# FRANCE

## Alsatians

Activity: 1969-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* There was an Alsatian home-rule movement seeking greater autonomy within the French Republic in the interwar years Gehring (2020b: 32).
* The first evidence of organized separatist activity in the post-WWII era we found is in 1969, when the Movement of Alsace Lorraine was founded, which called for “a free Alsace-Lorraine within a European federation” (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 21). Thus, 1969 is coded as start date.
* Keesing’s (January 1976) reports that “Autonomist tendencies in Alsace resulted in part from the fact that the regional dialect did not enjoy equal rights with the French language in law and education or in the press, radio and television (so that a majority of television users regularly tuned in to West German or Swiss television). Moreover, the region bordered on two of Europe’s wealthiest nations – West Germany and Switzerland – to which thousands of Alsatian workers were attracted by higher wages. M. Bernard Wittmann, president of the European Federalist Party in Alsace-Lorraine, stated in a letter published in Le Monde on March 29, 1974, that a majority of Alsatians believed in the eventual advent of a ‘Europe of the regions,’ which might force France, as ‘the last bastion of centralism (with Spain, Greece and Portugal) to grant a statute of autonomy within a federal framework to the regions of France.’”
* News reports indicate that various Alsatian separatist parties have been actively participating in regional and national politics since 1969. The most prominent parties in the 1990s appear to be Alsace-Lorraine National Forum (Nationalforum Elsass-Lothringen/Forum Nationaliste d'Alsace-Lorraine), the Union of the Alsatian People (Union du Peuple Alsacien/Elsass Volksunion, UPA/EVU), and Alsace First! (Alsace d’Abord) (Roth 2015: 62). In 2009, a new party, Unser Land, was formed with the merging of two separatist parties, Union du Peuple Alsacien and Fer's Elsass, to join the call for autonomy from France. Unser Land and Alsace First! remain active and thus the movement is ongoing (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis Minahan 1996, 2002; Snyder 1982; Unser Land; Yacoub 1998). [start date: 1969; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The movement’s claim is “greater autonomy, the unification of the Alsatian lands, and protection and recognition of the unique Alsatian dialects and culture” (Minahan 2002: 90). Even though there historically also had been claims for an independent Alsace, the dominant claim in the post-WWII period is devolution and increased cultural (predominantly linguistic) autonomy. This is in line with the program of the party ‘Unser Land’ and its predecessors ‘Union du Peuple Alsacien’ and ‘Fer’s Elsass’, which promote decentralization and bilingualism. [1969-2020: autonomy claim]
  + Note: the start date is coded in 1969, which is when the Movement of Alsace Lorraine (Elsaß-Lothringischer Volksbund) was founded, which called for “a free Alsace-Lorraine within a European federation” (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 21). It is somewhat ambiguous whether this should be read as an autonomy or an independence claim, but French Wikipedia suggests that he had claimed to have been “an autonomist, but not a separatist” (Wikipedia n.d.). At least in the movement’s first years (before the formation of autonomist parties such as the Union du Peuple Asacien (UPA) in 1988), one could thus also code an independence claim. However, Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 21) in the very next sentence refer to at least parts of the movement as “autonomist” and other evidence suggests that the claim for autonomy was dominant (see above).
  + Note too: with Strasbourg being the a center of European integration, the nationalist sentiments of Alsatians increasingly occurs in the form of a pro-European nationalist movement that preaches subsidiarity and the advent of a ‘Europe of the regions’ that limits the traditional nation-state’s influence while strengthening the regions (described as ‘regionalism’ by Gehring (2020a). This stands in stark contrast to the success of the extreme right, anti-European Front National in Alsace-Lorraine.

**Independence claims**

* We found evidence for independence claims prior to the period we cover, but no politically significant independence claims in the post-1945 period:
  + Alsatian secessionism arose in the context of resistance of rural populations of Baden against Napoleonic rule in the 19th century.
  + Alsace became German in 1871. At the end of WWI the region of Alsace-Lorraine passed from Germany to France through the Treaty of Versailles, and formed during this period a temporary and short-lived independent Soviet state (Haumann 1988). In May 1925, ‘Zukunft’, an Alsatian newspaper, demanded independence from France – and in June 1926 a manifesto appeared “inciting all Alsatians faithful to their country to unite in order to achieve full independence” (Fuchs 2017: 95). Between 1927 and 1928, 15 people were arrested and tried “for participation in a plot to separate Alsace from France” (Gehring 2020a: 12).
  + In addition to this, in the context of WWII there was an Alsatian resistance movement which sought to form an independent state. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

* Although Alsace was under German rule at various points, they are culturally neither entirely German nor French (Goetz 2017). Despite this, historically, there was a flank of the movement that is referred to as “pro-German” (Fuchs 2017: 97). However, the pro-German movement’s goal was not a merger with Germany, but the creation of an independent Alemannic state along with other Alemannic territories around Basel, Switzerland. We found no evidence for politically significant secession claims post-WWII (see above). [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Alsatians consists of the Alsatian lands which are composed of today’s French region of Alsace, the Moselle Departments within Lorraine region, and the territory of Belfort within the Franche-Compté region (Minahan 1996: 16-18; Minahan 2002: 85-90). We code the territorial claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence and therefore classify the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Treaty of Versailles after World War I ceded Alsace-Lorraine back to France, after almost fifty years of “Germanization” following the annexation by the Prussians/Germans in the war of 1970/1971. The new French administration, although at first welcomed by the Alsatians, “proofed as harsh and restrictive as that of the Germans” (Minahan 2002: 88). However, this was mostly forgotten when American and French troops liberated the Alsace in 1944 and ended the four-year intermezzo of Nazi occupation and terror.
* Again, as in the interwar period, the French government promoted assimilation in order to further distance the Alsatians culturally from their partly German identity. The most far-reaching policy in this direction comprised the 1945 ban of the Alsatian dialects in the local schools (Minahan 2002).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Alsace includes 2 departments (Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin) and until 2015 was also a region (see below), so we code acts of devolution to both departments and regions.
  + In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Alsace) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000).
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.
  + After the failed 1969 decentralization attempt in 1969, 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing’s Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). [1972: autonomy concession]
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements (Alsace is made up of two departments: Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin) “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
* In 2010, Article 29 of the new Territorial Collectivities Reform Act established that councillors may call referendums as a prerequisite for departmental mergers. In late 2011, the general and regional councillors of Alsace proposed such a referendum on the creation of a single territorial collectivity of Alsace (collectivité territorial d’Alsace) by merging the Alsace region and the departments Bas-Rhin and Haute-Rhin. The referendum was held in April 2013 and the proposal received 57% of votes cast. However, the result did not fulfill all requirements of a successful referendum, as a majority of residents of the smaller Haut-Rhin department voted against it and yes-votes were cast by less than 25% of the eligible electorate (Agence France Presse 2013; Le Figaro 2013). The Territorial Collectivities Reform Act is not classed as an autonomy concession as it did not entail a meaningful increase in regional autonomy, given that the administrative powers of new collectivities would essentially be the same as the powers previously held by the regional and departmental councillors.
* In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
* The 2015 Act on the Delimitation of Regions, Regional and Departmental Elections and Amending the Electoral Calendar merged the regions Alsace, Champagne-Ardenne, and Lorraine into a single region called Alsace-Champagne-Ardenne-Lorraine, renamed ‘Grand Est’ in 2016. The merger was unpopular among Alsatians, so the Paris government sought to appease the region’s politicians by specifying that Strasbourg would be the seat of the new regional council, although the territorial reform act generally allowed the new regions to choose the seat themselves (Art. 2). Despite this, the merger is coded as an autonomy restriction as it reduced Alsatians’ extent of self-rule. [2015: autonomy restriction]
  + In 2019, the French Parliament voted in favor of a law that merged the two Alsatian departments Bas-Rhin and Haute-Rhin into the European Collectivity of Alsace (Collectivité européenne d’Alsace) while keeping both as administrative districts (circonscriptions administratives de l’Etat) (Agence France Press 2019). The new European Collectivity henceforth held competencies that exceeded those held previously by the two departments, specifically in matters of cross-border cooperation, tourism, transport, and professional associations. Furthermore, the 2019 law contained provisions on school education in German language and its regional dialect as well as the establishment of a strategic committee on the teaching of the German language in Alsace (comité stratégique de l’enseignement de la langue allemande en Alsace) (Art. 2). We code the creation of the European Collectivity of Alsace as an autonomy concession. [2019: cultural rights & autonomy concession]
* Moreover, there were a number of concessions on language.
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages (German) and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
  + In 1991, the Strasbourg municipal authorities decreed that the Alsatian dialect has to be viewed on all street signs. Given the unilateral character of this decision and the negative reaction in the rest of France that denounced this move as an act of “Teutonic takeover” (Minahan 2002), this event is not coded as a concession.
  + In 1992, the Ministry of Education agreed to the use of German/Alsatian language in education. Bilingual German and French classes were introduced and the number of schools providing German language instruction was also increased (Bister-Broosen and Willemyns 1998). Meanwhile, it has to be noted that both German and the Alsatian dialect (Elsasserditsch) continue to lack a legal status. Furthermore, French remains the language of public administration, most education and most media (Minority Rights Group International). Nonetheless, the introduction of schooling in German is a significant cultural rights concession. [1992: cultural rights concession]
  + Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” Yet we found evidence that this was the case already before 1997 (see above).

**Regional autonomy**

* Given the centralized nature of the French state as described above, regional autonomy of the Alsatians is not given, despite some limited devolution of powers.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Alsatians |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* According to EPR the metropolitan French exercise monopoly power (all other groups are excluded from power). Alsatians are not considered politically relevant, suggesting a powerless coding (if Alsatians were actively discriminated against they were included in EPR). The evidence we found supports such a categorization. Alsatians enjoy equal political rights to metropolitan French, but representation in the national executive is token at best. In particular, throughout the movement’s existence, both the French president and the French prime minister consistently were non-Alsatians. Thus, we code the Alsatians powerless throughout. [1969-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 85) there were approximately 2.2 million Alsatians in France. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0356]

**Regional concentration**

* The Alsatians predominantly live in the historical region of Alsace-Lorraine (as defined above). In this region, they make up 75% of the population (Minahan 2002: 85). This amounts to 2.216 million Alsatians (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 2.237 million Alsatians in the whole of France in that same year. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 86), the Alsatians are descendatns of early Germanic peoples, and are closely related to the Luxembourgers and Germans in neighboring parts of Germany. [kin in adjacent country]

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## Basques

Activity: 1963-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* What appears to be the first French Basque self-determination movement – a political party by the name of Enbata – was formed in 1963, hence the start date of the movement.
* Presently there are many active French Basque separatist organizations. Moderates tend to support the various conventional Basque political parties that form and reform before every election. Those who call for more militant action tend to support Iparretarrak, or the newly formed Haika – a coalition of some members of Iparretarrek and a Spanish-based Basque youth group. MAR codes non-zero protest scores until 2005.
* In August 2006, a new militant Basque separatist organization, Irrintzi, was formed. Irrintzi subsequently claimed responsibility for five bombings and four additional attacks before disappearing in October 2006. It reappeared in April 2007 and several attacks have been attributed to the group, the last ones occuring in September 2009 (Burnett 2020: 279). In December 2009, the French police arrested three individuals (Agence France Presse 2009), one of whom was sentenced to five years in prison in May 2018 by a Paris court (Agence France Presse 2018). During this time, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, a predominantly Spanish Basque rebel group, also operated in France.
* While militant separatism appears to have ended in the French Basque country, a number of parties remain active that make some autonomy-related claims, for instance Abertzaleen Batasuna and the coalition Euskal Herria Bai. Many of their efforts relate to the shortage of housing but they also remain generally opposed to the French central government and favour increased regional autonomy (Roth 2015: 76). The Basque movement is therefore coded as ongoing (BBC 2011; Council on Foreign Relations 2008; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR; START). [start date: 1963; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Unlike its Spanish counterpart, the French Basques are not as cohesive nor is there a common political program or consensus on the movement’s objectives (Watson 2003). However, while there are some sources suggesting that the Basques in France have made claims for independence (Roth 2015: 75), we found no clear evidence to support this (see below). Instead, the group’s dominant claims include “political autonomy to protect and promote group culture” and the establishment of a separate Basque department (Iparralde) (Minorities at Risk Project, Minahan 2002). [1963-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* While there are some sources suggesting that the Basques in France have made claims for independence (Roth 2015: 75), we found little evidence to support this.
  + The Basque terrorist outfit ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), which operated from 1959 until 2018 and made claims for secession, was known to have a presence in France. For example, ETA held its first assembly in Bayonne in 1962 (Conversi 1997: 92-97). It is also known that ETA members used France as a hideout (Wilkinson 2002). However, ETA’s claims and activities focused on Basque self-determination in Spain.
  + On the other hand, the umbrella group ‘Basque National Liberation Movement’ (Euskal Nazio Askapenerako Mugimendua – ENAM) does contain parties that operate from (and on behalf of) Basques in France. One of those groups was Iparetarrak, which was founded in 1973 by Philippe Bidart and remained active until the year 2000. Iparetarrak’s goals are not entirely clear. A declaration from June 1996 refers to “objectives known to everyone” (but which are not specified) and is signed “autonomy is the first step to freedom” (Iparretarrak 1997). This could imply an independence claim, but we considered the statement as too open-ended and ambiguous.
  + The successor of Iparetarrak, Irrintzi, was founded in 2006. Judging from declarations in April 2007 (Irrintzi 2007a; Irrintzi 2007b), Irrintzi’s claims are focused on internal autonomy.
  + The mentioned organizations are the most radical organizations we could find. Other, more moderate organizations exist as well, but these have not made independence claims, either. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Basques consists of the southern part of the French department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques (Roth 2015: 75). The department of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques is divided into three districts or arrondissements: The Arrondissement of Bayonne, the Arrondissement of Oloron-Sainte-Marie, and the Arrondissement of Pau. French Basque Country includes all of Bayonne and Canton of Montagne Basque in Oloron-Sainte-Marie. Additionally, it includes the following territories in Béarn: Esquiule, Aramits, Géronce, and Arette (in the Canton of Oloron Sainte Marie (see: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=French\_Basque\_Country&oldid=1160985937). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No fatalities relating to separatist violence were found, and thus the movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The northern Basques were incorporated into the French kingdom in 1601 and enjoyed considerable autonomy until the French revolutionary government revoked all regional autonomy arrangements and dissolved the historical provinces in 1790. The French part of the Basque country was merged with neighboring Béarn in order to establish what today is the départment Pyrénées-Atlantiques. Increasing centralization, attempts to assimilate the Basques and the abrogation of ancient rights fueled Basque nationalism in the middle of the nineteenth century. The restrictive attitude towards Basque nationalism continued into the Fourth Republic, when Basque nationalists were imprisoned for threatening state security. However, the 1951 Loi Deixonne recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan (Hossay 2004: 408). This allowed a minimal presence of these four minority languages (and later Corsican, Tahitian and Melanesian) in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30), thus ending the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31).
* We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Given that the French Basque territory only forms part of a département (Pyrénées-Atlantiques), we need to ask to what extent these acts of decentralization affected the Basques’ level of autonomy. As of 2011, the Pyrénées-Atlantiques department had a population of 650,000 of which 289,000 (almost 45%) lived in the *pays Basque* (INSEE). The Basques make up an even smaller part of their region – Aquitaine, which has a population of more than 3 miillion. Given that the Basques cannot be said to have their “own” department or region, we do not code any concessions due to devolution of competencies to departments or regions.
* We do, however, code a language concession:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” We do not code another concession because the 1982 act appears much more significant. Note: despite some advances, the Basque language (Euskera) does not have any legal status and the language of public administration and most education has remained French (Minorities at Risk Project). Beck (2005: 118) states that the position of Euskera in administration and courts is “at a zero level”.
* In 2016, a special administrative order established a single Basque municipal community (Communauté d’agglomération du Pays Basque) by merging the ten existing municipal communities of the Basque country on the 1st January 2017 (Sud Ouest 2016). The newly created municipal community comprises 158 communes. Although the merging was welcomed by nationalist Basque groups, who perceived it as a step towards unifying the Basques and the creation of a Basque department, it is not coded as an autonomy concession given that the new municipal community held the same competences as its predecessors.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Basques |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Basques |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 22002000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.004]

**Regional concentration**

* The Basque are concentrated in the French Pays Basque. We could not find information on the exact number of Basque in the French Pays Basque but according to Minahan (2002: 283), there are 73% Basques in the entire Basque country in Spain and France, making it very likely that they also constitute a majority in the French part alone. Further evidence in this direction comes from the Minorities at Risk data and Weidmann (2009), where the Basque settlement in France is represented by one cluster and the territorial concentration index (SPATCONC) is 1 and the population dispersion index (POPCLDIST) is 0. We thus code the Basques as regionally concentrated [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Basques have kin in Spain (EPR; Minahan 2002: 283; MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Bretons

