# INDONESIA

## Acehnese

Activity: 1950-2005

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Acehnese rebel leaders declared Aceh independent of Indonesia on February 11, 1950. This is the first evidence of separatist mobilization we have found and therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1950.
* In 1953, a rebellion led by All-Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA) leader Daud Beureueh broke out in resistance to the central governement’s rule. Low-level violence continued until 1962 (Ross 2005).
* In 1957, Aceh became a full province and in 1959, Aceh was given “special region” status with autonomy in customary law, religious and educational affairs.
* The grievances of the Acehnese grew as Suharto’s New Order policy began to tighten its control over the religion, society, and economy of the region after 1969. In 1976, the Aceh-Sumatra Liberation Front (ASNLF, later known as Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM), pronounced the independence of the region. Subsequent years saw significant violence (Gurr 2000; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 11f, 129f; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 4ff, 2002: 25ff; MAR; UCDP/PRIO; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).
* In 2005 the GAM signed a peace deal with Jakarta that led to far-reaching autonomy. Subsequently GAM surrendered its separatist intentions, disbanded and transformed into political parties (in particular: the Independent Aceh Movement Party) (e.g., TRAC; Ansori 2012). Ex-combatants from GAM remain a force in Aceh politics in the post-conflict era (e.g., Ikramatoun et al. 2019), but we found no evidence for claims for increased self-rule after 2005, thus 2005 is coded as end date. [start date: 1950; end date: 2005]

