# ETHIOPIA

## Afars

Activity: 1975-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Afars of Ethiopia, along with Afars of Djibouti, formed the Afar Liberation Front in 1975. This is the first clear evidence of organized separatist activity that we have come across, and hence 1975 is coded as start date. However, separatist activity could predate 1975. Minahan (2002), for example, suggests that demands for Afar autonomy emerged earlier (1950s or 1960s) but we found no clear evidence that they were organized.
* 1975 saw the outbreak of separatist armed conflict (see below) and the movement remained ongoing in the 1980s. While certain Afar groups since 1991 attempt to work conventionally within the Ethiopian political system in alliance with the EPRDF (e.g. Afar National Democratic Movement and Afar Peoples Democratic Organization), the Afar Liberation Front continued its local rebellions in the pursuit of an independent Afar state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Hewitt et al. 2008; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR; Refworld 2002).
* According to some reports, ALF reportedly merged with the Afar National Liberation Front (ANLF), the Afar National Democratic Movement (ANDM), and ARDUF to create the Afari National Democratic Party (ANDP). That said, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada stated that there were indications that the group was active on its own in September 2000 and that its leader was involved in diplomatic negotiations (see UNCHR, 2002). In December 2019, ANDP merged with other parties – including the Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP), Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), Hereri National League (HNL), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) – to form the ‘Prosperity Party’ (Gedamu, 2019).
* As of 2020, the two main groups associated with this movement are the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), a separatist Afar group that lays claim to land straddling Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) (BBC, 2012). In January 2012, ARDUF had participated in tourist kidnappings using their release as diplomatic collateral in negotiations with the Ethiopian government (Volcano Discovery, 2012). In November 2021, ARDUF briefly joined the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces (Al Jazeera, 2021). [start date: 1975; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Afar struggle for self-determination in Ethiopia has mainly been pursued by two different groups: The Afar Liberation Front (ALF), formed in 1975, and the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), which was formed in 1993 and brought together three pre-existing Afar organisations (BBC 2012).
  + When the ALF was founded, its leader, Ali Mirah Anfere, declared the goal to be the establishment of an independent Islamic state for Afars (Minority Rights Group International). The secessionist claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002) and the Minority at Risk Project, which also calls the ALF a separatist group.
  + ARDUF, on the other hand, seeks to establish an “independent Afar homeland which would include areas of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti” and operates under the slogan that “The Red Sea belongs to the Afars” – however there is disagreement on whether the group would seek to establish “an internationally recognized sovereign state or an autonomous region within Ethiopia” (BBC 2012). Statements made by ARDUF in 2018 (see Woldie 2018a; 2018b) further confirm the existence of independence claims in recent years. [1975-2020: independence claim]
* Additional information: Afar generally support the establishment of an independent Islamic state whose boundaries would be defined on the basis of Afar ethnic habitation – including the Awash river and territories around it, as well as Southern Eritrea. Afar organizations do not recognize Eritrea as an independent state on the basis that this would divide the Afar by state boundaries. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has essentially put the Afar people “caught in the middle”, and each state encourages Afar movements in the other state (see Minority Rights Group International, 2018).

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1975; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Afars in Ethiopia initially consisted of the Afar National Regional State in Ethiopia and the Afar area in the southern part of today’s Eritrea (Minahan 2002: 41). Starting from 1994, after Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993, we code only the Afar National Regional State in Ethiopia, as the other area was no longer part of Ethiopia. We code the Afar National Regional State based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019), and the Eritrean territory based on a map by the Eritrean Afar National Congress (2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There is high agreement between different sources (UCDP/PRIO; Marshall & Gurr 2003, and MAR) that low-level separatist violence broke out in 1975-1976.
* There is much less agreement for the period that follows. UCDP/PRIO code an armed conflict in just a single year: 1996. Fearon & Laitin (2003), on the other hand, code a civil war involving the Afars in Ethiopia starting in 1997. Other sources suggest many more years. MAR’s rebellion score is 4-6 in 1980-1989 and 3 in 1996-2000, pointing to local rebellions and guerilla activity. Finally, Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) report ongoing armed conflict from 1975-1998, though they notably code ongoing armed conflict if it recurs within five years.
* Qualitative evidence suggests that a group called ALF began an insurgency began 1975, which continued throughout the remainder of the 1970s and 1980s. We were not able to find precise casualty estimates, but the 1970s and 1980s were a very violent period in Ethiopia and MAR’s rebellion score is very high (four-six).
* Then, a second insurgency was started in 1995 by a different rebel group, ARDUF, which reached the 25 deaths threshold in the subsequent year (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). That insurgency came to an end in 1998; according to Doyle & Sambanis (2006), “There is no report of secessionist violence after 1998.”
* On this basis, we code two periods of LVIOLSD, 1975-1989 and 1996-1998. The length of the first period is ambiguous, but any coding decision is ambiguous given the limited information.
  + Note: We do not apply a HVIOLSD code as Doyle & Sambanis (2006) demonstrate that the Afar violence did not rise to the level of civil war for while there were numerous clashes between the Afar and their neighbours (Issa, Oromo and Tigray) during which the government intervened, none resulted in more than a few hundred deaths.
  + Note: while the Afar movement is coded as violent in its first year, the account in Minahan (p. 44) suggests that this violence emerged after the Ethiopian government violently repressed nonviolent protests demanding famine aid and the “protection of their traditional grazing lands”. This seems to suggest that the conflict was nonviolent initially, but this case would profit from more research.
* There are several reports of separatist violence in the 2010s; however, the only evidence on casualty figures we could find is from rebel sources:
  + ARDUF claims to have killed 49 government soldiers in 2011 (see Maasho 2011).
  + ARDUF claims to have engaged in clashes with the Ethiopian-led TPLF in 2012 and killed 26.
  + We found reports of 30 casualties in 2015 in the context of clashes between the Ethiopian army and Afar rebels (Meseret 2015).
  + ARDUF claimed that it killed 17 TPLF soldiers in 2017 (ESAT News 2017).
* As these are rebel-reported numbers (other numbers could not be found using Lexis Nexis), it is not clear whether they are reliable and we do not code LVIOLSD.
* The Afars were also involved in inter-ethnic violence against the Issa, Oromo, and Somali people in 2018 and 2020, respectively (UCDP/PRIO; Woldie 2018a, 2018b; International Crisis Group n.d.). Inter-ethnic violence which does not involve state forces is not considered here. [1975-1989: LVIOLSD; 1990-1995: NVIOLSD; 1996-2000: LVIOLSD; 2001-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* A nomadic tribal culture, the Afars have traditionally been organized into independent Afar sultanates, among which the Sultanates of Aussa, Grifo, Gobaad, Rahayto and Tajurah. At times under the nominal rule of the ancient Ethiopian Empire, together, these sultanates formed a powerful federation in the twelfth century (Berhe and Adaye 2007; Minahan 2002; Rettberg 2013).
* In the sixteenth century, the Afars, together with other Muslim peoples such as the Sahos and Somalis, started a Jihad against Christian Ethiopians. At first successful, the conquest was ultimately defeated by Ethiopia and its Portuguese allies in 1541, causing the Afar to withdraw to their homeland and avoid contacts with other groups for the next century (Minahan 2002).
* The Italian colonization of the Afar territory started in 1869 with the establishment of a base at the seaport of Assab in what constitutes Eritrea today. The Ethiopian Empire feared further conquest of the colonialists and sent an army against the Afar sultanate of Aussa.
* A first part of the Afar territory was subsequently conquered by Menelik II and came under the control of an expanding Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire (Abyssinia). Eventually, the entirety of the Afar territory was divided among the colonial powers of Italy (present-day Eritrea), Ethiopia and France (present-day Djibouti), who put in place new boundaries in 1896 (Afar Triangle). Whereas the French favored the Afars against the Somali clan of the Issas, in the Ethiopian entity, the Afars were exposed to internal colonialism and Ethiopian leaders’ attempted to create “one Ethiopian nation” through cultural subjugation and Amharisation. The Amharic language became the only language in court, administration and education. Non-Amharic speakers such as the Afar had to depend on interpreters (Gudina 2007; Minahan 2002). In 1930, Haile Selassie became emperor and continued the nation-building process and the linguistic and religious homogenization. He embarked upon a policy of centralization (Bulcha 1997).
* The allied forces liberated Italian East Africa from Italian occupation in 1941. In September 1952, Eritrea was incorporated into Ethiopia and became a semi-autonomous self-governing territory within the Ethiopian confederation (Negash 1997). With this act, the territory of the Afars, with the exception of the territory under French rule (present-day Djibouti), was united under Ethiopian rule. Haile Selassie, who regained his throne after the Second World War, started to centralize power within his own ethnicity and, following the concept of Amharization, further diminished the status of all languages other than Amhara. Administratively, the Afar region was partitioned into five different provinces (Harar, Shoa, Wallo, Tigray, and Eritrea) during the reign of Haile Selassie. Berhe and Adaye (2007) report that the Afars constituted a smaller minority in these five provinces and were deprived of any political participation. In contrast, the Minorities at Risk Project states that the Afars did enjoy de facto self-determination and “maintained a high degree of autonomy until the Dergue came to power”. In line with Minorities at Risk, Africa Watch (1991: 62) reports that “the Afar leader and Sultan of Awsa, Ali Mirrah, had been accorded a high degree of autonomy by Haile Selassie, and the well-armed Afar had never come fully under the administrative or military control of the government”. Thus, it appears that the Afars enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy until 1974.
* In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). We do not code this act since it is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163) and evolved into a brutal dictatorship. With the takeover of the Derg in 1974, the autonomy of the Afar was annulled and the Sultan had to flee. [1974: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In an effort to defuse nationalist discontent (and most likely anticipating the Derg’s possible defeat) the National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987 approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country's internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The autonomous regions were named as Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden (Minorities at Risk Project; Van der Beken 2012). The autonomous province of Assab only constituted a part of the Afars’ territory and the most fertile land in the Awash valley remained under Amhara control (Minority Rights Group International). Kefale (2013: 29) states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime […] continued to centralize power”. Furthermore, there was no linguistic autonomy granted as Amharic remained the working language. We do not code a concession.
* In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. The Afar Liberation Front (ALF) became part of the new ruling coalition government even if it remained vehemently opposed to the central government. The ALF’s participation in the coalition government concerns power access at the center and is thus not coded. However, with the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for nations and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). This change from a unitary to a federal government is coded as an autonomy concession. [1991: autonomy concession]
  + This concession is not unambiguous. The minority TPLF government interfered with the internal affairs of the Afar region and was accused of seeking to undermine the ALF, the Afar people and its leadership (Arhotabba n.d.). Therefore, the concession was clearly not fully implemented, even though there was some movement towards more decentralization.
* The Afars protested against Eritrea’s secession in 1993 as the territory of Eritrea includes a significant portion of Afar land. Due to the closed border pastoral movement of the Afars was restricted (Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). This does not appear to constitute a restriction in the sense employed here, however.
* A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states, among which the Afar Regional State, and two chartered cities (Gudina 2007; Minorities at Risk; Minority Rights Group International). The constitution also granted the right of secession (though this was more theoretical) and the deployment of state representatives to the Council of the Federation (Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). However, the 1994 constitution was undermined even before it was ratified. Allegations of corruption and inefficiency as well as grievances over the preeminent position given to the southern Afar regions as regards development spending and regional positions created tensions between the ALF and the TPLF-dominated EPRDF central government. As a consequence, the EPRDF formed the government-loyal Afar Peoples Democratic Organisation (APDO). The APDO was seen by many Afar as a TPLF puppet which gained its support mainly from Afar clans which were part of the historic province of Tigray. The APDO won the 1995 regional elections (mainly due to ALF fragmentation due to disputes between the Sultan and his sons) and gained control over the region. Thus, the center undermined the Afars’ autonomy and made Afar representation in the regional government token (Sansculotte-Greenidge and Fantaye 2012). [1994: autonomy restriction]
* A 2012 Human Rights Watch reports large-scale forced reloactions of up to 500,000 Afar people in regions including Gambella, Afar, Somali, and Benishangul-Gumuz. HRW describes these “resettlements” or “villagization” (as the Ethiopian government calls the process) as “forced displacement” (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Davidson (2011) instead notes that the state’s intention was to resettle a combined 500,000 Somali and Afar. We code an autonomy restriction in 2010 which is when the villagization program begun. [2010: autonomy restriction]
* In July 2018 the “state of war” between Ethiopia and Eritrea was ended by mutual agreement and Ethiopia proceeded to lift further restrictions against militant groups – including opening access to banned websites and firing prison officials for failing to protect prisoners’ rights. The improvement of the Afar status is also noted in EPR, which elevates the Afar from ‘discriminated’ status to ‘junior partner’ in 2020. We could not find a concession as defined here, however.

**Regional autonomy**

* The federalization reform and the establishment of an autonomous ethnic state did not result in genuine autonomy for the Afars. The Minority Rights Group International calls the Afars “one of the most marginalized peoples of Ethiopia”. This is also reflected in EPR, where the Afars are coded as discriminated and not regionally autonomous throughout most of the period considered here. After 2018, the situation for the Afars improved somewhat (see above), but EPR continues not to code regional autonomy. Additional evidence against regional autonomy is provided by the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which states that the governing Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) strived to influence politics in the regional state by weakening the ALF and strengthening the pro-government, EPRDF-loyalist Afar People's Democratic Organization (APDO), which caused popular discontent in the region. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1993 part of the Afars became part of Eritrea. [1993: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Afars |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Afar |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53001000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1975-2019: discriminated; 2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1975-1993: 0.0137; 1994-2020: 0.0173]
  + This is broadly consistent with the CIA World Factbook, which reports a relative group size of 2.2% (CIA 2022).

