# GERMANY

## Badeners

Activity: 1952-1972

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* With the foundation of the German Federal Republic there were plans to merge the three south-western Länder (Baden, Württemberg, and Hohenzollern). The government of Baden was vehemently opposed to the merger. Despite Baden’s opposition the merger took effect in 1952. The opponents to the unification did not surrender and began to agitate for the restoration of Baden; hence, we code 1952 as the start date of the movement. The main organization associated with the movement, the Heimatbund Badenerland, enforced the holding of a referendum on the separation of Baden from Baden-Württemberg by handing in a petition signed by more than 15 per cent of Baden’s citizens (a vote had to be held if at least 10 per cent sign a petition). After a lot of back and forth and two rulings by the constitutional court, the vote was finally held in 1970. However, the vote turned out against the separation of Baden (Deutsches Bundesverfassungsgericht; Spiegel 1956). Following the referendum, in 1972, the Heiatbund Badenerland was dissolved (Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek n.d.). We do not find further evidence of separatist activity and so code the end of this movement in 1972. [start date: 1952; end date: 1972]

**Dominant claim**

* The organization associated with the movement, the Heimatbund Badnerland, made claims for the restoration of Baden, implying its separation from the unified Baden-Württemberg. The Heimatbund collected signatures for a popular vote on the restoration of Baden in the 1950s and contended successfully before the constitutional court for the vote (twice!), which eventually was held in 1970 (c2d 2011; Wilhelm 2007; Spiegel 1956). No other claim was found. [1952-1972: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Badeners claimed the territory of Baden, a Napoleonic creation that existed from the early 19th century until 1945 (Wilhlem 2007: 3-8). More specifically, the movement has demanded the restoration of Baden according to its pre-1945 borders. This area encompasses the previous Regierungsbezirke Nordbaden and Südbaden (Spiegel 1956). We code this claim based on a historical GIS dataset of German administrative boundaries from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (2011), which maps the territory in 1945.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Baden that the movement aimed to restore was a Napoleonic creation that existed from the early 19th century until 1945 (Wilhlem 2007: 3-8). In 1871 Baden joined the unified Germany; in 1918 it adopted a republican form of government. Under the Nazis, Germany became a centralized state (formally based on a January 1934 law), thus Baden lost its autonomy (Wilhelm 2007: 13). After the Second World War, Baden was split. Its larger Southern part became a state of its own under French occupation (1946) while the northern part was merged with Württemberg-Baden (under U.S. occupation) in 1947 (Wilhelm 2007: 22). The states’ autonomy remained limited as it was the occupying powers who effectively held power. We code an autonomy concession due to the restoration of South-Baden and a restriction due to the split of the territory. [1946: autonomy concession] [1947: autonomy restriction]
* With the 1949 Grundgesetz Germany again became a federal state, thus South-Baden and Württemberg-Baden (including North-Baden) re-attained autonomy. [1949: autonomy concession]
* After referendums in 1950 (test vote) and 1951 (binding vote), it was decided that the three south-western Länder (Baden, Württemberg), were to be merged to form a unified South-West state, Baden-Württemberg. The referendums involved much tinkering and maneuvering aimed to overcome the Badeners’ opposition to the merger. The merger took effect in 1952. (c2d 2011; Noack 2010: 88-89; Wilhelm 2007). [1951: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1955 Art. 29 Grundgesetz (GG) entered into force (the Allies had suspended the article until 1955), which among other things foresaw the possibility of post-hoc referendums on post-Second World War territorial reconfigurations that had not involved a popular vote. Referendums were promised if 10% of the relevant electorate signs a respective petition. The Heimatbund Badnerland, a separatist outfit, requested a vote on the restoration of Baden. In January 1956, the central government rejected the petition, partly on the grounds that there had been referendums on the question back in 1950/1951 (BVerfGE 5, 34 – Baden-Abstimmung). The Heimatbund filed a complaint with the constitutional court – and won: in May 1956 the court ruled that the 1951 referendum was not in conformity with art. 29 as the referendum was designed in a way so that the Württembergers and Hohenzollerns (who were generally in favor of unification) could outvote the Badeners (who were generally against unification).
* Due to the ruling, the Heimatbund Badnerland was allowed to collect the required signatures (more than 10% of the local enfranschised population), in which it was successful. However, the central government still refused to hold a vote.
* Again, the Heimatbund filed a complaint to the constitutional court. In 1969, the constitutional court set an ultimatum for the referendum and in 1969 Germany’s Bundestag amended art. 29 GG as such that there must be a vote in Baden until 1970. The amendment did not come without further tinkering: the new art. 29 GG set a new quorum. Henceforth, a territorial change requires the endorsement of at least 25% of the electorate (along with a simple majority). Nonetheless, the Badeners were finally granted a referendum on the re-establishment of their state, thus we code a concession (c2d 2011; Noack 2010: 88-89; Wilhelm 2007). [1969: autonomy concession]
* June 7, 1970, the Badeners finally voted. In yet another maneuver the question had been changed before the vote: it no longer referred to the restoration of Baden, but rather to the upholding of Baden-Württemberg. The vote resulted in a resounding 81.9% yes-vote (with a participation rate of 62.5%) (c2d 2011; Noack 2010: 88-89; Wilhelm 2007). The restoration of Baden was off the table and the movement died down subsequently.

