometimes reports in the literature that some elements in the movement preferred outright independence, we could not find independent evidence for a collective political actor advancing a claim for independence. [no independence claim]

**Irredentist claims**

* The Moravian National Social Party (Moravská Nacionální Sociální Strana). which was founded in 1940, was a fascist party that espoused secession of Moravia and its incorporation into the Greater German Reich as an autonomous part (Pejčoch 2009). We found no claims for irredentism in the post-WWII period, though. [no irredentist claim]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Moravians is the historic region of Moravia, which roughly corresponds to, but does not exactly match the current administrative regions Brnensky, Olomoucky, Ostransky, and Zlinsky (Minahan 2002: 1302). We code this claim based on a map from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Moravia{\&}oldid=1027671184.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Moravians put forward a declaration calling for a tripartite federation of equal republics (Bohemia, Slovakia and Moravia-Silesia) in 1968. This is not a sovereignty declaration as definied by the codebook (no entity was self-proclaimed) and thus not coded.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding for the entire movement. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical Context**

* Great Moravia, uniting Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, southern Poland and northern Hungary, collapsed in 908 and became part of the Holy Roman Empire in 955. From the tenth century until 1918, the Moravians were under the control of the European empires and periodically achieved a significant degree of autonomy (Moravian Margraviate) (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000): While Bohemia, which included Moravia in 1029, became a hereditary kingdom in the thirteenth century, Moravia could maintain its separate diet, parliament and administration. By 1526, Bohemia and Moravia became integral parts of the Habsburg Empire and lost their remaining independence after the battle of White Mountain in 1620. Germanization and repression of the Moravian national life, religious persecution and oppressive taxes followed. Germanization increased after the complete incorporation into Austrian Empire in the eighteenth century. In 1849, Moravia was separated from Bohemia and became a separate Austrian crownland (Minahan 2002).
* Czechoslovakia, a federated union of Czechs and Slovaks that united Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, was established as one of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War and the Treaty of St. Germain. The Czechs were the dominant national group in the new, highly centralized state, resulting in increased Moravian resentment of the Czech hegemony (Minahan 2002).
* The coexistence was interrupted during the Second World War when Bohemia and Moravia were proclaimed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the “Slovak Republic”, a Slovak fascist puppet state under Nazi suzerainty, was established (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minorities at Risk Project; World Directory of Minorities).
* After the war, Czechoslovakia came under Soviet influence and became a centralized communist state in 1948. The province of Moravia and Silesia was replaced by four administarive units. The 1960 Constitution articulated extreme centralism and split Moravia into two new regions, making Moravia politically cease to exist (Minahan 2002; World Directory of Minorities). [1960: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After the Prague Spring of 1968, the Constitutional Law of Federation was adopted by the National Assembly. Czechoslovakia was divided into two federal states with considerable autonomy within the usual constraints of the Brezhnev era (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; World Directory of Minorities). Against the general opinion that regards decentralization under communism as toothless, Brancati (2009) states that Czechoslovakia established a decentralized system in 1968 and was thus “highly decentralized at the time it democratized”. Under this system, the national government was divided into two legislative bodies — the House of People (Sněmovna Lidu) and the House of Nations (Sněmovna Národů). Each region had its own legislature, known as a National Council (Národní Rada), and the division of authority between the national and regional legislatures was extensive. Not only did regional legislatures wield a veto power over the national constitution, but the country's two national legislatures were also divided almost evenly between the Czech Lands and Slovakia, and decision rules within the latter allowed parties from either region to thwart that of the other. In this process, “attempts to revive the political distinctiveness of Moravia failed” (Fawn and Hochman 2010) as it was incorporated into the Czech Socialist Republic after 1968. The Moravians make up only about 15% of Czechs. Moreover, the expression of national Moravian identity is very much driven by a claim for distinctiveness from the Czech majority. Thus we do not code a concession.
* According to Murphy (2014) the regional units that were created during communism but were seen as arbitrary, non-historic by the new government, were dismantled in 1990 soon after the regime collapsed. Yoder (2003) states that there was a proposal to give the Czech and Slovak republics and Moravia and Silesia their constitution, citizenship status and judicial system and legislative and executive bodies. Yoder (2003), however, also notes that the interest in administarive and territorial reform faded quickly as the focus moved to economic reforms and was later also overshadowed by the disintegration of the country. A reform that would have increased Moravian autonomy was not implemented and hence nothing is coded.
* In November 1992, the republic was dissolved by the Czechoslovakian National Assembly, making the Czech Republic and Slovakia independent as of January 1, 1993 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000). This was not a concession to the Moravians and is hence not coded.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Czechs are coded as regionally autonomous following the 1968 federal reform. This is confirmed by EPR, which also codes the Czechs as regionally autonomous after 1968. However, to infer that the Movarians are also regionally autonomous is not accurate. According to Minahan (2002), the Czechs were the dominant group in Czechoslovakia and their hegemony was resented by the Morvians. Regional autonomy for the Czechs does hence not apply to the Moravians.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The Czech Republic gained independence in 1992/1993, implying a host change. [1992: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Moravians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Czechs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 31501000 |

