# ECUADOR

## Guayas

Activity: 1999-2018

**General notes**

* The Guayas movement is a regionalist movement claiming more autonomy for several coastal provinces (Minahan 2016: 166). According to Eaton (2011) the Guayas movement is different from the indigenous movements that have emerged in Ecuador. Thus, the Guayas movement can be considered a regionalist movement composed of mainly Whites and Mestizos.
* The Guayas are also referred to as the Guayaco by Minahan (2016). The following provinces form part of this group according to Minahan: Guayas, El Oro, Los Rios, Manabi, Essemeraldas, and Santa Elena. However, we only found evidence for separatist mobilization in four of six provinces (Guayas, El Oro, Los Rios, and Manabi).

**Movement start and end dates**

* Protests were organized in Guayaquil in March 1999 “after the collapse of the city’s major financial institutions” (Eaton 2011: 296). “A group called Fuerza Ecuador began to collect signatures towards… enabling the Prefect of Guayas… to request holding a popular consultation on autonomy” (Eaton 2011: 296).
* The Guayas movement seeks a higher percentage of local tax revenues for local use. They demand that “an autonomous region should be able to keep one-half… of non-trade tax revenues collected in the region” (Eaton 2011: 294). “Measures of fiscal decentralization… favored municipal, not regional, governments” (Eaton 2011: 294).
* Other demands include regional legislatures with law-making abilities, regional control over land tenure, and greater regional control over public security.
* Eaton argues that the autonomy movements in Guaya and Santa Cruz (Bolivia) are different from other autonomy movements in Latin America: The autonomy sought is more sweeping and not directly connected to indigenous land use. Both movements have a lot of popular and business support. There is analogous agitation for autonomy in three other departments (El Oro, Los Rios, Manabi); however, due to the strong link with the Guaya movement and the overlapping goals we code them all together. We peg the start date to 1999 when the first protests flared up.
* The last clear evidence for claims for increased autonomy we were able to find was in 2008, when movement leaders organized an aggressive “no” campaign on a constitutional referendum about a proposal for centralization of certain powers (Marquez 2008). We code an end to the movement in 2018 based on the ten-year rule. [start date: 1999; end date: 2018]

**Dominant claim**

* The first organized activity of the Guayas is evident in 1999, where protests erupted over the region’s financial situation and taxes. Especially the group Fuerza Ecuador demanded more autonomy for the Guayas province. In addition, the El Oro, Los Rios, and Manabi provinces also voice the same call for autonomy, which is coded under the Guayas movement due to the similarity of their claims. [1999-2018: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Guayas is composed of the current Guaya province in Ecuador, as well as the El Oro, Los Rios, and the Manabi provinces. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding for the entire movement. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Guayas are of mixed Spanish and Indigenous descent from the coastal region of Guayas. The indigenous descendents of the region flourished between 850-1600 as the area sat on an important trade route. Guayas was conquered by the Incas in the 1400’s and later by the Spanish in 1534, after which the region entered decline (Minahan, 2016: 166).
* In 1820 the Guayas from the city of Guayquil declared independence from Spain, joining Simon Bolivar’s Republic of Gran Columbia (Minahan, 2016: 166). The Guaya movement uses this early independence as a form of historical nation building (Easton, 2011: 306; vom Hau and Srebotnjak, 2021: 1021), as it was a period of brief autonomy before the rest of modern day Ecuador gained their independence from Spain in 1822 (Danver, 2015: 605; Minahan, 2016: 166). Due to the divisions between coastal and inland peoples in an independent Ecuador, the Guaya region was divided into several provinces between 1860-1884 (Minahan, 2016: 166).
* The cocoa boom of the late 1800’s led to the increased prosperity of the Guaya region, with the Liberal Revolution of 1895 enhancing the regions commercial and financial power (Easton, 2011: 299), helping to establish Guayaquil as the economic capital of Ecuador (vom Hau and Srebotnjak, 2021: 1012). A war between Equador and Peru came close to Guayaquil in 1942, which Minahan (2016: 166) marks as the beginning of Guayaco activism. Minahan (2016: 166) also notes that nationalism grew in the 1950’s-60’s, with increased calls for autonomy in the 1970’s. This period overlaps with a period of direct military rile in Ecuador and a return to democracy in 1979 (Eaton, 2011: 299). The 1979 constitution prohibited subnational parties, so parties representing local interests campaigned nationally but their interests entrenched these as de facto localized parties (vom Hau and Srebotnjak, 2021: 1015). One such party was the *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC), a centre right party representing the relatively affluent Guaya provice and surrounding areas. However, the leaders of the PSC were against autonomy. For example, Febres Cordero, president of Ecuador from 1984-1988, used his influence to produce benefits for Guayaquil, including special tax arrangements to prevent further autonomy (Eaton, 2011: 299).
* A general period of decentralization occurred during the 1990’s with various neoliberal economic reforms of the country. Although out of government, the PSC as major actors in central politics pushed through various laws designed to boost the power of Guayaquil, such as a bill for automatic revenue sharing and pushing the insertion of pro business measures in the consititutional reforms of 1998 (Easton, 2011: 296; 2013: 437; vom Hau and Srebotnjak, 2021: 1015). However, these moves did not substantially alter the region’s level of autonomy (Eaton, 211: 298).
* A financial crisis in 1999 placed strain on relations between local and national governments (vom Hau and Srebotnjak, 2021: 1015). Major financial institutions in Guayaquil collapsed, leading to mass demonstrations in March 1999. Following this, “a group called Fuerza Ecuador began to collect signatures toward the goal of enabling the Prefect of Guayas, Nicolas Lapentti, to request holding a popular consultation on autonomy” (Eaton, 2011: 296).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1999, the Electoral Tribunal of Guaya accepted the petition and request for consultation on autonomy, scheduling a vote for 23rd January 2000. However, Ecuadors president was overthrown the day before the scheduled vote. The cancellation of the vote led to greater calls for autonomy (Eaton, 2011: 296). However, the promise of the vote did not come from the central government but from a regional authority, so we do not code a concession or restriction.
* The central government of Ecuador strongly opposed autonomy, with this stance provoking more demonstrations in 2005. Claims for greater autonomy increased in 2008 after the election of Correa, with the centre right base in Guayaquil perceiving his left orientation a threat. (Eaton, 2011: 296; vom Hau and Srebotnjak, 2021: 1012).
* In 2006 Correa pledged to rewrite the country’s constitution, but this was largely seen to be at the expense of Guayaquil. This represents part of a struggle between Correa and the Guayaquil city mayor, Jaime Nebot, with the latter aiming to assert autonomy for the city (Bowen, 2015: 92). In January 2008 a mass demonstration in Guayaquil led to the presentation to Ecuador’s constituent assembly “a document titled "the Mandate of Guayaquil," which called on the assembly to grant provinces the right to petition for autonomy” (Eaton, 2011: 297). Eaton continues to note that “Correa's supporters controlled the design of the constitution, however, and opted to make it harder, not easier, for provinces to secure autonomy”.
* Movement leaders organized an aggressive "no" campaign on the constitutional referendum and helped defeat it in Guayaquil, but were powerless to secure meaningful compromises from the government (Eaton 2011: 297). The constitution centralized some competencies including those related to monetary and oil policy (vom Hau and Srebotnjak, 2021: 1015; Republic of Ecuador, 2008: Online). [2008 autonomy restriction]
* At the same time, the 2008 constitution created Decentralised Autonomous Governments (DAG). However, there was no meaningful increase in autonomy associated with this policy. In Guayaquil, the change was limited to the municipal council being given the ability to coordinate with surrounding DAG’s, but with the centralization of some competencies in the constitution there is no meaningful increase in autonomy brought about by the restructuring (Republic of Ecuador, 2008: Online; OECD, 2016: Online).

