# INDIA

## Andhrans

Activity: 1972-1973; 2006-2014

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1956, the Telangana/Telugu region of Hyderabad was added to Andhra to form Visalandhra or Greater Andhra (Minahan 2002). Frictions between Andhrans and Telanganas started to develop in the 1960s and in 1969, the Telanganas began to mobilize for their own state (Minahan 2002). In reaction to this, the Jai Andhra was formed in 1972, which demanded the creation of a smaller Andhra state without Telangana (Seshan 2018; Time 1973). 1972 is coded as the start date.
* Prime Minister Indira Gandhi intervened and, in 1973, a political settlement was reached (the “Six-Point Formula”. This appears to have satisfied the Andhrans and claims for a separate (smaller) Andhran state ceased (Indian Express 2022; The New Indian Express 2009a; Seshan 2018). [start date 1: 1972; end date 1: 1973]
* The movement for a separate smaller Andhra state re-emerged in the 2000s. The exact start date is not clear, but it seems that the movement gained momentum again on the 34th death anniversary of Jai Andhra movement protagonist Kakani Venkataratnam in 2006. At this point, the demand for a separate state was mainly advanced by The Andhra Joint Action Committee (AJAC). We peg the second start date of the movement to 2006. We found evidence of activity up to 2012 and in 2014, Andhra was bifurcated and two separate states created: Telangana and a smaller Andhra Pradesh. The end date is therefore coded in 2014 (Andhra Café 2006; The New Indian Express 2009b, 2010a and 2010b; United News of India 2012). [start date 2: 2006; end date 2: 2014]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1972, the Jai Andhra movement demanded separation from Telangana, and the creation of a separate Andhra state. [1972-1973: sub-state secession claim]
* Similarly, when the movement resurfaced again, the Andhra Joint Action Committee (AJAC) demanded a separate state. This demand was in line with the current Telangana movement (which demanded a separate Telangana state), and it was in fact also supported by the same. [2006-2014: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed consists of 13 districts in the southern part of Andhra Pradesh (which became Andhra Pradesh after the bifurcation of the state in 2014) (United News of India 2012). This included the region of Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence. Hence, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* At the time of independence, Telugu-speakers were located in Andhra (part of Madras Presidency) and in parts of Hyderabad, which formally joined the union only in 1948 (according to most sources, 1949 according to Minahan 2002: 115, 1872). Hyderabad was not directly under British rule and had a Muslim ruler. In 1941, Telangana leaders tried to overthrow the Muslim rulers and establish a communist state. When India and Pakistan became independent, the Muslim prince wavered between independence and joining Pakistan. The Telanganas rose against the prince and the Indian government used the opportunity to intervene. In 1949, Hyderabad joined the Indian Union as Hyderabad State (Minahan 2002: 1872).
* In 1920 Madras presidency (which the Telugus shared with Tamil speakers and other linguistic groups) attained limited autonomy and a locally elected government, but it appears that Madras state was dominated by Tamils (see below).
* The 1949 constitution lists Telugu in its Eighth Schedule; this implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004).
* After the movement’s leader fasted to death, which caused several strikes and protests, the Indian government gave in in 1953 and the state of Andhra Pradesh was established out of the Telugu-speaking areas of the Madras state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 127; Guha 2003). In 1956 the Telugu-speaking areas from Hyderabad were added to Andhra Pradesh (Minahan 2002: 118).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Telangana had in place the so-called Mulki rules, which ensured that native residents (Mulki) could obtain government posts. When the newly formed state allowed a great number of non-Mulki to get government positions, protest broke out leading to the Andhra Pradesh High Court to declare the Mulki rules void. In 1972, when the Supreme High Court upheld the rules, the Jai Andhra movement was created to demand a separate state for Andhra. This caused the resignation of several ministers, including the Chief Minister of the state. While it is ambiguous whether the abandonment of the Mulki rules should be counted as a restriction as defined here, we code an autonomy restriction because the developments led to president’s rule being imposed in the region in January 1973 (Indian Express 2022). [1973: autonomy restriction]
* In September 1973, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi intervened and reached a political settlement about the Mulki rules (Indian Express 2022). In addition to development plans for the backward areas, the “Six-Point Formula” involved dividing Andhra Pradesh in 6 zones, with jobs reservations being decided based on the zone (Indian Express 2022; The New Indian Express 2009a). This meant that the application of the Mulki rules was not necessary anymore. To back up the formula, the PM initiated the 32nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution. Overall, it is ambiguous whether the six-point formula can be seen as a concession as defined here. President’s rule was lifted in December 1973 after this; we do not code this as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In 2014, the State of Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated, and Telangana attained statehood through the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act (commonly known as the Telangana Act) (Times of India 2014). [2014: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Andhrans made up about 60% of the population of Andhra Pradesh, an Indian state equipped with significant autonomy rights (Minahan 2002: 1873). [1972-1973: regional autonomy] [2006-2014: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The State of Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated through the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act in 2014. [2014: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Telugus |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Telugu (Non-SC/ST/OBCs) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75020000 |

**Power access**

* The Telugus – of which the Andhrans make up ca. 60% - are coded as junior partner in EPR. [Junior partner]

**Group size**

* There were 38.5 million Andhrans in India in 2002 according to Minahan (2002: 115). According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,093 million in 2002. [0.0352]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 115), 85% of Andhrans live in their homeland, where they make up 84% of the local population. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for transborder ethnic kin. [no kin]

**Sources**

Andhra Cafè 2006. ““Jai Andhra” Now in Momentum!”. December 26. <https://web.archive.org/web/20110707141302/http://www.andhracafe.com/index.php?m=show&id=16085> [September 01, 2022].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Indian Express (2022). “Explained: How Telangana Became a Separate State.” June 07. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-telangana-separate-state-andhra-pradesh-kcr-7954289/> [September 01, 2022].

Minahan, James (2002). Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Seshan, K. S. S. (2018). “Telangana: History and the formation of a new state.” *Studies in People’s History* 5(1): 72-82.

The New Indian Express (2009a). “Six-Point Formula.” <https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhra-pradesh/2009/dec/08/six-point-formula-110969.html> [August 25, 2022].

The New Indian Express (2009b). “Separate Andhra Rising From the Ashes?.” December 28. https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhra-pradesh/2009/dec/28/separate-andhra-rising-from-the-ashes-116778.html [September 01, 2022].

The New Indian Express (2010a). “TRS to Chant ‘Jai Andhra’ Too.” May 20. https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhra-pradesh/2010/may/20/trs-to-chant-jai-andhra-too-157981.html [September 01, 2022].

The New Indian Express (2010b). “Splittsville the Only Option, Says AJAC.” May 25. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhra-pradesh/2010/may/25/splittsville-the-only-option-says-ajac-156145.html> [September 01, 2022].

Time (1973). “Jai Andhra!” [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906815,00.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20081214084132/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906815,00.html) [August 25, 2022].

Times of India (2014). “President Rule in Andhra Pradesh, Assent to Telangana Bill”. March 01. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/President-rule-in-Andhra-Pradesh-assent-to-Telangana-bill/articleshow/31214696.cms> [August 5, 2022].

United News of India (UNI) (2012). “'Demand for separate Andhra state gaining momentum'.” September 12. *Nexis.* [September 01, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Assamese

Activity: 1979-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was founded in 1979, hence the start date of the movement. Most of the ULFA leadership has been captured in recent years. Still, ULFA battalions remained active as of 2020. Therefore, the movement is ongoing (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Marshall et al. 2003; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR; South Asia Terrorism Portal). [start date: 1979; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The main organization associated with the movement, the ULFA, demanded secession from the Indian Union until 2011 when peace talks with the central government started (Minahan 2002; Rediff News 2013). In 2010 the ULFA split between those who want to negotiate with the central government and the rest. In 2011 the ULFA “pro talks” fraction renounced preconditions for talks with the central government, paving the way for a ceasefire with the government. According to some, at least the pro-talks faction thus gave up the claim for independence (UCDP). Yet part of ULFA continues to make claims for outright independence and regards Assam’s sovereignty as its core demand (Kalita 2021). It is unclear which claim is dominant; thus, we code the most radical claim (independence) throughout. [1979-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1979; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Assamese is the Assam state in northeastern India (Minahan 2002: 199; Roth 2015: 329). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Several sources speak of a ULFA constitution which names the organization’s objectives such as sovereignty from India (e.g., UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). We found no evidence for a unilateral sovereignty declaration, however.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Up through 1989 there are only reports of nonviolent action and violence below the threshold on the part of the ULFA, hence a NVIOLSD coding for that period.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war over “northeastern states” in 1990-2018. The coding notes clarify that ULFA is the main rebel group associated with this civil war, but the civil war in SSW combines casualties from a variety of rebellions in India’s northeast, including the Naga rebellion among others. Therefore, it is not clear whether the HVIOLSD should be applied to the Assamese movement. As discussed below, disaggregated data suggests the threshold for an HVIOLSD coding is not met.
  + UCDP/PRIO codes separatist armed conflict in 1990 and 1994-2010. In all years, the rebellion is classified as a low-level insurgency with the maximum of annual battle-related deaths recorded being 114.
  + SATP, which covers the period since 2000, associates 97-226 fatalities per year with the ULFA rebellion in 2000-2009, 22 in 2010, 7 in 2011, 7 in 2012, 8 in 2013, and 0 in all subsequent years except 2016 (3). In addition, SATP associates the following numbers of fatalities to ULFA-I, a splinter group from ULFA: 6 in 2010, 6 in 2011, 13 in 2012, 6 in 2013, 19 in 2014, 6 in 2015, 10 in 2016, 6 in 2017, and 11 in 2017. In 2019-2020 no fatalities are reported. Overall, SATP therefore suggests >25 battle-related deaths in 2000-2010, but not in subsequent years, in agreement with UCDP/PRIO.

UCDP/PRIO suggests that the 25 deaths threshold was not met in 1991-1993. There continued to be some low-level violence according to the coding notes: “In December 1991, negotiations resulted in a large-scale surrender of [ULFA](https://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/326) cadres. Approximately 4000 rebels surrendered in exchange for amnesty, but a group of hardliners refused to surrender and continued the armed struggle.”

* + Consistent with UCDP, the SSW coding notes suggest a de-escalation in the conflict with ULFA in 1991; however, violence continued: “We code the onset of the war in November of 1990 when direct military rule was imposed (on November 28), escalating the conflict between the state and the organized guerilla groups. Violence continued through out the 1990s: Operation Rhino relaunched in 1996. Two unsuccessful interim ceasefires: April 20 1991: unilateral ULFA ceasefire declared; ends Indian army “Operation Bajrang”; violence again escalates, leading to the implementation of “Operation Rhino” in September 1991. Unilateral ceasefire is declared by ULFA on 17 December 1991 in face of crackdown. Imminent talks between ULFA and the government are subverted by local ULFA leaders who are against any surrender of arms or negotiations (Baruah p.158). Major violence re-commences within the year.”
  + Consistent with this narrative, MAR’s rebellion score is four in 1991-1993, indicating “small-scale guerilla activity”.
  + Yet, according to UCDP/PRIO, fighting was limited in 1991 (2 deaths), and no deaths are reported in 1992. In 1993, violence started to pick up again with 16 deaths.
  + This broadly matches with case-based evidence from the University of Central Arkansas database, which points to a de-escalation in March 1991 due to ULFA declaring a unilateral cease-fire. The source reports more deaths in 1992 (10), but does not provide indications that the 25 deaths threshold was met in 1991-1993.
* Overall, there is evidence for an LVIOLSD coding in 1990 and 1994-2010. SSW suggests violence in 2011-2018, but they combine several rebellions and the disaggregated figures from SATP suggest violence attributed to the ULFA/ULFA-I conflict was below the threshold.
* UCDP/PRIO codes a separatist armed conflict over Western South East Asia in 2015-2018. The rebel group, United National Liberation Front of Western South East India, consists an alliance out of rebel groups from various SDMs including the Assamese (ULFA-I), the Nagas (NSCN-K), the Rajbangsis (KLO), the Bodos (NDFB-S), the Garos (GNLA), and the Manipuris (UNLF, KCP, and PREPAK). UCDP/PRIO codes 161 battle-related deaths in 2015, and 27-47 in 2016-2018. UCDP does not provide disaggregated fatality counts. Based on SATP, the 25-deaths threshold is not met for the Assamese in 2015-2018, so we code those years as NVIOLSD.
* [1979-1989: NVIOLSD; 1990: LVIOLSD; 1991-1993: NVIOLSD; 1994-2010: LVIOLSD; 2011-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Prior to British colonialization, there was an Assamese Kingdom (Minahan 2002: 200). The partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947 led to a chaotic situation in Assam. Some parts of Assam went to the newly created East Pakistan. Assam had to deal with a huge influx from neighbouring East Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 201). The Indian Constitution of 1949/1950 defines Assam as a state of the Indian Union, which has its own governmental structure (Britannica Academic Edition) and Assamese was recognized as an official language (though not at a par with Hindi or English). However, in the following decades the traditional Assam territory was downsized due to the creation of new states. The states of Nagaland (1963) and Meghalaya (autonomous status within Assam in 1969 and full separation in 1972) were carved out in the 1960s/1970s, and Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh were separated from Assam and became union territories in 1972 (Minahan 2002: 201; Encyclopedia Britannica). Since this implies the loss of traditional Assamese land, we code a (prior) restriction. [1972: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1979 the central government imposed president’s (direct) rule in Assam. This was after ULFA’s formation in April 1979. [1979: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in December 1980. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* Due to increasing violence the Assam state government was dissolved in June 1981 and the central government again imposed president’s (direct) rule (Minahan 2002: 202). [1981: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in January 1982. This is not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook.
* Only two months later, the center again imposed president’s rule. [1982: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in February 1983. This is not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook. This is not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook.
* In 1985 an Accord was signed between the All Assam Students Union (AASU), a group that was mainly against Bengali immigration, and the central government. The agreement concerned issues such as immigration and economic development (Minahan 2002: 202). The Accord also led to new elections in 1985, which resulted in the creation of an Assamese nationalist government. However, the ULFA was not content with the implementation of the accord and continued its armed struggle for independence (Minorities at Risk Project). We could not find evidence to suggest that the accord increased ethnic rights as defined here.
* In the late 1980s the ULFA intensified its violent campaign against government forces. The rebels installed a parallel government, which went as far as to levy taxes on the tea plantations. Therefore, the central government imposed president’s rule in the state and dissolved the government in November 1990. Subsequently the Indian army carried out two military operations and arrested around 7,000 suspected terrorists (Minahan 2002: 202; Minorities at Risk Project). The narrative in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (<https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/365>) appears to suggest that significant violence broke out only after the restriction; UCDP’s geo-referenced data suggests that there were only 3 fatalities in 1989-1990 before the restriction while the 25 deaths threshold was reached in late November 1990. [1990: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in June 1991 (Minahan 2002: 202; Minorities at Risk Project). This is not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook.
* In January 1991, the Minister of State for Internal Affairs banned the ULFA, the main separatist organization. Many ULFA members fled to Myanmar. The organization may have been banned already in 1990 (Minorities at Risk Project). Party bans do not, however, constitute restrictions in the sense employed here.
* The violence intensified and by 1995 more than 300,000 people were living in refugee camps, and over 5,000 people had been killed from either side (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 120). The Assam state was declared a disturbed area, which gave the military broad powers to combat insurgents. The declaration of a state of emergency due to violence is not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook.
* In 2010 the ULFA split between those who want to negotiate with the central government and the rest. In 2011 the ULFA “pro talks” fraction renounced preconditions for talks with the central government, paving the way for a ceasefire with the government. In 2012 both sides were engaged in peace talks. While these talks have not led to a peace agreement yet (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia), 23 districts in Assam were removed from the “disturbed areas” under the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act (AFSPA) in 2022 due to improved security (Singh 2022).
* In 2013, the Supreme Court of India asked the central government to settle the process for updating the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam (the list of Indian citizens living in the state), which begun in 2015. In an attempt to identify “illegal immigrants” that had come to Assam after the Bangladesh war in 1971, individuals were asked to prove that they or their ancestors had lived in Assam pre-1971. The register was officially concluded and published on 31 August 2019. Largely criticized for its targeting against Assam’s ethnic minorities (Chakravarty 2019), the register left out 1.9 million people living in Assam (BBC 2019), who were deprived of their rights and could only appeal to the Foreigners Tribunals (special courts set up in 1964). This is not coded as a restriction because the Assamese are the majority group in Assam and hence not affected as much as minority groups.
* In 2016, the central BJP-led government introduced a bill to amend the citizenship law, which provided Indian citizenship to non-Muslim migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. The Bill was later passed in 2019 as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), sparking protest in Assam (and across India) for its clear religious discrimination. In particular, the Bill was said to contradict the process of updating the NRC, which provided 1971 as a cutoff for citizenship irrespective of religion (see above). Those opposing the Act in Assam also feared a change in its demography if Bengali Hindus would be granted citizenship, despite having arrived after 1971 (Saha 2019). The CAA is difficult to see as a concession or restriction as defined here and so not coded.

**Regional autonomy**

* Assam has been an Indian state throughout, and the Assamese constitute almost fifty per cent of the local population. The center repeatedly imposed president’s rule; since president’s rule interrupts but does not abolish regional autonomy we code the Assamese as autonomous throughout. [1979-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Assamese |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Assamese (non-SC/ST) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75001000 |

**Power access**

* The Assamese are coded as junior partner throughout in EPR. [Junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.014]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 199) the majority of the Assamese lives in Assam, where they also comprise an absolute majority. This matches with information from GeoEPR and MAR. That said, whether the Assamese still comprise the majority across all of Assam is not fully clear as Talukdar (2008) notes that in the 2001 census the share of Assamese-speakers dropped to 49% due to an influx of Bengali speakers. In the 2011 census the share of Assamese-speakers dropped further to 48%, while the Bengali-speaking population increased in size (Firaque 2020). However, given this is so close to 50%, most likely Assamese-speakers still make up an absolute majority of a somewhat smaller territory within Assam. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR and MAR. According to Minahan (2002: 199) there are “sizable” Assamese communities in neighboring Bangladesh and Bhutan, but these are under 100,000 (Joshua Project). [no kin]

**Sources**

BBC (2019). “Assam NRC: What Next for 1.9 Million 'Stateless' Indians?”. August, 31. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-49520593> [July 20, 2022].

Britannica Academic Edition, Assam State Profile. Available online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/39101/Assam (27.11.13).

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chakravarty, Ipsita (2019). “Explainer: What exactly is the National Register of Citizens?”. July, 15. <https://scroll.in/article/930482/explainer-what-exactly-is-the-national-register-of-citizens> [July 20, 2022].

Encyclopedia Britannica. “Assam State Profile.” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/39101/Assam> [November 27, 2013].

Firaque, Kabir (2020). “Explained: In Assam, the Identities within Identities”. February, 14. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-assam-the-identities-within-identities-6266981/> [July 20, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 30.

Joshua Project. https://joshuaproject.net/ [November 3, 2015].

Kalita, Prabin 2021. “Send Political Envoys if Willing to Discuss Sovereignty, Says ULFA-I to Assam Government.” December, 03. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/send-political-envoys-if-willing-to-discuss-sovereignty-says-ulfa-i-to-assam-government/articleshow/88061983.cms> [July 20, 2022].

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 59.

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 44-46.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 199-204.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Rediff News (2013). “Assam CM and ULFA Agree on One Issue.” July 13. http://www.rediff.com/news/report/assam-cm-and-ulfa-agree-on-one-issue/20130713.htm [November 27, 2013].

Saha, Abhishek (2019). “Explained: Why Assam, Northeast are Angry”. January, 20. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/assam-protests-citizenship-amendment-bill-nrc-northeast-bandh-5543785/> [July 20, 2022].

Sambanis, Nicholas, & Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonas (2019). “Sovereignty Rupture as a Central Concept in Quantitative Measures of Civil War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(6): 1542–1578.

Singh, Vijaita. “‘Disturbed Areas under AFSPA Cut in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland”. March, 31. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/disturbed-areas-under-afspa-reduced-in-assam-manipur-and-nagaland-says-amit-shah/article65277327.ece> [July 20, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-assam_united-liberation-front-of-asom-ulfa> & <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-assam_united-liberation-front-of-asom-independent-ulfa-i> [June 24, 2022].

Talukdar, Sushanta (2008). “Less than 50 Per Cent Assamese Speakers in Assam.” *The Hindu*. January 9. <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/less-than-50-per-cent-assamese-speakers-in-assam/article1175679.ece> [March 26, 2015].

University of Central Arkansas (n.d.). “India/Assam (1967-present).” https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indiaassam-1967-present/ [May 19, 2023].

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/  
gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central\_and\_Southern\_Asia [November 27, 2013].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Bhil

Activity: 2017-2020

**General notes**

* Bhil refers to an ethnic group of tribal communities that inhabit different states in central western India (Encyclopedia Britannica). The Bhil tribal communities are listed as Scheduled Tribes and are one of the largest indigenous groups in West India.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Bhils’ first demanded their own state in 1913 after the Mangarh Massacre, when hundreds of Bhil tribals were killed by British forces. Separatist sentiment re-emerged in the 1980s (DNA 2013; Minahan 2016), but we could not find any evidence for organized separatist claims until 2017, when Bhil people formed the Bharatiya Tribal Party (BTP) in Gujarat. The BTP claims the creation of a separate Bhil state, Bhil Pradesh. Similarly, the Bhilistan Tiger Sena, a non-political wing of the Janata Dal (United), demands the creation of a new state named Bhalistan for Bhils and other tribal communities (Johari 2017). The movement remained active as of 2022 (Khan 2022; Insightsias 2022). [start date: 2017; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The non-political Bhalistan Tiger Sena demands a separate state for Bhils and other tribal communities to be named Bhalistan (Johari 2017). Similarly, the BTP, the main political party in this movement, demands a separate state to be carved out of four Indian states (Khan 2022). [2017-2020: sub-state secession]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* There are two claims made. On the one hand, the Bhilistan Tiger Sena broadly claims the Adivasi belt along Gujarat’s eastern border, where Bhils and other tribal communities live (Johari 2017). On the other hand, the BTP claims the creation of a Bhil Pradesh including 39 districts spread over four Indian states: Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Minahan (2016: 75) reports that the Bhils also make claims to Tharpakar District of Sindh in Pakistan, but we only consider claims within India. The BTP is the major political party in this movement; therefore, we code the claimed territory based on the demand for Bhil Pradesh using GIS data from GADM for polygon definition.
* We use a map shown in an article by the Times of India to identify the 39 districts territory claimed by the BTP (<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/btp-to-raise-bhil-pradesh-demand-in-local-body-polls/articleshow/80220684.cms>). Unfortunately, the image’s resolution is not sufficient for us to perfectly identify the districts (we could not find a more high-resolution map). The resulting polygon is similar to the map, but not 100% the same. We therefore code the claim as ambiguous.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of violence; thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* During the colonial period, the Bhils’ autonomy was initially challenged by the British East India Company conquest of Gujarat and the introduction of the Indian Forest Act of 1878 (Whitehead 2007: 75). The act extinguished the pre-existing lands right that some Bhil communities had in agreement with Rajput kings. This led to the migration of Bhils from mountain areas to other areas in search for work.
* On November 17, 1913, on the border between Rajasthan and Gujarat, hundreds of Bhil tribals were killed by British Forces (Khan 2022). The massacre gave rise to the demand for a separate state for tribal communities, which was advanced by Bhil social reformer and spiritual leader Govind Guru.
* In 2006, the revisions to the Scheduled Tribes Act were supposed to partially return the land that had been taken away during the colonial period to Bhil tribal communities. However, the Act was not successful in the case of some tribal communities in Gujarat, as it did not apply to lands which had already been used for development purposes (Whitehead 2007: 76).

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bhil |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* Bhil tribes are listed as scheduled tribes. The Scheduled Tribes are coded in EPR as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). However, we found no evidence of Bhil representation in the cabinet. [2017-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* The Indian census reports ca. 17 million Bhils as of 2011. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,250 million in 2011. [0.0136]

**Regional concentration**

* Bhil people reside in different states in India, particularly in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra. Based on data of speakers of Bhili/Bhilodi (part of the Bhil language family) in these states (Census 2011), the districts with the highest majority of Bhili/Bhilodi speakers are: Banswara (89.94%) and Dungarpur (74.60%) districts in Rajasthan; Alirajpur (89.96%), Jhabua (85.26%), Barwani (58.54%) districts in Madhya Pradesh; Nandurbar (60.88%) district in Maharashtra. As these districts are all in a contiguous area, we calculated the total amount of Bhili-Bhilodi speaking people (5,996,834) which corresponds to 35% of the total Bhil population in India. Although this number only refers to Bhili/Bhilodi speaking people, and Bhil people speak other Bhil languages not reported here, we could not find more accurate data at district level. Therefore, we code Bhil people as not concentrated. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Bhil people also reside in Pakistan in the Sindh province, which borders Rajasthan and Gujarat in India. According to the Joshua Project, there are a total of 584,000 Bhils in Pakistan. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Census of India (2011). “Language Atlas of India 2011.” <https://censusindia.gov.in/nada/index.php/catalog/42561> [September 06, 2022].

DNA (2013). “Clamour for Separate Saurashtra, Bhilistan to Get Louder”. November 21. <https://www.dnaindia.com/ahmedabad/report-clamour-for-separate-saurashtra-bhilistan-to-get-louder-1868566> [September 01, 2022].

Encyclopedia Britannica. “Bhil People”. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bhil> [September 01, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Insightsias (2022). “Demands for a separate Bhil Pradesh.” <https://www.insightsonindia.com/2022/05/27/demands-for-a-separate-bhil-pradesh/> [August 25, 2022].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Johari, Aarefa (2017). “In Gujarat’s Adivasi belt, BJP Has to Contend with Bhilistan Separatists, Boycotts and ‘Big People’.” *Scroll.in*. November 06. <https://scroll.in/article/856382/in-gujarats-adivasi-belt-bjp-has-to-contend-with-bhilistan-separatists-boycotts-and-big-people> [September 01, 2022].

Khan, Hamza (2022). “Explained: Why are tribals of Rajasthan and Gujarat demanding a separate state of Bhil Pradesh.” *Indian Express.* May 26. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/why-are-tribals-of-rajasthan-and-gujarat-demanding-separate-state-of-bhil-pradesh-7936036/ [August 25, 2022].

Minahan, James (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Second Edition*. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Ministry of Tribal Affairs Statistics Division (Government of India) (2013). “Statistical Profile of Scheduled Tribes in India 2013”. <https://tribal.nic.in/Statistics.aspx> [September 01, 2022].

The Joshua Project. “Bhil in Pakistan”. <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/16414/PK> [September 01, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Whitehead, Judith (2007). “The Bhils” In: Barbara Brower and Barbara Rose Johnston (eds.), *Disappearing Peoples?: Indigenous Groups and Ethnic Minorities in South and Central Asia,* 74-90. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.

## Bodos

Activity: 1967-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The All Bodo Student’s Union was formed in February 1967 to fight for Bodo autonomy. On October 3, 1986, the Bodo Security Force (BSF) was formed and in 1988, the BSF became the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). The All Bodos Students Union (ABSU) and Bodo Security Force (BSF) were formed in 1989 to press for a separate state for the Bodos, while the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) were formed on June 18, 1996, for the same purpose. (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Hewitt et al. 2008; Marshall et al. 2003, 2005; Minahan 2002; MAR; Rubin & Rubin 2008; South Asia Terrorism Portal).
* In 2003, following the signing of a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) (see concessions and restrictions), the BLT surrendered, and the organization formally ceased to exist (South Asia Terrorism Portal). In 2008, after entering a ceasefire with the central government (2005), the NDFB split into two main groups, pro- and anti-peace talks (which later further split in two sub-groups each). On January 27, 2020, all four factions signed a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS), the third Bodo accord, with the central government. Following the MoS, the NDFB was disbanded (Kalita 2020; Kamarkar 2020; First Post 2020; Singh 2020).
* Yet, the third Bodo accord did not end the statehood movement in Bodoland, as two new organizations were formed to revive the movement. Deeming the accord ‘unacceptable for the largest plains tribe in Northeast, the league All India Bodo People’s National League for Bodoland Statehood was formed on October 15, 2020 (The Hindu, 2020). Later, in February 2022, the Bodo National Students’ Union (BoNSU) was formed. The same year, BoNSU submitted a memorandum to India PM Modi, demanding the creation of a separate Bodoland State (The Hindu, 2022). Despite the dismantling of older organizations, we code the movement as ongoing due to new demands for statehood. [start date: 1967; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The sources we consulted do not agree on the exact contours of the Bodos’ claim.
  + MAR suggests a claim for sub-state secession.
  + Nath (2003: 534) also argues that the Bodos from the outset (1967) sought a separate state for Assam’s plain tribal peoples, Udayachal (the demand for Bodoland emerged only in the 1980s, see below, but that state would have been dominated by the Bodos as they make up the largest part of all plain tribal people).
  + Singh (2008), in contrast, argues that the Bodo movement initially demanded the establishment of an autonomous region within Assam but then revised its claim in favor of a union territory. Union territories are ruled directly by the central government, but do have a certain extent of autonomy (at least since 1963, see Kumar 1991: 48-61). Thus, the claim for a separate union territory is tantamount to separation from Assam.
  + Minahan’s comments can be interpreted in a similar way to Singh’s (first autonomy and then sub-state secession).
* The sources we consulted tend to agree that the All-Bodo Students Union, one of the most important organizations associated with the movement that emerged in the 1980s, made claims for separate statehood (e.g. Nath 2003: 535).
* In 2001 the Bodo Liberation Tigers (at this point the most important organization associated with the movement according to both Nath and Singh) gave up the demand for separate statehood. However, some Bodo leaders continued to make claims for separate statehood (Singh 2008: 1105-1106). Talukdar (2012) suggests that the statehood movement remained important. According to Minahan (2002: 316) and MAR there were even some calls for independence.
* While Minahan’s (2016: 78) discussion continues to mention demands for both independence and a fully autonomous state within India, Roth (2015: 335) claims that the NDFB demands a sovereign Bodoland, which is separate from Assam and India. Yet, according to Saikia, Chima and Baro (2016: 154), ABSU and NDFB (Progressive- after the split) periodically raised the demand for statehood, which did not die down after the creation of BTC. Besides, after the third Bodo accord, the movement has been revived by two new organizations, demanding a separate state for the Bodo people (see above).
* In sum, while it is clear that the movement sought a separate state in the 1980s and 1990s, there is some ambiguity in the period before and after whether the dominant claim was for sub-state secession or autonomy. We code the more radical claim throughout. While there have been claims for outright independence, these do not seem to be dominant. [1967-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Several sources cite a concurrent claim for independence by a particular group, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Minahan 2002: 316; Roth 2015: 335; MAR). Tan notes that this group was formed in 1986 as the Bodo Security Force and subsequently renamed. According to Tan, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland carried out politically motivated violent activities. In 2002, most of its leadership was arrested. At the time, the group’s membership was estimated to be around 1,500 (Tan 2011: 190). The group remained active. [start date: 1986; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Bodos consists of the autonomous Bodoland council, an administrative region located in Assam state, India. Some nationalists also claim a territory that exceeds this region although they appear to be a minority within the movement. We therefore code the former claim, based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Several sources agree that separatist armed conflict erupted in 1989-1990 (Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Hewitt et al. 2008; MAR; UCDP/PRIO). According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, “ABSU (All Bodo Student Union), established in 1979, launched its campaign for a separate state of Bodoland in March 1987. The insurgency soon gathered momentum, and by March 1989 violent agitation in the form of general strikes, bombings, attacks on security personnel and communal violence had killed approximately 300 persons, 35 of which were security personnel.”
* Fighting continued at lower intensity in subsequent years, with violence increasingly attributable to another, more extremist rebel group, NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland). Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) suggest ongoing armed conflict in 1991-1994 and so does MAR (though with the exception of 1993). UCDP/PRIO also suggests continued fighting, but that the 25 deaths was met only in 1994: according to UCDP/PRIO, there were 0 battle-related deaths in 1990, 14 in 1992, 6 in 1993, and 36 in 1994. Yet, qualitative evidence from the University of Central Arkansas suggests that there was a cease-fire in 1989 which was “immediately violated” and reports more than 25 deaths in 1991-1993, though notably many of the deaths are due to terrorist activity. Based on UCDP/PRIO, which reports LVIOLSD in 1989-1990, and qualitative evidence suggesting the 25 deaths threshold was met in 1991-1993, we code LVIOLSD throughout 1989-1994.
* Several sources suggest continued low-level violence until 2003. UCDP/PRIO codes all years with armed conflict except 1995 and 2000; however, in each case, deaths were just below 25 threshold (16 and 19, respectively). The University of Central Arkansas report lists more than 25 deaths in 2000, though not in 1995. The MAR rebellion score exceeds three in all years except 2003, indicating small-scale or intermediate guerilla activity. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code ongoing armed conflict throughout 1995-2003.
* In 2003, peace talks took place (SATP, Rubin and Rubin - Chronologies of Modern Terrorism) and in December 2003, the BLT surrendered. However, the LVIOLSD code is maintained for 2004 based on UCDP/PRIO.
* Subsequently violence de-escalated. SATP attributes just one death to the BLT in 2005-2008 and up to 14 deaths per year in 2005-2008 to the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). UCDP/PRIO records only 27 deaths across those four years, and <25 deaths in all individual years. Thus, 2005-2008 are coded with NVIOLSD.
* 2009-2010 are coded with LVIOLSD based on UCDP/PRIO.
* UCDP/PRIO again codes separatist armed conflict in 2013-2014. Yet, UCDP/PRIO reports substantial numbers of casualties also in the years in-between (more than 20 and 6, respectively). Furthermore, data from SATP suggests that the 25 deaths threshold was met in 2011 as SATP reports 12 casualties in relation to NDFB in 2011 and another 14 in relation to IK Songbijit faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S), a splinter group. We therefore code LVIOLSD throughout 2009-2014.
* UCDP/PRIO records only 12 deaths in 2015 and 0 in 2016, but SATP attributes 28 casualties to NDFB-S in 2015 and 38 in 2016 (and another 2 to NDFB). There was just 1 security force casualty, suggesting much of the violence could be due to inter-communal clashes or terrorism. However, to avoid a bogus de-escalation, we extend the LVIOLSD code in 2016.
  + Notably, UCDP/PRIO does, however, code another separatist armed conflict over Western South East Asia in 2015-2018. The rebel group, United National Liberation Front of Western South East India, is an alliance out of rebel groups from various SDMs including the Assamese (ULFA-I), the Nagas (NSCN-K), the Rajbangsis (KLO), the Bodos (NDFB-S), the Garos (GNLA), and the Manipuris (UNLF, KCP, and PREPAK). UCDP/PRIO codes 161 battle-related deaths in 2015, and 27-47 in 2016-2018. UCDP does not provide disaggregated fatality counts. Based on SATP, the 25-deaths threshold is met for 2015-2016, but not in 2017-2020, so we code the latter years as NVIOLSD.
* [1967-1988: NVIOLSD; 1989-2004: LVIOLSD; 2005-2008: NVIOLSD; 2009-2016: LVIOLSD; 2017-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Bodos are one of India’s largest tribal groups. The ancestors of the Bodos are believed to have settled the Brahmaputra river from the Tibetan Plateau over eight centuries ago (Northeastern India, northwestern Assam). For a long time, the region remained divided into small princely states outside the control of powerful nations. The Bodos endured repeated invasions from Burma, but eventually came under Assamese rule. The Bodos rebelled against Assamese rule in 1792 and the Assamese requested assistance from the British (Minahan 2012: 43). Following a war between the British and the Burmans in 1824-26, the entire Assam region was ceded to the UK. Bodo’s traditional territories formed part of British Bengal until 1874, when they were included in the new British colony of Assam. Missionaries were very active in the region and many Bodos converted to Christianity. It was Christian-educated youths who first suggested that the Bodo territories be separated from Assam in 1937. However, when India became independent in 1947, the Bodo lands were left as part of Assam (Minahan 2012: 44). When India’s map was redrawn in 1956 to create linguistic states the Bodos did not receive their own state and remained with Assam. In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language (the Bodos speak their own language) (Bhattacharjee 2012). [1960: cultural rights restriction]
* After riots, Assam’s language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105). [1961: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Choudhury (2014: 212), the Assamese government in 1986 passed a law that required Assamese as a compulsory “third language” in schools. We deem this too minimal to be coded as a restriction. At the same time, though, it is reported that there was a new regulation that made Assamese a requirement for obtaining any government job in Assam. [1986: cultural rights restriction]
* The Bodoland Autonomous Council Accord (BAC) was signed in 1993 by the All-Bodo Students Union, the Bodo People’s Action Committee, and the central and state governments. The Accord made a commitment to forming an elected Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) comprising “contiguous geographical areas between river Sankosh and Mazbat/river Pasnoi”. The accord left the question of the precise territorial jurisdiction open, which meant that the accord was not properly implemented until 2003 (Nath 2003: 537)
  + In late 1993 the Assamese government unilaterally demarcated the boundaries of the BAC. However, it refused to give the Autonomous Council the financial resources to make it function. Moreover, it never devolved the full set of competencies (Nath 2003: 538). The first council elections were held only in 2003 after the below agreement was reached (Singh 2014). We do not code a concession.
* February 10, 2003, the Bodoland Territorial Council Accord (BTC) was signed by the Bodo Liberation Tigers, the Indian government and the government of Assam (Nath 2003: 533). The agreement led to the devolution of further legislative, executive, administrative, and financial powers and control over ten major socio-political areas, including town administration, agriculture, inheritance of property, among others (Nath 2003: 539). [2003: autonomy concession]
* Furthermore, the Bodo language was included in the 8th schedule by way of the 92nd Amendment to India’s constitution. This implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [2003: cultural rights concession]
* On January 27, 2020, NFDB, the ABSU, and the United People’s Organization signed the third Bodo accord with the central government. The agreement led to renaming the Bodoland Territorial Council Accord (BTC) as the Bodoland Territorial Region. The number of council seats was increased from 40 to 60, and further legislative, executive, administrative and financial powers were devolved. The agreement also declared the Bodo language in Devanagari script as an associate official language of Assam. The accord considered the inclusion of additional villages in the BTR and the creation of a Bodo-Kachari welfare council that would focus on the development of Bodo villages outside the Bodo Council area (Hussain 2020). [2020: cultural rights & autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* See below. [2004-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1993 the Bodos received an autonomous council but it only became functional in 2003 after another agreement was signed. The first elections to the autonomous council were held only in 2003 and according to Singh it was only then that the autonomous council can be said to be in accordance with the Sixth Schedule arrangements. Thus, we code the establishment of autonomy in 2003 and not in 1993. EPR does the same. [2003: establishment of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bodos |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bodo |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75003000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the Bodos as powerless throughout. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* According to GeoEPR and MAR, the Bodos are concentrated in their homeland, Bodoland in Assam, but they make up less than 50% of the local population and the majority of Bodos resides elsewhere (see gc6b and gc7 in phase I-IV release). This matches with information from Minahan (2002: 311). Note: the Bodos’ minority status is due to inflows from Bengalis and Santals into their homeland (MAR; Minahan 2002: 313); the information we found is not detailed enough to establish when exactly the Bodos were outnumbered in their homeland, but it appears more likely than not that this was before the movement had started. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* No politically relevant kin according to EPR. MAR and Minahan (2002: 311) report kin in Bangladesh, but they number only approx. 30,000 (Joshua Project). [no kin]
  + Note: the Bodo language is similar to the language of the Dimasas and the Garos (Minahan 2002: 312), and there is a significant Garo population in Bangladesh (see Achiks (Garos)). We do not code this because the three groups are separately coded.

**Sources**

Baruah, Sanjib (1999). *India against Itself. Assam and the Politics of Nationality.* Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press.

Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa (2012). “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language Movement.” *Mainstream* L(9). <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html> [July 25, 2014].

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Choudhury, Lutfur Rahman (2014). “Ethnic Identity Question and the Autonomy Movement in Karbi Anglong.” *A Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2(3): 207-216. <https://www.thecho.in/files/Lutfur-Rahman-Choudhury_mp6q0gin.pdf> [December 1, 2014].

First Post (2020). “Bodo Peace Accord 2020: A Look at Timeline of Major Events in Long Standing Conflict in Assam”. January, 29. <https://www.firstpost.com/india/bodo-peace-accord-2020-a-look-at-timeline-of-major-events-in-long-standing-conflict-in-assam-7967881.html> [July 21, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 30.

Hewitt, Joseph J., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) (2008). *Peace and Conflict 2008.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Joshua Project. “Bodo in Bangladesh.” <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/16492/BG> [November 9, 2015].

Kalita, Prabin (2020). “After 34 Years of Armed Struggle, NDFB Finally Disbands Itself”. March, 11. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/after-34-yrs-of-armed-struggle-ndfb-finally-disbands-itself/articleshow/74568295.cms> [July 21, 2022].

Kamarkar, Rahul (2020). “Last NDFB Faction in Assam Calls Truce”. January, 17. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/last-ndfb-faction-in-assam-calls-truce/article30585388.ece> [July 21, 2022].

Kumar, Sudhir (1991). *Political and Administrative Setup Union Territories in India.* New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Lexis Nexis. http://www.lexis-nexis.com [December 10, 2013].

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 50.

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2005). *Peace and Conflict 2005:* *A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 311-316.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Nath, Monoj K. (2003). “Bodo Insurgency in Assam: New Accord and New Problems.” *Strategic Analysis* 27(4): 533-544.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Rubin, Barry M., and Judith Colp Rubin (2008). *Chronologies of Modern Terrorism*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Saikia, Pahi, Jugdep S. Chima, and Aniruddha Kumar Baro (2016). “Limits of Ethnofederalism and Local Political Autonomy Arrangements: Continuing violence in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts of Assam.” *India Review* 15(1): 136-162.

Singh, Bikash (2014). “Why Peace in Bodoland Always Ephemeral and Lasts Only till next Carnage.” *The Economic Times*. <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-10/news/49757781_1_bodos-bengalispeaking-muslims-bengali-speaking-muslims> [November 26, 2014].

Singh, Bikash (2020). “50 Cadres of Saoraigwra Faction of NDF of Boroland Will Soon Join the Peace Parleys”. Janruary, 13. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/50-cadres-of-saoraigwra-faction-of-ndf-of-boroland-will-soon-join-the-peace-parleys/articleshow/73221720.cms> [July 21, 2022].

Singh, M. Amarjeet (2008). “Ethnic Diversity, Autonomy, and Territoriality in Northeast India: A Case of Tribal Autonomy in Assam.” *Strategic Analysis* 32(6): 1101-1114.

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)- Terrorist Group of Assam.” [http://www.satp.org/  
satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist\_outfits/ndfb.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/ndfb.htm) [December 12, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_national-democratic-front-of-bodoland-ndfb> & <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_ik-songbijit-faction-of-national-democratic-front-of-bodoland-ndfb-s> [June 24, 2022].

Talukdar, Sushanta (2012). “Bodos to Intensify Statehood Movement.” *The Hindu*. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bodos-to-intensify-statehood-movement/article2955060.ece> [November 26, 2014].

Tan, Andre T H (2011) *The Politics of Terrorism: A Survey.* London: Routledge.

The Hindu (2020). “New Group to Revive Bodoland Statehood Stir”. October, 16. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/new-group-to-revive-bodoland-statehood-stir/article32871458.ece> [July 21, 2022].

The Hindu (2022). “New Student Body Revives Bodoland Statehood Demand”. April, 08. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/new-student-body-revives-bodoland-statehood-demand/article65302133.ece> [July 21, 2022].