**Power access**

* EPR subsumes the Moravians under the EPR group of the Czechs, which are coded as senior partner throughout. Although Morravains only constitute around 15 percent of the Czech group, there is evidence for executive influence: Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, a Moravian, was the first president of Czechoslovakia from 1918 until 1935. Gottwald (1948-1953) and Svoboda (1968-1975) followed. In general, however, the Moravians only played a subordinate role next to the dominant Bohemians (Minahan 2002), which is why we code them as junior partner. [1968-1992: junior partner]

**Group size**

* Since we could not find a reliable source on the Moravian population in Czechoslovakia, we infer the population share from the post-Czechoslovakia period. In the 1991 census, when respondents were allowed to claim Moravian nationality for the first time, 1,362,313 declared Moravian ethnicity (Neustupny and Nekvapil 2006). However, because many people boycotted the nationality question and many ethnic Moravians also identify themselves as Czechs, the census data does not accurately reflect the actual number of Moravians. Hence, we rely on the population number indicated by Minahan (2002), who states that there were approximately 1,528,000 Moravians in the Czech Republic in 2002. With the Czech Republic’s population totaling 10.2 million in 2002 (according to the World Bank), the Moravians make up approximately 14.98 percent of the Czech Republic. During the Czechoslovak period, the Czech Socialist Republic made up 68 percent of the entire Czechoslovak population (15.6 million in 1993). Pragamtically assuming that all Moravians lived in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, we code a group share of 0.1019. [0.1019]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1302), the majority of the Moravians is located in the Region of Moravia and Silesia, where they comprise approx. 37% (together with the Silesians) of the local population. They are thus a minority in their territory, which is why we code them as not concentrated. Other groups in Moravia and Silesia are the Czechs (44%) or the Slovaks (5%). We found no evidence for an alternatively defined territory that would cross the threshold for spatial concentration. [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* No evidence found. [no kin]