**Dominant claim**

* In the initial phase, the Aceh movement was focused on religion and the Darul Islam, its main organization, did not seek to separate Aceh from Indonesia but rather aimed to make Indonesia an Islamic state (Aspinall 2007: 245). With the defeat of Darul Islam and the granting of a special autonomy status, the Acehnese leaders “agreed to ‘regionalise’ their demands”, gave up the country-wide battle over shari’a and turned to the question of Aceh’s autonomy (Aspinall 2007: 252). Minahan (2002: 27) also states that autonomy was the dominant claim in 1958. Speaking of the 1953-1962 insurgency, Ross (2005: 39) states that: “[…] Aceh was the site of a 1953-62 rebellion led by Teungku Daud Beureueh. Importantly, the rebellion did *not* call for Acehnese independence, but rather, greater local autonomy and a stronger role for Islam in the national government.” [1950-1975: autonomy claim]
* In the 1970s, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), the Free Aceh Movement, emerged and replaced Islam with nationalism as the ideological basis. The organization sought Aceh’s complete independence (also confirmed by the Minorities at Risk Project), as illustrated by the 1976 declaration of independence (Aspinall 2007: 255). The claim for independence was emphasized in 1999, when over 100,000 Acehnese demanded a referendum on secession (Minahan 2002: 29). In 2005 GAM renounced its separatist intentions (e.g. TRAC; Ansori 2012). We code this claim from 1976, in contravention of the Jan 1 rule, because violence escalated after the independence declaration (see below). [1976-2005: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* Despite Minahan noting independence declarations, we do not code an independence claim in the initial phase because there is no further supporting evidence. All sources we consulted suggest that the movement was initially autonomist only (Aspinall 2007: 245; Ross 2005: 39). [start date: 1976; end date: 2005]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Acehnese consists of the current Aceh province in Indonesia. A map can be found in Roth (2015: 362). We code this claim using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas Database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Minahan (2002: 27) notes an independence declaration in February 1950, but we did not find any supportive evidence; moreover, the dominant claim at the time was for autonomy. Hence, we do not code a declaration in 1950.
* Minahan (2016: 481) reports another independence declaration in September 1953; we found supporting evidence (CNN 2003). Yet, CNN suggests the declaration was made by Daud Beureueh, who led the Darul Islam rebellion, which was autonomist but not secessionist. We code an autonomy declaration, but noting that this coding decision is ambiguous. [1953: autonomy declaration]
* A declaration of independence was issued on December 4, 1976 (Aspinall 2007: 255). Supported by a large portion of the population, Aceh separatist leader Hassan di Tiro proclaimed independence of Aceh one month later on 4 January 1977 (Minahan 2000: 28). The government responded with repressive measures, killing several leaders of the Free Aceh Movement. Since the official document was issued in December 1976, and since all other sources refer to this date, we code an independence declaration in 1976. [1976: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We code 1953 as HVIOLSD following Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). This is in connection with the Darul Islam revolt. According to the SSW coding notes, the Darul Islam “had its main strength in the Aceh province” though “it should be seen as separate from the Acehnese independence movement because the Darul-Islam movement called for local autonomy rather than independence and the actors were different.” The 1953 episode also included fighting in West Java, but the coding notes suggest that the HVIOLSD threshold was likely met for Aceh.
* The Darul Islam revolt reached HVIOLSD level again between 1956 and 1960 according to Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). It should be noted that this war was not limited to Aceh; however, we could not find disaggregated casualty data. Whether violence reached the HVIOLSD level in Aceh is therefore ambiguous, but the SSW coding notes would suggest so as total number of deaths is >30,000.
* We code LVIOLSD in 1954-1955 and in 1961-1962. The 1961 coding is based on UCDP/PRIO, which codes violence related to Darul Islam as ongoing in that year. The other LVIOLSD codes are based on the following account in Ross (2005: 39): “Aceh was the site of a 1953-62 rebellion led by Teungku Daud Beureueh. Importantly, the rebellion did not call for Acehnese independence, but rather, greater local autonomy and a stronger role for Islam in the national government.” We could not find any casualty estimates, but Ross would suggest there was sustained violence. We choose to code this way to avoid a bogus de- and re-escalation.
  + Note: violence associated with the Darul Islam revolt had mixed/partly center-seeking motives (creation of an Islamic State).
* We code LVIOLSD in 1976-1979 based on evidence from Ross (2005: 36), who suggest there were more than 100 casualties during those years attributable to a conflict with GAM. UCDP/PRIO does not include this episode, but they do refer to substantial violence in their coding notes, which confirm that there were clashes after an independence declaration in 1976. According to UCDP, “By 1979, most GAM members were exiled, imprisoned, or executed.” Furthermore, Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) suggest separatist armed conflict from 1977 onward and, finally, he quinquennial MAR rebellion score is three in 1975-1979, suggesting a local rebellion.
* Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) suggest separatist armed conflict throughout the 1980s. We could not find any other indication of separatist armed conflict in any other source, including qualitative sources (e.g. Ross 2005) until 1989, when a reinvented GAM emerged and engaged in clashes. The MAR rebellion score is five in that year, pointing to “intermediate guerilla activity”, but UCDP/PRIO would suggest the number of battle-related deaths was below 25. We do not code LVIOLSD, but this is an ambiguous decision.
* The HVIOLSD codings for 1990-91 and 1999-2005 follow Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) suggest ongoing armed conflict in-between those years. However, no other source reports any substantial violence; according to the SSW coding notes, 1992-1998 saw very few civil war deaths while UCDP/PRIO records just 7. Ross (2005: 2005: 44) suggests by the end of 1991, “many of GAM’s field commanders had been captured or killed […] Although human rights violations continued after 1993, only a handful of additional deaths were recorded.”
* [1950-1952: NVIOLSD; 1953: HVIOLSD; 1954-1955: LVIOLSD; 1956-1960: HVIOLSD; 1961-1962: LVIOLSD; 1963-1975: NVIOLSD; 1976-1979: LVIOLSD; 1980-1988: NVIOLSD; 1979: LVIOLSD; 1990-1991: HVIOLSD; 1992-1998: NVIOLSD; 1999-2005: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Despite Dutch colonialization, the Aceh Sultanate had been able to keep hold of its 500 year lasting autonomy until 1873 when the Dutch colonial government declared war on Aceh and set off the longest and bloodiest war in Dutch colonial history (Minahan 2002: 27). Dutch military rule was finally established in 1903, when the Sultanate surrendered. However, the collective identity and experience of Acehnese was reaffirmed and resistance continued nevertheless until World War II. A mass uprising in March 1942 brought down the Dutch regime shortly before the Japanese occupied Sumatra. Japanese forces arrived in Aceh on March 12 (Bertrand 2004: 165).
* Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Dutch attempts to regain control of their colonies in the East Indies were again met with fierce resistance by the Acehnese that finally resulted in inclusion as an autonomous state in a united, federal Indonesia in 1949. Rejecting the incorporation at first, Acehnese ended up accepting and even endorsing it, as they were promised (and granted) widespread autonomy (Minahan 2002: 27; Graf et al. 2010). Although efforts to turn the country into a unitary state quickly emerged and aggrieved the Acehnese, we code a (prior) concession since Aceh was granted autonomy in 1949. [1949: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Dutch imposition of a federal system was widely objected in Indonesia. In 1950, Indonesia returned to a unitary form of government (Ferrazzi 2000: 66-67). Despite the unitary form of government, the provinces retained some autonomy. However, Aceh’s provincial status was removed in 1950. Aceh was included in the larger Province of North Sumatra (Graf et al. 2010; Minahan 2002). The transition to a unitary state took place in August while the SDM had emerged in February 1950 (see above). [1950: autonomy restriction]
* The Indonesian government reinstated Aceh’s provincial status and gave back military regional command in late 1956 in order to undermine the nationalist movement and appease the rebellion that had broken out three year before (Minahan 2002: 27; Bertrand 2004: 167). The Minorities at Risk Project gives 1957 as the year of the concession. However, our own research suggested that Law No. 24/1956 on the *Establishment of Autonomy of Aceh Province and the Amendment to the Regulation of North Sumatra Province Establishment* was passed in 1956. [1956: autonomy concession]
  + Note: we code an onset of full-scale civil war in 1956 based on Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, who peg the start of the war to December 1956. The late start of the war within the calendar year makes it likely that the concession was at least initiated, if not fully implemented, by the time the war started. Therefore, the concession likely occurred before the onset of the war.
* In 1957, Jakarta introduced legislation which granted the regions increased autonomy, including the right to elect its own leaders (Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1957: autonomy concession]
* In 1959 Sukarno declared a state of emergency and ended parliamentary democracy. Under Sukarno’s system of “Guided Democracy”, the regions were stripped from most of their powers (Ferrazzi 2000: 67; Kimura 2013: 47-48; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). However, in contrast to the other regions, Aceh was not only able to retain its autonomy, but even to increase it. In 1959 and in response to Acehnese rebellion, the central government granted Aceh the status of a “special region/territory” with considerable autonomy in customary law, religious and educational affairs (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 27; Aspinall 2007: 252; Bertrand 2004: 167). Furthermore, a council of religious scholars was established in order to maintain the dominance of Islamic principles in all aspects of Acehnese social life (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 12). [1959: autonomy concession]
* Under Suharto’s (1965-1998) New Order, a centralized government was steadily established, following the regimes advocacy of “unity and nationalism” (Ferrazzi 2000: 67-68). Suharto tightened the constraints on Aceh continuously and made its special status fade rapidly due to centralization of political, economic and military power. We code two “New Order” restrictions: the first coincides with Suharto’s take-over in 1965, which initiated the end of Aceh’s autonomy, and the second is coced in 1974 to coincide with the “autonomy” law (see below). [1965: autonomy restriction]