Activity: 1957-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* While the first Breton separatist groups were formed in the late 19th/early 20th century, in the post-1945 era the movement seems to have been politically dormant until 1957, when the Mouvement pour l’Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) was formed, an organization widely described as federalist (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51).
* In 1958 Breton regionalists won 23% of the vote in their districts (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51). In 1964, the Union Démocratique Bretonne (Breton Democratic Union, UDB), a leftist party in quest of complete autonomy for Brittany in the French Republic and European Union by non-violent means, was founded.
* Both the UDB, which has been active since its founding, and the Party for the Organization of a Free Brittany (Parti pour l'Organisation d'une Bretagne Libre, POBL), which proclaims “the inalienable right of the Breton people freely to rule itself and to become independent again,” were active in both regional and national politics during the 1990s.
* POBL split in 2000 when its far-right members created Adsav, a new party fighting for Bretagne secession, and the remaining members created the more gradualist Breton Federalist League (Ligue fédéraliste de Bretagne) (Roth 2015: 60). While Adsav is considered to be inactive since 2016 (Ouest France 2020), other groups such as UDB, the Breton Federalist League, and the movement Pour La Bretagne! remained active in 2020 (Adsav; Gurr et al. 2001; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996, 2002, 2016; Snyder 1982). [start date: 1957; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* After World War I, Bretons presented a petition to U.S. president Woodrow Wilson calling for an independent and sovereign Brittany. However, the claim for secession has ever since lost most of its popularity. The Mouvement pour l’Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) that had been formed in 1957 is widely described as federalist (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51). Moreover, the principal Breton party, the Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB – Breton Democratic Union) has always been more regionalist than secessionist, therefore promoting devolution, and more (cultural) autonomy within a federal French state (Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 307).
* In addition to regional autonomy, one of the major demands of the Breton nationalist movement includes the reunification of historic Brittany – currently divided between Brittany and the Pays-de-la-Loire - into a single administrative region.
* The Party for the Organization of a Free Brittany (Parti pour l'Organisation d'une Bretagne Libre, POBL) was a bit more extreme in its demands and regarded “Breton independence a possibility” (Schrijver 2006: 255). However, the party never got much support in elections. The militant and violent Front de Libération de la Bretagne and the Armée Républicaine Bretonne caused media attention and “public sympathy for the detainees and amnesty movements” (Schrijver 2006), but experienced less support than the more moderate UDB, which is also the only regionalist party to ever win seats in parliaments (Cole and Loughlin 2003). The radical left-wing Emgann and the far-right Adsav enjoyed only minority support and are no longer active. [1957-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Breton nationalism is categorized into three phases (or ‘emsav’) – with the first taking place between the 20th century and until 1914. The second ‘emsav’ took place between 1914-1945; while the third took place in the postwar period.
* Early Breton movements were not secessionist in nature but primarily cultural and pro-autonomist. The popularization of Wilson’s principles of self-determination, however, including the “strengthening of the Sinn Féin Party in Ireland, resulted in the radicalization of the movement and its second phase (1914-1945) (Bargain 2010). In January 1919, the journal ‘Breizh Atao’ (Brittany Forever) “promoted for the foundation of an independent Breton state” – and in the 1920s there were efforts to establish a movement that would be the “Sinn Féin [equivalent] Organization of Brittany” (Stover 2013). From 1931 until 1944 the Breton National Party, with ties to the Nazi party and fascist ideology, operated on an openly secessionist agenda (Leach 2010).
  + Yet, it is important to note that prior to WWII, independence was a minority position (O’Callaghan 1982: 12, 92).
  + During WWII, while occupied by Germany, Bretons “were careful not to present themselves as mere puppets in the service of Germany” and their “propaganda […] was aimed first and foremost at the Germans themselves”. Breton nationalists were planning a coup d’etat on 22 June 1940 but instead regrouped and organized “a meeting [which took place on 3 July 1940] at Pontivy during which the independence of Brittany” would be announced alongside “a declaration of German support”. However, Germany was not interested in dismembering France, which brought an end to this bid for independence (O’Callaghan 1982: 86ff).
* After the war, there were scattered voices supporting independence, but no politically significant self-determination movement until 1957. The movement’s dominant claim was for autonomy, but the evidence we collected suggests that claims for outright independence have also been made on a more or less continuous basis.
  + O’Callaghan 1982: 111f) describes several pamphlets (etc.) published in the 1950s and 1960s which argued for an independent Britanny. Some of those pamphlets were published prior to 1957; however, there does not appear to have been an organized movement to speak of pre-1957.
  + In 1963, the Breton Liberation Front (Talbenn Diebiñ Breizh - FLB) was established, which had ties to ETA and claimed outright independence (O’Callaghan 1983: 77-83).
  + Radical elements of the movement continued to make independence claims in the 1970s and, in 1971, ARB (L'Armée Revolutionnaire Bretonne; Breton Revolutionary Army) was created as the armed wing of FLB (O’Callaghan 1982: 123).
  + ARB continued to exist and, in 2000, staged attacks (La Libre 2004). From that point on, ARB appears to have lost support and become more moderate.
  + However, the secessionist claim continued. In 1999, the former leader and founder of FLB, Yann Fouéré, formed the “Party for the Organization of Free Brittany”. Adsav, another secessionist organization, was formed in 2000. FLB subsequently became effectively defunct as most activists and supports switched their support to Adsav.
  + According to Wikipedia, Adsav “dropped below 50 declared members in 2016, and has since been considered inactive” (Wikipedia, n.d.).
* We could not find evidence organized mobilization after 2016 and therefore code the independence movement as ended in that year.
  + Additional information: a 2013 poll found that 18% of Bretons support independence; while 37% consider themselves ‘as Breton first’ but do not wish for independence (Henley et al. 2017). [start date: 1957; end date: 2016]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Bretons is historic Brittany as it existed in Ancien Régime France, which is composed of today’s region of Brittany and a small part of the Pays-de-la-Loire region: the Loire-Atlantique department (Minahan 2002: 323). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Although Breton separatists have carried out over 250 bomb attacks since 1966, these attacks seem to have resulted in human deaths only in three instances: one person was killed in 1974 while two people were killed in 2000. Following our coding rules we nevertheless classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Bretons, in union with France since 1532, lost all administrative and cultural autonomy following the French Revolution and the reorganization by the French revolutionary government. During Nazi occupation in World War II, the Bretons were granted cultural and linguistic rights and were placed under separate administration. Once liberated, these concessions were quickly withdrawn by the French authorities with the goal of assimilating the Bretons. The Breton nationalist movement was discredited and repressed and several of its members were arrested as collaborators (Minahan 2002). The centralized French state was set in place and the use of the Breton and Gallo language in school was forbidden. However, the 1951 Loi Deixonne recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan (Hossay 2004: 408). This allowed a minimal presence of these four minority languages (and later Corsican, Tahitian and Melanesian) in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30), thus ending the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31). [1951: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Brittany consists of several departments and also forms a region, so we code acts of devolution to both departments and regions.
  + In 1956 22 administrative regions were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000).
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.
  + After the failed 1969 decentralization attempt, 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing’s Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). [1972: autonomy concession]
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements (Brittany is made up of four departments: Finistère, Ille-et-Vilaine, Morbihan, Côtes-d’Armor) “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. While the 1982 act devolved some power to the regions, the establishment of Brittany as a political region also reinforced the cross-cutting of the ancient Breton homeland as the department of Loire-Atlantique, historically a part of Brittany, was integrated into another region (Pays de la Lore). While this could also be coded as a restriction, we value the act of devolution and the establishment of Brittany as a political region more decisive in increasing the Breton’s level of autonomy and thus code the event as a concession. [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
* In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
* There was also some movement regarding language:
  + In 1975 the French government announced that it would begin subsidizing Breton language courses in state schools (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 52). We do not code this smallish change. Breton language courses had already been possible under the 1951 Deixonne act (see above).
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
  + Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” This was, however, already possible under the 1951 Deixonne act and the 1982 Savary Circular (see above). We do not code another concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Given the centralized nature of the French state as described above, regional autonomy of the Bretons is not given, despite repeated acts of devolution.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bretons |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* In EPR Bretons are considered irrelevant. Metropolitan French are considered to have monopoly power. By implication, the Bretons should be coded powerless (by definition, all other ethnic groups are excluded if one group has monopoly power; on the other hand, if Bretons were discriminated against, they would be included in EPR). We did not find evidence that would suggest otherwise. After the Second World War, Breton language and culture were suppressed. Reece (1979) went as far as labelling Brittany an internal colony of metropolitan France. However, there is no evidence of active political discrimination as defined in EPR. Since the advent of the Fifth Republic, Bretons often held ministerial posts. But according to Reece (1979) these are best regarded as token, in particular since Breton ministers in fact often were non-Bretons ‘parachuted’ by the Gaullist into Breton constituencies. We did not find evidence that would justify a power upgrade in the post-1980 period. In particular, French presidents and Prime ministers were consistently non-Breton. Thus, we code the Bretons as powerless throughout. [1957-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 323), there were approximately 2.8 million Bretons in France in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0453]

**Regional concentration**

* The Bretons are concentrated in historic Brittany, where they make up 72% of the population (Minahan 2002: 323). This amounts to 2.625 million Bretons (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 2.825 million Bretons in the whole of France in that same year. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* In the most recent version of the Minorities at Risk data, the Bretons are no longer included. In versions I-IV, the Bretons are included and, referring to the Celtic Peoples in the United Kingdom, are coded as having “close kindred in one country”. We follow MAR and code ethnic kin in a neighboring country as the United Kingdom is within 150 statute miles proximity. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Catalans

Activity: 1969-2020

**General notes**

* Northern Catalonia, also knows as French Catalonia, refers to a relatively small territory that was ceded to France by Spain in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. The territory corresponds roughly to today’s department of Pyrénées-Orientales, which in 2019 had a population of approximately 480,000.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The earliest organized Catalan group was the Grup Rossellonès d’Estudis Catalans (GREC), founded in 1960 to standardize the Catalan language and promote its use. The group is considered to have been largely apolitical. In 1967, its younger, more political members founded the Grup Cultural de la Joventut Catalana (GCJC). The two organisations jointly organized cultural activities that promote the Catalan language, for instance the summer school-type Universitat Catalana d’Estiu a Prada de Conflent (Jané & Forcada 2010: 91). In 1969, the Front de Joventut Catalana (FJC), a revolutionary and anticolonial youth-group, emerged from the Grup Cultural de la Joventut Catalana (Ortín i Nadal 2011: 149). The FCJ was the first dedicated political Catalan organization that advocated for Catalan autonomy; hence, 1969 is coded as the start date.
* In 1970, Cultural Group members founded the Comitè Rossellonès d’Estudis i d’Animació (Roussillon Studies and Animation Committee, CREA), which made claims for greater autonomy and advocated a national emancipation from French cultural and economic control (Ortín i Nadal 2011: 150). In 1972, the CREA was transformed into the party Esquerra Catalana dels Treballadors (ECT - Catalan Left of the Workers) (Jané & Forcada 2010: 91). In the same year, the Acció Regionalista Catalana (ARC - Catalan Regionalist Action) was formed. Both presented candidates in the 1973 legislative election. The ECT’s candidate obtained 1.22% and the ARC’s 2.08% of votes cast in their constitutencies.
* The ARC disappeared soon thereafter while the ECT dissolved in 1981. However, ECT members continued their political work under the banner of the Unitat Nacionalista, which was founded in 1984. In 1985, the group was transformed into the political party Unitat Catalana, which put forward a candidate list for the 1986 regional elections that united several Catalan political and cultural organizations. The party received 5,324 votes in the 1986 election (2.89%) (Becat 2022: 187). In the 1989 municipal elections, Unitat Catalana for the first time won political office (13 local councillor positions). In subsequent regional and legislative elections, Unitat Catalana continued to obtain low single-digit vote shares (Becat 2022: 188).
* In 1996, the Partit per Catalunya (Party for Catalonia) was founded as the French counterpart of the Partit per la Independència in Spanish Catalonia. The Partit per Catalunya merged with a significant part of the Unitat Catalana membership in 2001 to form the Bloc Català. Bloc Català was dissolved in 2006 as it became the French part of the Spanish federation Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya. Unitat Catalana, meanwhile, entered a collaboration with the Spanish-Catalan electoral coalition Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència in 2010. Unitat Catalana actively continued its political work advocating for Catalan autonomy as of August 2022 (Becat 2022: 188). [start date: 1969; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Generally, the French Catalans appear less radical in their self-determination claims than the Catalan movement in Spain. Emerging from cultural and language-focused groups, most political Catalan organisations such as Unitat Catalana or Bloc Català have advocated for greater autonomy within the French Republic; claims for outright secession or irredentism with Spanish Catalonia are rare and do not constitute the principal claim of the Northern Catalan movement. Common claims have been changing the name of the department Pyrénées-Orientales to ‘Catalogne Nord’; secession of the department Pyrénées-Orientales from the region Languedoc-Roussillon (or its successor Occitania) and becoming a region in its own right; and obtaining a national autonomy statute similar to that of Catalonia in Spain (Jané & Forcada 2010; Ortín i Nadal 2011: 150; Minahan 2016: 73). [1969-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There are indications for secessionist sentiment. For example, Roth 2015: (73), suggests that “[s]ome Catalan nationalists in France make common cause with separatists in Spain for a united independent state.” In particular, secessionist sentiment appears to have emerged in response to the 2016 administrative overhaul of France, which led to fears that Occitan culture and language may receive preferential treatment over Catalan and Noble (2017) reports that there were reports of “the presence of a small but vocal group of Catalan nationalists” making claims for independence in 2017.
* That said, “separatists [i.e., outright secessionists] are very much a minority” in the French region according to the co-founder of ‘Yes To A Catalan Country’ party, which pushes for greater autonomy (The Local 2017).
* Furthermore, importantly, secessionists do not seem to have organized as no organized representatives of Catalan interests demand outright secession. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Northern Catalonia comprises the territories ceded to France by Spain in the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees. It is a collection of historic districts (Cat. comarques) situated at the southernmost point of mainland metropolitan France, at the eastern end of the Pyrenees. The comarques – Roussillon, Conflent, Vallespir, Cerdagne, and Capcir – correspond to different geographical features: the valleys of Conflent, Vallespir and Cerdagne, the Capcir plateau and the Roussillon plain. The five districts of Northern Catalonia all form part of the present-day department Pyrénées-Orientales, along with the traditionally Occitan speaking comarca of Fenouillèdes. (Hawkey 2018: 2). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence above the threshold. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1641, the Republica Catalana declared independence from the Kingdom of Spain and placed itself under the protection of the French king, who became Count of Barcelona. In 1652, the Principality of Barcelona was reincorporated into the Monarchy of Spain, and in 1659 France and Spain concluded the Treaty of the Pyrenees which ceded the northern part of the principality to France, where it became the province of Roussillon (Cole 2001: 65).
* In 1700, the government of Louis XIV prohibited the use of the Catalan language in public acts, which was extended to include registers of birth, marriage, and death kept by priests in 1738 (McPhee 1980: 403). During the French revolution, the provinces were abolished and Roussillon was joined with the traditionally Occitan-speaking district of Fennouillèdes to form the department Pyrénées-Orientales (Hawkey 2018: 11 et seq.).
* In 1907, the dire situation faced by wine growers in Languedoc and the Pyrénées-Orientales as well as widespread fraud and the need to outsource wine production to the colonies brought about the ‘Grande Révolte de Midi’, a shortlived popular uprising in cities across the south of France.
* During World War I, over 8.000 soldiers from Pyrénées-Orientales lost their lives fighting for France. In World War II, Northern Catalonia formed part of Vichy France but it has been argued that Catalans collaborated less with German forces than other minorities (Hakwey 2018: 14).
* Nevertheless, in the postwar years the residents of Northern Catalonia were treated with suspicion. In 1951, the Loi Deixonne recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan (Hossay 2004: 408; Hawkey 2018: 23). This allowed a minimal presence of these four minority languages (and later Corsican, Tahitian and Melanesian) in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30), thus ending the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31).
* In 1956 22 administrative regions were created. The department Pyrénées-Orientales became part of the region Languedoc-Roussillon. The reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000).
* We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Given that the French Catalan territory corresponds approximately to a single department (Pyrénées-Orientales), we code changes in department’s level of autonomy as concessions. By contrast, we do not code changes in the level of region’s autonomy (Pyrénées-Orientales is today part of the Occitania region, which had a population of almost 6 million in 2015, and until 2015 had been part of the region Languedoc-Rousillon, which had a population of almost 3 million; as such, Catalans’ influence at the regional level is limited).
  + When the Socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
  + In 2004, the Pyrenees-Mediterranean Euroregion was established as a cooperation project between Catalonia, Aragon, the Balearic Islands, Midi-Pyrenées, and Languedoc-Roussillon. The Euroregion was created to enhance inter-regional cooperation on railway infrastructure, aeronautics, logistics, innovation, and research. Aragon suspended its participation in 2006. The founding of the Euroregion did not entail concessions of political powers or an increase of autonomy, and is therefore not coded as an autonomy concession.
  + In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
  + The 2015 Act on the Delimitation of Regions, Regional and Departmental Elections and Amending the Electoral Calendar merged the regions Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées into a single region provisionally called Languedoc-Roussillon-Midi-Pyrénées, renamed ‘Occitanie’ in 2016. The new name was opposed by Unitat Catalana and other Northern Catalan nationalists (The New York Times 2016). Still, we do not code a restriction given these region’s large size and Catalans’ limited influence (see above).
* There was also some movement regarding language:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
  + Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” This was, however, already possible under the 1951 Deixonne act and the 1982 Savary Circular (see above). We do not code another concession.
  + On 10 December 2007, the Departmental Council of Pyrénées-Orientales recognized Catalan as a regional language of the department, though French is still the only official language in France. We do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Given the centralized nature of the French state as described above, regional autonomy of the Catalans is not given, despite repeated acts of devolution.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Catalans |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* In EPR, Catalans are considered irrelevant. Metropolitan French are considered to have monopoly power. By implication, the Catalans should be coded powerless (by definition, all other ethnic groups are excluded if one group has monopoly power; on the other hand, if Catalans were discriminated against, they would be included in EPR). We did not find evidence that would suggest otherwise. After the Second World War, Catalan language and culture were suppressed. McPhee (1980) went as far as labelling Northern Catalonia an internal colony of metropolitan France. However, there is no evidence of active political discrimination as defined in EPR. We did not find evidence that would justify a power upgrade in the post-1980 period. In particular, French presidents and Prime ministers are generally non-Catalan with Manuel Valls, who was born in Barcelona but opposes the Catalan independence movement, being a notable exception. [1969-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 403), there were approximately 409,000 Catalans in France in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0066]