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## Slovaks

Activity: 1945-1948; 1963-1992

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Kirschbaum (1980: 220), the first calls for Slovak autonomy date to 1918 (thus the start date), when Czechoslovakia was about to be created. From Kirschbaum (1980: 221-224) it appears that Slovak contention for self-determination continued throughout the interwar years. As a result of Hitler’s territorial ambitions, Czechoslovakia was effectively dissolved in 1939, shortly before WWII. While the Czech part became a German protectorate, the Slovak part became an “independent” puppet state. Communist resistance developed, initially aiming for a “free and independent” Slovakia (Kirschbaum 1980: 226-227). When it became clear that a post-war settlement would necessarily mean the reunification of Czechoslovakia, the claim shifted to a better status within Czechoslovakia. In 1943, a number of resistance groups signed the Christmas Agreement, which while acknowledging that Czechoslovakia should be reunited, also called for the new state being built on the principle of national equality, implying increased autonomy for the Slovaks (Kirschbaum 1980: 231-232). We note prior non-violent activity (while resistance groups fought German troops, there was no separatist violence as we define it). Slovak contention for self-determination carried over into the post-WWII period (Kirschbaum 1980: 236). In the 1946 elections, almost all Slovak politicians demanded increased autonomy (Hilde 1999: 650). The Communist coup in 1948 signalled the beginning of a highly repressive phase (Kirschbaum 1980: 238). Kirschbaum (1980: 243) writes that Slovak minority nationalism had been virtually eliminated in Slovakia by the early 1950s. Based on this, we code the end of the first phase in 1948, the year of the communist coup. One could also code the end in 1958 based on the ten-years rule, but the Communist coup appears to be a good cut-off (there was very little, if any, subsequent activity). [start date 1: 1918; end date 1: 1948]
* In the early 1960s, Slovak nationalism re-emerged, aiming for the federalization of Czechoslovakia. We found no exact start date, though Kirschbaum (1980: 244) suggests that there was significant contention at least from 1963 onwards. Thus 1963 is coded as the second start date. In the 1968 Prague Spring, Czech aspirations for democracy clashed with the Slovak quest for national reassertion. The Prague Spring was quickly suppressed, and most of the reforms that had been initiated were stopped. The only reform that was allowed to continue was the 1968 federalization reform, which led to the creation of two federal entities, the Czech and Slovak Republics, with the right of secession and parity in all federal institutions (Kirschbaum 1980: 245). Whether or not the movement can be considered active in 1968-1989 is not fully clear based on the sources we consulted. As of 1970, there was again centralization and according to Kirschbaum (1980: 245), it is not clear whether the Slovaks actively opposed the recentralization, given the strong censorship. Malova (2003: 55), on the other hand, suggests that there were small-scale protests involving nationalist claims also in subsequent years. We code an ongoing movement based on the ten years rule. With the collapse of Communism in 1989, two state governments with diverging trajectories came into being. More specifically, the Czech state was a pluralistic democracy with a market economy while the Slovak state was characterized by a socialist-leaning orientation, the continuing paternalistic role of the state in the economy, and strong nationalism. In the 1992 elections, 70% of the Slovak electorate voted for parties bent on quitting the federation and pro-Czechoslovak parties failed completely in the region. On July 17, 1992 the Slovak National Council declared independence, on September 1, 1992 it adopted the new Slovak constitution, and at the stroke on midnight ending 1992, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. Therefore, we peg the end of this movement at 1992. [start date 2: 1963; end date 2: 1992]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Kirschbaum (1980: 220), the first calls for Slovak autonomy date to 1918, when Czechoslovakia was about to be created. From Kirschbaum (1980: 221-224) it appears that Slovak contention for self-determination continued throughout the interwar years. As a result of Hitler’s territorial ambitions, Czechoslovakia was effectively dissolved in 1939, shortly before WWII. While the Czech part became a German protectorate, the Slovak part became an “independent” puppet state. Communist resistance developed, initially aiming for a “free and independent” Slovakia (Kirschbaum 1980: 226-227). When it became clear that a post-war settlement would necessarily mean the reunification of Czechoslovakia, the claim shifted to a better status within Czechoslovakia. In 1943, a number of resistance groups signed the Christmas Agreement, which while acknowledging that Czechoslovakia should be reunited, also called for the new state being built on the principle of national equality, implying increased autonomy for the Slovaks (Kirschbaum 1980: 231-232). Slovak contention for increased self-determination carried over into the post-WWII period (Kirschbaum 1980: 236). In the 1946 elections, almost all Slovak politicians demanded increased autonomy (Hilde 1999: 650). [1945-1948: autonomy claim]