**Regional autonomy**

* The province of Guayas, like other provinces of Ecuador, has a degree of autonomy as part of the countries constitutional make-up. In Ecuador there are multiple levels of regional government; provinces, cantons, and parishes. Provinces are run by an elected prefect. However, competencies of provinces are limited (Republic of Ecuador, 2008: Online; OECD, 2016: Online; vom Hau and Srebotnjak, 2021: 1015). EPR considers regional powers sufficient for a regional autonomy code in Ecuador; however, this not supported by other sources. For example, Ecuador’s regional authority index (RAI) remained at 9.75 in 2018 (out of 30), a score that is typical for a unitary state with a modest level of decentralization. The score has never been higher than 10.75 since 1990. For comparison, federal states in Latin America score above 20 in the RAI index (Argentina & Brazil) while Bolivia – the most decentralized unitary state in the region – tends to score around 14.5 in recent years. Based on this, we do not code regional autonomy. [1999-2018: no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Guayas |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Whites/mestizos |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 13002000 |

**Power access**

* Guayas are whites/mestizos, who are coded as dominant throughout in EPR. Guayaquils traditionally had a lot of clout in Ecuador; however, Eaton (2011: 299ff) suggests that Guayaquils and especially Guayaquil business organizations lost some of their influence over the national government in the 1990s and 2000s. Nevertheless, the Guayas retained significant representation in the national government. Notably, Rafael Correa, the long-term president of Ecuador (2007-2017) was born in Guayaquil. The same applies to his predecessors, Alfredo Palacio (2005-2007), and Gustavo Noboa (2000-2003). The same applies to several other prominent cabinet ministers, including Ricardo Patiño (Foreign Minister in 2010-16 and Minister of Defence in 2016-2017) and Maria Elsa Viteria (Minister of Finance in 2008-10 and 2018). [1999-2018: senior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2016: 165), the population was 5-6 mio. in 2015 (we use 5.5 mio). Ecuador's total population was 16.15 mio in 2015 (Worldometer 2017). [0.3406]

**Regional concentration**

* Mestizos/whites make up clear majorities in all provinces associated with this movement according to the 2010 census including Guyas province (2010 census: ca 77%), El Oro (89%), Los Rios (58%), and Manabi (75%). We found no evidence for the number of Guayas living outside of that region, but as this is a regional identity movement, the criteria for regional concentration highly likely apply. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for transnational kin. [no kin]

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## Highland Indigenous Peoples

Activity: 1972-2020

**General notes**

* The Highland Indigenous Peoples are dominated by the Quechua, or Quechua-Aymara (according to Minahan, 2002). However, there are also Quechuas in the lowlands. MAR (2009) refer to the group as the Sierra Indians. MAR (2009) notes that the highest concentration of indigenous peoples in the highlands are Chiborazo, Cotopaxi, Imbabura Tungurahua, and Bolivar.