**Regional concentration**

* McPhee (1980: 420) reports that about 60% of Northern Catalonia’s population is Catalan. Taking into account the size of Northern Catalonia (i.e., the Pyrénées-Orientales department: ca. 400,000 at the turn of the millennium, 480,000 today) and the above-reported group size (409,000), this suggests that ca. 60% of all Catlans in France live in northern Catalonia. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* In the most recent version of the Minorities at Risk data, the Spanish Catalans are listed and coded as having “close kindred in one country which adjoins its regional base”. We follow MAR and code ethnic kin in a neighbouring country as the French Catalans share a land border with the Spanish Catalans. [kin in neighbouring country]

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## Corsicans

Activity: 1967-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* With the reimposition of French rule in 1945, the nationalist Corse movement that had existed became dormant (Minahan 2002: 489). The movement began to resurface in the late 1950s. In 1960, Corsican students in Paris formed the Union Corse and began to voice their dismay about French development programs towards Corsica (Hossay 2004: 408). While demands were framed in nationalist terms, they did not clearly extend to self-determination as we define it. Then, in 1967, the Regional Front of Corsica (FRC) was founded, one of the first organizations advocating Corse autonomy (De La Calle and Fezi 2010: 399). We peg the start date to 1967.
* In 1973, the Action for the Revival of Corsica (ARC) was founded, another group aiming for Corse autonomy (De La Calle and Fezi 2010: 399). However, while the Corsicans are represented by numerous conventional and militant organizations, the largest Corsican self-determination organization was a low-level terrorist organization known as the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), which was founded in 1976 (Calle & Fazi 2010; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Hewitt et al. 2008; Hossay 2004; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR; Snyder 1985).
* The movement was ongoing as of 2020. In 2014, the FLNC announced that it would abandon its armed struggle and initiate a process of demilitarization (CNN 2014; Le Monde 2014). After the Pè a Corsica coalition of the autonomist Femu a Corsica and the separatist Corsica Libera parties won the 2015 regional elections, the FLNC declared an end to its ‘military operations’ in October 2016 (The Guardian 2016). The Pè a Corsica coalition also won the 2017 Corsican territorial election and despite including a party with separatist ambitions, its demands did not focus on outright secession but greater autonomy and devolution (Minority Rights Group International 2018; France 24 2017). The coalition was dissolved for the 2021 territorial elections, from which autonomist Femu a Corsica emerged as the single largest party. As protests erupted in early 2022 over the killing of an imprisoned Corsican nationalist and increasingly spiralled into riots, the French government announced that it was prepared to discuss autonomy with the Corsican authorities (The Telegraph 2022). [start date: 1967; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* We code the Corse movement as active from 1967 onwards, the year the Regional Front of Corsica (FRC) was founded. The group advocated Corse autonomy (De La Calle and Fezi 2010: 399).
* In 1973, the Action for the Revival of Corsica (Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse – ARC) was founded. Despite its more radical methods, the ARC “always defined its actions in the framework of the French Republic […] These men do not threaten the state. They struggle for a single thing: internal autonomy in the framework of the French Republic” (quoted in Hossay 2004: 411). This is confirmed by De La Calle and Fezi (2010: 399) who also call the group autonomist.
  + In 1975 ARC was banned by the French government (O’Callaghan 1982: 131f).
* The Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) was founded by radicals from the ARC in 1976. The FLNC’s aims were “the recognition of the national rights of Corsica, destruction of all the instruments of French colonialism, the foundation of a popular democratic power […] [and] the right to self-determination’ (Hossay 2004: 412). These claims are more radical, but there are numerous indications in De La Calle and Fezi (2010) and Hossay (2004) that the FNLC never had majority support, or even more support than other groups advocating on behalf of Corsican issues, which is why we code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout.
  + Additional evidence for this coding are the 1983 FLNC moderates who distinguished themselves from extremism and declared that “the independence that we demand may well be realized with and not against France” (Hossay 2004: 417).
  + Furthermore, the 2014 FLNC’s announcement to end its armed struggle was estimated by observers to be the result of a lack of broader public support, as “despite what the separatists would like to believe, only a tiny minority of locals support independence” (The New York Times 2014). In a similar vein, the 2015 and 2017 nationalist Pè a Corsica government’s claims focused on greater autonomy, despite the involvement of the separatist Corsica Libera party as junior partner in the ruling coalition (Minority Rights Group International 2018; France 24 2017; Minahan 2016: 111). [1967-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The first organizations making secessionist claims we could find are the FPCL (Frontu Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione) and Ghustizia Paolina (GP). In early May 1975, the two groups exploded 22 bombs in numerous Corsican localities, as well as in Nice and Marseille. The attacks came to be known as “nuit bleue” (blue night). A clandestine press conference claiming responsibility for the attacks asserted that the groups’ main objects included the independence of Corsica (Archivio900 n.d.). This is the first clear evidence for organized secessionist claims we could find; however, according to Wikipedia, the groups were active already in 1974, so we code the movement’s start date in 1974.
* In 1976, the FPCL and GP merged to form the Corsican National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale Corse – FLNC). The FLNC subsequently engaged in militant activity (Dejevsky 1997).
  + Note: Consulte des Comités Nationalistes (CCN) was founded in March 1980 as the ‘legal’ front of the FLNC. CCN was dissolved in 1983 (France Politique n.d.).
  + Movimentu Corsu per l'Autodeterminazione (MCA) was founded in October 1983 as the renewed legal front of FLNC. It was replaced in June 1987 by A Cuncolta Naziunalista (ACN), which was dissolved in 1998 (France Politique n.d.).
* FLNC announced that it would end its armed struggle in 2014. The FLNC is survived by splinter groups, such as FLNC du 5-Mai, which was established in 1997; and FLNC du 22-Octobre, which was established in October 2002. Both splinter groups advocate secession and, in addition, espouse anti-Islamic ideology. The 22-Octobre group announced an “unlimited truce” in May 2016 (Le Monde 2014).
* Another secessionist group is Core in Fronte, which was established in January 2018. The group is notable for being on the far left while many other Corsican secessionists are on the far right. Core in Fronte managed to elect 6 councilors in the Assembly of Corsica in 2017 (Le Point 2017).
* There are other smaller Corsican groups (Corse Matin 2010), including Clandestinu; Fronte Ribellu; and Reistenza Corsa. We did not research their claims in detail because this would not change our coding. [start date: 1974; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Corsicans consists of the island and current administrative region of Corsica in France. We code the territorial claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) suggest LVIOLSD in 1976-2006. Yet, no other source (UCDP/PRIO, MAR) would suggest that violence rose to the LVIOLSD level, and qualitative evidence suggests that while there was a significant number of casualties in 1976-2003, the 25 deaths threshold was not met in a single year (University of Central Arkansas).
* FNLC declared a unilateral ceasefire from November 2003 - March 2005 and attacks during this period of time resulted in no casualties.
* Few casualties were found in subsequent years as well, including accidental deaths from failed bombing attacks (Lexis Nexis). According to the Guardian, fatalities are rare as the FNLC targets buildings when empty so as to avoid deaths (The Guardian 8/28/2006; Lexis Nexis). The Associated Press also notes that “[m]ost of the attacks cause damage to property, but not human casualties” (Associated Press International, 10/16/2006; Lexis Nexis).
* In 2014, the FLNC announced that it would end its armed struggle and later stated that it would halt all ‘military operations’ in October 2016, with no subsequent reports of nationalist bombings until 2019, when explosive devices were found outside two tax offices (CNN 2014; The Guardian 2016; DPA International 2019).
* Based on this, all years are coded with NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Originally, Etruscans settled in Corsica. The island was overtaken step by step by the Romans starting in 259 B.C., and then overrun by German vandals in the 5th century. The island returned to nominal Roman suzerainty in A.D. 534, was taken by the Goths, then conquered by the Lombards in 725. Eventually, it came under the control of the Germanic Francs. It was then ceded to the Holy See – the Holy See gave the island to the Republic of Pisa in 1047 – until the Ligurians of Genoa expelled the last of the Pisans in 1347. The Genoese rule was harsh and unpopular. The first “nationalist” Corse rebellion by Sampiero Corso ended with continued Genoese rule in 1567. In 1729, the tax-burdened Corsicans started a decade-long rebellion; Pasquale Paoli led the rebellion after 1755. Paoli achieved virtual independence and established a Republic, complete with national government and university (Minahan 2002: 487-488). The Genoese, unable to quell the rebellion, sold their rights to the island to the French in 1768 (Minahan 2002: 488). By 1770, the French had closed down all of the Corsican state institutions. The Corsicans rebelled once more during the French Revolution, and in 1793 drove the last French troops from the island. After a short interlude of British rule, the island was reconquered by Napoleon in 1796, fell to the British again in 1814, and then was ceded to the French at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 despite Corsican protests (Minahan 2002: 488). Fascist Italian troops occupied the island after the fall of France in 1940. An uprising in 1943, aided by the Free French forces, drove the Italians off the island. The triumphant Corsicans were very disappointed by the reimposition of French rule in 1945 (Minahan 2002: 489). When the Loi Deixonne recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan in 1951, Paris felt no pressure to add Corsican to this list, as Corsican nationalism was dormant (Hossay 2004: 408).
* We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. Until 1973, Corsica was a department that was associated with a much larger region, Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur; therefore, we do not code the 1972 increase in regions’ powers (see e.g. Alsatians). In 1973, Corsica became its own region, which gave it a (very) limited degree of autonomy (Savigear 1975: 463). [1973: autonomy concession]
* In 1976, the Corsican department was split in two departments.
* In 1982, the new Socialist government adopted decentralization laws in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 73). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. The reforms included a Special Statute (‘statut particulier’) for Corsica which provided for a Corsican Assembly to be elected through proportional representation within six months. It also acknowledged to some extent the cultural specificity of Corsica (recognition of the “Corsican people”) (Hossay 2004: 415). [1982: autonomy concession]
* In 1991, French Senators rejected key portions of a bill that would have recognized the Corsicans as a separate nation (Hossay 2004: 421). However, there was a separate bill that recognized the Corsicans as a “people” and allowed for the teaching of Corsican in schools, as long as it was not mandatory (Minorities at Risk Project). Law 91-428 (S*tatut de la collectivité territoriale de Corse*) granted additional powers to the assembly as regards economic, social and cultural development and with regard to the protection of the identity and the environment (Legifrance). Despite initial disappointment over the non-recognition of Corsica as a separate nation, we code this as a concession, since the net-transfer of competencies and cultural rights was certainly positive. [1991: cultural rights & autonomy concession]
  + In 1993, France’s constitutional court struck down the provision recognizing Corsicans as a “people”. Even if largely symbolic, we code this as a cultural rights restriction as case study evidence suggests that the ruling was important (MRGI). [1993: cultural rights restriction]
* In late 2001, the French National Assembly adopted a law giving the local assembly in Corsica some powers to modify laws and decrees adopted by the central state and universalized the teaching of the Corsican language in all schools (Sanchez 2008: 660). However, in January 2002 the constitutional court struck down a vital part of the legislation: the “experimental power to derogate from national laws” (MRGI). Other portions of the law were left standing, including, most importantly, the provision that would make the Corsican language part of the primary school curriculum, provided that instruction is “optional and does not affect equality among students” (Sampson 2002). Since the autonomy provision was never properly implemented, we only code a cultural rights concession. [2001: cultural rights concession]
* In 2003, the government called for a referendum in Corsica on whether or not they wanted a new territorial assembly and an executive body that would manage more of the island’s affairs. The proposal was not implemented as the referendum was (narrowly) rejected by the Corsicans (Sanchez 2008: 658). Nevertheless, this constitutes a concession by the government. Furthermore, a new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
* In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
* In 2015, the New Territorial Organisation of the Republic Act (loi NOTRe) redefined the powers of local and regional governments regarding the country’s administrative and economic policies and decreased the number of regions from 22 to 13. In Corsica, the administrative powers of the departments Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud were merged with the territorial collectivity of Corsica (collectivité territorial de Corse) into the single ‘collectivity of Corsica’ (collectivité de Corse) on the 1st January 2018, although the two departments remained administrative departments in their own right (Art. 30 et seq., loi NOTRe). The new collectivity exercises both regional and departmental powers. The NOTRe Act also introduced electoral changes, as the number of seats in the Corsican Assembly increased from 51 to 63, and the executive council expanded from 9 to 11 members. The mandate of the Corsican Assembly elected through the 2015 territorial elections ended in 2017, when a new Assembly was elected for the imminently established collectivity of Corsica. We do not code a concession as there seem to be no new powers devolved.
* There were also concessions specifically on language:
  + In 1951 the French government removed the ban on regional languages (Deixonne Act). This allowed a minimal presence of four minority languages (Basque, Breton, Catalan, Occitan) in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30) and ended the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31). Corsican was added as of 1974. [1974: cultural rights concession]
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
  + Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” This was, however, already possible under the 1951 Deixonne act, applied to Corse since 1974, and the 1982 Savary Circular (see above).

**Regional autonomy**

* Following the first of January rule, we code regional autonomy as of 1992, which is also in line with the EPR coding that considers the Corsicans as regionally autonomous following the enactment of the statut particulier. [1992-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Corsicans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Corsicans |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 22003000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.004]

**Regional concentration**

* The Corsicans are concentrated on the island of Corsica, where they make up 55% of the population (Minahan 2002: 486). This amounts to 143,550 Corsicans (in 2002), which is less than 50% of the 390,000 Corsicans in the whole of France in that same year. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Neither EPR nor the Minorities at Risk data code the Corsicans as having ethnic kin. Minahan (2002: 486) mentions smaller Corsican communities in Italy and outside Europe, but these are too insignificant to be considered here. [no kin]

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## French Guianans

Activity: 1956-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* French Guiana became a Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM) in 1946. Thereby it was fully integrated with France and decolonized according to our definition.
* In 1956 the Guyanese Socialist Party (PSG) was formed. The PSG advocated autonomy for French Guiana (now it supports autonomy as a step leading towards full independence) (Auzias & Labourdette 2010: 42).
* The PSG is the most important representative of the movement, but there are other organizations too. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that the Guyanese Movement for Decolonization was active in 1973 elections. In 1976 the Boni Liberation Movement was formed. Other presently active self-determination organizations in French Guiana include: the Guianese Democratic Action (Action Démocratique Guyanaise, ADG), a left-wing pro-independence party founded in 1981; the Guianese National Popular Party (Parti National Populaire Guyanais, PNPG), a leftist party founded in 1985 that supports independence for French Guiana; and the Movement for Decolonization and Social Emancipation (Mouvement pour la Décolonisation et l'Émancipation Sociale, MDES), which also advocates independence for French Guiana.
* French Guianan citizens voted against increased autonomy in 2010, but the movement remained ongoing (Auzias 2010; BBC 2010; Bishop 2000; Degenhardt 1988; Europa World Year Book; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Jakobskind 2013; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 2002, Roth 2015: 422; The Economist 2017). [start date: 1956; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1956, the Guyanese Socialist Party (PSG) was formed. At the time, the PSG advocated autonomy for French Guiana (Auzias & Labourdette 2010: 42). [1956-1973: autonomy claim]
* In the 1970s, a number of independentist organizations emerged and the claim for independence became ever more important (Minority Rights Group International). Thus we code a switch to independence. [1974-2020: independence claim]
  + The independentist Guyanese Movement for Decolonization (MOGUDE) was formed in 1967 (Conteh-Morgan 2010: 20) and, according to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) MOGUDE was active in the 1973 elections. This is the first evidence of significant contention for independence we have found.
  + Other independentist parties are the Guianese Democratic Action (Action Démocratique Guyanaise, ADG), the Guianese National Popular Party (Parti National Populaire Guyanais, PNPG) and the Movement for Decolonization and Social Emancipation (Mouvement pour la Décolonisation et l'Émancipation Sociale, MDES) (Degenhardt 1988; Telegraph 2000; Roth 2015: 422; The Economist 2017).
  + The PSG continues to support autonomy for French Guiana, but referring to it as a first step towards the establishment of an independent state.

**Independence claims**

* The first independentist organization was the Guyanese Movement for Decolonization (MOGUDE). MOGUDE was established in 1967 and inspired by the formation of GONG in Guadeloupe (Conteh-Morgan 2010: 20f).
* There were several other independentist organizations, including PNPG, which was established in 1985 by former leaders of MOGUDE (France Politique, n.d.), and ADG, which was formed in 1986.
* Decolonization and Social Emancipation Movement (Mouvement de Décolonisation et d'émancipation Sociale [MDES]) was established in 1991 and positions itself as autonomist with “a path to sovereignty” (Guieu & Touchaleaume 2009). The group remained active as of 2023. In the French 2022 legislative lections, an MDES candidate was elected into the French Assembly. [start date: 1967; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the various parties advocating territorial self-determination consists of French Guiana (Roth 2015: 421f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence the NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The French began occupying the area in the early seventeenth century. Initially a profitable colony due to the discovery of gold, the importance of the territory declined as it was used as a penal colony from 1834 onwards for more than 70,000 French convicts (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).
* The colony was controlled by French administrators and police. Non-criminal inhabitants were granted French citizenship in 1877 (Minahan 2002).
* In 1930 the Inini Statute was adopted, which gave the locals a degree of self-rule (Bodley 2014; Minority Rights Group International).
* French Guiana became an overseas department, a Département d’outre Mer (DOM) in 1946 (Minahan 2002:700). Departmentalization implied increased centralization. [1946: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The special Inini Statute was in effect between 1930 and 1968. It allowed the indigenous people possession of 90% of the country but was abolished in 1968, when the indigenous were brought under French socio-cultural rule, traditional indigenous land claims were no longer recognized and the entire country was divided into twenty-four French communes (Bodley 2014; Minority Rights Group International). [1968: autonomy restriction]
* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. French Guiana is an overseas department and also a region, so we code acts of devolution to both departments and regions.
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.
  + 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Jerome 2009; Ziller 2009). [1972: autonomy concession]
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements (Guyana as the department and French Guiana as the region are territorially congruent) “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. The DOM have even been granted a “somewhat more extended autonomy than departments and regions of continental France” (Ziller 2009: 444). [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
  + When travelling to the region in June 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a referendum on whether French Guiana should become an overseas territory and hence more autonomous, similar to the autonomous French territories in the Pacific. The same referendum was also held in Martinique. The proposal was not implemented as the 2010 referendum was rejected by 69.8% (BBC 2010). Nevertheless, we code a concession as this constitutes a significant autonomy offer. [2010: autonomy concession]
  + In a second referendum held just two weeks after the first one, French Guiana voted on the question whether the territory should become a single territorial collectivity that would jointly exercise the powers that were hitherto held by the department and the region. 57% voted in favour of the proposal, commencing a process that would eventually establish the ‘Collectivité Territoriale de Guyane’ in 2015 (Le Monde 2010). This meant that the General Council of French Guiana and the Regional Council of French Guiana were replaced by the Assembly of French Guiana that is in charge of regional and departmental government. The combining of departmental and regional powers did not entail devolving any further powers to French Guiana, so the second 2010 referendum is not classed as an autonomy concession.
  + In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
* In addition, there was a concession specifically on language in 1982:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* As an overseas department (and region) of France (DOM), French Guiana enjoys a status identical to the departments (and regions) of metropolitan France. Given the centralized nature of the French state, regional autonomy for the departments and regions is not given, despite some limited devolution of powers. In 2010 voters rejected a referendum that would have granted French Guiana greater autonomy (Encyclopedia Britannica; Minority Rights Group International).