**Regional concentration**

* In the Afar State (1.6 million according to 2012 census), the Afars make up 92% of the population (Minahan 2002: 41). There is no evidence of significant Afar settlements outside the Afar State. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR the Afar ethnic group is distributed across Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. The Minorities at Risk data also provides evidence of “close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base“ and lists the Afars in Djibouti and Eritrea as the largest kin groups. Finally, Minahan (2002: 41) also mentions Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea as the only countries with Afar population. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Amhara

Activity: 2018-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Amhara dominated Ethiopia until the early 1990s, but have lost their pre-eminent position following the Eritrean-Tigrayan overthrow of the Mengistu regime in 1991. The Tigreans subsequently became Ethiopia’s dominant ethnic group, which led to Amhara concerns. The All-Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO) was created in 1993 by Asrat Woldeyes with the goal of minimizing Tigrean influence and dominance (Barder 1999). The party was rather fringe, however, and many of its members split-off in the early 2000s to form the All Ethiopian Unity Party over concerns regarding AAPO’s ethnically-orientated politics (Lyons 2006).
* While the Amharas traditionally espoused pan-Ethiopianism, since ca. 2015 there has been an emerging Amhara activism and political mobilization of identity (Tazebew 2021) and, according to Clark (2021), Amhara nationalism has been on the rise since 2016 (Tazebew, 2021: 297-298; also see Shiferaw Chanie & Ishiyama 2021). The first evidence of organized separatist activity we found is in 2018, when the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) was formed (Borkena 2018; Clark 2021). The Amhara nationalist movement is nascent and its claims range from the incorporation of additional territories into Amhara to increased autonomy and outright independence. The most dominant claim involves increasing the size and the autonomy of the Amhara region, and the establishment of self-administered Amharan regions in other parts of Ethiopia with significant Amharan majorities or minorities. The movement is ongoing (BBC News; Chanie & Ishiyama 2021; Tazebew 2021). Notably, the Amharan SDM emerged despite significant support among the Amhara for Abiy and despite Amharan politician Demeke Mekonnen being deputy prime minister.
* It should be noted that Minahan (2002: 107f) would suggest an earlier start date. According to Minahan (20002: 107), “local loyalty to the Amhara nation has always taken precedence over loyalty to the Ethiopian state” and Amhara regionalism grew with the persecutions of the Amhara Christian population by the Derg regime (1974-87). According to Minahan, the national movement split between those seeking cultural and economic autonomy and those seeking secession in the early 1980s. According to Minahan (2002: 108), the All-Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO) led a drive for autonomy in the 1990s.
* However, a constrating account by Tazebew (2021) suggests that the Amhara largely rejected Ethiopia’s move to ethnic federalism in the 1990s. Tazebew continues to explain that the organization referenced by Minahan, the AAPO, did not make separatist claims but “had a pan-Ethiopian goal, calling for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and the inapplicability of ethnic federalism.” Notably, Minahan’s updated 2016 encyclopedia does not list the Amhara as a stateless nation. [start date: 2018; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Amhara movement’s claims range from the incorporation of additional territories into Amhara to increased autonomy and outright independence.
* Several sources suggest that independence is not the dominant claim, however; for example Tazebew (2021) suggests that while an organization called Bete-Amhara (House of Amhara) has called for an independent Amhara state, the independence claim is “fringe”. Instead, Tazebew (2021) describe the goals of the Amhara nationalist movement as “internal irredentism” and focused on the re-attachment of territories claimed to be historically related to the Amhara but now under the political control of other regional governments, notably Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz.
* Similarly, the Addis Standard suggests that “most Amhara nationalists reject independent statehood as not only impractical but also undesirable.” Instead, according to the Addis Standard the goals of Amharan nationalists include “self-administration and the respect of the rights and interests of the millions of ethnic Amhara living outside the region” and, similarly, the incorporation of Amhara territories in Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz into the Amhara regional state. Furthermore, the Amhara demand a fairer distribution of resources within the Ethiopian federation and “a change in the federal narrative that blames the Amhara for everything that went wrong in the country’s historical trajectory”. Shiferaw Chanie & Ishiyama (2021) suggest that the status of Addis Ababa constitutes another important issue, with Amharan nationalists claiming that the majority-Amharan city should be given autonomy from Oromiya.
* Overall, the dominant claims for increased autonomy for Amhara state and the incorporation of additional territories into Amhara state; in keeping with the coding rules, we code the latter as the dominant claim. Further evidence for this coding can be found in Teshome (2018). [2018-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* While there are independene demands, they are “fringe” and, therefore, not politically significant (see above). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* According to Teshome (2018), Amhara nationalists claim a) the establishment territorially contiguous Amhara state that is larger than the current Amhara region; and b) the establishment of self-administered Amhara zones in other regions of Ethiopia. Amharan nationalists typically understand their claim as ‘reciprocal’ and would consider similarly accommodating Oromo minorities within the Amhara region. Such Amharan zones would include areas in the SNNPR and Sidamo where Amhara minorities exist (e.g. Hawassa), areas in Benishangul-Gumuz Region (e.g. Assosa), and areas in the Oromia-Somali Region border (e.g. Dire Dawa).
* Note: beyond Amhara Region, the Amhara inhabit Begemdir, Shoa, Gojjam, and the district of Lasta in Wollo (Wallo). Their southern border runs along the Ethiopian tableland up to the Danakil depression, and goes westward following the Blue Nile-Awash watershed and along the Blue Nile to the Sudan border (see Tucker and Bryan, 1956: 135; Shack, 2019). Many Amhara live in Addis Ababa as well.
* The group’s historic homeland were the Ethiopian Highlands, with particular concentrations of Amhara peoples in the Amhara Region around the Lake Tana. Of particular note are regions to the north of the current Amhara state, in the northern Amhara region of Gonder which were traditionally Amharan and became Tigray regions post-1991. Such regions are overwhelmingly Amhara and constitute claimed territory.
* Overall, the claim consists of Amhara Region plus other regions with significant Amhara populations. We code this claim based on the group’s settlement patterns, as indicated by GREG (Weidmann et al. 2010), which matches the aforementioned descriptions of the claimed territory.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO codes a territorial armed conflict over Amhara in 2019 connected to a failed coup in the Amhara region by forces led by Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige, an Amhara (also see: Borkena 2020; Corda, 2021). Tsige had made claims for more autonomy for the Amhara since at least 2018, when he had been released from prison. His earlier imprisonment was related to another coup attempt. [2018: NVIOLSD; 2019: LVIOLSD; 2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* According to Shack (2019: 15), the Amharas are descendants of the Ḥabašat founders of the ancient Ethiopian kingdom of Abyssinia and have retained cultural and religious traditions of the Ethiopian Aksumsite Empire (see Danver, 2015: 15) – hence why they also call themselves ‘Habesha’ (Abyssinian) (see Goitom, 2017). The group refers to its language as Amharic (Amərnnya) – a Semitic language –, and considers the northern province of Amhara as its homeland. The group is today spread across large areas of central Ethiopia, with smaller communities in the south (Shack, 2019). They are predominantly Christian Orthodox.
* The group is tied to the Ethiopian Empire, and Amharic kings ruled the region in the 14th and 15th centuries (Danver, 2015: 15). During the 15th and the 16th century, the Amhara kingdom suffered Muslim invasions – the most notable being the 1528 invasion of a Muslim union of coastal Islamic emirates backed by the Ottomans. Abyssinians, as they were then called, received support from the Portuguese and prevailed under Emperor Galwdewos (r. 1540-1559). The kingdom suffered subsequent invasions by other tribes from Ethiopia and Kenya in the 16th and 17th centuries. During the 18th century the centralized monarchical system became decentralized and political and military control was devolved provincially (Danver, 2015: 15-16).
* In 1868, the Amharic Emperor Tewodros II (r. 1855-1868) fought against the British who sought to colonize the region. In 1875, under Emperor Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889) the Ethiopian army fought against combined forces of Egyptians and Ottomans and won. Subsequent wars against the Italians beginning in 1896 forced the then Emperor Menilek II (r. 1889-1913) to relocate the capital to Addis Ababa in 1899. The last Amharic Emperor’s, Haile Selassie I (r. 1930-1974), rule was marked by continued conflicts with Italy in the context of WWII and a slow decline during the Cold War marked by Marxist/communist coup attempts (Danver, 2015: 16).
* On 12 September 1974 Haile Selassie’s government was overthrown by an originally non-ideological coup (the Derg later espoused a Marxist-Leninist ideology) by the Ethiopian Army leading to the Derg military junta (see Gebeyehu, 2010). The events led to the Ethiopian Civil War (1975-1991). In the conflict, Amharic people predominantly supported the anti-Derg Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) which was predominantly a pro-monarchy and conservative group. The group was established by Amhara hereditary Prince of Tigray Ras Mangasha Seyum who was a descendant of Emperor Yohannes IV and governor of Tigray between 1960-1974. Other groups involved in the civil conflict included the Marxist-Leninist Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) which begun its life in 1972 and whose role in toppling the Emperor was crucial. Due to politico-ideological factors, despite the Derg and EPRP both being originally anti-monarchical, EPRP became the de-facto leftist ideological opposition to the Derg, and did not operate on an ethnic-basis. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was the third main anti-Derg actor, established in 1975. While these three groups had a common aim, and at points briefly co-operated, they also fought against each other (see Gebru, 2009).
  + The TPLF won the civil conflict which resulted in the installation of a TPLF-led transitional government which later transformed into the EPRDF government of Ethiopia – a nominal co-alition of Tigray, Amhara, Oromo and SNNPR peoples which was dominated by the Tigray group. Originally, the EPRDF was formed by the union of TPLF and the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) which was the precursor of the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). Following these political changes in 1991, which culminated in the adoption of the new Ethiopian constitution and the first elections in 1994, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was primarily controlled by former top leaders of TPLF (see Adegehe, 2009). The vast majority of these Tigray leaders were communists and/or members of the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) before 1991, but due to the collapse of the Soviet Union during this period EPRDF dropped all references to Marxism-Leninism but nevertheless maintained broad communist revisionist ideals (see Vestal, 1999).
* While the Amhara were not the dominant group in the EPRDF, owing to their long-historical status, the group retained significant power and influence in the new arrangement. The group remained relatively affluent and influential in Ethiopian politics and society (Danver, 2015: 16) and many of its members maintained positions of influence and power. As a result of the 1994 constitution, which enshrined ethnic federalism, the Amhara region received a measure of autonomy.
* Calls for greater political inclusion of the Amhara protesting the domination of EPRDF by the Tigray led in September 2012 to a rebalancing of EPRDF. Demeke Mekonnen of the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) became deputy prime minister (see BTI, 2014: 3). We could not find a concession as defined here.

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

* Since 1994 Afar Region has enjoyed significant autonomy. The state is run by the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) (Gebreselassie, 2018). [2018-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Amhara |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Amhara |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53002000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [2018-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.2695]
  + This is broadly consistent with the CIA World Factbook, which reports a relative group size of 24.1% (CIA 2022). Danver (2016: 15) reports the relative size to be 27%, which is closer to EPR’s figure.

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 103), ca 80% of all Amhara in Ethiopia live in Amhara state, where they make up >90% of the local population. This matches with information from EPR. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There is a significant Amhara diaspora in the USA with close to 200,000 members according to the 2013 U.S. census (United States Census Bureau, 2016). [kin in non-adjacent country]