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minorities at Risk, the Highland Indigenous Peoples began to mobilize in the early 1940s, when the Ecuadorian Indigenous Federation (EIF) was formed. FEI was closely associated with the Communists and it mainly espoused class struggle goals (Rappaport n.d.).
* The first evidence for organized *separatist* mobilization we came across is in 1972, when ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui) was established (Minorities at Risk Project). At the national level, ECUARUNARI advocated a class-based agenda, but at the local level local activists often also made claims for local autonomy (Yashar 2005: 108).
* In 1986 ECUARUNARI established an umbrella indigenous organization, the Confederation of the Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE), together with CONFENAIE, the main organization representing the lowland indigenous. According to Minority Rights Group International, the founding of CONAIE was “[one of the most important political developments in Ecuador.” Furthermore, “[t]his confederation has been instrumental in organizing pan-indigenous uprising.
* A key player in Ecuadorian politics, CONAIE has demanded land restitution for indigenous peoples and envisaged a national economy based on territorial autonomy. Its sixteen-point demands included the right to practice traditional medicine, to bilingual education and to indigenous control of archaeological sites.”
* CONAIE continues to be active in fighting for indigenous cultural, language, and land rights (Rappaport n.d.; MRGI). A major political force in Ecuador, CONAIE leads mobilization against neoliberal policies, demands which overlap with indigenous autonomy and cultural rights, in particular, over resource extraction on indigenous land (CONAIE, 2022: Online). Thus the movement is coded as ongoing. [start date: 1972; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* We code the start of the movement in 1972, when ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui) was established. ECUARUNARI made claims for autonomy (Yashar 2005: 108). In 1986 the Confederation of the Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE), an umbrella indigenous organization representing both highland and lowland indigenous people of Ecuador, was established. CONAIE was the main indigenous organization in Ecuador and is also described as “one of the strongest indigenous organizations in Latin America” (Assies 2005: 166). The claim did not change with the emergence of CONAIE. As part of its 16-point program, CONAIE, like ECUARUNARI, advocates land restitution for indigenous peoples and bilingual education and furthermore envisages a national economy based on territorial autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). [1972-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* We were unable to find a specific definition of the territory to which this group’s claims are tied. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s ethnic settlement area as indicated by the GeoEPR dataset, which serves as an approximation.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. MAR reports a rebellion score of 8 in 2003, but this appears to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7 and the coding notes do not make mention of a rebellion). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* One of the highland indigenous groups, the Quechua date back as early as 1000 BCE, with this group reaching the peak of their power with the Tianhuanaco Empire between 1000-1200 CE (Minahan, 2002: 1552; 2016: 347; MAR, 2009). The Inca conquered the area in the 1400’s, with the empire homogenizing the diverse area around Quechua and Inca descendents (Danver, 2015: 605; MAR, 2009; Minahan, 1552).
* The area saw first contact with the Spanish in 1524, and the area was conquered by them in 1533. In the following 2-3 centuries the Quechua’s population declined by 75% (Minahan, 2002: 1553; 2016: 347). Spanish rule was very stratified, with forced conversions and slavery (Minahan, 2016: 347). The independence of Ecuador in 1822 only entrenched social hierarchies, with the Quechua and other Highland Indigenous groups being second class citizens used as forced labour well into the early 20th century (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010; Danver, 2015: 605; Yashar, 2005: 88). However, the Highland Indigenous groups did resist, with an uprising in 1871 establishing a reputation for the indigenous groups being rebellious (Danver, 2015: 605).
* The Quechua established a unique indigenous capitalism based around traditional textile making in the 1920s, giving the group a slightly elevated socio-economic status (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). The first group representing Indigenous interests was the Ecuadorian Indigenous Federation (FEI), set up in 1944 by the Ecuadorian Communist Party (MAR, 2009: Danver, 2015: 605). A series of land reforms in the 1960s and 1970s aimed to make indigenous highlanders part of the Ecuadorian peasantry (Yashar, 2005: 88). In response indigenous groups organized, with the Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI) being established in 1972, which functioned as a federation of local indigenous communities, largely the Quechua (MAR, 2009).
* The land reform of 1964 replaced a semi-feudal labour system (Hacienda) that tied indigenous families to farms. The Hacienda system was a form of dept patronage that acted as administration of highland indigenous groups, especially the Quechua (Danver, 2015: 605). The reform granted highland indigenous peoples within the Hacienda system civil rights but also outlined mechanisms for gaining access to land (Yashar, 2005: 92). This is coded as a concession due to the move towards recognition of land ownership of some highland farming communities. [1964: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1973 land reforms built on the 1964 reforms, which granted social and civil rights but importantly redistributed lands to indigenous communies. Although flawed (based on land quality and size), this built on and accelerated the recognition of land rights issued in 1964 reforms. Yashar (2005: 97) summarises the effect of these policies as such: “The corporatist citizenship regime therefore was meant to incorporate and control but unintentionally also granted the space for physical, material, social, and cultural autonomy – particularly with the recognition of comunas and the distribution of the land on which these communities were located. In this regard, the corporatist citizenship regime unwittingly institutionalized indigenous communities just as the state was seeking to privilege peasant and national identities.” [1973: autonomy concession]
* In response to demands by landlords, the military government reversed some of these concessions by drafting an agrarian development promotion law. Once the civilian government took over in 1979, this law was passed, slowing agrarian reform by disqualifying some highland indigenous communities classified as squatters and legitimizing the use of force to evict these groups (Yashar, 2005: 98, 134). Although this legitimized violence against highland indigenous peoples, it is not a restriction as the policy was designed to classify specific residents of land as squatters rather than the highland indigenous group as a whole.