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | French Guianans |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* As all other overseas department, French Guiana is represented in both houses of the French National Assembly (Minority Rights Group International). However, there is no evidence of representation at the executive level (nor is there evidence for discrimination), which is why we code the French Guianans as powerless throughout. [1956-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 698), the French Guianese number approximately 153,000. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0025]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 698), the French Guianese are “mostly concentrated in French Guiana”, where the population consists of 66% Creole, 7% white Guianese, 5% French, 12% Amerindians, and 10% East Indians, Chinese. The movement can be associated with all these groups according to Minahan. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No evidence found. [no kin]

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## French Polynesians (Tahitians)

Activity: 1958-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1947 the Comité Pouvanaa was formed (Pouvanaa was a local nationalist politician). The Comité made claims that Tahiti should be ruled by locals rather than expatriate Frenchmen (Henningham 1992: 121). In 1950, the Comité Pouvanaa was transformed into a political party, the Rassemblement Populations Tahitiennes (RDPT). The RDPT tended to an autonomist position. However, in April 1958 the RDPT leader, Pouvanaa, came out in favour of independence for Tahiti (Henningham 1992: 122; Fisher 2013: 73). Based on this, the start date is coded in 1947.
* However, at this point Tahiti had still been a colony according to our definition. In 1946, Tahiti was granted the status of a Territoire d’Outre-Mer (TOM), and thus a degree of autonomy. Furthermore, French citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of Tahiti. However, TOMs retained a colonial-like structure that involved racially separated representative bodies. An important step towards decolonization came in 1956 with the adoption of the Loi Deferre, which granted universal suffrage (Fisher 2013: 47; Henningham 1992: 49). Still, some discriminatory practices continued. The installation of the Fifth Republic in late 1958 constitutes a good cut-off to consider Tahiti decolonized. That year, a referendum was held in which TOMs, including Tahiti, could choose between continued union with France and immediate independence. Tahiti, like all other TOMs except for Guinea, opted for continued union with France. TOMs, including Tahiti, then faced a choice whether to i) be fully integrated with France, ii) become a state in free association with France or iii) retain the status of a TOM. Free association was a non-official status but understood as a transitional status leading towards independence. All African TOMs chose the status of free association, while Pacific islands such as New Caledonia and Tahiti went for TOM status (Mrgudovic 2012: 85-87; Henningham 1992: 49; Fisher 2013: 47). Furthermore, the 1958 constitution promised the TOMs ‘free-determination’. Based on this, we code the movement from 1958, but note prior non-violent activity.
* After the 1958 empire-wide referendum, the independence movement was significantly weakened (Henningham 1992: 125-126). Economic development and strong repression of advocates of independence pushed independence off the political agenda during the 1960s and 1970s (Henningham 1992: 132-133; Fisher 2013: 2013: 75). In 1963, the RDPT was first banned, then abolished and reformed (Henningham 1992: 133). Yet, self-determination activity continued (Henningham 1992: 133). RDPT supporters regrouped as the Patriot’s Party (Pupu Here Ai'a Te Nuina'a Ia Ora), a pro-autonomy rural party. The Patriot’s Party cooperated with E’a Api (The New Way), another emerging autonomist party. The autonomists argued that Tahiti should be given increased control over its own affairs, and called for social and economic reforms (Henningham 1992: 133). The two parties enjoyed strong support in what remained of the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s (Hennningham 1992: 135).
* In the 1960s and early 1970s, calls for autonomy were routinely rebuffed. In 1976 autonomists occupied Polynesia’s Territorial Assembly, continuing the occupation through 1977 (Henningham 1992: 136). Frustration over France’s continued refusal to accommodate the autonomists led again to organized activity in favour of independence. The most significant of these groupings was la Mana Te Nunaa (Power to the People), a party that had been formed in 1975 and came out in favour of independence in 1978 (Henningham 1992: 137).
* Independence-minded groups enjoyed some support, but clearly less compared to the autonomists (Henningham 1992: 137-138). In the late 1970s, France finally responded to the heightening nationalist pressure. A new 1977 statute devolved some limited competencies to Tahiti (Henningham 1992: 139). The limited nature of the autonomy granted led to a renewed campaign for increased autonomy (Henningham 1992: 140). Even the local conservative affiliate now favored autonomy (Henningham 1992: 141). Independence remained a minority position (Henningham 1992: 141).
* In 1984 Polynesia was granted far-reaching autonomy (Henningham 1992: 148-149). Nevertheless calls for increased autonomy and/or independence continued to be made, with pro-independence parties being in the minority (Henningham 1992: 156-157, 162; Fisher 2013: 72).
* In 1990 and 1996 Tahiti gained additional autonomy. In 2003/2004, Tahiti won a fully new autonomy statute which implied much increased autonomy.
* In 2004, pro-independence parties for the first time took over Polynesia’s government, though they tend to make claims for sovereignty-in-association rather than full independence (Fisher 2013: 180). The surge of pro-independentists followed changes to the electoral law in 2004, which gave the biggest party a major bonus. With independence-feeling on the rise, France attempted to stabilize the situation and again amended Tahiti’s statute in 2007, scrapping the bonus to the biggest party and instead introducing PR with a hefty 12.5% threshold. Most local parties were opposed to the changes, which they saw as France tampering with local issues. Following this, the pro-autonomy parties did better again, though the pro-independentists remained in a strong position (Fisher 2013: 181-185).
* Pro-independentists sought the re-inclusion of French Polynesia in the UN’s list of non-self-governing territories (Fisher 2013: 187), which occurred in 2013 (UN News 2013; Roth 2015: 408).
* Since 2014, pro-autonomy parties again control Polynesia’s government, while pro-independence parties recently had substantial success in French parliamentary elections, winning all three French Polynesian constituencies in the 2022 National Assembly elections. The movement is therefore coded as ongoing. [start date: 1947; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Until the 2000s, the movement tended to an autonomist position, though especially in the late 1950s there was also strong contention for independence. [1958-2004: autonomy claim]
  + In 1947 the Comité Pouvanaa was formed (Pouvanaa was a local nationalist politician). The Comité made claims that Tahiti should be ruled by locals rather than expatriate Frenchmen (Henningham 1992: 121).
  + In 1950 the Comité Pouvanaa was transformed into a political party, the Rassemblement Populations Tahitiennes (RDPT). The RDPT tended to an autonomist position.
  + However, in April 1958 the RDPT leader, Pouvanaa, came out in favor of independence for Tahiti (Henningham 1992: 122; Fisher 2013: 73).
  + The pro-independence position was harshly repressed. In 1959, the leader of the pro-independence camp, Pouvanaa, was tried and sentenced to eight years in prison and fifteen years of exile (Henningham 1992: 126).
  + Economic development and strong repression of advocates of independence pushed independence off the political agenda during the 1960s and 1970s (Henningham 1992: 132-133; Fisher 2013: 2013: 75). In 1963, the RDPT was first banned, then abolished and reformed (Henningham 1992: 133).
    - Note: we do not code an independence claim because advocates of independence were severely repressed, do not appear to have formed the majority and because independence was quickly pushed off the agenda.
  + Yet, self-determination activity continued (Henningham 1992: 133). RDPT supporters regrouped as the Patriot’s Party (Pupu Here Ai'a Te Nuina'a Ia Ora), a pro-autonomy rural party. The Patriot’s Party cooperated with E’a Api (The New Way), another emerging autonomist party. The autonomists argued that Tahiti should be given increased control over its own affairs, and called for social and economic reforms (Henningham 1992: 133). The two parties enjoyed strong support in what remained of the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s (Hennningham 1992: 135).
  + In the 1960s and early 1970s, calls for autonomy were routinely rebuffed. In 1976 autonomists occupied Polynesia’s Territorial Assembly, continuing the occupation through 1977 (Henningham 1992: 136). Frustration over France’s continued refusal to accommodate the autonomists led again to organized activity in favor of independence. The most significant of these groupings was la Mana Te Nunaa (Power to the People), a party that had been formed in 1975 and came out in favor of independence in 1978 (Henningham 1992: 137). Independence-minded groups enjoyed some support, but clearly less compared to the autonomists (Henningham 1992: 137-138).
  + A new 1977 statute devolved some limited competencies to Tahiti (Henningham 1992: 139). The limited nature of the autonomy granted led to a renewed campaign for increased autonomy (Henningham 1992: 140). Even the local conservative affiliate now favored autonomy (Henningham 1992: 141): Tahoeraa Huiraatira (People’s Unification), which held power for almost two decades from 1982 to 1987 and from 1991 to 2004 (and was the party with most votes until 2005) also adopted the concept of autonomy in the 1980s, thus supporting territorial autonomy while opposing independence from France (Gonschor 2009: 72). Independence remained a minority position (Henningham 1992: 141).
  + In 1984 Polynesia was granted far-reaching autonomy (Henningham 1992: 148-149). Nevertheless some calls for autonomy and/or independence continued to be made, with pro-independence parties being in the minority (Henningham 1992: 156-157, 162; Fisher 2013: 72).
* In 2004, pro-independence parties for the first time won the regional government. This indicates a switch to an independence claim. [2005-2014: independence claim]
  + In 2004, pro-independence parties for the first time took over Polynesia’s government, though they tend to make claims for sovereignty-in-association rather than full independence (Fisher 2013: 180). The surge of pro-independentists followed changes to the electoral law in 2004, which gave the biggest party a major bonus. With independence-feeling on the rise, France attempted to stabilize the situation and again amended Tahiti’s statute in 2007, scrapping the bonus to the biggest party and instead introducing PR with a hefty 12.5% threshold. Most local parties were opposed to the changes, which they saw as France tampering with local issues. Following this, the pro-autonomy parties did better again, though the pro-independentists remained in a strong position (Fisher 2013: 181-185).
  + Note: As of today, the Liberation Front of Polynesia (*Tavini Huiraatira/Front de Libération de la Polynésie*, FLP) is the main pro-independence organization. The party was founded in 1977 and won two of the 41 assembly seats in 1983, four in 1991 and 11 in 1996. Its leader received 42 percent of the votes in the election for the French National Assembly in 1997 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minority Rights Group International).
  + A trend towards independence as the dominant claim is also observed by the Minority Rights Group International, which states that “increasingly, most French Polynesians (and New Caledonians) see their future as part of the Pacific region”.
  + Note: The period from 2004 until 2013 was marked by intense political volatility in French Polynesia, as presidencies repeatedly ended by a vote of no confidence and the government shifted multiple times between the pro-autonomy and pro-independence camp (Roth 2015: 408). This makes it difficult to ascertain the dominant claim with absolute certainty. Following the coding rules that require coding the most radical claim in such instances, we code the dominant claim during this period as autonomy.
* In 2014, the French Polynesian presidency was won back by a pro-autonomy party and has been held by pro-autonomy parties since. We count this as a switch back to an autonomy claim. Following the first of January rule, we therefore code autonomy as the dominant claim after 2015. [2015-2020: autonomy claim]
  + The political instability that defined the previous decade ended in 2014, although the first years saw a rift emerge within the main pro-autonomy party that led to the establishment of a new pro-autonomy party in 2016. The new party, named Tapura Huiraatira, succeeded in including many established pro-autonomy politicians and has become the new principal pro-autonomy force in French Polynesia.

**Independence claims**

* Pouvanaa a Oopa Tetuaapua was a French Polynesian politician who spearheaded the movement for Polynesian independence. The party achieved some success in the 1949 elections, and transformed into the RDPT in 1950 – whereby it eventually won a majority in elections in 1953 and 1957. Our research suggests that RDPT was primarily autonomist at first, but switched to independentist in 1958. It should be noted that Pouvanaa and the leadership of RDPT preferred independence already before that, but moderated their public claims for strategic reasons (Craig 2011: 96; Henningham 1992: 122). In 1963, the RDPT was first banned, then abolished and reformed (Henningham 1992: 133).
* Frustration over France’s continued refusal to accommodate the autonomists led again to organized activity in favor of independence. The most significant of these groupings was La Mana Te Nunaa (Power to the People), a party that had been formed in 1975 and came out in favor of independence in 1978 (Henningham 1992: 137). Independence-minded groups enjoyed some support, but clearly less compared to the autonomists (Henningham 1992: 137-138).
* La Mana Te Nunaa abandoned its secessionist stance between 1987 and 1991. The party again officially adopted its secessionist stance in 1994 (Gleizal 1999). The independentist claim was upheld by another party, however: Tavini Huiraatira [FLP] (Tāvini Huiraʻatira / ‘People’s Servant – Serve the People’, which had been founded in 1977 (Gleizal 1999) (Tahiti Infos 2023). FLP is the largest independentist party today. [start date 1: 1958; end date 1: 1963] [start date 2: 1977; end date 2: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the parties advocating autonomy or independence includes all islands of French Polynesia (Minahan 1996: 555ff). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There was limited separatist violence. In particular, we found evidence for the death of one person in 1977. Following our coding rules, we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Having established a protectorate over the kingdom of Tahiti in1842 (as assistance against British encroachment) under the government of the Colony of Oceania, outer islands of French Polynesia were annexed and incorporated between 1880 and 1900, thus making the territory a French colony in the early twentieth century (Minahan 2002: 1822; Minority Rights Group International).
* After the Second World War, the Polynesians were granted French citizenship. Tahiti became a territoire d’outre-mer (TOM), a French overseas entity not fully integrated with metropolitan France but vested with an extent of autonomy (Minahan 2002: 1822). Note: there was no universal suffrage in Tahiti in 1946, but suffrage was soon extended in scope. Universal native suffrage followed in 1956 with the adoption of the Loi Deferre (Fisher 2013: 47; note: according to Henningham 1992: 49 universal suffrage was implemented only in 1957). Thus the 1946 reform can be considered an increase in the Tahitians’ level of self-government.
* In 1956, the Loi Cadre (Deferre) was adopted, which granted Tahiti a Territorial Assembly (TA). This implied some real autonomy, though autonomy remained relatively limited (Henningham 1992: 139; Fisher 2013: 73). [1956: autonomy concession]
* As part of the 1958 constitutional referendum held across the French Union, French Polynesia could decide on its status. Accepting the constitutional referendum meant becoming part of the French Community and the Fifth Republic. Rejecting would have granted French Polynesia independence. The new constitution was accepted with 64.4%, making French Polynesia become part of the New French Community. [1958: independence concession]
* For Tahiti, the 1958 constitution meant a significant reduction of local autonomy (Mrgudovic 2012: 86). Among other things, the competencies of the central government’s representative (governor) were increased. Tahiti’s at the time Conservative-controlled territorial assembly had agreed to the reduction (Henningham 1992: 135; Fisher 2013: 73). [1958: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* French Polynesia has the status of a territoire d’outre-mer (TOM)/pays d’outre-mer (since 2003). These have a different status than ordinary départements or overseas départements (like Guadeloupe or Martinique). Thus French Polynesia was not affected by decentralization reforms we coded in other cases (e.g., the 1972 reform).
* In the 1960s, Tahiti handed over responsibility for posts and telegraphs, secondary and technical education, and some public health programs (Henningham 1992: 135; Fisher 2013: 75). Meanwhile, municipal government was strengthened (Henningham 1992: 135-136). We lack a clearer indication as to when re-centralization occurred. However, we came across a report by Gonschor (2009: 68), who argues that as a consequence of the 1958 referendum and in order to facilitate the 1962 installation of a nuclear testing center in French Polynesia, the level of autonomy was decreased. Thus, we peg the restriction to 1961. [1961: autonomy restriction]
* In 1977, French Polynesia was granted increased autonomy with a status of limited ‘autonomy of management’ or ‘autonomie de gestion’. A territorial government council led by an elected vice president was installed. The government was responsible for all issues not specifically attributed to the central state which were, given the highly centralized French state, still many, including not only defense and foreign affairs but also many internal affairs (Gonschor 2009: 68. 2013: 275; Minority Rights Group International; Henningham 1992: 139; Fisher 2013: 76). [1977: autonomy concession]
* There were two concessions on language in 1981/1982:
  + The 1951 Loi Deixonne had recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan (Hossay 2004: 408). This allowed a minimal presence of these four minority languages in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30), thus ending the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31). The Loi Deixonne was extended to Tahitian in 1981. [1981: cultural rights concession]
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
* In 1983 the Socialist government announced plans to increase the autonomy of both New Caledonia and Polynesia (Henningham 1992: 148). While nationalists in New Caledonia were opposed to the proposals, in Polynesia they garnered significant support (Henningham 1992: 148). This led to the adoption of the 1984 autonomy statute. This gave Tahiti responsibility over a significant number of policy areas, including primary and technical education, culture, economy, regional development, and finance (Henningham 1992: 149). It also allowed for the co-official use of Tahitian (Fisher 2013: 77). In addition, French Polynesia was allowed to adopt its own state-like symbols (flag, coat of arms, and anthem) and was given the right to participate in foreign affairs if they concerned neighboring Pacific Island countries (Gonschor 2013: 275). [1984: autonomy concession]
* After some minor modifications to the 1984 statute in 1985 and 1987, the French parliament initiated legislation in 1989 that would lead to a modest increase in Tahiti’s autonomy. The proposed changes became law in July 1990, with Tahiti gaining fuller control over foreign direct investment, extended budget control, and increased control over natural resources (Henningham 1992: 161-162; Fisher 2013: 78). We code an autonomy concession in 1989, the year the process was initiated. [1989: autonomy concession]
* In April 1996, after the nuclear testing center was definitively closed, a new statute for French Polynesia was passed which further expanded its autonomy. Responsibilities concerning the territorial budget, health, primary education, social welfare, public works and agriculture, are added to the island’s competences (Gonschor 2013: 275; Fisher 2013: 310). [1996: autonomy concession]
* In 2003/2004, the French government underwent another major revision of the country’s constitution as regards the status of overseas possessions. As a consequence of this revision, the status of a ‘territoire d’outre-mer’ (overseas territory) for French Polynesia was replaced by that of a ‘pays d’outre-mer’ (overseas country) in 2004. The position of the regional government was strengthened and the central state would now only be responsible for foreign policy, justice, defense, monetary policy and security (Gonschor 2013: 276; Minority Rights Group International). We code the concession in 2003 as this is the year when the reform process was initiated. [2003: autonomy concession]
* In 2004, pro-independence parties for the first time took over Polynesia’s government, though they tend to make claims for sovereignty-in-association rather than full independence (Fisher 2013: 180). The surge of pro-independentists followed changes to the electoral law in 2004, which gave the biggest party a major bonus. With independence-feeling on the rise, France attempted to stabilize the situation and again amended Tahiti’s statute in 2007, scrapping the bonus to the biggest party and instead introducing PR with a hefty 12.5% threshold (and some other, minor statutory changes). Most local parties were opposed to the changes, which they saw as France tampering with local issues (Fisher 2013: 181-185). However, the electoral changes do not imply re-centralization, thus we do not code a restriction.