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## Anuaks

Activity: 1979-2020

**General notes**

* The Anuaks [also ‘Anyuaks’] are a Nilo-Saharan people located mainly in Gambella, a region of Ethiopia’s. The Nilo-Saharans are a much larger group that also includes e.g. the Dinkas, the Nuer, and the Benishangul. Anuaks are largely Christian.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for organized activity we found is in 1979, when some Anuaks formed the Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) (Young 1979: 326). Thus 1979 is coded as start date. In support of this, Minorities at Risk codes the Nilo-Saharans with SEPX=3 in an earlier version, which indicates an active movement in the 1980s/1990s.
* Initially, the GPDM made demands for independence, but dropped the independence demand at some point in the late 1980s before it established an alliance with the Tigray Front (Young 1979: 326). It appears that they continued to demand autonomy, however. In 1991 the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) liberated Gambella from the Derg and the GPDM attained power in the region (Young 1979: 326).
* In the 1990s and 2000s, the Anuaks were mainly involved in inter-ethnic conflict with local Nuer and “highlanders”, but there appear to have been some claims for self-determination too. According to a Human Rights Watch report, the Anuaks were Gambella’s majority group until the mid-1980s, when Nuer and “highlanders” moved into the region due to resettlement programs initiated by the Derg. This sparked resistance, and there is a long history of inter-ethnic violence. Conflict is over land, it appears, as the Anuaks lost part of their tribal lands: “These dramatic demographic changes are, to a large degree, responsible for the persistent ethnic tensions and frequent explosions of ethnic violence that have plagued Gambella since the fall of the Derg in 1991. The flow of non-Anuak migrants into Gambella has led many Anuak to fear the erosion of their political power, and some believe that the very survival of Anuak culture is at risk. Additionally, some traditionally Anuak lands are now inhabited almost exclusively by Nuer and Anuak widely regard the continual shrinking of their territory as a threatening development. The most frequent outbreaks of ethnic violence in Gambella have pitted the Anuak against the Nuer. This violence reached a bloody peak in 2002, a year that saw over one hundred people killed in clashes that displaced several thousand people. Violent Anuak-Nuer conflict subsided by late 2003, but the resulting respite was an extremely brief one, as ethnic conflict between Gambella’s Anuak and highlander communities had also been simmering throughout this period. Many Anuak bitterly resented the arrival of the settlers brought to Gambella by the Derg, and in May 1991, groups of Anuak villagers attacked and murdered large numbers of highlander farmers who had been living alongside them near the town of Abobo. More recently, in the past several years, a number of ambushes attributed to armed Anuak have left scores of highlander civilians dead.”
* The aims of the Anuak agitation in the post-1991 period are not fully clear, but they appear to have involved some claims for self-determination. According to Human Rights Watch, “Anuak fighters are not unified under the banner of any one group and do not share a common set of goals. They include Sudan-based rebels fighting against the Ethiopian government for Anuak “self-determination”; farmers carrying out isolated revenge attacks against ENDF soldiers and highlander civilians; and a small number of radicalized gunmen who seem to target the highlander population as a whole.” (HRW 2005). HRW reports Anuak armed forces’ activity until at least 2004 (HRW, 2005; see also Feyissa, 2011: 156; BBC, 2005).
* Since 2010 and the beginning of the villagization program, there have been few confirmed instances of active separatism. Descriptions of events in March 2012 – where Ethiopian military forces beat and arrested civilians – also includes an accusation by the Ethiopian government of a bus attack by Anuak rebels (see Davidson, 2014).
* Reporter At Large describes a “systematic genocide” of Anuak’s that is unopposed by Anuaks themselves (Basu 2018). This could suggest that the movement tailed off.
* Overall, the evidence we could find is extremely thin, but it appears that there were some claims made for territorial self-rule. To what extent the movement was ongoing as of 2020 is not clear; however, we code the movement as ongoing based on the ten-year rule. [start date: 1979; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) is the primary advocate for Anuak self-determination. Initially, the organization promoted independence but in 1989 it “dropped its demand for independence” in order to join the military coalition of the TPLF (Young 1979: 326). According to Tadesse (2009) there are still minorities within the organization that favor independence (mainly because of the potential for oil) or joining neighboring (South) Sudan. However, also Tadesse (2009: 18) writes that the “majority wants to remain part of Ethiopia under a fair representative political system”. For additional evidence for an autonomy claim during the 2000s, see ACANA (2007). Hence, we thus code an independence claim until 1989 and, following the 1st of January rule, an autonomy claim from 1990 onwards. [1979-1989: independence claim; 1990-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1979; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* According to Tadesse (2009: 18), the Anuak dissident movement includes people who seek union with (South) Sudan. [start date: 1979; end date: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Gambella People’s Democratic Movement consists of the Gambella region in southwestern Ethiopia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* According to Young (1979: 326), the GPDM launched a guerilla campaign immediately after its establishment, which lasted until 1991. In partial agreement with this, MAR’s anti-rebellion score of the NiloSaharans is three in 1975-1984, pointing to a “local rebellion”. However, this is a much larger group that includes also e.g. the Benishangul, Nuer, and Dinkas. It is questionable whether the 25 deaths threshold was met. According to Young, GPDM was generally weak and “unable to mobilise more than a negligible portion of the population”. Further qualitative evidence suggests that there was a lot of violence in Gambella, but that most of it was due to internecine/inter-ethnic clashes (Lie & Borchgrevink 2012). We were unable to find any precise information on casualties. UCDP/PRIO would not suggest violence above the threshold. We do not code LVIOLSD though noting that this decision is ambiguous.
* There has been violence in the post-1991 phase, but most of it was inter-ethnic and pitted Anuaks against Nuer.
  + Feyissa (2011: 156), for instance, notes two major episodes of violent inter-ethnic conflict in 1991 and 2003, both involving significant numbers of deaths. Feyissa (2011: 159) also notes that Anuaks took up arms against the government after the 2003 massacre, but we could not find any information on casualties.
  + Human Rights Watch also makes mention of government involvement in attacks (mostly one-sided attacks on civilians, however) as well as rebel attacks on the government (see above).
  + BTI reported claims by the Gambelan Democratic Movement (GDM) that Ethiopian government forces “had attacked its military wing in April 2012” due to the Anuak people’s opposition to forced resettlements and the “sale of Anyuk land to foreigners” (BTI, 2014: 19). No casualties or injuries are reported. Lie & Borchgrevink (2012: 137) state that Gambella is one of the most conflict-ridden regions of Ethiopia as of 2012, though they are quite clear that most of the conflict is inter-ethnic.
  + A November 2014 article similarly describes Gambella as one of Ethiopia’s most conflict-ridden regions (Horn Affairs 2014).
  + UCDP does code non-state violence between ethnic groups but no state-based conflict.
* In sum, there was violence post-1991. It was mostly inter-ethnic, but some rebel groups also attacked the government and the government engaged in counter-insurgency tactics as well as one-sided massacres of Anuaks. It is not clear whether there was violence in all years. Casualty estimates are also not clear. Therefore, we code NVIOLSD after 1991 and throughout until present. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The homeland of the Anuaks, Gambella, was nominally ruled by the Turco-Egyptian empire and the Mahdist state in the Sudan before Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia annexed the territory after defeating the Italians in 1896. The Anuak land was historically divided by four main rivers, Akobo, Openo, Alworo, and Gillo and had seven administration states – Adongo, Ciro, Nyikaani, Lul, Tier Naam and Openo (with each state having its own autonomous administration). Anuak used to be autonomous but their autonomy ended during nominal British control sometime during the 18th century (see Nyang, 2006). In 1902, Menelik signed a formal agreement with the British regarding the border between Ethiopia and Sudan. The agreement formally incorporated Gambella into Ethiopia. Despite this official annexation, the influence of Ethiopian rule remained very limited. Gambella has “generally been ignored” by the government (Young 1999: 322) due to it being very remote and inhospitable.
* In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). However, we do not code a concession since it is very clear that the concession is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163) and evolved into a brutal dictatorship (HRW 2005). However, the Derg also did not make a lot of progress in breaking down the autonomy of the indigenous peoples. According to Aleme Eshete (1978: 114), Ethiopian socialism “had little resounding effect on the people of these regions who have kept on with their simple daily life as if nothing has changed”. Still, there was likely some level of centralization, thus we code a restriction. [1974: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1979 the land of the Anuaks was seized by the government, which attempted to draft Anuaks into the army and forced labour on collective farms (Minority Rights Group International). According to Human Rights Watch (2012), “many of Gambella’s indigenous Anuak were evicted en masse when the government set up irrigation schemes on the Baro River, the main navigable waterway in the region”. Anuak were also denied access to the Baro River for fishing, which constitutes a crucial part of Anuak livelihoods and identity. Many Anuaks who tried to flee to Sudan were shot and imprisoned. In line with the codebook, the denial to live in a territory is coded as an autonomy restriction. MRGI suggests that the restriction occurred “at the end of 1979”, suggesting it was post-movement emergence, though that is not entirely clear. [1979: autonomy restriction]
* According to Human Rights Watch (2005), the Anuak were by far the largest group and the majority in Gambella before the 1980s. However, in the mid-1980s, the Derg forcibly resettled around 60,000 mostly lighter-skinned highlanders to the region. The resettlement villages were all built in territory that the Anuaks claimed their own. Simultaneous to this relocation program, there was a massive influx of refugees from the Sudanese civil war (mostly ethnic Nuer). As a result of these two processes, the Anuaks have become a minority in their own region and competition for land and water intensified (Minority Rights Group International). In sum, there is relatively clear evidence of a government policy of forced relocations, and in combination with refugee movements, the Anuaks became a minority in their own lands. Still, to be consistent with other cases and as stated in the codebook, we do not code the forced relocation of highlanders as a restriction.
* A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states, among which the Somali Region, and two chartered cities (Gudina 2007). The constitution also granted the right of secession (though this was more theoretical) and the deployment of state representatives to the Council of the Federation (Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). However regional autonomy was far from being implemented in every state. According to Young (1999: 344), there seems to have developed an (unofficial) two-tier federal system that distinguishes between highland and lowland states. Whereas the former are zealous in protecting their regional autonomy, the latter (among which Gambella, but also Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somali) remain placed under the Prime Minister’s Office. Furthermore, the Anuaks only constitute a minority in Gambella by this time. As a consequence, we do not code the 1994 constitution as a concession. Note: due to the Anuak's minority status within Gambella, we also do not code a concession in 1991, when Gambella and other regions gained a higher level of autonomy (see e.g. the Benishangul).
* In the early 2000s. the degree of self-determination decreased further. According to Human Rights Watch (2005), the government stationed several thousand ENDF troops in Gambella in December 2003 in response to a “request” for federal intervention by the regional government. Gambella’s regional president fled the country in December 2003 and executive power was taken over by former vice-president Ket Tuach, a Nuer. According to Human Rights Watch (2005), this meant that real power in the region has been exercised by the federal government’s Ministry of Federal Affairs which has assumed “de facto control over the regional government”. In addition to taking over power in the region, the government also stationed several thousand (mostly highland) soldiers in the region and has set up camps throughout the region in order to eliminate Anuak resistance and assure the secure exploration for oil by foreign companies. [2003: autonomy restriction]
* Reports from May 2007 suggest that the Ethiopian government is directly “responsible” for loss of Anuak lives, marginalization of the community – whose well-being is “a hindrance to oil [and minerals] mining” (see ACANA, 2007). Conditions are therefore gradually worsening throughout 2002-2010. We do not identify a specific policy during this period that would constitute an autonomy restriction, however.
* Under the ‘villagization’ program that started in 2010, the government forcibly removed tens of thousands of indigenous people in western Gambella (both Anuaks and Nuer), in a region where significant land investments were planned or are already occurring. Relocation was accompanied by threats, assaults, rape, and arrests. According to Human Rights Watch (2012), the resettlement threatens the access and right of the displaced to basic services and infrastructure (also see BTI 2014). Gambela, which has a considerable Anuak population exceeding 20% of the total regional population, is described by BTI reports as being “hard-hit by displacement” and there are reports of police tortures in custody (BTI, 2014: 15, 22). [2010: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* The 1994 constitution introduced an ethnically based federal system. However regional autonomy was far from being implemented in every state. According to Young (1999: 344), there seems to have developed an (unofficial) two-tier federal system that distinguishes between highland and lowland states. Whereas the former are zealous in protecting their regional autonomy, the latter (among which Gambella, but also Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somali) welcome central government assistance and remain placed under the Prime Minister’s Office. As a consequence, Gambella cannot be described as regionally autonomous. There is no evidence the situation has changed since Young’s (1999) assessment. If anything, the degree of self-determination has decreased.  According to Human Rights Watch (2005), the government has stationed several thousand ENDF troops in Gambella in December 2003 and has assumed “de facto control over the regional government”. Likewise, recent reports only suggest the group being severely threatened and repressed (e.g., Davidson, 2014). EPR Atlas does not code the Anuak prior to 2004 and describes the group as ‘discriminated’ from 2004 until 2019 which verifies this coding decision. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Anuaks |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Anuak |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53012000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the Anuaks as of 2004 only.  We found no evidence suggesting that the Anuaks had access to central state power. Until 1991, the only group with access to central state power was the Amharas. After 1991, the regime opened up ethnically, but the Anuaks appear to have continued to be left out. According to Young (1999: 322), for example, Gambella (where most Anuaks live) was "generally been ignored" by the government. We found no evidence of active discrimination before 2004. The post-2004 discriminated code is due to massacres, abuses, and executions of Anuaks by the federal army following an ambush by armed ethnic Anuaks against a group of highlanders. [1979-2003: powerless; 2004-2019: discriminated; 2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR (the 1979-1993 value stems from an earlier version of EPR). [1979-1993: 0.0007; 1994-2020: 0.0012]

**Regional concentration**

* We code a group as spatially concentrated if at least 50% of group members reside in a geographically contiguous territory where they make up at least 50% of the local population. In the case of the Anuaks, the first criterion is fulfilled throughout the movement’s period of activity (Tadesse 2009: 5). The second criterion, however, is a bit more complicated. According to Human Rights Watch (2005), the Anuak were by far the largest group and the majority in Gambella before the 1980s. However, with the governments forced settlement program (starting 1984) that brought 60,000 highlanders to the region, the massive influx of refugees from the Sudanese civil war, and additional eastward migration from Sudanese Nuer, the Anuak have become a minority in the Gambella Region. According to the 1994 census, the Anuak only make up 27% of the population of Gambella, with the Nuer (40%) and highlanders (25%) having grown to large numbers. That said, immigration of highlanders and Nuers only affected some of the nine districts of Gambella. It seems the criteria for territorial concentration remain fulfilled, on a smaller territory. While we did not by exact statistics, the following excerpt from Borchgrevink & Sande Lie (2009: 50), strongly suggests territorial concentration: "The Anuak live in eight of Gambella’s nine districts, and constitute the majority in five of them. The total area settled and claimed by the Anuak makes up about 70 per cent of the region. By contrast, most Nuer are found in only two districts covering only one-fourth of the land mass. The great majority of the highlanders live in the regional capital and other urban centres." [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes ethnic kin in South Sudan (Anyuak). According to EPR, they make up 1.5% of the population of South Sudan. This amounts to around 170,000 people today. We could not find any information on the exact number of Anuaks in Sudan in earlier years, and it may well have been below 100,000 in earlier years, but given the lack of clear evidence we prefer to handle the 100,000 criterion flexibly and code kin throughout. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Benishangul