* The transition to a civilian government in 1979 saw a new constitution implemented. This granted citizenship to indigenous people (Danver, 2015: 605). The implementation of a language law dropped requirement to speak Spanish to vote. This original restriction was intended to exclude indigenous peoples from voting, so this law marks the enfranchisement of indigenous peoples (Yashar, 2005: 141; Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). We do not code a concession because this change predominantly relates to ethnic representation.
* In 1980, the national organization representing indigenous groups was formed (CONAIE). This combined ECUARUNARI and CONFENAIE (MAR, 2009). However, Danver claims it was instead formed in 1986 (Danver, 2015: 605). This unification was encouraged by a programme of neoliberal reforms, which created economic inequalities across the country (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). This gave CONAIE its political character that saw it campaign against these reforms as well as for greater autonomy and rights for indigenous communities.
* The Ecuadorian government officially recognized bilingual education in 1981, began the Intercultural Bilingual Education Project in 1986, founded the National Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education in 1989, and promulgated a model curriculum for bilingual education in 1993 (Hornberger, 2000:180). EPR notes that “the Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (Directorate of Bilingual Education, DINEIB) [and other organisations] provided real power in specific domains” (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). After Duran won the 1992 presidential election, he tried to renege on these programmes, but was forced to back down by protests organized by CONAIE (MAR, 2009). We code a concession in 1981, when the process was initiated. [1981: cultural rights concession]
* In 1990, the highland regions saw multiple indigenous uprisings organized by CONAIE aiming to remind the country of its dependence of indigenous agricultural labour (MAR, 2009). CONAIE presented a list of sixteen demands, aiming to advance a broad range of rights of indigenous peoples and to reword parts of the 1979 constitution (Danver, 2015: 605; Yashar, 2005: 144).
* Following the election of President Duran in 1992, a range of neoliberal policies were promoted by the government (MAR, 2009). This included the 1994 Agrarian Development Law, which “effectively stopped land redistribution, targeted large export-oriented farms for credit, privatized water rights, and created the mechanisms (majority vote) for selling previously inalienable indigenous lands” (Yashar, 2005: 147-8). CONAIE organized large scale protests, forcing the government to retrace its steps and it “formed a commission with 50 percent participation by indigenous leaders to reform the Agrarian Development Law” (Yashar, 2005: 148), effectively giving CONAIE renegotiation powers, with which “they defended access to basic resources (credit, water, and land) and put in place strict measures for selling what had previous been inalienable community lands” (Yashar, 2005: 148). Rather than the land reform itself, this concession is focused on the commission which granted power over land decisions to indigenous groups. [1994: autonomy concession]
* In 1995-96, CONAIE decided to enter electoral politics, and established the political movement called Pachakutic and the party called the Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik Nuevo Pa´ıs (MUPP-NP). (Danver, 2015: 605; Yasher, 2005: 149).
* In 1996 Equador signed an agreement with an Argentinian oil company to drill on Quechua ancestral lands. This was later overturned by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in 2012 (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). [1996: autonomy restriction; 2012: autonomy concession]
* Protests in 1997 demanded the reforming of the constitution as a result of stability and legitimacy struggles of the central government (Van Cott, 2001: 45). Constitutional reforms implemented in 1998 “explicitly increased minority rights” and defined Ecuador as a plurinational state (MAR, 2009). This reform was spurred by Ecuador’s earlier ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, giving a greater level of protections to the indigenous communities of Ecuador and the lands they occupy (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010; ILO, ND: Online). The constitution states that “For the administration of the State and political representation there will be provinces, cantons and parishes. There will be indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian territorial constituencies that will be established by law” (Republic of Ecuador, 1998: Online). [1998: cultural rights & autonomy concession]
* Electoral parties in Ecuador were highly fragmented, which facilitated MUPP advancement in central and regional elected bodies (Van Cott, 2001). In local prefecture elctions in 2000, MUPP candidate Cesar Umajinga became the first indigenous prefect of Cotopaxi province (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). Van Cott agrees that the capture of this position does mean control of substantial administrative powers (2001: 44). Four more indigenous prefects were elected in 2004 expanding the terririty of autonomously managed prefectures under indigenous party authority. This accounts for EPR expanding the autonomous code to all indigenous groups from 2005 (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). As these developments were the result of electoral successes and not government concessions, we do not code a concession.
* The 2008 constitution centralized local competencies related to monetary and oil policy. This change in constitution under the Correa government restricted the autonomy of local administrations (Republic of Ecuador, 2008: Online]. This policy applied to the Highland Indigenous group because highland indigenous people were increasingly able to capture leadership positions in regional bodies (EPR). [2008: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* EPR codes for autonomy from 2001 because highland indigenous people were increasingly able to capture leadership positions in regional bodies. We found supporting evidence: In local prefecture elctions in 2000, MUPP candidate Cesar Umajinga became the first indigenous prefect of Cotopaxi province, and more highland indigenous people were elected in subsequent years. We still do not code autonomy because the powers of Ecuadorian provinces are too limited.
* Ecuadorian provinces have a degree of autonomy as part of the country’s constitutional make-up. In Ecuador there are multiple levels of regional government; provinces, cantons, and parishes. Provinces are run by an elected prefect. However, competencies of provinces are limited Republic of Ecuador 2008: Online; OECD, 2016: Online; vom Hau and Srebotnjak 2021: 1015). EPR seems to consider regional powers sufficient for a regional autonomy code in Ecuador; however, this not supported by other sources. For example, Ecuador’s regional authority index (RAI) remained at 9.75 in 2018 (out of 30), a score that is typical for a unitary state with a modest level of decentralization. The score has never been higher than 10.75 since 1990. For comparison, federal states in Latin America score above 20 in the RAI index (Argentina & Brazil) while Bolivia – the most decentralized unitary state in the region – tends to score around 14.5 in recent years. Based on this, we do not code regional autonomy. [1972-2020: no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Highland Indigenous Peoples |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Indigenous highland peoples (Kichwa) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 13003000 |