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1952 Germany’s three south-western states were merged: Baden, Württemberg and Hohenzollern became Baden-Württemberg. Thus, the Badeners without a doubt lost some autonomy in 1952. However, Baden comprises a sizeable part of the unified state (a little less than half, see Wilhelm 2007: 167) and the Badeners participated in the regional government. Thus, the Badeners are coded as autonomous throughout. [1952-1972: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1949, Germany was re-erected, implying a host change from the Allied Powers to Germany. But this was before the start date and is hence not coded.
* After referendums in 1950 (test vote) and 1951 (binding vote), it was decided that the three south-western Länder (Baden, Württemberg, Hohenzollern), were to be merged to form a unified South-West state, Baden-Württemberg. The referendums involved much tinkering and maneouvring aimed to overcome the Badeners’ opposition to the merger (c2d 2011; Noack 2010: 88-89; Wilhelm 2007). The merger took effect in 1952. [1952: sub-state merger]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Badeners |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Badeners are part of what EPR codes as ethnic Germans. EPR considers ethnicity irrelevant in Germany, but the Germans can be considered a monopoly group. During the movement’s activity, we found evidence of three ministers originating from Baden (Hans Filbinger 1960-1980, Werner Maihofer 1972-1978 and Rainer Offergeld 1978-1980). It is possible that we missed some out, thus this case would profit from further research. We apply a junior partner code as we found evidence of Badener representation in the central executive and that their access to central state power was clearly not restricted and, at least in theory, possible throughout the whole period. [Junior partner]

**Group size**

* We lack figures on the number of people with Badener ethnic identity. Thus, we draw on the regional population. After 1945, Baden was split; its larger Southern part became a state of its own while the northern part was merged with Württemberg Baden. We use the 1950 census estimate of the population of the historic Baden (to which also the movement’s claim refers). According to Wilhelm (2007: 167), Alt-Baden’s population was 2,811,152 in the 1950 census. The same census put West Germany’s population at 50,958,000. [0.0552]

**Regional concentration**

* We could not find population estimates based on Badener ethnic self-identification. However, it is very likely that the Badeners made up the majority in Baden and, although we do not know how many Badeners there were outside Baden, it is very unlikely that this number exceeded the number of Badeners in Baden. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We could not find evidence suggesting that there are numerically significant populations of Badeners outside of Germany. However, there are strong ethnic bonds between the Badeners and Swiss Germans (approx. 4.5 million) in adjoining areas in Switzerland. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Bavarians

Activity: 1949-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Bavaria Party (Bayernpartei, BP) was founded in 1946 to seek the restoration of an independent Bavarian state. Since this is the first evidence for organized separatist activity, we found in the post-WWII phase (note: there had been separatist activity in the interwar years, but not during the Nazi reign, see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39), 1946 is coded as start date. However, in the data set, we do not code the movement before 1949, the year the German Federal Republic was founded. We found no violence in 1946-1948 and thus note prior nonviolent activity.
* The Bavaria Party was represented in the Bundestag in 1949-53 (but not since) and influential in the Bavarian Landtag until the mid-1960s. Keesing’s reports that it was an active participant in the 1969, 1974, 1986, 1987 and 1990 regional and/or national elections. It won 0.1% of the vote in 1994 and 1998 federal elections and 0.1% in 1999 Euro-elections. In its ‘White-Blue Principles’ manifesto (adopted in 2011 and updated in 2017), the Bavaria Party continued to advocate for an independent Bavarian state (Bayenpartei 2022), part of a Europe of the regions (e.g., with Scotland and Catalonia). Further, the party seeks increased autonomy, by strengthening federalism and by giving the Bavarians the right to vote on decisions concerning them (BPB 2021). On this basis, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2020.
* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 39) suggest that in addition to the Bavarian Party, the much larger Christian Social Union (CSU) made claims for increased autonomy, but that argument is ambiguous. In support of Hewitt & Cheetham, Hepburn (2009) calls the CSU a “regionalist” party that seeks to decentralize the German federation with the goal of achieving maximum autonomy for Bavaria in Germany. Yet, according to Strum (2020: 117), the CSU has mistakenly been identified as ‘separatist’ or ‘autonomist’, as it is ‘a party with a regional base but national ambitions’.
* In a 2014 survey, 83% of Bavarians suggested that Bavaria could survive as an independent state (Minahan 2016: 74). [start date: 1946; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Bavaria Party (Bayernpartei, BP) has made claims for both independence and autonomy (cf. Bayernpartei 2022; BPB 2021). Which claim is dominant is ambiguous; Minahan (2002: 300), for example, describes the party’s goals with “sovereignty and eventual independence”.
* It is important to note that the Bayernpartei is relatively small – the most votes the BP ever got at regional elections was 17.9% in 1950. As previously noted, some sources also suggest that the CSU has made claims for increased autonomy (Hepburn 2009; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39). The CSU has dominated Bavarian politics since the Second World War and came out as the strongest party in all but one election (the Social Democratic Party was the strongest party by a very small margin in 1950) (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39). Yet, according to Strum (2020: 117), the CSU has mistakenly been identified as “separatist” or “autonomist”, as it is “a party with a regional base but national ambitions”.
* Overall, the evidence we collected suggested that a relatively small party has continuously made claims for both increased autonomy and independence while a much larger party is sometimes also considered as autonomist. On this basis, we code the movement’s dominant claim as for increased autonomy. [1949-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* As per above, it is clear that independence claims have been made – particularly by Bayernpartei (Bavaria Party). The party historically performed well in elections, achieving shares above 8% from 1949 until 1958; and typically above 0.8% from 1962 until 1978. The party has since polled between 0.4% and 2.1% (Wikipedia n.d.). While CSU is autonomist, BP is “regionalist-separatist” and has consistently requested for an “independent Bavarian state” – albeit with an intermediate goal of increased autonomy (BPB 2021). This is confirmed by Sorens (2012: 155-156). [start date: 1946; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Bavarians claim the territory of the federal state of Bavaria. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas Database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Bavaria, formerly independent, joined the unified Germany in 1871. The constitution of 1871 granted Bavaria a “larger measure of independence than any of the other constituent states of the German Empire” (Encyclopedia Britannica). As revolution swept Germany after WWI, the Bavarian king was deposed and the Bavarian republic proclaimed. Kurt Eisner declared Bavaria independent on November 22, 1918. On April 7, 1919, the Soviet Republic of Bavaria was declared following a communist coup. German troops defeated the Communists a month later and Bavaria was integrated into the German federation. In November 1923, Hitler attempted to seize Munich (Minahan 2000: 106-107). Under the Nazis, Germany became a centralized state (formally based on a January 1934 law), thus Bavaria lost its autonomy (Wilhelm 2007: 13). After the German surrender in May 1945, the state of Bavaria was restored in September 1945; however, its autonomy remained limited as it was the occupying powers who effectively held power. [1945: autonomy concession]
* With the 1949 Grundgesetz, which constituted the German Federal Republic, Germany again became a federal state. Bavaria became a state of the Federal Republic and re-attained autonomy (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Encyclopedia Britannica). [1949: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2017, chairman of the Bayernpartei Florian Weber claimed that Bavaria should be able to make its own decisions, without being ruled by the central government and Europe. The party tried to organize a referendum to leave the European Union, similar to the Brexit referendum, which was stopped by the German Supreme Court (The Washington Post 2017). This is not a restriction as defined here as Bavaria (less alone the Bayernpartei) does not have a right to call a referendum on Bavaria’s association with the EU.