University of Central Arkansas (n.d.). “India/Bodos (1967-present).” https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indiabodos-1967-present/ [May 11, 2023].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Dimasas

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The Dimasas are also referred to as the Masas.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Concentrated in the Cachar Hills region of Southern Assam, the Masas began to mobilize for the separation of their own state in the 1970s according to Minahan (2002: 1210). Yet, the first corroborated evidence of a separatist organization we could find is only in 1991 when, according to several news reports, a group called Dimasa National Security Force was formed. In the years before, agitation had focused on cultural matters (Barman 2014).
* The nationalist campaign intensified and became increasingly violent (Hewitt et al. 2008; Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). When the DNSF surrendered in 1995, its commander-in-chief, Jewel Gorlosa, formed another Masa separatist outfit, the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD). After peace talks with the government began in 2003, Jewel Garlosa broke away and create the Dimal Halam Daogah (Jewel) (DHD-J), and its armed wing Black Widow (BW) (Agarwala 2021a). These were active between 2003-2009 before they agreed to a cease-fire in 2009. In the same year, 360 DHD-J militants surrendered their arms (Talukdar 2009). Garlosa was arrested in 2009 and signed a ceasefire agreement in 2012, leading to the end of the group’s operations (Agarwala 2021a; South Asia Terrorism Portal).
* However, in 2019 a new insurgent group was formed, the Dimasa National Liberation Army (DNLA), which later surrendered in November 2021 (Agarwala 2021b). Following our ten-year rule, we code the movement as ongoing in 2020. [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim is for a separate state (Minahan 2002: 1210-1212). A small, militant faction favored complete separation from India and the creation of a small, neutral state between India and Bangladesh, but this claim cannot be considered dominant (Minahan 2002: 1211). Similarly, the most recent insurgent group, the DNLA, also demanded the ‘liberation of a sovereign, independent Dimasa nation’ (Agarwala 2021a). However, the group was only active between 2019 and 2021, and therefore we code the formation of a separate state as the dominant claim throughout. [1980-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan (2002: 1211) notes a small faction favoring independence but does not name a concrete organization. We could not independently verify this report. Yet, in 2019, the DNLA emerged, which made claims for independence (see above). [start date: 2019; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Masas (Dimasas) includes the Dima Hasao district (also called “Dimaland”, formerly known as North Cachar Hills) in southern Assam, in northeastern India (Roth 2015: 335f). The movement has also claimed some surrounding areas, specifically the Dimasa-dominated geographical areas of Cachar, Nagaon and Karbi Anglong (The Telegraph 2011). However, since we could not find reliable information on exactly what areas are claimed outside of Dima Hasao, we flag this claim as ambiguous and only code the Dima Hasao district based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict from the early 1980s-2003, based on the following account: “Fearing marginalization and insecurity, Dimasa begin agitating for self-determination in early 1980s. Rebel outfit forms and begins armed separatist conflict shortly thereafter (precise date unknown). Original rebel organization surrenders in 1995, causing dissident militants upset with this move to promptly form a new rebel group. Latter rebel group signs ceasefire agreement with government in January 2003; ongoing talks on peace and self-determination issues, but little progress has been made. Ceasefire has been renewed each year since 2003. Rejecting negotiations and the ceasefire, several smaller rebel factions form in 2003 and continue steady string of violent attacks into early 2007.”
* None of our other sources, including UCDP/PRIO, would suggest a separatist violence coding. We investigated this case further using qualitative sources.
* SATP includes information on several Dimasa rebel outfits, with coverage on casualties since 2000. In most years, SATP records 0 or single-digit casualties.
  + An exception is Dimasa National Liberation Army (DNLA), which is associated with 20 casualties in 2021. However, notably, only civilians and rebels range among the killed and no security forces, suggesting this could be inter-communal violence (UCDP codes the Dimasa as involved in conflicts with other groups). <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_dimasa-national-liberation-army-dnla>
  + DNLA is associated with just 2 casualties in 2020 and no casualties before that.
  + Another particularly violent group appears to be Black Widow, which is associated with 19 deaths in 2006. https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist\_outfits/blackbw.htm
  + Dimasa National Democratic Front (DNDF) is associated with a single death in 2011 <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-assam_dimasa-national-democratic-front-dndf>
* We conducted a Lexis Nexis search to dig deeper. We found several references to the first insurgent group, Dimasa National Security Force, but no evidence on casualties. Newspaper sources suggest that the Dimasa and Karbi rebellions were much less violent than the Bodo campaign, however. Furthermore, Minahan (2002: 1211) suggests that violence in the 1990s was mostly related to inter-ethnic (non-state) conflicts over land.
* Overall, it seems unlikely that the 25 deaths threshold was met in any year. We do not code LVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The ancestors of the Masas, a Tibeto-Burman people, are thought to have settled in the Brahmaputra River valley in the 12th Century. Their territories were gradually divided into areas ruled by individual tribes. The Hindus of the Valley were unable to bring the tribal regions under their rule, and the tribes lived relatively isolated (Minahan 2002: 1208). The Ahoms (a Thai people) overran the area in 1229, mixed with the Aryans to form the Assamese people, but were also unable to hold effective control over the tribes in the hills, but they were pushed further into the highlands. In the highlands, the Masas developed a distinct culture and erected a kingdom with Maibong as its capital. In the 15th century, the Ahoms overwhelmed the kingdom, and the kingdom became a tributary to the Ahom kings of Sibsagar in Upper Assam (Minahan 2002: 1209). The Brahmaputra Valley fell to the Muslim Moguls in 1661-62, but the hold was tenuous. Burmans overran the area, and the Assamese requested aid from the British. In 1792, the Masas joined a widespread rebellion against Assamese rule. The Burmans again invaded Assam in 1822, which was one of the reasons for the Anglo-Burman War two years later. All of Assam, including the Masa tribal areas, was ceded to British rule in 1826, when Assam became a protectorate. The Masa territories formed part of British Bengal until 1874, but was then included in the new Assam province (Minahan 2002: 1209). Based on the Coupland Plan, the British created different authority structures for some of the Northern tribal areas, listing them as “excluded areas” or “partially excluded areas”. These areas were set up as tribal reserves and migration from the lowlands was prohibited. The status of (partially) excluded area led to scheduled tribe status after India’s independence. Scheduled tribe status confers the rights to a proportionate share in state employment and proportionate representation both in the national and sub-national parliament. Moreover, scheduled tribe status protects the “tribal” language and culture (Swarup 2011). The Masas homeland was administered as an excluded area until India’s independence in 1947.
* In 1949, the Sixth Schedule to the Indian Constitution was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including one for the Masas (India – Constitution – Schedules). Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural autonomy. The first elections were held in 1952 (Prudaite 2005: 162-163). Minahan (2002: 1210) erroneously gives 1976 as the year when the council was set up.
* In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language. The Masas’ language was denied a separate status (Bhattacharjee 2012).
* After riots, Assam’s language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105).
* In 1970 Dima Hasao became a fully-fletched civil district. Prior to this the Masas were grouped with the Mikir Hills into a single district. Furthermore, additional powers were devolved to the autonomous district (Prakash 2007: 570).
* According to Choudhury (2014: 212), the Assamese government in 1986 passed a law that required Assamese as a compulsory “third language” in schools. We deem this too minimal to be coded as a restriction. At the same time, though, it is reported that there was a new regulation that made Assamese a requirement for obtaining any government job in Assam. [1986: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1995 Assam devolved additional powers to both the Karbi Anglong and the Dimasas autonomous councils, “much beyond those available under Sixth Schedule” (Prakash 2007: 577). [1995: autonomy concession]
* According to Minahan (2002: 1211) the Assamese government devolved further powers in 2000, but this could not be verified. We do not code a concession.
* On October 8, 2012, a tripartite Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) was signed by the Central Government, the Govt. of Assam and fractions of the DHD. The MoS conferred enhanced autonomy to the North Cachar Hills Autonomus Council in Assam (NCHAC), which was to be renamed as Dima Hasao Autonomous Territorial Council (DHATC) (South Asia Terrorism Portal). [2012: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1952 an autonomous council was set up for the Masas. Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). [1991-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Dimasas |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* The Masas are listed as scheduled tribes. The Scheduled Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). However, we found no evidence of Masas representation in the cabinet. [Powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1207) there are approximately 230,000 Masas (counting some in adjacent Bangladesh too). According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,077 million in 2002. [0.0002]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1207), most Masas reside in their homeland, Dimasaraji, in northeastern India. Dimasaraji covers southern parts of Assam and smaller areas of the neighboring Meghalaya and Manipur. According to Minahan, while more than 50% of the Dimasas reside in Assam’s North Cachar Hills district, they make up but 48% there. According to the 2001 and 2011 census, the figure is even lower: ca. 37%. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Dimasas’ two languages are similar to the language of the Bodos and the Garos (Minahan 2002: 312), and there is a significant Garo population in Bangladesh (see Achiks (Garos)), but we considered this too far-fetched to be coded. [no kin]

**Sources**

Agarwala, Tora (2021a). “Explained: The significance of DNLA militants laying down arms in Assam.” November, 16. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-dnla-militants-surrender-assam-significance-7622403/> [July 21, 2022].

Agarwala, Tora (2021b). “Assam: DNLA militants, including top commander, lay down arms.” November, 13. https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/assam/assam-dnla-militants-lay-down-arms-7621155/ [July 21, 2022].

Barman, B. (2014). “Assertion of Dimasa Identity: A Case Study of Assam.” *Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 19(1): 45-49.

Baruah, Sanjib (1999). *India against Itself. Assam and the Politics of Nationality.* Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press.

Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa (2012). “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language Movement.” *Mainstream* L(9). <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html> [July 25, 2014].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Choudhury, Lutfur Rahman (2014). “Ethnic Identity Question and the Autonomy Movement in Karbi Anglong.” *A Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2(3): 207-216. <https://www.thecho.in/files/Lutfur-Rahman-Choudhury_mp6q0gin.pdf> [December 1, 2014].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hewitt, Joseph J., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) (2008). *Peace and Conflict 2008.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

India – Constitution – Schedules. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/in01000_.html> [December 2, 2014].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laishram, Dhanabir (2013). “Autonomous District Council in NE India, Boon or Curse.” *Manipur Times.* <http://www.manipurtimes.com/news-article/116-the-people-chronicle-article/302-autonomous-district-council-in-ne-india-boon-or-curse> [July 16, 2014].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [March 7, 2014].

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1207-1212.

Prakash, Col Ved (2007). *Encyclopedia of North-East India.* New Delhi: Atlantic.

Prudaite, Lal (2005). “Mizoram.” In: Mayumi Murayama, Kyoko Inoue, and Sanjoy Hazarika (eds.), *Sub-Regional Relations in Eastern South Asia: With Special Focus on India’s North Eastern Region,* 153-240. Chiba: IDE-JETRO.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Tripartite MoS Among Central Government, Govt. of Assam and Factions of DIMA Halam Daogah.” <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/documents/papers/DHd_MoS.htm> [July 21, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/india-insurgencynortheast-assam [July 21, 2022].

Swarup, Mridushi (2011). “Protection of Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution: Promise and Performance.” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1790922> [July 16, 2014].

Talukdar, Sushanta (2009). “360 DHD (Jewel) Militants Surrender Arms.” October, 03. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/360-DHD-Jewel-militants-surrender-arms/article16884456.ece> [July 21, 2022].

The Telegraph (2011). “36-hour Dimaraji Bandh Hits Life - Demand to Press for Statehood Status.” January, 19. <https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/36-hour-dimaraji-bandh-hits-life-demand-to-press-for-statehood-status/cid/441440> [July 21, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Garos

Activity: 1992-2020

**General notes**

* The Garos are also referred to as the Achiks.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Achiks are one of the three main tribes in Meghalaya state alongside the Khasi and Jaintia. They are also known as the Garo, and were a part of the Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC), which made claims for increased SD between 1947 and 1972 (see Meghalayans) but continued to exist thereafter. In 1992, the HALC split into the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and Achik Matgrik Liberation Army (AMLA) as a result of inter-tribal tensions. The Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA) aimed to establish a separate state for the Garos, hence 1992 is coded as start date.
* ALMA ceased activities in 1994. Subsequent groups have been formed, however. In 1995, ex-ALMA rebels formed the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) to fight against the Hynniewtrep and establish an Achik-dominated state. In 2004, the ANVC signed a ceasefire agreement with the Indian government for a period of six months, which was later periodically extended. The ANVC was no longer active as of 2022.
* ALMA’s breakup also led to the formation of the People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M), which operates in the Garo hills and fights for economic development, increased education for the Garo tribes, and a separate state. The PLF-M is no longer active, although the South Asia Terrorism Portal reports that the group may have been rebranded as the Achik National Council (ANC).
* In 2004, the Achiks again founded the United Achik National Front (UANF).
* The Liberation of Achik Elite Force (LAEF) was founded in 2005 as a peaceful separatist movement.
* In 2009, the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) was founded to fight for a “sovereign Garoland” and commands around 70 soldiers altogether.
* Overall, several Achik separatist organizations have remained active since 1992. As of 2022, SATP reports activity for LAEF and GNLA. PLF-M and UANF are reported inactive by SATP as of 2022. In addition to the Garo movement for a separate state, Garo organizations have lobbied for the creation of an autonomous district within Assam, a status the Garos in Meghalaya attained in 1976, but has been denied thus far to the Garos in Assam (Hewitt et al. 2008; Khan 2013; Prakash 2008; South Asia Terrorism Portal; START). [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim appears to be for the establishment of a separate Garo state. The Garo Hills State Movement Committee has been working for Garoland statehood since 1992 and enjoys the support of several parties and political groupings, such as the Garo National Council (Meghalaya Times 2013; The Hindu 2014; also see the other group notes file). In addition, there is a movement in Assam advocating the establishment of an autonomous council akin to the one in Meghalaya (Khan 2013). [1992-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Achiks (Garos) in Meghalaya consists of the autonomous Garos hill district, as well as two districts in Assam; Kamrup and Goalpara. The Garos hill district includes the East, West, South, North and South West Garo Hills districts. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict from 1992-2004, noting that “Garo armed conflict begins shortly thereafter [i.e. 1992] and reaches its zenith in 2002-04. Ceasefire signed with government in July 2004, renewed each year since, and monitored by joint commission.”
* UCDP/PRIO, on the other hand, would not suggest a separatist violence coding until 2012. We investigated this case further using qualitative sources.
* SATP includes information on several Achik/Garo rebel outfits, with coverage on casualties since 2000. In most years, SATP records 0 or single-digit casualties, with two exceptions.
  + First, SATP suggests 27 and 28 deaths associated with a group called the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) in 2002 and 2003, respectively. The majority of deaths relate to rebels and security forces (8/11 and 13/2, respectively), with the rest being civilians. It seems likely that the threshold was met in 2002-2003. https://satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-meghalaya\_achik-national-volunteer-council-anvc
  + Second, Achik Matgrik Elite Force (AMEF), United Achik Liberation Army (UALA), and the Garo National Liberation Armey (GNLA), who are all associated with >10 casualties in the 2010s.
* We conducted a Lexis Nexis search to look for casualties before 2000. We only found evidence for a small number of casualties.
* 2012 and 2014 are coded LVIOLSD based on UCDP/PRIO (Garo National Liberation Army). In addition, SATP reports 25-50 deaths in relation to the Garo National Liberation Army and other rebel groups throughout 2011-2015, so we extend the LVIOLSD code to 2011-2015.
* UCDP/PRIO codes a separatist armed conflict over Western South East Asia in 2015-2018. The rebel group, United National Liberation Front of Western South East India, consists an alliance out of rebel groups from various SDMs including the Assamese (ULFA-I), the Nagas (NSCN-K), the Rajbangsis (KLO), the Bodos (NDFB-S), the Garos (GNLA), and the Manipuris (UNLF, KCP, and PREPAK). UCDP/PRIO codes 161 battle-related deaths in 2015, and 27-47 in 2016-2018. UCDP does not provide disaggregated fatality counts. Based on SATP, the 25-deaths threshold is not met for the Garos in 2016-2020, so we code those years as NVIOLSD. [1992-2001: NVIOLSD; 2002-2003: LVIOLSD; 2004-2010: NVIOLSD, 2011-2015: LVIOLSD; 2016-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Garos, a Tibeto-Burman people, were incorporated into the British Empire in 1835 as part of the Assam province. The Garos lands were “partially excluded areas” under British jurisdiction, which later led to scheduled tribe status (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). Upon partition, the Garo lands were divided, with parts becoming part of Pakistan and others becoming part of Assam. In 1972, when Meghalaya split from Assam, part of the Garo land became part of the new state (Mihanan 2012: 85). The Garos are a Scheduled Tribe, included in the initial 8th Schedule of the Constitution in 1950. They had an autonomous district (and thus autonomy) since 1952. The scheduled tribes status and the autonomous district was transferred to Meghalaya in 1972 (India Ministry of Law and Justice); the Garos in Assam did no longer have autonomy after that. The Garos are the second largest group in Meghalaya (around 20 per cent), and were active in the movement for the separation from Assam. We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2002/2003, the Garos in Assam were granted scheduled tribe status (Khan 2014). Scheduled tribe status confers the rights to a proportionate share in state employment and proportionate representation both in the national and sub-national parliament. Moreover, scheduled tribe status protects the “tribal” language and culture (Swarup 2011). The concession received presidential assent in January 2003 (https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/releases98/lyr2003/rfeb2003/24022003/r2402200317.html). [2003: cultural rights concession]
* Under the Meghalaya State Language Act of 2005, Garo became an associate official language of Meghalaya, thus allowing for education in the Garo language (Meghalaya Times 2005). Since it is the regional government which passed the legislation, in which the Garos participate, we do not code this event as a concession.
* Following the signing of a peace agreement (2014) that led to the disbanding of ANVC, sources report increased powers granted to the autonomous district council (Times of India 2014). However, according to SATP, the agreement mainly involved development packages and the renaming of the district to Garo Hills Autonomous District Council. Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 2022, the government decided that Garo will be used in schools as medium of instruction in Garo-dominated areas in Assam (The Meghalayan 2022). This would be coded as a cultural rights concession, but is beyond our time frame.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Garos make up around 20 per cent of Meghalaya and they participate in the regional government. Moreover, the Garos in Meghalaya have separate autonomy since there is a Garo autonomous district council. Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). The Garos in Assam do not have an autonomous district council, despite local organizations calling for this status (Khan 2013). Nonetheless we code the Garos as regionally autonomous since a substantial number of Garos is located in Meghalaya. [1992-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Garos |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* The Achiks (Garos) are one of India’s indigenous (scheduled) tribes and thus form part of the EPR Scheduled Tribes group, which is coded as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). Of course, this does not apply to all of the hundreds of indigenous groups associated with the umbrella Scheduled Tribes group and in particular not to the Garos. Hence, we code the Garos as junior partners from 1995-1996 (1st of January rule), and powerless otherwise. [1992-1994: powerless; 1995-1996: junior partner; 1997-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the 2001 census, there are 889,000 Garos in India (Ethnologue), which in combination with the total tally (1,028,737,436) yields a group size estimate of 0.000864. [0.0008]

**Regional concentration**

* The Garos are concentrated in Meghalaya’s autonomous Garo hills district. Almost 700,000 out of the approx. 900,000 Garos in India settle in Meghalaya, and according to Haokip (2012) Meghalaya’s Garos primarily settle in the Garo hills. According to the 2001 census the region’s total population was approximately 900,000, rendering it very likely that the Garos, who are the region’s titulars, also comprise the majority there. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Encyclopedia Britannica, there are Garos also in Bangladesh. They make up 141,000 according to the Joshua Project. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

**Sources**

Agnihotri, V. K. (ed.) (2010). *Indian History.* Mumbai: Allied Publishers.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Encyclopedia Britannica. “Garo people.” http://www.britannica.com/topic/Garo [October 16, 2015].

Ethnologue. *Languages of the World.* <http://www.ethnologue.com/language/grt> [August 30, 2014].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Haokip, Thongkolal (2014). “Inter-Ethnic Relations in Meghalaya.” *Asian Ethnicity* 15(3): 302-316.

Hewitt, Joseph J., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) (2008). *Peace and Conflict 2008.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

India Ministry of Law and Justice. “The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.” <http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/subord/rule9a.htm> [July 16, 2014].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Joshua Project. “Garo in Bangladesh” https://joshuaproject.net/people\_groups/11826/BG [October 26, 2015].

Khan, Saidul (2013). “Garo Council: Gogoi Says Garos Are Deserving, Points out Dr. Milton Sangma.” *Assam Times*, December 17. <http://www.assamtimes.org/node/9159> [July 16, 2014].

Khan, Saidul (2013). “Garo Council: Gogoi Says Garos Are Deserving, Points out Dr. Milton Sangma.” *Assam Times*, December 17. <http://www.assamtimes.org/node/9159> [July 16, 2014].

Laishram, Dhanabir (2013). “Autonomous District Council in NE India, Boon or Curse.” *Manipur Times.* <http://www.manipurtimes.com/news-article/116-the-people-chronicle-article/302-autonomous-district-council-in-ne-india-boon-or-curse> [July 16, 2014].

Meghalaya Times (2005). “Khasi, Garo Recognized as Associate Official Languages.” June 7. <http://meghalayatimes.info/index.php/front-page/6179-khasi-garo-recognised-as-associate-official-languages> [July 16, 2014].

Meghalaya Times (2013). “Separate Garo State Movement Not against Non-Tribals: GHSMC.” May 18. <http://meghalayatimes.info/index.php/front-page/19531-separate-garo-state-movement-not-against-non-tribals-ghsmc> [July 16, 2014].

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Prakash, Ved (2008). *Terrorism in India’s North-East: A Gathering Storm*. New Dehli: Gyan Publishing House.

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Casualties in Violence by ANVC.” [http://www.satp.org/  
satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/data\_sheets/anvc/casualties.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/data_sheets/anvc/casualties.htm) [December 20, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Casualties in Violence by People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLFM).” [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/  
data\_sheets/mplf/casualties.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/data_sheets/mplf/casualties.htm) [December 20, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA).” *South Asia Terrorism Portal*. [http://www.satp.org/  
satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist\_outfits/GNLA.HTM](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/GNLA.HTM) [December 20, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Incidents and Statements Involving Liberation of Achik Elite Force(LAEF).” [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/  
terrorist\_outfits/LAEF\_tl.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/LAEF_tl.htm) [December 20, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M).” [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/  
states/meghalaya/terrorist\_outfits/plf\_m.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/plf_m.htm) [December 20, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. <https://www.satp.org/document/paper-acts-and-oridinances/draft-agreement-signed-between-the-anvc-and-anvc-b-with-the-centre-and-meghalaya-state-government-on-january-5-2013> [July 29, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_garo-national-liberation-army-gnla> [June 24, 2022].

START - National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “United Achik National Front.” [http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data\_collections/tops/terrorist\_organization\_  
profile.asp?id=4735](http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4735) [December 20, 2013].

Swarup, Mridushi (2011). “Protection of Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution: Promise and Performance.” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1790922> [July 16, 2014].

The Hindu (2014). “Meghalaya Assembly Rejects Resolution for Garoland” March 18. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states//article60402985.ece> [July 29, 2022].

The Meghalayan (2022). “Schools in Assam’s Garo Areas to Have Language as Medium”. February 23. <https://themeghalayan.com/assamese-medium-schools-to-become-garo-medium-in-garo-dominated-areas/> [July 29, 2022].

Times of India (2013). “Garos in Assam Intensify Separate Council Demand.” *Times of India,* May 13. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/Garos-in-Assam-intensify-separate-council-demand/articleshow/20020469.cms> [November 3, 2015].

Times of India (2014). “Two Meghalaya Insurgent Groups Sign Peace Act”. September 24. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/two-meghalaya-insurgent-groups-sign-peace-pact/articleshow/43346605.cms [July 29, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Gond

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The Gond are a Scheduled Tribe living across different Indian states, mainly in Central India. The Gond are also known as Gondi.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Gonds have demanded establishment of a state called Gondwana for Adivasis since the early 1940 (Adivasi Resurgence 2015). However, despite the existence of separatist sentiment, this demand failed to become an organized political movement until the 1990s (Prasad 2015).
* In 1991, a formal political organization – the Gondwana Gantantra Party (GGP) – was established to work towards the creation of a separate “Gondawana State” (Prasad 2015). Thus, 1991 is coded as start date. The GGP remained active in subsequent years and continued to make claims for a Gond state (Hitavada 2019; Minahan 2016; The Times of India 2014; The Pioneer 2010). [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Gondwana Gantantra Party (GGP), the main political organization in this movement, demands the creation of a separate Gondwana state for the tribals. [1991-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The exact contours of the territory claimed are unclear. According to Minahan (2016: 162), the claimed territory includes the Deccan Plateau in Central India, which includes parts of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. This is similar to what has been claimed by the GGP, which demands: the whole of Vidarbha in Maharashtra, the whole of Chhattisgarh, Adilabad district from Telangana, the Mahakoshal region in Madhya Pradesh (the Sidhi, Umaria, Shahdol, Anuppur, Dindori, Mandla, Balaghat, Sheoni, Chhindwada, Betul, Damoh and Tikamgadh districts) (Prasad 2015).
* Another, more recent demand includes 24 districts from Madhya Pradesh, in addition to the ones mentioned above (Prasad 2015; Tehelka 2017). Furthermore, there are claims for a separate Gondwana state to be carved out of Telengana and Andhra Pradesh (from the districts of Adilabad to Srikakulam).
* Overall, the GGP’s claim appears to be dominant, though this is not fully clear. We flag this claim as ambiguous and code the GGP claim using data from GADM for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of violence; thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* During the 9th and 13th century, the Gond tribes inhabited Central India (Minahan 2016: 163). During the Mughal period, Gondwana was marked as the country of Gond people, and it was politically at the periphery of the empire (Prasad 2015). Although the Muslim invasion had ended several Gond kingdoms in central India (some remained in the West), it was not until a Maratha invasion in 1740 that Gond independence ended (Minahan 2016: 163). By the end of the 18th century, Gond people had dispersed in a wide area, often settling in the highlands (Minahan 2016: 163).

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Gond |
| *Scenario* | n: 1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* Gond tribes are listed as scheduled tribes. The Scheduled Tribes are coded in EPR as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). However, we found no evidence of Gond representation in the cabinet. [1991-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* The Indian census reports 13,256,928 Gond as of 2011. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,250 million in 2011. [0.0106]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 2011 census, Gond people reside in eleven different Indian states across different districts (e.g., Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Karnataka, etc.). Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh have the highest Gond population (4,298,404 and 5,093,124 respectively). According to the way regional concentration is coded on this project, they are not concentrated in any of these states. Besides, based on the number of people who speak Gondi, the 2011 census shows that at even at a district level Gondi-speakers are not concentrated. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to the Joshua Project, there are Gondi people in Bangladesh, but they number <100k. [no kin]

**Sources**

Adivasi Resurgence (2015). “10 Things you need to know about “Gondwana State’ demand.” <http://adivasiresurgence.com/2015/12/18/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-gondwana-state-demand/> [August 25, 2022].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

DownToEarth (2014). “Why demand for Gondwana state continues to be scuttled.” <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/why-demand-for-gondwana-state-continues-to-be-scuttled-46694> [August 25, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hitavada (2019). “Movement for Gondwana state from June 24.” <https://www.thehitavada.com/Encyc/2019/5/28/Movement-for-Gondwana-state-from-June-24.html> [August 25, 2022].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lexis Nexis. http://www.lexis-nexis.com [July 20, 2022].

Minahan, James (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Second Edition*. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Prasad, Akash K. (2015). “Gondwana Movement in Post-Colonial India: Exploring Paradigms of Assertion, Self-Determination and Statehood”. *Journal Of Tribal Intellectual Collective India* 3(1): 37-45.

Tehelka (2017). “Public in Tight Spot Over Politics of Small States.” March 02. *Nexis.* [September 14, 2022].

The Pioneer (2010). “GGP Initiates Revival Efforts for Separate State.” June 16. *Nexis.* [September 06, 2022].

The Times of India (2014). “Demand for Separate State, Again.” May 24. *Nexis.* [September 06, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Gorkhas

Activity: 1947-2020

**General notes**

* The Gorkhas are also referred to as Gurkhas.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1907 the Hillmen Union was formed, an organization representing the interests of the Gorkha (Indian Nepalese). In 1909 the Union petitioned the British government that Darjeeling remains a scheduled district. Note: this is not coded as start date because the claim did not exceed the status quo.
* The first claim for more autonomy we found is in 1917, when the Union demanded an independent administrative unit and thus a certain degree of autonomy. The Hillmen Union continued to contend for a separate status. In 1935, Darjeeling became a partially excluded area, a status that implies a certain degree of autonomy. Yet the Hillmen Union continued to make claims for more autonomy. With independence on the horizon, the Gorkhas stepped up their demands (Chadha 2005: 382). An important contender was the All India Gorkha League, an organization that had been formed in 1943. Based on this, we code 1917 as the start date. In the data set, we code the movement from 1947, the year India attained independence. We found no separatist violence in 1917-1947, and thus note prior non-violent activity (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; India Today 2011; Minahan 1996, 2002; Rai 2008; Sinha 2013; TRAC).
* In 1952 the All India Gorkha League proposed the creation of a separate Nepali-speaking state (Dhakal 2009: 160). Agitation for separate statehood continued but did not gain much traction until the 1980s when the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) was formed (in 1980) (Gungaly 2005). The GNLF demanded the creation of a separate Gorkha state within India (Chadha 2005: 386).
* In 1988 the GNLF officially gave up its claim for separate statehood, but agitation towards a separate state continued, if at a lower level of intensity (Ganguly 2005; Minahan 2002: 681). In 1997 the GNLF’s re-started its official claim for the creation of a separate Gorkha state. In 2007, Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) was founded, which continued the GNLF’s fight for a separate Gorkhaland state (Rai 2008).
* In 1988, a semi-autonomous Gorkha region was created, which received additional powers in 2011. Roth (2015: 327) reports the movement has been ‘mollified’ by the grant of further powers in 2011, but Minahan (2016: 164) reports that the movement for the creation of a Gorkha state is ongoing. This is corroborated by other sources (NDTV 2013; Hindustan Times 2017). Thus, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1917; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim is for the creation of a separate Ghorka state in India, Ghorkaland (Minahan 2002: 679-680). Already in the early 20th century first calls for autonomy for India’s Gorkhas (Indian Nepalese) were made (Chadha 2005: 382). Demands were also made around the time of India’s independence (Chadha 2005: 382), in particular by the All India Gorkha League that was formed in 1943. For example, in 1952 the All India Gorkha League proposed the creation of a separate Nepali-speaking state (Dhakal 2009: 160). Agitation for separate statehood continued but did not gain much traction until the 1980s when the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) was formed (in 1980) (Gungaly 2005). In 1988 the GNLF officially gave up its claim for separate statehood, but some elements continued to agitate for separate statehood (Ganguly 2005; Minahan 2002: 681). In 1997 the GNLF leadership changed policy and once again sought separate statehood. The claim resurfaced with increased intensity in 2007 (Rai 2008). In 2013, all pro-Gorkhaland parties joined forces creating the Gorkahland Joint Action Committee, which demands the creation of a separate Gorkha state (Sarkar, 2013). According to Minahan there have also been calls for secession (and a merger with Nepal) but according to Chadha (2005: 379) claims for outright secession were not dominant. [1947-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan (2002: 680-681) notes that a radical and vocal minority has been making claims for independence since the late 1980s as some members of the GNLF demanded a sovereign state separate from India and Nepal. This demand appears to coincide with periods of violence in the 1980s and into the 1990s. However, we could not independently verify the existence of an organized, politically significant movement for independence. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Gorkhas is called Gorkhaland with Darjeeling as its center. This territory is situated in northeastern India within the northern West Bengal State (Minahan 2002: 677). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 328).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The LVIOLSD coding for 1986 follows this report from Keesing’s: “Agitation by the Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) for a separate state within the Indian union (Tarun Gorkha or Gurkhaland) resulted in the deaths of over 100 people during 1986 and continued into 1987.” Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 114), in contrast, suggest that fighting continued into 1988. Yet, we only found clear evidence that the 25 deaths threshold was met in 1986. [1947-1985: NVIOLSD; 1986: LVIOLSD; 1987-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Drabya Shah established the kingdom at Gorkha in 1559 (the city was formerly the ancestral home of the ruling house of Nepal). His descendants created a powerful military force out of the ethnically diverse inhabitants of the area, and conquered neighboring kingdoms and principalities, which he consolidated as the kingdom of Nepal. In the late 18th century they raided south into British territory. The British sent an expedition against the raiders, provoking the Gurkha War of 1814-1816. The Gurkhas sued for peace in 1816 (Minahan 2002: 678-679). The Nepalese king was forced to cede Darjeeling (where most Gorkhas live) to British India in 1835 (Chadha 2005: 380). Attracted by the Darjeeling tea cultivation, many Nepalese settled in the uplands. They were called Gorkhas by the British, whatever their ethnic or cultural origin (Minahan 2002: 679). Their common feature is that they tend to speak Nepali (Gorkhas have varied linguistic backgrounds but adopted Nepali as their lingua franca). In the First World War, Gorkhas were heavily represented in the British Army, both in the European and Middle Eastern theaters (over 20,000 Gorkhas died in WWI). The Gorkhas did not enjoy autonomy under the British (Chadha 2005: 381-382).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1949 the state of West Bengal recognized Nepali as the medium of instruction in primary and secondary education in Darjeeling (that is, the area that is claimed by the movement, Gorkhaland) (Chadha 2005). Pamanand (1986) reports that the West Bengal government has given the Nepali language a special status, though not noting specific measures and years. [1949: cultural rights concession]
* In August 1988 an autonomy agreement was reached, providing for a semi-autonomous “hill council” (Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, or DGHC) to take over local administration from West Bengal and Western Assam (tripartite – Indian government, government of West Bengal, GNLF) (Ganguly 2005: 468, 487). [1988: autonomy concession]
* In 1992 Nepali was included in the 8th schedule of the constitution (Roy 2012: 247-248). This implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [1992: cultural rights concession]
* In 1994, the Gorkha autonomous area was enlarged and further powers devolved (Minahan 2002: 681). [1994: autonomy concession]
* In July 2011, the Indian government once more increased the autonomy powers of Gorkhaland, setting up the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration, which would have powers to set up industries and create government jobs (BBC 2011). [2011: autonomy concession]
* In May 2017, the West Bengal Education Minister Partha Chatterjee announced that all students, irrespective of their mother tongue and school, would have to learn Bengali from Class 1 to 10 (Scroll.in 2017). Following the announcement, protest broke out in Darjeeling, as the move was interpreted as an imposition by the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM). As a result of agitation, the chief minister clarified that Bengali would only be optional in the hills. This, however, did not stop protests, as GJM proceeded to demand a separate Gorkhaland state (Hindustan Times 2017). We do not code the event as a restriction because Bengali was not made a compulsory subject in the hills.

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1988 the Gorkha autonomous council was set up. Prior to that, the Gorkhas appear not to have had any meaningful degree of regional autonomy: they played a minor role in West Bengal’s regional government (Sinha 2013). [1989-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* In 1988 the Gorkha autonomous council was set up. Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). [1988: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Gorkhas (Gurkhas) |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Gorkhas are Indian Nepali speakers. There is no Gorkha group coded in EPR. Thus, the Gorkhas are not represented in EPR, at least not as a whole. Part of the Gorkhas belong to the Other Backward Class/Scheduled Tribe/Scheduled Caste status (Roy 2012: 49-57). We found no evidence that would allow us to code the Gorkhas as included. Sinha (2013) suggests that the Darjeeling region (the proposed Gorkhaland) has little say both in West Bengal and Delhi. Pamanand (1986) does not give evidence of substantial representation in Delhi, either. Some Gorkhas even lack Indian citizenship, though a discrimination code appears unjustified. [1947-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* The Indian census counts about 2-3 million Nepali speakers, but this only counts those who speak Nepali as their first language. There are about 4-10 million Gorkhas estimated to reside across India (Sinha 2013). Parmanand (1986) estimates their number at 6 million. According to Minahan (2002) there are 6.36 million Gorkhas in India. We use Minahan’s estimate. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,093 million in 2002. [0.0058]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 677), approx. 80% of India’s Gorkhas resides in Gorkhaland (northern part of West Bengal state), where they make up 80% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 677), there are approx. 300,000 Gorkhas in neighboring Bhutan. Furthermore, the Gorkhas are descendants of Nepali immigrants, and thus have ethnic kin in Nepal. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Barun, Roy (2012). *Gorkhas and Gorkhaland.* Darjeeling: Parbati Roy Foundation.

BBC (2011). “Gorkha Ethnic Group in Autonomy Deal with India.” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14181433> [November 27, 2014].

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chadha, Vivek (2005). *Low Intensity Conflicts in India.* *An Analysis.* New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Dhakal, Rajendra P. (2009). “The Urge to Belong: An Identity in Waiting.” T.B. Subba, A.C. Sinha, G.S. Nepal, and D.R. Nepal, *Indian Nepals. Issues and Perspectives*, pp. 148-167. New Delhi: Concept Publishing.

Ganguly, Rajat (2005). “Poverty, Malgovernance and Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Gorkha Nationalism and the Gorkhaland Agitation in India.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11(4): 467-502.

Ganguly, Rajat (2005). “Poverty, Malgovernance and Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Gorkha Nationalism and the Gorkhaland Agitation in India.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11(4): 467-502.

Ghosh, Palash (2013). “Tea and No Sympathy: Gorkhas Demand Separate State From India.” *International Business Times*. July 29. <http://www.ibtimes.com/tea-no-sympathy-gorkhas-demand-separate-state-india-1363337> [June 20, 2014].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 114.

Hindustan Times (2017). “Demand for Gorkhaland: How Bengali language derailed peace in Darjeeling”. June 16. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/demand-for-gorkhaland-the-darjeeling-crisis-began-with-the-bengal-govt-announcement/story-S7VdgGSabmfxvLKoXc76mO.html> [August 03, 2022].

India Today (2011). “Gorkhaland Tripartite Accord Signed, Darjeeling Hills Get More Powers : East, News - India Today.” July 18. <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/gorkhaland-tripartite-pact-signed/1/145323.html> [June 20, 2014].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [March 25, 2002].

Laishram, Dhanabir (2013). “Autonomous District Council in NE India, Boon or Curse.” *Manipur Times.* <http://www.manipurtimes.com/news-article/116-the-people-chronicle-article/302-autonomous-district-council-in-ne-india-boon-or-curse> [July 16, 2014].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [December 10, 2013].

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 202-204.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 677-682.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

NDTV (2013). “Telangana effect: Gorkha Janmukti Morcha calls indefinite shutdown in Darjeeling”. July 30. <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/telangana-effect-gorkha-janmukti-morcha-calls-indefinite-shutdown-in-darjeeling-529985> [August 03, 2022].

Parmanand (1986). “The Indian Community in Nepal and the Nepalese Community in India: The Problem of National Integration.” *Asian Survey* 26(9): 1005-1019.

Rai, Joel (2008). “Redrawing the Map of Gorkhaland.” *Indian Express.* June 12. <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/redrawing-the-map-of-gorkhaland/321606/1> [June 30, 2014].

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Sarkar, Debasis (2013). “Pro Gorkhalad Organizations to Remain on Path of Darjeeling Movement under GJAC Name.” *The Economic Times.* August 16. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pro-gorkhaland-organizations-to-remain-on-path-of-darjeeling-movement-under-gjac-name/articleshow/21862376.cms> [August 5, 2022].

Scroll.in (2017). “West Bengal: Government Makes Bengali Compulsory from Class 1 to 10 in All Schools”. May 16. [https://scroll.in/latest/837760/west-bengal-government-makes-bengali-compulsory-from-class-1-to-10-in-all-schools [August](https://scroll.in/latest/837760/west-bengal-government-makes-bengali-compulsory-from-class-1-to-10-in-all-schools%20%5bAugust) 5, 2022].

Sinha, Satyabrat (2013). “The Battles for Gorkhaland.” *New York Times.* August 8. <http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/the-battles-for-gorkhaland/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0> [June 30, 2014].

Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC). “Gorkha National Liberation Front.” <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/gorkha-national-liberation-front-gnlf> [November 27, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Jharkhandis

Activity: 1947-2000

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Jharkhandis consists of a number of tribal peoples in northeastern India, officially included in the Scheduled Tribes category. The largest tribal group associated with this movement is the Santhals. According to Minahan (2002: 841), the Jharkhandis began to organize after the First World War, though initially the Jharkhandi movement was directed mainly against Hindu immigrants. We found no evidence of claims that can unambiguously be interpreted as directed towards self-determination as we define it until 1938, when Jharkhandi nationalists founded the Jharkhand Party to press for pan-tribal unity and autonomy. As Indian independence in 1947 neared, militant nationalists demanded that the British grant separate independence to Jharkhand as a Christian majority area outside Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. Based on this, 1938 is coded as start date. In the data set, we code the movement only from 1947, the year of India’s independence. We found no evidence of separatist violence in 1938-1946 and thus indicate nonviolent prior activity.
* With India’s independence the Jharkhand Party began to demand a separate Jharkhand State. Movement support increased in the 1960s, but it took until the year 2000 for a state of Jharkhand to be created. The creation of Jharkhand appears to have ended agitation towards increased autonomy. Minahan (2002: 844) notes that nationalists demand the incorporation of several districts around Jharkand into an enlarged Jharkhand state. But we found no evidence of organized activity. Thus, we code an end to the movement in 2000. [start date: 1938; end date: 2000]

**Dominant claim**

* Prior to India’s independence, the Jharkandis made claims for separate independence. With India’s independence the Jharkhand Party began to demand a separate Jharkhand State. This is the dominant claim. An early indication of this is that the Jharkhand Party submitted a memorandum demanding statehood to the States Reorganization Committee in 1953 (Horo 2013: 4). The Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, the party (founded in 1972) that became the main vehicle of the movement after the Jharkhand party had fragmented, also had a pro-statehood agenda (Horo 2013: 5; Tillin 2011: 73). [1947-2000: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Only prior to India’s independence (see above). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* According to Minahan (2002: 839), Jharkhand nationalists have claimed: “a number of administrative districts of [...] Bihar, Orissa, Madya Pradesh and West Bengal.” In response to these claims, the state of Jharkhand was created out of the southern districts of the state of Bihar in 2000. It is unclear what specific areas Jharkhandis have claimed beyond the current state of Jharkhand. For lack of better information, we flag this claim as ambiguous and code it based on Jharkhand’s present-day borders according to the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In previous versions of this dataset, we attributed the Naxalite rebellion to the Jharkhandis. However, the Naxalite rebellion is much broader and also in the first instance center-seeking. Minahan (2002: 842) reports that the Jharkhandi movement was peaceful until the early 1990s. In subsequent years, Minahan reports that there were several inter-communal clashes, but he does not report evidence of separatist violence between rebels and the state. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The term Jharkhandis refers to tribal people mostly in the state of Bihar (now Jharkhand). The largest tribal groups associated with this movement are the Santhals, the Mundas, and the Oraoans (Minahan 2002: 839-840). The Jharkhandi tribes settled in highland jungles after having their territory constantly reduced. The territory was conquered by Muslims in the 12th century. In 1497 came the territory came under the rule of the powerful Sultanate of Delhi (Minahan 2002: 841). The tribal peoples, emulating lowland Hindus, formed small monarchies in the Chota Nagpur Plateau. The tribes came under British rule in 1765 as part of the Bengal province. Resistance provoked several revolts, including the Ho revolt of 1820-1827, and the Munda uprising of 1831-32 (Minahan 2002: 841). In 1908, the government restricted the Jharkandi tribes to allotted reserves. Jharkhandis moved to the new industrial cities in large numbers in the 1920s and 1930s, where many adopted Christianity (Minahan 2002: 841). The Jharkhandis of Bihar became a “partially excluded” group in 1935, a status which implied some limited autonomy and led to scheduled tribe status upon India’s independence. Scheduled tribe status implies some limited protection of tribal culture.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Jharkhandis’ “partially excluded” status was transformed to Scheduled Tribe status after independence. This implies some limited cultural autonomy; however effectively this is a continuation of British colonial policy (Minahan 2002: 842; Minority Rights Group International). Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 1994 a bill was passed that led to creation of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council in 1995. The council was given limited legislative and economic autonomy. The Jharkhandis received guaranteed representation (Kumar 1998: 120; Roy 1994: 3065; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 144). [1994: autonomy concession]
* In 2000 the Jharkhand autonomous council was upgraded. Jharkhand was separated from Bihar and became a new state (e.g. Minahan 2002: 844). [2000: autonomy concession]
* By way of the 92nd Constitutional Amendment in 2003, the Santhali language was included in India’s eighth schedule. This implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). The Santhalis are the largest tribal group associated with the Jharkhandis movement. However, at this point the movement had already ended.

**Regional autonomy**

* See major territorial changes. [1996-2000: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* In 1994 a bill was passed that led to creation of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council in 1995. The council was given limited legislative and economic autonomy as well as oversight of 40 subjects. The Jharkhandis received guaranteed representation (Kumar 1998: 120; Roy 1994: 3065). [1995: establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 2000 the Jharkhand autonomous council was elevated. Jharkhand was separated from Bihar and became a new state (e.g. Minahan 2002: 844). [2000: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Jharkhandis |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* The term Jharkhandis refers to tribal people mostly in the state of Bihar (now Jharkhand). The Scheduled Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout in EPR. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). Evidently this does not apply to all of the hundreds of indigenous groups associated with the umbrella Scheduled Tribes group. We found no evidence of Jharkhandi representation in the cabinet before 2004, when Shibu Soren (ethnic Santhal/Jharkhandi) became minister for coal (Encyclopedia Britannica). [1947-2000: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 839) there are 14.5 million Jharkhandis in India. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,077 million in 2002. [0.0135]

**Regional concentration**

* The term Jharkhandis refers to tribal people mostly in the state of Bihar (now Jharkhand). However, according to Minahan (2002: 839), the Jarkhandis make up less than 50% of Jarkhand’s population, and less than 50% of all Jarkhandis live there. From the Jharkhandis’ settlement pattern depicted in Minahan, it does not appear as if there would be an alternatively defined territory that would fulfil the definition (the Jharkhandi settlement pattern spreads across Jharkhand and adjacent areas).
  + Note: Minahan (2002: 841) suggests that the Jharkhandis formed a majority in 1947, but Horo (2013) suggests that the Jharkhandis formed a minority in Jharkhand already in the 1950s. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The term Jharkhandis relates to a number of tribal peoples; the largest are the Santhals, the Mundas, and the Oraoans (Minahan 2002: 839-840). There are Santhals, Mundas, and Oraoans also in Bangladesh (642,000/142,000/114,000 according to the Joshua Project) [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Encyclopedia Britannica. “Shibu Soren.” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1976343/Shibu-Soren> [November 27, 2014].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 144.

Horo, A. (2013). “Jharkhand Movement.” *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention* 2(4): 1-6.

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Joshua Project. <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/13867/BG> & <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/14743/BG> & <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/14210/BG> [November 9, 2015].

Kumar, B.B. (1998). *Small States Syndrome in India.* New Delhi: Concept Publishing.

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 59.

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 250-252.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 839-844.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples.* <http://www.minorityrights.org/5659/india/adivasis.html> [November 27, 2014].

Roy, A.K. (1994). “Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council - One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?” *Economic and Political Weekly* 29(49): 3065-3068.

Sambanis, Nicholas, & Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonas (2019). “Sovereignty Rupture as a Central Concept in Quantitative Measures of Civil War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(6): 1542–1578.

Tillin, L. (2011). “Questioning Borders: Social Movements, Political Parties and the Creation of New States in India.” *Pacific Affairs* 84(1): 67-87. [http://www.pacificaffairs.ubc.ca/files/2011/07/  
Tillin.pdf](http://www.pacificaffairs.ubc.ca/files/2011/07/Tillin.pdf) [November 27, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Weidmann, Nils B. (2009). “Geography as Motivation and Opportunity: Group Concentration and Ethnic Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 526-543.

## Kashmiri Hindus

Activity: 1952-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Praja Parishad Party, the dominant party in Hindu Jammu (the Hindu portion of Kashmir), was formed in 1947. Since 1952 it has campaigned for a separate status for Jammu, a demand which over the years has been shared by other organizations like Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Bharatiya Janata Party, and Shiv Sena. In 1963, the Praja Parishad merged in the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, later the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which carried forward the demand for a separate state of Jammu. In August 2019, Jammu and Kashmir lost statehood and it became a union territory. In 2020, a new party called party Ikkjutt Jammu emerged, which has advocated for the creation of a separate Jammu state. Thus, we code the movement as ongoing (Chowdhary 2000; Frontline 2002a, 2002b; Ganguly 1996; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Tremblay 2005; Anand 2020; Sharma 2020; Hindustan Times 2021). [start date: 1952; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1952 the Praja Parishad movement began to make claims for the separation of Hindu Jammu from J & K. The claim garnered renewed prominence in the 1990s (Behera 2002; Chowdhary 2000). The claim is ongoing as of 2020 (see movement dates). There are also claims for autonomy within J & K but the evidence we found suggests that the former is dominant. [1952-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kashmiri Hindus is the Jammu Division within the state of Jammu and Kashmir in northern India. The division includes the districts of Jammu, Doda, Kathua, Ramban, Reasi, Kishtwar, Poonch, Rajouri, Udhampur, and Samba. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Since we found no evidence of separatist violence, we classify the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Previously independent, Kashmir was conquered by the Mughal Empire in 1586. The Kashmiri state was reestablished in the mid-eighteenth century, but shortly thereafter fell to the incoming Pashtuns (Minahan 2012: 135-136). Sikhs from Punjab added the Kashmiri homeland to their expanding empire in 1819. The first Anglo-Sikh War broke out in 1845 and ended in the defeat of the Sikhs. Gulab Singh, the Hindu ruler of Jammu became a British ally and was granted rule of the entire Kashmir region (princely) (Minahan 2012: 137). In 1947 the Hindu maharaja had to accede to India and the local Hindus lost dominance over Kashmir. [1947: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Several sources note that the Kashmiri Hindus often complain about under-representation in the regional government. Indeed, it appears that the Kashmiri Hindus (who make up about 30% of the local population) have relatively limited say in the regional government. In particular, all of J & K’s chief ministers have been Muslim thus far. And Jammu’s Hindus “appear to have not received their fair share” at the cabinet level (Tremblay 2005: 404). Thus, we do not code the changes in J & K’s autonomy status as concessions/restrictions.
* By way of the 92nd Amendment to India’s constitution, Dogri (the language spoken by most Kashmiri Hindus) was included in the 8th schedule of the Indian constitution in 2003. This implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [2003: cultural rights concession]
* In 2019, the Indian government revoked Kashmir’s special autonomy and Jammu and Kashmir was reorganized into two union territories – Ladakh and J & K (BBC 2019; Tiwary et al. 2021). The J & K union territory (but not the Ladakh territory) was granted a legislative assembly with powers to make laws in all areas mentioned in the State List (which lists competencies of Indian states), with the exception of security and policing matters (Indian Express 2019; Ministry of Law and Justice 2019). We do not code the revocation of J & K’s special autonomy as a restriction because the Kashmiri Hindus had only limited influence over J & K (see above). In fact, the Hindus’ influence over J & K appears to have increased. After Jammu and Kashmir became a union territory, a delimitation of seats for the Assembly elections provided Jammu with 43 seats and Kashmir with 47 (Dutta et. al 2022).
* In September 2020, the Jammu and Kashmir Official Languages Bill was introduced to Lok Sabha (later the Jammu and Kashmir Official Languages Act). The Act declared that Kashmiri, Dogri, Urdu, Hindi and English were to be recognized as official languages of the union territory Jammu and Kashmir (Ministry of Law and Justice 2020). We do not code a concession because Dogri already has official status by way of the national constitution (see above).