Activity: 1976-2020

**General notes**

* The Benishangul-Gumuz region lies in the northwest of Ethiopia. It is dominated by the Gumuz, Benishangul (Berta) and Amhara ethnic groups, followed by the Oromo, Shinasha, Agnew, Mao, and Komo. Ethnic tensions within the region run high at times, particularly between the Gumuz and the Benishangul, who make up the two largest ethnic groups.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The start date is not fully clear, but we found indications that the movement emerged in the 1970s. A report by Africa Intelligence (1995) features an article from November 1995 that describes Yussuf Hamad Nasser as the leader of an organization called the Benashingul People’s Liberation Front (BPLF), which was founded in 1989. According to another source, there were as many as six Benishangul groups vying for “self-rule and identity” in the 1970s and 1980s (GSJ 2019: 1358, 1364). In particular, in 1976 an organization called Aljebeha Wataniya (Nationalist Front) was formed in 1976, which was short-lived and superseded by the BPLF in “1976/1977” (GSJ 2019: 1325f, 1377). This account is broadly supported by Minorities at Risk: MAR codes the Nilo-Saharans with SEPX=3 in an earlier version, which indicates an active movement in the 1980s/1990s. The Benishangul are a Nilo-Saharan people, though it should be noted that Nilo-Saharans is a much larger group that also includes e.g. the Dinkas, the Nuer, and the Anuaks. Partial support comes also from Young (1999: 327-328), who suggests that the Benishangul organized already under the Derg in the late 1970s/1980s, though Young does not explicitly state that these groups had separatist aims.
* According to GSJ (2019: 1325), the BPLF mainly operated from Sudan and briefly controlled the region of Benishangul-Gumuz in 1991-1992.
* In 1995, the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM) was founded (Eresso 2017). The BPLM operates from Sudan, where they have been fighting for the secession of the Benishangul region in Ethiopia. In 1997, the BPLM allied with other organizations, including the Ethiopian Democratic Motherland Party, the Ethiopian People’s Unifying Organization, the Ethiopian Unity Democratic Movement, the Ethiopian Unity Front, the Kafegn Patriotic Front, and the Medhin party, to form the Ethiopian Democratic Patriotic United Front (EDPUF). As the BPLM is a Muslim organization that was ideologically similar to the Sudanese government, Khartoum extended its support to the rebel group. According to the Small Arms Survey, “A faction of the BPLM fell under the influence of the NIF and advocated self-determination for Benishangul as a prelude to union with Sudan” (Young 2007, 26). Besides aid from Sudan, the BPLM also received support from Eritrea.
  + Notably, the BPLF and the BPLM could be the same group, i.e., the result of a name change, though that is not clear. As recently as 2020, the Indian Data Crime Centre, which is operated by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) of India, lists both groups separately as designated terrorist organizations (India Crime 2020). That said, we do not find references to the BPLF after 1995.
* In 2005, the BPLM sealed a peace deal with the Ethiopian government, but resumed its militant activities in 2006 (see Sudan Tribune, 2013).
* On August 17, 2012, the BPLM and the Ethiopian Government signed a peace agreement to end the 17-year armed conflict. However, since then, the BPLM have renewed their commitment to the freedom of Benishangul as a result of new dam constructions planned for the region. According to the BPLM, Benishangul has “never been part of so called Abyssinia…” because Ethiopia invaded and illegally occupied Benishangul with the help of the British in 1898. Thus, the BPLM contends that the Ethiopian government does not hold the right to approve dam construction in the region.
* In June 2013, following the 2012 agreement, BPLM “laid down its arms” and the group “fully accepted” the terms of the agreement and swore to “abide by the constitution of the country” in return for its members not being prosecuted, and to receive government support (Sudan Tribune, 2012, 2013). Yet, the group continued to make self-rule claims (Waagacusub Media, 2015).
* The peace lasted until 2019, when BPLM resumed its militant activities (see BBC, 2019; AP News, 2020).
* The BPLM again laid down arms and agreed to “reunite with society” in December 2022 (New Business Ethiopia, 2022). [start date: 1976; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The group’s claims are ambiguous, especially in the early period. According to GSJ (2019: 1325f), the group’s initial claim was for “self-rule and identity”. From 1995 onwards, the main organization associated with this movement is the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM). It is difficult to find information for the organization’s gaols in the early years. According to Adegehe (2009: 159), the group even “lacked clear political objectives” during its formative years. According to Young (2007: 26), a faction of the BPLM fell under the influence of the National Islamic Front (NIF) and “advocated self-determination for Benishangul as a prelude to union with Sudan.” However, overall, sources suggest that the dominant goal has been independence.
* Since 2012, there have been peace negotiations, and there are some indications that the BPLM is moderating its demand to increased internal autonomy (Sudan Tribune 2012, 2013), especially after the signing of a peace deal post-2020 (New Business Ethiopia 2022). However, until 2020, the dominant claim appears to have remained for independence. For example, In a 2012 declaration, the BPLM had urged its people “to continue their struggle with all means until we gain freedom and independence” (Ogaden News Agency 2012). In December 2015, BPLM issued a press release warning of “interference” and asserting that reports of BPLM changed its aims were from people unrelated to the group’s hierarchy, ending the press release with the words “Long live BPLM struggle. Long live Struggle till freedom” (Waagacusub Media 2015). [1976-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1976; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* According to Young (2007: 26), a faction of the BPLM fell under the influence of the National Islamic Front (NIF) and “advocated self-determination for Benishangul as a prelude to union with Sudan.” We could not find further information on this and, in any case, the “prelude” suggests it was not their main claim. [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the BPLM is the Benishangul-Gumuz region in northwestern Ethiopia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Case study evidence suggests that Benishangul engaged in an armed conflict right from the get go in 1976, which lasted until 1991 (Mussa 2019). The report does not include casualty figures, but throughout the guerilla campaign is described as small-scale and sporadic. None of our other standard sources would suggest an LVIOLSD. It seems unlikely that the 25 deaths threshold was met and we do not code LVIOLSD, therefore.
* Young (1999: 333) suggests that violence continued in 1995: “A jihad was declared [by Benishangul separatists], and the party [i.e. the BPLM] began military operations against government infrastructure, military outposts and resident highlanders.” A 2012 article in the Sudan Tribune reports a peace accord signed in 2012 between the BPLM and the Ethiopian government. Another peace pact was signed in 2005, but it was broken soon thereafter. The article suggests that the BPLM was involved in a low-level insurgency ever since 1995: “[s]ince its establishment in 1995 the BPLM carried out cross-border attacks, mainly against developmental facilities in Ethiopia’s Benishangul Gumuz state, which borders Sudan.” Again, we could not find information on casualties, but it appears unlikely that the 25 deaths threshold was met.
* In 2017, significant tensions emerged over the ‘Grand Renaissance Ethiopian Dam’ construction project located in Guba wereda (Mekonnen 2020) and the villagization program (AP News 2020). ICG reports several instances of violence in 2018-2020 (see International Crisis Group n.d.). Yet, most of this violence is again inter-ethnic, especially Benishangul vs Oromos (see Etefa 2021; AP News 2020). We do not code LVIOLSD.
* Our coding choice is consistent with UCDP/PRIO which codes the Benishangul as involved in non-state inter-ethnic armed conflict, but not state-based violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The areas of Benishangul and Gumuz were ruled by Arab-speaking Khomosha, Bela Shangul and Aqoldi, which were all Muslims of Sudanese origin. Their territory was incorporated into the kingdom of Menelik in 1897 but in exchange for an annual tribute, the leaders managed to retain some degree of autonomy (Bahiru 1991: 87).
* During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936-1941), the Oromo nobelties ousted the traditional leaders and ended indigenous self-rule. With the return of Haile Selassie, who established highly centralized rule, autonomy was not restored. Local rulers were replaced with nobilities appointed by the center. Furthermore, the Benishangul area was put under the administrative jurisdiction of the neighbouring Wellega province (Balcha 2007: 157).
* In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). However, we do not code a concession since it is very clear that the concession is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163). [1974: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In an effort to defuse nationalist discontent (and most likely anticipating the Derg’s possible defeat) the National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987, approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country's internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The Benishangul area was given its own administrative jurisdiction called Assosa Administrative Area. However, only very few indigenous individuals were included in the area’s administration (Balcha 2007: 157). Furthermore, Kefale (2013: 29) states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime […] continued to centralize power”. Furthermore, there was no linguistic autonomy granted as Amharic remained the working language. Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. With the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for fourteen self-governing states (among which Benishangul-Gumuz) and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). This change from a unitary to a federal government is coded as a concession. [1991: autonomy concession]
* A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states, among which Benishangul-Gumuz (Gudina 2007). The constitution also granted the right of secession (though this was more theoretical) and the deployment of state representatives to the Council of the Federation (Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). However regional autonomy was far from being implemented in every state. According to Young (1999: 344), there seems to have developed an (unofficial) two-tier federal system that distinguishes between highland and lowland states. Whereas the former are zealous in protecting their regional autonomy, the latter (among which Benishangul-Gumuz) remain placed under the Prime Minister’s Office. This is confirmed by Adegehe (2009: 237), who states that regional officials were almost powerless due to the presence of the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA), which was put in place by the federal government to support the transitional process but which emerged as the real power broker and was more oriented towards control than enablement. As a consequence, we do not code the 1994 constitution as a concession.
* The Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM) and the Ethiopia government signed two peace agreements: A first one in 2005, which was broken a year later, and a second one in 2012. We could not find evidence of any type of territorial or cultural rights concessions in either accord (Sudan Tribune 2012; Reliefweb 2012).

**Regional autonomy**

* The 1994 constitution introduced an ethnically based federal system. However genuine regional autonomy was far from being implemented in every state. According to Young (1999: 344), there seems to have developed an (unofficial) two-tier federal system that distinguishes between highland and lowland states. Whereas the former are zealous in protecting their regional autonomy, the latter (among which Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Afar, Somali) remain placed under the Prime Minister’s Office. As a consequence, Benishangul-Gumuz cannot be described as regionally autonomous. There is no evidence the situation has changed since Young’s (1999) assessment. Adegehe (2009: 237) even stated that regional officials were almost powerless due to the presence of the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA), which was put in place by the federal government to support the transitional process but which emerged as the real power broker and was more oriented towards control than enablement. Adegehe (2009: 257) concludes that in spite of the presence of the new titular leadership in the administrative apparatus, Benishangul-Gumuz does “not exercise autonomy beyond that of language and culture.” Similarly, according to Yimenu (2022), the Benishangul-Gumuz region had a rather limited degree of regional policy autonomy after 1994. [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Benishangul |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Beni-Shugal-Gumez |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53003000 |

**Power access**

* The main organization associated with this movement is the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM). According to Young (1999: 327) and Adegehe (2009: 159), the BPLM was dominated by ethnic Bertas and, to a lesser extent, ethnic Gumuz. Berta and Benishangul (Beni-Shugal) is used synonymously, so we can establish a 1:1 match with the EPR group “Beni-Shugal-Gumez”. Until and including 1995, EPR codes the Beni-Shugal-Gumez as irrelevant. However, EPR clearly states that all groups other than the Amhara were discriminated until 1991 and we found no evidence of government inclusion in 1992-1995. For 1996 onwards we follow EPR. [1976-1991: discriminated; 1992-2019: powerless; 2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.0106]

**Regional concentration**

* GeoEPR codes the Beni-Shugal-Gumez as concentrated, though they employ a lower threshold (the group has to make up only 25% of the regional bases’ population). However, the 2007 census – combined with GeoEPR - confirms that the higher threshold applied here is also met: According to Young (1999: 327) and Adegehe (2009: 159), the BPLM was dominated by ethnic Bertas and ethnic Gumuz. The 2007 census yields 25.41% Berta and 20.88% Gumuz in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, hence slightly less than the 50% required by the codebook to code the movement as concentrated. However, if we look at the settlement polygons provided by GeoEPR, we see that the ethnic groups in the region are geographically separated and that the Beni-Shugal-Gumez (a group which we code 1:1 to this movement) are concentrated in the west of the region whereas the Amhara (21.69%) and Oromo (13.55%) are concentrated in the east. Hence, we can assume that the movement makes up more than 50% of the population in the west of the region and can hence be coded as concentrated. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There is no 100,000+ Benishangul diaspora in another country, and EPR does not code ethnic kin in another country. We follow this decision while noting that in principle, one could code kin because the Benishangul form part of the larger cluster of the Nilo-Saharans, which includes numerically significant but also relatively distant groups in other countries such as the Dinkas and the Nuer in South Sudan. [no kin]

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## Eritreans

Activity: 1958-1993

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Eritrea was colonized by the Italians in 1890 and became part of Italian East Africa when the fascist Italian forces occupied the Ethiopian Empire in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935/1936. British forces liberated Italian East Africa in 1941, reestablished Ethiopian independence, and placed Eritrea under British administration. After World War II, Eritrean organizations emerged calling for independence (allied under the header of the Independence Bloc, formed in 1949). Against the wishes of many Eritreans, the UN General Assembly decided to turn over Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1950 (as a war compensation). While the Eritreans’ desire for independence was ignored, the UN resolution foresaw autonomy for the Eritreans: Eritrea should have its own administration with control over domestic affairs, including police and taxes. The merger took place in 1952.
* Confronted with severe repression, the movement appears to have been dormant until 1958, when the Eritrean Liberation Movement was formed. The Movement was succeeded by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1961 (Encyclopaedia Britannica; Ofcansky & Berry 1991). 1958 is coded as start date. Violence emerged in the early 1960s. The war ended when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front seized the capital in 1991 and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front took control of the province of Eritrea. The two groups agreed that Eritrea would have an internationally-supervised referendum on independence. In April 1993 an election was held with almost unanimous support for Eritrean independence and Ethiopia recognized Eritrea as an independent state. The international community also recognized Eritrea as an independent state in 1993. We therefore peg the end of the movement 1993 (Degenhardt 1988; Encyclopedia Britanica; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Ofcansky & Berry 1991). [start date: 1958; end date: 1993]

**Dominant claim**

* Independence has clearly been the dominant claim by the 1970s (International Crisis Group 2009; Iyob 1997; Minority Rights Group International; Negash 1997), however, there is a bit of ambiguity as regards the movement’s early period. The International Crisis Group identifies a radicalization of the EPLF, which first fought for regional autonomy and only later changed its goal to independence. This is also confirmed by Heraclides (1991: 180), who claims that the movement’s demand at the early stage was “not necessarily independence” and by Negash (1997: 36), who states that “by the 1970s all Eritrean armed opposition organizations had modified their political demands to that of complete independence”. On the other hand, there are sources that describe the movement’s primary goal as “to secure Eritrean independence from Ethiopia” (START; also Minority Rights Group International) from the beginning. We code independence as the dominant claim throughout. Note that there has already been significant support among Eritreans for independence before Eritrea’s merger with Ethiopia in 1952 (see Yohannes 1991: 133). [1958-1993: independence claim]
* Splits and internal divisions of the Eritrean self-determination movement were mostly between Christians and Muslims, urban and rural elements or socialists and nationalists and were accentuated in different views on how an independent Eritrea should look like but did not significantly affect the movements claim as regards independence or autonomy.