**Regional autonomy**

* Bavaria has been a federal state since 1949. [1949-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1949, Germany was re-erected, implying a host change from the Allied Powers to Germany. [1949: host change (new)]
* [1949: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bavarians |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), unlike all other Christian-democratic state sections, did not join the federal Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU). Nevertheless, as the CDU’s sister party, the CSU has consistently been represented in the national executive (usually disproportionately) when the Christian Democrats were in power (1949-1969; 1982-1998; 2005-present). After gaining votes in the 2013 Bavarian state and federal elections, the CSU saw the worst election results in 2021, with 5.2% of national votes and 31.7% in Bavaria (Der Bundeswahlleiter 2021). Despite this, the Bavarians also had representation in all governments without CDU/CSU participation except in the first cabinet of Gerhard Schröder from 1998-2002. Given the Bavarians’ strong and consistent representation in the national cabinet, we apply a junior partner code throughout. [1949-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 296) reports an estimate of 10.235 million Bavarians. This figure seems too high, given that Bavaria in 2012 had a population of roughly 12.5 million and that about a third are Franconians (see the respective entry). Therefore, we draw on Minahan (2016: 73), who reports a population of 6.8 million as of 2015.
  + The group size changes significantly after the German re-unification in 1989/1990. According to the 1970 census, West Germany’s population was 58,520,000. [1949-1989: 0.1162]
  + In 2015, Germany had a population of 81.69 million according to the World Bank. [1990-2020: 0.0832]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 296), the majority of the Bavarians live in the state of Bavaria, where they comprise approx. 80% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Apart from minor Bavarian communities in Austria and Italy, we could not find evidence suggesting that there are numerically significant populations of Bavarians outside of Germany. However, there are quite strong ethnic bonds between the Bavarians and the Tyroleans in Austria (Minahan 2002: 297), who number approx. 500,000 (Minahan 2002: 1946). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Franconians