**Regional autonomy**

* Several sources note that the Kashmiri Hindus often complain about under-representation in the regional government. Indeed, it appears that the Kashmiri Hindus (who make up about 30% of the local population) have relatively limited say in the regional government. In particular, all of J & K’s chief ministers have been Muslim thus far. And Jammu’s Hindus “appear to have not received their fair share” at the cabinet level (Tremblay 2005: 404). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change, but we do not code one as this was before the start date.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kashmiri Hindus |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Kashmiri Hindus speak [Dogri](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dogri); this linguistic group is not represented in EPR. Despite their small size, the Kashmiri Hindus appear represented in India’s cabinet. Karan Singh, the son of the last maharaja, served in the cabinet from 1967. Jitendra Singh serves as minister of state (junior minister) under the current Modi government. Chaman Lal Gupta (served from 1999-2004) is another junior minister with Kashmiri Hindu background. Adarsh Sein Anand, a former Chief Justice in India’s Supreme Court, has Kashmiri Hindu background. Tremblay (2009: 927) claims that Nehru was also a Kashmiri Hindu, but this could not be verified. Overall, the repeated inclusion of this small group suggests a junior partner code throughout. [1952-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to the 2001 census 29.63% of J & K’s population of 10.1437 million are Hindus and India’s total population 1,028,737,436. [0.0029]
  + Data from the 2011 census leads to the same group size: 3,566,674/1,210,854,977=0.0029.

**Regional concentration**

* Hindus in Kashmir primarily reside in the Jammu region, where Hindus make up a majority. The following data comes from the 2011 census. [concentrated]
  + 28.44% of J&K’s population are Hindus, or 3,566,674.
  + Hindus form a majority in the following four spatially contiguous J&K districts: Kathua (88% Hindu or 540,063), Jammu (84%, 1,289,240), Samba (86%, 275,311), and Udhampur (88%, 489,044). In combination, approx. 2.6 million Hindus lived in these four districts, more than 70%.
  + Hindus in addition make up a significant share of the population in the following districts: Reasi (48%, 153,898), Rajouri (35%, 221,880), Doda (46%, 187,621), and Kishtwar (41%, 93,931).

**Kin**

* Many Kashmiri Hindus speak Dogri, but we found no evidence of significant Dogri-speaking minorities outside of India (Ethnologue). Nevertheless, we code kin due to Hindus in various countries, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. [kin in adjacent country]

**Sources**

Anand, Arun (2020). “Praja Parishad Party — The Forgotten Name Behind the Removal of Article 370 in J&K.” *The Print.* November 14. <https://theprint.in/india/praja-parishad-party-the-forgotten-name-behind-the-removal-of-article-370-in-jk/543732/> [August 18, 2022].

BBC (2019). “Article 370: What Happened with Kashmir and Why It Matters”. August 06. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-49234708> [August 18, 2022].

Behera, N. C. (2002). “A Signal from Jammu.” *Frontline - India’s National Magazine, The Hindu* 19(22).

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chowdhary, Rekha (2000). “Debating Autonomy.” *Seminar Magazine.* <http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/496/496%20rekha%20chowdhary.htm> [June 20, 2014].

Dutta, Anisha, Basharaat Masood and Arun Sharma. “J&K Delimitation Commission Issues Final Notification, Reserves 43 Assembly Seats for Jammu, 47 for Kashmir.” *Indian Express.* May 06. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jk-delimitation-commission-final-notification-assembly-seats-jammu-kashmir-7902846/> [August 18, 2022].

Ethnologue. “Dogri.” <http://www.ethnologue.com/language/doi> [November 9, 2015].

Frontline (2002a). “A Massacre and a Message.” August 3. <http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1916/19160160.htm> [June 20, 2014].

Frontline (2002b). “RSS-BJP Game PLan in Jammu.” July 20. <http://jammuregionalmuslims.wordpress.com/bjp-panther-party-two-sides-of-same-coin/> [June 20, 2014].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Ganai Naseer (2021). “Why AFSPA In Jammu And Kashmir Is Not Just A Defence Act.” December 07. <https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-news-why-afspa-in-jammu-and-kashmir-is-not-just-a-defence-act/404114> [August 18, 2022].

Ganguly, Sumit (1996). “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay.” *International Security* 21(2): 76-107.

Hindustan Times (2021). “Separate state only lasting solution: Ikkjutt Jammu”. October 19. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/separate-state-only-lasting-solution-ikkjutt-jammu-101634586452657.html> [August 18, 2022].

Indian Express (2019). “Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Bill Passed by Rajya Sabha: Key Takeaways”. August 05. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-bifurcation-ladakh-union-territory-key-takeaways-from-reorganisation-bill-article-370-amit-shah-5880177/> [August 18, 2022].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [March 25, 2002].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [December 10, 2013].

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 64.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Ministry of Law and Justice (2019). “The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019”. <https://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/210407.pdf> [August 18, 2022].

Ministry of Law and Justice (2020). “The Jammu and Kashmir Official Languages Act, 2020”. <https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2020/Jammu%20and%20Kashmir%20Official%20Languages%20Act,%202020.pdf> [August 18, 2022].

Sharma, Arun (2020). “IkkJutt Jammu Declares Itself Political Party, Says Its Goal Statehood.” *The Indian Express.* November 14. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/ikkjutt-jammu-declares-itself-political-party-says-its-goal-statehood-7050969/> [August 18, 2022].

Tiwari, Deeptiman, Arun Sharma and Naveed Iqbal (2021). “18 Months After Split, Downgrade, 4G Mobile Internet Back in J&K”. *Indian Express.* February 06. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-internet-services-restored-7176371/> [August 18, 2022].

Tremblay, R. C. (2009). “Kashmir’s Secessionist Movement Resurfaces.” *Asian Survey* 49(6): 924–950.

Tremblay, Reetha Chowdhari (1995). “Kashmir: The Valley’s Political Dynamics.” *Contemporary South Asia* 4(1): 79-102.

Tremblay, Reetha Chowdhari (2005). “Dogri.” In: Carl Skutsch (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the World’s Minorities*, pp. 402-404*.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Kashmiri Muslims

Activity: 1947-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first clear evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1939, when the Kashmir National Conference was formed. This is generally considered the inception of modern Kashmiri nationalism (Minahan 2002: 956). Thus, 1939 is coded as start date.
* Note: there had been activity already before 1939 that could be interpreted as geared towards self-determination as we define it, but this is somewhat ambiguous and thus not considered: In 1931 the Kashmiri Muslims rebelled against their local Hindu ruler, who was thereby forced to legalize political parties and in 1934 granted a legislative assembly (Minahan 2002: 956).
* In the data set, we begin to code the movement in 1947, the year India gained independence (Kashmir accessed India in 1947).
* Non-zero MAR protest scores and various separatist armed conflicts (see below) suggest an ongoing movement (Roth 2015; Minahan 2016; SATP). [start date: 1939; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the initial year the dominant claim was clearly for independence. As soon as Sheikh Abdullah was co-opted and made leader of Kashmir (in 1948), demands de-radicalized. However, Abdullah soon raised the independence claim again, in 1952 (Templay 2009). In 1953 Sheikh Abdullah was arrested upon claims that he agitated against the Union. Indeed, Abdullah was making claims that the adherence to India is provisional, pending a referendum, and he was thinking of an independent Kashmir, says the International Crisis Group. Abdullah was only released from prison in 1964 and the independence movement was severely repressed (the new leadership was more loyal to India). Nevertheless, Abdullah continued to work closely with a party called Plebiscite Front (that agitated for full self-determination) from prison (International Crisis Group 2003a: 9; Tremblay 2009: 932). In sum, there was continued agitation for independence. [1947-1974: independence claim]
* In 1974 Abdullah signed an agreement with Indira Gandhi that officially ended his agitation for for independence. The Plebiscite Front was abolished (e.g. Tremblay 2009). However, Abdullah kept his secessionist stance and agitation for independence continued (Tremblay 1995). [1975-1989: independence claim]
* With the 1989 insurgency, demands for secession became louder once again (Tremblay 2009). The movement became increasingly factionalized. According to UCDP, “[t]he aim of the insurgents is Kashmir's secession from India, a demand firmly rejected by India.” And: “what unites all of the Kashmiri groups is the desire to end Indian rule, since all the Kashmir insurgents dismiss the legality of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India in 1947 and thus the legitimacy of India's claim to the territory. The more precisely stated goal of incompatibility differs, however, between the separate outfits. The main division is between the pro-Pakistani elements, favoring accession to Pakistan, and those favoring Kashmir's complete independence. Any attempt to forge unity between the rebel movements has necessarily had to leave this issue undecided. To complicate the matter, several of the outfits have been deliberately vague on the issue, since Pakistan's patronage has been dependent on adhering to pro-Pakistani stance.” While the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front enjoyed more popular support (see Staniland 2010, 2013), the pro-Pakistani factions are stronger militarily and thus fairly “dominant” (Tremblay 2009: 935). After the events of August 2019, there has been a call to restore statehood for Jammu and Kashmir (Greater Kashmir 2021; Shakir 2021). However, it appears that the independence claim is still dominant. A case could be made to code an irredentist claim, too. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 144) also argue that independence is the stronger claim, but that the claim for a merger with Pakistan is gaining ground. [1990-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* The first group to emerge in 1939, the Kashmir National Conference, primarily campaigned for greater autonomy (Britannica; Minahan 2002: 956). It wasn’t until partition that the issue of independence emerged when a provisional government deposed the Hindu leadership (Minahan 2002: 956; Roth 2015: 317). An independence claim is therefore coded from 1947 onwards (see above for why coded as ongoing). [start date: 1947; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* There were attempts to attach Kashmir to Pakistan throughout the coding period, beginning in 1947 when the Pakistani military entered the region (Roth 2015: 317; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 143). However, this is noted coded as this and future attempts by Pakistan to incorporate Kashmir come from Pakistan and not from Kashmir itself.
* Internal calls for joining Pakistan became politically significant after 1989 (see above) as the SDM became divided supporters of outright independence and elements demanding accession to Pakistan. 1989 is coded as the start date of this claim because there were significant protests that year in whose context both claims for separate independence and a merger with Pakistan were made (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 144). Roth notes that the timing of this may be down to the sectarian and geopolitical factor of the USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan and a new fight needed for the mujahadeen (Roth 2015: 319; see also Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 144). Although irredentist claims appear to be driven by the Pakistani ISI, Tremblay notes the relative military dominance of pro-Pakistani factions (2009: 935), indicating that despite being partly driven by forces outside of Kashmir irredentist demands are politically significant. [start date: 1989; end date: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kashmiri Muslims consists of the Indian state Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the Pakistani parts of Kashmir, the Azad ("Free") Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan (Roth 2015: 317). However, following the SDM dataset’s coding rules we do not code cross-border claims. We therefore code the entire Jammu and Kashmir territory up until 1949 and only code the Indian parts of Kashmir from 1950 onwards, relying on Deiwiks et al. (2012) for map definition and on GIS data from the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1947 Kashmiri rebels (with the help of Pakistani forces) declared parts of Kashmir independent on October 24. The independence declaration was not directed directly against India but against the Kashmir princely state (Tremblay 2009: 928). Kashmir only acceded India on October 27. Thus, the declaration is not coded.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Pakistan and India fought two wars over the Kashmir region. The first was in 1946-1948. Minahan (2002: 244-245; 956) suggests that the Kashmiri Muslims engaged in separatist violence in 1947-1948, but he does not state any casualty figures. Neither MAR nor Marshall & Gurr/Hewitt et al. 2008 nor UCDP/PRIO would suggest a LVIOLSD code. We found no evidence that the 25-deaths threshold was met for the intra-state dyad. In 1949, the region was divided between Pakistan and India, with most of Balawaristan and Azad Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan. Based on this, we code 1947-1948 NVIOLSD.
* MAR codes a rebellion score of four in 1960-1964, indicating small-scale guerilla activity. This is likely in relation to the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965; at least, we could not find any other explanation for this coding decision. No other source suggests an internal conflict at this point. In their coding notes, SSW suggest that “the fighting was mainly between India-Pakistan in Kashmir in 1965. Pakistan coordinated and instigated a group of mujahadeen fighters to cross into Indian-controlled Kashmir in the hopes of starting a full-blown rebellion that they could use as justification for intervening. But the rebellion didn’t materialize and the resulting war was primarily between regular troops of the two national armies so it should be coded as an inter-state war. Significant indigenous armed rebellion against Indian control in Kashmir started much later.” The same is suggested by a case study by the University of Central Arkansas, which also does not note any significant violence in 1960-1964. We do not code LVIOLSD.
* In the aftermath of the 1965 war with Pakistan there was an upsurge of protest by militant Muslim students. In order to curb this, the Indian government invoked the Defense of India Rules, instituting censorship, jailing all advocates of self-determination, and prohibiting gatherings of more than five people without prior permission. These measures were later relaxed somewhat, but the government continued to make laws relating to the prevention of separatist activity. Beginning in mid-1988 there was a series of bomb blasts, arson attacks, shootings and strikes organized by various Islamic separatist organizations, to which the government responded by police and military action; it appears that fewer than 25 deaths have occurred in 1988 (e.g. UCDP/PRIO does not code 1988). [1965-1988: NVIOLSD]
* The HVIOLSD coding for 1989-2013 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). The LVIOLSD coding for 2014-2020 (ongoing) follows UCDP/PRIO. [1947-1988: NVIOLSD; 1989-2013: HVIOLSD; 2014-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Previously independent, Kashmir was conquered by the Mughal Empire in 1586. The Kashmiri state was reestablished in the mid-eighteenth century, but shortly thereafter fell to the incoming Pashtuns (Minahan 2012: 135-136). Sikhs from Punjab added the Kashmiri homeland to their expanding empire in 1819. The first Anglo-Sikh War broke out in 1845 and ended in the defeat of the Sikhs. Gulab Singh, the Hindu ruler of Jammu became a British ally and was granted rule of the entire Kashmir region (princely) (Minahan 2012: 137). According to Minahan (2002: 956) the Hindu rule over the Muslim Kashmiris became increasingly despotic in the early 20th century. In 1934 the Hindu Maharaja had to concede limited democratization (political parties were allowed and elections held to a local assembly). In 1939 the Muslims formed the Kashmir National Conference and began to agitate against Hindu domination and, upon partition, for accession to Pakistan.
* Kashmir’s Hindu prince hesitated whether to join India or Pakistan (Ganguly 1995: 169). In October 1947 Muslim Pashtuns from Pakistan invaded Kashmir. The Hindu prince, Hari Singh, appealed to the British. Aid was given conditional upon Kashmir’s accession to India (Minahan 2012: 137). Ganguly (1995: 170) argues that Nehru intervened only after having asked Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the largest secular and popular organization within the state, for provision. Initially, India regarded the accession as “provisional” until a plebiscite could be held to determine the will of the people (Tremblay 2009: 928). In 1948, as a result of UN mediation, a cease-fire was negotiated (Ganguly 1995: 171). A 1949 UN resolution demanded that a referendum should be held to decide on the final status of Kashmir (Minahan 2002: 957). Initially the Indian government supported the plan to hold a referendum. We code an independence concession in 1947 since India initially accepted a referendum. [1947: independence concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Immediately after Kashmir’s accession to India in late October 1947 a provisional emergency government was set up, with the Kashmiri Muslim leader (Sheikh Abdulla) appointed as head of the administration (Tremblay 2009: 928). This implied increased autonomy. [1947: autonomy concession]
* In 1949, a significant part of Kashmir was annexed by Pakistan (parts of Balawaristan and Azad Kashmir); since this was not granted by India, we do not code a concession.
* In 1949 the Indian Constituent Assembly approved Article 370 of the Constitution which gave Kashmir a special status within the federation. The article gave Kashmir special autonomy and limited the center’s powers to three areas: defense, foreign affairs, and communications (Tremblay 2009: 928-929). [1949: autonomy concession]
* The 1949 constitution lists Kashmiri and Urdu in its Eighth Schedule; this implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [1949: cultural rights concession]
* In 1951 the first elections were held in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir backed accession to India. India argued that this made a referendum unnecessary as the elections indirectly proved the people’s will to remain with India. The UN and Pakistan argued that a referendum was needed to take into account the views of voters throughout the former princely state (BBC). [1951: independence restriction]
* In 1952 the Delhi Agreement was signed by the J&K Constituent Assembly and the Indian government. The agreement clarified article 370 and recognized Urdu as the official state language (Tremblay 2009: 29). Since it appears that no new powers were conferred we do not code a new concession.
* In 1953 the Prime Minister of J & K, Sheikh Abdullah, was dismissed after he took a pro-referendum stance and delayed formal accession to India. A new Jammu and Kashmir government ratified accession to India (BBC; Tremblay 2009: 930). We code an autonomy restriction since the center removed Kashmir’s local leader. [1953: autonomy restriction]
* Abdullah was replaced with Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad. During his decade-long reign Kashmir’s special autonomy was significantly eroded (International Crisis Group 2002: 6). 1957 appears to be an adequate year to peg the restriction as this was when “most of the provisions of the Indian constitution were extended to Kashmir” (International Crisis Group 2003b: 5). [1957: autonomy restriction]
* In 1965, the center assumed the power to impose President’s rule in J & K (that is, direct rule) (Forsythe 2009: 305). [1965: autonomy restriction]
* In 1974 an accord was signed by Sheikh Abdullah and Indian PM Indira Gandhi that reaffirmed J & K as a constituent unit of India (Tremblay 2009: 931) but promised to restore some of the autonomy J & K had lost. Furthermore, it allowed Sheikh Abdullah to return to power in J & K (he had been dismissed and imprisoned in 1953) in return for him ending his agitation towards independence (Ganguly 2001: 89). [1974: autonomy concession]
* In March 1977 President’s rule was installed in Jammu and Kashmir. [1977: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in July 1977. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In 1984 the nationalist government of Farooq Abdullah was replaced with a government that is more sympathetic to New Delhi after 12 MPs defected to a rival faction (Stevens 1984). The Gandhi government had sought to replace Abdullah since Congress had lost the regional elections in 1983 (Minahan 2002; International Crisis Group 2003b).
* In March 1986 President’s rule was installed in Jammu and Kashmir. [1986: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in November 1986. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* According to MAR it is alleged that India rigged the 1987 elections in Jammu and Kashmir to manipulate events in the region. We do not code a restriction as this is too ambiguous.
* In January 1990 President’s rule was installed in Jammu and Kashmir. This was a reaction to the Kashmiri Muslims’ insurgency and boycott of the state elections. [1990: autonomy restriction]
* In September 1990, the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act was introduced, and the Kashmir Valley was declared as ‘disturbed’. In August 2001, the Act was extended to Jammu (Ganai 2021). We do not code emergency declarations as long as there is no clear restriction of autonomy/cultural rights.
* President’s rule was lifted in October 1996. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In October 2002 President’s rule was installed in Jammu and Kashmir. Yet, already a month later, in November 2002, President’s rule was lifted. Because the duration of direct rule was less than three months, we do not code a restriction.
* In July 2008 President’s rule was installed in Jammu and Kashmir. [2008: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in January 2009. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In December 2018, President’s rule was installed in Jammu and Kashmir. It has not been lifted at the time of writing (mid-2023). [2018: autonomy restriction]
  + There were two further periods of President’s rule in 2015 and 2016. Both were shorter than three months and therefore not coded (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President%27s\_rule).
* In 2019, the Indian government revoked Kashmir’s special autonomy and Jammu and Kashmir was reorganized into two union territories – Ladakh and J & K (BBC 2019; Tiwary et al. 2021). The J & K union territory (but not the Ladakh territory) was granted a legislative assembly with powers to make laws in all areas mentioned in the State List (which lists competencies of Indian states), with the exception of security and policing matters (Indian Express 2019; Ministry of Law and Justice 2019). [2019: autonomy restriction]
* In September 2020, the Jammu and Kashmir Official Languages Bill was introduced to Lok Sabha (later the Jammu and Kashmir Official Languages Act). The Act declared that Kashmiri, Dogri, Urdu, Hindi and English were to be recognized as official languages of the union territory Jammu and Kashmir (Ministry of Law and Justice 2020). We do not code a concession because Dogri already has official status by way of the national constitution (see above).

**Regional autonomy**

* There were interruptions due to president’s rule and Kashmir’s autonomy was decreased over the years, but autonomy has not been fully abolished. New Delhi has always been strongly involved in the regional government (International Crisis Group 2003a: 9), but the Kashmiri Muslims certainly were represented in the regional governments. The autonomy code defects from EPR, where an end to regional autonomy is coded after the state elections of 1987. We, however, follow what has been outlined above (International Crisis Group 2003a: 9) and code autonomy throughout. The first of January rule does not apply because regional autonomy was effective as of Kashmir’s accession to India.
* In 2019, J & K’s special autonomy was abolished and they lost statehood. However, J & K became a union territory vested with significant powers (see above). Therefore, the Kashmiri Muslims are considered to have retained a meaningful (yet lower) level of autonomy than before. [1947-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Immediately after Kashmir’s accession to India in late October 1947 a provisional emergency government was set up, with the Kashmiri Muslim leader (Sheikh Abdulla) appointed as head of the administration (Tremblay 2009: 928). [1947: host change (new); establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 1949, a significant part of Kashmir was annexed by Pakistan. [1949: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kashmiri Muslims |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kashmiri Muslims |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75006000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code the Kashmiri Muslims in 1947-1948. Clearly, the Kashmiri Muslims were not represented in the central government at the time. For all other years, we follow EPR. [1947-2019: powerless; 2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* For 1949 onwards, EPR codes a group size of 0.0045.
* Yet, from 1947-1949, the number of Kashmiri Muslims must have been higher because significant parts of Kashmir were annexed by Pakistan in 1949 (Azad Kashmir and most of Balawaristan).
* Contemporary population data is difficult to get by.
  + To get an estimate, we draw on Minahan (2002). He provides the following figures:
    - Minahan (2002: 242): 785,000 Balawaris in Pakistan and 70,000 in India.
    - Minahan (2002: 954), 5.663 million Kashmiris in India and 3.015 in Pakistan.
    - Note that Minahan considers the Balawaris a separate group, while we do not.
  + Combined with the 2002 population estimate for India provided by the World Bank (1,093 million), Minahan’s figures roughly match the EPR figure: Based on Minahan, the 2002 group size would be 0.0051.
  + To this, we add the numbers of Balawaris and Kashmiris in today’s Pakistan for 1945-1949: (.785+.07+5.663+3.015)/1093+(.785+.07+5.663+3.015)=.0086
  + [1947-1949: 0.0086; 1950-2012: 0.0051]

**Regional concentration**

* The vast majority of the Kashmiri Muslims resides in J&K, where they make up more than 50% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 954). Note: J&K also includes some areas where Hindus form a majority (Jammu), as well as areas where Buddhist Ladakhis form the majority (Leh district). The majority of Muslims of J&K resides in the Kashmir area. This information matches with MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are numerically significant Kashmiri Muslim populations in Pakistan (MAR; Minahan 2002: 954) and in the UK (Minahan 2002: 954). The Kashmiri population in Pakistan primarily resides in Azad Kashmir, which was annexed by Pakistan in 1949. EPR in addition considers Pakistan’s Punjabi and Mohajirs as ethnic kin. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

BBC (2019). “Article 370: What Happened with Kashmir and Why It Matters”. August 06. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-49234708> [August 18, 2022].

BBC. “Kashmir Profile.” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-16069078> [November 28, 2014].

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Britannica (2021). “Jammu and Kashmir National Conference”. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Jammu-and-Kashmir-National-Conference> [March 11, 2023].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Deiwiks, Christa, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian S. Gleditsch (2012). “Inequality and Conflict in Federations.” *Journal of Peace Research* 49(2): 289-304.

Forsythe, David P. (2009). *Encyclopedia of Human Rights. Volume II.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Ganai Naseer (2021). “Why AFSPA In Jammu And Kashmir Is Not Just A Defence Act.” December 07. <https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-news-why-afspa-in-jammu-and-kashmir-is-not-just-a-defence-act/404114> [August 18, 2022].

Ganguly, S. (1995). “Wars without End: The Indo-Pakistani Conflict.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 541(1): 167–178.

Ganguly, Sumit (2001). *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Greater Kashmir (2021). “Restore Statehood, Democratically-Elected Govt in J&K as Centre has 'Utterly Failed' There: Cong”. October 20. <https://www.greaterkashmir.com/kashmir/restore-statehood-democratically-elected-govt-in-jk-as-centre-has-utterly-failed-there-cong> [August 18, 2022].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, pp. 127-128, 143-144.

Hewitt, Joseph J., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) (2008). *Peace and Conflict 2008.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Hindustan Times (2020). “President Rule Revoked in Jammu and Kashmir After Bifurcation into 2 UTs”. July 16. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/president-rule-revoked-in-jammu-and-kashmir-after-bifurcation-into-2-uts/story-t1DLDQRokRWBeILfjaXHMJ.html> [August 27, 2022].

Indian Express (2019). “Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Bill Passed by Rajya Sabha: Key Takeaways”. August 05. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-bifurcation-ladakh-union-territory-key-takeaways-from-reorganisation-bill-article-370-amit-shah-5880177/> [August 18, 2022].

International Crisis Group (2002). “Kashmir: The View from Srinagar.” http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/  
media/Files/asia/south-asia/kashmir/041%20-%20Kashmir%20-%20The%20View%20From%20  
Srinagar.pdf [November 28, 2014].

International Crisis Group (2003a). “Kashmir: Learning from the Past.” [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/kashmir/070\_kashmir\_learning\_  
from\_the\_past](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/kashmir/070_kashmir_learning_from_the_past) [November 28, 2014].

International Crisis Group (2003b). “Kashmir: The View from New Delhi.” http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/kashmir/069\_kashmir\_new\_delhi.pdf [November 28, 2014].

Iqbal, Naveed (2020). “District Development Councils (DDC): Why Parties Think This New Layer of Governance will Kill Politics in J&K”. *Indian Express.* October 20. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/district-development-councils-jammu-and-kashmir-why-parties-think-they-will-kill-politics-in-the-ut-6789839/> [August 18, 2022].

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 283-285.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 242-248, 954-959.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Ministry of Law and Justice (2019). “The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019”. <https://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/210407.pdf> [August 18, 2022].

Ministry of Law and Justice (2020). “The Jammu and Kashmir Official Languages Act, 2020”. <https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2020/Jammu%20and%20Kashmir%20Official%20Languages%20Act,%202020.pdf> [August 18, 2022].

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group (1990). *World Directory of Minorities.* Chicago: St. James Press, pp. 302-303.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Sambanis, Nicholas, & Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonas (2019). “Sovereignty Rupture as a Central Concept in Quantitative Measures of Civil War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(6): 1542–1578.

Shakir, Pirzada (2021). “‘Decision of August 5 Was Against the Majority of the People of Jammu and Kashmir’: Ghulam Hassan Mir”. *The Kashmirwalla.* July 19. <https://thekashmirwalla.com/decision-of-august-5-was-against-the-majority-of-the-people-of-jammu-and-kashmir-ghulam-hassan-mir/> [August 18, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Jammu & Kashmir: Assessment- 2022.” <https://www.satp.org/terrorism-assessment/india-jammukashmir> [August 18, 2022].

Staniland, P. (2013). “Kashmir since 2003: Counterinsurgency and the Paradox of “Normalcy.”” *Asian Survey* 53(5): 931–957.

Staniland, P. S. (2010). *Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation and Control in Insurgent Groups*. Boston, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Stevens, William K. “India Replaces Kashmir State’s Leaders.” *NY Times*, July 3. <http://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/03/world/india-replaces-kashmir-state-s-leaders.html> [November 28, 2014].

The Wire (2018). “How President’s Rule in Jammu and Kashmir Differs From That in Other States”. December 20. <https://thewire.in/government/presidents-rule-jammu-kashmir-different> [August 27, 2022].

Tiwari, Deeptiman, Arun Sharma and Naveed Iqbal (2021). “18 Months After Split, Downgrade, 4G Mobile Internet Back in J&K”. *Indian Express.* February 06. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-internet-services-restored-7176371/> [August 18, 2022].

Tremblay, R. C. (1995). “Kashmir: The Valley’s Political Dynamics.” *Contemporary South Asia* 4(1): 79-102.

Tremblay, R. C. (2009). “Kashmir’s Secessionist Movement Resurfaces.” *Asian Survey* 49(6): 924–950.

University of Central Arkansas (n.d.). “India/Jammu and Kashmir (1947-present).” https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indiakashmir-1947-present/ [May 11, 2023].

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/  
gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central\_and\_Southern\_Asia#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia) [November 28, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Keralans

Activity: 1949-1956

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1160), the first stirrings of Keralan nationalism date to the immediate post-WWII phase, and grew dramatically as India prepared for independence in early 1947, when the rulers of the Keralan (Malayali) princely states, Travancore and Cochin, expressed their preference for association rather than incorporation into India. Since this is the first clear-cut evidence for organized separatist activity, we code 1947 as the start date. Travancore and Cochin remained an Indian protectorate until their formal merger with India (as a united Travancore-Cochin state) in 1949. After accession, the Keralans’ demand shifted to the creation of a Malayalam-speaking state, implying the separation from some parts of the former Madras state and their amalgamation with Travancore-Cochin. Based on this, we code the movement from 1949, but indicate prior non-violent activity. In 1956 the state of Kerala was established; this appears to have ended the movement. Minahan (2002: 1161) notes that the Kerala Socialist Party (KSP) advocated secession in subsequent years, but this could not be confirmed with other sources. We code an end to the movement in 1956. [start date: 1947; end date: 1956]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially Travancore, the bigger of the two princely states, sought separate independence, and Cochin was preparing to follow suit. In 1947 Travancore declared independence (Minahan 2002: 1161). After the formal accession in 1949, the Keralans’ demand shifted to the creation of a Malayalam-speaking state, implying the separation from some parts of the former Madras state and their amalgamation with Travancore-Cochin. [1949-1956: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Only prior to accession to India (see above). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Keralans consists of the current Kerala state in south India. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On August 15, 1947, the day India became independent, C.P. Ramaswani Aiyer, the prime minister of Travancore, declared Travancore a sovereign state, with neighboring Cochin preparing to follow suit (Minahan 2002: 1161). We do not code this declaration since Travancore only acceded India in 1949.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The area of current-day Kerala, populated by Dravidian peoples since between 1500 and 1200 B.C., was a powerful maritime kingdom (“Kerala” or “Chera”) in the early Christian era (Kerala was at least partly Christian). Kerala was conquered by the Tamils in the fourth century. The region divided into a number of petty states before the first European rounded the Cape of Good Hope. The Portuguese built the first European port in Cochin in 1503 – Kerala had always been an important trading hub (Minahan 2002: 1159). Under British colonial rule, there were two ‘Keralan’ princely states (Travancore and Cochin); other parts of today’s Kerala belonged to the Madras Presidency, an administrative subdivision of British India. Upon independence, Travancore and Cochin demanded separate independence; formally they acceded India only in 1949 after lengthy negotiations. Note: some other Keralan parts in the Madras Presidency became part of Madras state and have thus acceded India already in 1947 (Minahan 2002).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* When Cochin and Travancore (former princely states that make up much of today’s Kerala) formally acceded India in 1949 they were combined to form the (short-lived) state of Travancore-Cochin. The maharaja of Travancore was made the Rajpramukh (the appointed governor) (Minahan 2002: 1161). Thus the Keralans retained autonomy (possibly less but this is not clear). We do not code a restriction.
* The 1949 constitution lists Malayalam (the language spoken by most Keralans) in its Eighth Schedule; this implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). The constitution was adopted in November 1949, two months after Trancare-Cochin’s formal merger with India. [1949: cultural rights concession]
* In March 1956 Travancore-Cochin came under president’s rule (direct rule) (Boland-Crewe & Lea 2003: 147). President’s rule was lifted in 1957. [1956: autonomy restriction]
* When India’s states were re-organized along linguistic lines in 1956, most of the Malayalam-speaking regions were united to form Kerala: Travancore-Cochin (minus the southern, Tamil-speaking part) was merged with the Malabar and the South Kanara districts of the former Madras state (Minahan 2002: 1161). [1956: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* EPR codes the Malayalams as autonomous only after the formation of Kerala. However, a large part of the Keralans had regional power already before that: until 1949 in the form of two princely states, Travancore and Cochin, and from 1949-1956 in the form of the Travancore-Cochin state. Thus, there was some form of regional autonomy throughout the movement’s activities. [1949-1956: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Travancore and Cochin effectively joined India in 1947. Formally, the accession was in 1949, though, so we code a host change to reflect this. [1949: host change (new)]
* In 1956 the Malabar and the South Kanara districts of the former Madras state were merged with Travancore-Cochin. [1956: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Keralans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Malyalam (non-SC/ST) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75009000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [Junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.024]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1157), more than 75% of all Keralans/Malayalis live in Kerala, where they form more than 80% of the local population. Minahan’s estimate refers to the situation in 2002, but we found no evidence suggesting that the situation would have been different in the 1940s/1950s. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No politically relevant kin according to EPR. According to Minahan (2002: 1157), there are “smaller” communities in neighboring states, the US, the UAE, Malaysia, Singapore, the UK, and Fiji. The only other country with a significant number of Malayalam-speakers noted by Ethnolgoue is Singapore (only 25,000). [no kin]

**Sources**

Boland-Crewe, Tara, and David Lea (2003). *Territories and States of India*. London: Routledge.

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Ethnologue. “Malayalam.” <https://www.ethnologue.com/language/mal> [November 9, 2015].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [March 25, 2002].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [December 10, 2013].

Lujala, Päivi, Jan Ketil Rød, and Nadia Thieme (2007). “Fighting over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 24(3): 239-256.

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1157-1162.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Khasi-Jaintia

Activity: 1992-2020

**General notes**

* The Khasi-Jaintia are also referred to as the Hynniewtreps.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Khasis and Jaintia people are ethnically Mon-Khmer people who represent two of the three main tribes in Meghalaya state alongside the Achiks, and are together known as the Hynniewtreps. In 1992, the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) was formed to represent the Khasi-Jaintia (start date). The HNLC was formed out of tribal conflict within the Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC) that was previously fighting for Meghalayan self-determination, and the group claims to fight against Achik domination and ‘outsider’ influence. The HNLC operates in Meghalaya state, but maintains bases in Bangladesh. The primary goal of Khasi militants is the creation of an autonomous Khasi-only Meghalaya (i.e. breaking up the state along linguistic lines). The HNLC was outlawed in 2000 (SATP), and while the group has been weakened by counter-insurgency operations, the movement remains ongoing (Agarwala 2022a; Bhattacharyya et al. 2009; Lintner 2012; Minahan 2002, 2012; Prakash 2008). [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The main claim of the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) appears to be to transform Meghalaya into a state exclusively for the Khasi tribe (i.e. breaking up the state along linguistic lines). They contend that the Garo are dominating the state (SATP). According to Roth (2015: 330-331), claims for a sovereign Khasiland separate from India can also be found. However, overall, the claim for their own state seems dominant. [1992-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* According to Roth (2015: 330), the Khasi’s main demand is for the creation of a separate state, but “at times” there has also been contention for outright independence. Minahan (2016: 218) also suggests that there are claims for outright independence. According to the Economic Times (2019, the HNLC was banned in 2019 because of its increasing use of violence. The Indian government asserted that the HNLC has been making claims for outright independence. The entry in SATP, by contrast, does not reference outright independence as a goal of the HNLC.
* Overall, this case is somewhat ambiguous, but the evidence overall suggests that the HNLC has (also) made claims for secession. It is not clear when the first such claims were made. Therefore, we code the start date to coincide with the broader SDM’s start date. [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Khasi and Jaintia represent two of the three major ethnic groups in Meghalaya state. Their territorial claim concerns the Khasi and the Jaintia autonomous districts within Meghalaya state. We, therefore, consider the districts in the east that are not Garo-named (West Khasi Hills, South West Khasi Hills, East Khasi Hills, Ri Bhoi, and Jaintia Hills) as the territory claimed by the movement and code the districts based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Hewitt et al. (2008) suggest continued up to, or beyond, the last year they cover (2006). According to Hewitt et al. (2008), “inter-communal antagonisms force a Khasi-Garo split in 1992. Khasi armed self-determination conflict begins shortly thereafter and reaches its zenith from 2001 to 2003. Formidable government repression weakens rebels in recent years; most news reports since 2004 are of rebel surrenders or detentions. Little progress made on peace talks despite numerous attempts to jumpstart the process. In 2005, it is reported that Khasi rebels are receiving support from Bodo, Naga, and Assamese militants, as well as Bangladesh and Pakistan. Khasi militants often target non-Khasi with extortion, intimidation, and violence.
* None of our other sources, including UCDP/PRIO, would suggest a separatist violence coding. We investigated this case further using qualitative sources.
* SATP provides a table with casualties 1992-1991. The total is 62, with the maximum being in 2001 (21). Two-thirds of the reported casualties are civilians, suggesting that not all casualties may be attributable to separatist violence between insurgents and the state (alternatives include criminal activity or inter-ethnic conflicts). https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/data\_sheets/hnlc/Casualties.htm
* SATP reports casualties every subsequent year until 2009 but well below the 25-deaths threshold and, in all years except 2002, in the single digits. https://satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-meghalaya\_hynniewtrep-national-liberation-council-hnlc
* In agreement with Hewitt et al., the conflict seems to have had its zenith around 2001, and SATP reports increasing numbers of surrenders after this and that the HNLC was increasingly weakened.
* SATP reports no casualties in 2010-2018 and just 2 in subsequent years. Overall, it does not seem that the 25 deaths threshold was met in any year. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Khasis retained their independence throughout the period of northern state formation in India but were never centrally administered with a lot of infighting. They submitted to British authority in the 1820s but retained relatively broad autonomy. They became a “partially excluded” group in 1935, a status which implied some limited autonomy and led to scheduled tribe status. At independence, the Khasis wanted to form their own state together with the neighboring Garos. However, a part of the Khasi homeland came under the jurisdiction of Pakistan, and the rest was attached to Assam. Still, the Hynniewtreps had their own autonomous districts within Assam since 1952 (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). The Hynniewtreps were active in the “Meghalayan” movement agitating for the creation of a non-Assam dominated state. In 1972 (pre-autonomous status granted in 1969), the Hynniewtreps received a major concession when the hill state of Meghalaya was carved out from Assam (Minahan 2012); with a population share of around 50 per cent, the Hynniewtreps form the largest group in Meghalaya. Both the Khasis and the Jaintias continued to have their own autonomous districts (and scheduled tribes status), now within Meghalaya (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under the Meghalaya State Language Act of 2005, Khasi became an associate official language of Meghalaya, thus allowing for education in the Khasi language (Meghalaya Times 2005). Since it is the regional government which passed the legislation, in which the Hynniewtreps participate, we do not code this event as a concession.
* In 2022, the states of Assam and Meghalaya signed a pact to resolve six of the twelve border disputes between the two states (Agarwala 2022b). The Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) claims that they were not consulted by the state government before the pact was signed. As each of the Khasi tribal groups have areas bordering with Assam, the council decided to file a petition opposing the agreement and requesting that the pact is reviewed (The Hindu 2022). While the Council was not consulted on the matter, the pact was not aimed at restricting the regional autonomy of the KHADC, and therefore we do not code this as a restriction.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Hynniewtreps are the largest of Meghalaya’s groups, making up around fifty per cent of Meghalaya’s population, and they are represented in Meghalaya’s regional government, despite claims for Garo domination. In addition, both the Khasis and the Jantias had their own autonomous districts throughout the movement’s activities (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). Hence, we code regional autonomy throughout. [1992-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Khasi-Jaintia |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* The Hynniewtreps (Khasi-Jaintias) are one of India’s indigenous (scheduled) tribes. The Scheduled Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout in EPR. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). Evidently this does not apply to all of the hundreds of indigenous groups associated with the umbrella Scheduled Tribes group and in particular not to the Hynniewtreps. But in 2004, Paty Ripple Kyndiah, an ethnic Hynniewtrep/Khasi, attained cabinet rank. He remained in office until May 2009. We found no evidence for representation in subsequent years. [1992-2004: powerless; 2005-2009: junior partner; 2010-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the 2001 census, there are 843,000 Khasis in India and 243,000 Jaintias (Ethnologue), which in combination with the total tally (1,028,737,436) yields a group size estimate of .0011. [0.0011]
  + Note: this figure matches rather well with Minahan’s (2002: 985) figure of approximately 1 million Hynniewtreps in India.

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 985) almost all Hynniewtreps reside in the eastern part of Meghalaya, where they make up 88% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 985) around 120,000 Khasis live in adjacent areas of Bangladesh. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Agarwala, Tora (2022a). “Exaplained: What is HNLC, the Militant Group Behind Shillong IED Blast”. February 02. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-hnlc-militant-group-behind-shillong-ied-blast-7751384/> [July 29, 2022].

Agarwala, Tora (2022b). “Assam, Meghalaya Sign Pact to Resolve Border Dispute in 6 Locations; Amit Shah Terms It Historic”. March 30. <https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/assam-meghalaya-resolve-border-dispute-in-6-locations-shah-terms-it-historic-day-for-northeast-7842749/> [29 July, 2022].

Agnihotri, V. K. (ed.) (2010). *Indian History.* Mumbai: Allied Publishers.

Bhattacharyya, Harihar, Partha Sarkar, and Angshuman Kar (2009). *The Politics of Social Exclusion in India: Democracy at the Crossroads*. London: Routledge.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Economic Times (2019). “Meghalaya-based insurgent group HNLC banned by government.” <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/meghalaya-based-insurgent-group-hnlc-banned-by-government/articleshow/72108146.cms?from=mdr> [March 13, 2023].

Ethnologue. *Languages of the World.* <http://www.ethnologue.com/language/kha> & http://www.ethnologue.com/language/pbv [August 30, 2014].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laishram, Dhanabir (2013). “Autonomous District Council in NE India, Boon or Curse.” *Manipur Times.* <http://www.manipurtimes.com/news-article/116-the-people-chronicle-article/302-autonomous-district-council-in-ne-india-boon-or-curse> [July 16, 2014].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [April 11, 2014].

Lintner, Bertil (2012). *Great Games East.* *India, China and the Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.

Meghalaya Times (2005). “Khasi, Garo Recognized as Associate Official Languages.” June 7. <http://meghalayatimes.info/index.php/front-page/6179-khasi-garo-recognised-as-associate-official-languages> [July 16, 2014].

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 985-989.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Prakash, Ved (2008). *Terrorism in India’s North-East: A Gathering Storm.* New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC).” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/hnlc.htm> [July 17, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Civilians Killed by Various Terrorist Groups.” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/data_sheets/civilians_killed_by_various_terrorist_groups.htm> [December 20, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Incidents and Statements Involving Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC): 2000-2012.” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/HNLC_tl.htm> [December 20, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Security Force Personnel Killed by Various Terrorist Group.” [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/data\_sheets/  
security\_force\_personnel\_killed\_by\_various\_terrorist\_groups.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/data_sheets/security_force_personnel_killed_by_various_terrorist_groups.htm) [December 20, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_hynniewtrep-national-liberation-council-hnlc> [June 24, 2022].

The Hindu (2022). “Meghalaya Tribes Oppose Boundary Deal”. April 27. [https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/meghalaya-tribal-council-to-take-boundary-deal-with-assam-to-court/article65359469.ece [29](https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/meghalaya-tribal-council-to-take-boundary-deal-with-assam-to-court/article65359469.ece%20%5b29) July, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Kodavas

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The Kodavas are also referred to as Coorgs.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Historically, Coorg was an independent and autonomous province both during the medieval and British period. After India’s independence in 1947, Coorg first became a province, and in 1952 a “Part C” state of the Republic of India. However, under the States Reorganization Act of 1956, the state of Coorg and the Kodagu-speaking region of the adjoining states were incorporated into the Mysore state, despite protests by a strong section of the Kodava people (Assadi 1997). According to Minahan (2002), economic neglect, exploitation and deforestation led to the formation of a national movement in the late 1970s. The movement started gathering momentum when the Liberation Warriors of Kodagu (LIWAK) was formed in 1991. The organization, renamed the Coorg National Council (CNC) in 2000, has raised claims separation from Karnataka (initially) and later for autonomy within Karnataka. Despite already existing separatist sentiments, we peg the starting date of the movement at 1991, the year the LIWAK was founded. There is continued activity as of 2020 (Assadi 1997; Minahan 2002; Ramaswamy 2007; The Hindu 213; Chinappa 2013; Star of Mysore 2017; Star of Mysore 2020a). [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially the movement demanded separate statehood and thus full separation from Karnatka. In 2000 there was a moderation in the demand and the movement began to make claims for an autonomous region/council similar to Darjeeling in West Bengal or Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir (Chinnappa 2013; David 2008). According to Minahan (2016: 224), the movement has made claims for independence as of 2015-16. However, we could not find other sources supporting this. As of 2020, the dominant claim continues to be for an autonomous region/council (Star of Mysore 2020b). [1991-2000: sub-state secession claim; 2001-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan (2016: 224) reports an independence demand, but we could not independently verify this. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kodavas (Coorgs) is the Kodagu district (previously called Coorg district) within Karnataka state in southwestern India. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no separatist violence associated with the Kodavas, and thus code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Scholars believe that the Kodavas evolved from a synthesis of peoples, originally settlers from the eastern Arabian peninsula in the fifth century. Records are very spotty; the Coorg region appears to have been included in the kingdom of the Ganges in the ninth and tenth centuries, then under the rule of the Cholas in the eleventh century. The Coorg kingdom remained mostly independent until the 14th century (Minahan 2002: 999). By the 16th century, the Coorg were mostly Hindu; a Hindu dynasty ruled from 1633 to 1834, when it was overthrown by the British. The kingdom comprised 12 principalities. From 1834 to 1858, Kodava was ruled by a commissioner responsible to the British East India Company, and then came under the direct rule of the British raj (Minahan 2002: 999). The British made Kodava/Coorg a “chief commissioner’s province”. It was the only province that was allowed to have a legislative body in 1924. In the 1920s and 30s, Tamils, Malayalis, and other non-Kodavas were resettled into the region to work on the coffee fields, which intermittently led to violence (Minahan 2002). After India’s independence, Coorg was initially made a separate “Part C” state under the Indian constitution (part C states today are called union territories; they had little autonomy before 1963, see Kumar 1991: 48-61), with two parliamentary seats in the national legislature. In 1956, the Indian government reorganized all the states according to linguistic lines and merged Coorg with the new Kanarese-language state of Mysore, later renamed Karnataka. Former Coorg was now a district of Mysore/Karnatka and was relegated to the sidelines in this union (Minahan 2002: 1000; Assadi 2012: 133-134).