**Power access**

* We adopt power access codes from EPR, which codes the highland peoples as discriminated against in 1972-79 and subsequently as powerless. [1972-1979: discriminated; 1980-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR’s group size estimate (12%). [0.12]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes the highland peoples as regionally concentrated, but EPR uses a lower bar. MAR codes also codes regional concentration but suggests that the Quechua do not have a regional base, i.e., that there is no spatially contiguous area where they make up >25% of the local population. This matches with information from MRGI, which suggests that the Quechua/highland indigenous peoples inhabit multiple areas in Ecuador. Furthermore, MAR (2009) notes that the highest concentration of indigenous peoples in the highlands are in Chiborazo, Cotopaxi, Imbabura Tungurahua, and Bolivar. The 2010 census indicates the following percentages of indigenous residents in these four provinces: Chiborazo – 38%; Cotopaxi – 22.1%; Tungurahua – 12.4%; Bolivar – 25.4% (INEC, 2010: Online). As these figures are all below the 50% threshold, we do not conde regional concentration. [no regional concentration]

**Kin**

* There are Quechuas in multiple countries including Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina (EPR; MAR; Minahan 2002: 1551). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Lowland Indigenous Peoples

Activity: 1964-2020

**General notes**

* MAR (2009) lists lowland indigenous peoples including the Aushiris, Cofanes, Quichuas, Secoyas, Sionas, Shuaras, Tetetes, and Zaparos. These can also be labelled as Amazonian Indians. EPR (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010) notes this is a small, fragmented group that includes lowland Quechua, Shuar [Shuraras], Huarorani, and Achuar.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for lowland indigenous mobilization in Ecuador we found is in 1964, when the Shuar Federation was formed. The Shuar Federation was formed in opposition against the incoming oil and agrarian companies with the main aim to protect the land of lowland indigenous peoples (Rubenstein 2001; Yatchana.org). Thus 1964 is coded as the start date.
* An oil boom in the 1970s further eroded indigenous communities’ hold on their ancestral lands.
* The Organization of the People of Pastaza (OPIP) and the Federation of the Indigenous Organization of Napo (FOIN) were both formed in 1973. FOIN represents over 60 Runa Indian communities, mainly provincial organizations throughout the Amazonian region, and it is primarily concerned with land struggles.
* In 1980, Amazonian groups united to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENAIE). The organization’s leadership includes Shuar, Quichua, Achuar, Woaroni, Cofan, Siona, and Secoya tribal representatives. Its principle decision-making body is a congress held every two years. Through this alliance, Ecuador’s lowland indigenous peoples have brought their issues to public attention, placing them on the political agendas of national and international groups.
* CONFENAIE has formed alliances with environmental and human rights organizations to force oil companies and the Ecuadorian government to negotiate development practices in the Amazon region. Again, land rights have been a central issue.
* Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1970-2006 indicate that the movement has been consistently active since its founding. Protests continued to take place, notably in 2012 and 2013 against oil-drilling, but no fatalities were recorded.
* In 1986 CONFENAIE merged with other organizations to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). According to Minority Rights Group International, the founding of CONAIE was “[one of the most important political developments in Ecuador.” Furthermore, “[t]his confederation has been instrumental in organizing pan-indigenous uprising. A key player in Ecuadorian politics, CONAIE has demanded land restitution for indigenous peoples and envisaged a national economy based on territorial autonomy. Its sixteen-point demands included the right to practice traditional medicine, to bilingual education and to indigenous control of archaeological sites.”
* CONAIE continues to be active in fighting for indigenous cultural, language, and land rights (Alvaro 2013; CONAIE; Cultural Survival 2012; Marshall & Gurr 2003; MAR; MRGI; Native Web; Rubenstein 2001; Yachana.org; CONAIE 2022: Online). [start date: 1964; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* There were several organizations representing the lowland indigenous groups in Ecuador. We could not find evidence of a claim other than land rights and autonomy. The SDM dataset codes the start to the lowland indigenous movement in 1964, when the Shuar Federation was established. According to Rubenstein (2001), the Shuar Federation was established to protect indigenous land against incoming oil companies. With the Organization of the People of Pastaza (OPIP) and the Federation of the Indigenous Organization of Napo (FOIN), two new lowland indigenous organizations were formed in 1973. Both OPIP (Becker 2011: 7) and FOIN (Cultural Survival 1986) fought for land rights. In 1980, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENAIE) was formed as an umbrella group for lowland indigenous organizations. Again, land rights were the central issue of CONFENAIE (Minorities at Risk Project). In 1986 the Confederation of the Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE), an umbrella indigenous organization representing both highland and lowland indigenous people of Ecuador, was established. CONAIE was the main indigenous organization in Ecuador and is also described as “one of the strongest indigenous organizations in Latin America” (Assies 2005: 166). As part of its 16-point program, CONAIE advocates land restitution for indigenous peoples, bilingual education and furthermore envisages a national economy based on territorial autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project).
* CONAIE’s 2022 Annual Assembly reveals continuity in the claim for autonomy for indigenous communities in Ecuador. One of the resolutions passed reads: “Deepen and strengthen with the peoples and nationalities the self-identification campaign throughout the national territory, in order to strengthen our cultural identity, our right to self-determination, defense of the territories and our ancestral memory as indigenous peoples and nationalities of Ecuador in this path for the construction of the Plurinational and Intercultural State; and as a real transformation option for the country, based on our political project of the peoples.” (CONAIE, 2022: Online). [1964-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* We were unable to find a specific definition of the territory to which this group’s claims are tied. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s ethnic settlement area as indicated by the GeoEPR dataset, which offers the best approximation in this case.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. MAR reports a rebellion score of 8 in 2003, but this appears to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7 and the coding notes do not make mention of a rebellion). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The lowland indigenous groups had been contacted by European settlers at various points since the 1500s (MAR, 2009). The Spanish Empire tried to colonise Shuar areas in the 1500’s but failed to do so, largely leaving the area untouched (Rubenstein, 2001: 263). Sapara were first written of in the 1800s (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). The Huaorani had no major contact until visited by missionaries in 1956 (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). This is part of a pattern of Amazonian resistance to Spanish and Ecuadorian colonization efforts with a shift to the use of Catholic missionaries to exert control instead (Danver, 2015: 605).