Activity: 1989-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1989 Franconian regionalists formed the Fränkische Bund, an organization making claims for a separate Franconian Bundeland to be carved out of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and possibly Thuringia. This is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, thus 1989 is coded as start date.
* Immediately, the Fränkische Bund began to collect signatures for a separate Franconian Land. More than 8,000 signed the petition (approximately 7,200 signatures were considered valid by the Federal Government), enough to request a popular vote in accordance with the German constitution. However, the Federal Government declined the request. Complaints with the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights remained unsuccessful.
* The Fränkische Bund has continued its activities, mainly in Bavaria (Fraenkischer Bund). For example, since 1990, the Fränkische Bund organizes an annual Franconian day. Its statute contains a claim for the creation of a separate Franconian land. Furthermore, in 2009 the Partei für Franken was formed. (Partei für Franken) The party makes a somewhat ambiguous claim for a separate Franconian land: while saying that separation is currently an “unrealistic political vision”, they also state that the establishment of a separate Franconian Land should be seriously considered if a reorganization of Germany’s administrative structure is on the agenda. Furthermore, the party advocates the merger of three Frankish districts (Lower, Middle and Upper Franconia). In the 2013 Bavarian state elections the party achieved between 1.6% (in Lower Franconia) and 2.9% (in Upper Franconia). In the 2018 Bavarian state elections the party achieved 1.47% of the votes, defending a seat in Middle Franconia (Bezirk Mittlefranken 2018). In the 2020 local elections the party won again mandates in Hof, Roth and Feucht, despite losing votes in Hof (Partei für Franken 2020). Roth (2015: 110-111) reports that Franconians want to create a separate state within Germany, but that no one is ‘pushing terribly hard’ for this to happen. Based on this, the movement is coded ongoing. [start date: 1989; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Fränkische Bund, established in 1989, made claims for a separate Franconian Bundesland to be carved out of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and possibly Thuringia. A separate Franken Land was also the aim of the petition initiated by the Fränkische Bund and signed by 8,000 people. Hence we code a claim for sub-state secession. Sub-state secession remained the dominant claim also after the emergence of the Partei für Franken in 2009. Although the new party considers the separation a currently “unrealistic political vision” it also states that the establishment of a separate Franken Land should be seriously considered if a reorganization of Germany’s administrative structure is on the agenda (see Roth 2015). [1989-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Franconians claims have varied within the movement. The dominant claim refers to three administrative districts from Bavaria, the Upper, Middle and Lower Franconia, even if sometimes territorial claims for parts of Baden – Württemberg, Thuringia and Hessen are also made (Roth 2015: 110f). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 108), who only maps the areas within Bavaria.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Once themost powerful Christian kingdom of early medieval Western Europe, Franconia began to fragment into secular and ecclesiastical principalities in the thirteenth century. These territories formed the Landfriedensbund (regional peace-keeping league) in 1340 and the Franconian Kreis (circle, or administrative district) that was set up in the early 16th century. The Franconian Kreis still today serves as an important reference for Franconian nationalism (Encylopedia Britannica).
* In the reorganization of Germany under Napoleon, the Franconian region was divided between the kingdoms of Bavaria and Württemberg and the Grand Duchy of Baden, with Bavaria receiving the largest share. To counteract the scattered regionalism the Bavarian administration was reformed in 1938 and the provinces of Upper, Middle, and Lower Franconia were created (Encylopedia Britannica).
* Bavaria, Baden and Wurtemberg joined the unified Germany in 1871. The constitution of 1871 granted Bavaria a larger measure of independence than any of the other constituent states of the German Empire” (Encyclopedia Britannica).
* Under the Nazis, Germany became a centralized state (formally based on a January 1934 law), thus Bayern and hence also the Franconian minority of Bavaria lost their autonomy (Wilhelm 2007: 13). After the German surrender in May 1945, the states of Bavaria, Würtemberg-Baden, Baden and Würtemberg-Hohenzollern were restored in September 1945; however, autonomy remained limited as it was the occupying powers who effectively held power.
* With the 1949 Grundgesetz Germany again became a federal state, thus granting the sub-states autonomy. The Franconians were small minorities in all states but Bavaria.

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

* Following the population numbers of the census 2011, the population of the Franconian regions of Bavaria make up 32.6 percent of Bavaria’s total population. Given the executive influence of Franconians in Bavarian politics (e.g., Markus Söder, who has led Bavaria since 2018, is from Franken) and the fact that Bavaria has been a federal state since 1949, we code the Franconians as regionally autonomous. [1989-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Franconians |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Franconians are part of what EPR codes as ethnic Germans. EPR considers ethnicity irrelevant in Germany, but the Germans can be considered a monopoly group. During the movement’s activity, we found evidence of several ministers originating from Franconia or at least representing a Franconian district (Carl-Dieter Spranger 1993-1998; Wolfgang Bötsch 1993-1997; Paul Lehrieder 2005- present; Hans-Peter Friedrich 2011-2013; Andrea Lindholz 2013-present; Anja Weisgerber 2013-present; Manuela Rottmann 2017- present). Hence we apply a junior partner code as we found evidence of Franconian representation in the central executive and that their access to central state power was clearly not restricted and, at least in theory, possible throughout the whole period. [1989-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* In light of the lack of any source that provides the number of ethnic Franconians we code the population share of what is considered the Franconian territory today. There is no officially defined spatial confinement of the historically significant region Franconia but it can roughly be demarcated by the territory in which the East Franconian dialects predominate. In terms of today’s administrative divisions, this includes the regions of Lower Franconia (Unterfranken), Middle Franconia (Mittelfranken), and Upper Franconia (Oberfranken) in Bavaria, the districts of Schmalkalden-Meiningen, Hildburghausen, Sonneberg and the kreisfreie Stadt of Suhl in Thuringia and the districts of Schwäbisch-Hall, Hohenlohekreis, and Main-Tauber-Kreis in Baden-Württemberg. There are some districts in Hesse (Fulda and Odenwaldkreis), Baden-Würtemberg (Heilbronn) that are considered to be partially Franconian. Since we already overestimate the Franconian population these districts are not taken into consideration. According to the 2011 German Census (Zensus 2011) the population of Franconia amounts to 4,760,398 (Middle Franconia (1,682,297), Upper Franconia (1,063,454), Lower Franconia (1,300,647), Thuringia (290,000), Baden-Württemberg (424,000)). With Germany’s population totaling 80,209,997 in 2011, the population of Franconia makes up a share of 0.05935. This number is overestimated as it is not related to ethnic identity but only indicates the population of the administrative equivalent of Franconia. However, in light of the lack of any other source we code the region-based population share. [1990-2020: 0.0593]
  + In early 1989 Germany was not yet unified. According to the 1970 census, West Germany’s population was 58,520,000. [1989: 0.0813]