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kodavas (Coorgs) |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Kodavas speak their own language, Kodagu. Though there are demands for recognition as a scheduled tribe, it appears they have not been granted that status (as of 2020). Some Kodavas are included in the ‘Other Backward Classes’ list of Karnatka (an Indian state), but not all. Thus they are not represented as such in EPR.
* We apply a powerless code: while the Kodavas were represented in India’s cabinet under Indira Ghandi (from 1967-1969 in the person of C. M. Poonacha), and under Rajiv Gandhi (C. G. Somiah, 1986-1988), we found no evidence of cabinet representation in more recent years. [1991-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* The Kodavas are a small group; Minahan (2002: 997) estimates their number at 159,000. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,093 million in 2002. [0.0001]

**Regional concentration**

* The Kodavan homeland lies in southwestern India, in the southern part of the Indian state of Karnatka (Kodagu district). Most Kodavans reside in the Kodagu district according to Minahan, and there are significant Kodava populations across the Kodagu district (see the map in Minahan 2002: 997), but the Kodavas make up but 25% of the local population. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence of numerically significant kin groups (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 997-998). [no kin]

**Sources**

Assadi, M. (2012). “Regions within Regions and their Movements in Karnataka: Nuances, Claims and Ambiguities.” In: A. Kumar (ed.), *Rethinking State Politics in India: Regions within Regions*. London: Routledge.

Assadi, Muzaffar (1997). *“*Karnataka-Separatist Movement in Coorg.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(49): 3114-3116.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chinnappa, K. J. (2013). “Kodava Homeland: Telangana Reinforces CNC Belief.” *The Hindu*, August 1. [http://www.thehindu.com/  
news/national/karnataka/kodava-homeland-telangana-reinforces-cnc-belief/article4974689.ece](http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/kodava-homeland-telangana-reinforces-cnc-belief/article4974689.ece) [November 29, 2014].

David, S. (2008). “Kodava Group Cries for Autonomous Region in Karnataka.” *India Today*, October 30. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Kodava+group+cries+for+autonomous+region+in+Karnataka/1/18916.html [November 29, 2014].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Kumar, Sudhir (1991). *Political and Administrative Setup Union Territories in India.* New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 997-1002.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Ramaswamy, Harish, S.S. Patagundi, and S.H. Patil (2007). *Karnataka Government and Politics*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.

Star of Mysore (2017). “Codova National Council to Take Out ‘Delhi Chalo’ Tomorrow”. October 31. *Nexis.* [August 5, 2022].

Star of Mysore (2020a). “Committed to Autonomous Development Council for Kodagu: Dr. Subramanian Swamy”. January 17. *Nexis.* [August 5, 2022].

Star of Mysore (2020b). “CNC urges Centre to accord Geo-Political Autonomy and ST tag to Kodava tribe”. February 17. *Nexis.* [August 5, 2022].

The Hindu (2013): “Kodava Homeland: Telangana Reinforces CNC Belief.” <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/kodava-homeland-telangana-reinforces-cnc-belief/article4976377.ece> [January 28, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Kuki

Activity: 1960-2020

**General notes**

* The Kuki are closely related to Myanmar’s “Zomi (Chin)”.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1946, the Kuki National Assembly KNA was formed to protect Kuki identity, culture, and land. It initially strove to bring all Kukis (in today’s Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India) under a single administration and made threats of secession. The movement appears to have soon died down and there do not appear to have been calls for Kuki autonomy in the first years of India’s independence. Only in 1960, the KNA renewed its claim to self-determination (start date), when it began to make demands for the creation of a separate Kuki state within the Indian union (Haokip 2012: 59).
* The KNA continued to make claims for autonomy for the Kukis. From 1970 the KNA supported a pledge for a separate Kuki autonomous district within Manipur (Tohring 2010: 67). In the late 1980s the movement gained ground but also became increasingly factionalized. Among the many organizations/rebel groups making claims for a Kuki homeland are the Kuki National Front and the Kuki National Army. Both strive for a Kuki state within the Indian union (Haokip 2012: 68; SATP). Other organizations making demands for the self-determination of Kuki in India include the Kuki Liberation Army and the United Kuki Liberation Front. Some of the organizations demand outright secession There is evidence of continued activity in recent years (Haokip 2012; Minahan 2002; START; SATP; Firstpost 2022). We code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1960; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1946, the Kuki National Assembly KNA was formed to protect Kuki identity, culture, and land. It initially strove to bring all Kukis (in today’s Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India) under a single administration and made threats of secession. In independent India the KNA renewed its claim to self-determination in 1960, when it began to make demands for the creation of a separate Kuki state within the Indian union (Haokip 2012: 59). From 1970 the KNA supported a pledge for a separate Kuki autonomous district within Manipur (Tohring 2010: 67). It is not clear whether the KNA abandoned its claim for a separate state. In the late 1980s the movement gained ground but also became increasingly factionalized. Among the more important organizations/rebel groups making claims for a Kuki homeland are the Kuki National Front and the Kuki National Army. Both strive for a Kuki state within the Indian union (Haokip 2012: 68; SATP; Leivon 2020). There are also claims for an autonomous district and even secession. Overall, the claim for separate statehood in the form of a Kukiland appears dominant, but it is difficult to tell given the limited evidence available. [1960-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Some sources suggest that certain organizations, or at least factions within those, have made claims for outright independence. Most notably, this concerns the Kuki National Army (KNA) (Insights on India 2022: Online). Roth also notes that there is a significant claim for independence by groups such as the Kuki National Organization (2015: 332). However, the much more detailed account in SATP suggest that the independence claim had limited political significance. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the KNA corresponds to the Kuki state, a territory within the Manipur state in northeast India, although some groups (e.g. the KLO) have also made claims for a “Greater Kukiland”, also called Zale’n-gam. We code the former claim by the KNA, which seems to be the dominant one, based on the description and map in Roth (2015: 328). The claimed territory has no official status, but includes parts of Manipur, excluding the districts surrounding the region’s capital Imphal. This also matches the depiction of Kukiland on another map found on Wikipedia (2015).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Kukis were involved in armed non-state conflicts with other groups including the Nagas and the Karbis (UCDP/PRIO; START). However, we found no evidence of separatist violence (which needs to involve the state) above the threshold in any of the years. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The hill region where the Kukis settled (in today’s India (mostly Manipur), Myanmar, and Bangladesh) came under British authority in 1826. Initially the British followed a policy of “exclusion”, as they did with many other tribes (this implies the Kukis were left with significant autonomy). During the 19th century, the Kukis rebelled against the British several times, fearful for their culture and traditional way of life. The continued opposition climaxed during WWI in what is known as the “Kuki Rising of 1917-1919” (Haokip 2012: 51-52). Following the Kuki rebellion, the British followed a policy of “disarming” the Kukis by confiscating their arms and weaponry. The British also adopted a closer form of hill administration (previously, there had been a Political Agent who administered the area, and there was little direct contact between the British and the Kukis). The hill administration was transferred to the President of Manipur (Haokip 2012: 52). In 1935 Assam’s hill areas were classified as “excluded” or “partially excluded areas”. The same did not apply to Manipur, however, where most Kukis resided. Furthermore, following the India Act of 1935, the Kukis and their territories came to be separated between British India and British Burma (Haokip 2012: 52). Upon independence, the Kuki land was divided between India (mainly but not only Manipur), Myanmar, and Bangladesh. In 1950 the Kukis were granted scheduled tribe status (Haokip 2011). Scheduled tribe status confers the rights to a proportionate share in state employment and proportionate representation both in the national and sub-national parliament. Moreover, scheduled tribe status protects the “tribal” language and culture (Swarup 2011). [1950: cultural rights concession]
  + Note: In 1956 the Manipur Village Authority (Hill Areas) Act was passed by the Government of Manipur, decreeing that the chiefs are to be designated as the ex-officio chairmen of the village and that village councilors are to be directly elected through universal adult franchise. Some Kukis saw this as an attempt to do away the rights of the chiefs over land (Haokip 2012: 59). At the same time this was a step towards democratization. The measure focuses on the local level and it does not appear that powers were devolved. We do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act 1971, the Kukis (together with the Nagas) obtained a total of six autonomous district councils in Manipur (Sekholal Khom 2011: 158). However, the powers of the Manipur hill districts appear very limited. Unlike autonomous districts in Assam, Meghalaya or Mizoram, Manipur’s hill districts were not established under the 6th schedule of the Indian constitution and unlike the others, they do not have any legislative or judicial powers but only some administrative powers (Singh 2006: 174-176; Haokip 2012; Gupta 2004: 80). According to Devi (2000: 182), autonomy is “only in name”. We do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The hill districts set up in 1971 devolved little autonomy. We do not code a major change.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kuki |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* Most Kuki tribes are listed as scheduled tribes. The Scheduled Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). However, we found no evidence of Kuki representation in the cabinet. [1960-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Population data is somewhat difficult to get by. According to Raza & Ahmad (1990: 75-80), there are Kukis in the following states: Assam (21,000), Meghalaya (2,500), Nagaland (6,200), Tripuras (7,800), and Manipur (~300,000). There are also Kukis in Mizoram, but Mizoram is not listed in the source. According to the 2001 census, there were approx. 21,000 Kukis in Mizoram; we add 20,000 to the other figures (which relate to 1990). According to the World Bank India’s 1990 population was 869 million. [0.0004]
  + Note: in the 1990s, a number of Kuki tribes changed their affiliation to the Nagas, mainly as a result of the Nagas’ attempts to ethnically cleanse the area. Whether the number of *self-identified* Kukis decreased as a result of this is not clear, however (see Arora & Kipgen 2012).

**Regional concentration**

* Most Kukis live in Manipur. The Kukis are, however, a minority within Manipur (they comprise approx. 300,000 of Manipur’s total population of approx. 2.5 million), where the Manipuris/Meiteis comprise approx. 60% (Minahan 2002: 1219). We found it difficult to get by data on the spatial pattern of Manipur’s Kukis. Some limited information comes from Haokip (2011). According to Haokip, while the majority group, the Meitis, primarily reside in Manipur’s valleys, the minorities, in particular the Nagas and the Kukis, tend to reside in the hills. While Kukis can be found across the state of Manipur, there is a concentration in the southwest district of Churachandpur (total population of 230,000 according to 2001 census). However, the largest Kuki sub-group, the Thadou (approx. 190,000) live scattered across Manipur. And some other Kuki groups (e.g. the LIangmai and the Rongmei/Kabui) also tend to live in other districts. Arora & Kipgen (2012) also suggest that the Kukis are dispersed across Manipur’s hill districts. On this basis, we code the Kuki as not concentrated, though noting that the data basis for this is weak. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Zomis/Chin in Myanmar (>1 million) are closely related to the Kukis in India (see Minahan 2002: 2102). [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Arora, Vibha, and Ngamjahao Kipgen (2012). “The Politics of Identifying with and Distancing from Kuki Identity in Manipur.” Sociological Bulletin 61(3): 429-449.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Devi, Bimol (2000). “Administrative Changes in the Hill Areas of Manipur.” In: M. Horam (ed.), *The Rising Manipur.* Delhi: Manas Publications.

Firstpost (2022). “Amit Shah Vows to End Kuki Militancy Problem in Manipur in Five Years”. February 23. <https://www.firstpost.com/india/chandigarh-registers-name-in-guinness-world-record-for-largest-human-chain-forming-tiranga-11053861.html> [August 5, 2022].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Gupta, D. N. (2004). *Decentralization: Need for Reforms.* New Delhi: Concept Publishing.

Haokip, Pauthang (2011). “The Languages of Manipur: A Case Study of the Kuki-Chin Languages.” *Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area* 34(1): 85-118.

Haokip, Seikhogin (2012). “Genesis of Kuki Autonomy Movement in Northeast India.” In: Thongkholal Haokip (ed.), *The Kukis of Northeast India: Politics and Culture*, 49-87*.* Delhi: Bookwell.

Haokip, T.T. (2011). “Kuki Armed Opposition Movement.” *Eastern Quarterly* 6 (1-2).

Insights on India (2022) “The history of the Kuki insurgency in Manipur.” <https://www.insightsonindia.com/2022/03/05/insights-into-editorial-the-history-of-the-kuki-insurgency-in-manipur/> [February 25, 2023].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Leivon Jimmy (2020). “Manipur: Suspension of Operation with Kuki Militants Extended for 6 Months.” *Indian Express.* February 22. <https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/manipur/manipur-suspension-of-operation-kuki-militants-extended-6-months-6281312/> [August 5, 2022].

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 2102-2107.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Raza, Moonis, and Aijazuddin Ahmad (1990). *An Atlas of Tribal India.* New Delhi: Concept Publishing.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Sekholal Kom, C. (2011). “Ethnic Politics in the Hills of Manipur.” *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences* 3(1): 147-167. [http://www.japss.org/upload/7.\_Ch.\_Sekholal[1].pdf](http://www.japss.org/upload/7._Ch._Sekholal%5b1%5d.pdf) [December 1, 2014].

Singh, M. Romesh (2006). *Tribal Development in 21st Century. An Experience from Manipur.* New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Kuki Liberation Army”. <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/KLA.htm> [August 5, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “KRA Timeline.”[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/  
countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist\_outfits/KRA\_tl.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/KRA_tl.htm) [March 7, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Kuki National Army.” <http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/kna.htm> [March 4, 2014].

START – National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF).” [http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist\_  
organization\_profile.asp?id=3685](http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3685) [January 30, 2014].

Swarup, Mridushi (2011). “Protection of Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution: Promise and Performance.” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1790922> [July 16, 2014].

Tohring, S.R. (2010). *Violence and Identity in North-East India: Naga-Kuki Conflict*. New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/  
gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central\_and\_Southern\_Asia#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia) [January 30, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Wikipedia (2015). “Proposed Map of Kuki State.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/  
File:Propose\_KUKILAND\_Map.jpg

## Ladakhis

Activity: 1949-2020

**General notes**

* There are both Buddhist and Muslim Ladakhis. Ladakh includes two districts, Leh (majority Buddhist) and Kargil (majority Muslim).

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1949, the Ladakh region was subsumed into Kashmir despite ethnic differences. This gave way to autonomist agitation among Ladakhis, led by the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA). “A memorandum submitted to Prime Minister Nehru on May 4, 1949, by Cheewang Rigzin, President, LBA, pleaded that Ladakh not be bound by the decision of a plebiscite, should the Muslim majority of the State decide in favour of Pakistan. They sought to be governed directly by the Government of India, or to be amalgamated with the Hindu-majority parts of Jammu to form a separate province, or to join East Punjab. Failing all options, they would be forced to consider the option of reuniting with Tibet” (Behera 2001). We code the movement as of 1949.
* Nehru convinced the LBA to drop its more radical demands and the movement began to make calls for internal autonomy within Kashmir in 1952 (Behera 2001). There was a plan to give both Jammu and Ladakh limited autonomy within Kashmir in the early 1950s, but the plan was soon dropped (Behera 2001). In 1962 the Ladakhis began to demand central administration along the lines of the North-East Frontier Agency (today the union territory of Arunachal Pradesh); this can be read as a demand for separation from Kashmir (van Beek 2000). Indeed there was a short spell of central administration between 1962 and 1964 in the context of Chinese aggression (the Ladakhis protested against the restoration of the status quo in 1964) (van Beek 2000). There was another round of protest in 1969 (van Beek 2000).
* We found no evidence of activity in the 1970s, but we also did not find evidence that the movement had ended. Based on the ten-years rule we code the movement as ongoing.
* We again find evidence for separatist mobilization in 1980, when there was violence in the context of protests against transferring a diesel generator from Zanskar to Kargil. The protests quickly turned into calls for regional autonomy and scheduled tribe status. The Ladakh Action Committee “launched a full-fledged agitation” in January 1981 for a separate union territory (implying outright separation from Kashmir) (Behera 2001; van Beek 2000). The Buddhist Ladakhis set up the All-Party Ladakh Action Committee to represent their calls for autonomy. At the same time, Muslim Ladhakis set up a parallel Kargil Action Committee which made a similar demand for ‘provincial status for the two districts of Leh and Kargil’ (Behera, 2001).
* In 1989 the LBA initiated another campaign for the formation of a Ladakh union territory. This campaign for a separate Ladakh from Kashmir was opposed by Kargil Muslims (Behera, 2001). In subsequent years, there was some violence (see below). In 2000 the LBA re-launched its agitation for union territory status (Behera 2001). In 2002, the Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF) was founded as a coalition of political parties fighting for separation from Kashmir (now part of BJP). The Buddhist Ladakhis continued to demand union territory status in subsequent years (Economic Times 2014).
* In 2019, LBA’s claims were met and Ladakh including the Leh and Kargil districts became a union territory (Ministry of Law and Justice). While this was initially welcomed by Buddhist and non-Muslim communities, the situation soon changed as the Act did not provide a legislative assembly or elected government to Ladakh (Ministry of Law and Justice 2019). Two new alliances were formed in Ladakh: the Apex Body of Leh (initially the People’s Movement for Sixth Schedule for Ladakh) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance. The Apex Body of Leh first demanded increased constitutional rights under Sixth Schedule, while the Kargil Democratic Alliance asked for the restoration of J&K special status. However, in December 2021, the two groups jointly called for a bandh (shut down) to demand for statehood for Ladakh and protection of lands and jobs. After the demand for statehood, it seems that the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) disassociated from the movement. The movement is ongoing (Bhat, 2021; Fareed, 2021; The Kashmir Monitor 2020; Singh, 2021; Zargar 2021). [start date: 1949; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1949, the Ladakh region was subsumed into Kashmir despite ethnic differences. This gave way to autonomist agitation among Kashmiri Buddhist Ladakhis, led by the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA). “A memorandum submitted to Prime Minister Nehru on May 4, 1949, by Cheewang Rigzin, President, LBA, pleaded that Ladakh not be bound by the decision of a plebiscite, should the Muslim majority of the State decide in favor of Pakistan. They sought to be governed directly by the Government of India, or to be amalgamated with the Hindu-majority parts of Jammu to form a separate province, or to join East Punjab. Failing all options, they would be forced to consider the option of reuniting with Tibet” (Behera 2001). The calls for central administration, the merger with Jammu to form a separate state and the merger with East Punjab all imply separation from Kashmir. [1949-1952: sub-state secession claim]
* Nehru convinced the LBA to drop its more radical demands and the movement began to make calls for internal autonomy within Kashmir in 1952 (Behera 2001). [1953-1962: autonomy claim]
* In 1962 the Ladakhis began to demand central administration along the lines of the North-East Frontier Agency (today the union territory of Arunachal Pradesh); this can be read as a demand for separation from Kashmir (van Beek 2000). In the 1980s the Ladakhis initiated substantial agitation for central administration (now called union territory status) (Behera 2001; van Beek 1998, 2000). [1963-1989: sub-state secession claim]
* Peace talks begun in late 1989; the LBA could be convinced of dropping its demand for a separate union territory in favor of an autonomous council (regional autonomy within Kashmir) (Behera 2001). [1990-2000: autonomy claim]
* In 2000 the LBA re-launched its agitation for union territory status (Behera 2001; Minahan 2012: 1967). In 2002, the Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF) was founded as a coalition of political parties fighting for separation from Kashmir. The movement continued to demand union territory status throughout the 2000s and 2010s (Economic Times 2014). [2001-2019: sub-state secession claim]
* After Ladakh became a Union Territory in 2019, the Apex Body of Leh and the Kargil Democratic Alliance jointly rejected the UT status. The Apex Body of Leh initially demanded increased constitutional rights under Sixth Schedule, while the Kargil Democratic Alliance demanded the restoration of J&K special status (Kargil Muslims had never been in favor of the Union Territory for Ladakh). In 2021, however, the two alliances joined forces to demand statehood for Ladakh, along with protection of land and jobs. [2020-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* There is some indication of an irredentist claim in 1949 (Behera 2001) but this appears to be for political bargaining purposes for the main demand of sub-state secession rather than a significant demand in its own right. [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ladakhis is the Ladakh region. The region in northern India became a union territory in October 2019 and was previously part of the Jammu and Kashmir state (Abrol 2019). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Violence took place in 1980, 1981, and 1982, but death estimates could not be found. Violence took place in 1989 when the police killed a small number of Ladakhi protestors. Peace talks begun in late 1989; the LBA could be convinced of dropping its demand for a separate union territory in favour of an autonomous council (regional autonomy within Kashmir) (Behera 2001). The peace talks continued until May 1995, when an autonomous council was set up in Leh and a bit later another autonomous district in Kargil. We could not find clear evidence on casualty numbers for any of these events, but it seems unlikely that the 25-deaths threshold was met. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Ladakh was traditionally populated by immigrants from western Tibet. It was considered an outer province of Tibet until the tenth century. After the Tibetan state collapsed in A.D. 900, Ladakh became independent under a member of the royal family. The area was very isolated from the outside world (Minahan 2012: 1064). In 1531, the weakened Ladakhi kingdom lost its western districts in Baltistan to invading Kashmiri Muslims. In 1533, Ladakh was conquered by a descendant of the Tibetan Kings, who established the Namgyal dynasty. Under him, the Ladakhis reconquered Baltistan and defeated the Kashmiris. Ladakh expanded during this time due to trade. The Tibetans invaded again in the early 1640s. Cornered, the Ladakhi king appealed for help in Delhi, who exacted the price of making Ladakh a tributary kingdom, but cleared the area of Tibetans. Later in the decade, Ladakh also appealed to the Kashmiris for military aid and gradually became a vassal state of Kashmir (Minahan 2012: 1065). Over the next two centuries, the kingdom gradually threw off Kashmir. In 1809, threatened by the expanding Sikhs, Tsepal Namgyal (the king) sought an alliance with the British, but did not have much to offer the British and their appeal was ignored; eventually, it became part of the Jammu state of Dogra, and in this way came under British rule (Minahan 2012: 1065). The Simla Conference between the British and Chinese authorities finally delimited Ladakh’s formerly indefinite boundaries and drew a firm border between Ladakh and Tibet. Culturally, the Ladakhis remained relatively autonomous, partly because they remained cut off from November through June each year (Minahan 2012: 1065).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* A significant part of Ladakh is disputed between China and India; if the Indian view is followed, China annexed part of Ladakh after 1947, but this would not constitute a restriction as defined here anyway.
* In 1949 Ladakh came under the rule of Kashmir, which sparked the movement. Soon after Urdu was imposed as language of instruction in Ladakhi schools (Behera 2001). The Ladakhis speak their own language, Ladakhi. [1949: cultural rights restriction]
* There was a plan to give both Jammu and Ladakh limited autonomy within Kashmir in the early 1950s, but the plan was soon dropped (Behera 2001).
* In 1962 the Ladakhis became centrally administered in 1962. This was a core demand of the Ladakhis and hence they protested when central administration was retracted in 1964 (van Breek 2000; Behera 2001). The measure was a consequence of the Sino-Indian War. The Ladakhis’ status remained unchanged, thus we do not code a concession or restriction.
* In 1979 the Ladakh area was divided along communal lines; a majority-Buddhist and a majority-Muslim district were created. Districts have very limited say and we do not code a concession/restriction.
* Peace talks begun in late 1989 and continued until May 1995, when two autonomous councils were set up for the Ladakhis (van Beek 2000; Behera 2001). The Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, Leh (LAHDC Leh) was created in 1995 and includes the Buddhist-majority populated Leh district in Ladakh. Muslim Ladakhis in Kargil did not initially accept the council, delaying implementation and the set-up of another autonomous council in Kargil until 2003, the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, Kargil (LAHDC Kargil). Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). [1995: autonomy concession]
* According to Minahan (2002: 1067) Jammu and Kashmir passed a new autonomy bill in 1997 which the Ladakhis rejected as too limited. According to Behera (2001) the 1997 bill was intended to replace the act by the union government and not intended to increase the districts’ powers. According to Minahan (2002: 1067) there was another autonomy bill in 2000 (this could not be verified). Minahan does not say whether new powers were devolved and it appears likely that this was another implementation bill of the 1995 agreement (it was again rejected by the Ladakhis). We do not code a concession.
* According to Cunningham (2014: 212), the Indian government devolved further economic powers to the Ladakh autonomous council in 2002, which increased powers of appropriation and control over land. [2002: autonomy concession]
* In 2019, the Indian government reorganized the state of Jammu and Kashmir in two Indian-administered union territories—Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh (including the Leh and Kargil districts)—through the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act (2019). Published on August 5, 2019, and later implemented in October 2019, the Act did not provide a legislative assembly or elected government to Ladakh (Ministry of Law and Justice 2019). However, each district within the union territory continues to elect an autonomous district council as done previously (Indian Express 2019). While the autonomy gain appears limited, we still code a concession because the set-up of a separate union territory fulfilled the Ladakhis’ long-held ambition to be separated from Jammu & Kashmir. [2019: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* See major territorial changes. [1996-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change but as this was before the start date, we do not code one.
* The Ladakhis had limited influence over Kashmir’s regional government (van Beek 2000). Thus, they can only be considered autonomous after the establishment of the autonomous councils. The first Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council was sworn in later in the year (van Berek 1998: 35). The second autonomous council was installed in 2003. Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). The autonomous districts continued to function after the establishment of a Ladakh union territory in 2019. [1995, 2003: establishment of regional autonomy]
* Due to establishment of union territory. [2019: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ladhakis |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence of government inclusion. [1947-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* The Indian part of Ladakh is comprised of two districts, Leh and Kargil. According to the 2011 census there was a population of 140,802 in the Kargil district and of 133,487 in the Leh district. This means that the total population of Ladakh was 274,289 in 2011. This figures excludes Ladakhis outside the Ladakh region, but this cannot be too many. India’s total population in the 2011 census was 1,250,287,940. [0.0002]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1063), most Ladakhis reside in the Ladakh region, where they also constitute a majority. The Buddhist Ladakhis are a majority in the Union Territory (Minority Rights Group International). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Ladakhis are of Tibetan origin and retain close ethnic ties to the Tibetans (Minahan 2002: 1063). [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Abrol, Paul (2019). *India’s Newsly Created Union Territory of Ladakh Looks to the Country’s Northeast for Lessons.* <https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/indias-newly-created-union-territory-of-ladakh-looks-to-the-countrys-northeast-for-lessons>.

Beek, Martijn van (2000). “Dangerous Liaisons: Hindu Nationalism and Buddhist Radicalism in Ladakh.” <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach9.pdf> [November 27, 2014].

Behera, Navnita C. (2001). “Autonomy in J & K. The Forgotten Identities of Ladakh.” *South Asia Terrorism Portal.*  [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume6/  
Fault6-NavnitaCB-F.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume6/Fault6-NavnitaCB-F.htm) [November 27, 2014]

Bhat, Tariq (2021). “Buddhist Body Dissociates from Groups Seeking Statehood for Ladakh”. *The Week.* November 26. <https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2021/11/26/buddhist-body-dissociates-from-groups-seeking-statehood-for-ladakh.html> [September 01, 2022].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chitkara, M. G. (2003). *Kashmir’s Buddhist Ladakh*. Delhi: APH Publishing.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher (2014). *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Deshpande, Rajeev (2002). “In-House Drama. RSS Suggests Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Ladakh Could Form Separate States.

Economic Times (2014). “Congress Slams Rajnath Singh for Remarks on ‘Union Territory’ Status for Ladakh.” <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-11-21/news/56339960_1_article-370-bjp-leaders-election-rally> [November 27, 2014].

Fareed, Rifat (2021). “Why India’s Ladakh is Witnessing Growing Discontent”. *Al Jazeera.* December 17. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/17/india-ladakh-discontent-statehood-kashmir-china-pakistan-autonomy> [September 01, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Government of India. “District Leh- Ladakh”. <https://leh.nic.in/about-district/ataglance/> [September 02, 2022].

Government of India. “Kargil- Ladakh”. https://kargil.nic.in/demography/ [September 02, 2022].

Govt, BJP Oppose.” *India Today*. August 5. <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/rss-suggests-kashmir-valley-jammu-ladakh-could-form-separate-states-govt-bjp-oppose/1/219090.html> [June 20, 2014].

Indian Express (2019). “Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Bill Passed by Rajya Sabha: Key Takeaways”. August 05. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-bifurcation-ladakh-union-territory-key-takeaways-from-reorganisation-bill-article-370-amit-shah-5880177/> [August 18, 2022].

Indian Express (2019). “Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Bill Passed by Rajya Sabha: Key Takeaways”. August 05. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-bifurcation-ladakh-union-territory-key-takeaways-from-reorganisation-bill-article-370-amit-shah-5880177/> [August 18, 2022].

Kargil District, Ladakh. “LAHDCK – Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, Kargil”. <https://kargil.nic.in/lahdc/> [September 01, 2022].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [April 11, 2014].

Laishram, Dhanabir (2013). “Autonomous District Council in NE India, Boon or Curse.” *Manipur Times.* <http://www.manipurtimes.com/news-article/116-the-people-chronicle-article/302-autonomous-district-council-in-ne-india-boon-or-curse> [July 16, 2014].

Laishram, Dhanabir (2013). “Autonomous District Council in NE India, Boon or Curse.” *Manipur Times.* <http://www.manipurtimes.com/news-article/116-the-people-chronicle-article/302-autonomous-district-council-in-ne-india-boon-or-curse> [July 16, 2014].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [April 11, 2014].

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 64.

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 319-321.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1063-1068.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Ministry of Law and Justice (2019). “The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019”. <https://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/210407.pdf> [August 18, 2022].

Ministry of Law and Justice (2019). “The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019”. <https://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/210407.pdf> [August 18, 2022].

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Groups*. <http://minorityrights.org/directory/> [November 9, 2021].

Pirie, Fernanda (2007). *Peace and Conflict in Ladakh: The Construction of a Fragile Web of Order*. Leiden: Brill.

Singh, Vijaita (2021). “Growing Demand for Statehood in Ladakh”. *The Hindu*. December 18. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/growing-demand-for-statehood-in-ladakh/article37987307.ece> [September 01, 2022].

The Kashmir Monitor (2020). “Apex Body Calls for Unanimous LAHDC Poll Boycott in Leh”. September 22. <https://www.thekashmirmonitor.net/apex-body-calls-for-unanimous-lahdc-poll-boycott-in-leh/> [September 01, 2022].

The Tribune (2000). “Chandigarh, India - Jammu & Kashmir.” January 12. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000113/j&k.htm#2 [June 20, 2014].

Van Beek, Martijn (1998). “True Patriots: Justifying Autonomy for Ladakh.” *Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies* 18(9): 35-46.

Van Beek, Martijn (1998). “True Patriots: Justifying Autonomy for Ladakh.” *Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies* 18(9): 35-46.

Van Beek, Martijn (2000). “Dangerous Liaisons: Hindu Nationalism and Buddhist Radicalism in Ladakh.” [http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/  
PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach9.pdf](http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach9.pdf) [November 27, 2014].

Van Beek, Martijn (2000). “Dangerous Liaisons: Hindu Nationalism and Buddhist Radicalism in Ladakh.” [http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/  
PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach9.pdf](http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach9.pdf) [November 27, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Weidmann, Nils B. (2009). “Geography as Motivation and Opportunity: Group Concentration and Ethnic Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 526-543.

Zargar, Safwat (2021). “After Two Years of Disagreement, Ladakh’s Kargil and Leh Regions Now United in Demand for Statehood”. August 07. <https://scroll.in/article/1002265/after-two-years-of-disagreement-ladakhs-kargil-and-leh-regions-now-united-in-demand-for-statehood> [September 01, 2022].

## Manipuri

Activity: 1949-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Manipur was a princely state and thus given the option to join either India or Pakistan upon partition. In 1947, the Manipur government signed an interim agreement acknowledging Indian sovereignty but did not formally join India until 1949. This sparked major protests and demands for full independence (Minahan 1947: 1222). Irawat, a social movement against social and economic inequalities (Kshetri 2006: 53), began to make claims for secession after Manipur’s (formal) merger with India in 1949 (Kshetri 2006: 18-19). Based on this, the start date is coded as 1947. Since Manipur formally joined India only in 1949 and had the status of an Indian protectorate beforehand, we code the movement from 1949, though noting prior non-violent activity.
* Minahan (1996) reports separatist activity throughout the 1960s and 1980s, which allows us to code the movement as ongoing throughout that period. Separatist armed conflict broke out in 1978 (see below). Roth (2015: 331) claims that although over 20 militant groups in Manipur surrendered in September 2012, The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) continued its activities for an independent Manipur. In addition to PREPAK, the militant outfit People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is still active and has rejected negotiations with the Indian authorities (SATP; Centre for Development and Peace Studies). Thus, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1947; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Until the grant of statehood, there has been agitation for both independence and autonomy (UCDP; Minahan 2002: 1222). In 1964, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) was founded, one of the most important organizations advocating the secession of Manipur from India (START). Since at least the 1970s, independence is the dominant claim. Since the dominant claim is not entirely clear for 1947-1970, we code the more radical claim, independence, throughout. [1949-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1947; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Manipuri consists of the current Manipur state in India Roth (2015: 330ff). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 328).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO pegs the start of the low-level violence to 1982 and continues to code ongoing armed conflict until 1988.
  + Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict throughout 1978-2006, the last year they cover. However, they do not have a deaths threshold, and they code conflict as ongoing if it recurs within five years.
  + MAR does not include the Manipuris and is therefore unhelpful.
  + The UCDP Encyclopedia provides further, qualitative information. According to this, the armed conflict is associated with a group known as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which was formed in 1978. UCDP/PRIO suggests reporting difficulties, so it is possible that the 25 deaths threshold was met before 1982; however, it seems plausible that the conflict did not immediately escalate to 25 deaths.
  + UCDP continues to explain that PLA was “practically decimated by 1989” after a number of harsh military crackdowns, and only re-launched its armed struggle in 1992. UCDP/PRIO does not report any casualties 1989-1990and only 6 in 1992, so we code 1989-1992 with NVIOLSD.
* UCDP/PRIO suggests armed conflict in all subsequent years until and including 2009 with only three exceptions: 1997, 2001, and 2002. UCDP/PRIO does report double-digit numbers of deaths in all of those years, however, suggesting fighting was sustained.
  + We investigated this further using data from SATP. Combining deaths associated to the PLA, the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), there were 43 casualties in 2001 and 39 in 2002. Based on SATP, the 25 deaths threshold was therefore met in 2001-2002 (1997 is not covered). Furthermore, there were 27 deaths in 2010.
* On this basis, we code ongoing armed conflict until and including 2010.
* UCDP/PRIO codes a separatist armed conflict over Western South East Asia in 2015-2018. The rebel group, United National Liberation Front of Western South East India, consists an alliance out of rebel groups from various SDMs including the Assamese (ULFA-I), the Nagas (NSCN-K), the Rajbangsis (KLO), the Bodos (NDFB-S), the Garos (GNLA), and the Manipuris (UNLF, KCP, and PREPAK). UCDP/PRIO codes 161 battle-related deaths in 2015, and 27-47 in 2016-2018. UCDP does not provide disaggregated fatality counts, thus we investigated this further using SATP. Combined casualty figures for PLA, PREPAK, KCP, and UNLF are as such:
  + 2011: 17
  + 2012: 17
  + 2013: 5
  + 2014: 4
  + 2015: 9
  + 2016: 1
  + 2017: 12
  + 2018: 11
  + 2019: 1
  + 2020: 0
* Based on SATP, the 25-deaths threshold is therefore never met after 2010. [1949-1981: NVIOLSD; 1982-1988: LVIOLSD; 1989-1992: NVIOLSD; 1993-2010: LVIOLSD; 2011-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Manipur kingdom was established approximately 2000 years ago. The Meithei state, made up of the seven Meithei clans, was consolidated in the 15th century. A treaty between the Meithei kingdom and the East India Company was signed in 1762. The Burmese invaded the Meithei kingdom in 1767, only to be driven out in 1773. The Meithei name for their kingdom, Meitrabak, was considered too unwieldy by the British and thus renamed Manipur in 1774 (Minahan 2012: 186). The Burmese invaded again during a period of discord among Meithei princes in 1819, devastating the country. They were driven out in 1825. The Meitheis aided the British against the rebels in the Sepoy Revolt of 1857 and established close political ties while retaining their independence. In 1873, the British and the kingdom agreed on the demarcation of Manipur’s boundaries. After a war of succession within Manipur that turned into war with the British, Manipur fell to Britain in 1891. The Japanese invaded Manipur during WWII. In 1947 Manipur, a princely state, faced the decision whether to join India or Pakistan (Minahan 2012: 187).
* In 1949 Manipur formally accessed the Indian Union. Manipur became a Part C state. This implies a loss of autonomy: Part C states were directly administered by the center and did not enjoy significant autonomy (Kumar 1991). [1949: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1956, part C states were renamed “union territories” and territorial councils introduced. The reform implied some decentralization with regard to administration, but no devolution of legislative powers (see Das 2001: 226-227; Kumar 1991: 44-45). We do not code a concession.
* In 1958, The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) (Manipur and Assam) was introduced in the North-East to counter Naga insurgency, giving the police and military extensive powers (Arora 2020). Declarations of a state of emergency are not coded.
* By way of the 1963 Union Territories Act, union territories gained significant autonomy and, in particular, legislative powers (Kumar 1991: 48-61). The territorial councils were replaced with a legislative Assembly and a council of ministers (Das 2001: 226-227). [1963: autonomy concession]
* President’s rule (direct rule by the center) was imposed in January 1967 (Dhavan 2001). Yet, President’s rule was lifted only two months later, in March 1967 (Dhavan 2001). Then, President’s rule was imposed again in October 1967 (Dhavan 2001). This time it lasted longer: until February 1968 (Dhavan 2001). [1967: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was imposed in October 1969 (Dhavan 2001). [1969: autonomy restriction]
* Dhavan suggests that President’s rule was installed in January 1972-March 1972 but it seems that the President’s rule installed in 1969 was simply not abolished until March 1972.
* In 1971, Manipur attained statehood and thus increased autonomy; statehood was implemented in 1972. [1971: autonomy concession]
* President’s rule was imposed in March 1973 (Dhavan 2001). [1973: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in March 1974 (Dhavan 2001). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was imposed in May 1977 (Dhavan 2001). Yet, President’s rule was lifted only a month later, in June 1977 (Dhavan 2001). In line with the codebook, we do not code the short-term imposition of direct rule if it is less than three months.
* President’s rule was imposed in November 1979 (Dhavan 2001). It lasted until January 1980 (Dhavan 2001). [1979: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was imposed in February 1981 (Dhavan 2001). [1981: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in June 1981 (Dhavan 2001). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was imposed in January 1992 (Dhavan 2001). [1992: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in April 1992 (Dhavan 2001). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* Meithei (the Manipuris’ language) was included in the 8th schedule to India’s constitution in 1992 (Minahan 2012: 187). This implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [1992: cultural rights concession]
* President’s rule was imposed in December 1993 in connection with Kuki-Naga clashes (Dhavan 2001). [1993: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: We code an onset of violence in 1993 based on UCDP and most fatalities recorded in UCDP date to before December (September-November 1993). Therefore, this restriction occurred after the onset of violence.
* President’s rule was lifted in December 1994 (Dhavan 2001). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was imposed in June 2001 (Dhavan 2001). [2001: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in March 2002. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In 2016, the central BJP-led government introduced a bill to amend the citizenship law, which provided Indian citizenship to non-Muslim migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. The Bill was later passed in 2019 as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), sparking protest in across India for its clear religious discrimination. In Manipur, the Act was opposed on the grounds of threatening the ‘balance of indigenous people in the region’ (Choudhury 2019). The CAA is difficult to see as a concession or restriction as defined here and so not coded.

**Regional autonomy**

* Until abolishment of princely state in 1949, but this is not coded because Manipur was a protectorate and not fully integrated with India.
* From 1963 Union Territories Act onward (see above and below). [1964-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1949 Manipur formally acceded India and the autonomous kingdom was abolished. [1949: loss of autonomy; host change (new)]
* In 1963 Manipur got a legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers by way of the Union Territories Act (Das 2001: 226-227). By this, Manipur attained substantial autonomy. [1963: establishment of autonomy]
* Since the 1963 reform is coded as a major change, the attainment of statehood in 1972 is not coded as another major change.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Manipuri |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Manipuri |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75010000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.002]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1219), India’s Manipuris (Meitheis) reside primarily in the state of Manipur (>50%), and in some adjacent Indian states. In the state of Manipur, the Manipuris make up 62% of the local population according to Minahan. Data from the 2001 census confirms this (see http://manipuronline.tripod.com/feature/population.htm). (Note: the Manipuris settle primarily in Manipur’s valleys, while the state’s minorities (in particular Kukis, Nagas) tend to reside in the hill area (Haokip 2011)). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1219), there are 150,000 Manipuris in Myanmar and 135,000 in Bangladesh. Other sources (e.g. Joshua Project; Ethnologue) suggest a much smaller number below the threshold, however. We found no other evidence for close kin. [no kin]

**Sources**

Arora, Vibha (2020). “Citizens, the Smoking Guns of AFSPA and Bare Life in Northeast India”. *Sociological Bulletin* 69(3): 351-367.

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Centre for Development and Peace Studies. “Militant Group Profile.” <http://cdpsindia.org/manipur/militant-group-profile/> [August 11, 2022].

Das, J.R. (2001). *Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples.* New Delhi: S. B. Nangia.

Dhavan, Rajeev (2001). “President’s Rule in Manipur.” *The Hindu*, June 15. <http://www.thehindu.com/2001/06/15/stories/05152523.htm> [December 1, 2014].

Ethnologue. „Meiti.“ https://www.ethnologue.com/language/mni [November 10, 2015].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Haokip, Pauthang (2011). “The Languages of Manipur: A Case Study of the Kuki-Chin Languages.” *Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area* 34(1): 85-118..

Hewitt, Joseph J., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) (2008). *Peace and Conflict 2008.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Joshua Project. “Meiti.” <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/13513> [November 10, 2015].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [March 25, 2002].

Kshetri, R. (2006). *The Emergence of Meetei Nationalism: A Study of Two Movements Among the Meeteis*. New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Kumar, Sudhir (1991). *Political and Administrative Setup Union Territories in India.* New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 362-364.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1219-1224.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Datasheet – Manipur.” <https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-manipur> [June 23, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “People’s Liberation Army (PLA).” <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india-insurgencynortheast-manipur/people-s-liberation-army-pla> [August 11, 2022].

START – National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “United National Liberation Front (UNLF).” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/  
manipur/terrorist\_outfits/unlf.htm [December 1, 2014].

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/  
gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central\_and\_Southern\_Asia#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia) [December 1, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Meghalayans

Activity: 1947-1972

**General notes**

* Two main groups are associated with the Meghalayan movement; each subsequently launched its own movement in the 1990s: the Khasis (Hynniewtreps) that make up around 50% of Meghalaya’s population and the Achiks (Garos) that make up around 20% of Meghalaya’s population.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The campaign for the separation of the Meghalayan hill tracts from Hindu-dominated Assam and the creation of a new tribal state in the region began in 1947 (Minahan 2002: 987), hence the start date of the movement. Activity continued until Meghalaya was granted its own state in 1972.
* After 1972, the Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC), which represented the three main tribes – the Achiks (Garo), Hynniewtrep (Khasi, and Jaintia) – aimed to “fight against the outsiders (Dkhars)” (Bharati 2007: 55). There is no evidence that this group was fighting for self-determination as it was mainly a militant group focused on tribal warfare. Thus, the end of the movement is coded as 1972.
* There is no evidence of a revival of the movement in recent sources (Minahan 2016; Roth 2015). [start date: 1947; end date: 1972]
  + In 1992, HALC split into the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and Achik Matgrik Liberation Army (AMLA) as a result of inter-tribal tensions between the tribes involved. The HNLC “aims at transforming Meghalaya into a State exclusively for the Khasi tribe” while AMLA and subsequent rebel group Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) “demand[ed] the Achikland comprising of three Garo districts of Meghalaya and adjoining areas of Assam (Bharati 2007: 55). These movements are coded separately from the Meghalaya movement.