* Ecuadorian independence in 1822 only reinforced social hierarchies that saw indigenous communities excluded (Danver, 2015: 605). The 1890s saw increased colonization by the Ecuadorian authorities, including the establishment of the Selesian Order of the Catholic Church, who colonized by proxy (Rubenstein, 2001: 266). A rubber boom in the early 1900s saw the Sapara population decline (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online), whilst the discovery of oil in Shuar areas encouraged the expansion of the Catholic mission in those areas (Rubenstein, 2001: 266). Border tensions and wars with Peru in the 1940s saw terrirory ceded to Peru, putting extra pressure on groups such as the Shuar and Sapara (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online; Rubenstein, 2001: 266).
* A Shuar Reserve was established in 1935, however the Salesian Order was given control over its administration (Rubenstein, 2001: 267). The first group representing Indigenous interests was the Ecuadorian Indigenous Federation (FEI), set up in 1944 by the Ecuadorian Communist Party (MAR, 2009: Danver, 2015: 605). However the Catholic Church later helped found the Shuar Federation in 1964, partly with the intention of countering the FEI (Danver, 2015: 605). The early days of the federation are described as follows by Rubenstein (2001: 279): “From 9-13 January 1964, 52 delegates met to form the Shuar Federation, to elect directors, and to designate a commission to write statutes. The Federation, as a third level of administration over the associations and the centros, consists of five commissions: land tenure, labor and cooperatives, culture and religious education, health, and means of communication. Shutka presented the statutes to the Ministry of Social Welfare in Quito, and they were approved on 22 October 1964. The Federation quickly grew, and by 1988 there were over 260 centros in the Federation”.
* The 1964 Agrarian Reforms aimed to colonise the Amazon lowland regions. The Shuar Federation was established in response to this law (MAR, 2009). Unlike the highland indigenous peoples, the lowland indigenous groups did not benefit from land redistribution. Instead, the reform put pressure on lowland indigenous communities, especially as a result of its active encouragement to colonize the Amazon regions (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). We code this as a prior restriction because the restriction gave rise to the SDM. [1964: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1967 the national government gave the Shuar Federation the authority to register births. More significantly, in 1972 it gave the Federation the right to organize and run schools (Rubenstein, 2001: 280). [1972: autonomy concession]
* The 1973 land reforms built on the 1964 reforms, granting social and civil rights but importantly redistributed lands to indigenous communies. Although flawed (based on land quality and size), this built on and accelerated the recognition of land rights issued in 1964 reforms. Yashar (2005: 97) summarises the effect of these policies: “The corporatist citizenship regime therefore was meant to incorporate and control but unintentionally also granted the space for physical, material, social, and cultural autonomy – particularly with the recognition of comunas and the distribution of the land on which these communities were located. In this regard, the corporatist citizenship regime unwittingly institutionalized indigenous communities just as the state was seeking to privilege peasant and national identities”. For the Shuar in particular, this came as part of a petition to suspend colonization, with a policy to remove non Shuar colonisers who owned less than certain amount of land, alleviating land pressure (Rubenstein, 2001: 281). [1973: autonomy concession]
* The transition to a civilian government in 1979 saw a new constitution implemented. This granted citizenship to indigenous people (Danver, 2015: 605). The implementation of a language law dropped requirement to speak Spanish to vote. This restriction was intended to exclude indigenous peoples from voting, so this law marks the enfranchisement of indigenous peoples (Yashar, 2005: 141; Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). We do not code a concession because this change predominantly relates to ethnic representation.
* During the 1970s, pressure to develop the Amazon created further groups representing indigenous communities, such as the Organization of the People of Pastaza (OPIP) and the Federation of the Indigenous Organization of Napo (FOIN), both formed in 1973 (MAR, 2009).Various Amazonian groups formed the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENAIE), which later joined with the highland indigenous group ECUARUNARI to form CONAIE (MAR, 2009). However, Danver claims it was instead formed in 1986 (Danver, 2015: 605). This unification was encouraged by a programme of neoliberal reforms, which created economic inequalities across the country (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). This gave CONAIE its political character that saw it campaign against these reforms as well as for greater autonomy and rights for indigenous communities. In addition, an earthquake in the lowland provinces in 1987 caused a major oil spill, generating environmental and anti Amazon development demands. The President at the time formally recognized CONAIE as the legitimate representative organization of Ecuadors indigenous communities (MAR, 2009).
* The Ecuadorian government officially recognized bilingual education in 1981, began the Intercultural Bilingual Education Project in 1986, founded the National Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education in 1989, and a model corricuum for bilingual education promulgated in 1993 (Hornberger, 2000:180). EPR notes that “the Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (Directorate of Bilingual Education, DINEIB) [and other organisations] provided real power in specific domains” (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). After Duran won the 1992 presidential election, he tried to renege on these programmes, but was forced to back down by protests organized by CONAIE (MAR, 2009). We code a concession in 1981, when the process was initiated. [1981: cultural rights concession]
* In 1990, the highland regions saw multiple indigenous uprisings organized by CONAIE aiming to remind the country of its dependence of indigenous agricultural labour (MAR, 2009). Supported by lowland indigenous communities, CONAIE delivered presented a list of sixteen demands, aiming to advance a broad range of rights of indigenous peoples and to reword parts of the 1979 constitution (Danver, 2015: 605; Yashar, 2005: 144).
* The Huarani made a successful land claim, seeing government recognition of their control over 600,000 hectares, although at the cost of allowing oil companies to drill there (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). Despite the conditionality, this is a substantial recognition of land claims and is coded as a concession. [1990: autonomy concession]