**Regional concentration**

* We could not find information on the number of self-identified Franconians. The best proxy for an estimate is the number of Franconian language/dialect speakers. As noted above, the East Franconian dialects predominate in the regions of Lower Franconia (Unterfranken), Middle Franconia (Mittelfranken), and Upper Franconia (Oberfranken) in Bavaria, the districts of Schmalkalden-Meiningen, Hildburghausen, Sonneberg and the kreisfreie Stadt of Suhl in Thuringia and the districts of Schwäbisch-Hall, Hohenlohekreis, and Main-Tauber-Kreis in Baden-Württemberg. There are some districts in Hesse (Fulda and Odenwaldkreis), Baden-Würtemberg (Heilbronn) that are considered to be partially Franconian. Since the Franconian dialects predominate in this (spatially contiguous) area, we assume that the Franconians constitute a majority and code them as territorially concentrated. Large Franconian communities outside this area appear not to exist. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* It is debatable whether there is a direct continuity between the Franconians and the historic Germanic tribe of the Franks. The latter absorbed into the peoples of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Flanders. We do not code ethnic kin since we could not find evidence of strong ethnic bonds between the Franconians in Germany and the other people of Frank descent. [no kin]

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## Lusatian Sorbs

Activity: 1990-2000

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Domowina, an umbrella organization for Sorbian associations, was founded in 1912. The primary goal of the organization has been the promotion of the Sorb culture and language. Only at two occasions after 1945 did we find evidence of claims that go beyond cultural demands. The first time occurred at the end of the Second World War when the Sorbs sought allied support for independence (Minahan 2002) or the unification with Czechoslovakia (Oschlies 1990: 30). Their demands were ignored and the Sorb national movement was subsequently suppressed by the Soviets. At this time, there was no German state as Germany was occupied; the German Democratic Republic was founded only in 1949. Therefore, we do not code this first phase of activity.
* Plans for an autonomous Sorbian homeland reemerged in late 1989 in the context of German re-unification (Minahan 2002). We code 1990 as the start date since this is when Germany reunified. Domowina and another Sorb cultural organization, the Sorbian National Assembly, have been active since then but, besides demands for the preservation of their culture and language, we did not find further evidence of separatist activity (Domowina Union of Lusatian Sorbs). For instance, in 2008, Domowina Union of Lusatian Sorbs published a memorandum asking for help against the threat of cultural extinction (Domowina 2008). Later, in 2020 Domowina asked for protection of minorities through law and for further political participation, but not for an autonomous homeland (Dpa International 2020). Based on this, we code the movement as terminated in 2000 based on the ten-years rule. [start date: 1990; end date: 2000]