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim is for the creation of a separate tribal state. According to Minahan (2002: 987), the campaign for the separation of the Meghalayan hill tracts from Hindu-dominated Assam and the creation of a new tribal state in the region began in 1947. In 1954 there was a conference of the people of the autonomous hill districts of Assam to consider the demand of a hill state. It was decided to submit a memorandum to the States’ Reorganisation Commission for the formation of a separate “Eastern Hill State” (Kumar 1998: 66). It was mainly the Garos and the Khasis that wanted their own state at that point; members of North Cachar Hills (Mikirs and Masas) and Lushai Hills wanted greater autonomy within Assam. In 1960, representatives from the hills area formed the All Party Leaders Conference to lobby for the separation of the hill area from Assam (Inoue 2005: 26). Originally, the demand also included tribal areas in Manipur and Tripura (Kumar 1998: 67). [1947-1972: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Meghalayans largely coincides with today’s Meghalaya state, though the demanded territory also included some tribal areas in Manipur and Tripura (Kumar 1998: 67). Since we could not find a good indication as to exactly what areas were claimed in addition to present-day Meghalaya, we flag this claim as ambiguous and use today’s Meghalaya as an approximation. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* While there has been intermittent separatist violence, it does not appear that any of this violence qualifies as LVIOLSD. We therefore classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The largest group associated with the movement, the Khasis, retained their independence throughout the period of northern state formation in India and were never centrally administered. The Khasis submitted to British authority in the 1820s but retained relatively broad autonomy. They were included in the Assam province. On the other hand, the Garos, a Tibeto-Burman people, were incorporated into the British Empire in 1835 as part of the Assam province. Under the British both the Garos and the Khasis retained cultural autonomy: both Khasi and Garo lands were administered as “partially excluded areas”, a status that subsequently led to scheduled tribe status (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). Scheduled tribe status implies some limited protection of tribal culture. We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Upon partition, the Meghalayans’ land was divided, with parts becoming part of Pakistan and others becoming part of Assam. This does not constitute a restriction in the sense employed here.
* In November 1949, the Indian Constitution and with it the Sixth Schedule was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including one for the Garos and one for the Khasis (India – Constitution – Schedules). Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural autonomy (Prudaite 2005: 162-163; note that Prudaite erroneously gives 1952 as the year of adoption). [1949: autonomy concession]
* In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language. The languages of the Meghalayans were denied a separate status (Bhattacharjee 2012). [1960: cultural rights restriction]
* After riots, Assam’s language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105). [1961: cultural rights concession]
* From 1962 onwards there were intense negotiations over the future status of Meghalaya. In 1962, the Indian government offered the so-called Scottish Plan, which would have given more autonomy to the hill area, including budgetary powers, a separate budget, autonomy over planning and development funds, among others. The proposal was not acceptable to the tribal leaders, who argued that the language problem was not addressed at all, and that the proposed Statutory State Council was very similar in scope to the earlier Advisory Council, if not in name (Kumar 1998: 67). The subsequent 1963 Nehru Plan went much further in the degree of autonomy granted to the hills peoples, including autonomy over education, agriculture, horticulture, forests, health and the administration of justice, budgetary control, a separate university, a Cabinet Minister, one MP per hill district, and one LMA for every 40,000 people. The hill tribal leaders accepted the Nehru Plan, and a Commission was appointed to work out the details (Kumar 1998: 70-71). The Pataskar Commission was appointed to work out the details of the Nehru Plan. Contrary to the earlier proposal, the commission recommended the strengthening of the district councils. Since the proposal fell short of the Nehru Plan, the hill tribal leaders did not accept it (but Assam unsurprisingly did) (Kumar 1998: 71). An agreement was reached with the 1969 plan of reorganization. The 1969 plan established an autonomous state within Assam, consisting of the Garo Hills and the United Khasi and Jaintiya Hills districts of Assam. The North Cachar and Mikir Hills could join if 2/3 of their District Council voted in favor of doing so. The plan implied significantly increased autonomy. The autonomous state was inaugurated on April 2, 1970 (Kumar 1998: 72). [1969: autonomy concession]
* In 1971 the North-Eastern Area (Reorganization) Act was passed, which created three new states in the North-Est: Tripura, Manipur, and Meghalaya. Meghalaya attained statehood in 1972 (Inoue 2005: 26; Kumar 1998: 73). [1971: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* See major territorial changes. [1953-1972: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* In 1949, the Sixth Schedule to the Indian Constitution was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including councils for the Garos and Khasis. The autonomous district councils became functional in 1952. Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural autonomy (Prudaite 2005: 162-163). [1952: establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 1972, Meghalaya was separated from Assam and attained statehood (Inoue 2005: 26; Kumar 1998: 73). [1972: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Meghalayans |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* Both the Achiks (Garos) and the Khasis have scheduled tribe status. Until the 1990s, scheduled tribes members were not represented in India’s cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. Thus, the Meghalayans are coded as powerless. [1947-1972: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (1996: 359), there were 1.49 million Meghalayans in 1995. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 963.9 million in 1995. [0.0015]

**Regional concentration**

* The term “Meghalayans” relates to a number of tribal groups in India’s northeast. The two largest such groups are the Achiks (Garos) and the Hynniewtreps (Khasis). Each subsequently launched its own movement for separation from Meghalaya. Jointly, the two groups make up about 70% of Meghalaya’s population, and they also primarily reside in the area (see the respective entries). Note: the data cited here relates to recent years, yet we found no signs that the situation would have been different in the post-independence years. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Encyclopedia Britannica, there are Garos also in Bangladesh. They make up 141,000 according to the Joshua Project. And According to Minahan (2002: 985) around 120,000 Khasis live in adjacent areas of Bangladesh. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Agnihotri, V. K. (ed.) (2010). *Indian History.* Mumbai: Allied Publishers.

Baruah, Sanjib (1999). *India against Itself. Assam and the Politics of Nationality.* Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press.

Bharati, Astha (2007). *Problems of Ethnicity in the North-East India*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing.

Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa (2012). “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language Movement.” *Mainstream* L(9). <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html> [July 25, 2014].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chandran, D. Suba, and P. R. Chari (2013). *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-Wing Extremism and Religious Violence*. London: Routledge.

Encyclopedia Britannica. “Garo people.” http://www.britannica.com/topic/Garo [October 16, 2015].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

India – Constitution – Schedules. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/in01000_.html> [December 2, 2014].

Inoue, K. (2005). Integration of the North East: The State Formation Process*.* http://www.ide-jetro.jp/English/Publish/Download/Jrp/pdf/133\_3.pdf [December 2, 2014].

Joshua Project. “Garo in Bangladesh” https://joshuaproject.net/people\_groups/11826/BG [October 26, 2015].

Kumar, B.B. (1998). *Small States Syndrome in India.* New Delhi: Concept Publishing.

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [October 26, 2013].

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 985-989.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Prudaite, Lal (2005). “Mizoram.” In: Mayumi Murayama, Kyoko Inoue, and Sanjoy Hazarika (eds.), *Sub-Regional Relations in Eastern South Asia: With Special Focus on India’s North Eastern Region,* 153-240. Chiba: IDE-JETRO.

Reddy, P. L. Sanjeeva, and P. C. Shekar Reddy (2007). *Peace and Development in Northeast: A Virtuous Spiral*. New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Mikirs

Activity: 1947-2020

**General notes**

* The Mikirs are also referred to as Karbi.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Mikir National Council (MNC) was founded in the late 1930s. It remained loyal to the British during the WWII. At the end of the war, the MNC entered into negotiations with the British for the establishment of an autonomous Mikir district, but their demands were ignored (Minahan 2002: 1258). The MNC and Mikir leaders have remained active claiming self-determination for the Mikirs since the independence of India. As we lack a clearer indication as to when the Mikirs began to demand self-determination (Minahan simply states that activity started after the end of WWII), we code 1946 as the start date. As India gained independence only in 1947, we code the movement from 1947 in the data set, but note prior non-violent activity.
* According to Minahan (2002: 1258), the Indian government “in an effort to offset growing Mikir militancy” offered some concessions in 1952. The government formed the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council, which gave Mikirs some control over the land, but this “was denounced by the more militant groups as inadequate and too limited to be effective. […] Mikir leaders demanded the creation of a more extensive territory…” According to Prakash (2007: 569), the “search for autonomy continued even after they [the Mikirs] got the ADC [autonomous district council] for themselves.” Eventually the perception of the concessions as too limited resulted in the formation of several rebel organizations in the 1980s that launched military campaigns to support their demand for autonomy in a new Mikir state (Minahan 2002). Among these was the Karbi National Volunteers, founded in 1980 (TRAC; SATP).
* In 2011, the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), a merger of two rebel outfits in the Karbi Anglong district, signed a tripartite memorandum of settlement (MoS) and disbanded (SATP; Saha 2021). However, Roth (2015: 335) identifies the Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) as another prominent group fighting for a Mikir state, along with the Karbi People’s Liberation Tigers (KPLT). SATP reports that the KPLT is now inactive; the same applies to another rebel outfit, the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV). Meanwhile, according to SATP, the KLNLF has entered peace talks with the Indian government. In 2021 over a thousand members of five Karbi Anglong militant groups laid down arms, leading to peace talks in the region (Saha 2021). While this movement may be on its way out, it was ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1946; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially demands were focused on autonomy within Assam (Prakash 2007: 569). The dominant claim appears to have shifted to separate statehood around 1980 (Prakash 2007: 569). In 1986, the leaders of Karbi Anglong and NC Hills districts formed a new organization, the “Autonomous State Demand Committee” (ASDC), which immediately began pressuring the central government for their own state (Prakash 2007: 572). In the early 1980s, several more radical rebel groups formed (such as the Karbi National Volunteers or the Karbi Peoples Front). Most demanded Karbi statehood. A few made claims for independence, but statehood was the dominant demand. (Minahan 2002: 1259). In 1999, the KNV and KPF united to form the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) in 1999 and launched a military campaign for an autonomous Mikir state. In 2000, the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council passed a resolution for Karbi Anglong statehood within India, which enjoyed widespread support (Minahan 2002: 1259-1260). We code the sub-state secession claim from 1980 onwards (so that it coincides with the Masas; the contention appears to have evolved in parallel) [1947-1979: autonomy claim; 1980-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan notes that there have been some claims for independence within different SDM organizations (2002: 1259), but the independence claim has limited significance claims (SATP). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Mikirs (Karbi) includes their heartland called Karbi Anglong, which is composed of the three districts Karbi Anglong, North Cachar Hills (today called Dima Hasao district) and West Karbi Anglong within Assam State (Saha 2021). The claim also includes additional territories beyond these areas, although it remains unclear which territories exactly are claimed. We therefore flag this claim as ambiguous and use the Karbi Anglong, West Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills as an approximation. We code this territory based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Hewitt et al. (2008) suggest a LVIOLSD code for 1986-2002: “Rebel outfit forms [in 1986] and begins armed separatist conflict shortly thereafter. This organization merges with another rebel faction in 1999 to form the current main militant Karbi organization. Rebels sign ceasefire agreement with government in May 2002 and begin negotiations soon following; ceasefire has been renewed each year since, despite regular accusations of truce breaking from both sides. Rejecting ceasefire and negotiations, additional rebel factions form and continue steady violent attacks into early 2007. In January 2006, main rebel faction (the one on ceasefire with the government) reportedly drops long-time goal of separate Karbi Anglong state in favor of more autonomy.” However, the evidence we found does not suggest that violence was significant enough to warrant a LVIOLSD code: while SATP lists several Mikir/Karbi rebel groups, the aggregate deaths count over all years is only ca. 100 and below 25 in every year. Thus, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Mikirs, a Tibeto-Burmese tribal people, were driven into Assam’s highlands by invading Mogul troops in the 17th century. They had a national assembly, king and a capital in Ronhang Rongbong, the present Assamese district of Karbi Anglong (Minahan 2002: 1257). The Mikirs came in contact with the British when the Assamese enlisted British help against the Burmese. Assam was annexed to the British Empire in 1826. British colonial control depended on the traditional chief/king to extert their rule. Most Mikirs converted to Christianity (Minahan 2002: 1257). The missionary-educated Mikir leaders were relatively pro-Indian independence. Based on the Coupland Plan, the British created different authority structures for some of the Northern tribal areas, listing them as “excluded areas” or “partially excluded areas”. These areas were set up as tribal reserves and migration from the lowlands was prohibited. The status of (partially) excluded area led to scheduled tribe status after India’s independence. Scheduled tribe status confers the rights to a proportionate share in state employment and proportionate representation both in the national and sub-national parliament. Moreover, scheduled tribe status protects the “tribal” language and culture (Swarup 2011). The Mikirs’ homeland was administered as a partially excluded area until India’s independence in 1947 (Minahan 202: 1257).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1949, the Sixth Schedule to the Indian Constitution was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including one for the Mikirs (India – Constitution – Schedules). Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural autonomy (Prudaite 2005: 162-163). [1949: autonomy concession]
* In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language. The Mikirs’ language was denied a separate status (Bhattacharjee 2012). [1960: cultural rights restriction]
* After riots, Assam’s language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105). [1961: cultural rights concession]
* In 1970 Karbi became a fully fletched civil district. Prior to this the Mikir Hills were grouped with the Masas into a single district. Furthermore, additional powers were devolved to the autonomous district (Prakash 2007: 570). [1970: autonomy concession]
* According to Choudhury (2014: 212), the Assamese government in 1986 passed a law that required Assamese as a compulsory “third language” in schools. We deem this too minimal to be coded as a restriction. At the same time, though, it is reported that there was a new regulation that made Assamese a requirement for obtaining any government job in Assam. [1986: cultural rights restriction]
* The Mikir Hills District was renamed Karbi Anglong and thereby given the traditional name of the Mikir homeland (Minahan 2002: 1257). This appears too limited to be coded as a concession.
* In 1995 Assam devolved additional powers to both the Karbi Anglong and the Dimasas autonomous councils, “much beyond those available under Sixth Schedule” (Prakash 2007: 577). [1995: autonomy concession]
* According to Minahan (2002: 1211) the Assamese government devolved further powers in 2000, but this could not be verified. We do not code a concession.
* In 2011, the central government, the government of Assam and UPDS signed a tripartite memorandum of settlement (MoS). The MoS provided further autonomy to the Council and special development packages (SATP; Centre for Development and Peace Studies). It also involved the renaming of the Council to Karbi Anglong Autonomous Territorial Council (KAATC), although this does not seem to have happened yet due to protests from Nagas (see: Leivon 2021). However, given that some further powers were devolved, we code the MoS as a concession. [2011: autonomy concession]
* In 2021, the Centre, the Assam government, and representatives of six Karbi Anglong outfits signed the Karbi Anglong Agreement (2021) (PA-X). The agreement reinstated some of the provisions included in the 2011 MoS, including the creation of sub-state Karbi Anglong Autonomous Territorial Council. As these seemingly had not been implemented yet, we do not code another concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* See major territorial changes. [1953-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* In 1952 the autonomous council became functional. Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). [1952: establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 1970 Karbi became a fully-fletched civil district. Prior to this the Mikir Hills were grouped with the Masas into a single district (Prakash 2007: 570). [1970: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Mikirs |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* The Mikirs are listed as scheduled tribes. The Scheduled Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). However, we found no evidence of Mikir representation in the cabinet. [1947-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1255) there are 548,000 Mikirs in India. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,093 million in 2002. [0.0005]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1255), most Mikirs reside in their homeland, Karbi Anglong, in the northeastern state of Assam. Karbi Anglong covers southern parts of Assam, and in particular the Karbi Anglong, West Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hill districts of Assam (note: in the latter, the Masas make up a relative majority, see Minahan 2002 : 1207). According to Minahan, while more than 50% of the Mikirs reside in their homeland, they make up but 43% there. This is marginally below the threshold. It is possible that the threshold was fulfilled if we considered an alternatively defined territory, but this is the most detailed data we could find. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Found no evidence. [no kin]

**Sources**

Baruah, Sanjib (1999). *India against Itself. Assam and the Politics of Nationality.* Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press.

Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa (2012). “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language Movement.” *Mainstream* L(9). <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html> [July 25, 2014].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Centre for Development and Peace Studies. “Militant Groups Profile”. <http://cdpsindia.org/assam/militant-groups-profile-2/> [August 11, 2022].

Choudhury, Lutfur Rahman (2014). “Ethnic Identity Question and the Autonomy Movement in Karbi Anglong.” *A Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2(3): 207-216. <https://www.thecho.in/files/Lutfur-Rahman-Choudhury_mp6q0gin.pdf> [December 1, 2014].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hewitt, Joseph J., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) (2008). *Peace and Conflict 2008.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

India – Constitution – Schedules. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/in01000_.html> [December 2, 2014].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laishram, Dhanabir (2013). “Autonomous District Council in NE India, Boon or Curse.” *Manipur Times.* <http://www.manipurtimes.com/news-article/116-the-people-chronicle-article/302-autonomous-district-council-in-ne-india-boon-or-curse> [July 16, 2014].

Leivon, Jimmy (2021). “Alienation of Naga Ancestral Land with Proposed Karbi-Anglong Territorial Council not Acceptable: NSCN-IM.” *Indian Express.* June 7. <https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/manipur/alienation-of-naga-ancestral-land-with-proposed-karbi-anglong-territorial-council-not-acceptable-nscn-im-7348352/> [August 11, 2022].

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [October 26, 2013].

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1255-1260.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). “Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Resistance Force (KNPR). <http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4451> [February 03, 2014].

Peace Agreement Database (PA-X). “Karbi Anglong Agreement”. <https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/2391/Karbi%20Anglong%20Agreement> [August 11, 2022].

Prakash, Col Ved (2007). *Encyclopedia of North-East India.* New Delhi: Atlantic.

Prudaite, Lal (2005). “Mizoram.” In: Mayumi Murayama, Kyoko Inoue, and Sanjoy Hazarika (eds.), *Sub-Regional Relations in Eastern South Asia: With Special Focus on India’s North Eastern Region,* 153-240. Chiba: IDE-JETRO.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Saha, Abhishek (2021). “Explained: The Significance of Militants’ Surrender in Assam, and History of Karbi Insurgency.” *Indian Express.* February, 25. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-significance-of-militants-surrender-in-assam-and-history-of-karbi-insurgency-7203011/> [August 11, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) – Terrorist Group of Assam.” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/knv.htm> [February 03, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS).” <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/upds.htm> [August 11, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “UPDS Accord”. <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/documents/papers/UPDS_accord.htm> [August 11, 2022].

Swarup, Mridushi (2011). “Protection of Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution: Promise and Performance.” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1790922> [July 16, 2014].

Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC). “India - Terrorist, insurgent and extremist groups.” https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/india [June 23, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Mizos

Activity: 1947-1986

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1946, the Mizo Union was formed (initially named the Mizo Common People’s Union). While the Mizo Union favored remaining in India, a secessionist group, the United Mizo Freedom Organisation (UMFO), split from the Mizo Union in July 1947 (Prudaite 2005: 161-162). Thus, 1947 is coded as start date.
* It is not fully clear to what extent the UMFO agitated for separate independence after the petition, but it seems some self-determination agitation continued (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR; Patnaik 2008; Prudaite 2005; Vasundhara 2013).
* In 1953, after the creation of the Mizo Autonomous District Council, the UMFO began to call for statehood (Prudaite 2005: 164).
* The Mizo National Famine Front was founded in 1959 to combat the famine in the area. In 1961 it changed its name to the Mizo National Front (MNF), and thus became a political organization. The MNF declared independence as its goal.
* In 1966 the MNF led an insurgency against the government and declared independence (Prudaite 2005: 165). In 1986, when a peace accord was signed and Mizoram was granted statehood, the MNF officially renounced the goal of secession and it transformed into a political party. There appears to be little contention for self-determination beyond 1986. According to Minahan (2016: 277) many Mizos still support rebel movements for the unification of all Mizos in an independent state. According to Roth (2015: 332), the MNF has achieved poor results lately and therefore, ‘demands for independence are on hold’. While not all Mizos seem to be happy about Mizoram’s borders, since 1986 there has not been organized political activity around the issue (Prudaite 2005: 165). Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1986. [start date: 1946; end date: 1986]
* Note: At present, there appears to be some insurgency in Mizoram, but it is in relation to the Brus, Reangs and Hmars groups which are not coded here. In Mizoram, different insurgent groups were formed to defend the interest of the respective communities: Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram (BLFM), Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), the Hmar People’s Convention- Democratic (HPC-D) and the Singlung People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). While some of these insurgent groups became dormant, there are still acts of sporadic violence in the state (Financial Express 2021).

**Dominant claim**

* In 1946, the Mizo Union was formed (initially named the Mizo Common People’s Union). While the Mizo Union favored remaining in India, a secessionist group, the United Mizo Freedom Organisation (UMFO), split from the Mizo Union in July 1947 (Prudaite 2005: 161-162). It is not fully clear to what extent the UMFO continued to agitate for separate independence after the partition; given the ambiguity we code the most radical claim, independence. In 1953, after the creation of the Mizo Autonomous District Council, the UMFO began to call for statehood (Prudaite 2005: 164). Based on this, we code an independence claim until and including 1953 (first of January rule), and a sub-state secession claim as of 1954. [1947-1953: independence claim; 1954-1961: sub-state secession claim]
* The Mizo National Famine Front was founded in 1959 to combat the famine in the area. It received very significant support. In 1961 it changed its name to the Mizo National Front (MNF), and thus became a political organization. The MNF declared independence as its goal. In 1966 the MNF led an insurgency against the government and declared independence (Prudaite 2005: 165). In 1986, when a peace accord was signed and Mizoram was granted statehood, the MNF officially renounced the goal of secession and it transformed into a political party. Based on this, we code an independence claim from 1962 to 1986 (first of January rule). [1962-1986: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date1: 1947; end date1: 1953; start date2: 1961; end date2: 1986]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Mizos is the Indian state Mizoram (Roth 2015: 332). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* After the capture of Aizwam, Mizo rebel leaders declared the independence of Mizoram on July 6, 1966 (Minahan 2002: 1271; Prudaite 2005: 165). [1966: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Both UCDP/PRIO and Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) suggest the start of a low-level insurgency in 1966. There is disagreement about the duration of the rebellion in different sources, however, with UCDP/PRIO coding the armed conflict as active only until 1968 while MAR’s rebellion score is four or higher until 1984, which points to small- to large-scale guerilla activity. Marschall & Gurr (2003) also suggest continued violence until 1984.
* Qualitative evidence from Minahan (2002: 1272) corroborates that the insurgency continued until the 1980s, but suggests that there was a cease-fire in place in 1976-1979. More details can be found in a report by the University of Central Arkansas, which suggests that there were two phases to the conflict. The first lasted from 1966-1976, in which a total of 1,400 people were killed (no annual casualties are included). The conflict resumed in 1979 and between 1979 and 1980 a total of 100 people were killed. A peace agreement was then concluded in 1986, but no substantial violence is reported in 1981-1986.
* Based on this, we code two LVIOLSD phases: 1966-1976 and 1979-1980. [1947-1965: NVIOLSD; 1966-1976: LVIOLSD; 1977-1978: NVIOLSD; 1979-1980: LVIOLSD 1981-1986: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Mizo tribal areas were conquered by the North-Indian Assamese in the early 19th century. The conquerors left the Mizos to live their traditional lives and extended rule through local chiefs. The British took over the region soon afterwards, and the Mizo Hills became a part of Britain in 1895. In 1936, the Lushan Hills (Mizo homeland) were officially declared an “excluded area”. Excluded areas were allowed to retain a certain limited extent of autonomy and led to scheduled tribe status, which implies the protection of tribal culture; the 1936 act confirmed a long-standing practice of indirect rule (Pudaite 2005: 158). We found no evidence for a concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Upon independence, a Mizo advisory council was set up. It seems that its powers were limited and hence we do not code a concession (Prudaite 2005: 162). Note that the Mizos had already enjoyed a certain degree of cultural protection due to their recognition as a scheduled tribe in 1936.
* In November 1949, the Indian Constitution and with it the Sixth Schedule was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including one for the Mizos (India – Constitution – Schedules). The autonomous district councils became functional in 1952. Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural autonomy (Prudaite 2005: 162-163). [1949: autonomy concession]
* In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language. The Mizo language was denied a separate status (Bhattacharjee 2012). [1960: cultural rights restriction]
* After riots, Assam’s language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105). [1961: cultural rights concession]
* In 1966, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act was applied to Mizo areas. In line with the codebook, the declaration of a state of emergency is not coded.
* In 1971 it was decided that Mizoram would be separated from Assam and become a union territory. The change was implemented in 1972 (Cunningham 2014: 212; Minahan 2012). Union territories are ruled directly by the central government, but do have a certain extent of autonomy since 1963 (Kumar 1991: 48-61). Separation from Assam was a major goal of the Mizo movement. [1971: autonomy concession]
* In 1976, the Mizo rebels accepted an offer of increased autonomy. This ended the violent conflict (e.g., University of Central Arkansas n.d.). But the ceasefire broke down three years later (Minahan 2002: 1272). [1976: autonomy concession]
* In May 1977, president’s rule was imposed upon Mizoram (Sinha 2007: 95). [1977: autonomy restriction]
* In June 1978, president’s rule was lifted. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* Shortly thereafter, in November 1978, Delhi again imposed president’s rule (Sinha 2007: 96-97). [1978: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in May 1979. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In 1980, Mizoram was declared a “disturbed area” (Minahan 2012: 1272). The declaration of a state of emergency is not coded in line with the codebook.
* In 1986, an agreement for statehood was reached. The peace agreement was implemented in early 1987, when Mizoram became a full-fledged Indian state (Minahan 2012: 1972). [1986: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* See under major territorial changes. [1953-1986: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, Mizoram became part of India, implying a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* In November 1949, the Indian Constitution and with it the Sixth Schedule was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including one for the Mizos. The autonomous district councils became functional in 1952. Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural autonomy. The first elections were held in 1952 (Prudaite 2005: 162-163). [1952: establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 1972, Mizoram was separated from Assam and became a union territory (Minahan 2012). Union territories are ruled directly by the central government, but do have a certain extent of autonomy since 1963 (Kumar 1991: 48-61). [1972: sub-state secession]
* In 1987 Mizoram attained statehood, implying much-increased autonomy. However, Mizoram was separated from Assam already in 1972. Moreover, the movement ended in 1986. Hence, we do not code a major change.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Mizos |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Mizo |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75012000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1268) an absolute majority of the Mizos lives in Mizoram, where they comprise an absolute majority. This matches with information from GeoEPR and MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR, the Mizos have ethnic kin in neighboring Myanmar. Myanmar gained independence only in 1948, but in line with the codebook we code kin throughout.
  + This matches with MAR, according to which the Mizos have “close kindred in more than one country which adjoins it regional base”. MAR mentions the Chin in Myanmar and the Jumma (Chittagong Hills People) in Bangladesh as the two largest kin groups. Myanmar and Bangladesh are also the two countries with Mizo communities mentioned by Minahan (2002: 1268). [1947-1986: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

**Sources**

Baruah, Sanjib (1999). *India against Itself. Assam and the Politics of Nationality.* Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press.

Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa (2012). “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language Movement.” *Mainstream* L(9). <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html> [July 25, 2014].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher (2014). *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Financial Express (2021). “Insurgencies of the North East (Part II); The Naga Tribes Always Had Socio-Economic and Political Links with Tribes in Assam and Myanmar”. November 18. Nexis. [29 July, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 30.

India – Constitution – Schedules. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/in01000_.html> [December 2, 2014].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [March 25, 2002].

Kumar, Sudhir (1991). *Political and Administrative Setup Union Territories in India.* New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p.59.

Miller, Michelle A (2012). *Autonomy and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 368-370.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1268-1274.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Patnaik, Jagadish K. (2008). *Mirzoram, Dimensions and Perspectives: Society, Economy, and Polity*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Prudaite, Lal (2005). “Mizoram.” In: Mayumi Murayama, Kyoko Inoue, and Sanjoy Hazarika (eds.), *Sub-Regional Relations in Eastern South Asia: With Special Focus on India’s North Eastern Region,* 153-240. Chiba: IDE-JETRO.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Sinha, S.P. (2007). *Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India’s Response.* New Delhi: Lancer Publishers.

University of Central Arkansas (n.d.). “India/Mizos (1961-present).” <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indiamizos-1960-present/> [May 11, 2023].

Vasundhara, Sirnate, and Rahul Verma (2013). “From Insurgency to Electoral Democracy.” *The Hindu.* November 30. [http://www.thehindu.com/  
todays-paper/tp-opinion/from-insurgency-to-electoral-democracy/article5406379.ece](http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/from-insurgency-to-electoral-democracy/article5406379.ece) [June 30, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Nagas

Activity: 1947-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1929 Naga leaders demanded the unification of several Naga districts of India and Burma under a separate administration and asked for a promise by the British that the Nagas would be granted separate independence should the British ever leave India. The British did not respond to these claims, which prompted a Naga rebellion that continued until WWII (Minahan 2002: 1330). In 1942 the Japanese invaded northeast India. They sought to win dissident Nagas with promises of independence, and some Naga leaders collaborated, which divided the national movement. In 1945, the Naga National Council (NNC), an organization that had been formed during WWII to promote Naga interests, opened negotiations on separate independence. In August 1947 it proclaimed Naga independent.
* In sum, the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found is in 1929, thus the start date. In the data set, we begin to code the movement in 1947, the year of India’s independence. From Minahan (2002: 1330) it appears that the Nagas were involved in a rebellion from 1929 until the start of WWII (“Outraged at the British failure to reply, several of the Nagas rebelled; the resulting disturbances continued until World War II”). Note: we could not find casualty estimates, but tentatively code this period as prior separatist violence. There was, however, no ongoing rebellion in 1946/1947. Thus, we note that activity immediately before 1947 was non-violent.
* The movement is ongoing (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 1996, 2002; 2016; Roth 2015; MAR; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Minority Rights Group International). [start date: 1929; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* We code an independence claim in 1947-1975 based on the following:
  + Upon independence Naga leaders declared independence (see above). Franke (and others, see Franke 2006: 77, 212) estimate that by 1949, a majority at least within the Naga National Council (NNC), the most important Naga self-determination organization, favored immediate independence. In 1956, the NNC set up a parallel government.
  + In 1957, a faction of the NNC was co-opted and subsequently formed another, more moderate Naga self-determination organization, the Naga People’s Convention (NPC). The NPC demanded separation from Assam and unification of Nagaland under central rule (Franke 2006: 78). The NPC does not, however, appear to have had majority support within the Naga movement.
* Over the years, demands shifted to towards increasing Nagaland’s autonomy and the incorporation of additional territories. The latter is the more radical claim and therefore coded here (Minorities at Risk Project). We use 1975 as the cut-off as this is when the Naga National Council agreed to keep the solution of the Naga question within the Indian framework (Kotwal 2000: 758).
* Importantly, independence claims have continued along autonomy claims. For example, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formed in 1980 with the aim of establishing a Maoist Greater Nagaland (SATP; Roth 2015: 331). Minahan (2016: 291) reports that the majority of Nagas supports independence, but this is not supported by other sources (e.g., see Assam Tribune 2022). [1947-1975: independence claim; 1976-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. Note: it is somewhat ambiguous whether to code the start date in 1929 or later because the main claim was for autonomy within colonial India. In 1947, the Nagas declared independence, which unambiguously initiated the independence movement. [start date: 1929; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Nagas, also called Greater Nagaland (“Naga Lim”), consists of the following regions in India: the Nagaland State, the Maram and Tamma districts of Manipur State, the eastern districts of Assam, Ledo District of Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore, the Naga Hills District of Sagaing Division of Myanmar is also part of the claimed Greater Nagaland (Minahan 1996: 386; Minahan 2002: 1332). However, as the SDM dataset does not cover cross-border claims, we code only the territory within India, based on a map by Kashyap (2017).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On August 14, 1947, the Naga leaders of the NNC declared Nagaland independent of India and Burma, one day before the date set for Indian independence (Chasie and and Hazarika 2009: 4; Kotwal 2000: 756; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 201). [1947: independence declaration]
* March 22, 1956, the Naga National Council set up a parallel government – the Federal Government of Nagaland – and hoisted up its flag (Kotwal 2000: 1958). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 201) note that there was also a declaration that Nagaland is a sovereign republic. [1956: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Nagas were involved in low-level violence in the post-1947 phase, but different sources differ on periods of peace and war.
  + UCDP/PRIO reports minor war in the following years: from 1956-1959, 1961-1968, 1992-1997, and in 2000.
  + Other sources suggest much more extensive dates, however. First, Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) indicate LVIOLSD from 1952-1964 and 1972-2001. Second, the MAR rebellion score is four or even five (indicating small-scale/intermediate guerilla activity) in 1955-1964, 1970-1974, 1985-1996 and in 1999-2000.
* We investigated this case further using qualitative sources. We found evidence to suggest that there were highly substantial casualty rates in many, if not all, years between 1956 and 2001. Specifically, a case study by the University of Central Arkansas suggests that there were around 4,000 casualties between 1956 and 1964. The report suggests that the rebels and the government started to negotiate in 1964, but that significant violence continued and that another 4,000 ended up dead by 1972. The report suggests continued significant violence between 1973 and 2001, with a total tally of 17,000 dead. No annual figures are provided, but the report includes qualitative accounts of attacks with casualties in most years. On that basis, we code LVIOLSD in 1956-2001. It is possible that the HVIOLSD threshold was met in some of the years, but the evidence is too thin.
* This leaves whether the start of the insurgency should be coded in 1952 (as suggested by Marschall & Gurr) or 1956 (as suggested by UCDP/PRIO).
  + We found some indications that violence emerged before 1956. For example, Minahan (2002: 1331) reports that the Nagas had rebelled already in 1955. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 201) similarly suggest that “open warfare” began in 1955.
  + The more detailed account in Srikanth & Thomas (2005: 62) suggests that the Naga held a unilateral independence referendum in 1951, which caused state authorities to raid the houses of Naga leaders and ban Naga newspapers. The Nagas then started a civil disobedience movement in 1952 and soon started a violent insurrection, which became increasingly virulent after 1956.
  + According to Thakker & Singh (2019), India sent its forces to Naga areas in 1952, which kicked off the insurgency. Yet, Chasie and Hazarika (2009: 8) suggest that the Nagas were largely peaceful until at least 1953.
* Overall, there are some indications that violence emerged before 1956, but it appears to have been limited and likely below the casualty threshold (though we could not find precise casualty estimates). Based on this, we code LVIOLSD starting in 1956-2001.
* 2002-2020 is coded as NVIOLSD. According to UCDP, the organizations related to the Naga movement were involved in significant inter-factional clashes throughout the period, but clashes with government forces were more rare. Information on SATP confirms UCDP’s account. The University of Central Arkansas report cites a figure of around 800 dead after 2001, but only very few are security personnel, which provides further confirmation that separatist violence as defined here largely ended after 2001.
  + UCDP/PRIO codes a separatist armed conflict over Western South East Asia in 2015-2018. The rebel group, United National Liberation Front of Western South East India, consists an alliance out of rebel groups from various SDMs including the Assamese (ULFA-I), the Nagas (NSCN-K), the Rajbangsis (KLO), the Bodos (NDFB-S), the Garos (GNLA), and the Manipuris (UNLF, KCP, and PREPAK). UCDP/PRIO codes 161 battle-related deaths in 2015, and 27-47 in 2016-2018. UCDP does not provide disaggregated fatality counts. Based on SATP, the 25-deaths threshold is not met for 2015-2018, so we code these years as NVIOLSD.
* [1947-1955: NVIOLSD; 1956-2001: LVIOLSD; 2002-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Nagas once occupied a much wider area than at present, but gradually lost the lowlands to successive waves of invaders. The Naga tribes, often warring among themselves, never developed a state system (Minahan 2002: 1329). The British made first contact with the Nagas in 1832. The encounter was violent, which prompted the British to withdraw and ignore the Nagas for nearly two decades. After much conflict, the various Naga chiefs signed treaties with the British in 1881 that allowed the British to add their tribal lands to the colonial governments of Assam and Burma (Minahan 2002: 1330). In a memorandum sent to the Simon Commission, the Nagas had demanded to remain under direct British rule – the British failed to respond (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 3). In 1935, the Nagas were excluded from the Indian reform scheme and treated as an “excluded area” (Kotwal 2000: 754; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 201). Excluded areas were allowed to retain a certain limited extent of autonomy and led to scheduled tribe status, which implies the protection of tribal culture (Pudaite 2005: 158).
* Upon India’s independence, the Nagas were contending for separate independence. In 1947 (1945 according to Minahan 2002: 1330, but Minahan seems mistaken; see Kotwal 2000: 756), Gandhi met with Naga leaders and, according to the Naga side, declared that “I do not believe in forced unions. If you [Nagas] do not wish to join the Union of India, nobody will force you to do that” (Minahan 2002: 1330). Whether Gandhi actually made this statement is ambiguous, as Kotwal (2000: 756) argues that no Indian leader ever confirmed Gandhi’s statement. In any case, the new Indian government refused to recognize Naga independence and sent in the army to crush the separatist movement. In late June 1947, shortly before India’s formal independence, the then-governor of Assam and representatives of the Naga National Council signed the Hydari Agreement (see SATP). The agreement gave the Nagas relatively far-reaching autonomy within Assam (with judicial, executive, and legislative competencies; in particular, land and taxation matters were put in the hands of the Nagas). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 1947 due to the set-up of an autonomous region within Assam. Note that the Nagas interpreted the agreement as giving them the right to secede from India within the next ten years. This interpretation was disputed from the Indian side (Franke 2006: 212; Kotwal 2000: 757). [1947: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Beginning in 1953, the Assamese and the central government passed a series of “security” laws which aimed to legitimize the (violent) counter-insurgency against the Nagas. The regulations constitute severe restrictions of the Naga’s physical integrity rights, but also included restrictions of ethnic rights.
  + In 1953 the Assamese government enacted the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous Districts) Act (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 5). The provisions were sweeping and, among other things, affected the freedom of movement and freedom of association as well as the right to physical integrity. Following the 1953 act, an executing officer needs no proof except his own personal “opinion” to proceed against a suspect. Inhabitants of an “area” could also be “collectively” fined in any manner that the “authority” thought fit. Police could arrest without warrant. No suits or other legal proceedings were allowed against any officer acting under the act (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 9-10). In addition, all Naga tribal councils and courts were dismissed (p. 5; also see: Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 201). [1953: autonomy restriction]
  + In 1955, the security law was tightened again. The 1955 act allowed the Assamese government to declare any area “disturbed”; furthermore it allowed any magistrate or police officer of sub-inspector rank to fire upon or use force to the extent of causing death, if he “thinks” such a step is necessary to maintain “public order” (for more see Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 10).
  + In 1958 the Indian government enacted the Armed Forces Act, which allowed the security forces wide powers in Nagaland, which were widely abused (Minahan 2002: 1331; Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 6).
  + In 1961 the Nagaland Security Regulation Act was passed. The act put more sweeping powers in the hands of police and civilian authorities, including the rights to using force to the causing of death if an officer suspects a person was likely to commit an act of “looting” in a riotous situation; control the production, sale, and purchase of any commodity – including transport, modification, repair, etc.; evict any person from their own property, which could be confiscated/requisitioned; enable the governor to take a range of additional actions, which included the arbitrary relocation of villages (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 12).
  + In 1995, the Indian government declared the state of Nagaland a “disturbed area”, thus empowering the armed forces to take drastic measures to regain control (Minahan 2002: 1332).
* In 1957, an agreement was reached between Naga leaders and the Indian government. The agreement involved the creation of a single separate region of the Naga Hills, the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA). The NHTA was separated from Assam and became a union territory directly administered by the central government, but with a large degree of autonomy (Kumar 2007: 19). [1957: autonomy concession]
* In 1960, India signed an agreement with the Naga People’s Convention (NPC), one of the Naga organizations contending for increased self-determination. The 16-point agreement stipulated that Nagaland would become a fully-fledged Indian state within three years (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 16). In December 1963, Nagaland became inaugurated as an Indian state (with special rights: customary laws would continue to be applicable and laws passed by Parliament do not apply to the state unless ratified by the local legislature, see Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 16). [1960: autonomy concession]
  + Note that the Naga National Council (NNC) and its leader, Phizo, considered the agreement invalid. Note also that the Naga state did not include all areas claimed by the NNC (Franke 2002: 78; Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 16).
* In 1975, the first pro-separatist government in Nagaland was dismissed by the central government and president’s rule imposed (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 17; Hoshi 2013). [1975: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in 1977 (Hoshi 2013). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In August 1988, president’s rule was imposed in Nagaland (Hoshi 2013). [1988: autonomy restriction]
* In January 1989, president’s rule was lifted (Hoshi 2013). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was again imposed upon Nagaland in April 1992 (Hoshi 2013). [1992: autonomy restriction]
* President’s lasted until April 1993 (Hoshi 2013). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In January 2008, president’s rule was again imposed upon Nagaland (Hoshi 2013). Yet, it was lifted already in March 2008, less than two months after the imposition (Hoshi 2013). In line with the codebook, we do not code a restriction.
* In August 2015, the Indian government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM) signed a framework agreement. Negotiations on the final agreement were ongoing by end of 2020 (Pisharoy 2020). Therefore, it remains unclear to what extent the accord will honor the Nagas’ claim for the integration of all the Naga areas into Nagaland (Kikhi 2020). We do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Shortly before independence in 1947 the Nagas were granted autonomy within Assam, in 1957 Nagaland became a union territory separate from Assam and with a large degree of autonomy, and in 1963 Nagaland became a fully-fledged Indian state (see above). Based on this, we code regional autonomy from 1947 onwards (autonomy was established with independence, thus the first of January rule is not applicable). [1947-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, Nagaland became part of India, implying a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* In late June 1947, shortly before India’s formal independence, the then-governor of Assam and representatives of the Naga National Council signed the Hydari Agreement (see SATP). The agreement gave the Nagas relatively far-reaching autonomy within Assam (with judicial, executive, and legislative competencies; in particular, land and taxation matters were put in the hands of the Nagas). [1947: establishment of autonomy]
* In 1957, an agreement was reached between Naga leaders and the Indian government. The agreement involved the creation of a single separate region of the Naga Hills, the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA). The NHTA was separated from Assam and became a union territory directly administered by the central government, but with a large degree of autonomy (Kumar 2007: 19). In 1963, the area became a fully-fledged Indian state. [1957: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Nagas |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Naga |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75014000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1947-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.002]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1328), an absolute majority of the Nagas reside in Nagaland, where they comprise an absolute majority. This matches with information from GeoEPR, Weidmann (2009), and MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Both the Minorities at Risk data and Minahan (2002: 1328) note kin in neighboring Myanmar in the Naga Hills of the Sagaing Division. Information on the Naga population of Myanmar is very scarce and estimated to be at 200,000 (Kachin News 2009). Myanmar gained independence only in 1948, but in line with the codebook we code kin throughout. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

**Sources**

Assam Tribune (2022). “Naga People Have Rejected Gun Culture, Say NNPGs”. July 12. *Nexis.* [August 18, 2022].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chasie, Charles, and Sanjoy Hazarika (2009). *The State Strikes Back: India and the Naga Insurgency.* Washington, DC: East-West Center.

Franke, Marcus (2006). “Wars without End: The Case of the Naga Hills.” *Diogenes* 53(4): 59-84.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Gurr, Ted R. (2000). *Peoples versus States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, p. 198.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 201.

Hoshi, K. (2013). “Multi President’s Rule in Nagaland.” <http://www.easternmirrornagaland.com/2013/09/multi-presidents-rule-in-nagaland/> [July 18, 2014].

Kachin News (2009). “Appaling conditions in Naga Hills Region under Burmese junta.” April 30. http://www.kachinnews.com/articles/feature/815-appalling-conditions-in-naga-hills-region-under-burmese-junta.html [March 3, 2015].

Kashyap, Samudra Gupta (2017). “Why Thuingaleng Muivah’s new statement has dug up old fears, anger.” *Indian Express.* https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/why-thuingaleng-muivahs-new-statement-has-dug-up-old-fears-anger-assam-manipur-protest-4590030/.

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [March 25, 2002].

Kikhi, Kedilezo (2020). “The Naga Homeland Movement”. *Economic & Political Weekly* 55(23).

Kotwal, Dinesh (2000). “The Naga Insurgency: The Past and the Future.” *Strategic Analysis* 24(4): 751-72.

Kumar, B.B. (2007). “Ethnicity and Insurgency in India’s North-East.” In: B.B. Kumar (ed.), *Problems of Ethnicity in the North-East India*, 17-57. New Delhi: Astha Bharati.

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp.386-388.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1328-1333.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Pisharoy, Sangeeta Barooah (2020). “Four Reasons Why the NSCN(I-M) Released the Confidential Nagaland Framework Agreement.” *The Wire.* August 17. <https://thewire.in/politics/nagaland-framework-agreement-nscn-im> [August 18, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “National Socialist Council of Nagaland- Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM).” <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india-insurgencynortheast-nagaland/national-socialist-council-of-nagaland-isak-muivah-nscn-im> [August 18, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “The Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord, 1947.” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/nagaland/documents/papers/nagaland\_9point.htm [July 18, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. https://www.satp.org/terrorism-assessment/india-insurgencynortheast-nagaland [June 24, 2022].

Srikanth, H., and C.J. Thomas (2005). “Naga Resistance Movement and the Peace Process in Northeast India.” *Peace and Democracy in South Asia* 1(2): 57-87.

Thakker, Aman, and Kartikeya Singh (2019). “Nagaland’s Time: A States-Led Effort to Resolve the Naga Conflict.” <https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/nagalands-time-a-states-led-effort-to-resolve-the-naga-conflict/> [May 19, 2023].

The Sentinel (2022). “Assam CM’s Role in Naga Peace Talks”. June 05. *Nexis.* [August 18, 2022].

University of Central Arkansas (n.d.). “India/Nagas (1947-present).” https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indianagas-1947-present/ [May 11, 2023].

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* https://ucdp.uu.se/?id=1&id=1 [November 9, 2021].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Weidmann, Nils B. (2009). “Geography as Motivation and Opportunity: Group Concentration and Ethnic Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 526-543.

## Pangals

Activity: 1993-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Meitei Pangal are the Muslim minority in the state of Manipur. Ethnic and religious tensions in Manipur increased and around 150 Pangals were killed in riots in 1993. Several Pangal self-defence groups were subsequently formed, among them the PULF (People’s United Liberation Front). The start date is thus coded as 1993. Apart from protection of the Muslim minority, the PULF also stated their wish to create an 'Islamic State' in the Northeast. The first recorded attacks on government targets occurred in 2004, while only very little had been known about the PULF’s activities in the ten years before. Attacks have continued and intensified since. SATP reports PULF as an active terrorist group, thus we code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1993; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The main organization associated with the movement, the PULF (People’s United Liberation Front) aims at the creation of an independent Islamic state in India’s north-east. Apart from this, they also pursue religious/cultural (Islamist) aims (SATP). [1993-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1993; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The predominant claim of this movement seems to concern Pangal-inhabited areas in Manipur. However, the PULF has also stated its wish to create an ‘Islamic State’ in the Northeast, which would extend beyond Manipur. We were unable to find information on exactly what areas are claimed by the movement, so we flag this claim as ambiguous and code five districts with significant Pangal populations as an approximation. These districts are Imphal East, Thoubal, Bishenpur, Chandel, Churachandpur, which we code based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* According to UCDP/PRIO, the conflict involving PULF reached the 25 battle deaths threshold in 2008, thus 2008 is coded with LVIOLSD. All other years are coded with NVIOLSD since even if there was violence, the threshold for LVIOLSD was not met (SATP; UCDP/PRIO). [1993-2007: NVIOLSD; 2008: LVIOLSD; 2009-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Pangals (Muslims in Manipur) settled in Manipur in the 16th or 17th century, coming from Bengal (hence the name). They adopted the Meithei language and social structure. Manipur was granted statehood in 1972. The Pangals have not been given scheduled tribes status by the union government (Irene 2010: 220). The Pangals do not appear discriminated against (politically) in Manipur, at least in recent history. In 1992, Meithei (the language spoken by Pangals as well as non-Muslim Manipuris) was included in the 8th schedule to India’s constitution (Minahan 2012: 187). This implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [1992: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Pangals have participated in Manipur’s regional government. Irene (2010: 235) notes that the first Chief Minister of Manipur (after Manipur had attained statehood in 1972), Mohammed Alimuddin, was a Muslim Meithei and thus a Pangal. Moreover, the Pangals have had sporadic representation in the state’s cabinet (e.g. Irene 2010: 223). Also, the Pangals have roughly proportional representation in the regional assembly. Still the evidence appears insufficient to warrant a regional autonomy code. The Pangals make up only about 8% of the local population, and their influence over the regional government appears weak. Since we do not code the Pangals as participants in the regional government, we also do not code changes in Manipur’ autonomy levels as concessions or restrictions.
* In 2018, an agreement was reached between the Chief Minister of Manipur and the All Manipur Muslim United Clubs' Organisation (AMMUCO) regarding nine demands made by the organization. The Chief Minister agreed to grant five out of the nine demands made by AMMUCO. This included the introduction of a Meitei-Pangal programme to be aired on All India Radio (Imphal Free Press 2018). [2018: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Pangals |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Manipuri |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75010000 |

**Power access**

* The Pangals are Muslim Manipuris, thus they form part of the Manipuri. The Manipuri are coded as powerless throughout in EPR, and this applies to the Pangals, too. [1993-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the 2001 census, there were 190,939 Pangals (Irene 2010: 222). According to the 2001 census India’s population was 1,028,737,436. [0.0002]

**Regional concentration**

* The Pangals are concentrated in Manipur, yet they form but a small minority. 2001 census data (see http://manipuronline.tripod.com/feature/population.htm) suggests that Pangals can be found in five of Manipur’s nine districts (Imphal East, Thoubal, Bishenpur, Chandel, Churachandpur), some of them in the valley (where Meiteis/Manipuris dominate, see the respective entry), and some in the hills (where Nagas and Kukis dominate). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Muslim Manipuris in Bangladesh, but they number <100,000 (see Ethnologue; Joshua Project). [no kin]

**Sources**

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Ethnologue. „Meiti.“ https://www.ethnologue.com/language/mni [November 10, 2015].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Imphal Free Press (2018). “CM agrees to Fulfil some of the Demands made by AMMUCO”. November 12. *Nexis*. [August 10, 2022].