* MAR (2009) notes that “In 1992, indigenous groups in the Yuracruz region were awarded land but not funding, leading to a breakdown in negotiations with landowners, who hired private security officers to protect themselves from violent protests.” Subsequent violence led to a government settlement. Despite the violent outcome, there was a policy of awarding land to indigenous communities in the Yuracruz regions, and so is coded as a concession. [1992: autonomy concession]
* Following the election of President Duran in 1992, a range of neoliberal policies were promoted by the government (MAR, 2009). This included the 1994 Agrarian Development Law, which “effectively stopped land redistribution, targeted large export-oriented farms for credit, privatized water rights, and created the mechanisms (majority vote) for selling previously inalienable indigenous lands” (Yashar, 2005: 147-8). CONAIE organized large scale protests, forcing the government to retrace its steps and it “formed a commission with 50 percent participation by indigenous leaders to reform the Agrarian Development Law” (Yashar, 2005: 148), effectively giving CONAIE renegotiation powers, with which “they defended access to basic resources (credit, water, and land) and put in place strict measures for selling what had previous been inalienable community lands” (Yashar, 2005: 148). Rather than the land reform itself, this concession is focused on the commission which granted power over land decisions to indigenous groups. [1994: autonomy concession]
* In 1995-96, CONAIE decided to enter electoral politics, and established the political movement called Pachakutic and the party called the Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik Nuevo Pa´ıs (MUPP-NP). (Danver, 2015: 605; Yasher, 2005: 149).
* Protests in 1997 demanded the reforming of the constitution as a result of stability and legitimacy struggles of the central government (Van Cott, 2001: 45). Constitutional reforms implemented in 1998 “explicitly increased minority rights” by recognizing Ecuador as a plurinational state (MAR, 2009). This reform was spurred by Ecuador’s earlier ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, giving a greater level of protections to the indigenous communities of Ecuador and the lands they occupy (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010; ILO, ND: Online). Van Cott notes that “The resulting 1998 Constitution lacks a clear framework for the practical interpretation of Indigenous Territorial Circumscriptions, which are to have autonomous powers under the new charter” (2001: 51). The constitution states that “For the administration of the State and political representation there will be provinces, cantons and parishes. There will be indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian territorial constituencies that will be established by law” (Republic of Ecuador, 1998: Online). This indicates that the legal basis for autonomous indigenous territories was established in the constitution, but there was a lack of direction in how these could be established. However, it established the legal possibility of autonomy for indigenous areas so is coded as a concession. [1998: cultural rights & autonomy concession]
* Electoral parties in Ecuador were highly fragmented, which facilitated MUPP advancement in central and regional elected bodies (Van Cott, 2001). In local prefecture elctions in 2000, MUPP candidate Cesar Umajinga became the first indigenous prefect of Cotopaxi province. EPR notes that this capture represents the beginning of regional autonomy for the Quechua, hence EPR codes regional autonomy code from 2001 (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). Van Cott agrees that the capture of this position does mean control of substantial administrative powers (2001: 44). Four more indigenous prefects were elected in 2004 expanding the terririty of autonomously managed prefectures under indigenous party authority. This accounts for EPR expanding the autonomous code to all indigenous groups from 2005 (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). As these developments were the result of electoral successes and not government concessions, we do not code a concession.
* The main issues for the lowland indigenous communities have consistently been land use, which overlaps with environmental struggles. This continued through Rafeal Correa’s government despite his election being supported by CONAIE (MAR, 2009), and has led to some reversals in land rights for lowland indigenous groups. The 2008 constitution centralized local competencies related to monetary and oil policy. This change in constitution under the Correa government restricted the autonomy of local administrations (Republic of Ecuador, 2008: Online]. This policy applies to the Lowland Indigenous group because they control a regional administration. [2008: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012, the Ecuadorian government allowed exploration and exploitation of Sapara land without proper consultation (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). This was part of a government policy of formalizing tender for oil and mining companies to explore and extract, without consent of locals, in the South East/ Amazonian regions of Ecuador: “In this event, in 2012, it was where the Ecuadorian government formalized the tender for 21 oil blocks that make up the so-called  ["Southeast Round"](https://www.dropbox.com/s/dk6a6wrzd74zbey/Ronda%20Suroriente%202018.jpg?dl=0), for which this edition of the event generated great expectations and concern in the indigenous organizations of the Amazon since that a new tender for these blocks had been announced” (CONAIE, 2018: Online). This led to the later sale by the government of oil exploration rights to two Chinese firms over 500,000 acres which overlaps with Sapara land. This was a major blow to the land use rights of Sapara over their own land. Similarly, the government also granted licences to another Chinese firm to mine of Shuar land without prior consent and on territory formerly recognized as Shuar. This is coded in 2012 as it was the opening of the policy for unconsulted exploration and exploitation. [2012: autonomy restriction]
* In 2014 the Ecuadorian government allowed for the extraction of oil in Napo province on Quechua ancestral land in the Ecuadorian Amazon (MRGI). This marks a continuation of the policy for unconsulted exploration and explointation. [2014: autonomy restriction]
* The Huaorani lands were due to be protected by the Yasuni National Park, which was supported by the UN. However, citing a lack of funds Correa cancelled the national park project in 2016 and authorized oil drilling in the area soon after (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). This both reneges on a promised policy, intrudes on the land use rights of the Huaorani, and is part of a continued pattern of behaviour of the Correa government towards the lowland Amazonian indigenous peoples. [2016: autonomy restriction]
* In 2022, the Ecuadorian constitutional court decided to affirm indigenous rights by guaranteeing the right to consent over extractive projects on their land, which clarifies the appropriate articles in the constitution (Koenig, 2022: Online). This effectively reverses the 2012 policy of unconsulted exploration and extraction and is coded as a concession advancing the land rights of lowland indigenous communities. (We note this for a future update.)