* While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50). According to Kell (1995: 32), the 1974 law on regional administration “laid the ground for a tightening of central control over the composition of regional administrations” and was the very legislation that defined the theoretical extent of Acehnese autonomy. We consider this “antidote to disintegrative forces” as one of the most relevant acts in a series of restrictions under Suharto and therefore code a restriction in 1974. [1974: autonomy restriction]
* Note: In 1971, large reserves of liquified natural gas (LNG) were discovered in Aceh (Lhok Seumawe). Immediately, Jakarta took over the management of the exploitation, and established industrial enclaves where most of the LNG reserves were located (Bertrand 2004: 170). This may be a restriction, but it is not clear whether Aceh previously had autonomy regarding natural resources.
* In November 1999, the newly elected president of Indonesia, Abdurraham Wahid, held talks with the Free Aceh Movement. With demands for an independence referendum similar to East-Timor mounting, he declared his willingness to allow such a referendum, but stepped back only a few days later, saying that the options in the referendum would only consist of greater autonomy and the status quo (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 12). No such referendum was ever held. However, at this point a decentralization process had been initiated already. In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions (unlike the 1974 law), but similar to the 1974 “New Order” legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1999: autonomy concession]
  + Note: we code a separatist violence onset in 1999. UCDP/PRIO records the first fatalities already in January 1999 (and a smaller number in 1998), suggesting the violence came before the concession in May.
* A cease-fire agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2000. It was widely regarded as a humanitarian rather than as a political agreement and was signed by the secessionists in the hopes that the human rights violations would end (Minahan 2002: 30). The MoU is not coded as a concession as it did not include devolution of powers and did not affect the autonomy status of the Acehnese.
* In August 2001, President Megawati Soekarnoputri enacted the Law on Special Autonomy for the Province Naggro Aceh Darussalam (NAD). It offered broad autonomy to the Province of Aceh and a greater share of income from its natural resources, previewing a 70 per cent share for Aceh’s oil and gas revenues (Wenmann and Krause 2009). Furthermore, it granted Aceh the right to establish its local government in line with local traditions and to base the legal system on the Sharia. [2001: autonomy concession]
* Due to difficulties with the implementation of the 1999 decentralization laws, the 1999 laws were revised and replaced with two new laws in 2004. The 2004 legislation enhanced the provinces’ autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]
* Increasing international pressure led to the signing of another MoU between the central government and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in August 2005. The MoU granted “widespread autonomy to the province, greater control over the province's natural resources, increased participation in reconstruction efforts [Aceh was hit hardest by the 2004 Tsunami], GAM decommissioning, amnesty for GAM fighters, and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission”. The implementation of the MoU is monitored by a Monitoring Mission with participation from the EU and ASEAN (Minorities at Risk Project). The MoU ended the 1999-2005 civil war (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). [2005: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Aceh was granted the status of an autonomous republic upon incorporation in Indonesia in 1949. This status was removed only one year later but reinstated in 1956. In the intermediate six years, the Aceh rebellion emerged in which the Acehnese rebels “were not able to seize power in Aceh” (Graf et al. 2010). Following the first of January rule, we therefore code regional autonomy for 1950 and again as of 1957. Aceh’s autonomy became toothless with Suharto’s take-over in 1965. [1950: regional autonomy; 1957-1965: regional autonomy]
* January 1, 2001, the 1999 decentralization laws went into effect; the same year Aceh was granted a special autonomy statute. [2001-2005: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Aceh was incorporated into independent Indonesia in 1949. This was before the start date and is thus not coded.
* Aceh was merged with North Sumatra in 1950. [1950: sub-state merger]
* In 1956 Aceh regained province status. [1956: sub-state secession]
* Aceh’s special autonomous status was eroded with Suharto’s take-over. [1965: abolishment of regional autonomy]
* The 1999 decentralization laws went into effect January 1, 2001. [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Acehnese |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Acehnese |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85001000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1950-2004: powerless; 2005: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* The Acehnese are concentrated in the region of Aceh, where they make up 90% of the population (Minahan 2002: 25). This amounts to 3.96 million Acehnese (in 2002), or almost all Acehnese in the whole of Indonesia in that same year (3.97 million). Regional concentration is also confirmed by MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR and MAR I-IV. The only main source that mentions kin groups is the more recent MAR V, which states that the Acehnese have “close kindred in one country which adjoins its regional base” without giving details where this group lives. Additional research (see Missbach 2011) has shown that there is indeed a significant Acehnese community in Malaysia. According to Missbach (2011) the number of Acehnese in Malaysia remains unknown, but certainly exceeds the 24,000 that are often mentioned. Nevertheless, the number of Acehnese in Malaysia seems to not exceed 100,000. [no kin]