Irene, Salam (2010). *The Muslims of Manipur*. Delhi: Gyan Publishing House.

Joshua Project. “Meiti.” <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/13513> [November 10, 2015].

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “People’s United Liberation Front.” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist\_outfits/PULF.HTM [December 2, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Incidents and Statements Involving PULF: 1998-2012.” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/PULF_tl.htm> [March 7, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) – Yearly Fatalities.” <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-manipur_people-s-united-liberation-front-pulf> [June 24, 2022].

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* https://ucdp.uu.se/?id=1&id=1 [November 9, 2021].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Rabhas

Activity: 1980-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Rabhas are a Tibeto-Burman nation located in northeastern India. The incorporation in the state of Assam and years of Assamese dominance alienated the Rabhas, so that in 1950 the idea of separation from Assam was first pronounced by a group of Rabha students (Minahan 2002: 1561). The first instance of organized self-determination activity we found is the formation of the All Rabha Students Union (ARSU), an organization that mobilized for ethnic autonomy, in 1980 (Das 2012: 4-5). The start date is thus pegged at 1980. The Rabha National Security Force (RNSF) was formed in the mid-1990s, after over a decade of persistent conflict between government officials and Rhaba students over autonomy. The RNSF is no longer active, but the Rabha Viper Army and Rabha National Liberation Front (RNLF) have recently been active in fighting for Rabhaland. The movement is ongoing (Center for Development and Peace Studies; Das 2013; Das 2013; Minahan 2002; SATP; The Times of India 2013a, b; The Sentinel 2022). [start date: 1980; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Several sources suggest an autonomy claim (for an exception see Minahan 2002: 1562-1563). Among the most important organizations associated with the movement is the All Rabha Students Union (ARSU), an organization that was formed in 1980 and mobilized for ethnic autonomy (Das 2012b: 4-5). In 2003, a committee for inclusion in the sixth schedule (implying the creation of an autonomous district within Assam with significant autonomy) was formed (Das 2012b: 5). Also Das (2012a) suggests that the dominant demand is for 6th schedule status. Prakash (2007: 587) suggests an autonomy claim, too. Recent sources too show that the dominant demand is for 6th schedule status (The Sentinel 2022). The RNSF makes claims for separate statehood according to SATP, but this claim does not appear dominant. [1980-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan (2002: 1563; 2016: 350) indicates that the movement is split with an element agitating for independence. Roth (2015: 335) also briefly refers to independence claims; however, we could not independently verify this and the political significance of independence claims, to the extent they indeed exist, remains ambiguous. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Rabhas is primarily composed of the districts Goalpara, Bongaigaon, and Dhubri, which are the Rabha inhabited districts within the Assam state in northeastern India (Minahan 2002: 1558). This is the dominant territorial claim, although some nationalists also claim additional territories in adjacent areas of Meghalaya and West Bengal. We code the former claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The RNLF has been involved in violence, but casualties do not reach LVIOLSD levels. The Rabha Viper Army’s activities generally involve kinappings and extortion. Based on this, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Assam became a British protectorate in 1826. The Rabha territories formed part of British Bengal until 1874, after which they became a part of Assam protectorate (Minahan 2002: 1561). Upon independence, the Rabhas remained in the state of Assam and were listed as a scheduled tribe, a status that implies some protection of cultural rights and affirmative action (Minahan 2002: 1561; Swarup 2011). In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language. The Rhabas’ language was denied a separate status (Bhattacharjee 2012). After riots, Assam’s language law was changed in 1961 so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105). We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Choudhury (2014: 212), the Assamese government in 1986 passed a law that required Assamese as a compulsory “third language” in schools. We deem this too minimal to be coded as a restriction. At the same time, though, it is reported that there was a new regulation that made Assamese a requirement for obtaining any government job in Assam. [1986: cultural rights restriction]
* According to Das (2012a), the Rabha language was allowed to be taught as a subject up to the third year in 70 primary schools in Goalpara, Dbubri, and Bongaigaon districts in 1988. The source does not appear too reliable, though, thus no concession is coded.
* In 1995, the Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council was set up. Minahan (2002: 1562) cites the year 2000, but this was not the original legislation (which was in 1995). However, it does not seem that this implies some sort of actual autonomy. The Rabha autonomous council was not set up according to the 6th schedule of the constitution. The council has only limited executive powers and no legislative powers (Prakash 2007: 587). In an article in *The Hindu*’s weekly, the council is described as amounting to little more than an office in the region’s capital (Prabhakara 2005). We do not code a concession.
* In 2017, the Assam state government passed the Assam State Capital Region Development Authority (ASCRDA) Bill to set up a state capital region including Guwahati and surrounding areas (The Economic Times 2017). ARSU opposed the bill as the plan included areas under the areas under the Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council (Kalita 2018). Despite protests, the ASCRDA bill was passed and became an Act in 2018. As the Act includes areas in the tribal belt, we code this as a restriction. [2017: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Rabhas |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* The Rhabas are listed as a scheduled tribe. The Scheduled Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout in EPR. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). However, we found no evidence of Rhabas representation in the cabinet. [1980-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1255) there are approximately 310,000 Rhabas in India. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,093 million in 2002. [0.0003]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1558), a majority of the Rabhas resides in Rabha Hasong in the western part of the state of Assam. However, according to Minahan, they make up but 22% there. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Rabha are ethnically related to the Bodos, the Masas, and the Mikirs. None of these groups has numerically significant kin in other countries, and we found no kin for the Rabhas either. [no kin]

**Sources**

Baruah, Sanjib (1999). *India against Itself. Assam and the Politics of Nationality.* Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press.

Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa (2012). “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language Movement.” *Mainstream* L(9). <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html> [July 25, 2014].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Center for Development and Peace Studies. “United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).” <http://cdpsindia.org/assam_mgp.asp> [March 7, 2014].

Choudhury, Lutfur Rahman (2014). “Ethnic Identity Question and the Autonomy Movement in Karbi Anglong.” *A Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2(3): 207-216. <https://www.thecho.in/files/Lutfur-Rahman-Choudhury_mp6q0gin.pdf> [December 1, 2014].

Das, Dhrubajyoti (2012). “Ethno-Based Student’s Organization and Movement for Ethnic Autonomy in North-East India: Understing the Role of All Rabha Student’s Organization (ARSU) in the Movement for Rabha Ethnic Autonomy in Assam.” *Indian Streams Research Journal* 2(10): 1-7.

Das, Dhrubajyoti (2012a). “Reconstructing Ethno-Cultural Identity: A Study on the Assertion of Ethnic Identity of the Rabha Community in Assam (Specific Study Area: Goalpara District and South Kamrup).” *Global Research Methodology Journal* 6(3).

Das, Dhrubajyoti (2012b). “Ethno-Based Student’s Organization and Movement for Ethnic Autonomy in North-East India: Understing the Role of All Rabha Student’s Organization (ARSU) in the Movement for Rabha Ethnic Autonomy in Assam.” *Indian Streams Research Journal* 2(10): 1-7.

Das, Rani P. (2013). “Assam & Meghalaya: Threats of Violence in Garo Heartland.” *Early Warning and Conflict Alert Articles No 4192.* Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. <http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-early-warning-and-conflict-alert/conflict-early-warning-assam-meghalaya-threats-of-violence-in-garo-4192.html> [March 7, 2014].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kalita, Kulendu (2018). “Sonowal Taking Our Land: Rabha Union”. September 10. <https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/sonowal-taking-our-land-rabha-union/cid/1667219> [August 11, 2022].

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1558-1563.

Prabhakara, M.S. (2005). “Tribes: New and Old.” *Frontline* 22(1). <http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2201/stories/20050114002304100.htm> [December 3, 2014].

Prakash, Col Ved (2007). *Encyclopedia of North-East India.* New Delhi: Atlantic.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Rabha National Security Force (RNSF).” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist\_outfits/rnsf.htm [December 2, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam.” https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-assam\_rabha-viper-army-rva & https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india-insurgencynortheast-assam/rabha-national-security-force-rnsf & https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-assam\_rabha-national-liberation-front-rnlf & [June 24, 2022].

Swarup, Mridushi (2011). “Protection of Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution: Promise and Performance.” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1790922> [July 16, 2014].

The Economic Times (2017). “Assam forms 'State Capital Region' around Guwahati”. September 15. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/assam-forms-state-capital-region-around-guwahati/articleshow/60530837.cms> [August 11, 2022].

The Sentinel (2022). “Don't View us Politically, All Rabha Students' Union Tells Dispur”. January 7. *Nexis.* [August 11, 2022].

The Times of India (2013a). “Tribal Body to Move NHRC, NCST over Rabha Violence.” March 22. <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-03-22/guwahati/37936072_1_panchayat-polls-rabha-hasong-autonomous-council-rhac> [January 30, 2014].

The Times of India (2013b). “Violence in Rabha-Hasong Areas over Elections.” February 10. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/Violence-in-Rabha-Hasong-areas-over-elections/articleshow/18425545.cms> [March 7, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Rajbangsis

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The Rajbangsis are also known as Rajbangshis and Rojbangshis.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1966 an organization called All Koch Rajbanshi Student Union began to demand scheduled tribe status for the Rajbangsis (this would imply the protection of language and tribal culture as well as affirmative action). In 1969 the former ruler of a princely state demanded the formation of a separate Rajbangsi state (Das 2011). However, several sources note that organized agitation for a separate Rajbangsi state dates to the 1990s. In 1991, the Kamtapur Youth Organization was formed which made demands for a separate state (Barma 2007: 282). Since this is the first organization dedicated to a separate Rajbangsi state we found, this coded as the start date.
* Several additional Kamatapur organizations were formed in the following years, notably the Kamtapur Liberaton Front in 1993, the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) in 1995, and the Kamtapur People’s Party in 1996 (SATP; Barma 2007: 281-282).
* In 2020, the Kamatapur Autonomous Council was created (see concessions). Yet, Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (now proscribed by the Government) and the Koch-Ragbonshi National Convention have not given up on demands of a separate state (SATP; The Sentinel 2019; The Wire 2020; Minahan 2016: 223; Mitra 2022). Therefore, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1991: end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The movement that emerged in the early 1990s mainly demands a separate state, Kamatapur, to be carved out of West Bengal and Assam. Some elements in the militant wing of the movement (KLO) made also demands for independence, but this is not the dominant claim (Nandi 2014; Das 2011; Minahan 2002: 1567-1569; SATP; Barma 2007; The Sentinel 2019; Mitra 2022). [1991-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* According to Roth and Minahan, a small faction of the KLO demand independence (Roth 2015: 335; Minahan 2002: 1568). We could not verify this independently and the political significance of any independence claims, to the extent the exist, seems too small for us to code a secession movement. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kamatapur nationalists consists of the northern districts of the West Bengal State (Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, the plains of Darjeeling, North and South Dinajpur, and Malda), parts of Assam (Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Dhubri, and Goalpara), parts of Meghalaya (Western territories of West Garo Hills), as well as the Dinapur and Saidpur regions of Bangladesh (Minahan 2002: 1564). However, following SDM coding rules on cross-border claims, we only code those areas within India, based on Roth (2015: 328) and using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM 2019) for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Rajbangsi movement, in particular the KLO, was involved in the war that began in Assam in 1990. According to SATP (also see Prakash 2007: 484-493), the Kamatapur Liberation Organization has cooperated with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and was involved in armed struggle soon after its inception in 1995. However, we lack clear information on the violent activity of this group. From the sources we reviewed it appears that only a small number of the casualties are associated with the Rajbangsi insurgency. Therefore, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]
  + The first reported armed operation (jointly with ULFA) was in July 1999 (abduction of a tea garden owner). According to Minahan (2002: 1568) the KLO was involved in skirmishes with the Indian police in 2001-2002.
  + According to Prakash (2007: 76), the KLO is “the main source of violence” in North Bengal and has unleashed a “massive spate of violence” until 2003. However, the most detailed source we could find ­– SATP – attributes only a small number of casualties to the KLO.
  + More specifically, according to SATP, the KLO is associated with 5 fatalities in 2000, 1 in 2001, and 16 in 2002. 2003, 2004, 2006, 2012-2014, and 2016-2017 also saw fatalities, but the number was always below 25.
  + UCDP/PRIO codes a separatist armed conflict over Western South East Asia in 2015-2018. The rebel group, United National Liberation Front of Western South East India, consists an alliance out of rebel groups from various SDMs including the Assamese (ULFA-I), the Nagas (NSCN-K), the Rajbangsis (KLO), the Bodos (NDFB-S), the Garos (GNLA), and the Manipuris (UNLF, KCP, and PREPAK). UCDP/PRIO codes 161 battle-related deaths in 2015, and 27-47 in 2016-2018. UCDP does not provide disaggregated fatality counts. Based on SATP, the 25-deaths threshold is not met for the Rajbangsis (KLO) in 2015-2018, so we code these years as NVIOLSD.

**Historical context**

* The Rajbangsis established several small kingdoms at the foot of the Himalayas in the 13th century. These were consolidated into the Koch dynasty in 1511. Part of the kingdom was taken over by Muslim Mughals at the end of the 16th century. The remaining part survived as a small kingdom, Cooch Behar. Cooch Behar was incorporated into the British Empire as a princely state (Minahan 2012). Cooch Behar formally acceded India in 1949/1950 (sources differ) and became a district of West Bengal (Das 2011; Nandi 2014: 578). This implies a loss of autonomy.
* Today there are Rajbangsis in West Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya (Minahan 2002: 1564). The Rajbangsis were not recognized as a scheduled tribe (contrary to Minahan 2002: 1567; see Nandi 2014: 582; Das 2011). In Assam the Rajbangsis became subject to the Assamese’ assimilationist policies: in 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language. The Rajbangsis’ language was denied a separate status (Bhattacharjee 2012). After riots, Assam’s language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105).
* According to Choudhury (2014: 212), the Assamese government in 1986 passed a law that required Assamese as a compulsory “third language” in schools. We deem this too minimal to be coded as a restriction. At the same time, though, it is reported that there was a new regulation that made Assamese a requirement for obtaining any government job in Assam. [1986: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In September 2020, the Assam assembly passed the Kamatapur Autonomous Council Bill, 2020. In spite of some opposition concerning the name of the council, the Bill led to the creation of the Kamatapur Autonomous Council, including the Undivided Goalpara district and excluding the areas of the Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council and the Bodoland Territorial Council. [2020: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* In 2020, the Kamatapur Autonomous Council Bill was set up. Until then, the Rajbangsis clearly had no meaningful autonomy. Due to the 1 January rule, we do not code regional autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 2020, the Kamatapur Autonomous Council Bill was set up. Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). [2020: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Rajbangsis |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence suggesting that the Rajbangsis were included in the national government. [1991-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Nandi (2014: 582) the Rajbangsis have scheduled caste status, but Das (2011) notes that not all Rajbangsis have scheduled caste status. According to Minahan (2002: 1564) there are 2.645 million Rajbangsis in India, but Minahan (2016) cites a much higher number of 10-15 million for 2015. The latter, higher estimate is closer to what is reported in other sources: According to the Sentinel (2019), there are 70 lakh Rajbangsis in Assam (7 million) and according to the Indian Express, another 33 lakh in West Bengal (10.33), suggesting a total of 10.33 million across these two states. We use 12.5 mio – the middle range reported by Minahan (2016) as the total group size estimate. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1.31 billion in 2015. [0.0095]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1564) a majority of the Rajbangsis is located in North Bengal, but they do not comprise the absolute majority of the local population (only 48%). This is certainly borderline, and it is possible that a slightly different drawing would result in a higher number. Yet, Minahan is the best source we could find, thus we do not code the Rajbangsis as concentrated. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1564), there are around 200,000 Rajbangsis in Bangladesh and 105,000 in Nepal. [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Barma, Sukhbilas (2007). *Socio-Political Movements in North-Bengal (a Sub-Himalayan Tract)*. Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House.

Baruah, Sanjib (1999). *India against Itself. Assam and the Politics of Nationality.* Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press.

Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa (2012). “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language Movement.” *Mainstream* L(9). <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html> [July 25, 2014].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Choudhury, Lutfur Rahman (2014). “Ethnic Identity Question and the Autonomy Movement in Karbi Anglong.” *A Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2(3): 207-216. <https://www.thecho.in/files/Lutfur-Rahman-Choudhury_mp6q0gin.pdf> [December 1, 2014].

Das, Arup J (2001). “Kamatapur Movement: Taking Inspiration from the Past.” In: Chandan K. Sarma (ed.), *Souvenir. North East India History Association 29th Session,* 129-137. <http://www.kamatapur.com/sites/kamatapur.com/files/Kamatapur_Movement-Taking_Inspiration_from_the_Past.pdf> [July 4, 2014].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Laishram, Dhanabir (2013). “Autonomous District Council in NE India, Boon or Curse.” *Manipur Times.* <http://www.manipurtimes.com/news-article/116-the-people-chronicle-article/302-autonomous-district-council-in-ne-india-boon-or-curse> [July 16, 2014].

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1564-1569.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Mitra, Atri (2022). “A Spent Force, a Kamtapur Militant Outfit Speaks from the Periphery”. *Indian Express.* June 15. <https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/a-spent-force-a-kamtapur-militant-outfit-speaks-from-the-periphery-7968520/> [August 11, 2022].

Nandi, Rajib (2014). “ Spectacles of Ethnographic and Historical Imaginations: Kamatapur Movement and the Rajbanshi Quest to Rediscover their Past and Selves.” *History and Anthropology* 25(5): 571-591.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO).” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist\_outfits/klo.htm [January 30, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO) – Terrorist Group of Assam.” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/krlo.htm> [March 8, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) – Yearly Fatalities.” <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_kamtapur-liberation-organisation-klo> [June 24, 2022].

The Sentinel (2019). “Reaction to Kamatapur Autonomous Council for Koch Rajbongshis Mixed”. December 23. <https://www.sentinelassam.com/guwahati-city/reaction-to-kamatapur-autonomous-council-for-koch-rajbongshis-mixed/> [August 11, 2022].

The Wire (2020). “Assam Assembly Passes Bills To Create Three Separate Autonomous Councils”. September 4. <https://thewire.in/government/assam-assembly-passes-bills-to-create-three-separate-autonomous-councils> [August 11, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Reang

Activity: 1994-2005

**General notes**

* The Reang are also referred to as Bru.

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1273) a group called the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) began a violent campaign for autonomy in 1992. According to other sources (e.g., SATP), the BNLF was formed only in 1996. However, already before that, in 1994, another Reang organization, the Bru National Union (BNU) was formed (SATP). The BNU made claims for the establishment of an autonomous district in Mizoram under the sixth schedule of India’s constitution (Das 2010: 37; SATP). 1994 is therefore coded as the start date.
* SATP reports that the BNLF moderated its demand to a regional council with fewer powers in subsequent years (also see Grant 2013).
* In 2005, the BNLF signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Mizoram and dissolved (PA-X). In 2006, over 400 Bru militants belonging to the Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram (BLFM) surrendered to the Mizoram government (Hindustan Times 2006). Recent sources suggest that the Bru insurgency in Mizoram came to an end after the memorandum of understanding, and recent sources define the outfits as ‘Ex-Bru rebels’ (Assam Tribune 2018). This is further supported by the movement not being represented in Minahan (2016) or Roth (2015). Besides, SATP reports all the Bru militant outfits in Mizoram as inactive. While SATP mentions an increase in the recovery of arms and explosives by the security forces in 2021, these do not seem connected to Bru militant outfits. We found no other claims for self-determination after 2005, and so code an end to the movement in 2005. [start date: 1994; end date: 2005]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Das (2010: 37), Minahan (2002: 1273), Phadnis & Ganguly (2001) and SATP the Bru National Union (BNU) and the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) made claims the creation of an autonomous district in Mizoram under the sixth schedule. As the claim for an autonomous district council does not imply outright separation from Mizoram, we code an autonomy claim throughout. SATP reports that the BNLF moderated its demand to a regional council with fewer powers in subsequent years (also see Grant 2013). [1994-2005: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the BNU and the BNLF are the Bru inhabited areas in Mizoram (northeastern India), which form the Mamit district (Patnaik 2008: 81f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* According to SATP, there have been some casualties attributed to the BNLF but these fall below the LVIOLSD threshold, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Reang (Bru) received scheduled tribe status in 1950, a status that implies some protection of cultural rights and affirmative action (Swarup 2011; Siddiq 2014).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2005, the government of Mizoram and the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The understanding provided a start to the process of changing Reang to Bru in the Scheduled Tribe List, development programs and the inclusion of Bru voters in the Electoral Roll once they resettled in Mizoram (PA-X). We code a cultural rights concession due to the change of the name to Bru in the Scheduled Tribe List, which seems to be preferred by the group. [2005: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Reang |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* The Reang are listed as a scheduled tribe. The Scheduled Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). However, we found no evidence of Reang representation in the cabinet. [1994-2005: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the 2001 census, there were 165,103 Reangs in Tripura. There are also Reangs in the neighboring state of Mizoram; according to Minahan (2002: 1268) the Reangs make up approx. 6% of Mizoram’s population, which he puts at 911,000. There are also smaller communities in Assam and Manipur, but we were unable to find exact figures. We draw on the combined figure (approx. 220,000) and the total population of India according to the 2001 census as a referent for the group size (1,028,737,436). [0.0002]
  + Note: Ethnologue reports a slightly smaller number of 144,000 ethnic Reangs in India.

**Regional concentration**

* There are Reangs in both Tripuras and Mizoram (see above and Minahan 2002: 1268, 1915). Approx. 75% of all Reangs live in Tripuras, where they make up approx. 5% of the population. The Reang are mainly concentrated in Tripura’s northeastern part, though one can find substantial numbers of Reang in three of the four districts of Tripura. They do not make up an absolute majority in any of Tripuras’ four districts, though with 49% they come close in the northern district (Bera 2010: 59). We did not find more detailed data below the district level. Based on this, we code the Reang as not concentrated. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Reangs in other countries, but fewer than 100,000 (see Ethnologue). No other evidence for kin found. [no kin]

**Sources**

Asian Centre for Human Rights (2006). *India Human Rights Report 2006. Mizoram.* <http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/AR06/mizoram.htm> [December 3, 2014].

Assam Tribune (2018). “Ex-Bru Rebels Demand Fulfillment of Peace Accord”. August 2. *Nexis.* [August 17, 2022].

Bera, Gautam K. (2010). *The Land of Fourteen Gods.* New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Das, N.K. (2010). “Identity Politics and Social Exclusion in India’s North-East: The Case for Redistributive Justice.” 33-47. In: H. Bhattacharyya, P. Sarkar, and A. Kar, *The Politics of Social Exclusion in India. Democracy at the Crossroads* London: Routledge.

Ethnologue. “Riang.” <http://www.ethnologue.com/language/ria> & http://www.ethnologue.com/map/IN\_05 [November 10,2015].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Grant, Jaimie (2013). “As Displaced Bru Population Return to Indian Region, Instability Could Follow.” *IPI Global Observatory.* <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/10/as-displaced-bru-population-return-to-indian-region-instability-could-follow/> [December 3, 2014].

Hindustan Times (2006). “Over 400 Bru Militants Surrender in Mizoram”. October 23. *Nexis.* [August 17, 2022].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [March 25, 2002].

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p.64.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Patnaik, Jagadish K. (2008). *Mirzoram, Dimensions and Perspectives: Society, Economy, and Polity*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing.

Peace Agreements Database (PA-X). “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Mizoram and the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF)”. <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1836/Memorandum%20of%20Understanding%20Between%20the%20Government%20of%20Mizoram%20and%20the%20Bru%20National%20Liberation%20Front%20(BNLF)> [August 17, 2022].

Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2001). *Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia*. New Delhi: Sage.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Siddiqui, F. A. (2014). “Pushed to the Boundaries: The Brus of Mizoram.” *Hindustan Times,* February 23. <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pushed-to-the-boundaries/article1-1187282.aspx> [December 3, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) – Yearly Fatalities.” <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_bru-national-liberation-front-bnlf> [June 24, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Bru National Liberation Front.” [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/  
india/states/mizoram/terrorist\_outfits/BNLF.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/mizoram/terrorist_outfits/BNLF.htm) [December 12, 2013].

South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Tripura: Assessment- 2022”. <https://www.satp.org/terrorism-assessment/india-insurgencynortheast-tripura> [August 17, 2022].

Swarup, Mridushi (2011). “Protection of Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution: Promise and Performance.” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1790922> [July 16, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Santhals (Assam)

Activity: 1996-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to UCDP, the Santhals (also known as Adivasis, Hor, Santals or Sangtals) are India’s largest tribal group, with a population of approximately 10 million. Most Santhals are located in north-east India, mainly in Jharkhand, Assam, and West Bengals. The Santhals in Jharkhand are included under the header of the “Jharkhandis” movement, which aimed at the creation of a separate Jharkhand state. This movement refers to Santhals in Assam.
* The Santhals in Assam are migrants that came in mainly to work on tea plantations. In the 1980s and 1990s Assam’s Santhals were involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the Bodos that resulted from the Bodos’ desire for an autonomous homeland. There were Bodo campaigns to drive out the incoming Santhals, sometimes described as ethnic cleansing. In response, the Santhals organized and formed several militant outfits. They primarily fought the Bodos for land, but it appears they also made some separatist claims. Minahan (2002: 1650-1651), for instance, reports that the split-up of Assam (with Meghalaya, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunchal Pradesh separating in the 1960s/1970s) and the conflict with the Bodos triggered a Santhal separatist movement. According to Minahan (2002: 1651-1652) “Santhal leaders chalked out a plan to form a separate Santhal homeland in Assam by force. The proposed homeland, called Adivasiland, stretched from the Sankoch River in Kokrajhar District to the Panch River and the Indo-Bhutanese border to the southern railway line north of the Brahmaputra River.” Minahan also notes that the Santhals have demanded scheduled tribe status.
* Minorities at Risk, too, codes the Santhals with SEPX = 3, indicating an active separatist movement in the 1990s/2000s, but it is not clear whether this refers to the Santhals as a whole, only to the Santhals in Jharkhand (which we code under the header of the Jharkhandis) or only to the Santhals in Assam.
* That said, we found a number of Santhal militant groups in Assam, and at least some of them appear to have had separatist goals. First, the Birsa Commando Force (BCF), which was formed in 1996-1997. START classifies this group as “nationalist/separatist”, arguing that the BCF has demanded an independent state in Assam. CDPS India also notes that the creation of a separate Adivasi land ranges among the BCF’s claims. Hussain (2004) and Wars in the World (2012) as well confirm that the BCF is a rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam. Finally, Sentinel Assam (2013) also suggests that the BCF has had separatist goals. However, separatism appears not BCF’s primary goal. START notes that “the BCF is mostly a protection outfit for Santhals” and only “technically a separatist group.” In addition, the BCF has made claims for scheduled tribe status, which the Santhals in Assam lack. Scheduled tribe status does not necessarily imply autonomy, but always some limited form of cultural protection and positive discrimination. START reports that the BCF was mostly involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the Bodos.
* A second Santhal militant group is the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF), which also appears to have made some separatist claims. The ACF was formed in the second half of the 1990s “with the purported objective of protecting the Adivasi (tribal) people of Lower Assam through an armed revolution” (see SATP). START classifies the ACF as “nationalist/separatist”. However, according to START they “do not explicitly demand a separate state for Adivasis.” Hussain (2004) confirms that the Cobras are a rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam. Another Santhal outfit is the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), which was formed in 2006 and primarily demands scheduled tribe status for the Santhal community in Assam (SATP). The claim for scheduled tribe status is confirmed by CDPS India. Sentinel Assam (2013) and Wars in the World (2012), however, while confirming that the AANLA advocated schedule tribe status, suggest that the AANLA made claims also for a territorial council, which appears to mean an autonomous status within Assam.
* Another group that apparently has made separatist claims is the Adivasi People’s Army (APA) (Sentinel Assam 2013; Wars in the World 2012). Mohan (2011), for instance, suggests that APA demands the set-up of an Adivasi autonomous council in Assam. APA was formed in 2011 according to TRAC.
* There are many more Santhal outfits but it is not clear whether all have also espoused separatism. For instance, there is the National Santhali Liberation Army (NSLA), formed in 2005. This group represents an umbrella organization uniting several of the above-mentioned groups (CDPS India). The NSLA’s aims are not clear.
* In short, the Santhal militants in Assam appear to be mainly involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the Bodos, but have also made claims for scheduled tribe status and, in some cases, an autonomous status within Assam (which appears to be the dominant claim in terms of self-determination as we define it) or even separate statehood for the Santhals. Based on this, we code an active and ongoing movement. We peg the start date to 1996: the earliest evidence we found is the formation of the BCF in 1996-1997 and the formation of the ACF in “the second half of the 1990s”, see above.
* In 2012, APA, Adivasi Cobra Militants of Assam (ACMA), BCF, STF, and All Adivasi National Liberation Arm (AANLA) surrendered and started peace talks with the Indian government. In 2014, the Assam Home Secretary told The Hindu that NSLA was also willing to join the peace process by surrendering their arms (Centre for Development and Peace Studies). This is further confirmed by SATP which reports all the Santhals militant outfits in peace talks with the Indian government. We could not find recent sources reporting activity from these outfits. However, following the creation of three autonomous councils for Moran, Mottock and Koch Rajbongshi, Assam Tribune (2020) reports that the communities of tea plantations met to demand an autonomous council. To carry on their demand, the communities formed the committee ‘Tea Tribes Adivasi Autonomous Council Demand Committee, Assam’. Representatives of the All Adivasi Students’ Association of Assam and the Santal Students’ Union were present. Thus, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1996; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Santhal militants in Assam appear to be mainly involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the Bodos, but have also made claims for scheduled tribe status and, in some cases, an autonomous status within Assam (which appears to be the dominant claim in terms of self-determination as we define it) or even separate statehood for the Santhals. [1996-2020: autonomy claim]
  + In the 1980s and 1990s Assam’s Santhals were involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the Bodos that resulted from the Bodos’ desire for an autonomous homeland. There were Bodo campaigns to drive out the incoming Santhals, sometimes described as ethnic cleansing. In response, the Santhals organized and formed several militant outfits. They primarily fought the Bodos for land, but it appears they also made some separatist claims. Minahan (2002: 1650-1651), for instance, reports that the split-up of Assam (with Meghalaya, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunchal Pradesh separating in the 1960s/1970s) and the conflict with the Bodos triggered a Santhal separatist movement. According to Minahan (2002: 1651-1652) “Santhal leaders chalked out a plan to form a separate Santhal homeland in Assam by force. The proposed homeland, called Adivasiland, stretched from the Sankoch River in Kokrajhar District to the Panch River and the Indo-Bhutanese border to the southern railway line north of the Brahmaputra River.” Note that Minahan writes of an autonomous status within Assam, thus not implying full separation from Assam. Minahan also notes that the Santhals have demanded scheduled tribe status.
  + We found a number of Santhal militant groups in Assam, and at least some of them appear to have had separatist goals. First, the Birsa Commando Force (BCF), which was formed in 1996-1997. START classifies this group as “nationalist/separatist”, arguing that the BCF has demanded an independent state in Assam (not India, implying autonomy within Assam). CDPS India also notes that the creation of a separate Adivasi land ranges among the BCF’s claims. Hussain (2004) and Wars in the World (2012) as well confirm that the BCF is a rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam. Finally, Sentinel Assam (2013) also suggests that the BCF has had separatist goals. However, separatism appears not BCF’s primary goal. START notes that “the BCF is mostly a protection outfit for Santhals” and only “technically a separatist group.” In addition, the BCF has made claims for scheduled tribe status, which the Santhals in Assam lack.
  + A second Santhal militant group is the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF), which also appears to have made some separatist claims. The ACF was formed in the second half of the 1990s “with the purported objective of protecting the Adivasi (tribal) people of Lower Assam through an armed revolution” (see SATP). START classifies the ACF as “nationalist/separatist”. However, according to START they “do not explicitly demand a separate state for Adivasis.” Hussain (2004) confirms that the Cobras are a rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam.
  + Another Santhal outfit is the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), which was formed in 2006 and primarily demands scheduled tribe status for the Santhal community in Assam (SATP). The claim for scheduled tribe status is confirmed by CDPS India. Sentinel Assam (2013) and Wars in the World (2012), however, while confirming that the AANLA advocated schedule tribe status, suggest that the AANLA made claims also for a territorial council, which appears to mean an autonomous status within Assam.
  + Another group that apparently has made separatist claims is the Adivasi People’s Army (APA) (Sentinel Assam 2013; Wars in the World 2012). Mohan (2011), for instance, suggests that APA demands the set-up of an Adivasi autonomous council in Assam. APA was formed in 2011 according to TRAC.
  + There are many more Santhal outfits but it is not clear whether all have also espoused separatism. For instance, there is the National Santhali Liberation Army (NSLA), formed in 2005. This group represents an umbrella organization uniting several of the above-mentioned groups (CDPS India). The NSLA’s aims are not clear.
* Minahan (2016: 367) claims that Santhal nationalists’ demand is for an independent state (named Jangalmahal), which includes the northern West Bengal and parts of Assam. We could not find other sources confirming this and therefore, we do not code this claim.

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Minahan (2002: 1651f) describes the territory claimed among Santhal leaders, called Adivasiland, as an area strip stretching from the Sankoch River in the Kokrajhar district to the Indo-Bhutanese border, the southern railway line north of the Brahmaputra river and the “Panch” river. We coded the claimed territory based on Minahan’s description. As the Panch river remained untraceable, we decided to code along the Manas river that separates the districts of Bongaigaon and Chinang with the districts of Barpeta and Baksa.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The above-mentioned Santhal militant outfits were involved in violence. However, violence was predominantly of the inter-ethnic sort and driven by land disputes with the local Bodos. According to UCDP’s Conflict Encyclopedia, “[b]y the mid-late 1990s, the Santhals were confronted by a significant spread in communal violence, multiple clashes occurring between them and the Bodo people.” UCDP summarizes the non-state conflicts as such: “[a] further step on the path to violence came as a direct result of the State of Assam establishing a non-autonomous Bodoland Executive Council (BEC) in 1993, in areas of Bodo majority, under the pressure of Bodo militancy. By not establishing precise borders (until 1999), and by promising that all localities with over 50% Bodos will be included in the BEC, it triggered a lengthy campaign of ethnic cleansing, as various Bodo groups would try to reach the target. Santhals were the primary targets, as they were seen as ‘tea people’, immigrants brought by the British and Indians, taking away land, resources and jobs from the native Bodos. Further, violence levels were increased by infighting between various Bodo groups acting within the Bodo community (such as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NFDB) or the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF)), each having different views of whether the Bodos should collaborate or not with the Assamese authorities. Attacked, Santhals responded similarly, by organizing militias for both self-defense and to attack Bodo positions, such as the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF), leading to a severe spiral of violence that reached its peak in 1996 and 1998, leading to over 200 000 Internally Displaced Persons (over 45 000 of them still being housed in relief camps). Violence began to subside as the borders of BEC were delineated in 1999 and as the Government of India and the state of Assam took stronger measures for maintaining security and initiated negotiations with the militant groups. Violence between the two ethnic groups did not erupt significantly after 1999, even with the creation of a stronger Bodo Territorial Council in 2003.” Based on this, UCDP codes two non-state conflicts between the Santhals and the Bodos (in 1996 and 1998), but does not list an armed insurgency by the Santhals against the state.
* There is evidence Santhals also fought against the state, but it is extremely difficult to get by reliable information on casualty estimates regarding the various Santhal militant outfits’ involvement in armed insurgency against the state. However, there is evidence that a number of militant outfits also engaged in violence against the state and not only in inter-ethnic strife. START, for instance, notes that the ACF’s attacks “are generally focused on Assamese government targets or against Bodo militants.” Furthermore, the BCF is “mostly a protection outfit for Santhals” but “have carried out several small attacks on police and government targets”, again according to START.
* SATP reports a number of deaths resulting from Santhal outfits, though annual figures never add up to 25.
* In 2001 the ACF has signed a cease-fire with the government and has largely sticked to it according to START. Furthermore, START reports that BCF signed a cease-fire agreement with the Indian government in 2004 and has largely sticked to it. However, some groups/factions appear to have continued their insurgency, as a 2012 article reports that various Santhal rebel outfits surrendered in that year (Wars in the World 2012).
* In short, violence is primarily of the inter-ethnic sort. There appears to have been violence against the state as well, but we found no evidence to suggest that casualty figures exceeded 25 in any year. On this basis, we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* According to UCDP, the Santhals (also known as Adivasis, Hor, Santals or Sangtals) are India’s largest tribal group, with a population of approximately 10 million. Most Santhals are located in north-east India, mainly in Jharkhand, Assam, and West Bengals. The Santhals in Jharkhand are included under the header of the “Jharkhandis” movement, which aimed at the creation of a separate Jharkhand state. This movement refers to Santhals in Assam. The Santhals in Assam (approximately 240,000, see below) are migrants that came in mainly to work on tea plantations (Minahan 2002: 1649).
* In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language (the Bodos speak their own language) (Bhattacharjee 2012).
* After riots, Assam’s language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105).
* According to Choudhury (2014: 212), the Assamese government in 1986 passed a law that required Assamese as a compulsory “third language” in schools. We deem this too minimal to be coded as a restriction. At the same time, though, it is reported that there was a new regulation that made Assamese a requirement for obtaining any government job in Assam. [1986: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1993, the Bodos were granted an autonomous council. The accord left the question of the precise territorial jurisdiction open (Nath 2003: 537) and Assam refused to implement the agreement properly (Nath 2003: 538). The first council elections were held only in 2003 after yet another agreement (see below) (Singh 2014). According to UCDP, the signing of the 1993 accord with the Bodos triggered an “ethnic cleansing” campaign by local Bodos directed against local Santhals. The 1993 accord promised that “all localities with over 50% Bodos will be included in the BEC [Bodoland Executive Council]” which led various Bodo groups to try to reach the target by removing non-Bodos from the territory they claim. The main target were the local Santhals as “they were seen as ‘tea people’, immigrants brought by the British and Indians, taking away land, resources and jobs from the native Bodos” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). While an important driver for the Santhals movement in Assam, the Bodos’ ethnic cleansing campaign does not represent a restriction as defined here.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Santhals in Assam made claims for autonomy within Assam and for scheduled tribe status. Scheduled tribe status does not necessarily imply autonomy, but always some limited form of cultural protection and positive discrimination. By the end of 2020, the last year we cover, the Santhals in Assam had not been granted autonomy nor scheduled tribe status (see e.g. Ministry of Tribal Affairs; Assam Tribune 2021).
* By way of the 92nd Constitutional Amendment in 2003, the Santhali language was included in India’s eighth schedule. This implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). This reform may be due to the fact that Jharkhand (where a much higher number of Santhals lives) attained statehood in 2000. Nevertheless, it represents a cultural rights upgrade for the Santhals in Assam too. [2003: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Santhals (Assam) |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Santhals are a tribal people. They speak their own language, Santhal, and are divided religiously, with Hindu, Christian, and animist communities (Minahan 2002: 1648-1649). The Santhal-speakers are not separately coded in EPR. Most Santhals (in particular in Jharkhand, where they are concentrated) enjoy scheduled tribe status and accordingly are included under the header of EPR’s Scheduled Castes and Tribes group. Contrary to other places, the Santhals in Assam do not have scheduled tribe status. Thus they do not form part of EPR’s Scheduled Castes and Tribes group. In 2004-2006, the Santhals had representation in the national cabinet, when Shibu Soren (an ethnic Santhal) was minister for coal (Encyclopedia Britannica). However, Soren is a Santhal from Jharkhand and not a Santhal from Assam. In 2022, Draupadi Murmu (an ethnic Santhal) became the first woman tribal President of India (FirstPost 2022). However, Murmu is a Santhal from Odisha, and not from Assam. We found no evidence of representation of Assam’s Santhals in the national executive and this movement relates exclusively to Santhals from Assam. Thus, a powerless code best represents this group’s power access. [1996-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to UCDP, the Santhals (also known as Adivasis, Hor, Santals or Sangtals) are India’s largest tribal group, with a population of approximately 10 million. Most Santhals are located in north-east India, mainly in Jharkhand, Assam, and West Bengals. The Santhals in Jharkhand are included under the header of the “Jharkhandis” movement, which aimed at the creation of a separate Jharkhand state. This movement refers to Santhals in Assam. According to the 2001 census, there were approximately 240,000 Santhal-speakers in Assam, a marked increase compared to the 1991 census that had counted only approximately 140,000 Santhal-speakers in Assam (Talukdar 2008). According to Talukdar, the increase is the result of the inclusion of Santhal in the list of scheduled languages and not in-migration. Thus we draw on the higher 2001 figure. According to the 2001 census India’s population was 1,028,737,436 in 2001. [0.0002]
  + Note that Minahan’s (2002) figure differs but appears to be wrong. According to Minahan (2002: 1648), there are approximately “890,000 Santhals in northeastern India and neighboring countries, concentrated in the state of Assam, but with sizable communities in the neighboring districts of the states of Meghalaya and Tripura, and in Bangladesh and Nepal.” All other sources we consulted (see above) suggest that the total number of Santhals is much higher (UCDP, for instance, reports a population of approximately 10 million). Furthermore, the movement relates to Santhals in Assam only. Thus we do not draw on the figure provided by Minahan.

**Regional concentration**

* The Santhals in Assam are a relatively small group of migrants that came to Assam to work on tea plantations. Minahan (2002) remains ambiguous as to whether they can be considered territorially concentrated. The information we found suggests that the Santhals do not form a majority in the four districts where most of them reside according to Minahan: Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Dhubri, and Nalbari (see Indian censuses). Our coding is in line with MAR. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Referring to kin groups in Nepal and Bangladesh, the Minorities at Risk data codes the Santhals as having “close kindred across a border”. This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 1648), who mentions Bangladesh and Nepal as two other countries with sizable Santhal populations. The Santhal community in Bangladesh amounts to 157,000 (Tribalzone) and to roughly 40,000 in Nepal (Nepal Census 2001). [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

**Sources**

Assam Tribune (2020). “Autonomous Council for TE Communities Demanded”. September 11. *Nexis.* [August 18, 2022].

Assam Tribune (2021). “Adivasi Body Renews ST Status Demand”. August 10. *Nexis.* [August 18, 2022].

Baruah, Sanjib (1999). *India against Itself. Assam and the Politics of Nationality.* Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press.

Bhattacharjee, Nabanipa (2012). “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language Movement.” *Mainstream* L(9). <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html> [July 25, 2014].

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CDPS India. <http://www.cdpsindia.org/assam_mgp.asp> [March 10, 2015].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Centre for Development and Peace Studies. “Assam- Militant Groups Profile”. <http://cdpsindia.org/assam/militant-groups-profile-2/> [August 18, 2022].

Choudhury, Lutfur Rahman (2014). “Ethnic Identity Question and the Autonomy Movement in Karbi Anglong.” *A Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2(3): 207-216. Encyclopedia Britannica. “Shibu Soren.” [http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1976343/  
Shibu-Soren](http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1976343/Shibu-Soren) [March 26, 2015].

FirstPost (2022). “Explained: The Santhal Tribe that President-Elect Draupadi Murmu Belongs to”. July 22. <https://www.firstpost.com/india/explained-the-santhal-tribe-that-president-elect-droupadi-murmu-belongs-to-10827411.html> [August 18, 2022].

Hussain, Zarir (2004). “Indian State Welcomes Ceasefire Offer from Northeast Rebel Group.” *Agence France Press (AFP).* October 9.

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1648-1653.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Ministry of Tribal Affairs. “State/Union Territory-wise List of Scheduled Tribes in India.” <http://tribal.nic.in/Content/list%20of%20Scheduled%20Tribes%20in%20India.aspx> [March 26, 2015].

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Mohan, Vishwa (2011). “16 Adivasi People’s Army Insurgents Allegedly Involved in Assam Rail IED Blast Arrested.” *The Times of India.* July 13. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/16-Adivasi-Peoples-Army-insurgents-allegedly-involved-in-Assam-rail-IED-blast-arrested/articleshow/9209440.cms> [March 10, 2015].

Nath, Monoj K. (2003). “Bodo Insurgency in Assam: New Accord and New Problems.” *Strategic Analysis* 27(4): 533-544.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). “Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF).” [http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist\_organization\_profile  
.asp?id=4635](http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4635) [March 10, 2015].

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). “Birsa Commando Force (BCF).” [http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist\_organization\_  
profile.asp?id=3564](http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3564) [March 10, 2015].

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). “Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF).” [http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist\_organization\_profile  
.asp?id=4635](http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4635) [March 10, 2015].

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). “Birsa Commando Force (BCF).” [http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/  
terrorist\_organization\_profile.asp?id=3564](http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3564) [March 10, 2015].