**Regional autonomy**

* French Polynesia had had some limited autonomy already before 1984, but real autonomy came only with the 1984 statute (Encyclopedia Britannica; Gonschor 2013; Henningham 1992: 149; Fisher 2013: 77). Following the first of January rule we code French Polynesia as regionally autonomous as of 1985. [1985-2012: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1984: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | French Polynesians (Tahitians) |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence of representation in the central government, except for 1986-1988, when Gaston Flosse was French State secretary for the South Pacific (Fisher 2013: 76-77, 90-94). Gaston Flosse is from mixed European French and Polynesian descent (he can speak Tahitian, for instance), but is staunchly pro-French. It is questionable whether Flosse can be seen as representing the Tahitians. Based on this, we assign a powerless code throughout. [1958-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1820), the Tahitians numbered approximately 191,000 in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0031]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1820), the majority of the French Polynesians resides in Tahiti, where the French Polynesians make up 77% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We code other Polynesian groups as ethnic kin (see Encyclopedia Britannica). The groups that are large enough are the Polynesians in New Zealand (Maori), the United States (Kanaka Maoli in Hawaii), Australia (Tongan, Samoan, Maori Australians), and Samoa (Samoans). [kin in non-adjacent country]

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## Guadeloupe Islanders

Activity: 1965-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Guadeloupe became a Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM) in 1946. Thereby it became fully integrated with France and decolonized according to our definition.
* The first nationalist organization, the Group d’Organisation Guadeloupénne, was formed in 1965, hence the start date of the movement. Guadeloupe rejected an autonomy offer in 2003 by way of a popular vote. There is though continued contention directed towards increased self-determination (Bishop 2000; Bonilla 2009; Degenhardt 1988; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 2002; Snyder 1982; Roth 2015). [start date: 1965; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim is clearly independence from France throughout the movement’s activity (Conteh-Morgan 2010: 20). The Minority Rights Group International and Minahan (2002) categorize the Guadeloupean movement as a pro-independence movement that emerged in the late 1950s and institutionalized in the 1960s and that denounced the French rule as disguised colonialism. The claim for independence is also confirmed by the goals of the organizations representing the movement. The Group d’Organisation Guadaloupénne (also known as Groupe d'organisation nationale de la Guadeloupe – GONG), formed in 1965 and thus the first institutionalized self-determination organization, advocated independence from France, as does the Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG), the terrorist Guadaloupe Liberation Army (GLA) and its successor, the Caribbean Revolutionary Army (ARC). The National Council of the Guadeloupean Resistance (CNRG), was also founded by separatist leaders and set up the provisional government of the Republic of Guadeloupe (Degenhardt 1988; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002; Roth 2015: 428f). It has been suggested that the 2003 autonomy referendum was partly rejected by voters because “autonomy [was] not a step toward independence” (Alcoy 2021). [1965-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1965; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the parties advocating increased self-determination consists of the island of Guadeloupe (Roth 2015: 428ff). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Guadeloupe Liberation Army (GLA) employed acts of terror, but only three such events appear to have resulted in any deaths: in March 1980 gunmen shot and wounded the only white member of the city council of Pointe-a-Pierre. In September 1980, GLA terrorists attached a bomb to an Air France Boeing 727 and killed a French explosives expert. In May 1985 a bomb in a restaurant killed one person. Given this death count and our coding rules, we nevertheless classify the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Guadeloupe became a French colony in 1635 after the Spanish had unsuccessfully tried to colonize the islands in the sixteenth century. In 1674, the colony became part of the French kingdom. Ever since, and with only a few exceptions of English occupation, Guadeloupe has been part of France. While the indigenous population gradually disappeared, the development of a plantation economy required imported labor from Africa and later, after slavery was abolished, mainly from India. As of today, the population of Guadeloupe is 75% of African descent and 9% of East Indian descent, with only a small minority of European descent (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).
* In 1946 the island became a French Overseas Department (DOM) and thus fully integrated with France (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2000; Minority Rights Group International). Thus, Guadeloupe was decolonized.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Guadeloupe is an overseas department and also a region, so we code acts of devolution to both departments and regions.
  + In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Guadeloupe) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000).
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.
  + After the failed 1969 decentralization attempt, 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing’s Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). As a result, in 1974, Guadeloupe was granted the status of a region (Minahan 2002; Busky 2002). [1972: autonomy concession]
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. The DOM have even been granted a “somewhat more extended autonomy than departments and regions of continental France” (Ziller 2009: 444). [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). Article 72 to 74 particularly addressed the Caribbean DOMs and enabled a referendum in 2003 where voters were asked whether they wanted Guadeloupe to become a territorial collectivity and hence more autonomous. 73% of voters rejected the proposal. The same referendum was also conducted in Martinique, Saint-Barthélemy and the northern French part of Saint Martin. While Martinique also rejected the proposal (by a tiny margin), Saint-Barthélemy and Saint Martin, previously under the jurisdiction of Guadeloupe, voted in favor of becoming a territorial collectivity. This meant a detachment from Guadeloupe and the establishment of an own local administration (Sutton 2008). We code a concession because there was a significant offer of autonomy. [2003: autonomy concession]
    - Note: even if Guadeloupe rejected an autonomy offer in 2003, the constitutional reform process resulted in increased autonomy for Guadeloupe: The 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. In conformity with other cases, this is coded as a single autonomy concession in 2003.
  + In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
* In addition, there was a concession on language in 1982:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The territory is administered by a prefect, appointed by the President of France. Furthermore, there are two popularly elected local executive bodies, a general and regional council. As an overseas department (and region) of France (DOM), Guadeloupe enjoys a status identical to the departments (and regions) of metropolitan France. Given the centralized nature of the French state, regional autonomy for the departments and regions is not given, despite some limited devolution of powers. In 2003 voters rejected a referendum that would have granted Guadeloupe greater autonomy (Minority Rights Group International; Sutton 2008).

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Guadeloupe Islanders |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* As all other overseas department, Guadeloupe is represented in both houses of the French National Assembly (Minority Rights Group International). However, we found no evidence of representation at the executive level (nor evidence for discrimination), which is why we code the Guadeloupe Islanders as powerless throughout. [1965-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 688) there were 455,000 Guadeloupeans in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0074]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 688), most Guadeloupeans live on the major island, Guadeloupe, where they make up 90% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No evidence for kin in other countries found. [no kin]

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## Kanaks (New Caledonians)