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1958; end date: 1993]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Eritreans in Ethiopia coincides with the current borders of Eritrea. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Republic of Eritrea was declared in May 1993 (Minority Rights Group International). However, this was agreed upon with the center, which granted Eritrea independence. Thus this is not a unilateral declaration.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We find no reports of separatist violent activity in the initial years, hence a NVIOLSD coding.
* Low-level violence emerged in the early 1960s, but the exact start date is ambiguous. UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict over Eritrea from 1964-1991, but Marshall & Gurr (2003: 62) peg the start of the low-level armed conflict already to 1961. We use 1964 as the start year of the LVIOLSD phase, in keeping with UCDP, since while the first attack seems to have occurred in September 1961, we found no evidence of significant violence above the threshold before 1964 in case reports (University of Central Arkansas n.d.).
* We code 1974-1991 as HVIOLSD following Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). [1958-1963: NVIOLSD; 1964-1973: LVIOLSD; 1974-1991: HVIOLSD; 1992-1993: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Eritrea was colonized by the Italians in 1890 and became part of Italian East Africa when the fascist Italian forces occupied the Ethiopian Empire in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935/1936. In Ethiopia, centralization had been a core principle during the regencies of Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) and his successors Iyasu V (1913-1916) and Haile Selassie I (as of 1916). This process was halted by the Italian occupation between 1936 and 1941, during which particularly the western parts of Eritrea enjoyed considerable autonomy (International Crisis Group 2009; Negash 1997). British forces liberated Italian East Africa from Italian occupation in 1941 and reestablished Ethiopian independence. Haile Selassie was reinstalled as emperor and started to centralize power within his own ethnicity (Minahan 2002). Eritrea, however, was placed under British administration. Unsure about the territory’s future, the UN dispatched a commission to Eritrea in 1950. The majority report presented by Burma, Norway and the Union of South Africa recommended incorporation into Ethiopia, as also requested by the expansionist Ethiopia and the British and the US, who wanted to reward Ethiopia for their support during World War II. The minority report compiled by Pakistan and Guatemala proposed an independent Eritrea (Negash 1997). Against the wishes of many Eritreans, the UN General Assembly decided to turn over Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1950. While the Eritreans’ desire for independence was ignored, the UN resolution foresaw autonomy for the Eritreans: Eritrea should have its own administration with control over domestic affairs, including police and taxes. The first article of UN resolution 390(V) A of 1950 stated that Eritrea was to become “an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown” (‘Federal Act’). [1950: autonomy concession]
* In September 1952, ignoring Eritrean wishes for independence, Eritrea became a semi-autonomous self-governing territory within the Ethiopian confederation. In line with the 1950 UN resolution, Eritrea was granted “its own government, parliament, prime minister, national flag, police force and two official languages, Arabic and Tigrinya” as well as its own “political parties, a free press and trade unions” (Minority Rights Group International; Negash 1997). However, Ethiopia soon began to violate the autonomy arrangement: Between 1952 and 1962 Addis Ababa gradually stripped Eritrea’s autonomous status through a “systematic erosion of Eritrean constitutional rights” (Iyob 1997: 89). To reflect this, we code an autonomy restriction in 1952. [1952: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Ethiopian Parliament unanimously voted on November 14, 1962 to abolish the federal status possessed by Eritrea since 1952. The Eritrean parliament was unilaterally dissolved, the territory annexed and its status transformed to a province of the Ethiopian Empire (Keesing’s Record of World Events: November 1962; Negash 1997). [1962: autonomy restriction]
* In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Behre 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163) and adopted an uncompromising position towards the EPLF (International Crisis Group 2009). [1974: autonomy restriction]
  + We code an onset of high-intensity separatist armed conflict in 1974. Based on the sources we consulted, it is not fully clear whether centralization preceded the escalation from LVIOLSD to HVIOLSD or the other way around. However, Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl code the onset of full-scale war in January 1974 while the Haile Selassie government government was overthrown only in September 1974. This suggests that the restriction likely came after the onset of the full-scale civil war.
* The National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987 approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country’s internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The autonomous regions were named as Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden. Kefale (2013: 29) states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime […] continued to centralize power”. However, special provisions were made for the former province of Eritrea which “was provided with more autonomy than the other autonomous regions.” In acknowledgement of its ‘unique social and economic situation’, Eritrea was granted special status in political, economic, legislative and other spheres. The region would thus be permitted to promulgate and to enforce its own laws provided that they did not conflict with state law. The remaining autonomous regions on the other hand would need central government permission to implement laws promulgated by their respective assemblies. Among other things Eritrea was also given greater control over setting up industries in the region, (ii) education; and (iii) budget planning. In addition, Eritrea's composition of three administrative regions was seen as a recognition of the area's multi-ethnic population (Keesing’s Record of World Events: November 1988 - Ethiopia). Unlike in the case of the other autonomous regions of the 1987 act, the autonomy concessions for Eritrea seem significant which is why we code an autonomy concession. [1987: autonomy concession]
* In 1991, when Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown, the EPLF immediately established a provisional government in Eritrea. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference in July 1991 (The ‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) also established a transitional government in Ethiopia, which held talks with the EPLF as regards the status of Eritrea. The parties agreed to leave it to the Eritreans to decide over their future through a referendum on independence (Tesfaye 2002).
  + This concession occurred only after the end of the Eritrean independence war in May 1991 (Sambanis & Schulhof-Wohl 2019). [1991: independence concession]
* In the 1993 referendum, the Eritreans voted almost unanimously in favor of independence, making Eritrea an independent from Ethiopia in 1993. Since this had been agreed already in 1991, we do not code another concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Between 1952 and 1962 Addis Ababa gradually stripped Eritrea’s autonomous status through a “systematic erosion of Eritrean constitutional rights” (Iyob 1997: 89). It is hard to identify a specific year in which autonomy was abolished. Some sources even argue that there had never been any real autonomy to begin with. EPR, for example, does not code the two Eritrean groups (Muslim Eritreans, Christian Eritreans) as regionally autonomous but as discriminated from 1952 onwards. Also Iyob (1997) claims that the federal and constitutional guarantees of Eritrean autonomy were undermined early on. Based on these sources, we do not code regional autonomy in this period.
* In 1991 Eritrea achieved de facto independence, hence we code regional autonomy from 1992-1993. [1992-1993: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Caspersen (2012) defines Eritrea as a de-facto state from 1991 onwards, when the EPLF took control of the province of Eritrea and the transitional government was installed. De-facto independence ended when the country also gained de-jure independence in 1993. Following the first of January rule, we therefore code de-facto independence as of 1992. [1992-1993: de-facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1950 Eritrea was turned over to Ethiopia, implying a host change. However, this was before the start date.
* In line with the codings of de-facto independence and regional autonomy, we code a major territorial change in 1991, when de-facto independence was established. [1991: establishment of de-facto state]
* In 1993 Eritrea became independent. [1993: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Eritreans |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Christian Eritreans; Muslim Eritreans |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53010000; 53011000 |

**Power access**

* EPR distinguishes between Muslim and Christian Eritreans, which in combination make up the Eritreans. Christian and Muslim Eritreans do not differ with regards to the power status coding in EPR. Thus the EPR codes are used. Note: EPR’s self-exclusion code in 1992-93 becomes a powerless code in our scheme. [1958-1991: discriminated; 1992-1993: powerless]

**Group size**

* The sum of the respective EPR group sizes (.03 + .03) yields the group size of Eritreans. [0.06]

**Regional concentration**

* The two Eritrean groups in EPR made up 6% of the Ethiopian population. For the year 1990, this amounts to 2,882,000. The autonomous region of Eritrea in the same year had a population of 3.273 million (World Bank). According to MAR, >75% of the Eritreans resided in Eritrea (see gc7 in phase I-IV release). [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR the Eritreans did not have ethnic kin outside Ethiopia. The Minorities at Risk data codes the Afar in Djibouti as ethnic kin of the Eritreans, but we found no evidence for “close ethnic bonds”. [no kin]

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## Oromos

Activity: 1973-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was formed in 1973, hence the start date of the movement. There is evidence for prior Oromo resistance in the 1960s with the formation of the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association in 1964. However, the aim of this self-help association was predominantly restricted to the improvement of conditions in Oromo lands and hence does not qualify as a self-determination movement as defined in the codebook.
* The movement is ongoing (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Hewitt et al. 2008; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996, 2002, 2016; MAR). [start date: 1973; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* There are several organizations representing the Oromo, including the Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Oromo (IFLO), the Oromo Peoples Liberation Front (OPLF) and the Oromo People's Democracy Organization (OPDO). However the OLF seems to be the dominant representative of the Oromo, which is why we code the claim of the Oromos in accordance with the claim of the OLF.
* According to Lahra Smith (2013), the OLF’s history of SD claims is complicated. The group traditionally demanded independence. This is confirmed by several sources. According to Minahan (2002) the OLF led a separatist campaign with the aim of establishing an independent Democratic Republic of Oromia. The independentist claim is also confirmed by the Minorities at Risk Project, Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 201) and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which all see a clear secessionist claim behind the OLF’s rebellion. The OLF’s political program also stated that the organization’s main objective would be “the realisation of national self-determination for the Oromo people and their liberation from oppression and exploitation in all forms”. Yet, over time, disagreements emerged as to whether the group should pursue an independence or an autonomy claim
* Notably, while Oromo elites have requested “self-determination and secession under the present constitutional order”, the Oromo people do not overwhelmingly “favor full secession from Ethiopia” (Smith 2013: 163). We are, however, here concerned with the claims made by those active in the movement.
* In August 2018, the OLF signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government. After this, the group relinquished its claim for secession while committing the group to conducting “political activities in Ethiopia through peaceful means” (Shaban 2018).
* The OLF’s moderation led to the formation of a splinter group, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), which makes independence claims. OLA consists of former armed members of the OLF. OLF is considered to be a legal party, while the OLA is designated as a terrorist group (Addis Standard 2021). The OLF remained the more important representative of the movement (Dube 2020).
* It is not fully clear when the OLF’s dominant claim switched to autonomy. We use the 2018 peace deal as a marker, though it could be argued that autonomy was the dominant claim already in 2016, when the group made demands for an autonomy referendum. [1973-2018: independence claim; 2019-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There continued to be independence claims after 2018 (see above). [start date: 1973; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the OLF is not fully clear but it at least includes the following Ethiopian states: Oromo, Dire Dawa, and Harar (Minahan 2002: 2065f). We flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s ethnic settlement area according to GeoEPR, which serves as an approximation.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Violence emerged soon after the movement’s inception. We follow UCDP/PRIO and code the first instance of low-level violence only in 1977-1978,
  + Other sources (Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005; Hewitt et al. 2008) would suggest an earlier start date: 1973. This is not consistent with qualitative evidence. According to Keller's detailed description of Oromo history, the OLF emerged as a militant organization, but (see p. 628), the OLF “began an offensive against the Ethiopian authorities in Hararge Province [only] in 1974” and furthermore that “sustained activities did not occur until 1976, after the collapse of the imperial regime. The OLF subsequently spread its activities to Wollega in the west.” It is possible that the 25-deaths threshold was met in 1976 based on this description, but very unlikely that substantial violence above the threshold emerged before that.
* UCDP/PRIO provides evidence for low-level violence in 1980-1981 and 1983-1992. We found no evidence for a de-escalation and subsequent re-escalation in 1979 or 1982, and thus code ongoing LVIOLSD.
* UCDP/PRIO next codes armed conflict 1994-1995 and 1998 – but not in 1993 and 1996-1997. UCDP/PRIO records 6 battle-related deaths in 1997, pointing to sustained fighting, but 0 in 1993 and 1996. We still code ongoing LVIOLSD because we could not find evidence for a clear de-escalation. The UCDP coding notes describe the conflict as ongoing intermittently throughout this period and MAR’s rebellion score is 4 or 5 in all of the years in which UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict, pointing to “small-scale” or “intermediate guerilla activity”.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war from 1999-2002, thus these years are coded with HVIOLSD. It has to be noted, however, that this is a borderline case in terms of casualties (the maximum is in 1999 with just under 700 and 2000-2002 are much lower).
* UCDP/PRIO suggests a minor war throughout 2003-2013
* UCDP/PRIO next suggests a LVIOLSD code in 2015-2016. According to UCDP/PRIO, there were largely peaceful large-scale protests in 2016, which were met with significant violence from the Ethiopian state leading to hundreds of deaths and subsequent fighting. There was sustained fighting in 2014 (5 deaths according to UCDP/PRIO), so we code LVIOLSD throughout 2007-2016 (also see Ethiopia Insight 2020).
* UCDP suggests that there were no deaths in 2017, but suggests there are reporting difficulties and that they could have missed “potential OLF activity during the year”. In 2018, they report 18 deaths. We code ongoing violence due to sustained fighting.
* In 2018, Abiy Ahmed, an ethnic Oromo, became president of Ethiopia. He started negotiations with the OLF, and OLF declared a unilateral cease-fire. Yet, violence continued after the Oroma Liberation Army had detached itself from the OLF. UCDP/PRIO reports more than 25 battle-related deaths in 2019-2021. [1974-1998: LVIOLSD; 1999-2002: HVIOLSD; 2003-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* According to Minahan (2016: 319), the Oromo people inhabited central Ethiopia for over 1,000 years and moved into Ethiopian highlands in the 1500s and 1600s – mixing with local Amharas and partially converting to Christianity (while other Oromo in the East adopted Islam in the 18th and 19th centuries). To this day, the Oromo are of mixed religion, with approximately half being Sunni Mulsim, and one quarter being Christian (Minahan 2016: 319).
* Oromos came to occupy much of what is now southern Ethiopia and became the dominant power in that region. This expansion brought them into conflict with the Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002).
* In the mid-nineteenth century, Tewodros II initiated the creation of a modern multi-ethnic empire, which would unite Ethiopia and end the supremacy of the Oromos. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Oromo, along with several other peoples in the Horn of Africa, were conquered by Menelik II and came under the control of the Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire (Abyssinia). Addis Ababa, in traditional Oromo territory, was made the capital in order to ensure Oromo loyalty (Gudina 2007; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* The Oromo have always viewed the Amhara as colonizers. The Oromo were enslaved and their productive lands were expropriated and given to Amhara settlers (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). This internal colonialism came along with the attempted creation of “one Ethiopian nation” through cultural subjugation and Amharisation. The Amharic language became the only language in court, administration and education. Non-Amharic speakers such as the Oromos had to depend on interpreters (Gudina 2007).
* In the early 1900s, Ethiopians conquered independent Oromo states in the south (such as Jimma and Kaffa). Resistance to Ethiopian rule “provoked frequent rebelions” such as those of 1928-1930 which Minahan describes as being “the forerunner of the modern Oromo national movement” (Minahan 2016: 319).
* In 1930, Haile Selassie became emperor and continued the nation-building process and the linguistic and religious homogenization. He embarked upon a policy of centralization and revoked the limited autonomy of the two Oromo regions of Jimma and Wallaga (Bulcha 1997).
* An attempted Oromo secession in 1936 was ended by the invading Italians, who many Oromo saw as liberators from Amhara domination (Minahan 2002; Minahan 2016: 319). However, after the Allies liberated Ethiopia in 1941, Haile Selassie regained his throne, started to centralize power within his own ethnicity and continued the settlement of Amharas on Oromo lands. The Oromo faced retaliation for their collaboration with the invading Italians. In order to ensure the domination of the Amhara culture and language, Haile Selassie banned the Oromo language (Minahan 2002; UNPO 2008).
* No concession or restriction was found in the ten years before movement onset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). However, we do not code a concession since it is very clear that the concession is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163) and evolved into a brutal dictatorship that continued the discrimination of the Oromo (HRW 2005). [1974: autonomy restriction]
* In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) became part of the new ruling coalition government but increasing hostilities with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which dominated the government, made the OLF withdraw from the government in 1992. The OLF’s participation in the coalition government concerns power access at the center and is thus not coded. However, with the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for nations and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). This change from a unitary to a federal government is coded as an autonomy concession. [1991: autonomy concession]
* A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states, among which the state of Oromia, and two chartered cities (Gudina 2007; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The constitution also granted the right of secession (though this was more theoretical) and the deployment of state representatives to the Council of the Federation (Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). [1994: autonomy concession]
* In June 2011, the state – invoking the anti-terrorism law – designated the Oromo Liberation Front (OLM) as a terrorist group (BTI, 2014: 35). This designation was reversed 7 years later following signed reconciliation agreement on the 7th of August 2018 (International Crisis Group, n.d.). These are not restrictions or concessions as defined here.
* In September 2012, a “clear rebalancing of the ruling EPRDF” which was previously dominated by Tigray leaders, saw the appointment of deputy prime ministers including one from the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (Mukdar Kedir) – which was described by BTI as part of an effort to reduce “centralizing tendencies” and to bring about “a broader representation of various ethnic groups at the center of power” (BTI, 2014: 3). This is not a concession as defined here.
* Following a deadly stampede at an Oromo religious festival on the 2nd of October 2016, which was the culmination of a series of demonstrations that have been estimated to have led to the casulaties of as many as 500 people, the Ethiopian government imposed a state of emergency. During this state of emergency, diaspora-run television networks were banned; as well as the use of social media and the use of Oromo signs of solidarity and support (see Gaffey, 2016). Freedom of press was severely restricted (see Gaffey, 2016b) primarily affecting discriminated groups such as Oromo peoples. Minority Rights Group International describes a severe “crackdown and human rights violations” including all kinds of violence in 2015 and 2016 (Minority Rights Group International, 2016). These actions are better seen as “standard” repression and not restrictions of ethnic rights as defined here.
* Under pressure from protests lasting almost a year, the Ethiopian government led a “substantial cabinet reshuffle” in late August 2016, which notably included a couple of members from the Oromo ethnic group. Largely described as “an olive branch” in international media, the local sentiment among Oromo people was the reshuffle could not address popular grievances in Oromia or Amhara – and that only a complete regime change would go far enough. We do not code changes in government representation as concessions.