* In the early 1960s, Slovak nationalism re-emerged, aiming for the federalization of Czechoslovakia. In the 1968 Prague Spring, Czech aspirations for democracy clashed with the Slovak quest for national reassertion. Whether or not the movement can be considered active in 1968-1989 is not fully clear based on the sources we consulted. As of 1970, there was again centralization and according to Kirschbaum (1980: 245), it is not clear whether the Slovaks actively opposed the recentralization, given the strong censorship. Malova (2003: 55), on the other hand, suggests that there were small-scale protests involving nationalist claims also in subsequent years. [1963-1988: autonomy claim]
* Following the fall of communism in 1989, Slovak nationalism re-emerged with full force. A number of influential groups promoted secession. But the call for independence was a minority position among the Slovak population (Hilde 1999: 651-653). More important to us, the most important parties/organizations favored increased autonomy for the Slovaks. According to Hilde (1999: 653): “Unlike secessionist nationalism, autonomy nationalism had widespread support both among Slovak politicians and in the population at large. In the first democratic elections in June 1990 all Slovak political parties called for a revision of the federal system.” [1989-1991: autonomy claim]
* Slovak claims radicalized in 1991/1992. In early 1991, the Slovak PM Meciar was ousted; in opposition, “Meciar switched from a federalist position to supporting a vague confederate solution” (Hilde 1999: 657). A number of other parties followed in a process of ethnic outbidding. Critically, many Slovak parties continued to call for a common state. But the specific claims that were advocated, including an international legal status for Slovakia, a separate UN seat, a separate Slovak central bank, and a separate Slovak army (Hilde 1999: 658). According to Hilde, the Slovak claims were compatible not even with a confederal solution. Thus, we code independence as the dominant claim in 1992, following the first of January rule. [1992: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* According to Kirschbaum (1980: 221-227; also see Kiliánová 2003), there was an independence movement during the interwar period. The creation of a partially-recognized Nazi client-state on the 14th of March 1939 was supported by some ultra-nationalist Slovaks, though the creation of the state was primarily an outcome of Nazi diplomatic coercion (Jůn & Rychlík 2016). However, while secessionist sentiment is likely to have continued after 1945 and into the 1960s, we could not find evidence for a politically organized secessionist movement before 1989 (Jůn & Rychlík 2016). According to Hilde (1999: 651-653, 657), independence claims emerged in 1989. [start date: 1989; end date: 1992]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The proclaimed independent state by the Slovak National Council consisted of the Slovak Socialist Republic in Czechoslovakia. Note that Slovakia’s territorial expansion increased significantly in 1947. Hungary obtained some of the territory it had lost under the post-WWI Treaty of Trianon back in 1938 through the intervention of Germany. Those changes were reversed in 1947. Following the January 1 rule, we code the larger territory (which corresponds to today’s Slovakia) starting from 1948, using data from the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition. For the claim in 1945-1947, we combine data from GADM and CShapes 2.0 dataset (Schvitz et al. 2021).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On July 17, 1992 the Slovak National Council declared the independence of the Slovak Nation by a resolution. On September 1 the new Slovak constitution was adopted. Whether or not this can be considered a unilateral declaration is somewhat ambiguous. Negotiations on splitting up the country were ongoing at the time, and according to Hacker (2010: 94) the die had effectively been cast already by mid-July that the country would separate on January 1, 1993. Yet Klaus and Meciar only formally agreed to split up the country a couple of days after the declaration (Hacker 2010: 95). We do not code the declaration as unilateral, though could be seen as an ambiguous decision.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Following the dissolution of the Moravian Empire, present day Slovakia was made part of the Kingdom of Hungary in the early tenth century. With Hungary it was later incorporated into the Hapsburg Empire until 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed.
* The 1867 reforms made the Austrian and the Hungarian states equal within the Empire. This resulted in increased Magyar autonomy and a deterioration of the status of the Slovaks, who suffered from the policy of Magyarization. The Hungarian authorities closed the Matica Slovenska, the Slovak cultural institution, and Slovak high schools. Slovaks were only referred to as “Slovak-speaking Magyars” (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; World Directory of Minorities).
* Czechoslovakia, a federated union of Czechs and Slovaks that united Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, was established as one of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War and the Treaty of St. Germain. In practice, Czechoslovakia was highly centralized and Prague refused Slovak calls for autonomy (Kirschbaum 1980: 221-223). The official ideology was that Slovaks and Czechs were branches of the same nation, and that Slovak was merely a dialect of the Czech language.
  + As a result of Hitler’s territorial ambitions, Czechoslovakia was effectively dissolved in 1939, shortly before WWII. While the Czech part became a German protectorate, the Slovak part became an “independent” puppet state (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minorities at Risk Project; World Directory of Minorities). The installation of a puppet state is not coded (it conferred very little autonomy; moreover, the legitimate authorities (the Allies recognized a Czechoslovak government-in-exile) did not grant autonomy or even independence).