Activity: 1958-2020

**General notes**

* Kanaks are the indigenous inhabitants of New Caledonia, a French Overseas Territory in the Pacific Ocean.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1951, the Union Calédonienne (UC) was formed (Henningham 1992: 49). Initially, the UC was a multi-ethnic party (though with many Kanak members), but by the 1970s it mainly consisted of ethnic Kanaks. In its early days, the UC was moderate in its demands and decidedly pro-French. Nevertheless the UC made demands for autonomy and in particular increased local control over natural resources (Henningham 1992: 53-55). In 1956, the UC had a major success when the Loi Cadre (Deferre) was adopted, which granted New Caledonia a Territorial Assembly (TA) elected by universal suffrage. This gave New Caledonia some real autonomy (Chappell 2003: 190), though autonomy remained relatively limited (Henningham 1992: 61).
* The UC favored continued integration with France in a 1958 referendum, but according to Henningham (1992: 56), UC leaders also hoped, in the longer term, for full autonomy with France retaining control only over foreign affairs, defense, and the financial system.
* Starting in 1958, the French government re-centralized a number of previously devolved competencies (Chappell 2003: 190-191). This prompted the opposition of the UC, which in the 1967 regional elections campaigned for a restoration of the powers that had been granted back in 1956 (Chappell 2003: 191).
* Based on this, we code the start date in 1951, the year when the UC began to campaign for autonomy. There was a significant accommodation in 1956, but powers were re-centralized starting in 1958, which prompted the UC to lobby for the restoration of autonomy in 1967. Whether or not one can speak of an autonomy movement between 1956-1966 is somewhat ambiguous, but we consider it an ongoing movement for the following reasons: i) we found no clear-cut evidence that would allow us to code an end to the movement, ii) there is the somewhat ambiguous statement that UC leaders continued to dream of full autonomy by Henningham (see above), and iii) the fact that competencies were stripped away from 1958 onwards makes it likely that UC had made claims for the restoration of autonomy already before the 1967 campaign cited above.
* Note that in the data set, we only code the movement from 1958, despite its start date in 1951. In 1951, New Caledonia was still a colony according to our definition. In 1946, New Caledonia had been granted the status of a Territoire d’Outre-Mer (TOM), and thus a degree of autonomy. Furthermore, French citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of New Caledonia. However, TOMs retained a colonial-like structure that involved racially separated representative bodies. An important step towards decolonization came in 1956 with the adoption of the Loi Deferre, which granted universal suffrage (Fisher 2013: 47; Henningham 1992: 49). Still, some discriminatory practices continued. The installation of the Fifth Republic in late 1958 constitutes a good cut-off to consider New Caledonia decolonized. That year, a referendum was held in which TOMs, including New Caledonia, could choose between continued union with France and immediate independence. New Caledonia, like all other TOMs except for Guinea, opted for continued union with France (see above). TOMs, including New Caledonia, then faced a choice whether to i) be fully integrated with France, ii) become a state in free association with France or iii) retain the status of a TOM. Free association was a non-official status but understood as a transitional status leading towards independence. All African TOMs chose the status of free association, while Pacific islands such as New Caledonia and Tahiti chose continued TOM status (Mrgudovic 2012: 85-87; Henningham 1992: 49; Fisher 2013: 47). Furthermore, the 1958 constitution promised the TOMs ‘free-determination’. Based on this, we code the movement from 1958, but note prior non-violent activity.
* By the 1960s, the Kanak population had become a minority within New Caledonia, mainly due to in-migration from French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, two other French overseas entities (Henningham 1992: 55). In the late 1960s/early 1970s, Kanak students began to form a number of self-determination organizations with increasingly radical claims. In 1968, Kanak students formed the Comité d’action pour l’autonomie de la Calédonie et de la defense de la France. That same year, the Association des jeunes Calédoniens à Paris (AJCP) was formed, an organization that advocated increased autonomy for New Caledonia (Chappell 2003: 193).
* Soon also calls for independence were made. Radical students in France, for instance, launched a study group called Groupe d’action pour l’indépendance accélérée de la Calédonie (Chappell 2003: 194). In 1969, the Marxist Foulards Rouges was formed and began to make calls for independence (Chappell 2003: 194-197). In May 1977 the UC also adopted a pro-independence stance (previously it had favoured autonomy). This signaled the shift of the majority of Kanaks into the independence camp (Henningham 1992: 67, also see 77).
* In June 1988, the Matignon Accord was signed, which led to much increased autonomy and a promise of another vote on independence to be held in 1998 (BBC UK). In 1998, instead of holding a referendum, the two sides signed the Noumea Accord, “which gave New Caledonia greater autonomy and stipulated that the independence vote should be held between 2014 and 2019. The accord also created New Caledonian citizenship” (BBC 2013).
* In 2006, France passed laws that only allow New Caledonian residents to vote in territorial elections, thereby restricting French citizens from voting. This has “long been sought by the Kanak community” (BBC UK). 2010 saw the adoption of a Kanak flag.
* In 2018, an independence referendum was held in New Caledonia, according to the stipulations of the 1998 Noumea Accord. New Caledonians (apart from recent residents) had the choice of remaining a part of France or becoming an independent country. 56% voted in favou of the status quo, thus rejecting independence (The Guardian 2018).
* In 2020, a second independence referendum was held in New Caledonia, again following the stipulations of the 1998 Noumea Accord. As before, New Caledonians (apart from recent residents) could chose between upholding the status quo or becoming an independent country. This time, 53% voted in favour of remaining a part of France, a slight decrease from the 2018 result (BBC 2020).
* In 2021, a third and final independence referendum was held in New Caledonia, following the stipulations of the Noumeau Accord which provided for a third referendum if one third of members of the Congress of New Caledonia voted for one. This time, 96,5% voted against independence with a significantly lower turn out than in the previous two referendums (80,881 in 2021 versus 141,099 in 2018 and 154,918 in 2020). The referendum was boycotted by the Kanak population, whose leaders called for postponing the vote amid a large-scale Covid-19 outbreak (The Guardian 2021).
* The movement is ongoing. As of 2020, active pro-independence groups include: UC, Parti de Liberation Kanak, Union Progressiste Melanesienne, and Parti Travailliste. [start date: 1951; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the movement’s initial years the demand was clearly for autonomy. The relevant organization is the Union Calédonienne (UC). [1958-1977: autonomy claim]
  + The Union Calédonienne (UC) was formed in 1951 (Henningham 1992: 49). The UC initially was a multi-ethnic party (though with many Kanak members), but by the 1970s it mainly consisted of ethnic Kanaks. Initially the UC was moderate in its demands and decidedly pro-French. Nevertheless the UC made demands for autonomy and in particular increased local control over natural resources (Henningham 1992: 53-55). In 1956 the UC had a major success when the Loi Cadre (Deferre) was adopted, which granted New Caledonia a Territorial Assembly (TA) elected by universal suffrage. This gave New Caledonia some real autonomy (Chappell 2003: 190), though autonomy remained relatively limited (Henningham 1992: 61). The UC favored continued integration with France in a 1958 referendum, but according to Henningham (1992: 56), UC leaders also hoped, in the longer term, for full autonomy with France retaining control only over foreign affairs, defense, and the financial system. However, starting in 1959, the French government instead opted to re-centralize a number of previously devolved competencies (Chappell 2003: 190-191). This prompted the opposition of the UC, which in the 1967 regional elections campaigned for a restoration of the powers that had been granted back in 1956 (Chappell 2003: 191).
* In the late 1960s/early 1970s, Kanak students began to form a number of self-determination organizations with increasingly radical claims. In 1968, Kanak students formed the Comité d’action pour l’autonomie de la Calédonie et de la defense de la France. That same year, the Association des jeunes Calédoniens à Paris (AJCP) was formed, an organization that advocated increased autonomy for New Caledonia (Chappell 2003: 193). Soon also calls for independence were made. Radical students in France, for instance, launched a study group called Groupe d’action pour l’indépendance accélérée de la Calédonie (Chappell 2003: 194). In 1969, the Marxist Foulards Rouges was formed and began to make calls for independence (Chappell 2003: 194-197). Pro-independence parties later formed an alliance into the Front Indépendantiste (FI) and subsequently the Front de Libération National Kanake et Socialiste (FLNKS). In 1977, the Union Caledonienne (UC) also declared itself in favor of independence and joined the FI. This signaled the shift of the majority of Melanesians into the independence camp (Henningham 1992: 67, also see 77) – thus we code independence as the dominant claim from 1978 onwards, following the first of January rule. Independence has remained the dominant claim also after the Matignon Agreement (Henningham 1992: 115) and today a number of parties, including the UC, continue to advocate independence. The dominance of the separatist claim is reflected in the elections for the territorial assembly where the FI took 35% in 1979 and a majority of the votes in 1982 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 204). The BBC (2014) confirms this and also saw a strong “pro-independence sentiment among the Kanaks” in the 1980s. In 1984, the pro-French government only returned to power because the nationalists boycotted the elections. Elections in 1996 brought a pro-independence government back to power (Minahan 2002). [1978-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* Independence claims first emerged in the late 1960s. The first group we could find which made clear independence claims is the Marxist Foulards Rouges, which was formed in the summer of 1969 (Chappell 2003: 194-197). From the late 1970s, independence became the movement’s dominant claim (see above). [start date: 1969; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the parties advocating autonomy or independence consists of the island chain New Caledonia (Roth 2015: 390-400). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1984, the FLNKS boycotted the elections and occupied several town halls and the small town of Thio. The provisional government of the Republic of Kanaky was declared with Jean-Marie Tjibaou as President (Aldrich and Connell 1998; Minority Rights Group International). [1984: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The movement was nonviolent initially, but violence began to be used more systematically in 1979, following a declaration by the Front Independantiste, which denounced “French colonialism and imperialism in the Pacific” and declared that “by its obstinate refusal to grant the Kanak people sovereignty in their own country” the French government bore full responsibility for the “inevitable” confrontation to come. This confrontation consisted of various violent attacks on Europeans, looting, damage to property, particularly in response to a 1981 assassination of a FI leader.
* In 1983, two policemen were killed when Kanak tribesmen ambushed a convoy carrying equipment for a timber plant.
* 1984 was a particularly violent year: between November 13 and December 31, a total of 107 roadblocks were erected, 15 bombs exploded, 96 cars or buildings were burnt, 41 buildings were ransacked and a total of 16 people died in either separatist acts of violence or in clashes between separatists and the police.
* The Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, a socialist secessionist group, was formed in 1984. Five people were killed in separatist clashes in 1985 and in 1986, a 14-year-old boy was killed in violent clashes between pro-independence and pro-French groups.
* In 1987 Paris decided to hold a referendum on independence. The referendum resulted in a decisive vote against independence. The referendum was boycotted by the local Kanaks.
* Violence escalated again in 1988. According to Thompson (2014: 243), Kanak nationalists killed an opponent of independence in early 1988. In April 1988, members of the independence movement took 27 police officers, a prosecutor and seven members of a French paramilitary unit hostage on the island of Ouvéa, demanding talks about independence. Four gendarmes were killed in the process. France refused to negotiate. 19 Kanak independentists and two French soldiers died in the subsequent rescue mission. In sum, 1988 saw 26 deaths. Thus 1988 is coded as LVIOLSD. After the outburst of violence, negotiations followed that led to the Matignon Accord.
* We found no violence above the LVIOLSD threshold except for 1988, thus all other years are coded as NVIOLSD. [1958-1987: NVIOLSD; 1988: LVIOLSD; 1989-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1853, New Caledonia was formally annexed by Napoleon III of France. The island was subsequently used as a penal colony from the 1860s until 1879 for about 22,000 French convicts.
* The Kanaks were marginalized, their land confiscated and many were kidnapped to work as slaves on plantations in Queensland or Fiji. A revolt from the local population in 1878, in which 200 Frenchmen and over 1,000 Kanaks lost their lives, was brutally suppressed.
* In 1946 the island became a territoire d’outre-mer (TOM), a French overseas entity not fully integrated with metropolitan France but vested with some autonomy. Note: there was no universal suffrage in New Caledonia in 1946, but suffrage was soon extended in scope. Universal native suffrage followed in 1956 with the adoption of the Loi Deferre (Fisher 2013: 47; note: according to Henningham 1992: 49 universal suffrage was implemented only in 1957), though it had already been extended to selected Kanaks in 1945 and, more significantly, in 1951. Citizenship was extended to all inhabitants in 1946 (according to Henningham 1992: 49 and Fisher 2013: 47) or 1953 (Encyclopedia Britannica). Thus the 1946 reform can be considered an increase in the Kanaks’ level of self-government.
* In 1956, the Loi Cadre (Deferre) was adopted, which granted New Caledonia a Territorial Assembly (TA) elected by universal suffrage. This gave New Caledonia some autonomy (Chappell 2003: 190), though autonomy remained relatively limited (Henningham 1992: 61). [1956: autonomy concession]
* As part of the 1958 constitutional referendum held across the French Union, New Caledonia could decide on its status. Accepting the constitutional referendum meant becoming part of the French Community and the Fifth Republic. Rejecting would have granted New Caledonia independence. The new constitution was overwhelmingly accepted with 98.12%, making New Caledonia become part of the New French Community. The electoral freedom to decide on New Caledonia’s status would, in theory, constitute a concession by the French government. However, Tierney (2012: 87) states that given the marginalization of the Kanak population “the fairness of such a vote is seriously questioned”. Thus the outcome mostly reflects the will of the inhabitants of French origins and not of the indigenous peoples like the Kanaks. Thus, we do not code the referendum as a concession.
* According to Chappell (2003: 190), a decade-long process of re-centralization was initiated in 1959. He reports that as a first step, local control of the civil service, police and radio was taken away (Chappell 2003: 190). From Mrgudovic (2012: 86) it appears that the re-centralization was a result of the 1958 constitution, thus we peg the restriction to 1958. [1958: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1960s saw further centralization. In 1963, the Jacquinot statute was adopted by the French parliament (Marrani 2013: 92). Marrani reports that the 1963 Jacquinot statute was similar to the 1956 Deferre statute, but that it reduced local competencies. In line with this, Chappell (2003: 190-191) reports that the local executive, the Governing Council (GC), was stripped of its ministerial powers and left with a consultative role. Moreover, Paris took control of secondary and technical education, citing a lack of local funds and trained personnel. Also see Henningham (1992: 49). [1963: autonomy restriction]
* In January 1969, another statute was adopted, the Billotte statute (Marrani 2013: 92). Critically, Paris re-took control over mining, large-scale investments and local communal elections (Chappell 2003: 191). [1969: autonomy restriction]
* In 1975, a New Caledonian representative (Yann Céléné Uregei) travelled to Paris to negotiate a new autonomy statute. He was rebuffed (Chappell 2003: 199). However, in 1976 the Stirn statute was adopted, which gave back some limited competencies to the overseas territory, including a certain degree of law-making powers (Marrani 2013: 92). [1976: autonomy concession]
* To contain the rising nationalist challenge, the French government came up with the Dijoud plan in 1979. The plan included measures “intended to compensate for the historic disadvantages of the Melanesian community” but was never implemented (Henningham 1992: 70). Furthermore, in 1979 the French government enacted the Dijoud statute. Its most important provision was the installment of a 7.5% threshold for the Territorial Assembly elections. The splintered independence camp responded by regrouping into a single Independence Front (Hinningham 1992: 71). While perceived as a restriction by Kanak nationalists (Fisher 2013: 58), the threshold criterion is not a restriction in the sense employed here.
* In 1981, the Mitterrand government initiated four reforms by decree: i) the establishment of a land reform office “charged with resolving land disputes and with acquiring land from settlers who would be compensated for returning land to Kanaks”; ii) the establishment of an economic development office; iii) the creation of a Kanak cultural, scientific and technical office to foster and preserve Melanesian/Kanak culture; and iv) a provision that Melanesian advisers should be consulted in civil cases involving Melanesians (Henningham 1992: 72; also see Thompson 2014: 240). [1981: cultural rights & autonomy concession]
* There was another concession on language in 1982:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
* In 1983 the French government organized a roundtable involving both the Kanak pro-independence group and the White pro-France group. Following the roundtable, the French government drafted a new statute, the Lemoine statute. The Lemoine statute involved increased autonomy and a specified five-year transition period until a vote on independence in 1989 (Henningham 1992: 74). Both camps opposed the Lemoine statute; while the integrationists did not want to sever ties with France, the independence-minded Kanaks demanded an earlier referendum and restrictions on immigrants’ right to vote in the independence referendum. Nevertheless, the Lemoine statute was adopted by the French parliament in 1984 and implemented (Thompson 2014: 240; Marrani 2013: 92; Fisher 2013: 60). We code an autonomy concession in 1983 because this is when the process began (also see Henningham 1992: 148). Note: the proposed independence referendum is difficult to see as a concession; New Caledonia’s French settler-majority ensured a vote against independence. The referendum was opposed by the Kanaks and its main function was the legitimation of France’s anti-independence stance. [1983: autonomy concession]
* The 1985 Pisani plan proposed “independence in association” with France. New Caledonia would become a sovereign state with a seat in the United Nations while still legally associated with France (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 204; LA Times 1985). Pisani promised to hold such a referendum in July 1985; the franchise was limited to those who had lived in New Caledonia for at least three years (Fisher 2013: 61). The three-year requirement was unlikely to reverse the expected vote against independence. The Pisani plan collapsed within no time after a surge of violence (Thompson 2014: 241).
* Nevertheless the Socialist government went ahead and implemented the autonomy proposal while postponing the independence referendum until 1987. The French government installed four regional councils with significant local powers including economic development (Fabius statute) (Marrani 2013: 92). The Fabius statute constituted a significant victory for the Kanak movement as only one of the four regions included Noumea and thus the nationalists were able to win control of thee of the four regional councils with less than 40% of the total vote (Thompson 2014: 242). Overall the Fabius statute clearly increased New Caledonia’s autonomy (Marrani 2013: 93). We code an autonomy concession in 1985 because this is when the Fabius statute was adopted. Note: the proposed independence referendum is difficult to see as a concession; New Caledonia’s French settler-majority ensured a vote against independence. The referendum was opposed by the Kanaks and its main function was the legitimation of France’s anti-independence stance. [1985: autonomy concession]
* France’s conciliatory stance ended when the right-wingers under Chirac took the Prime Ministry in 1986. Chirac almost immediately moved to weaken the Kanak nationalists. The 1986 Pons I statute centralized a number of previously granted decision-making powers, in particular of the regions installed by the Fabius statute. At the same time, it contained a number of provisions that were designed to encourage the rival pro- and anti-independence blocks to work together (Henningham 1992: 99-101). Fisher (2013: 65) furthermore notes that what used to be the office for Kanak culture was changed to an office for all cultures (note: it is not clear whether this reform was part of the Pons I statute). We code an autonomy restriction in 1986, coinding with the Pons I statute. [1986: autonomy restriction]
* Meanwhile, the Chirac government remained committed to the referendum; the statute foresaw a vote in 1987 with a three years’ residence requirement (Henningham 1992: 102). The Chirac government worked hard to guarantee a high participation rate to legitimate its anti-independence stance (Henningham 1992: 102). For example, the French government set up roadblocks to prevent agitators from entering Noumea and pro-French rural supporters were bussed in (Fisher 2013: 65). The referendum went ahead and produced the expected no to independence. The vote was boycotted by Kanak nationalists, thus turnout was only 59%. Overall, the 1987 independence referendum is difficult to see as a concession; New Caledonia’s French settler-majority ensured a vote against independence. The referendum was opposed by the Kanaks and its main function was the legitimation of France’s anti-independence stance.
* In early 1988, another statute was enacted, Pons II (Fisher 2013: 65). The changes implied appear not too significant, and there appears to have been both concessions and restrictions. According to Fisher, Pons II “provided for implied abolition of Melanesians’ special legal status, and a revised regional demarcation more sympathetic to pro-France views […] the pro-France group duly won in the newly created western region, and made gains in the other Kanak dominated regions owing to boycotts.” However, Fisher (2002: 308) concludes that overall the proposal would have implied increased autonomy. In line with this, Marrani (2013: 93) writes that Pons II gave normative power to the territory while giving the executive power to a wider conseil exécutiv (executive council) of ten members (the presidents du Congrès and of the four regions plus five members elected by Congrès). In sum, it is not clear whether the proposal should be seen as a restriction or a concession. Thus we decided not to code it at all. Note: Pons II was not that significant. It was never implemented (see Fisher 2013: 308). And Henningham (1992) does not even make mention of Pons II in his rather detailed account.
* New Caladonia was at the brink of a civil war when in 1988 a compromise was found between indigenous Kanak (separatists) and the European populations (loyalists) – after the right-wing Chirac government had been voted out of office in 1988 (Thompson 2014: 243). The Matignon Agreement put New Caledonia under direct rule for a transition period of a year, but then would lead to a deep increase in autonomy (Henningham 1992: 104-105). It established three new regional assemblies with substantial powers and financial resources. In addition, a referendum on independence was scheduled for 1998, with an electorate limited to those living in the territory in 1988. In return, nationalists agreed not to raise the independence issue for the following ten years. The Matignon agreement was approved in referendum in November 1988 (BBC 2014; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002: 893; Minority Rights Group International). We code both an autonomy and an independence concession. Note: the independence concession remains ambiguous to some extent as the Kanaks remain a minority; however, in this case they did agree to the plan. [1988: autonomy concession, independence concession]
  + Note: the 1988 concessions occurred after the onset separatist violence in January-April 1988 and led to the end of violence.
* The 1951 Loi Deixonne had recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan (Hossay 2004: 408). This allowed a minimal presence of these four minority languages in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30), thus ending the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31). The Loi Deixonne was extended to four Kanak languages (Aijé, Drehu, Mengone, Paici) in 1992. [1992: cultural rights concession]
* The Noumea Accord of 1998 replaced the Matignon Accords. The planned referendum on independence was postponed, but the Noumea Accord mandated new independence referendums (see below). In addition, the agreement also initiated the transfer of additional powers from France to New Caledonia over a period of 15 to 20 years whereas only so-called "sovereign powers" (justice, public order, defense and currency) would remain in the hands of Paris (Minority Rights Group International; Nationalia 2014). In June 1999, the first government was elected (Minahan 2002). With 72% voting in favor, the Noumea Accord was accepted in New Caledonia on November 8, 1998. [1998: autonomy concession]
* In a 2006 legislation of the French parliament, the voting rights in New Caledonia were restricted to indigenous Kanaks and long-term residents rather than to all French citizens (BBC 2014; Radio Australia 2005). A key demand of the Kanak community, this move increased the level of Kanak self-determination (i.e., is tantamount to increasing the Kanaks’ local control) and is thus coded as an autonomy concession. [2006: autonomy concession]
* In 2018, an independence referendum was held in New Caledonia, according to the stipulations of the 1998 Noumea Accord. New Caledonians (apart from recent residents) had the choice of remaining a part of France or becoming an independent country. 56% voted in favour of the status quo, thus rejecting independence (The Guardian 2018). This concession is already coded in 1988 (see above).
* In 2020, a second independence referendum was held in New Caledonia, again following the stipulations of the 1998 Noumea Accord. As before, New Caledonians (apart from recent residents) could chose between upholding the status quo or becoming an independent country. This time, 53% voted in favour of remaining a part of France, a slight decrease from the 2018 result (BBC 2020). This concession is already coded in 1988 (see above).

**Regional autonomy**

* The Matignon Agreements established three new regional assemblies with substantial power and financial resources. The inaugural elections were in 1989, which ended the one-year period of direct rule. Following the first of January rule, we code regional autonomy as of 1990. [1990-2020: regional autonomy]
  + New Caledonia had had some limited autonomy already before 1988, given its status as a TOM. But this autonomy had been rather limited before Matignon (see e.g. Chappell 1999: 376; Henningham 1992: 73; also see above).

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1989: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kanaks (New Caledonians) |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence of representation in the central government. [1958-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 889) the Kanak numbered approximately 96,000 in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0016]
  + Note: this figure matches with data from the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (insee.fr), according to which the Kanak population of New Caledonia amounted to 99,100 in 2009.

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 889), the Kanaks live “mainly in the French Territory of New Caledonia”, where they comprise approx. 44% of the local population. They are thus a minority in their territory, which is why we code them as not concentrated. Other groups in New Caledonia are the French (34%), the Wallisians and Futunas (9%), the Tahitians (4%), and the Javanese (3%). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for numerically significant kin in other countries. [no kin]