**Regional autonomy**

* Following the first of January rule, we code regional autonomy as of 1995, which is also in line with the EPR coding that considers the Oromo as regionally autonomous following the federalization reform and the establishment of an autonomous ethnic state. [1995-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1994: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Oromos |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Oroma |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53006000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR, but apply the senior code already in 2019 since Abiy Ahmed (an ethnic Oromo) became PM in 2018. [1973-1991: discriminated; 1992-2018: junior partner; 2019-2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1973-1993: 0.2907; 1994-2020: 0.3439]
* This broadly matches with the CIA World Factbook, which suggests that Oromo constituted the majority (35.8%) of Ethiopia’s population in 2022.

**Regional concentration**

* The Oromos make up 85% of Oromia’s population (Minahan 2002: 1468). This amounts to 20.097 million Oromos (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 23.5 million Oromos in the whole of Ethiopia in that same year. In addition to Oromia, there are larger Oromo concentrations in the Dire Dawa and Harar regions. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* MAR notes “close kindred in more than one country”, referring to the Oromos in Kenya. This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 1468), who additionally mentions Oromo communities in neighboring Somalia. The Kenya census of 2009 estimates slightly less than 250,000 Oromos in Kenya, which makes them large enough to be coded. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Sidama

Activity: 1978-1984; 1991-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Advocating an autonomous Sidamaland, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) [‘Siaamu Dagoomu Wolaphphote Alibishsha (SDWA), also known as Sidama Liberation Front (SLF) and Sidama National Liberation Front (SNLF)] was founded in 1978. We peg the start date to 1978. The Sidama movement got significant support from the Somalia government and the SLM was involved in separatist violence in 1980-1984. According to Minorities at Risk and Human Rights Watch (1991: 75), the SLM disappeared in the 1984 but reappeared in June 1991. Since the SLM was decisively defeated in 1984 and no other movement fighting for Sidamaland was found between 1984-1991, we code the end of the first movement in 1984.
* The second movement begins in 1991, and since then, there is evidence of continued separatist activity (Ethiomedia; Human Rights Watch 1991; MRGI; SLM; UCDP/PRIO; Sidama National Liberation Front 2020). Note that, in 1999, the SLM changed its name to SNF – and finally to SNLF at a later point (see Sidama National Liberation Front 2010). In 2019, the Sidama approved the creation of an autonomous Sidama region in a referendum. [start date 1: 1978; end date 1: 1984; start date 2: 1991; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The movement is represented by several organizations: The Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM, now Sidama National Liberation Front SNLF), the Sidama Liberation Front (SLF), and the Sidama National Liberation Organization (SNLO). The dominant claim seems to be regional autonomy within Ethiopia (Ethiomedia 2012). This is also confirmed by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, which states that the goal of the SLM, which seems to be the dominant representative of the Sidama self-determination movement, is to “ensure Sidama peoples' national self-determination within the context of Ethiopia”. Note: we code a claim for autonomy rather than a sub-state secession claim because the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region’s (SNNPRS) level of autonomy is limited (see above). [1978-1984: autonomy claim] [1991-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Proponents of the Sidama movement have considered both internal autonomy and outright secession as options (Boni 2020: 12-13). However, we found no clear evidence for a politically significant claim for independence (see e.g. Tronvoll et al 2020: 8ff; Addis Standard 2019, 2021; ICG 2019). [no indendence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Sidama is Sidamaland (also called the Sidama Zone), which lies within the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region in southwestern Ethiopia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* According to UCDP/PRIO, armed conflict emerged in 1981 and 1983. A 1991 Human Rights Watch report provides evidence that casualties were above 25 also in 1980 and 1982. First, foonote 111 suggests that the government commited “atrocities” in Sidama throughout 1980-1982. Furthermore, it is noted that “[t]he Sidama Liberation Front (SLF) was becoming more active, largely in response to pre-emptive government counter-insurgency policies. The war in Sidamo in 1981 was one of the Dergue's best-kept secrets. In January, 200 people were reported killed by an army patrol at Godaboke Mito and Chire villages in Sidamo. Between March 19-21, helicopter and airplane at tacks at Gata Warrancha in Sidamo caused at least 20,000 people in one valley to flee, and over 1,000 (and possibly more than 2,000) were reported killed when a "wall of flames" was ignited by bombing using either phosphorous or ethylene. Ethylene is a heavier-than-air gas which can be sprayed from the air, whereupon it spreads out, hugging the ground, and can be ignited by an incendiary to create instantaneous combustion over a large area. Its use in this attack has not been confirmed by other independent sources […] [i]n the highlands of Sidamo and Harerghe, widespread violence by government forces continued throughout 1982” (Human Rights Watch 1991: 78-79).
* Violence appears to have continued well into 1984: “[o]n April 1, 1983, in a government reprisal for SLF activities during the previous two months, soldiers killed 100 civilians in the village of Halile, Sidamo. In 1984, the government was able to recapture most of the areas previously held by the SLF, and forcibly relocated the population in relief shelters. In Chire camp 3,000 people died, mainly children, before relief agencies were allowed to provide services in 1984” (Human Rights Watch 1991: 80). We found no casualty estimates but nonetheless extend the LVIOLSD code based on this description to 1980-1984. We found no casualty information for 1978-1979, and thus code that period NVIOLSD. [1978-1979: NVIOLSD; 1980-1984: LVIOLSD]
* We code NVIOLSD from 1991-2015 since we found no evidence for separatist violence above the threshold for that period. [1991-2015: NVIOLSD]
* In 2016, the Sidama began to call for a referendum on the creation of an autonomous Sidama region and we found reports of violence in this context. We found further evidence for violence in 2019. Sidama activist groups put the figure of Sidama casualties from clashes in July 2019 to “almost 170” (also see Amnesty International, 2019). However, the violence appears one-sided. We do not code separatist violence. [2016-2020: NVIOLSD]
  + Note: Corda (2021) suggests >25 deaths on both rebel and state side in both 2016 and 2019; however, Corda bands together all Southern Nations, which includes groups other than the Sidama.

**Historical context**

* Until the conquest of their territory by Menelik II in the late 19th century, the Sidama had been organized in a loose coalition of fourteen kingdoms (Encyclopedia Britannica 2007). The Sidama are a Cushitic people whose territory was conquered during Shewan military campaigns in late 1800s – and a large majority of them are Christian (Yokamo 2019).
* The Sidama people developed a sense of “separateness” in the imperial era (Misikir 2021). Traditionally, the Sidama politico-administrative organization was characterized by decentralized egalitarianism under the ‘Moote system’ – which is an “agglomeration of independent and territorially divided clans, each one governed by their own clan leader” – a form of loose federation (Boni 2020: 19).
* The Ethiopian rulers engaged in internal colonialism and an attempted creation of “one Ethiopian nation” through cultural subjugation and Amharisation. The Amharic language became the only language in court, administration and education. Non-Amharic speakers such as the Somalis had to depend on interpreters (Gudina 2007). The culture and traditional institutions of the Sidama were virtually destroyed (Ambaye 2000). In 1930, Haile Selassie became emperor and continued the nation-building process and the linguistic and religious homogenization. He embarked upon a policy of centralization (Bulcha 1997).
* In the early phase of Italian occupation, the Sidama cooperated with the new colonial power. But cooperation ended quickly when the Italians began to appropriate land and cattle to feed the troops (Hamer 1987).
* In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). However, we do not code a concession since it is very clear that the concession is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163). [1974: autonomy restriction]
* In an effort to defuse nationalist discontent (and most likely anticipating the Derg’s possible defeat) the National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987, approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country's internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions, of which Sidamo was one. However, Kefale (2013: 29) states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime […] continued to centralize power”. Hence, we do not code a prior concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. With the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for fourteen self-governing states (among which Sidama) and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). Note: it is not fully clear whether this concession was made before or after the movement’s start date. [1991: autonomy concession]
* A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states and two chartered cities (Gudina 2007). The administrative division of the country also underwent a change: The Sidamo Province was divided among three regions (SNNPR, Somali, Oromia). The majority of Sidama, however, was merged with four other regions into the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPRS). The Sidama Zone, where the majority of Sidama live, became one of 19 districts of the SNNPR. According to the 2007 census, the Sidama only made up 19.38% of the population of the SNNPR. This made them the largest group in the region, but no majority. This downgrade from the constituent group of a self-governing state to group that approximately makes up a fifth of the population constitutes a decrease in the level of self-determination and is coded as an autonomy restriction. Furthermore, the level of autonomy for the SNNPRS is at best questionable. Despite official decentralization, regional autonomy was far from being implemented in every state. According to Young (1999: 344), there seems to have developed an (unofficial) two-tier federal system that distinguishes between highland and lowland states. Whereas the former are zealous in protecting their regional autonomy, the latter (among which SNNPRS) remain placed under the Prime Minister’s Office. [1994: autonomy restriction]
* In 2016, the Sidama began to call for a referendum on the creation of an autonomous Sidama region/state. In July 2018, Sidama Zone representatives submitted a formal declaration for statehood. Ethiopia’s federal Constitution requires the authorities to organize a referendum within a year of a statehood request. The government was reluctant to grant the request (ICG 2019). The original 12-month constitutional deadline of 18 July 2019 was not met, despite pressure from third parties including the International Crisis Group (2019). Instead the government “resorted to violence to quash the constitutional demand” leading to the July 2019 massacre (resulting in “an estimated 153” civilian deaths, and imprisonments of at least 2,000. The government finally gave in to the demands after these events and the referendum was set for 20 November 2019. The results were 98.52% in favour of the creation of a Sidama state/region (Paravicini, 2019). Formally an autonomous region was established as a regional state on 18 June 2020. It should be noted, though, that there continued to be strong government interference and that the concession was not fully implemented (Ethiopia Insight 2020). [2019: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* As outlined out above, the Sidama's level of autonomy remained limited until the creation of their own state in 2020 and, even after that, it remains questionable whether one can speak of “meaningful” autonomy (see above). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Sidama |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Sidama |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53013000 |

**Power access**

* EPR only codes the Sidama from 1979 while we code them from 1978; we found no indications that power relations were different in 1978 compared to 1979. We follow EPR in all other years. [1978-2019: discriminated; 2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.041]
  + This matches wth the CIA World Factbook, which suggests that the Sidama constituted 4.1% of the total Ethiopian population as of 2022.