**Dominant claim**

* After the First and Second World War the Sorbs aimed at independence. They considered the unification with another Slavic state (Poland or Czechoslovakia) or the establishment of an own Sorb state within the German Reich. However, when the claim for self-determination reemerged in 1989/1990, it seemed to have moderated. According to Minahan (2002) there were plans for an autonomous Sorbian homeland/Sorb Bundesland within Germany. Both Domowina and the Sorbian National Assembly have been active since then, but besides demands for the preservation of their culture and language, we did not find further evidence of activity towards more self-determination. Hence, we code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. [1990-2000: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There were claims for independence in 1945 (see above), but this was before the formation of the German Federal Republic. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Lusatian Sorb claims corresponds to the historical Lusatia region, which includes parts of Saxony and Brandenburg and is composed of the cities Bautzen, Görlitz, Kamenz, Niesky, Zittau Calau, Cottbus, Forst, Guben, Hoyerswerda and Weisswasser (Minahan 1996: 34). We code the historical Lusatia region based on a map published by the Lusatian-Serbian National Committee in Bautzen (Semik 1945). Note that historical Lusatia stretched beyond Germany’s present-day boundaries, but we only code those parts of Lusatia that belong to Germany today, as the Sorb’s have demanded increased autonomy within Germany alone.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Until the 1800s, the Sorbs lived relatively peaceful in Saxony, following Lutheran Protestantism but retaining their own language. When Napoleon lost Lower Lusatia to Prussia, Prussia pursued an intense Germanization campaign; the eastern districts experienced something similar after 1871. Resistance to forced assimilation sparked Sorb nationalism in the late 19th Century. To escape harsh Prussian rule, many Sorbs emigrated (Minahan 2002: 1748f.).
* The German parliament declared in 1908 that German must be the spoken language of the empire and placed official restraints on the Sorb cultural and national revival. An organization called Domowina (Nation) was formed in 1912 and pressed for Sorb secession from the German Empire. In November 1918, as defeated Germany collapsed in revolution, Sorbian leaders declared the autonomy of Lusatia and dispatched a delegation to Berlin to negotiate the peaceful secession of Lusatia from Germany. Rebuffed by the German government, the Sorbs declared Lusatia independent of Germany on 1 January 1919 (Minahan 2002: 1749).
* In the postwar German reorganization the states of Saxony and Prussia again divided the Sorbian homeland. In 1929, the Sorbs won the right to use their language in education and religion, but concessions fell short of Domowina’s demands (Minahan 2002: 1749).
* In 1945, the Sorbs attempted to win support for Sorb independence. In an exchange of territories the Americans withdrew from the region and allowed the Soviets to occupy Saxony and Lusatia. Western and central Lusatia was incorporated into East Germany in 1949, where it was further divided into three districts, while the portion of Lusatia east of the Neisse River was ceded to Poland (Minahan 2002: 1749).
* In the GDR period from 1949 until 1989/1990 ethnic self-determination was ruled out at an early stage, while autonomy in cultural matters was, at least de-jure, constitutionally enshrined. According to Glaser (2007: 112), the “conditions for the maintenance of Sorbian language and culture in Eastern Germany since 1945 surpassed by far what had been offered to the Sorbian community under previous political regimes.” This is particularly in the years from 1954-1958 when the East German authorities created several Sorb institutions and bilingualism in Lusatia was the official government policy.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The German reunification treaty (“Einigungsvertrag”) was signed on August 31, 1990. As a protocol note to Article 35 the treaty stated that (1) there shall be freedom of commitment to the distinctive Sorbian way of life and to Sorbian culture; (2) the maintenance and further development of Sorbian culture and traditions shall be guaranteed and that (3) the Sorbian people and their organizations shall be free to cultivate and preserve the Sorbian language in public life. It does not appear as if the Sorbs’ status was increased thereby, thus we do not code a concession.
* In 1991 the federal government in collaboration with the federal state of Brandenburg and the Free State of Saxony established the Foundation for the Sorbian People (Stiftung für das Sorbische Volk) in order to preserve, develop and promote the Sorbian language, culture and traditions as an expression of the identity of the Sorbian people. The foundation is financed by the German government. [1991: cultural rights concession]
* Since the German federal states have autonomy as regards matters of education and culture, the cultural rights of the Sorbs are enshrined in the constitutions of Saxony and Brandenburg. In Saxony, for example, there are the Provisional Administrative Procedures Act of January 21, 1993 which guarantees the use of Sorbian when dealing with the authorities or the Local Authority Regulations for the Free State of Saxony, which regulates the local governments’ responsibility to promote the Sorbian language and culture. However, these acts “are not supported by specific implementing regulations or follow-up legislation” (Research Centre of Multilingualism). Hence, we do not code them. According to Domowina, there were two relevant acts in Brandenburg and Saxony as regards the protection of and support for the Sorbs. Since Sorbs live in both Saxony and Brandenburg, we code both acts. These are:
  + The "Law on Settling the Rights of the Sorbs", which was passed in 1994 in Brandenburg and grants far-reaching concessions and minority rights to the Sorb minority of Brandenburg. [1994: cultural rights concession]
  + The "Law on the Rights of the Sorbs in the Free State of Saxony", which was passed by the Saxon parliament in 1999 and grants far-reaching concessions and minority rights to the Sorb minority of Saxony. [1999: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1990, Lusatia became part of West Germany. [1990: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lusatian Sorbs |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We did not find any evidence of representation in the central government nor any of discrimination for the period of activity of the Lusatian Sorbs movement for self-determination (1989-2012). Hence, we code the Lusatian Sorbs as powerless throughout. [1990-2000: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan, there are around 600,000 Sorbs in central Europe of which most live in the eastern German states. This number, however, appears too high. According to other sources, the number of Sorbs has been continuously declining and amounts to 60,000 in 2010 (Domowina), 67,000 in 1987 (Sochorek 2007) or 60,000-80,000 in 1990 (Oschlies 1990). We use the upper bound provided by Oschlies (1990), 80,000, in combination with (unified) Germany’s population of 79.43 million in 1990 (World Bank). [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1746), the majority of the Sorbs is located in Lusatia, where they comprise approx. 43% of the local population. They are thus a minority in their territory, which is why we code them as not concentrated. We found no alternatively defined, smaller territory in which the Sorbs would form a majority. Other groups in Lusatia are the Germans (54%) or the Poles (2%). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1746), there is a significant Sorb community in Poland (40,000). However, this community is not large enough (>100,000) to be coded as kin. No other kin found. [no kin]

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## Oldenburgers

Activity: 1956-1985

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* After the Second World War, the three Länder Oldenburg, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Hannover were merged to form the new Land of Lower Saxony in 1946, similar to the merger of Baden-Württemberg. This occurred against the will of many Oldenburgers. Taking advantage of a constitutional provision, the Oldenburger movement in 1956 successfully petitioned for a referendum on separation from Hannover by collecting the signatures of more than 10 per cent of the former Land’s citizens. Because this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, we peg the start date to 1956. However, the government refused to hold the vote, until it was forced to hold the referendum by way of a constitutional ruling (following an appeal by the Heimatbund Badenerland – the Badeners faced a similar problem). The vote was eventually held in 1975, and a majority opted for separation, requiring the central government to react. The central government refused to partition Lower Saxony (Deutsche Bundesverfassungsgericht; Spiegel 1975). We do not find evidence of further separatist activity. Following our ten-year rule we code the movement as terminated in 1985. [start date: 1956; end date: 1985]