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## Martinique Islanders

Activity: 1957-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Martinique became a Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM) in 1946. Thereby it became fully integrated with France and decolonized according to our definition.
* The first Martinque party to demand greater autonomy for the island – the Martinique Progressive Party (PPM) – was founded in 1957, hence the start date of the movement.
* On the basis of their common belief that autonomy was a necessary step towards the independence of Martinique, the island’s two major political parties – the PPM and the Martinique Communist Party (PCM) – formed in 1975 the Front National Martinquais pour L’Autonomie (National Martinique Front for Autonomy). By early 1980 this Front had effectively collapsed, with the PCM accusing the PPM of seeking “absorption rather than alliance.” Both parties, however, continued to champion the cause of greater autonomy: at its eighth congress in 1980 the PPM adopted a motion calling for “autonomy for the Martinique nation as a stage in the struggle of the Martinique people for independence and self-managing socialism.” Also in 1980, at its seventh congress the PCM abandoned the party’s previous commitment to “popular and democratic autonomy within the framework of the French Republic” and opted instead for a “struggle for national liberation” with the aim of achieving autonomy as a stage towards eventual independence.
* The PPM and PCM (also founded in 1957) have been consistently active in Martinique politics since 1957. Besides these two groups, in 1978, the Mouvement Independantiste Martiniquais was founded to fight for Martinique independence. The party continues to be active in Martinique politics as of 2020, and has become more successful in elections in the early 2000s (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Minahan 1996, 2002; Mouvement Independentaiste Martiniquais; Roth 2015: 429). [start date: 1957; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Information on the claim of the Martinique self-determination movement is inconsistent or at best difficult to interpret. Minahan (2002: 1205) calls the Martinique Progressive Party (PPM), the first nationalist party, a pro-independence party that “called for immediate independence”. Other nationalist groups that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s also either demanded immediate independence or a gradual transition to eventual independence. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000), on the other hand, state that the island’s two major political parties, the Martinique Communist Party (PCM) and the PPM, which split from the PCM in 1957, both favor autonomy over independence. A 1980 motion by the eighth congress of the PPM calling for “autonomy for the Martinique nation as a stage in the struggle of the Martinique people for independence and self-managing socialism” confirms this view. Further evidence is provided by Ameringer (1992: 396), who considers the PPM a pro-autonomous party from the start. Pro-independence groups such as the Socialist Revolution Group, Workers Fight, the Martinique Independence Movement and the Martinique Patriots have all performed poorly in elections, receiving below 3% of the total vote (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000). Since the PPM was the dominant party in the early years of the movement’s activity, we code autonomy as the dominant claim, despite some (limited) evidence of a secessionist claim. [1957-1998: autonomy claim]
* The situation changed in the 1990s when the Martinique Independence Movement emerged as the strongest party in the regional elections of 1998 (13 seats of 41) and 2004 (28 seats). Following the first of January rule, we therefore code secession as the dominant claim from 1999 until 2010, when the PPM list won a majority and the MIM was ousted. [1999-2010: independence claim]
* With the return of the PPM as the dominant party (Lansford 2014: 492), we again code autonomy as the dominant claim. [2011-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The first independentist organization was the Organisation de la Jeunesse Anticolonialiste de la Martinique (OJAM), which was formed in 1962 (Party 2010). The group’s manifesto, “Manifesto of Martinican Youth”, was posted on public buildings in the night of December 23 to 24, 1962. Among other things, the manifesto spoke of a “youth [showing] our country the way to emancipation”, “greater resistance to colonial oppression”, the “inevitable need for Martinique to join the vast movement of total decolonization” and the “liberation of the country” (France Info n.d. a). We therefore code independence claims in 1962. Note: Conteh-Morgan (2010: 20) suggests the OJAM was formed in 1965 and not in 1962, but this appears to be wrong.
* We could not find much information on organized independence claims until 1973, but also could not find evidence to suggest that OJAM was dissolved or that the movement ended. On that basis, we code the claim as ongoing, though it is worth noting that a strict implementation of our coding rules would suggest we code two separate phases, one in 1962 and the other starting in 1973. We do not do so because historians treat the events in 1962 as the starting point of the Martinican independence movement, suggesting there was continuity.
* In 1973, Alfred Marie-Jeanne founded the “La Parole au Peuple” organization, which was pro-independentist. In 1978, the party changed its name to Martinican Independence Movement (MIM). The MIM aimed to secure the “decolonization and independence of Martinique” (Ameringer 1992: 395).
  + In the first direct election for the Regional Council held in February 1983, MIM secured 3% of the votes.
  + In March 1989, it performed worse, receiving “only a handful of seats on municipal councils” and losing “one of their two mayors” (Ameringer 1992: 395).
  + MIM continued to be active and emerged as the strongest party in the regional elections of 1998 (13 seats of 41) and 2004 (28 seats). In 2015, MIM, ran as part of a coalition of independentist parties, which won 33 out of 51 seats in the new Territorial Collectivity’s Assembly (France Info, n.d. b).
* Another independentist group, the Socialist Revolution Group, was active from at least 1983 (CIA Factbook 1986: 160) and continued to be active as of 2020. [start date: 1962; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* This movement’s claims concern Martinique Island (Roth 2015: 432). We code this territory based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Martinique became a French colony in 1635 and was declared a domain of the French crown in 1674. Ever since, and with only a few exceptions of English occupation (once during the Seven Years' War and twice during the Napoleonic Wars), Martinique has been part of France. The development of a plantation economy required imported labor from Africa and later, after slavery was abolished and former slaves became French citizens in 1848, mainly from India (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).
* In 1946 the island became a French Overseas Department (DOM) fully integrated with the metropole. Inhabitants were granted the same political rights as other French citizens (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2000; Minority Rights Group International). Thus Martinique was decolonized.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Martinique is an overseas department and also a region, so we code acts of devolution to both departments and regions.
  + In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Martinique) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000).
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.
  + After the failed 1969 decentralization attempt, 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing’s Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). As a result, in 1974, Martinique was granted the status of a region (Minahan 2002; Busky 2002). [1972: autonomy concession]
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. The DOM have even been granted a “somewhat more extended autonomy than departments and regions of continental France” (Ziller 2009: 444). [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). Article 72 to 74 particularly addressed the Caribbean DOMs and enabled a referendum in 2003 where voters were asked whether they wanted Martinique to become a territorial collectivity and hence more autonomous. 73% of voters rejected the proposal. 50.48% of voters rejected the proposal. The same referendum was also conducted in Guadeloupe, Saint-Barthélemy and the northern French part of Saint Martin. While Guadeloupe also rejected the proposal, Saint-Barthélemy and Saint Martin, previously under the jurisdiction of Guadeloupe, voted in favor of becoming a territorial collectivity (Sutton 2008). We code a concession because the 2003 autonomy offer was significant. We do not code a restriction because the center did not unilaterally row back but this was the result of a negative popular referendum. [2003: autonomy concession]
  + Note: even if Martinique rejected an autonomy offer in 2003, the constitutional reform process resulted in increased autonomy for Guadeloupe: The 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. In conformity with other cases, this is coded as a single autonomy concession in 2003.
  + When travelling to Martinique in June 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a referendum on whether Martinique should become an overseas territory and hence more autonomous, similar to the autonomous French territories in the Pacific. The same referendum was also held in French Guiana. The proposal was not implemented as the 2010 referendum was rejected by 79.31% (BBC 2010). We code a concession because this was a significant offer of autonomy. We do not code a restriction because the center rowed back after a referendum. [2010: autonomy concession]
  + In a second referendum held just two weeks after the first one, Martinique voted on the question whether the territory should become a single territorial collectivity that would jointly exercise the powers that were hitherto held by the department and the region. 57% voted in favour of the proposal, commencing a process that would eventually establish the ‘Collectivité Territoriale de Martinique’ in 2015 (Le Monde 2010). This meant that the General Council of Martinique and the Regional Council of Martinique were replaced by the Assembly of Martinique that is in charge of regional and departmental government. The combining of departmental and regional powers did not entail the devolution of further powers to Martinique, so the second 2010 referendum is not classed as an autonomy concession.
  + In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
* In addition, there was a concession on language in 1982:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The territory is administered by a prefect, appointed by the President of France. Furthermore, there are two popularly elected local executive bodies, a general and regional council. As an overseas department (and region) of France (DOM), Martinique enjoys a status identical to the departments (and regions) of metropolitan France. Given the centralized nature of the French state, regional autonomy for the departments and regions is not given, despite some limited devolution of powers. In 2003 and 2010 voters rejected a referendum that would have granted Martinique greater autonomy (BBC 2010; Sutton 2008).

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Martinique Islanders |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* As all other overseas department, Martinique is represented in both houses of the French National Assembly (Minority Rights Group International). However, we found no evidence of representation at the executive level (nor for discrimination), which is why we code the Martinique Islanders as powerless throughout. [1957-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002), the Martinicans numbered around 380,000 in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0061]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1202), the Martinique Islanders are concentrated in Martinique, where they comprise approx. 94% of the local population. This amounts to around 365,000 Martinicans, which is more than half of the 380,000 Martinicans in France as a whole. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for numerically significant kin in other countries. [no kin]

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## Normans

Activity: 1969-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1969, the Youth Movement of Normandy (Mouvement de la Jeunesse de Normandie) was founded. In 1971, it became the Normandy Movement (Mouvement Normand, MN), a political party that has been active since then and which advocates a self-governing Normandy within the European Union. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1969 and code the movement as ongoing to the present.
* In 2016, the two administrative regions Upper Normandy and Lower Normandy were merged into the new region Normandy. This was a major success for Norman groups such as the Parti Federaliste de Normandie (PFN) which had long opposed the division of the two Normandy regions and advocated for joining them together. PFN appears to have become largely inactive afterwards. However, MN remains active as of 2020, and so the movement is coded as ongoing. (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Le Mouvement Regional Normand; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996, 2002; Mouvement Normand; Party Federaliste de Normandie; Roth 2015: 59). [start date: 1969; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Youth Movement of Normandy (Mouvement de la Jeunesse de Normandie), founded in 1969, changed its name into Normandy Movement (Mouvement Normand, MN) in 1971. The MN is the most popular nationalist party and advocates a self-governing Normandy within the European Union. It calls itself a regionalist movement that advocates decentralization and the reunification of the historic Normandy (Mouvement Normand n.d.). Also the Mouvement Régional Normand (MRN), despite being seen as more pro-independent, acknowledges the Normandy’s affiliation to France (Mouvement-Régional-Normand n.d.).The autonomy claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 1386), who also calls the MN a regionalist movement aiming at the reunification of the Normandy. The same goal is pursued by the Parti Federaliste de Normandie. Only a small minority supports separatism. The Party for Independent Normandy (Parti pour la Normandie Indépendante, PNI) is at best marginal (see below). [1969-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There is a secessionist party: the Party for Independent Normandy (Parti pour la Normandie Indépendante, PNI) (PNI 2005). Although the party allegedly “set up a provisional government” (Kellas 2004: 230), its level of public support seems very small. We cannot find much information on the PNI, including regarding its date of formation. It appears the PNI is no longer active as of 2020. Roth (2015: 77) describes the movement as autonomist without mentioning a secessionist claim. This is an ambiguous case, but based on the available evidence decided that the independence movement does not reach the level of political significance required. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Normans consists of the Normandy region in northwestern France formerly made up of the Haute-Normandie and the Basse-Normandie (Minahan 2002: 1382). The two administrative regions merged in 2016 to form the region Normandy (Law 2012). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Until 1087, from 1106 until 1144 and again from 1154 until 1204, the Normandy was part of England. During the Hundred Years War, English troops again occupied the territory for two longer periods. In 1468, the Normandy was declared an inalienable part of the French crown and was thereafter governed directly by the French monarch. The Normans were granted several privileges. A Norman parliament was established in 1499 and enjoyed considerable regional power until the French Revolution, when power was centralized and regional power abolished. Norman rebellions in 1793 and 1815 were crushed (Minahan 2002: 1385).
* Normandy was part of the German occupied zone of France during the Second World War. Nazi Germany’s attempts to win the Norman’s support were not very successful, as many Normans remained loyal to France. The entirety of the territory was liberated on May 9, 1945 (Minahan 2002: 1385).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Normandy consists of several regions (just one from 2015 onward, see below) and departments, so we code acts of devolution to both departments and regions.
  + In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Upper Normandy (Haute-Normandie) and Lower Normandy (Basse-Normandie)) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000).
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.
  + After the failed 1969 decentralization attempt, 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing’s Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). [1972: autonomy concession]
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements (the two Norman regions are made up of five departments: Eure, Seine-Maritime, Calvados, Manche, Orne) “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. While the 1982 act devolved some power to the regions, it also divided the historic Normandy into two distinct regions. While this could also be coded as a restriction, we value the act of devolution and the establishment of two Norman regions as political regions more decisive in increasing the Norman’s level of autonomy and thus code the event as a concession. [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
  + In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
  + The 2015 Act on the Delimitation of Regions, Regional and Departmental Elections and Amending the Electoral Calendar merged the regions Upper Normandy and Lower Normandy into a single region called Normandy. This was a major success for Norman groups such as the Parti Federaliste de Normandie (PFN) which had long opposed the division of the two Normandy regions and advocated for joining them together. However, no new powers seem to have been devolved, so we do not code a concession.
* In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional language was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages (German) and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. The Norman language does not seem to have been affected by the Savary Circular. The Gallo language, which was included in the Savary Circular, is, like Norman, part of the Oïl language group, but is only spoken by a small minority of the Normans. Thus, we do not code the Savary Circular as a concession in case of the Normans.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Normans |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | French |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 22001000 |

**Power access**

* According to EPR the metropolitan French exercise monopoly power (all other groups are excluded from power). The Normans are not considered politically relevant, but are subsumed under the ethnic group of the French. To infer that the Normans are also dominant is of course not accurate. However, the Normans make up more than 5% of France and with Pierre Bérégovoy (PM from 1992-1993; Minister of Social Affairs and Minister of the Economy and Finance 1982-1986), Jean Lecanuet (minister 1974-1977), , there are also some high ranking officials who represent the Norman region or at least originate from there. Since there is a high likelihood of various ministerial posts being held by Normans throughout their period of activity, and since the Normans are part of what EPR labels a monopoly French ethnic group, we code the group as junior partners. [1969-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1382), the Normans numbered approximately 4.03 million in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0652]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1202), the Normans are concentrated in the Normandy region, where they comprise approx. 91% of the local population. This amounts to around 2,933,000 Normans, which is more than half of the 4.03 million Normans living in France as a whole. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No evidence found. [no kin]

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## Occitans

Activity: 1959-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Partit Nacionalista Occitan (Occitan Nationalist Party, PNO) was founded in 1959, hence the start date of the movement. As of 2012, it aims for an independent Occitan that would participate in the European Union. Another separatist organization is Volem Viure al Pais, which at first advocated autonomy and then independence (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 216). Several smaller organizations, including Volem Viure, merged to form the Partit Occitan (Occitania Party, POC) in Toulouse in 1987 to seek “self-government” for the region of southern France where Occitan is spoken. The movement is ongoing as of 2020 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996, 2002, 2016; Partit de la Nacion Occitana; Roth 2015: 62). [start date: 1959; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The right-wing Partit Nacionalista Occitan (Occitan Nationalist Party, PNO), founded in 1959, first advocated decentralization and later changed its claim to independence (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 216). Another organization, Volem Viure al Pais, also initially advocated autonomy and later independence (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 216). We lack a clear indication as of when these organizations began to make claims for independence. None of them has ever garnered a very significant following in elections (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 216). Minahan (2002: 1443) suggests that in the 1970s and 1980s, “autonomist” and “nationalist” sentiments were dominant. He furthermore notes that in the 1980s, nationalists demanded a regional parliament.
* In 1987, several smaller organizations, including Volem Viure, merged to form what appears to have soon become the most important representative of the movement, the Partit Occitan (Occitania Party, POC). In 2010 the POC managed to be elected to several regional councils (Aquitaine, Auvergne, Midi-Pyrénées, and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur), while the PNO continues to have no representation. The POC seeks “self-government” for the region of southern France where Occitan is spoken; it is widely described as autonomist.
* Most claims, even historical ones, are autonomis tin nature. The famous motto “Volem viure al pais!” (We want to live in our region!) was already in use in the 1930s (Loubère 1990: 264; Loubère 1974). It has since become part of a series of symbolisms used in protests – including insignia, flags, throughout the decades and into the 1990s (Lem 2002: 297).
* In sum, the evidence suggests that the movement initially demanded autonomy. At some point, smaller parties including the PNO switched to independence, but in the 1970s/1980s autonomy was still the dominant claim, at least so it appears from Minahan. In 1987 the autonomist POC emerged, which became the dominant force of the movement. Based on this, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1959-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Several smaller organizations have made claims for independence; however, we found it difficult to establish when independence claims first emerged. PNO, which was formed in 1959, first advocated autonomy and later switched to independence. Another organization, Volem Viure al Pais, also initially advocated autonomy and later independence (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 216). We lack a clear indication as of when these organizations began to make claims for independence, though Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 216) suggest that the independentist movement peaked in the mid-1970s. On this basis, we somewhat arbitrarily peg the start date to 1970.
* It is important to note that organizations making secessionist claims have limited political significance. In 2014, PNO leader Martine Gros explained that PNO is presently a fringe party, and spokesperson Jean-Pierre Hilaire said that he understands that “independence is not for tomorrow” – but spoke of the party’s commitment to a long-term process towards “our future national liberation” which will only be achieved if “Occitanists of all tendencies unite” (Sud Quest 2014). The same source suggests that the party’s performance was disappointing, with 0.16% in Lot-et-Garonne and 0.03% in the wider region (179 and 878 votes respectively).
* Despite limited support in elections, the secession claim has some backing among more militant members. For example, Anaram Au Patac (AAP) was a militant party established in 1992 (its name is translated as “We will go to battle”) that seems to have made independence claims (Anaram Au Patac n.d.). It was dissolved in 2009.
* Iniciativa per Occitania was established in 2003 and has made ambiguous claims that seem, however, predominantly classified as autonomist rather than secessionist (Iniciativa per Occitania 2013).
* On the other hand, the party Libertat! (Organizacion Independentista e Socialista d'Occitània) was established in 2009 and makes claims for Occitanian independence (Jornalet 2016). [start date: 1970; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* PNO and POC claims primarily concern the Occitan speaking regions, which roughly coincide with the following administrative regions in southern France: Auvergne, Aquitaine, Languedoc - Roussillon, Limousin, Provence – Alps-Côte d’Azur, and Midi Pyrénées, and the southern departments of Rhone-Alps (Minahan 2002: 1438). We code this territory based on Roth (2015: 58), using GADM for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 2001 the Assembly of the Autonomous Occitan Community was established. The French government declared it illegal and separatist (Minahan 2002: 1443). This can be considered a unilateral declaration of autonomy. [2001: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Occitan dialects and culture flourished in the ninth to the thirteenth centuries. Official documents and courts in the south used Occitan (while the northern part of France still used Latin). The increasing influence of the Cathar sect in many Occitan states angered the Catholic Church and led to a war with the French kingdom in the north in 1209 (Albigensian Crusade), which resulted in the defeat of the Cathars and Occitans and the annexation of several southern regions by the French kingdom. In 1539 French replaced Occitan in public administration (Minahan 2002: 1441; Minority Rights Group International).
* With the French Revolution came a period of repression of regional identities and dialects. The introduction of universal education and compulsory schooling in the 1870/80s further diminished the importance of the Occitan dialects. By the 1930s standard French had replaced Occitan dialects as the language of daily life (Minahan 2002: 1442; Minority Rights Group International). However, in 1951 the French government removed the ban on regional languages (Deixonne Act). This allowed for a minimal presence of four minority languages (Basque, Breton, Catalan, Occitan and later Corsican, Tahitian, and four Melanesian languages) in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30) and ended the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31). [1951: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Occitania consists of several regions and departments, so we code acts of devolution to both departments and regions.
  + In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Aquitaine, Auvergne, Languedoc-Roussillon, Limousin, Provence-Alps-Côte d’Azur, Midi-Pyrénées, which together with the southern departments of Rhone Alps make up historical Occitania) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000).
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.
  + After the failed 1969 decentralization attempt, 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing’s Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). [1972: autonomy concession]
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
  + In 2001 the Assembly of the Autonomous Occitan Community was established. The French government declared it illegal and separatist (Minahan 2002: 1443). Thus, we do not code a concession.
  + In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
  + The 2015 Act on the Delimitation of Regions, Regional and Departmental Elections and Amending the Electoral Calendar merged the regions Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées into a single region provisionally called Languedoc-Roussillon-Midi-Pyrénées, renamed ‘Occitanie’ in 2016. The Partit Occitan welcomed the name, but emphasized that the new region only comprises a part of the larger cultural and historical region of Occitania. It also criticized the lack of say citizens had in the merging of the regions and their name. As the 2015 Act did not devolve substantial power to Occitans nor decreased their political influence, it is neither coded as a concession nor restriction.
* There was also at least one concession specifically on language.
  + According to Minahan (2002: 1443), Occitan was introduced in regional schools in the 1980s. This appears to coincide with the 1982 Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages.
  + The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were a number of Occitan dialects including Auvergnat, Gascon, and Languedocien. [1982: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Occitans |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | French |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 22001000 |