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 2007 census, the Sidama made up 93% of the population of the Sidama Zone, hence a clear majority. Given the Sidama Zone’s approximate population of 3 million, this means that far more than 50% of the entire Sidama population (approx. 4 million) of Ethiopia lives in the Sidama Zone, which is why we code them as regionally concentrated. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We do not code transborder ethnic kin. This follows EPR. [no kin]

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## Tigreans

Activity: 1975-1992; 2019-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was established in February 1975, hence the start date of the movement. It was formed under the auspices of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front to further separatist aspirations among the people of Tigre provinces (Degenhardt 1988: 104). Minahan (1996, 2002) suggests that the movement remained active in 1975-1991. Although representing less than one-tenth of Ethiopia’s population, the Tigreans became the dominant ethnopolitical group in Ethiopia after 1991. The TPLF spearheaded the four-party ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which held power for a quarter-century until 2019 (ICG 2020a). Furthermore, Tigreans received a degree of autonomy after the Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991. This ended the movement. We code the movement as active until 1992 to allow us to reflect the autonomy concession, which occurred after the end of the civil war in May 1991. Coding that concession in 1991 could create a wrong association, namely, that the concession ended the war; by extending the movement to 1992, we avoid that. [start date 1: 1975; end date 1: 1992]
* Protests brought Abyi, an ethnic Oromo, to power in 2018, thus ending the TPFL’s dominant position. Abyi subsequently gradually ousted all federal ministers belonging to the TPFL (ICG 2020a). This led to renewed talk of secession in Tigray and, according to the International Crisis Group (2020b), several new nationalist parties emerged which supported secession or at least saw it as a last resort.
* According to Alamineh et al. (2021), the new parties (which all had the blessing of the TPFL) included the National Congress of Great Tigray (Baytona), Salsay Woyane Tigray (SaWOT), Tigray Independence Party, and Assimba Democratic Party. Additional research suggests that most of these parties made claims for independence, with one exception: we found no evidence to suggest that the Assimba Democratic Party made claims for secession (or, more generally, increased self-rule).
* Wikipedia suggests that Baytona, SaWOT, and the Tigray Independence Party were all founded shortly before the September 2020 regional election in Tigray. However, another source from 2019 reports on the rise of secessionism Tigray and refers to both Baytona and SaWOT as advocates of secession (Ethiopia Insight 2019). We also found a picture of a party congregation by Baytona from 2019.[[1]](#footnote-1)
* According to Alimaneh et al. (2021), secession was advocated not only by these new parties, but also by parts of the TPFL elite, the dominant party organization in Tigray.
* Finally , Alimaneh et al. (2021) also refer to a movement called the “Agazain movement”, which seeks the re-unification of Tigray with Eritrea. We found indications for the existence of this movement as early as 2017[[2]](#footnote-2); however, the movement’s political significance and level of political mobilization seems doubtful.
* Based on the evidence collected, we code a second start date in 2019, the earliest date for which we found clear evidence for a renewed, politically significant secession movement.
* In December 2019, Abyi created the Prosperity Party as a replacement for the EPRDF. The Tigrayans refused to join the Propserity Party. The TPLF thus became an opposition party (ICG 2020a).
* 2020 saw a dispute about the holding of regional elections in the context of a national ruling that all elections should be delayed due to Covid-19. The TPLF maintained its its constitutional right to hold elections, an interpretation of the constitution which was rejected by the national authorities (ICG 2020a). Tigray went ahead and held the elections in September 2020. Some parties in the election advocated secession (ICG 2021). The federal government declared the elections and the regional government illegal and, in response to Tigray going ahead with the election, the central government decided to redirect funds from Tigray’s state executive (ICG 2020b; ICG 2021). According to ICG, the TPLF saw this as another violation of the region’s right to self-administer itself.
* According to the International Crisis Group, the final trigger for the civil war came in early November 2020, when Tigray’s regional paramilitaries, assisted by Tigrayan federal military officers, took over almost all the army’s Northern Command, capturing heavy weapon stockpiles, and detaining or killing officers and soldiers who resisted (ICG 2021).
* Within a month of the fighting starting in November 2020, the federal forces were able to remove the TPFL administration, establishing a provisional replacement (ICG 2021). However, the TPFL retook Mekellele, Tigray’s capital, in July 2021 and, in late 2021, threatened to move on Addis Ababa to dismantle Abyi’s government. The central government fought back and, in March 2022, the parties agreed to a cease-fire. War resumed in August 2020 and fighting continued until November 2022, when the parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities. The war was extremely destructive, with war crimes committed by all sides. Death estimates range between 300,000 and 800,000. [start date 2: 2019; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* TPLF removed all rival anti-government groups in Tigray such as the TLF, EDU and the EPRP from Tigray between 1975 and 1978, which is why we consider the TPLF’s claim as dominant. When the TPLF was founded, the goal of self-determination was mostly understood as autonomy within a federal, poly-ethnic Ethiopia. When violence escalated, an ultra-nationalist section within the TPLF that proclaimed secession emerged in 1976 (‘Manifesto 68’) and brought along a split in the Tigrean national movement (Ethiopian Review 2009). However, according to Berhe (2004: 591), this extreme position “was relinquished straightaway, since it had no popular support” and in 1978 already, the aim of secession was dropped. We therefore code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. [1975-1992: autonomy claim]
* Several new parties emerged in 2019 and 2020 advocating secession. Some elites from the TPFL, the dominant party organization in Tigray, also advocated secession. There is also the “Agazain movement”, which seeks the re-unification of Tigray with Eritrea; however, that movement’s political significance seems doubtful. See above for further details and supporting references. [2019-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date 1: 1976; end date 1: 1978; start date 2: 2019; end date 2: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Tigreans consists of the administrative boundaries of the Tigray state of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in northern Ethiopia, as indicated by Minahan (2002: 1896). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The LVIOLSD coding for 1976 follows UCDP/PRIO, which suggests more than 1,000 deaths in that year; however, since it is not included in Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), we code 1976 as LVIOLSD. While UCDP/PRIO does not code the TPLF as involved in armed conflict in 1977, we found no evidence to suggest that the conflict de-escalated and therefore continue to code LVIOLSD in 1977. The violence in 1976-1977 is denoted as “ambiguous” as the conflict was primarily over the government according to UCDP/PRIO (i.e. associated with a Marxist movement aimed at overthrowing the government).
* The 1978-1991 civil war involving the Tigreans is coded as HVIOLSD following Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). Fearon and Laitin (2003) indicate that the conflict was over “mixed motives” while UCDP/PRIO suggest that the war was a contest over control of the central government. However, from Minahan (1996: 570-572) it appears that the Tigreans were *also* mounting a separatist rebellion during this period. The mixed motives of the rebellion make this an ambiguous case. [1975: NVIOLSD; 1976-1977: LVIOLSD; 1978-1991: HVIOLSD]
* The ongoing HVIOLSD coding for 2020 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). We code the civil war as ambiguous because UCDP/PRIO codes it as mainly a conflict over government. [2019: NVIOLSD; 2020: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Tigray was the center of influence in the reestablishing of the Ethiopian Empire (Abyssinia) under Emperor Teodros II and its successor Emperor Yohannes in the nineteenth century, after the empire had undergone a process of decentralization that devolved power to numerous independent units (Berhe 2009; Minorities at Risk Project). However, as a result of internal force and manipulation but also due to external interventions, the subsequent decades brought a shift in the locale of power southwards and away from the Tigreans to the rivaling Amhara.
* The new Ethiopian leaders, Emperors Menelik II (1889-1913) and Haile Selassie I (1930-1974), did not attempt to mitigate the state of Tigray but instead employed a policy of deliberate and systematic neglect to weaken and demoralize its population.
* When British forces liberated Ethiopia from Italian occupation during World War II, Haile Selassie was reinstalled as emperor and started to centralize power within his own ethnicity, leading to Tigrean resentments and rising Tigrean demands for more autonomy (Minahan 2002). However, their demands were not only ignored but met with a harsh response. When open resistance broke out in southern and eastern Tigray and the region was declared independent in the early 1940s (Woyane rebellion), Haile Selassie’s forces in collaboration with the British Royal Air Force devastated the region crushed the rebellion (Behre 2009).
* As a punishment for the rebellion, the Tigreans were targeted by various discriminatory and repressive acts: Tigrean land was confiscated and distributed to loyal gentry, regional power was taken away from hereditary leaders and given to loyal administrators and a new taxation system was imposed that “cost the peasants five times more than they had paid under the Italians” (Erlich 1981: 219, also cited in Behre 2004: 572).
* In addition to increased centralization and neglect of Tigray, Amhara domination also manifested itself in cultural discrimination of Tigreans. Tigrigna, spoken by more than 75% of the population, was banned and forbidden in schools and courts in the 1940s and was replaced by Amharigna, which was only spoken by 12.3 per cent of the males in Tigray (Stavenhagen 1996; Berhe 2009).
  + Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 295-296), in contrast to this account, suggest that the Tigreans retained a certain level of autonomy after the 1940s, but the above-mentioned sources are more detailed and trustworthy.
* In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration in its dealings […] with regard to the Tigrayans and other marginalized nationalities whose demand was self-determination” (Behre 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163). [1974: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Radical Tigreans were imprisoned in early 1975 and Tigray was declared a military zone as regime forces invaded Tigray and devasted towns, villages and farmland in order to combat the insurgency. Furthermore, in order to hinder mobilization and destabilize ethnic and social relations, Tigrean farmers were resettled. We code an autonomy restriction due to the resettlement policies (the denial to live in a territory constitutes an autonomy restriction according to the coding rules). This narrative suggests that the restriction occurred post-movement emergence/simultaneously. [1975: autonomy restriction]
* In an effort to defuse nationalist discontent, the National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987, approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country's internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The autonomous regions were named as Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden. The Tigray nationalist movements dismissed the initiative as “insignificant” (Keller 1991: 242). Kefale (2013: 29) also considers the act as windown dressing and states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime […] continued to centralize power”. Furthermore, there was no linguistic autonomy granted as Amharic remained the working language. Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. With the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for nations and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). [1991: autonomy concession]
  + This concession occurred after the end of the civil war in May 1991 (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).
* 2020 saw a dispute about the holding of regional elections in the context of a national ruling that all elections should be delayed due to Covid-19. The TPLF maintained its its constitutional right to hold elections, an interpretation of the constitution which was rejected by the national authorities (ICG 2020a). Nevertheless, Tigray went ahead and held the elections in September 2020. The federal government declared the elections and the regional government illegal and, in response to Tigray going ahead with the election, the central government decided to redirect funds from Tigray’s state executive (ICG 2020b; ICG 2021). According to ICG, the TPLF saw this as another violation of the region’s right to self-administer itself. We code an autonomy restriction though note that this is not completely unambiguous due to the contested nature of the constitutionality of the central government’s actions. Shortly after the restriction, in November 2020, the Tigray War broke out. [2020: autonomy restriction]
* In November 2020 the government proposed that TPLF be designated as a terrorist organization (BBC, 2020), which was subsequently implemented in May 2021 (Bloomberg 2021). This is not a restriction as defined here.

**Regional autonomy**

* Follows the coding of de facto independence. [1979-1991: regional autonomy]
* EPR codes regional autonomy throughout 2019-2020. This is because of Ethiopia’s federal constitution from the mid-1990s. [2019-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* In the process of seizing power at the center, the TPLF took over the entire Tigre region (Minorities at Risk Project). According to Minahan (2002), Ethiopian forces had been driven out of 90% of Tigre by 1978. In their attempt to mobilize the Tigrean population and to isolate Tigray from the regime, the TPLF introduced land reforms and reforms that aimed at equality of women and Muslims in a previously Christian-patriarchal dominated society. Furthermore, they set in place elected people’s councils’ (baitos) that administered villages and confirmed laws and directives presented by the TPLF. Due to this “monopolization of power in Tigrai by the TPLF” (Berhe 2009: 281) by 1978, we code de facto independence as of 1979, following the first of January rule [1979-1991: de-facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* [1978: establishment of de-facto state]
* [1991: de-facto state abolished]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tigreans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Tigry |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53009000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR for the period up to 1991. [1975-1991: discriminated]
* EPR codes the Tigray as senior partner between 1992 and 2020. We deviate from EPR based on the following grounds:
  + The Tigreans became the dominant ethnopolitical group in Ethiopia after 1991. The TPLF spearheaded the four-party ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which held power for a quarter-century until 2019 (ICG 2020a). However, Protests brought Abyi, an ethnic Oromo, to power in 2018, thus ending the TPFL’s dominant position. Abyi subsequently gradually ousted all federal ministers belonging to the TPFL (ICG 2020a). As the process was gradual, we use a junior partner code for 2019.
  + In December 2019, Abyi created the Prosperity Party as a replacement for the EPRDF. The Tigrayans refused to join the Propserity Party. The TPLF thus became an opposition party (ICG 2020a). Therefore, we code the Tigrayans as powerless in 2020. [2019: junior partner; 2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.0608]
  + This is broadly in line with the CIA World Factbook, which suggests 5.7%.