**Dominant claim**

* The claim has been for the restoration of Oldenburg and thus separation from Lower Saxony, as evidenced by the 1956 petition and continued agitation thereafter (Spiegel 1975). [1956-1985: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Oldenburgers is the Oldenburg Land without its exclaves. This territory was known until 1946 also as the Free State Oldenburg, and existed until 1978 as the administrative district of Oldenburg (Spiegel 1975). We code this claim based on a historical GIS dataset of German administrative boundaries published by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (2011).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found for the Oldenburgers movement, and thus we code it as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Oldenburg joined unified Germany in 1871 and was henceforth a German state. In 1918 Oldenburg adopted a republican form of government. Under the Nazis, Germany became a centralized state (formally based on a January 1934 law), thus Oldenburg lost its autonomy (Wilhelm 2007: 13). In 1946 Oldenburg lost its separate status completely as it was merged with Hannover and Schaumburg-Lippe. We code this as a restriction since the Allies were about to restore the federation, though noting that Oldenburg at the time had very limited autonomy (the effective power was with the occupying powers) (Teller n.d.). [1946: autonomy restriction]
* In 1949 the Grundgesetz entered into force, including article 29 (which was suspended until 1955) that foresaw the possibility of post-hoc referendums on post-Second World War territorial configurations were no referendum had been held.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After the Second World War, the three Länder Oldenburg, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Hannover were merged to form the new Land of Lower Saxony in 1946. This occurred against the will of many Oldenburgers. In 1955 Art. 29 Grundgesetz (GG) entered into force (the Allies had suspended the article until 1955), which among other things foresaw the possibility of post-hoc referendums on post-Second World War territorial reconfigurations that had not involved a popular vote. Referendums were promised if 10% of the relevant electorate signs a respective petition. Taking advantage of this constitutional provision, the Oldenburger movement successfully petitioned for a referendum on separation from Hannover in 1956. However, the central government refused to hold a vote.
* Facing a similar problem, the Heimatbund Badnerland filed a complaint with the constitutional court and won the right to have a referendum in 1969. That same year, the German Bundestag amended art. 29 Grundgesetz (GG) as such that there must be a vote in Baden until 1970 and in Oldenburg and in Schaumburg-Lippe by March 31, 1975. [1969: autonomy concession]
* The referendum was held in 1975; upon a turnout of 38%, 81% of voters wanted to restore Oldenburg (c2d 2011; Meerkamp 2011: 343-345). Since the referendum was not binding, the central government had merely to react but not to implement the result. In January 1976, the central government refused to restore Oldenburg despite the referendum result. The constitutional court confirmed the constitutionality of this decision in 1978 (BVerfGE 49, 15 – Volksentscheid Oldenburg; Teller n.d.). To reflect this, we code a restriction. [1976: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1946 Oldenburg was merged with Lower Saxony. Lower Saxony has been a federal state with significant autonomy throughout. However, Oldenburg comprises only about ten per cent of Lower Saxony’s population (see below). Even if there appears to have been no discrimination against the Oldenburgers, their influence over the regional government appears too limited, thus we do not code regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1949, Germany was re-erected, implying a host change from the Allied Powers to Germany. But this was before the start date and is hence not coded.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Oldenburgers |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Oldenburgers form a (very small) part of what EPR codes as ethnic Germans. EPR considers ethnicity irrelevant in Germany, but the Germans can be considered as a monopoly group. Despite the Oldenburgers being part of the ethnic group of the Germans, we did not find any evidence of representation in the central government for the period of activity of the Oldenburg movement for self-determination (1956-1985). Hence we code the Oldenburgers as powerless throughout. [1956-1985: powerless]

**Group size**

* We lack information on the number of people self-identifying as Oldenburgers. Thus, we draw on the region’s population. Post-war population data for Oldenburg is difficult to get as the former Land was merged with Lower Saxony. Therefore, we draw on the 1939 data and assume Oldenburg had the same growth rate than Lower Saxony. In the 1939 census, Oldenburg had a population of approximately 556,000. According to the 1950 (1939) census, Lower Saxony had a population of about 6.8 million (4.55 million) (Schmitt et al. 1994). Thus the 1950 estimate is approximately 831,000. The 1950 census put West Germany’s population at 50,958,000. [0.0163]

**Regional concentration**

* We lack information on the number of people who self-identify as Oldenburgers, but it appears likely that the threshold is met. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We could not find evidence suggesting that there are numerically significant populations of Oldenburgers outside of Germany. We do not code Germans in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against a German-dominated government. [no kin]