Sentinel Assam (2013). “ST status: Adivasi Rebel Groups Set December Deadline.” <http://www.sentinelassam.com/mainnews/story.php?sec=1&subsec=0&id=166104&dtP=2013-12-22&ppr=1#.VP7MzmP92_Z> [March 10, 2015].

Singh, Bikash (2014). “Why Peace in Bodoland Always Ephemeral and Lasts Only till next Carnage.” *The Economic Times*. <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-10/news/49757781_1_bodos-bengalispeaking-muslims-bengali-speaking-muslims> [November 26, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF). <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/acf.htm> [March 10, 2015].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “All Adivasi National Liberation Army.” [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/  
india/states/assam/terrorist\_outfits/AANLA.HTM](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/AANLA.HTM) [March 10, 2015].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Fatalities”. <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_birsa-commando-force-bcf> & <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_adivasi-dragon-fighters-adf> & <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_adivasi-tiger-force-atf> & <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_chasi-muliya-adivasi-sangh-cmas> & <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_adivasi-cobra-force-acf-also-known-as-adivasi-cobra-military-of-assam-acma> & <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india_adivasi-people-s-army-apa> & https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india\_national-santhal-liberation-army-nsla [June 24, 2022].

Talukdar, Sushanta (2008). “Less than 50 Per Cent Assamese Speakers in Assam.” *The Hindu*. January 9. <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/less-than-50-per-cent-assamese-speakers-in-assam/article1175679.ece> [March 26, 2015].

Talukdar, Sushanta (2012). “Bodos to Intensify Statehood Movement.” *The Hindu*. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bodos-to-intensify-statehood-movement/article2955060.ece> [November 26, 2014].

Tracking Terrorism (TRAC). “Adivasi People’s Army (APA).” <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/adivasi-peoples-army-apa-india> [March 16, 2015].

Tribalzone (2015). “Santali.” http://www.tribalzone.net/language/santali.htm [October 27, 2015].

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/  
gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central\_and\_Southern\_Asia#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia) [March 10, 2015].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Wars in the World (2012). “India: 700 Militants Belonging 9 Separatist Groups Surrendered in Assam.” <http://www.warsintheworld.com/index.php/2012/01/24/india-700-militants-belonging-9-separatist-groups-surrendered-in-assam/> [March 10, 2015]

## Sikhs

Activity: 1947-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* After World War II Sikh leaders began negotiations on the creation of a Sikh homeland separate from both India and Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 1723). This is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found. We lack a clearer indication and thus, somewhat arbitrarily, peg the start date to 1946. India gained independence in 1947, thus in the data set, we begin to code the movement in 1947. We found no violence in 1946, thus we note prior violent activity.
* In 1947 the areas where Muslims constituted a majority were partitioned to create Pakistan (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 154). After the partition, Akali Dal (originally a revivalist Sikh religious movement formed in 1920) led a campaign for a separate Sikh state, which was achieved in 1966. Still, the movement continued (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 154).
* In 1973 Akali Dal issued a resolution that demanded maximal autonomy for the Sikh state, and in the 1980s the demand shifted to independence. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-2006 allows us to code the movement as ongoing. Dhillion (2007) writes, “[t]oday, there are a few groups still fighting for the creation of Khalistan, but the movement has lost its popular support both in India and within the Diaspora community” (Dhillion 2007: 10). There is evidence of an ongoing militant movement in recent years (e.g., Ghosh 2013).
* The 2015 Indian government list of banned terrorist organizations mentions several Sikh militant groups (Ministry of Home Affairs). Furthermore, SATP and other sources (e.g. Indian Express 2020) report several Sikh militant outfits as active. [start date: 1946; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the post-independence period, the Akali Party (the main organization associated with the Sikhs) made demands for the creation of a majority-Sikh state to be carved out of Punjab (Malik 1986: 348; Minahan 2002: 1723). The creation of a majority-Sikh state met many of the Sikh’s demands in terms of federal reorganization, though remaining issues were left, including Punjabi-speaking areas left out of the new state (Bakke 2009: 296). [1947-1973: sub-state secession claim]
* However, in the 1970s the dominant demand began to shift to increased autonomy. Scholars usually cite a 1973 resolution by the Akali party according to which the center’s powers should be limited to defense, foreign relations, currency, and communication (Malik 1986: 348; van Dyke 2009: 977). [1974-1984: autonomy claim]
* Independence became the movement’s dominant demand in the 1980s. Jodkha (2000), for instance, speaks of a powerful secessionist movement that had emerged in the 1980s. UCDP suggests that independence was widely supported in the mid-1980s. Bakke (2009: 298-299) suggests that independence gained significant support after the 1984 Golden Temple incident. Also see Minahan (2012: 292). [1985-1992: independence claim]
* Since the mid-1990s the independence movement has lost much ground (Minority Rights Group International). Militants continue to make claims for an independent Khalistan (Bakke 2009: 302-303). But the majority of Sikhs appear now to favor greater autonomy for the Punjab (Minorities at Risk Project). Van Dyk (2009: 978) reports that at least parts of the Akali party make claims for the implementation of the 1973 resolution that demanded far-reaching autonomy. It is unclear when to peg the moderation; van Dyk (2009: 992-993) argues that the traditional (more moderate) Sikh leaders began to quite successfully consolidate power again after the 1992 election. With this the independence claim lost ground, hence the 1992 election is used as marker. [1993-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* In 1946, concerned with the prospect of the Sikh’s being divided between India and Pakistan, Sikh leaders negotiated for an independent homeland of Khalistan, however this was not successful and the claim was dropped upon partition (MRGI; Minahan, 2002: 1723).
* In the initial phase of India’s independence, claims were focused on internal autonomy. However, in the campaign for increasing autonomy more violent means were applied as fundamentalist movements emerged from 1978, founded by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (SATP). Support for Bhindranwale grew and calls for independence started to emerge (MRGI; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 155; Minahan 2002: 1724). In 1980, the National Council of Khalistan was founded, a group openly calling for secession and an independent Khalistan (Roth 2015: 320). In response to growing violence the central government imposed direct rule in 1983, and in early 1984 nationalist took control of the Golden Temple. This prompted an Indian police crackdown leaving hundred dead and kick started a period of sustained violence targeted towards an independent Khalistan (Minahan 2002: 1725; SATP; Roth 2015: 320; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 155).
* As the Indian authorities reasserted control in the early 1990s, violence reduced dramatically, with a residual violent campaign until 1994/95 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 155; MRGI). Support for independence declined as well (Minahan 2016: 385). Still, some calls for independence continued (Roth 2015: 321). In particular, militant leaders declared 1995 the year of the revival of the Khalistan Movement, whilst in 1997 it was reported that militant groups attempted to revive the insurgency (Minahan 2002: 1725).
* In 2001 Jagjit Singh Chohan returned to India from exile and announced peaceful advocacy of an independent Khalistan. Both Roth (2015: 321) and Minahan (2016: 385) suggest that there is continued support for independence, though it is clear that public support for independence and with it the political significance of independence claims have ebbed.
  + The most vocal support for independence comes from the diaspora with large international protests calling for an independence Khalistan in 1997 (Minahan 2002: 1726) and international calls for independence in 2018 (Nexis). However, as a diaspora movement, these are not coded. [start date: 1980; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Sikh to create their own „Khalistan“ consists mainly of Punjab, a Sikh populated state in northern India. Some Sikh nationalists make claims for the much larger historic Sikh Empire, which also includes the Chandigarh state, the Sikh-populated regions of Haryana, the Rajasthan State, and Pakistan’s Punjab state (Roth 2015: 320f). However, according to Roth, the claim for Punjab state is dominant. We code this claim using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1986 “a group of nationalists, led by Jagjit Singh Chohan, declared the independence of Khalistan” (Minahan 2002: 1724). Possibly in exile, but not clear. [1986: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Ayres (2000: 118) indicates that the Sikhs engaged in violent nationalist conflict in 1947-48. Minahan (1996: 298-300) corroborates this report and states that the fighting left thousands dead in communal massacres. However, this was not an armed rebellion but appears to relate to the genocide in the context of the partition. Thus, we do not code LVIOLSD in 1947-1948.
* Following Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) we code 1984-93 as HVIOLSD. The LVIOLSD code in 1983 follows UCDP/PRIO.
  + Marshall & Gurr (2003) suggest that violence had emerged already in 1978.
  + Case study evidence suggests that 13 Sikh demonstrators were killed in 1978 and that “Sikh militants led by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale launched an insurgency in the state of Punjab beginning in September 1982.” However, there are just four deaths reported in 1982, increasing to more than 200 in 1983 (University of Central Arkansas). Minahan (2002: 1724) also suggests that violence broke out in 1982. However, since the 25 deaths threshold is not met before 1983, we code LVIOLSD only in 1983.
* Since the government militarily suppressed the Sikh militants, there has been sporadic violence in the region and a few arrests of alleged rebels.
* The MAR rebellion score is 4 in 2001-2003, indicating “small-scale guerilla activity”. Yet, according to qualitative evidence from SATP, the number of casualties does not exceed 7 in any of those years. We do not code LVIOLSD. [1947-1982: NVIOLSD; 1983-1983: LVIOLSD; 1984-1993: HVIOLSD; 1994-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* By 1765, the Sikhs had taken control of the Punjab and extended their territorial holdings into present Pakistan and Kashmir (Minahan 2012: 288, 289). In 1849 the British gained control over Sikh Punjab (Minahan 2012: 290). At the end of WWII, Sikhs began negotiations for a separate Sikh homeland, called Sikhistan or Khalistan. The British initially agreed, but retracted later under pressure from the Indian center, but the Sikhs were promised religious and cultural autonomy (Minahan 2012: 292).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Until 1966, when Punjab was partitioned to create a majority-Sikh state, the Sikhs were a minority within Punjab (see under regional autonomy). Therefore, we do not code changes in Punjab’s autonomy as concessions and restrictions before 1966. This includes:
  + President’s rule (direct rule) was imposed upon Punjab in June 1951. It was lifted again in April 1952 (University of Central Arkansas).
  + President’s rule was imposed in July 1966, shortly before the trifurcation of Punjab in November 1966. President’s rule was lifted in November 1966 (University of Central Arkansas).
* In 1947 the Punjab was partitioned between Pakistan and India, which led to a massive exodus of Sikhs from the Pakistani Punjab (and Muslims from Indian Punjab) and massive killings of Sikhs and Muslims. Sikh leaders had demanded the partition (Brass 2003: 77). The eventual demarcation lines did not, however, satisfy the Sikhs (Brass 2003: 81-82). It is difficult to see the partition as either a concession or a restriction as defined here.
* The 1949 constitution lists Punjabi (the language spoken by Sikhs) in its Eighth Schedule; this implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [1949: cultural rights concession]
* Punjab was trifurcated along linguistic lines, creating a much smaller but majority-Sikh state. The corresponding law was passed in September 1966 and implemented in November 1966 (van Dyk 2009: 983; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 154). [1966: autonomy concession]
* President’s rule was imposed in August 1968 (University of Central Arkansas). [1968: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in February 1969 (University of Central Arkansas). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was imposed in June 1971 (University of Central Arkansas). [1971: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in March 1972 (University of Central Arkansas). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* The period of emergency rule (1975-1977) is a potential candidate for a restriction as it led to a concentration of powers in Indira Ghandi’s hands. This would have to be coded for all movements. We do not code it as the “Emergency” was primarily an assault on democracy.
* President’s rule was imposed in April 1977 (University of Central Arkansas). [1977: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in June 1977 (University of Central Arkansas). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was imposed in February 1980. [1980: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in June 1980. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was imposed in October 1983 (University of Central Arkansas; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 155). [1983: autonomy restriction]
  + The narrative in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia suggests that the imposition of president’s rule was a consequence of the outbreak of significant violence. Consistent with this, according to the University of Central Arkansas (n.d.), the first attacks took place in September 1982 and the rebellion was publicly announced in April 1983. Therefore, this restriction occurred after the onset of violence.
* In 1983, the central government enacted the AFSPA (Punjab and Chandigarh) in the state of Punjab and the union territory of Chandigarh to counter the Khalistan movement, giving the police and military extensive powers. It was later removed in 1997 (Dabas 2016). Declarations of a state of emergency/martial law are not coded.
* In 1985 the new Prime Minister, Rajiv Ghandi, signed the Rajiv-Longowal Accord. Among other things the accord foresaw the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and some concessions on religion. However, soon after the accord was signed, it became clear that the Gandhi administration did not move to implement the accord (Singh 1995: 483-485; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 155). We do not code a concession. In the same year (in September), president’s rule was lifted (University of Central Arkansas). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was imposed in June 1987 (University of Central Arkansas; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 155). [1987: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in February 1992 (University of Central Arkansas; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 155). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.

**Regional autonomy**

* Until 1966, when Punjab was partitioned to create a majority-Sikh state, the Sikhs were a minority within Punjab. In the post-independence Punjab, the Sikhs made up 35% of the population and the Hindus 60%. After 1966, approximately 60% were Sikhs. Hence, the Sikhs clearly had regional power after 1966 (the Chief Minister often is from the Sikhs’ Akali party). Whether or not the Sikhs had regional power before 1966 is more difficult to tell. EPR does not code the Sikhs as autonomous before 1966. However, between 1947-1966, Punjab’s Chief Minister had been a Sikh for more than eight years (Pratap Singh Kairon). Moreover, Chima (2002: 26) notes that Punjab’s Congress party at the time was clearly dominated by Pratap Singh Kairon. Thus, the Sikhs appear to have been represented in the regional government also before 1966’s partition (if not by ‘their’ party, Akali). Still, they were in a minority, so we follow EPR. [1967-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* [1966: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Sikhs |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75017000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1947-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.019]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1720), approx. 80% of all Indian Sikhs reside in the state of Punjab (primarily central and eastern Punjab) and the adjacent Union Territory of Chandigarh, and they make up a majority in both (63% and 55%, respectively). This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR and MAR count the Punjabis in Pakistan (approx. 80-90 mio.) as ethnic kin of the Sikhs. There are “sizable” Sikh communities in some Western European countries, particularly the UK, as well as Canada, the US, Australia, and New Zealand (Minahan 2002: 1720). [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Ayres, R. William (2000). “A World Flying Apart? Violent Nationalist Conflict and the End of the Cold War.” *Journal of Peace Research* 37(1): 107-117.

Bakke, Kristin M. (2009). “State, Society and Separatism in Punjab.” *Regional & Federal Studies* 19(2): 291-308.

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brass, Paul R. (2003). “The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-1947: Means, Methods, and Purposes.” *Journal of Genocidal Research* 5(1): 71-101.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chima, Judgep S. (2002). “Back to the Future in 2002?: A Model of Sikh Separatism in Punjab.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 25(1): 19-39.

Dabas, Maninder (2016). “AFSPA - Necessity Or A Misused Power? Everything You Need To Know About The Controversial Act”. *India Times.* July 12. <https://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/afspa-necessity-or-a-misused-power-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-controversial-act-258238.html> [August 18, 2022].

Dhillon, Simrat (2007). “The Sikh Diaspora and the Quest for Khalistan: A Search for Statehood or for Self-Preservation?” *IPCS Research Papers.* New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. <http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1787132181IPCS-ResearchPaper12-SimratDhillon.pdf> [June 20, 2014].

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90 (replication data available at <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html> [June 19, 2014]).

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Ghosh, Palash (2013). “Khalistan: Almost 30 Years After Blue Star, Sikh Homeland Movement Fading.” *International Business Times*. June 13. <http://www.ibtimes.com/khalistan-almost-three-decades-after-operation-blue-star-movement-sikh-homeland-fading-away-1304493> [June 20, 2014].

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, pp. 127-128, 154-155.

Indian Express (2020). “Nine Linked to Khalistani Groups Get ‘Terrorist’ Tag”. July 2. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/nine-linked-to-khalistani-groups-get-terrorist-tag-6485850/> [August 11, 2022].

Indian Express (2022). “Video on Khalistani Claim Goes Viral”. April 16. <https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/video-on-khalistani-claim-goes-viral-7871536/> [August 11, 2022].

Jodhka, S. S. (2001). “Looking Back at the Khalistan Movement.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 36(16): 1311-1318.

Malik, Y. K. (1986). “The Akali Party and Sikh Militancy: Move for Greater Autonomy or Secessionism in Punjab? *Asian Survey* 26(3): 345-362.

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 59.

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 298-300.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1720-1726.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Ministry of Home Affairs. “Banned Organizations”. <https://web.archive.org/web/20180503233101/https://mha.gov.in/banned-organisations> [August 11, 2022].

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples.* http://www.minorityrights.org/5663/india/sikhs.html [December 4, 2014].

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Sambanis, Nicholas, & Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonas (2019). “Sovereignty Rupture as a Central Concept in Quantitative Measures of Civil War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(6): 1542–1578.

Singh, Gurharpal (1995). “The Punjab Crisis since 1984: A Reassessment.” *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 18(3): 476-493.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)”. <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india-punjab/international-sikh-youth-federation-isyf> [August 11, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Punjab: Assessment 2022”. <https://www.satp.org/terrorism-assessment/india-punjab> [August 11, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Yearly Fatalities.” <https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-punjab> [August 11, 2022].

The Balochistan Times (2022). “Indian Sikhs Refuse to Hoist Tricolor; Raise Khalistan Flag on Independence Day”. August 16. *Nexis.* [August 11, 2022].

University of Central Arkansas. “India/Punjab (1947-Present).” <http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indiapunjab-1947-present/> [May 11, 2023].

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/  
gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central\_and\_Southern\_Asia#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia) [December 3, 2014].

Van Dyke, Virginia (2009). “The Khalistan Movement in Punjab, India, and the Post-Militancy Era: Structural Change and New Political Compulsions.” *Asian Survey* 49(6): 975-997.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Sikkimese

Activity: 1981-2004

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Around 1817 Sikkim became a de facto protectorate of the British Empire, a status that was formalized in 1861 (Minahan 2002: 1729). Sikkim was unwilling to give up its separate status upon India’s independence in 1947. The Sikkimese king declared Sikkim an independent state on August 15, 1947, the day of India’s independence. A party loyal to the Sikkimese king and committed to Sikkim’s independence, the Sikkim National Party, was formed. In its resolutions, the party opposed accession to India and favored independence (Bareh 2001: 94-95). In 1950 India signed an agreement with the Sikkimese king. According to the agreement Sikkim became an Indian protectorate with far-reaching autonomy (India directed defense, foreign relations and communications). Thus, Sikkim did not have to (formally) merge with India (Minahan 2002: 1729). This initial phase of activity is not coded as Sikkim was not fully integrated with India. The agreement appears to have satisfied the Sikkimese: we did not find activity in subsequent years.
* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 268) report that the Sikkimese king in 1974 declared that since he had never signed an instrument of accession, Sikkim was not part of India. We considered this statement too ambiguous to code movement activity.
* In 1975 India annexed Sikkim, thus ending Sikkim’s last vestiges of independence. The king was deposed. The movement unambiguously re-erupted in the 1980s. According to Minahan (2002: 1731): “[i]n 1981-1983 serious disturbances shook the state as nationalists demanded the expulsion of the newcomers and the restoration of Sikkimese independence under United Nations auspices.” And: “[i]n 1990 Sikkimese nationalist leaders declared the annexation of Sikkim to be illegal and reiterated their demands for the restoration of the kingdom […] In November 1994 state elections the Sikkimese nationalists won a substantial portion of the vote.” Based on this, the start date is coded with 1981.
* We found no activity beyond 1994 except for an instance in 2003 that may or may not qualify as a protest for independence (“the [Sikkimese] protestors challenged the merger of Sikkim into India”, see Arora 2007: 215). In 2017, Chinese media reported that Beijing would support and help pro-independent appeals in Sikkim, following tensions between China and India on the Sikkim border (Deccan Chronicle 2017). However, we found no evidence for local mobilization in Sikkim. Based on this, we code the end of the movement in 2004 following the ten-year rule. [start date: 1981; end date: 2004]

**Dominant claim**

* The claim follows Minahan (2002: 1731), who notes that “[i]n 1981-1983 serious disturbances shook the state as nationalists demanded the expulsion of the newcomers and the restoration of Sikkimese independence under United Nations auspices.” And: “[i]n 1990 Sikkimese nationalist leaders declared the annexation of Sikkim to be illegal and reiterated their demands for the restoration of the kingdom […] In November 1994 state elections the Sikkimese nationalists won a substantial portion of the vote.” [1981-2004: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1981; end date: 2004]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Sikkimese nationalist consists of the former Sikkim Kingdom, including the territory of Gorkhaland (Roth 2015: 327ff). We code this claim based on the map shown in Roth (2015: 328) using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas Database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* August 15, 1947, the Sikkimese king declared independence (Minahan 2002: 1729; Bareh 2001: 94-95). However, at the time Sikkim was not fully integrated with India.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The term Sikkimese includes three indigenous groups, the Lepchas, the Bhutias, and the Limbus (Minahan 2002: 1727). In 1642, Pentsho Namgyal established the kingdom of Sikkim, which was nominally beholden to Tibet. The Sikkimese experienced several wars with Bhutan and Nepal as well as invasions by the Gorkhas; in 1815, the British helped the Sikkimese to drive out the Gorkhas. Sikkim became a de-facto British protectorate. In 1835, the British put the southern part of Sikkim under direct rule, including Darjeeling, followed by more areas in the subsequent decades. In 1861, Sikkim’s status as a British-protected state was formalized by a treaty and a British officer was appointed to “assist” the king. The issue of sovereignty remained undefined (Minahan 2002: 1728).
* In 1950 India signed an agreement with the Sikkimese king. According to the agreement Sikkim became an Indian protectorate with far-reaching autonomy (India directed defense, foreign relations and communications). Thus, Sikkim did not have to (formally) merge with India (Minahan 2002: 1729).
* In 1975, India annexed Sikkim and deposed the Sikkimese king. Even if Sikkim was granted statehood upon its accession, this implies a loss of autonomy for the Sikkimese, who now (as a minority in the state) had to share power with the local Nepalese. [1975: autonomy restriction]
* In August 1978 president’s rule was imposed on Sikkim. [1978: autonomy restriction]
* In 1978 the Bhutias and the Lepchas were recognized as scheduled tribes (Arora 2007: 203). Scheduled tribe status implies some protection of cultural rights, reserved seats in the legislature, and affirmative action (Swarup 2011). [1978: cultural rights concession]
* President’s rule was lifted in October 1979. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In May 1984, Delhi dissolved the state government and imposed direct rule from the center (president’s rule) (Minahan 2002: 1730). [1984: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was lifted in 1985. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* In 2002 the Limbus, the remaining of the three indigenous groups associated with the movement, also attained scheduled tribe status (Arora 2007: 204). [2002: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* After 1975 and the formal accession to India, Sikkim became a democracy. The Sikkimese are but a minority in Sikkim (the majority are ethnic Nepalis). However, the Nepalese shared power with the Sikkimese according to Das (1994: 89-90). The first Chief Minister (1975-1979) was of Sikkimese origin. Thus, we code the Sikkimese as regionally autonomous. [1981-2004: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence and Sikkim de-facto became part of India. In 1975, Sikkim was fully annexed. This implies a host change, but we do not code the SDM until after that.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Sikkimese |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Scheduled Tribes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75022000 |

**Power access**

* The Sikkimese remained powerless after the merger. Since 1978 two of the three groups associated with the movement (the Bhutias and the Lepchas) are listed as scheduled tribes, and since 2002 all three. The Scheduled Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout in EPR. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India’s bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). However, we found no evidence of Sikkimese representation in the cabinet. [1981-2004: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1727) there are about 192,000 Sikkimese in India. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,093 million in 2002. [0.0001]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1727), >80% of all Sikkimese reside in India’s Sikkim. The Sikkimese make up but a minority within Sikkim, approx. 30% according to Minahan, while Nepalis (Gorkhas) form the majority (>60%). Minahan’s figures refer to the situation in the early 2000s, but the Sikkimese appear to have been a minority in the state already in the 1980s, when this movement emerged (Das 1994: 89-90). Note: there appears to be a somewhat higher concentration of native Sikkimese in Sikkim’s high valleys in the northern and eastern parts of the state. However, the cold and hilly north is only sparsely populated, and generally speaking, all communities are scattered across Sikkim (Bareh 2001: 11). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The native Sikkimese include three related groups, the Lepchas, the Bhutias, and the Limbus (see Minahan 2002: 1727). According to Minahan, the Sikkimeses’ culture is close to that of the Tibetans. There are more than six mio. Tibetans in China, thus the numeric threshold is easily met (see Minahan 2002: 1889). There are also approx. 400,000 Limbus in Nepal (see the respective entry). [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

Arora, Vibha (2007). “Assertive Identities, Indigeneity, and the Politics of Recognition as a Tribe: The Bhutias, the Lepchas and the Limbus of Sikkim.” *Sociological Bulletin* 56(2): 195-220.

Bareh, E. H. (ed.) (2001). *Encyclopedia of North-East India: Sikkim.* New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Das, B. S. (1994). “Sikkim’s Identity as an Indian State.” In: M. P. Lama (ed.), *Sikkim. Society, Polity, Economy, Environment,* pp. 89-91. New Delhi: Indus.

Deccan Chronicle (2017). “Chinese Daily Says Beijing Should Support Sikkim's Independence”. July 06. <https://www.deccanchronicle.com/world/neighbours/060717/india-bullying-bhutan-beijing-will-support-sikkims-independence-chinese-daily.html> [July 29, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 268.

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Keesing’s Record of World Events <http://www.keesings.com> [December 11, 2013].

Lexis Nexis. http://www.lexis-nexis.com [December 10, 2013].

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 518-520.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1727-1731.

Minahan, James (2012). *Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Swarup, Mridushi (2011). “Protection of Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution: Promise and Performance.” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1790922> [July 16, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Tamils

Activity: 1947-1963; 1985-2015

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1846), the first organized call for self-determination dates to 1925, when a Tamil political group, the Self-Respect Movement, adopted a secessionist program. However, we could not find other sources backing up this claim. Instead, the Self-Respect Movement is generally described as a cultural movement demanding equal rights in the caste system.
* In 1938 the Justice Party (a Tamil party) adopted a resolution demanding an independent Tamil state in South India (the claim actually included Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada-speaking areas but was brought forward by Tamils and not supported by the other linguistic groups). A similar call was made in 1944 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 291-292). In 1949 the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – the Dravida Progressive Federation (DMK) – was formed, a breakaway organization of the Justice Party. The DMK campaigned for an independent Dravidian. Based on this, 1925 is coded as the start date. In the data set, we begin to code the movement in 1947, the year India attained independence. We note prior non-violent activity.
* In 1956, the Tamils received a separate state, which was given its current name (Tamil Nadu) in 1969. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 291) report that the movement has remained active, but other sources suggest that the movement ended in the early 1960s. Kohli (1997: 335) suggests that the DMK has focused more on Tamil cultural and language rights since 1956. The DMK removed the claim for an independent Tamil state from its program in 1960 (see e.g. Chandra 2005: 238). In 1963 the DMK formally dropped its claim for separation (Chandran 2012). 1963 is thus coded as end date. [start date: 1938; end date: 1963]
* In the 1980s, during the tensions in Sri Lanka which then culminated into civil war, several separatist groups emerged in Tamil Nadu. The Tamil Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA) advocated for the independence of Tamil Nadu from the Indian state to be achieved through armed struggle. While we did not find a precise date when the group was established, the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) reports activity for the group starting in 1985. Therefore, we code this date as the second start date.
* After the death of its leader in 1987, the TNLA is believed to have split in different factions. In the late 1980s (the exact date is unknown), another Tamil nationalist group was formed: the Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT), which also advocated for a greater Tamil Nadu nation independent from India. Both groups had ties with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.
* In 2002, TNLA and TNRT were proscribed by the Government of India for terrorist activities and, according to Roth (2015: 323), in 2009 Tamil nationalists were further ‘demoralized by the decisive defeat of the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka’s war’, putting the movement on hold. For TNRT, there is no evidence of continued activity after 2002, and SATP reports the last major incidents for TNLA in 2005. SATP reports that six militants from the Tamil Nadu Liberation Army were arrested in 2022, but we found no clear evidence that separatist claims continued after 2005. We did find the following threat issued by Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) deputy general secretary, A. Raja, in relation to a disagreement with the central government’s policies: “Don't force us to seek independent Tamil Nadu: DMK's Raja tells Centre” (Subramanian 2022). However, as this is no direct claim, it is not considered here. Overall, the last clear evidence for separatist mobilization we found is in 2005, but we found no clear indications as to when the movement. Following the ten-year rule, we code the end of the movement in 2015. [start date 2: 1985; end date 2: 2015]

**Dominant claim**

* There were claims for both increased autonomy within India and secession, but the latter is noted more often and appears dominant (at least more vocal). Already in 1938, the Justice Party (a Tamil party) adopted a resolution demanding an independent Tamil state in South India (the claim actually included Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada-speaking areas but was brought forward by Tamils and not supported by the other linguistic groups). In 1949 the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – the Dravida Progressive Federation (DMK) – formed, a breakaway organization of the Justice Party. The DMK campaigned for an independent Dravidian (Kohli 1997: 335; Chandra 2005: 238). The DMK removed the claim for an independent Tamil state from its program in 1960 and formally abandoned it in 1963, when the movement ended. [1947-1963: independence claim]
* In the 1980s, insurgent groups in Tamil Nadu also advocated for an independent Tamil state (SATP). [1985-2015: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date 1: 1938; end date 1: 1963; start date 2: 1985; end date 2: 2015]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Tamils in the first phase is not clearly defined. After its foundation, the DMK demanded an independent Dravidian state („Dravida Nadu“) composed of the southern states in India, i.e., the territories of the principal populations with the Dravidian language; Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada. Some Tamil nationalists also advocated for a separate Tamilland, which roughly corresponds to the current Tamil Nadu state within India (Roth 2015: 322f). According to Minahan (2002: 1843), though, Tamilland also includes the territory of Pondicherry. The former, larger claim appears dominant in the first phase. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas Database.
* In the second phase of the movement, the claim shifted to a smaller territory. As noted above, some groups favored independence for today’s Tamil Nadu state in India while others laid claim to a larger area. We treat Tamil Nadu as the movement’s dominant claim in the second phase, but note that this decision is ambiguous. We identify the polygon based on GADM.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1846) the Tamils were involved in violent protests in 1938, but these were related to language and not separatism. SATP reports violence in the 1980s, but we found no evidence for casualties and hence code both phases as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1639, the British opened the first port in Madras. The stability and peace under the British added greatly to the flowering of Tamil culture in the 19th century (Madras was one of the three most important cities in British India) (Minahan 2002: 1846). In 1920 Madras Province (which the Tamils shared with Telugu speakers and other linguistic groups) attained limited autonomy and a locally elected government.
  + Minahan (2002: 1846) notes that “[t]he British province of Madras [was] made a separate autonomous province of British India in 1937 [which] gave the Tamils a territorial base.” However, the Madras province had existed already before 1937, thus it is unclear what Minahan refers to. We do not code a prior concession.
  + Furthermore, Minahan (2002: 1846) notes that Hindi was introduced as a compulsory subject in 1937, sparking violent protests. It does not appear as if Hindi was made the primary (or even sole) schooling language. Because of the limited nature of the intervention, we do not code a prior restriction.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1949 constitution lists Tamil in its Eighth Schedule; this implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [1949: cultural rights concession]
* In 1956, India was reorganized along linguistic lines. Madras state was divided along ethnic lines. Thus, the Tamils received a Tamil state where Tamils make up an overwhelming majority (Kohli 1997: 334). [1956: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The Tamils got their separate state only in 1956. EPR code the Tamils as autonomous from then on. But the Tamils were the biggest group in the former Madras state (together with Telugu-speakers the Tamils made up about 80% of Madras state’s population). Furthermore, the Tamils played an important role in Madras’ regional government; for instance, the Chief Minister of 1952-1954 (Rajagopalachari) was a Tamil (if upper caste – the DMK, the secessionist organization, represented the lower Tamil castes and was not represented in the government). [1947-1963: regional autonomy] [1985-2015: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* [1956: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tamils |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Tamil (non-SC/ST/OBCs) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75019000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1947-1963: junior partner] [1985-2005: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.047]

**Regional concentration**

* The Tamils in India are concentrated in today’s Tamil Nadu (>75%), where they make up 83% of the local population according to Minahan (2002: 1843). Minahan’s figures refer to the situation in the early 2000s, but we found no information suggesting that the situation was fundamentally different in the post-independence years. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Tamils also in Sri Lanka (approx. 3.5 million according to Minahan 2002: 1843). [kin in neighboring country]

**Sources**

AIADMK. “Official Site of AIADMK Supremo J.Jayalalitha.” <http://aiadmk.8k.com/> [December 12, 2013].

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chandra, Kachan (2005). “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.” *Perspectives on Politics* 3(3): 235-252.

Chandran, Subramaniam (2012). “Political Mobilization of Tamils in India and Sri Lanka: A Historical Note.” [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?  
abstract\_id=1990822](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990822) [December 4, 2014].

Deiwiks, Christa, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian S. Gleditsch (2012). “Inequality and Conflict in Federations.” *Journal of Peace Research* 49(2): 289-304.

Desai, Meghnad (2009). *The Rediscovery of India*. London: Penguin Books.

DMK Headquarters. “Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam: Aims and Principles.” <http://www.dmk.in/> [December 12, 2013].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements.* Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 127-128, 291-292.

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [April 3, 2002].

Kohli, Atul (1997). “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-Determination Movements in India.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 56(2): 325–344.

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 554-556.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1843-1850.

Regional Parties of India. <http://adaniel.tripod.com/regional.htm> [June 20, 2014].

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Rules and Regulations 2003.” [http://eci.nic.in/eci\_main/mis-Political\_Parties/Constitution\_of\_Political\_  
Parties/Constitution\_of\_Dravida%20Munnetra%20Kazhagam.pdf](http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/mis-Political_Parties/Constitution_of_Political_Parties/Constitution_of_Dravida%20Munnetra%20Kazhagam.pdf) [June 20, 2014].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Tamil Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA)”. <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/tamil-nadu-liberation-army-tnla> [July 29, 2022].

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). “Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT)”. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/tamil-national-retrieval-troops-tnrt [July 29, 2022].

Subramanian, Lakshmi (2022). “Don’t Force Us to Seek Independent Tamil Nadu: DMK’s Raja Tells Centre”. July 04. <https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2022/07/04/dont-force-us-to-seek-independent-tamil-nadu-dmks-raja-tells-centre.html> [July 29, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Telanganas

Activity: 1969-1973; 1989-2014

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1969, there were clashes between separatists and the police. Official estimates claim 30-40 deaths, but unofficial estimates go as high as 200-300 (Firstpost 2013; Gray 1971). The uprising was led by the Telangana Praja Samithi (TPS), which was founded in 1969. 1969 is coded as start date. The TPS continued to operate until 1973 when it reached a political settlement with the government (One India News 8/1/2013). This appears to have ended separatist agitation, and hence we code an end to this first phase in 1973. [start date 1: 1969; end date 1: 1973]
* In 1983, the Telugu Desam Party was founded to safeguard the “political, economic, social and cultural foundations of Telugu speaking people in the country” (Telugu Desam Party website). This party did not fight for separatism, but for cultural and language autonomy, and thus does not qualify as a self-determination organization under our definition. Ram (2007) notes that separatism resurfaced again in the late 1980s in the civil society realm at first. “The present phase of the movement led by various civil society groups started in 1989 and intensified from 1996 onwards” (Ram 2007: 93). In 1999, separatist agitation resurfaced in the political realm with the Congress party at the helm of the movement. Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) was founded in 2001 as a political party with separatist aims. Hence, we code a second, with a start date in 1989. The movement came to an end in 2014 when the state of Telangana was formed (Roth 2015: 322). [start date 2: 1989; end date 2: 2014]

**Dominant claim**

* Demands appear focused on separation from Andhra Pradesh throughout (Minahan 2002: 1872-1874). [1969-1973: sub-state secession claim; 1989-2014: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Telanganas consists of nine districts located in the northwestern part of Andhra Pradesh, which were, however, separated in 2014 to form today’s state of Telangana (Minahan 2002: 1869). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We code 1969 as LVIOLSD based on qualitative evidence suggesting there were at least 30-40 deaths that year due to clashes between separatists and the police, and possibly many more (Firstpost 2013; Gray 1971).
* Note that while we code violence in the movement’s first year, the account in Minahan suggests an initial period of nonviolence with swift escalation to violence (see p. 1872): “Telangana discontent intensified in 1969, when the unification guarantees were scheduled to lapse. Student agitation for the continuation of the agreement spread across Telangana, though most Telenganas felt that the agreement had been violated by the leaders of the Andhra region. Government employees and opposition groups threatened to support the students. New agreements on revenue sharing and local government employment failed to appease the separatists, and violent mob attacks on railroads, highways, and government facilities spread across the Telengana, threatening civil war in the state. Police fired on demonstrators, killing 23 people, according to official figures.” Gray (1971) also suggests prior nonviolent contention. [1969: LVIOLSD]
* All other years are coded as NVIOLSD. [1970-1973; 1989-2014: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Telenganas are an ancient Hindu dynasty. Their settlement area was overrun by Muslims in the 14th century, which split the Andhrans into two groups. In 1724, a Mugal general, Asaf Jah, declared Hyderabad independent and named himself prince. Meanwhile, the Telugu-speaking Andhrans were ruled by the British. The Telenganas organized for the first time politically in the form of the Telengana State Congress, formed in 1938. In 1941, Telengana leaders tried to overthrow the Muslim rulers and establish a communist state. When India and Pakistan became independent, the Muslim prince wavered between independence and joining Pakistan. The Telenganas rose against the prince and the Indian government used the opportunity to intervene (Minahan 2002: 1872). In 1948, Hyderabad joined the Indian Union as Hyderabad State. The 1949 constitution lists Telugu as an official language, though not at a par with Hindi or English. In 1956, the Telanganas lost separate statehood when Hyderabad was incorporated into Andhra Pradesh to form a linguistically homogenous state of Telugu speakers (Minahan 2002: 1872). The Telanganans were given assurances regarding revenues, education, and positions in local government. These assurances were planned to run out in 1969 (Minahan 2002: 1872). Nonetheless, we code a prior restriction due to the loss of separate statehood in 1956. We found no evidence of a concession or restriction in the ten years before the first start date, and also not before the second start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* We found no concessions or restrictions until 2012 (Telangana attained statehood in 2014). This is in line with Haragopal’s (2010) detailed account of Telangana’s political movements, which does not make mention of any concession. One thing to mention is that the guarantees regarding revenues, education, and positions in local government given to the Telanganas back in 1956 when Hyderabad was merged with Andhra Pradesh ran out in 1969. However, we do not code a restriction since this was foreseen in 1956. Still, it is worth noting that there were widespread protests that the guarantees should be continued, but also about a lack of implementation in the first place. 1969 was also when the Telengana People’s Association was founded (Minahan 2002: 1872).
* Telangana attained statehood in 2014 through the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act (commonly known as the Telangana Act) (Times of India 2014). [2014: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Minahan (2002: 1872) reports that the Telenganas felt discriminated against “in government”. He writes that Telugus from the Andhran part had advantages in government and education. But he also reports that an important nationalist leader, M. Chenna Reddy, was elected governor of the region in the 1970s. The Telanganas made up about 40% of Andhra Pradesh. And the Telangana region is known as a “stronghold of Congress” (Minahan 2002: 1873). This makes it unlikely that the Telanganas did not have any meaningful say over Andhra Pradesh’s affairs. Still, the Telanganas did not have their own state and formed only a minority. (Of course, this changed after 2014 when Telangana state was created; however, the movement did not carry on after 2014.) [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [2014: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Telanganas |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Telugu (Non-SC/ST/OBCs) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75020000 |

**Power access**

* The Telanganas speak Telugu, the language that is spoken throughout Andhra Pradesh and today’s Telangana. Thus, they form part of EPR’s Telugu group.
* The Telugus are coded as junior partner in EPR. While the Andhra-part of Andhra Pradesh seems to have advantages in terms of representation, the Telangana region is known as a “stronghold of Congress” (Minahan 2002: 1873) and we found no evidence that the Telanganas would be systematically excluded. Hence, we adopt the junior partner code, though noting that the evidence upon which this is based is rather scarce. [1969-1973: junior partner; 1989-2014: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan, there are 31.4 million Telanganas as of 2002. Minahan’s figure appears plausible: according to the 2011 census, Telangana has a population of 35.2 million. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,093 million in 2002. [0.0287]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1869) the Telanganas easily make up an absolute majority of the Talangana region, where also most of them live. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Telanganas are a regional grouping of Telugu speakers. For the Telugus, EPR codes kin groups in Mauritius and Myanmar. According to Stutsch (2005: 102), the largest Telugu community outside of India is in Malaysia and numbers but 30,000. Note: we would not code Telugus as a whole as kin anyway because this is a movement by parts of the Telugus against other Telugus. [no kin]

**Sources**

All Refer. “India: Regionalism” <http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-study/india/india75.html> [July 20, 2014].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Firstpost (2013). “From 1948 to 2013: A Brief History of the Telangana Movement.” <http://www.firstpost.com/politics/from-1948-to-2013-a-brief-history-of-the-telangana-movement-998093.html> [November 17].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gray, Hugh (1971). “The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India.” *Asian Survey* 11(5): 463-474.

Haragopal, G. (2010). “The Telangana People’s Movement: The Unfolding Political Culture.” *Economic and Political Weekly* XLV (42). <http://www.telanganablogs.org/ref/Telangana_Movement-Unfolding_Political_Culture.pdf> [November 18, 2014].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements.* Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 293.

McHenry Jr, Dean E. (2007). “Do Elections Foster Separatism? The Case of Telangana.” <http://www.cgu.edu/PDFFiles/SPE/workingpapers/politics/SASA%20Do%20Elections%20Foster%20Separatism4.pdf> [June 20, 2014].

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1869-1874.

Oneindia (2013). “Telangana Movement: A Brief History and Chronology.” August 1. <http://news.oneindia.in/2013/07/31/telangana-movement-a-brief-histroy-and-chronology-1272238.html> [November 17].

Ram, M. Kodanda (2007). “Movement for Telangana State: A Struggle for Autonomy.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(2): 90-94.

Stutsch, Carl (2005). *Encyclopedia of the World’s Minorities.* New York, NY, London: Routledge.

Telugudesam Party (2013). “About Telugudesam Party.” <http://www.telugudesam.org/tdpcms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=28> [November 17].

Times of India (2014). “President Rule in Andhra Pradesh, Assent to Telangana Bill”. March 01. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/President-rule-in-Andhra-Pradesh-assent-to-Telangana-bill/articleshow/31214696.cms> [August 5, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Telugus

Activity: 1950-1956

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1921, the first Telugu (Andhran) politico-cultural organization was formed, Andhra Jana Sangh (AJS) (Minahan 2002: 117). At this point in time, the movement appears to have focused on language; we found no calls for political self-determination. After independence in 1947, the Telugus asked the Congress to implement its old resolution – dating to 1920 – in favor of linguistic states (Guha 2003). The first evidence for organized activity directed towards self-determination as we define it we found is in 1950 (see Minahan 2002: 118). Thus 1950 is coded as start date. After the movement’s leader had fasted to death, which caused several strikes and protests, the Indian government gave in in 1953 and the state of Andhra Pradesh was established out of the Telugu-speaking areas of the Madras state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 127; Guha 2003). In 1956 the Telugu-speaking areas from Hyderabad were added to Andhra Pradesh (Minahan 2002: 118). We found no separatist activity beyond 1956 (e.g., the group is not represented in Minahan 2016). Thus 1956 is coded as end date. [start date: 1950; end date: 1956]

**Dominant claim**

* The Telugu movement’s claim was for the creation of a Telugu state to be carved out of Madras state and Hyderabad (Minahan 2002: 118; Hewitt & Cheetham: 127; Guha 2003). [1950-1956: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Telugus appears to coincide roughly with the Andhra Pradesh state created in 1956, which included today’s Andhra Pradesh and Telangana states (which split from Andhra Pradesh in 2014). The boundaries of this state were drawn to coincide with the local distribution of languages, in response to Telugu claims for self-determination (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 127). However, we did not find a more precise description of the territory initially claimed by the Telugus, and hence cannot be sure whether this initial claim matched the boundaries of Andhra Pradesh. We therefore flag this claim as ambiguous and code it based on the historical boundaries of Andhra Pradesh (Deiwiks et al. 2012). We use the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence. Hence, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* At the time of independence, Telugu-speakers were located in Andhra (part of Madras Presidency) and in parts of Hyderabad, which formally joined the union only in 1948 (according to most sources, 1949 according to Minahan 2002: 115, 1872). Hyderabad was not directly under British rule and had a Muslim ruler. In 1941, Telengana leaders tried to overthrow the Muslim rulers and establish a communist state. When India and Pakistan became independent, the Muslim prince wavered between independence and joining Pakistan. The Telenganas rose against the prince and the Indian government used the opportunity to intervene. In 1949, Hyderabad joined the Indian Union as Hyderabad State (Minahan 2002: 1872).
* In 1920 Madras presidency (which the Telugus shared with Tamil speakers and other linguistic groups) attained limited autonomy and a locally elected government, but it appears that Madras state was dominated by Tamils (see below).
* The Telanganans (Telugus in Telangana) were joined with India in 1948. Previously, they had been under a Muslim ruler (Minahan 2002: 1872).
* The 1949 constitution lists Telugu in its Eighth Schedule; this implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). [1949: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After the movement’s leader fasted to death, which caused several strikes and protests, the Indian government gave in in 1953 and the state of Andhra Pradesh was established out of the Telugu-speaking areas of Madras state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 127; Guha 2003). [1953: autonomy concession]
* In 1956 the Telugu-speaking areas from Hyderabad were added to Andhra Pradesh (Minahan 2002: 118). This constitutes a concession to the Telugus. But note that a significant number of Telugu-speakers in Telangana were not in favor of joint statehood with the Andhrans, which eventually sparked the “Telanganans” movement (Minahan 2002: 1872). [1956: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The Telugus got their separate state only in 1953/1956. EPR codes the Telugus as autonomous from 1954 onwards. The Telugus were the second-biggest group in the former Madras state (together with Tamil-speakers the Telugus made up about 80% of Madras state’s population). The Tamils were well represented in Madras state; for instance the Chief Minister of 1952-1954 (Rajagopalachari) was a Tamil. Guha (2003) reports that the Telugu-speakers in Madras state argued that they were discriminated against. We found no better information as to whether the Telugus indeed had no representation in Madras state and thus follow EPR and code autonomy from 1954-1956. [1954-1956: regional autonomy]
  + Note: Telugu-speakers in Hyderabad (Telanganas) appear to have participated in the regional government that was formed in 1949 when Hyderabad was formally joined with India. The Telanganans make up about half of the Telugus. Thus, there would be to code justification autonomy from 1950 onwards; however, the “no autonomy” code better reflects case dynamics.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change, but this was before the start date.
* Creation of Andhra Pradesh out of parts of Madras state in 1953 (see above). [1953: sub-state secession]
* Addition of Telangana areas in 1956. [1956: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Telugus |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Telugu (Non-SC/ST/OBCs) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75020000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.053]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 2001 census, approx. 80% of all 79.5 million Telugu speakers in India resided in today’s Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, where they make up approx. 80% of the local population. We found no information suggesting that the situation was fundamentally different in the post-independence phase. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes Indians and Muslim Arakenese in Myanmar as kin of the Telugus (and other Indian groups, including the Tamils, the Bengali, and the Hindi). This is a rather broad understanding of ethnic kin. We do not follow EPR, also because this is a movement against an Indian-dominated government. We found no Telugu communities crossing the threshold outside of India (see e.g. Ethnologue). [no kin]

**Sources**

Brass, Paul R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Deiwiks, Christa, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian S. Gleditsch (2012). “Inequality and Conflict in Federations.” *Journal of Peace Research* 49(2): 289-304.