**Regional autonomy**

* EPR codes autonomy from 2005 because lowland indigenous people were increasingly able to capture leadership positions in regional bodies. We found supporting evidence: In local prefecture elctions in 2000, MUPP candidate Cesar Umajinga became the first indigenous prefect of Cotopaxi province. Four more indigenous prefects were elected in 2004, including Morona Santiago in the Lowland Amazon area, expanding the terririty of autonomously managed prefectures under indigenous party authority. EPR notes that this capture represents the beginning of regional autonomy that has been sustained by electoral victories in Zamora Chinchipe and Morona Santiago. We still do not code autonomy because the powers of Ecuadorian provinces are too limited.
* Ecuadorian provinces have a degree of autonomy as part of the country’s constitutional make-up. In Ecuador there are multiple levels of regional government; provinces, cantons, and parishes. Provinces are run by an elected prefect. However, competencies of provinces are limited (Republic of Ecuador 2008: Online; OECD, 2016: Online; vom Hau and Srebotnjak 2021: 1015). EPR seems to consider regional powers sufficient for a regional autonomy code in Ecuador; however, this not supported by other sources. For example, Ecuador’s regional authority index (RAI) remained at 9.75 in 2018 (out of 30), a score that is typical for a unitary state with a modest level of decentralization. The score has never been higher than 10.75 since 1990. For comparison, federal states in Latin America score above 20 in the RAI index (Argentina & Brazil) while Bolivia – the most decentralized unitary state in the region – tends to score around 14.5 in recent years. Based on this, we do not code regional autonomy. [1964-2020: no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lowland Indigenous Peoples |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Lowland peoples (Shuar, Achuar etc.) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 13004000 |

**Power access**

* We adopt power access codes from EPR, which codes the lowland peoples as discriminated against in 1964-79 and subsequently as powerless. [1964-1979: discriminated; 1980-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We draw on EPR’s group size estimate (2%). [0.02]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes the lowland peoples as regionally concentrated, but EPR uses a lower bar. MAR codes also codes regional concentration but suggests that the lowland indigenous peoples do not have a regional base, i.e., that there is no spatially contiguous area where they make up >25% of the local population. According to MAR (2009), the lowland indigenous peoples “reside principally in the northeast in a region known as the Oriente, on the upper tributaries of the Amazon basin in the provinces of Morona Santiago, Napo, Orellano, Pastaza, Sucumbios and Zamora Chinchipe”. According to 2010 census, indigenous people make up the following shares in these regions: Morona Santiago – 48.4%; Napo – 56.8%; Orellano – 31.8%; Pastaza – 39.8%; Sucumbios – 13.4%; Zamora Chinchipe – 15.6% (INEC, 2010: Online). As the 50%/50% threshold is therefore not met, we do not code regional concentration. [no regional concentration]

**Kin**

* MAR codes ethnic kin, but this is due the the small number of Kichwa/Quechua who live in the lowlands. EPR, by contrast, codes ethnic ties to the lowland indigenous peoples in Peru. The likely reason is that there are Shuar (the main group associated with the lowland indigenous peoples in Ecuador) also in Peru (see MRGI). However, the Shuar are among the smaller indigenous communities in Peru and their numbers do not cross the 100,00 threshold (Danver 2015: 158). We found no other evidence for numerially significant transborder ethnic kin. [no kin]

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