2nd phase:

* In 1956, Prague made some concessions under Krushchev’s pressure for destalinization, but these concessions were more nominal than real (Kirschbaum 1980: 243). We do not code a concession.
* The 1960 Constitution articulated extreme centralism and severely limited Slovak autonomy (Kirschbaum 1980: 244; Minahan 2002; World Directory of Minorities; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 270). [1960: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After WWII, Czechoslovakia was reconstituted. Initially, Prague took a conciliatory stance. The First Prague Agreement, signed on June 2, 1945, gave Slovakia significant (asymmetric) autonomy (Kirschbaum 1980: 237). [1945: autonomy concession]
* Yet only shortly thereafter, on April 11, 1946, the Second Prague Agreement was signed, which implied that Slovakia’s autonomy was significantly curtailed. Only two months later, the Third Prague Agreement was signed, which further curtailed Slovakia’s autonomy (Kirschbaum 1980: 237). [1946: autonomy restriction]
* Slovakia’s territorial expansion increased significantly in 1947. Hungary obtained some of the territory it had lost under the post-WWI Treaty of Trianon back in 1938 through the intervention of Germany. Those changes were reversed in 1947. As a result, Slovakia’s territory increased significantly (http://library.law.fsu.edu/Digital-Collections/LimitsinSeas/pdf/ibs066.pdf). However, at the time Slovakia’s autonomy was being continuously eroded. We do not code a concession.
* After the 1948 Communist coup, the asymmetric system was officially ended. What was left of Slovakian autonomy was removed. Discrimination against Slovaks and their leaders, especially Catholic leaders, was widespread in the 1950s (Kirschbaum 1980: 241-242; Minahan 2002; World Directory of Minorities; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 270). [1948: autonomy restriction]
* After the Prague Spring 1968, the Constitutional Law of Federation was adopted by the National Assembly. Czechoslovakia was divided into two federal states with considerable autonomy within the usual constraints of the Brezhnev era (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 271; World Directory of Minorities). Against the general opinion that regards decentralization under communism as toothless, Brancati (2009) argues that Czechoslovakia established a decentralized system in 1968 and was thus “highly decentralized at the time it democratized”. Under this system, the national government was divided into two legislative bodies — the House of People (Sněmovna Lidu) and the House of Nations (Sněmovna Národů). Each region had its own legislature, known as a National Council (Národní Rada), and the division of authority between the national and regional legislatures was extensive. Not only did regional legislatures wield a veto power over the national constitution, but the country's two national legislatures were also divided almost evenly between the Czech Lands and Slovakia, and decision rules within the latter allowed parties from either region to thwart that of the other. [1968: autonomy concession]
* After the 1968 decentralization, decision-making on economic and many other matters was soon recentralized (Goldstone 2015: 129). According to Kirschbaum (1980: 245), recentralization started in 1970. [1970: autonomy restriction]
* In April 1990 the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic was created by passing of the Constitutional Law 101/1990 (Crampton 2002). Furthermore, a new power-sharing law was adopted in December as constitutional amendment 556/1990. It reduced the power of the central organs and “eliminated the exclusive prerogative of the federation in foreign policy and defense, which opened up the future possibility of separate international treaties and even the creation of republic-level armed forces” (Rychlik 2000: 54). [1990: autonomy concession]
* In November 1992, the republic was dissolved by the Czechoslovakian National Assembly, making Slovakia independent as of January 1, 1993 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 283). [1992: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The First Prague Agreement (1945) foresaw an asymmetric federation with significant autonomy for the Slovaks (see Kirschbaum 1980: 237-238). In 1946, the Second and Third Prague Agreements seriously restricted Slovakia’s autonomy, and in 1948 the asymmetric system was fully abolished (Kirschbaum 1980: 237-241). Based on this, we code the establishment of autonomy in 1945 and, following the 1st of January rule, autonomy in 1946. One could code the end of autonomy already in 1946, but it appears that at least some autonomy was retained until 1948, thus the end of autonomy. [1946-1948: regional autonomy]
* In line with the reasoning of Brancati (2009), we code the Slovaks as regionally autonomous following the 1968 federal reform. This is confirmed by EPR, which also codes the Slovaks as regionally autonomous after 1968. Since regional autonomy is coded following the first of January rule, only the second phase of activity is affected. [1969-1992: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1945: establishment of regional autonomy]
* [1948: revocation of regional autonomy]
* [1968: establishment of regional autonomy]
* [1992: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Slovaks |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Slovaks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 31502000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. The 1946 code also applies to 1945 (which isn’t coded in EPR). If anything, the Slovak’s position was better in 1945. [1945-1948, 1963-1992: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.308]

**Regional concentration**

* According to EPR, Czechs make up almost 100% of the population of today’s Czech Republic and Slovaks 80% of the population of Slovakia. While EPR’s estimate relates to the situation after 1993, there is no evidence that the situation would have been dramatically different before that. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code ethnic kin. MAR, on the other hand, codes Sloavks in Hungary and Poland as the two largest kin groups. According to Poland’s 2002 census, there were 2,000 Slovaks in Poland. The number of Slovaks in Hungary is more substantial, but also below the threshold: 17,000 indicate that they are ethnic Slovaks, 56,000 speak Slovak, and around 100,000 have Slovak ancestry. [no kin]

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