Ethnologue. “Telugu.” <https://www.ethnologue.com/language/tel> [November 10, 2015].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Guha, Ramachandra (2003). „The Battle for Andhra.“ *The Hindu.* March 30. [http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/mag/  
2003/03/30/stories/2003033000040300.htm](http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/mag/2003/03/30/stories/2003033000040300.htm) [April 13, 2015].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements.* Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 127-128.

Mallikarjun, B. (2004). “Indian Multilingualism, Language Policy and the Digital Divide.” *Language in India* 4(4).

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 115-119.

Minahan, James B. (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Tripuris

Activity: 1949-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Following the partition of British India into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan, the numerous British protectorates (princely states) were given a choice which of the two new states they wished to join. Predominantly Hindu, Tripura favored India, but as it was considered too small to maintain itself as a separate state, the British recommended that it become part of Assam. This recommendation was vehemently opposed and set off the beginning of the Tripuran self-determination movement: an organization named Seng Krak was formed in 1947 to press for separate statehood, but it was banned shortly afterwards. Tripura formally joined India in 1949, when the local king signed the Tripura Merger Agreement (Minahan 2002: 1918). Based on this, the movement is coded from 1949, though we note prior non-violent activity. The start date is coded with 1947.
* Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1945-69 suggest that the movement remained active throughout this period, though this evidence is ambiguous because MAR protests do not necessarily have to involve SD claims.
* In the late 1960s, a new organization, the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS), began a political campaign to create an autonomous tribal district council.
* The militant Tripura National Volunteer Force (TNV) emerged in 1978. A Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council was created in 1982. However, the TNV continued its armed campaign until 1988, when it signed an accord with the federal government. The agreement promised to address various tribal concerns including migration from Bangladesh, the loss of tribal lands to Bengali settlers, and greater participation of tribals in the state administration (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR; SATP).
* Limited implementation of the accord led to the emergence of the next phase of the Tripuri rebellion. Disgruntled members of the TNV formed the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) in 1990 and launched attacks against state authorities. SATP reports the ATTF and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) as still active.
* Furthermore, parties such as the Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT) continue to demand statehood (Centre for Development and Peace Studies; Chakravarty 2016; Chakraborty 2020). Thus, the movement is ongoing. [start date: 1947; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially the Tripuras claim was for increased autonomy by attaining statehood for Tripuras. In the 1960s demands began to be issued for the creation of an autonomous tribal district within Tripuras (Minorities at Risk Project). The TUJS (Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti) was formed through the amalgamation of several parties/organizations in the mid-1960s. Their original demands were (a) the creation of an autonomous district council for the tribes under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, (b) the restoration of tribal lands from the non-tribals which were illegally transferred, (c) the recognition of Kokborok language, and (d) the adoption of the Roman script (Ghosh 2003: 229). [1949-1978: autonomy claim]
* In 1978, the first avowedly independentist organization was founded, the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV). In 1991, part of the TNV began advocating for Tripuri Tribal statehood within India (Minahan 2002). It seems that claims are largely centered around increased tribal autonomy, the expulsion of Bengalis from Tripuras (or a reduction in their rights), and the safe-guarding of Tripuri culture (SATP; Ghosh 2003, Rajagopalan 2008). Nonetheless, the independence claim is significant and thus which claim is to be considered dominant is somewhat ambiguous. Thus, we code the most radical claim (independence) from 1979 onwards. [1979-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1978; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Tripuris consists of the current Indian State of Tripura (Minahan 1996: 585; Roth 2015: 330). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 328).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59, 2005: 86) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict in 1967-1972. No other source would suggest a separatist armed conflict during those years, including MAR and UCDP/PRIO. We found no evidence for a separatist uprising in qualitative sources, either (Minahan 2002: 1918; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; University of Central Arkansas n.d.). We do not code LVIOLSD.
* UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict over Tripura in 1979-1988, 1992, 1997, and 1999-2004. Other sources provide more extensive dates, however. For one, Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59, 2005: 86) and Hewitt et al. (2008) suggest armed conflict throughout 1979-2006, though they code ongoing conflict if it recurs within 5 years. According to MAR, there was small- to large-scale guerilla activity in most years between the late 1970s and 2000.
* Qualitative evidence appears to broadly back up UCDP/PRIO’s coding decisions, however. According to a University of Central Arkansas report, significant violence first emerged in 1979. Almost ten years later, “Government and TNV representatives agreed to a cessation of military hostilities on August 12, 1988. […] Some 425 Tripura rebels turned their weapons over to the government on September 10, 1988.” No significant violence is reported in this source in 1989, just 6 casualties in 1990, and 11 in 1991. Consistent with UCDP/PRIO, the 25 deaths threshold was next met in 1992 (34 deaths). Based on this, we code LVIOLSD in 1979-1988 and then again in 1992.
* According to both sources, violence continued in 1993-1995, but was below the 25 deaths threshold. However, the University of Central Arkansas report suggests 41 deaths in 1996. Some of those are related to interethnic Tripuri-Bengali violence, but there clearly was an escalation and it is not clear whether the report lists all attacks. UCDP/PRIO suggests more than 70 deaths in 1997. UCDP/PRIO suggests 21 battle-related deaths in 1998 while the University of Central Arkansas reports almost 40 deaths, though some may again be related to interethnic conflict. On that basis, we code NVIOLSD in 1993-1995 and LVIOLSD in 1996-1999.
* UCDP counts more than 25 deaths in 1999-2004 while SATP associates >25 deaths to the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in 2000-2006 (previous years are not covered); and 21 in 2007. A further 11 fatalities are attributed to another Tripura group, the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), in 2007, bringing the total to 32. After 2007 the 25-deaths threshold is never met including when the two groups are combined. The University of Central Arkansas report similarly suggests that the 25 deaths threshold was never met post-2007. We extend the LVIOLSD code to 2007 on that basis.
* [1949-1978: NVIOLSD; 1979-1988: LVIOLSD; 1989-1991: NVIOLSD; 1992: LVIOLSD; 1993-1995: NVIOLSD; 1996-2007: LVIOLSD; 2008-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Originally migrated from China, the Tripuris, converted to Hinduism, established state structures in Northeastern India in the 7th century. In the 15th and 16th century, the Tripuris spread their rule across the surrounding (predominantly Bengali Muslim) areas. In 1625, the Bengalis overran Tripura and incorporated it as a dependency into the Mughal Empire. The Tripuris expelled the Bengalis again and retained precarious independence until the 18th century (Minahan 2002: 1917). When the British took Tripura, the Tripuris were at first allowed to retain nominal independence with tributary status. In 1765, the Mughals tried to carve out a piece of Tripura and bring it outside the British purviews; the British reclaimed the area in 1803, and the Tripuris established direct treaty relations with the British, becoming a separate district of British Bengal. In 1905, Tripura was attached to West Bengal and Assam. During WWI and WWII, the Tripuris supported the British. When India prepared for independence, it was proposed that Tripura be attached to Assam, which the Tripuris resisted on historical grounds. The area was deemed too small to be an independent state. Hence, Tripura remained under nominal British rule when India and Pakistan became independent in 1947 (Minahan 2002: 1918).
* A sharp influx of Bengali refugees led the Tripuris to fear Pakistani annexation and they went to Delhi for aid. The king signed the Tripura Merger Agreement in 1949, which paved the way for union with India, though with official protection for the Tripura cultural and political autonomy (Minahan 2002: 1918). Until the merger with India, Tripura had been a princely state under (nominal) British dominion, though with a substantial degree of autonomy; after the merger Tripura became a part C state, meaning that it was henceforth centrally administered and lost its autonomy (Das 2001: 224-225). [1949: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Starting in the 1950s, Tripuras has experienced a significant influx of Bengali refugees due to the situation in East Pakistan. Thus, the Tripuris became a minority in their own lands, and the regional governments that existed from 1963 onwards were dominated by Bengalis from the 1970s (Minahan 2002: 1918). Still, the Tripuris appear to have had a certain influence over the regional government, and thus seem affected by changes in Tripuras’ autonomy level. Thus, we code such changes as concessions and restrictions.
* In 1956, part C states were renamed “union territories” and territorial councils introduced. The reform implied some decentralization with regard to administration, but no devolution of legislative powers (see Das 2001: 226-227; Kumar 1991: 44-45). We do not code a concession.
* By way of the 1963 Union Territories Act, union territories gained significant autonomy and, in particular, legislative powers (Kumar 1991: 48-61). The territorial councils were replaced with a legislative Assembly and a council of ministers (Das 2001: 226-227). [1963: autonomy concession]
* In the early 1950s, Muslim refugees began entering the fertile Tripuri valleys illegally, driving the Tripuris into the mountains. Due to the refugee influx, the Bengalis began to dominate the Tripura government. In 1968 the Congress government in Tripura declared Bengali as the official language, reduced the tribal reserves by 300 sq miles, and evicted tribal peasants from Dambur Valley for dam construction (Ghosh 2003: 229). By this, the Tripuris’ autonomy was reduced (reduction of tribal reserves) as well as their cultural rights: Kokborok, the Tripuris’ first language, was downgraded relative to the Bengali language. [1968: cultural rights restriction, autonomy restriction]
* In 1971, Tripuras was granted statehood; it became a full-fledged Indian state in January 1972 (Minahan 2002: 1918). [1971: autonomy concession]
* In 1971, president’s rule was established in Tripuras. [1971: autonomy restriction]
* President’s rule was ended in March 1972. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* President’s rule was established in Tripuras in November 1977 (Keesing’s Record of World Events: December 1978). Yet, it was lifted again already in January 1978, just two months later. We do not code a restriction in line with the codebook.
* In 1978, Kokborok, the Tripuris’ language, was recognized as Tripuras’ second state language (Minorities at Risk Project). We do not code this as a concession given it was enacted by Tripura’s own regional government; this decision is ambiguous because the regional government was increasingly Bengali-dominated.
* In 1979, the Tripuris received their own autonomous district within Tripuras with the passage of the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) Act through the Indian parliament (Rajagopalan 2008: 26). The majority ethnic group in Tripuras, the Bengalis, opposed the set-up of the autonomous district. [1979: autonomy concession]
  + We code a separatist violence onset in 1979. The narrative in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia suggests that first violence had emerged already in 1978, though below the threshold. The onset of violence therefore came before the concession.
* The Tripura autonomous district was established in 1982. In 1985 it was upgraded when it came under the ambit of the 6th schedule to the Indian constitution (Rajagopalan 2008: 26). [1985: autonomy concession]
* In 1988 Tripuri rebels signed an accord with the federal government. The agreement promised to address various tribal concerns including migrations from Bangladesh, the loss of tribal lands to Bengali settlers, and greater participation of tribals in the state administration (Minorities at Risk Project). MAR argues that the accord was not fully implemented, but does not imply that there was no implementation. The accord ended the 1979-1988 violent conflict (MAR). [1988: autonomy concession]
* According to a University of Central Arkansas report, significant violence first emerged in 1979. Almost ten years later, “Government and TNV representatives agreed to a cessation of military hostilities on August 12, 1988. […] Some 425 Tripura rebels turned their weapons over to the government on September 10, 1988.”
* In 1993, another agreement was signed between Tripuri rebels and the Indian government. It contained reiterations of the 1988 agreement (these are not coded again) as well as cultural concessions, including the codification of tribal laws, setting up a cultural development center, using cultural Tripuri place names, and language guarantees (Rajagopalan 2008: 28). [1993: cultural rights concession]
* In March 1993, president’s rule was established in Tripuras (Minorities at Risk Project). Yet, it was lifted again a month later, in April 1993. We do not code a restriction in line with the codebook.
* In 1997, India sent troops into Tripura, after the extremist TMV factions made demands that included declaring as “migrants” anyone who had entered Tripura after 1949 (to curb Bengali power at the ballots). The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was imposed in 1997, giving the police and military extensive powers. The Bengali-dominated areas were excluded (Minorities at Risk Project). Declarations of a state of emergency are not coded.
* In May 2015, after 18 years, the state government decided to withdraw the AFSPA in Tripura, due to a decrease in militancy (Lal 2015). As declarations of a state of emergency are not coded, we do not code this as a concession.
* In 2016, the central BJP-led government introduced a bill to amend the citizenship law, which provided Indian citizenship to non-Muslim migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. The Bill was later passed in 2019 as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), sparking protest in across India for its clear religious discrimination. In Tripura, the IPFT opposed the Act as it threatened indigenous people in the state, who became a minority after the influx of immigrants from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) (Chakraborty 2020). The CAA is difficult to see as a concession or restriction as defined here and so not coded.
* In 2020, the state government announced that the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) would be renamed the Tipra Territorial Council (TTC). Additional powers were devolved to the Council and the number of seats was increased from 28 to 50 (Ali 2020). [2020: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Until abolishment of princely state in 1949, but this is not coded because Tripuras was not formally integrated with India.
* In 1963 Tripuras got a legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers by way of the Union Territories Act (Das 2001: 226-227). By this, Tripuras attained substantial autonomy. In 1972 Tripuras became a state. In 1982, the Tripuris received their own autonomous district within Tripuras. The Tripuris form a minority within Tripuras (as of today around 30 per cent), while the Bengalis constitute the majority group. As of the 1970s the Bengalis began to dominate Tripuras and the Tripuris became underrepresented in the regional government. Thus, the autonomy code is somewhat ambiguous in the 1970s/early 1980s (before the Tripuris were granted their own autonomous district). We retain the autonomy code since the Tripuris appear to have retained a certain influence (Minahan 2002: 1918). Hence, we code autonomy from 1964 onwards, following the first of January rule. [1964-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, Tripuras de-facto became part of India. In 1949 Tripura formally acceded India and the autonomous kingdom was abolished. [1949: host change (new); loss of autonomy]
* In 1963 Tripuras got a legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers by way of the Union Territories Act (Das 2001: 226-227). By this, Tripuras attained substantial autonomy. [1963: establishment of autonomy]
* Since the 1963 reform is coded as a major change, the attainment of statehood in 1972 is not coded as another major change.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tripuris |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Indigenous Tripuri |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75007000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* Starting in the 1950s, Tripuras has experienced a significant influx of Bengali refugees due to the situation in East Pakistan. Thus, the Tripuris became a minority in Tripura as a whole (Minahan 2002: 1918; MAR). Nevertheless, we code them as concentrated throughout. It appears likely that the Tripuris continue to form a majority in rural, western areas of Tripura (Minahan 2002: 1918, also see GeoEPR). In the tribal district established in the 1980s the Tripuris are close to an absolute majority (Mahato & Deb n.d.); hence it is easily possible that they form a majority in a significant share of the district. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Both MAR and Minahan (2002: 1915) code kin in neighboring Bangladesh. According to Minahan (2002: 1915), around 100,000 of the approximately 1.52 million Tripuris live in Bangladesh. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

**Sources**

Ali, Syed Sajjad (2020). “Tripura Trival Council to Get a New Name”. *The Hindu.* December 19. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/tripura-tribal-council-to-get-a-new-name/article33367579.ece> [August 18, 2022].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Centre for Development and Peace Studies. “Tripura- Chronology”. <http://cdpsindia.org/tripura/chronology-t/> [August 18, 2022].

Chakraborty, Tanmoy (2020). “IPFT on Indefinite Sit-In Against Law”. *The Telegraph India.* January 06. <https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/indigenous-peoples-front-of-tripura-ipft-on-indefinite-sit-in-against-citizenship-law/cid/1733540> [August 18, 2022].

Chakravarty, Ipsita (2016). “Tripura vs Twipra: An Old Identity Politics May Feed Into New Political Rivalries”. *Scroll.in.* August 25. <https://scroll.in/article/814873/tripura-vs-twipra-an-old-identity-politics-may-feed-into-new-political-rivalries> [August 18, 2022].

Das, J.R. (2001). *Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples.* New Delhi: S. B. Nangia.

Deb, Debraj (2021). “Tripura Tribal Politics Heats Up Over Separate State Demand.” *Indian Express.* December 22. *Nexis.* [August 18, 2022].

Ghosh, Biswajit (2003). “Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura.” *Sociological Bulletin* 52 (2): 221-243.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002). “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Hewitt, Joseph J., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) (2008). *Peace and Conflict 2008.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [June 26, 2003].

Kumar, Sudhir (1991). *Political and Administrative Setup Union Territories in India.* New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Lal, Anshu (2015). “AFSPA Removed in Tripura After 18 Years: Here’s Why It Was Enforced and Why It’s Gone Now”. *Firstpost.* May 29. <https://www.firstpost.com/india/afspa-removed-in-tripura-after-18-years-heres-why-it-was-enforced-and-why-its-gone-now-2266770.html> [August 18, 2022].

Mahato, Arobindo, and Mrinal K. Deb (n.d.). “Democratic Decentralization: A Study of the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC).” <https://www.academia.edu/9877822/Democratic_Decentralization_A_Study_of_the_Tripura_Tribal_Areas_Autonomous_District_Council_TTAADC_> [November 3, 2015].

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p.59.

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 585-587.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1915-1921.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Petersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, and Magnus Öberg (2021). “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809-825.

Rajagopalan, Swarna (2008). *Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones*. Policy Studies 46. Washington, DC: East-West Center.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india-insurgencynortheast-tripura/national-liberation-front-of-tripura-nlft> & [https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-tripura\_all-tripura-tiger-force-attf & <https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-tripura_national-liberation-front-of-tripura-nlft> [June 24, 2022].

University of Central Arkansas. “India/Tripura (1949-present).” https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indiatripura-1949-present/ [May 11, 2023].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Tulu

Activity: 2006-2020

**General notes**

* The Tulu live in India’s south-west along the coast. They are also known as Tuluva people.

**Movement start and end dates**

* We found evidence for calls for a Tulu state before India’s independence in 1947 and in the 1990s, but these were short-lived. The first such call was made after the Quit India Movement in 1942 by Srinivas Updhyaya Paniyadi, an influential Tulu leader (DNA India, 2013; Tulunadu Museum). The second call was made in the 1990s (Firstpost 2013; The Hindu 2006). In either case, we could not find any evidence for sustained mobilization.
* The Tulu movement gained momentum in the early 21st century. Calls for a Tulu state were again made in 2006. Organized claims continued thereafter, and the movement active as of 2020 (Devaiah 2021; Mangalore Today 2016; Roth 2015: 323; The Hindu 2006, 2016). [start date: 2006; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Tulu speakers make two main demands: official recognition of Tulu language according to the 8th Schedule of the constitution and the creation of a separate state within India to be called Tulu Nadu (Indian Express 2021; Mangalore Today 2016; The Hindu 2015; Times of India 2022). The latter is an SD demand as defined here. [2006-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory that is claimed by Tulu speakers includes parts of Karnataka and Kerala (where they also reside). The region, which is informally known as Tulu Nadu, consists of Dakshina Kannada and Udupi districts in Karnataka, and the northern parts of the Kasaragod district in Kerala. The proposed capital is Mangalore (Roth 2015: 316; also see: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulu_Nadu#/media/File:Map_of_South_Canara_district_in_1956)>. This material suggests the claim includes the following districts, which we code using GADM for polygon definition: Kundapura, Udupi, Karkal, Mangalore, Beltangadi, Puttur, Kasara, Bantval.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of violence; thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Tulu people are an ethno-linguistic group in Southern India. Historically, the region of Tulu Nadu consisted of two separate lands of Haive and Tuluva, two different ethnic groups. Over the centuries, more ethnic groups started migrating to Tulu Nadu and in the 16th century, the region saw a large influx of Catholics. In the 18th century, Tulu Nadu was conquered by the ruler of Mysore, before being taken by the British in 1799. Under the British, the region (named South Canara) was attached to the Madras Presidency (later the Mysore state, and now Karnataka).
* In 1956, the states were reorganized along linguistic lines, and some areas of Tulu Nadu became part of the newly formed Mysore state (Karnataka), while others became part of Kerala.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2017, Tulu was introduced as the third optional language from class six to class ten in Karnataka (The Hindu 2017). [2017: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* 80%+ of Tulus resides in Karnataka, but they make up less than 3% of Karnataka’s population. Despite their small size, the Tulu have had some representation at state level including, most notably, in the form of Marpadi Veerappa, an ethnic Tuluvalu who was Karnataka’s Chief Minister between 1992 and 1994. Overall, though, the Tulus’ representation at regional level seems limited and therefore we do not code regional autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tulu |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* Tulu-speaking people are not coded in EPR. The language they speak is part of the Dravidian languages, and the main religions among them are Hinduism and Jainism. Other Dravidian languages speakers (e.g., Telegu and Tamil) are coded as junior partners in EPR. We found evidence of Tulu-speakers’ representation in India’s cabinet and state’s government. The first ethnic Tuluva to be elected as Chief Minister of Karnataka (1992-1994) was Marpadi Veerappa Moily. After being CM, he later occupied different ministerial positions at central government level (2009-2014). V. Dhananjay Kumar was Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism in 1996 and later served as a Union Minister. D.V. Sadananda Gowda, former Chief Minister of Karnataka, also served different ministerial positions under the two mandates of Modi government (2014-2021). As Tulu-speaking people have had consistent representation in India’s cabinet during the movement’s dates, we code them as junior partners throughout. [2006-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* As per 2011 census, there are 1,846,427 Tulu speakers in India. According to the World Bank, India’s population in 2011 was 1,250 million. [0.0015]

**Regional concentration**

* Tulu-speaking people live over parts of present Karnataka and Kerala (see claimed territory). Small numbers of Tulu speakers are also found in other states in India, with Maharashtra having the highest population of Tulu speakers. Most Tulu-speaking people live in Karnataka (86.39%), where they constitute 2.61% compared to the total population of the state (Census of India 2011). In Karnataka, they reside in two districts, Dakshin Kannada and Udupi, where they make up 48.57% and 31.44% of the local population. Overall, we found no evidence that the Tulu make up an absolute majority in a contiguous spatial territory. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* We did not find evidence of transborder ethnic kin. [no kin]

**Sources**

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Census of India (2011). “Language Atlas of India 2011.” <https://censusindia.gov.in/nada/index.php/catalog/42561> [September 06, 2022].

Deccan Hearald (2006). “Samithi seeks separate Tulu state.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20140419192813/http://archive.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/oct222006/district1955220061020.asp> [July 21, 2022].

Devaiah, Darshan (2021). “Explained: The History of Tulu and the Demand for Official Language Status.” [*Nexis.*](https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1519360&crid=940a5cda-2869-4fc7-931e-9518daf33ea0&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdstartin=&pdsearchterms=tulu+nadu+separate+state&pdtimeline=&pdpsf=&pdquerytemplateid=&pdsf=&ecomp=6dbhkkk&prid=5cbfb452-e88b-4591-a7bb-3c8b254b7261) [September 06, 2022].

Firstpost (2013). “Kamtapur, Tulu Nadu, Harit Pradesh: New States in the Offing?.” July 31. <https://www.firstpost.com/politics/kamtapur-tulu-nadu-harit-pradesh-new-states-in-the-offing-999627.html> [September 06, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Government of Kerala, Department of Tourism. “Tulu Nadu.” <https://www.keralatourism.org/bekal/tulu-nadu.php> [September 06, 2022].

Lexis Nexis. http://www.lexis-nexis.com [July 21, 2022].

Mangalore Today (2016). “Flag Hoisted Demanding Separate Tulu State, Black Day Called.” November 02. <https://www.mangaloretoday.com/main/Flag-hoisted-demanding-seperate-Tulu-state-black-day-called.html> [September 06, 2022].

Roth, C, F. (2015). *Let’s Spilt! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar*, Sacramento: Litwin Books, LLC.

The Hindu (2006). “Tulu Nadu movement gaining momentum.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20120924043309/http://www.hindu.com/2006/08/13/stories/2006081317290300.htm> [July 21, 2022].

The Hindu (2008). “Tulu organizations to meet soon.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20110821030433/http://www.hindu.com/2008/03/06/stories/2008030658140300.htm> [July 21, 2022].

The Hindu (2015). “Demand for Statehood for ‘Tulu Nadu’ Comes to the Fore.” October 16. *Nexis.* [September 06, 2022].

The Hindu (2016). “Vedike demands separate Tulunadu State.” <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/Vedike-demands-separate-Tulunadu-State/article16086768.ece> [July 21, 2022].

The Hindu (2017). “Academy to Push for Tulu in 20 More Schools This Year.” April 15. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/academy-to-push-for-tulu-in-20-more-schools-this-year/article18031617.ece> [September 06, 2022].

The Times of India (2022). “Karnataka: 1 Lakh Postcards to PM Narendra Modi to Push for Tulu Language.” September 06. *Nexis.* [September 06, 2022].

Tulunadu Museum, <http://www.museumoftulunadu.com/projects/> [July 21, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Uttarakhandis

Activity: 1976-2000

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* After India attained independence from the British, Uttarakhand was merged into the state of Uttar Pradesh in in 1949. Destruction of their lands and livelihoods resulted in the formation of separatist sentiment. Fiol (2008: 70) dates the emergence of the Uttarakhand separatist movement to the 1950s and 1960s, but only as of 1976 have we found evidence for organized separatist activity, when a youth group called Uttarakhand Jan Sangharsh Vahini began to pick up the call for an autonomous region (Fiol 2008: 72). Thus, we peg the start date to 1976. Initially the Uttarkhanadi nationalist organizations were distinctly nonviolent, grassroots movements that were mostly village-based cooperatives focusing on land and environmental issues. However, in 1979, the Uttarakhand Revolutionary Front was formed in order to fight for separation from Uttar Pradesh. Emerging protests and outbreaks of violence were met with governmental repression. The division of Uttarakhand from Uttar Pradesh finally took place in 2000. A militant minority was still unsatisfied and aimed for full-fledged sovereignty, but the movement was only of marginal influence and we did not find any evidence of continued demands for more autonomy by the main representatives of the Uttarakhandis (Fiol 2008; Minahan 2002). We thus code an end to the movement when the Uttarakhand state was formed in 2000. [start date: 1976; end date: 2000]

**Dominant claim**

* Several organizations demanded statehood separate from Uttar Pradesh; there were calls for independence, but these appear to come from marginal groupings (Minahan 2002: 1978-1979; Tillin 2011; Moller 2000). [1976-2000: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Although claims for independence were present, they were marginal and cannot be considered politically significant (Minahan 2002: 1978-1979; Tillin 2011; Moller 2000). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Uttarakhandis consists of today’s administrative region Uttarakhand. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found for this movement, and thus it is coded NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Pushed by the Aryans into the hill country, the indigenous peoples were mixed with Tibetans; they were divided into a number of small states in the twelfth century, often warring among themselves. The Panwar dynasty united the hill tribes in 1517, leading to three centuries of prosperity and stability. Silk worms imported from Nepal and Tibet began a tradition of silk production that continued for over 200 years. Mughal emperors moved into the area in the 16th century; the hill states retained their independence but became tributary states to the Mughal court (Minahan 2002: 1976-1977). The two states of Kumaon and Garhwal (the two largest hill states) were united in 1624, but the region slid into anarchy in the late 18th century after wars with Tibet and Nepal. Gorkhas invaded in the early 19th Century, beginning a serious pattern of deforestation. The Uttarakhandis, to escape the ravaging Gorkhas, left their terraced fields and silk worms and escaped to the higher altitudes (Minahan 2002: 1977). The British feared that the Gorkhas would unite with the Sikhs to the west to resist British influence, and sent troops to aid the Uttarakhandis. The British annexed all of Kumaon and half of Garhwal. A small princely state was maintained for the descendants of the Garhwal kings (Minahan 2002: 1977). Organized British loggings for the industrial revolution heavily impacted the area. Large tracts of virgin forests were cleared and then given to immigrants from the overcrowded lowlands. This provoked demonstrations and riots. Kumaon and Garhwal became very active in the Indian independence movement. It should be noted that demands for Uttarakhandi statehood were first advanced during this period, but by the Congress Party; there was no Uttarakhandi statehood movement at this time; similarly, proposals for Uttarakhandi statehood were brought forward at the Indian legislature in 1952 by national parties, which were supported by the Uttarakhandis, but no independent movement existed. Garhwal and Kumaon were two Divisions of Uttar Pradesh. (Minahan 2002: 1977). The ancient trade routes with Tibet were closed in 1950 because of the Chinese occupation of Tibet; however, the brief Indian war against China led to well-developed roads into Uttarakhand, which made deforestation all the easier. Many Uttarakhandi families were dislocated (Minahan 2002: 1978). The deforestation issue led to the emergence of a separatist movement in the 1970s. We code a prior restriction due to the repeated but never implemented proposals for a separate Uttarakhand state. We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Until 2000, when it became a state of its own, Uttarakhand had been part of Uttar Pradesh. Since Uttarakhand makes up a tiny part of Uttar Pradesh and since the Uttarakhandis were “marginalized” within both India and Uttar Pradesh (Minahan 2002: 1975; Tillin 2011), it seems likely that the Uttarakhandis did not have substantial influence over Uttar Pradesh’s government. Hence, changes in Uttar Pradesh’s autonomy status (e.g., the imposition of president’s rule) are not coded as concessions or restrictions since they do not diretly affect the Uttarakhandis.
* In 2000, Uttarakhand attains statehood through the Uttar Pradesh Reorganization Bill (Minahan 2002: 1980). [2000: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Until 2000 when it became a state of its own (this is not coded given the first of January rule: the movement ends in 2000), Uttarakhand had been part of Uttar Pradesh. Since Uttarakhand makes up a tiny part of Uttar Pradesh and since the Uttarakhandis were “marginalized” within both India and Uttar Pradesh (Minahan 2002: 1975; Tillin 2011), it seems likely that the Uttarakhandis did not have substantial influence over Uttar Pradesh’s government. Hence, we do not code regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [2000: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Uttarakhandis |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Hindi (Non SC/ST OBCs); Other Backward Classes (Castes); Scheduled Castes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75005000; 75016000; 75021000 |

**Power access**

* We code the Uttarakhandis as junior partners for several reasons. First, the Uttarakhandis are mostly Hindu (Minahan 2002), and the Hindus have always been (over-)represented in the national executive (Jayal 2006: 152-153, 157). Second, Minahan (2002: 1975) notes that most of them belong to the lower castes, though Wikipedia suggests that a significant part also belongs to the upper castes. Hence, they form part of the Hindus (non SC/ST), the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and the Scheduled Castes. All three groups are coded as included in EPR (though the OBCs are only coded from 1977 onwards). In line with EPR, Jayal (2006: 154, 158) shows that not only the Upper Castes, but also the lower Hindu castes were consistently represented in the cabinet (note: the cabinet is the smaller, more powerful sub-set of India’s executive, the Council of Ministers), and that their representation has even increased since independence. Furthermore, India’s North, where Uttarakhand (and Uttar Pradesh, from which it separated) is located, is also well-represented (Jayal 2006: 155, 159). Finally, we also found evidence for an Uttarakandhi in the union cabinet: N.D. Tiwari served as foreign minister in 1986-1987. [1976-2000: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1975), there are 7,370,000 Uttarakhandis in 2002, which in combination with the Worldbank estimate of India’s total population in 2002 (1,093 million) yields a group size estimate of 0.0067. [0.0067]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1975), almost all Uttarakhandis are located in Uttarakhand, where they make up more than 80% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1975) there are Uttarakhandi communities in neighboring areas of Nepal and Tibet as well as in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. We found no evidence suggesting that they cross the numeric threshold. [no kin]

**Sources**

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Fiol, Stefan Patrick (2008). *Constructing Regionalism: Discourses of Spirituality and Cultural Poverty in the Popular Music of Uttarakhand, North India*. University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, PhD Dissertation.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Moller, Joanne (2000). “Anti-Reservation Protests and the Uttarakhand Pro-Autonomy Movement: Caste and Regional Identities in the Indian Himalayas.” *South Asia Research*, *20*(2): 147-169.

Tillin, Louise (2011). “Questioning Borders: Social Movements, Political Parties and the Creation of New States in India.” *Pacific Affairs* *84*(1): 67-87.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Vidarbhites

Activity: 1947-2020

**General notes**

* The Vidarbhites live in the north-eastern part of Maharashtra state.

**Movement start and end dates**

* We found the first evidence of a separatist Vidarbhite movement in 1938, pre-independence of India. On 1st October 1938, the central provincial legislature passed a resolution to create a separate state of Mahavidarbha. Based on this resolution, the States Reorganisation Committee (SRC) recommended that the Marathi-speaking districts of Madhya Pradesh should constitute a separate state. Based on this, we code 1938 as the start date. In the data set, we code the movement from 1947, the year India attained independence. We found no separatist violence in 1938-1947, and thus note prior non-violent activity (Agrawal 2017; Kumar 2001 and 2013).
* In 1953, a memorandum was submitted by Vidarbhite leaders including M. S. Aney and Brijlal Biyani to the State Reorganization Commission (SRC) for a separate Vidarbha state. Despite this demand being favored in 1956, Vidarbha was merged with the new state of Maharashtra in 1960 (Kumar 2001).
* According to Agrawal (2017), the movement lost in popularity after the 1960s, but the movement did not end. Several different groups and parties including the Vidarbha Jan Andolan Samiti (VJAS) and the Vidarbha Rajya Party continued to demand a separate state.
* The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leadership promised to carve out a Vidarbha state before the 2014 elections. In 2018, as the BJP promise was not fulfilled, nine political parties came together as a united front, the Vidarbha Nirman Mahmanch, to compete in the 2019 elections (Deccan Chronicle 2016; Deshpande 2018; Times of India 2010, 2019 and 2020) [start date: 1938; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Ever since its start, the main demand of the movement has been a separate state within India (see above). [1947-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed for a Vidarbha state is Vidarbha, the north-eastern region of Maharashtra (Chandwani 2021). The region comprises eleven districts: Buldana, Akola, Amravati, Washim, Yavatmal, Wardha, Nagpur, Chandrapur, Bhandara, Gondiya, Garhchiroli. The proposed capital for the state is Nagpur (see Roth 2015: 316; IndiaSpend 2016). We code this claim drawing on GIS data on admin units from GADM.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of violence; thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Vidarbha is the north-eastern region of Maharashtra, which is named after the historical Vidarbha Kingdom that appears in the Mahabharata (Indian epic poem) (Chandwani 2021). During the British period, Vidarbha was part of the province known as Central Provinces and Berar, with Nagpur being its capital (Agarwal 2017). Berar (comprising Vidarbha) and the Central Provinces were merged in 1903 for administrative purposes. The difference in revenue between the two territories led to tensions, resulting in people from Berar to demand the separation from the province (Kumar 2001). In 1938, a resolution was passed for Berar to separate from the province.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1953, the Indian government appointed the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC), which later provided recommendations in favour of the creation of a separate state of Vidarbha in 1955 (Agarwal 2017). In anticipation of the reorganization of states, political leaders began informal discussions on how to carve out a Marathi-speaking state from Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Hyderabad. This led to the signing of the Nagpur Agreement (1953) which, among other things, concerned development needs for the different areas. According to Kumar (2001: 4615), the pact resembled a previous agreement, the Akola Pact (1947), which outlined the existence of the two regions of western Maharasthra and Vidarbha, sharing a common governor but with separate executive, judiciary and legislature. The Nagpur Agreement was recognized constitutionally in the form of Article 371 (1), which provided equitable allocations of funds and the establishment of development boards for Vidarbha and Marathwada (Kumar 2013). We do not code this agreement as concession as it is not concerned with autonomy but economic aspects more broadly.
* When the state of Maharashtra was formed in 1960, Vidarbha and Marathwada were assured their development needs would be taken into consideration. However, years later, development plans still lagged behind. For this reason, in 1994 the President of India issued the State of Maharashtra (Special Responsibility of Governor for Vidarbha, Marathwada and the rest of Maharashtra) Order, instituting three development boards. This included the creation of the Vidarbha Development Board, whose role was to assess the impact of projects in the region and submit an annual reports to the governor of Maharashtra. We do not code this agreement as a concession as it is not concerned with autonomy but economic aspects more broadly.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Vidarbhites make up 20% of the local population in Mahrashtra. according to Wikipedia, Vidarbha has 62 seats out of 288 in the Vidhan Sabha, Maharashtra Legislative Assembly (lower house). Nagpur (Vidarbha) hosts the winter session of the assembly. However, according to Wikipedia, only two chief ministers came from Vidarbha districts, with one of them being Sudhakarrao Naik from Yavatmal district. This is an ambiguous case, but overall we judge the Vidarbhites influence at the regional level too limited for us to code regional autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, India attained independence. This implies a host change. [1947: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Vidarbhite |
| *Scenario* | n: 1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Marathi (non-SC/ST) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75011000 |

**Power access**

* According to EPR, Marathis are junior partners throughout. We follow EPR and code the Vidarbhites as junior partners for several reasons. First, according to the 2011 census, Vidarbhites are mostly Hindu, and the Hindus have always been (over-)represented in the national executive (Jayal 2006: 152-153, 157). Besides, EPR notes that during the Singh and Modi government, ministerial positions were occupied by people from Maharashtra. Finally, we have found evidence of a Vidarbhite (there might be others as well that we could not find) in the union cabinet: Nitin Gadkari has served different ministerial positions since 2014. [1947-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to the 2011 census, Vidarbha has a total population of c. 23,000,000. According to the World Bank, India’s population in 2011 was 1,250 million. [0.0184]

**Regional concentration**

* It is hard to establish the number of Vidarbhites across India. Evidence seems to suggest that most Vidarbhites reside in the geographical area of Vidarbha in Maharashtra. EPR also codes Marathis (the larger group Vidarbhites are part of) as regionally based. However, they do not constitute a majority in the state. According to the 2011 census, the total population of Maharashtra was 112,374,333. Vidarbhites make up roughly 20% of the local population. [not concentrated]
* We could not find data on the number of self-identified Vidarbhites, but given the more regional character of this movement, and that Vidarbhites are generally describes as concentrated in the Vidarbha area of Maharashtra, we code the group as concentrated. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR reports that there are Marathis in Mauritius, but they number only around 20-30,000 and not all will have ties to Vidarbha. According to Wikipedia, there are ca. 100,000 Marathis in the U.S., but again, not all will have ties to Vidarbha. [no kin]

**Sources**

Agrawal, Nikhit Kumar (2017). “Mobilisation in Vidarbha.” *Economic & Political Weekly* 52(39): 47-53.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chandwani, Nikhil (2021). “Separate Vidarbha- Pros and Cons and the Vaccination Drive.” *Times of India.* May 27. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/desires-of-a-modern-indian/separate-vidarbha-pros-and-cons-and-the-vaccination-drive/> [September 06, 2022].

Deccan Chronicle (2016). “Pro-Vidarbha Outfit Sets Jan 1 Deadline, MNS Disrupts Meeting.” September 13. <https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/130916/pro-vidarbha-outfit-sets-jan-1-deadline-mns-disrupts-meeting.html> [September 06, 2022].

Deshpande, Vivek (2018). “Nagpur: Nine Political Parties Unite to Demand Separate Statehood for Vidarbha.” *Indian Express.* November 28. *Nexis.* [September 06, 2022].

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Government of Maharashtra. “Districtwise Total & Tribal Population”. <https://trti.maharashtra.gov.in/index.php/en/districtwise-total-tribal-population> [September 06, 2022].

IndiaSpend (2016). “Dividing Maharashtra: Vidarbha = Serbia; Konkan = Cuba.” *IndiaSpend.* <https://www.indiaspend.com/dividing-maharashtra-vidarbha-serbia-konkan-cuba-27046/> [July 10, 2023].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kumar, Ajit (2001) “Statehood for Vidarbha.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 36(50): 4614-4617.

Kumar, Ajit (2013). “Aricle 37(2) and the Receding Demand for Vidarbha State.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 48(4): 71-76.

Lexis Nexis. http://www.lexis-nexis.com [July 21, 2022].

Roth, C, F. (2015). *Let’s Spilt! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar*, Sacramento: Litwin Books, LLC.

Times of India (2019). “Most Vidarbha MPs, MLAs Favour Statehood.” January 14. *Nexis.* [September 06, 2022].

Times of India (2019). “Vidarbha Statehood Forgotten in 2019 Polls.” April 11. *Nexis.* [September 06, 2022].

Times of India (2020). “City Police Quell Attempted Vidarbha Statehood Stir.” February 27. *Nexis.* [September 06, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Western Uttari

Activity: 1996-2020

**General notes**

* Western Uttar Pradesh is ethnically heterogeneous. The movement is regionally defined.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Occasionally, demands for a Western Uttar Pradesh state were made starting in the 1930s, which saw demands for a separate state in Western Uttar Pradesh to protect the cultural and other interests of Hindu Jats, one of the larger or even the largest group in Western Uttar Pradesh. In 1954, a demand for the creation of Western Uttar Pradesh was made in the context of federal re-organization; the proposed territory would also have included parts of Haryana. The demand was raised again in the Uttar Pradesh (UP) assembly in the 1970s. However, there was no sustained, organized movement until the 1990s (Singh 2001: 2962).
* In 1996, the Kisan Vikas Party (KVP) was formed, which demanded the creation of a separate state. After a bad performance in the 1996 UP assembly elections, the party was dissolved. Yet, the demand was a separate Western UP state continued to be raised by several political parties and organizations in subsequent years, including the Bharatiya Kisan Kamgar Party (BKKP), the the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), the Pashchimi Uttar Pradesh Rajya Nirman Morcha (PUPRNM; Western Uttar Pradesh State Formation Front) and Harit Pradesh Nirman Samiti (HPNS) (Singh 2001: 2961f).
* The movement was given a boost by the creation of three new states elsewhere in India in 2000 (Washington Post 2001).
* The movement remains active as of 2020 (Hindustan Times 2019).
* Over the years, varying names have been given to the proposed Western UP state including Doab Pradesh, Ganna Pradesh, Kisan Pradesh, Jatistan, Brij Pradesh, Pashchimanchal, and Harit Pradesh (Singh 2001: 2961). The exact territorial scope differs. According to the Hindustan Times (2019), the concept that is now the most popular is ‘Greater Delhi’, which includes 17 districts of western UP (Meerut, Baghpat, Shamli, Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Bijnor, Moradabad, Sambhal, Amroha, Hapur, Ghaziabad, Noida, Bulandshahr, Aligarh, Hathras, Mathura and Agra) will be merged with existing Delhi state. A selected part of New Delhi where Parliament, embassies are situated could be declared Union Territory. [start date: 1996; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Ever since its start, the main demand of the movement has been a separate state within India (see above). [1996-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Over the years, varying names have been given to the proposed Western UP state including Doab Pradesh, Ganna Pradesh, Kisan Pradesh, Jatistan, Brij Pradesh, Pashchimanchal, and Harit Pradesh (Singh 2001: 2961).
* According to Singh (2001: 2961), the dominant demand in the movement’s initial phase was for a territory including 23 UP districts: Agra, Mainpuri, Firozabad, Aligarh, Bareilly, Badaun, Bulandshahr, Etah, Mathura, Meerut, Ghaziabad, Moradabad, Pilibhit, Rampur, Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Bijnor, Hardwar, Shahjahanpur, Mahamaya Nagar, Baghpat, Gautambudha Nagar, and Jyotiba Phule Nagar.
* According to the Hindustan Times (2019), the concept that is now the most popular is ‘Greater Delhi’, which includes 17 districts of western UP (Meerut, Baghpat, Shamli, Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Bijnor, Moradabad, Sambhal, Amroha, Hapur, Ghaziabad, Noida, Bulandshahr, Aligarh, Hathras, Mathura and Agra) will be merged with existing Delhi state.
* We code the former until 2019 and the latter from 2020 onwards, using GIS data on admin units from GADM for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of violence; thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The state of Uttar Pradesh is an “artefact” consisting largely of territories which were brought under colonial administration by conquest and annexation between 1775 and 1856. Originally, there were two administrative units there; the north-west province (Agra) and Awadh. In 1902, they were merged under the name of Agra and Awadh (later: United Provinces). The autonomous princely states of Rampur and Tehri Garhwal were added in 1949 and in 1950 the province was again renamed into Uttar Pradesh (Northern Province). Originally, there were 51 districts in UP. By 1997, there were 82 districts. After Uttarakhand’s separation in 2000, UP is left with 70 districts. UP is India’s most populous state. Western Uttar Pradesh does not have a special status within UP (Singh 2001).

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

* Western UP is represented in UP’s regional government, though separatist claim they are under-represented. Western UP does not have a special status within UP, however (Singh 2001). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Western Uttari |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Hindi (Non SC/ST OBCs); Other Backward Classes (Castes); Scheduled Castes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 75005000; 75016000; 75021000 |

**Power access**

* The people from Western UP are mostly Hindu (ca. 75%), and the Hindus have always been (over-)represented in the national executive (Jayal 2006: 152-153, 157). We found evidence for several cabinet members from Western UP including Mulayam Singh Yadav (defence 1996-8), Santosh Gangwar (various roles 2014-21), and S. P. Singh Baghel (state and law 2021-). [junior partner]

**Group size**

* We could not find figures on the number of self-identified people from Western UP. We rely on Wikipedia, which cites a figure of 71,217,132 based on the 2011 census. This refers to a total of 30 districts. India’s total population was 1,210,854,977 in the 2011 census. [0.0588]

**Regional concentration**

* The movement is regionally defined. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

**Sources**

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hindustan Times (2019). “Harit Pradesh passé, demand for ‘Greater Delhi’ picks up pace.” <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/harit-pradesh-passe-demand-for-greater-delhi-picks-up-pace/story-ySbOcLKZDt8v0iYIMFYJZI.html> [January 26, 2023].

Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2006). *Representing India. Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Singh, Jagpal (2001). “Politics of Harit Pradesh: The Case of Western UP as a Separate State.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 36(31): 2961-296.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

Washington Post (2001). “Unhappy With the State They're In.” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/07/08/unhappy-with-the-state-theyre-in/28e6b9b2-4a52-4b33-8b57-46e53b0a729e/> [January 26, 2023].

Wikipedia. Western Uttar Pradesh. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Uttar_Pradesh> [January 26, 2023].