**Power access**

* According to EPR the metropolitan French exercise monopoly power (all other groups are excluded from power). The Occitans make up a significant part of the group of the French (26.25%) and with French presidents Pompidou , and Chirac (Limousin) and prime minister Juppé (Aquitaine), there are several high ranking officials who represent the Occitan region or at least originate from there. Given the significant executive influence of the Occitans in the French government, we code their power status as senior partner throughout. [1959-2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1438) the Occitans numbered around 10.84 million in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.1754]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1438), almost all Occitans live in the Occitan region, where they comprise approx. 71% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1438), there are around 300,000 Transalpin Occitans in northwestern Italy. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Reunion Islanders

Activity: 1959-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* La Réunion became a Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM) in 1946. Thereby, it became fully integrated with France and decolonized according to our definition.
* The main separatist group is the Marxist Movement for the Independence of Réunion (MIR), which was formed in November 1981. The predecessor of MIR is the Marxist-Leninist Communist Organisation of Réunion, which was founded in 1975. This was in turn preceded by the Communist Party of Reunion, which held autonomist goals when it was founded in 1959 (Alpers 2004: 25). We therefore peg the start date of the movement to 1959.
* MIR has been consistently active in Réunion politics since its founding although it public support from Réunion Islanders is limited (Alpers 2004; Degenhardt 1988; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 2002; Roth 2015: 297). [start date: 1959; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Although there are several pro-independence movements, the dominant group in the self-determination movement advocates more autonomy. The Socialist and Communist Parties, particularly the Communist Party of Réunion (Parti Communiste Réunionais), advocate more self-determination in the form of autonomy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 248; Minahan 2002). Since the Communist Party of Réunion has also been the dominant party advocating some form of self-determination in all regional elections, we code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. [1959-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The first independentist organization we could find is the Marxist–Leninist Communist Organization of Réunion (Organisation Communiste Marxiste Léniniste de la Réunion – OCLMR). OCLMR has made independence claims since 1975 along with several other, “equally tiny and radical groups” (Aldrich & Connell 1998: 125).
* Another secessionist group is the the Marxist Movement for the Independence of Réunion (MIR), which was formed in 1981. MIR continued to be active throughout the 1980s (FANAL 2020).
* Independentists have always been in a minority, but their numbers dwindled further from the 1990s, when there was a “shift away from radical liberation movements” with general acceptance of politics based on being a département “for fear of the economic consequence of independent status” (Connell & Aldrich 2020: 49f). Still, independentist mobilization continued, with a new group which merges several previously independent secessionist organiizations, OCMLR-MPLR-MIR, remaining active as of 2020. [start date: 1975; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Reunion Islanders consists of Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean and an overseas department of France. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Réunion became a French colony in 1642, after nominal Portuguese rule since the early sixteenth century had left the island virtually untouched. After a short interlude of British rule since 1810, the island was again ceded to the French at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (Minahan 2002; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000).
* In 1946 the island became a French Overseas Department (DOM) fully integrated with France (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2000; Minority Rights Group International). This means Reunion was decolonized. We code a prior restriction due to the gradual loss of autonomy in the context of colonization and subsequent departmentalization.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. Réunion is an overseas department and also a region, so we code acts of devolution to both departments and regions.
  + In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Reunion) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000).
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.
  + After the failed 1969 decentralization attempt, 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing’s Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). As a result, Reunion was granted the status of a region in 1974 (Minahan 2002; Encyclopedia Britannica). [1972: autonomy concession]
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. The DOM have even been granted a “somewhat more extended autonomy than departments and regions of continental France” (Ziller 2009: 444). [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
  + In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
* In addition, there was a concession on language in 1982:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The territory is administered by a prefect, appointed by the President of France. Furthermore, there are two popularly elected local executive bodies, a general and regional council. As an overseas department (and region) of France (DOM), La Reunion enjoys a status identical to the departments (and regions) of metropolitan France. Given the centralized nature of the French state, regional autonomy for the departments and regions is not given, despite some limited devolution of powers.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Réunion Islanders |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* As all other overseas department, Reunion is represented in both houses of the French National Assembly (Minority Rights Group International). However, we found no evidence of representation at the executive level (nor evidence for discrimination), which is why we code the Reunion Islanders as powerless throughout. [1959-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1576), the Reunionese numbered around 690,000 in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0112]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1576), 677,000 Réunionese live in Reunion (out of 1.04 million in across France as a whole), and they make up 91% of Reunion’s local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for numerically significant kin. [no kin]

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## Savoyards

Activity: 1946-1948; 1972-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1946 Savoyard nationalists in the Aosta Valley in Italy demanded secession and unification with Savoyards in France. This spurred separatist agitation among the Savoyards in France, but this agitation died down after the Italian government separated Val d’Aosta from Piemonte and granted some political autonomy to the region in 1948. Therefore, we code a first phase of separatist activity in 1946-1948. [start date 1: 1946; end date 1: 1948]
* A period of dormancy in the movement’s history followed until 1972, when the Mouvement Région Savoie was founded, an autonomist party. In 1995 another Savoyard self-determination organization was founded, the Savoy League (Ligue Savoisienne/Liga de Saboya, LS), with the aim of reversing French annexation of Savoy in 1860 and re-establishing it as a sovereign independent state. While the Savoy League suspended its activities in 2012, the Savoy Region Movement remains active as of 2020 and thus the movement is coded as ongoing (Blog de La Ligue Savoisienne; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996, 2002; Mouvements Régionalistes de Savoie; Roth 2015: 65). [start date 2: 1972; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1946 Savoyard nationalists in the Aosta Valley in Italy demanded secession and reunification with French Savoy in an independent Etat Montagne in 1946 (Minority Rights Group International). This spurred separatist sentiment among the Savoyards in France, albeit not as strong as in Italy. The dominant claim was clearly independence. After the granting of a special statute in 1948 the claim of the Valdostan Union moderated and changed to political autonomy for the French-speaking minority within Italy (Sandri 2008:1). As a consequence, separatist sentiment among the Savoyards in France died down. [1946-1948: independence claim]
* The second period of activity starts with the establishment of the Mouvement Région Savoie in 1972. The movement wants an own Savoy region; currently Savoy is part of the region Rhône-Alpes (MRS 2010). In 1994, the Savoy League (Ligue Savoisienne/Liga de Saboya, LS) was founded. The party wants the reversing of French annexation of Savoy in 1860 and independence of Savoy from France (Kellas 2004: 230). This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 1672), who calls the Savoy League an “openly separatist organization” (apparently implying that separatism = secessionism).  The justification for the independence claim is that the 1860 annexation treaty is alleged to be “invalid” because the referendum only offered the people of Savoy the option of becoming part of France or “remaining on the periphery of the newly born Italian State”, with no “option of independence” (Notre Savoie 2002). Apart from the 1998 elections, when the Savoy League managed to get 5.39% of the votes on Savoy territory, the new party has not been very successful electorally and was dissolved in 2012. The Mouvement Région Savoie on the other hand has had low but constant support in regional elections. Autonomy also seems to be the dominant claim of the Savoy population with only 19% or 23% supporting an independent Savoy and 41% or 55% of the population favoring a Savoy region, according to two surveys (La Ligue Savoisienne). Thus autonomy is coded as the dominant claim throughout the second period of activity. [1972-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above for the first phase. [start date 1: 1946; end date 1: 1948]
* We code a second phase in 1994-2012, coinciding with the existence of the Savoy League, or LS. The LS had limited but politically significant backing. According to LS’ own claims, in September 1999 it had more than 4,500 registered members and an alleged “further 60,000 sympathisers”. Furthermore, in 1998, the party obtained 6.1% of the vote in Northern Savoy and 4.8% of the vote in Southern Savoy in the election of 1998. The party suspended its activities at the Party’s 17th Congress in 2012 (Bertoni 2012). [start date 2: 1994; end date 2: 2012]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the various Savoyard organizations consists of the departments of Savoie and Haute-Savoie (Minahan 1996: 153). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + Initially having its own, powerful state, the Savoyards came under French and Swiss dominance in the early sixteenth century. The Swiss territories were lost and the center of the Savoyard state moved to Piedmont (Turin).
  + Napoleon occupied the region in 1792, after French troops had already occupied the Savoy territory several times during the sixteenth century. The house of Savoy, however, was restored in 1815 and played a major role in the Risorgimento, the consolidation of the different states of the Italian peninsula into the Kingdom of Italy. In return for the French aid during Italian unification, the French speaking parts of the new kingdom, among which Savoy, was annexed to the French state. A neutral and free-trade zone was established along the Swiss border (Minahan 2002).
  + After the First World War the French government ended the military neutrality and eliminated the free trade zone. The use of the Savoy dialect had already been banned for some decades by the centralized French state (Minahan 2002).
* 2nd phase:
  + In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). While in general we code autonomy concessions when the government grants a referendum on an autonomy proposal, in this case we refrain from doing so because the vote was held at the national level, giving the SDM group only relatively little say.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding. These concessions referred either primarily to regions or to departments. As of 2011, the two Savoy départements (Savoie, Haute-Savoie) constituted only approximately 18.5% of the population of the region they formed part, Rhone-Alps. Therefore, changes in the competencies of regions are not coded.
  + When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated (PR) governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. Given that the territory of the Savoyards encompasses two départements (Savoie, Haute-Savoie) we code a concession. [1982: autonomy concession]
  + A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
  + In 2013, a new round of decentralization reforms was undertaken with the Acte III de la décentralisation. Contrary to previous rounds, no substantial increases of regional autonomy were granted by the French government. Instead, reforms focused on metropolitan areas, specifically Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as well as the decision-making procedures of collectivities and intercommunal bodies. This reform round is not coded as a concession.
* In addition, there was a concession on language in 1982:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers & McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform include Provençal, the language spoken by at least some of the Savoyards (see Minahan 2002: 1668). [1982: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Savoyards |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | French |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 22001000 |

**Power access**

* According to EPR the metropolitan French exercise monopoly power (all other groups are excluded from power). The Savoyards are not considered politically relevant, but are subsumed under the ethnic group of the French. To infer that the Savoyards are also dominant is of course not accurate. The Savoyards make up only a very small share of EPR’s “French” (approx. 1%). We did not find any evidence of the Savoyards being part of or having significant influence on the French government or being actively discriminated against (for neither period). Savoyards enjoy equal political rights to metropolitan French, but representation in the national executive is token at best. In particular, throughout the movement’s existence, both the French president and the French prime minister consistently were non-Savoyards. Thus, we code the Savoyards powerless throughout. [1946-1948: powerless] [1972-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1667) there were approximately 910,000 Savoyards in France in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [0.0147]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1667), the Savoyards make up approx. 77% of the local population in the two Savoy départements (Savoie, Haute-Savoie), where >50% of all Savoyards live. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1667), there are significant Savoyard communites in the Valle d’Aosta in Italy (75,000) and in the canton of Valais in Switzerland (40,000). Both are not large enough (>100,000) to be considered here. We do not code French speakers in other countries more generally as ethnic kin because this movement is directed against a French-dominated government. [no kin]

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## St. Barthelemy Islanders

Activity: 1996-2007

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* St. Martin was part of Guadeloupe, a French Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM), until 2007. There was agitation for separation from Guadeloupe and increased autonomy at least from 1996 (Natale n.d.). 1996 is coded as the start date. The main claim apparently was for fiscal and tax autonomy, but also identitarian claims are made based on the island’s Anglo-Saxon culture (contrary to Guadeloupe). In a 2003 referendum the residents of St. Barthélemy voted for separation from Guadeloupe and a more autonomous status. This was finally accomplished in 2007. Since we do not find evidence for further separatist activity, we code the movement as terminated in 2007. [start date: 1996; end date: 2007]

**Dominant claim**

* The residents of St Barthélemy aimed at a separation from Guadeloupe and an autonomous status. Since Guadelopue is not an autonomous sub-state we still code autonomy as the dominant claim. [1996-2007: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the St. Barthélemy Islanders consists of the St. Barthélemy island in the Caribbean and is now an overseas collectivity of France. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Saint Barthelemy was settled by the French in 1648 and became part of the French kingdom in1674. After a brief English occupation, the island was sold to Sweden in 1784 and prospered as a free port during the colonial wars of the eighteenth century. The island was given back to France in 1877 and was subsequently placed under the administration of Guadeloupe (CIA World Factbook).
* In 1946 Guadeloupe became a French Overseas Department (DOM) fully integrated with the metropole (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2000; Minority Rights Group International). This constituted also the end of the status as a French colony. Guadeloupe received a number of concessions in the following decades (see “Guadeloupe Islanders”). These are not coded because the St. Barthelemys make up only a negligible share of Guadeloupe.
* However, there was a concession on language in 1982:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers & McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited included French-based Creoles spoken in Guadeloupe, which includes both St. Barthélemy and St. Martin.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). Article 72 to 74 particularly addressed the Caribbean DOM and enabled a referendum in 2003 where voters were asked whether they wanted St Barthélemy to become a territorial collectivity (Collectivité d’Outre Mer COM). This meant a separation from Guadeloupe, the establishment of an own local administration and own legislative competences regarding tax and immigration (CIA World Factbook; Sutton 2008). Voters overwhelmingly voted in favor of the proposal (95.5%). The granting of a referendum constitutes an act of concession by the government. The new status entered into force in 2007. [2003: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* St. Barthelemy became regionally autonomous following the 2007 upgrade to a French overseas collectivity. Hence, we would code regional autonomy as of 2008 (1st of January rule). However, since we code movement termination in 2007, this is not reflected in the coding.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [2007: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | St. Barthélemy Islanders |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* Being part of Guadeloupe, which is coded as powerless throughout, the St Barthelemys were also not represented at the executive level. The very small population size (9,035 in 2011) would have made representation at the center very unlikely anyway. Hence, we code them as powerless throughout. [1996-2012: powerless]

**Group size**

* We do not have data on the number of persons who self-identify as St. Barthelemys. Thus we draw on the island’s population. According to the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (insee.fr), the population of St Barthelemys amounts to 9,035 in 2011. With France’s population totaling 64,933,400 in that same year, we code a population share of 0.0001. [0.0001]

**Regional concentration**

* Whether or not the St. Barthélemys can be considered territorially concentrated is ambiguous since we lack population data based on self-identification. We do not know whether there are also self-identified St. Barthélemys in other parts of France (or how many). We decided to code the group as concentrated due to the island status. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No evidence found. [no kin]

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## St. Martin Islanders

Activity: 1996-2007

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* St. Martin was part of Guadeloupe, a French Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM), until 2007. There was agitation for separation from Guadeloupe and increased autonomy at least from 1996 (Natale n.d.). 1996 is coded as onset. In a 2003 referendum the residents of St. Martin voted for separation from Guadeloupe and a more autonomous status. This was finally accomplished in 2007. Since we do not find evidence for further separatist activity, we code the movement as terminated in 2007. [start date: 1996; end date: 2007]

**Dominant claim**

* The residents of St. Martin aimed at a separation from Guadeloupe and increased autonomy. Since Guadelopue is not an autonomous sub-state we still code autonomy as the dominant claim. [1996-2007: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the St. Martin Islanders consists of the St. Martin island in the Carribean. It is now an overseas collectivity of France. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, and thus we assign a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Having seen occupation by Spanish, English, French and Dutch forces, the Treaty of Concordia in 1648 divided the island of Saint Martin between France and the Netherlands. The French part was placed under the administration of Guadeloupe (CIA World Factbook).
* In 1946 Guadeloupe became a French Overseas Department (DOM) and thus fully integrated with the metropole (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2000; Minority Rights Group International). This constituted also the end of the status as a French colony. Guadeloupe received a number of concessions in the following decades (see “Guadeloupe Islanders”). These are not coded because the St. Martins make up only a negligible share of Guadeloupe.
* However, there was a concession on language in 1982:
  + In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers & McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited included French-based Creoles spoken in Guadeloupe, which includes both St. Barthélemy and St. Martin.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). Article 72 to 74 particularly addressed the Caribbean DOM and enabled a referendum in 2003 where voters were asked whether they wanted the French part of St Martin to become a territorial collectivity (Collectivité d’Outre Mer COM). This meant a separation from Guadeloupe, the establishment of an own local administration and own legislative competences regarding tax and immigration (CIA World Factbook; Sutton 2008). Voters voted in favor of the proposal (76.17 %). The granting of a referendum constitutes an act of concession by the government. The new status took effect in 2007. [2003: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* St. Martin became regionally autonomous following the 2007 upgrade to a French overseas collectivity. Hence, we would code regional autonomy as of 2008 (1st of January rule). However, since we code movement termination in 2007, this is not reflected in the coding.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [2007: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | St. Martin Islanders |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* Being part of Guadeloupe, which is coded as powerless throughout, the St Martins were also not represented at the executive level. The very small population size (36,286 in 2011) would have made representation at the center very unlikely anyway. Hence, we code them as powerless throughout. [1996-2012: powerless]

**Group size**

* We do not have data on the number of persons who self-identify as St. Martins. Thus we draw on the island’s population. According to the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (insee.fr), the population of St Martins amounts to 36,286 in 2011. With France’s population totaling 64,933,400 in that same year, we code a population share of 0.0006. [0.0006]

**Regional concentration**

* Whether or not the St Martins can be considered territorially concentrated is ambiguous since we lack population data based on self-identification. We do not know whether there are also self-identified St. Martins in other parts of France (or how many). We decided to code the group as concentrated due to the island status. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No evidence found. [no kin]

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