**Regional concentration**

* The Tigreans make up 94% of Tigray’s population (Minahan 2002: 1896). This amounts to 3.719 million Tigreans (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 5.5 million Tigreans in the whole of Ethiopia in that same year. Regional concentration is also confirmed by MAR. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR (scenario 1:1) the Tigreans do not have ethnic kin groups. Minorities at Risk and Minahan (2002: 1896) report a significant Tigrean community in Eritrea, with Minahan pegging the number of Tigreans in Eritrea at more than 1.8 million. [1975-1991: no kin; 2019-2020: kin in neighboring country]

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## Western Somalis

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The idea of “Greater Somalia” evolved during Italian occupation in the mid-1930s, when the Somali peoples were united under one government for the first time. In 1941, the allied forces liberated the Somali-inhabited areas, including the Ogaden, and put them under British military administration (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 217; Human Rights Watch 2008; Minahan 2002: 2067). In 1942, the Dir and Darod clans rebelled; an event that Minahan (2002: 2067) defines as the “beginning of the modern Western Somali national movement.” The movement was put down by the British and the Western Somali clans were disarmed but violent protest erupted again in 1948 when the Ogaden territory, against heavy Somali opposition, was incorporated into Ethiopia. We follow Minahan (2002) and code 1942 as the start date of the movement, but only code the movement from 1948, the year of the incorporation of Ogaden into Ethiopia. We found no casualty estimates for the incidents in 1942 and 1948 reported by Minahan, and thus indicate prior non-violent activity and code 1948 as NVIOLSD.
* According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the Ogaden Liberation Front (‘Jabhadda Waddaniga Xoreynta Ogaadeeniya’ (JWXO)) emerged in 1963. In 1975 another important Western Somali rebel group was formed, the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 217). Disagreements with WSLF over whether the movement should aspire to involve itself within the Ethiopian government led to the birth of another secessionist organization, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), in 1984 (Abdi 2007: 556).
* Despite a peace agreement in 1988, the Ogaden issue remained unresolved. Tense relations between Ethiopia and Somalia persisted, particularly in the early and mid-1990s due to Ethiopia’s support of the Somalian National Movement (SNM), a rebel organization that engaged the Somalian government in the civil war of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
* The by then nearly defunct WSLF merged with the ONLF in 1991. The ONLF continued to pursue Ogadeni self-determination via both the conventional political process (after 1992) and intermittent armed struggle, particularly in the late 1990s.
* Full-scale war broke out in 1998. The WSLF and the government signed an agreement in 2010, and a unilateral ceasefire was announced by ONLF in August 2018, but the ONLF remains active (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Hewitt et al. 2008; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR; UCDP/PRIO; ONLF 2018, 2020). [start date: 1942; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The idea of “Greater Somalia” had already evolved during Italian occupation in the mid-1930 and, according to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, has found fertile soil in the Ogaden region (even before Somali independence in 1960). UCDP states that the Western Somali movement also engaged in “irredentist agitation” when the Ethiopian government launched its first systematic attempts to collect taxes in the region in the 1960s. In 1975, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was founded. Minahan (2002) and Hewitt and Cheetham (2000) state that in 1981 the WSLF announced that it was seeking an independent Western Somali state rather than unification with Somalia. From this we infer that the claim had been irredentist prior to 1981.The irredentist claim in the early years of the WSLF’s activity is confirmed by the Minority Rights Group International, which sees an irredentist claim of the WSLF particularly during the Ethio-Somali War of 1977/1978. Following the first of January rule, we thus code irredentism as the dominant claim until 1981, when independence was declared the organization’s main goal. [1948-1981: irredentist claim]
* We have seen above that independence was declared the main goal of the WSLF in 1981. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was formed in 1984 from a split in the WSLF and became the leading Somali rebel organization. In the first local and regional elections in 1992, the ONLF won by a wide margin. In his initial statement, the ONLF leader pledged to establish an “independent Ogaden state with full sovereignty in line with the aspirations of its people” (UCDP). Independence thus seemed to continue as the dominant claim also under the ONLF.
* In 1994, numerous Somali organization denounced the secessionist intentions of the ONLF, stressed their continued cooperation with the transitional government and re-oriented towards Ethiopian political life. Together, these organizations formed the Ethnic Somali Democratic League (ESDL), which won a majority in the regional parliament in the 1995 elections. However, despite electoral success, the ESDL soon lost credibility as it was often perceived as an EPRDF puppet. The same is true for the Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP) which was formed in 1998 through the merger of the ESDL with moderate factions of the ONLF (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International; Minorities at Risk Project). The Somali claim hence seems a bit ambiguous, with different oganizations pursuing different goals. However, given the very close ties between the ESDL and later the SPDP with the ruling EPRDF, we consider the ONLF as the main representative of the Somali self-determination movement and hence code independence as the dominant claim.
* It is worth noting that ONLF started to release statements in recent years suggesting a softening of its stance (e.g., ONLF 2020). [1982-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* Independence became the movement’s dominant claim after 1981 (see above). We found no evidence for a politically significant independence claim before 1981. [start date: 1981; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* Irredentism was the movement’s dominant claim until 1981 (see above). We found no evidence for a politically significant irredentist claim after 1981. [start date: 1942; end date: 1981]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Western Somalis coincides with the Somali Regional State (Hararge) in Ethiopia (Minahan 2002: 2065). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There was clearly violence in the 1960s, but different sources disagree on its duration.
  + UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over Ogaden in only one year, 1964.
  + Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008), on the other hand, suggest ongoing (as of the last year they cover, 2002-2006) armed conflict starting in 1963. Meanwhile, the quinquennial MAR rebellion score is six (“large-scale guerilla activity”) from 1960-1969 and zero in 1970-1974.
* We investigated this case further. Qualitative evidence from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia suggests that a rebel group called the Ogaden Liberation Front launched an armed rebellion in 1963 “and by mid-1963 fighting was ongoing in both lowland Harerghe and Bale […] Over the year the rebels grew in number to about 3000 and in January some heavy fighting was reported between the two parties.” Yet, the account countinues: “In the end, the Oganden Liberation Front was too weak to pose a challenge to the Ethiopian regime and after the first months of 1964 the group failed to make any military impact. Instead, the region became the scene of a brief interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, as the latter tried to press its demand for the formation of a Greater Somalia (see the Ethiopia – Somalia section) […] After the 1963-64 rebellion had been suppressed the Ethiopian regime initiated a process of pacification that hit the Ogaden population hard. Apart from carrying out atrocities such as killings and beatings, the imperial regime also launched what knowledgeable sources call an economic war against the Ogaden. The pastoralist Somali population was deprived of large numbers of their animals, with thousands being either confiscated or killed.”
* Based on this account, we code 1964 as LVIOLSD, but do not follow Marschall & Gurr or MAR and code ongoing violence into the 1970s.
* The HVIOLSD coding for 1976-1988 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
  + Note: qualitative evidence from the SSW coding notes suggests that the conflict erupted in late 1975, but the 25 deaths threshold was only met in 1976.
* UCDP/PRIO next codes conflict involving the Western Somalis in 1991 (over Hararghe) and then in 1993-1994 and 1996 (over Ogaden). The conflict over Hararghe involved a Somali-dominated rebel group, the Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF), and featured sustained fighting in 1992 (9 deaths). There was also continued fighting in 1995 according to UCDP/PRIO (14 deaths). UCDP/PRIO does not record any deaths in 1989-1990 and we could therefore code a de-escalation; however, evidence from MAR would suggest that there was sustained fighting throughout all those years, with the rebellion score consistently remaining at four (“small-scale guerilla activity”). Based on this, we retain LVIOLSD throughout 1989-1996.
* None of our standard sources suggests separatist violence in 1997. Qualitative evidence from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia corroborates that there was a de-escalation: one Somali rebel group was underground at the time (ONLF) while the other was inactive and re-emerged only in 1999 (AIAI). We code NVIOLSD.
* The HVIOLSD code for 1998-2017 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* According to UCDP/PRIO, peace talks were initiated in 2018 and ONLF was allowed to legally return to Ethiopia. “The conflict was inactive in the following years and the ONLF went through the process of transforming into a political party, in preparation for the planned general elections in Ethiopia in 2020.” [1948-1963: NVIOLSD; 1964 LVIOLSD; 1965-1975: NVIOLSD; 1976-1988: HVIOLSD; 1989-1996: LVIOLSD; 1997: NVIOLSD; 1998-2017: HVIOLSD; 2018-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Nomadic tribes had been living autonomously in the Ogaden desert since ancient times. The territory was officially part of Somali sultanates (Ifat Sultanate and Adal Sultanate). When the Adal Sultanate expanded, it came into conflict with the Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia in 1529, setting off centuries of sporadic warfare with the Christian Ethiopian kingdom (Minahan 2002).
* In the mid-nineteenth century, Tewodros II initiated the creation of a modern multi-ethnic empire, which would unite Ethiopia. In 1887, the Ethiopians conquered Harar, which was the traditional capital of Western Somali clans and was henceforth used as a base for the Ethiopian colonization of the Ogaden region. In 1887, the Ogaden was conquered by Menelik II and came under the control of an Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire (Abyssinia). Resistance to the Ethiopian occupation was finally crushed in 1920. (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The Ethiopian rulers engaged in internal colonialism and an attempted creation of “one Ethiopian nation” through cultural subjugation and Amharisation. The Amharic language became the only language in court, administration and education. Non-Amharic speakers such as the Somalis had to depend on interpreters (Gudina 2007). In 1930, Haile Selassie became emperor and continued the nation-building process and the linguistic and religious homogenization. He embarked upon a policy of centralization (Bulcha 1997).
* When the Italian military invaded and occupied Abyssinia in 1936, the Ogaden region was administered as part of the Italian East African Empire (Italian Somaliland). Only five years later, the allied forces liberated Ethiopia and the Somali-inhabited areas, including the Ogaden, were put under British military administration (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Human Rights Watch 2008; Minahan 2002).
* After the Second World War, the Allied forces established the Four Power Commission (Britain, United States, Soviet Union, and France) to decide on the future of Italy’s colonial possessions. The claims presented to the Commission were divergent: Britain proposed a united Somalia under British trusteeship, Ethiopia wanted control over Ogaden and Somali clans were divided between advocates of a “Greater Somalia” and those who wanted to remain with Ethiopia. Britain discarded its vision of a united Somalia and, against heavy Somali opposition, the Ogaden territory was incorporated into Ethiopia in 1948. This is not a restriction as defined here, however.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1954, the last parts were returned to Ethiopia, where Haile Selassie regained his throne after the Second World War, started to centralize power within his own ethnicity and, following the concept of Amharization, further diminished the status of all languages other than Amhara (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Human Rights Watch 2008; Minahan 2002). [1954: cultural rights & autonomy restriction]
* In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). Theoretically a concession, we do not code this act since it is very clear that the concession is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163) and evolved into a brutal dictatorship that repressed the Somali population through forced relocation and military offensives (HRW 2008). [1974: autonomy restriction]
* In an effort to defuse nationalist discontent (and most likely anticipating the Derg’s possible defeat) the National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987, approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country's internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The autonomous regions were named as Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden (Minorities at Risk Project; Van der Beken 2012). Kefale (2013: 29) states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime […] continued to centralize power”. Furthermore, there was no linguistic autonomy granted as Amharic remained the working language. Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. With the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for nations and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). This change from a unitary to a federal government is coded as an autonomy concession. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Although the *Ogaden National Liberation Front* (ONLF) was not part of the coalition government under the EPRDF, it won the first regional election with 60 percent of the regional parliamentary seats. In February 1994, the regional assembly voted to exercise the “right to self-determination” for the Somali Region. As a consequence, the federal government removed the regional president and his deputy. A large part of the regional administration was replaced and a new EPRDF affiliate party, the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL), was formed. This is coded as an autonomy restriction in 1994. The replacement of the elected ONLF regional president and his administration with EPRDF-loyalists clearly diminished the level of self-determination of the Somali. The restrictive character of this act is confirmed by Human Rights Watch (2008): the ESDL won a majority in the regional parliament in the 1995 elections but eventually lost credibility due to the popular perception of it being an EPRDF puppet. The repeated removal of regional presidents paired with the presence of powerful TPLF/EPRDF “technical advisors” reinforced the Somali perception that the “regional administration has little real power and that the autonomy promised by ethnic federalism has been a hollow pledge” (HRW 2008: 25). [1994: autonomy restriction]
* A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states, among which the Somali Region, and two chartered cities (Gudina 2007; Minorities at Risk; Minority Rights Group International). The constitution also granted the right of secession (though that was more theoretical) and the deployment of state representatives to the Council of the Federation (Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). We do not code a concession since the reform has not been emplemented in the Somali region; rather the center has sought to undermine Somali autonomy by placing puppet regimes in the region (see above).
* Forced relocations of 500,000 Somali people are reported by Human Rights Watch (2012), which cited a plan to “resettle 1.5 million people” in regions including Gambella, Afar, Somali, and Benishangul-Gumuz. HRW conducted interviews that confirmed these resettlements were not voluntary. These resettlements have been presented by Ethiopia as attempts to resettle people “in less arid areas” and “to tackle poverty and ignorance” – but HRW noted concern about the true government intentions and identified new locations to be “mostly located in dry, arid areas […] away from […] water sources such as a major river” (Human Rights Watch 2012). BTI confirms that at least 125,000 households had already been resettled by between May 2012 and 2014 in Ogaden, Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz – including Somalis (BTI 2014: 22). We code an autonomy restriction choosing 2010 as the earliest date, as 2010 was the start of the villagization program. [2010: autonomy restriction]
* Peace talks started in 2018, but we could not find evidence for a concession as defined here.

**Regional autonomy**

* The 1994 constitution introduced an ethnically based federal system. But regional autonomy for the Western Somalis is not given (see above). This is also in line with the EPR coding that considers the Somali (Ogaden) as discriminated and not regionally autonomous, despite the federalization reform and the establishment of an allegedly autonomous ethnic state.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Ogaden territory was handed over to Ethiopia in 1948 and 1954, implying host changes. [1948, 1954: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Western Somalis |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Somali (Ogaden) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 53008000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1948-2019: discriminated; 2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1948-1993: 0.0379; 1994-2020: 0.0622]
  + This matches broadly with the CIA World Factbook, which suggests 7.2%.

**Regional concentration**

* Somalis make up 95% of the population of the Somali Regional State (Minahan 2002: 2065). This amounts to 4.055 million Western Somalis (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 4.075 million Western Somalis in the whole of Ethiopia in that same year. Regional concentration is also confirmed by MAR. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there are kin groups in three adjoining countries (Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti). Also see Minahan (2002: 2065) and MAR. [kin in neighboring country]

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2. <https://hornaffairs.com/2017/03/18/agazian-movement-exhuming-corpse/>; https://www.tigraionline.com/articles/agazian-movement-tegaru.html [↑](#footnote-ref-2)