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## Schaumburg-Lippeners

Activity: 1956-1985

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* After the Second World War, the three Länder Oldenburg, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Hannover were merged to form the new Land of Lower Saxony in 1946, similar to the merger of Baden-Württemberg. Similar to the Oldenburg movement, the Schaumburg-Lippener movement successfully collected signatures to demand the holding of a referendum on restoration of the old Land in 1956. Because this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, we peg the start date to 1956. The central government did not hold the vote until it was forced to do so by way of a constitutional ruling (following an appeal by the Heimatbund Badenerland – the Badeners faced a similar problem). The vote was eventually held in 1975, and a majority opted for separation, requiring the central government to react. The central government refused to partition Lower Saxony (Spiegel 1975). We do not find evidence of further separatist activity, Following our ten-year rule we code the movement as terminated in 1985. [start date: 1956; end date: 1985]

**Dominant claim**

* The claim has been for the restoration of Schaumburg-Lippe and thus separation from Lower Saxony, as evidenced by the 1956 petition and continued agitation thereafter (Spiegel 1975). [1956-1985: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Schaumburg-Lippeners is the historical free state Schaumburg-Lippe, an area that is now integrated into Lower Saxony. We code this claim based on a historical GIS dataset of German administrative boundaries published by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (2011). The area coded matches the region described in a news report on the 1975 referendum (Spiegel 1975).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding for the entire movement. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical Context**

* Schaumburg-Lippe joined unified Germany in 1871 and was henceforth a German state. In 1918 Oldenburg adopted a republican form of government. Under the Nazis, Germany became a centralized state (formally based on a January 1934 law), thus Oldenburg lost its autonomy (Wilhelm 2007: 13). In 1946 Schaumburg-Lippe lost its separate status completely as it was merged with Hannover and Oldenburg (Schaumburg). We code this as a restriction since the Allies were about to restore the federation, though noting that Schaumburg-Lippe at the time had very limited autonomy (the effective power was with the occupying powers). [1946: autonomy restriction]
* In 1949 the Grundgesetz entered into force, including article 29 (which was suspended until 1955) that foresaw the possibility of post-hoc referendums on post-Second World War territorial configurations were no referendum had been held.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After the Second World War, the three Länder Oldenburg, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Hannover were merged to form the new Land of Lower Saxony in 1946. This occurred against the will of many Schaumburg-Lippeners. In 1955 Art. 29 Grundgesetz (GG) entered into force (the Allies had suspended the article until 1955), which among other things foresaw the possibility of post-hoc referendums on post-Second World War territorial reconfigurations that had not involved a popular vote. Referendums were promised if 10% of the relevant electorate signs a respective petition. Taking advantage of this constitutional provision, the Schaumburg-Lipeners movement successfully petitioned for a referendum on separation from Hannover in 1956. However, the central government refused to hold a vote.
* Facing a similar problem, the Heimatbund Badnerland filed a complaint with the constitutional court and won the right to have a referendum in 1969. That same year, the German Bundestag amended art. 29 Grundgesetz (GG) as such that there must be a vote in Baden until 1970 and in Oldenburg and in Schaumburg-Lippe by March 31, 1975. [1969: autonomy concession]
* The referendum was held in 1975; upon a turnout of 50%, 79% of voters wanted to restore Schaumburg-Lippe (c2d 2011; Meerkamp 2011: 343-345). Since the referendum was not binding, the central government had merely to react but not to implement the result. In January 1976, the central government refused to restore Schaumburg-Lippe despite the referendum result. The constitutional court confirmed the constitutionality of this decision in 1978 (BVerfGE 49, 15 – Volksentscheid Oldenburg; Teller n.d.). To reflect this, we code a restriction. [1976: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1946 Schaumburg-Lippe was merged with Lower Saxony. Lower Saxony has been a federal state with significant autonomy throughout. However, Schaumburg-Lippe comprises only about one per cent of Lower Saxony’s population (see below), thus we do not code regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1949, Germany was re-erected, implying a host change from the Allied Powers to Germany. But this was before the start date and is hence not coded.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Schaumburg-Lippeners |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Schaumburg-Lippeners form a (very small) part of what EPR codes as ethnic Germans. EPR considers ethnicity irrelevant in Germany, but the Germans can be considered as a monopoly group. Despite the Schaumburg-Lippeners being part of the ethnic group of the Germans, we did not find any evidence of representation in the central government for the period of activity of the Schaumburg-Lippeners movement for self-determination (1956-1985). Hence we code the Schaumburg-Lippeners as powerless throughout. [1956-1985: powerless]

**Group size**

* We lack information on the number of people self-identifying as Schaumburg-Lippeners. Thus, we draw on the region’s population. Post-war population data for Schaumburg-Lippe is difficult to get as the former Land was merged with Lower Saxony. Thus we draw on the 1939 data and assume Schaumburg-Lippe had the same growth rate than Lower Saxony. In the 1939 census, Schaumburg-Lippe had a population of approximately 52,000. According to the 1950 (1939) census, Lower Saxony had a population of about 6.8 million (4.55 million) (Schmitt et al. 1994). Thus the 1950 estimate is approximately 78,000. The 1950 census put West Germany’s population at 50,958,000. [0.0015]

**Regional concentration**

* We lack information on the number of people self-identifying as Schaumburg-Lippeners, but it appears likely that the threshold is met, given the movement’s regional character. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We could not find evidence suggesting that there are numerically significant populations of Schaumburg-Lippeners outside of Germany. We do not code Germans in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against a German-dominated government. [no kin]

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