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## Ambonese

Activity: 1950-1950

**General notes**

* The Ambonese are also referred to as South Moluccans.

**Movement start and end dates**

* South Moluccan nationalism in the early twentieth century focused on the creation of a separate Christian state in union with the Netherlands. Vehemently opposed to Muslim rule, the Ambonese joined the Dutch forces in fighting the Indonesian nationalists from 1946-49. After Indonesia’s independence in 1949, a secessionist war erupted in 1950. We begin to code the movement in 1950 as the previous activity involved the Ambonese fighting with the Dutch against the Muslims and not for their own state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 129f, 276f; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996: 536ff, 2002: 97ff; Snyder 1982). [start date: 1950; end date: 1950]
* Following defeat in the 1950 war, many Ambonese left their ancient homeland to resettle in the Netherlands. The movement continued to be active, but all activity appears to be in the Netherlands. Therefore, we code an end to the movement in 1950.
  + Additional information: the Ambonese movement resurfaced in 1975 and from 1975-77 Ambonese staged several hijackings, occupations and arsons in the Netherlands. Five Dutch and six Ambonese were killed in these confrontations. News reports indicate that the South Moluccan self-determination movement has been active in the Netherlands up to 2012.

**Dominant claim**

* See above. [1950: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1950; end date: 1950]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ambonese consists of the South Moluccas, i.e., 150 islands with Ceram, Ambon, and Buru as the main islands (Roth 2015: 373). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 362) using the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* April 25, 1950, the Ambonese leadership declared the independence of the Republic of the South Moluccas and appealed to the UN and the Dutch government for support. For the next couple of months, South Molucca was de-facto independent from Indonesia (Minahan 2012: 10; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 277). [1950: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD in 1950 coding follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). [1950: HVIOLSD]
  + Note that while we code a war in the first year, the description in Minahan (2002: 99) suggests a sequence of events starting with nonviolent claims that quickly escalated to violence. “The Indonesian government, soon after independence, began to centralize the government over the objections of the peoples other than the central island of Java. In 1950 the Ambonese announced their intention to secede from Indonesia. The Indonesian government retaliated by dissolving the local administration and imposing direct rule from Djakarta. The Dutch-trained Ambonese army rebelled and drove the Indonesians from the southern islands.”

**Historical context**

* The southern islands of the Banda Sea were originally the home of the Afuros, a Papuan people, before they were displaced by early Malay settlers. Valued for their produce and spices, the islands were converted to Islam by Islamic traders, before the Portuguese defeated the Muslim rulers and won a virtual monopoly on the spice trade. The Dutch won the islands from Portugal in 1605 and annexed the Southern Moluccas in 1660. Since most South Moluccans converted to Protestant Christianity, they were a favored people of the Dutch colonizers. The Ambonese were significantly better educated during colonization than their Muslim neighbors and remained fervently pro-Dutch. During World War II, the Ambonese fought alongside of the Dutch against the Japanese and against the mainly Muslim Indonesian nationalists from 1945 to 1949 (Minahan 2012: 8-10). A 1949 settlement incorporated South Molucca into the loose federation of autonomous states that Indonesia had been envisioned as (Minahan 2012: 10; Ferrazzi 2000: 66). [1949: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Dutch imposition of a federal system was widely objected in Indonesia. In 1950, Indonesia returned to a unitary form of government (Ferrazzi 2000: 66-67). While the provinces retained some autonomy, the return to a unitary form of government is coded as an autonomy restriction. In response to the centralization, South Molucca declared its independence. Subsequently, the Indonesian government dissolved the local administration and imposed direct rule (Minahan 2012: 10). The transition to a unitary state took place in August while the SDM had clearly emerged by April 1950 (see above). The narrative in Minahan (2002: 99) suggests that the restriction occurred prior to the violence onset. [1950: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Initially, Indonesia had a federal system and South Molucca autonomy. [1950: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Indonesia gained independence in December 1949/January 1950. Since South Molucca only became de-facto independent after its declaration of independence in April 1950, de facto independence ended in November (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 277) and since we stop coding the movement at the end of 1950, we do not code a period of de-facto independence (first of January rule).

**Major territorial changes**

* There was a host change in 1949 (decolonization and incorporation into Indonesia), but this was before the start date.
* See above. [1950: establishment & revocation of de-facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ambonese |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Amboinese |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85002000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-exclusion = powerless. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.0042]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 97), the vast majority of Indonesia’s South Moluccans (Ambonese) is located in the South Molucca islands (Maluku province) in eastern Indonesia, where they make up a relative majority of 44% of the local population. According to Minahan (2002: 100) there was Muslim in-migration starting in 1954 that turned the Christian majority into a Muslim majority. The Ambonese are largely Christian. When exactly the Ambonese became a minority/lost their absolute majority status in the province is not clear, but according to Minahan it must have been before the 1990s (see p. 100). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR. We found no evidence for close kindred in other sources either, except for 50,000 Ambonese refugees in the Netherlands, which is below the threshold (Minahan 2002: 97). [no kin]

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## Balinese

Activity: 1999-2020

**General notes**

* Unlike Indonesia’s majority, the Balinese mostly practice a special form of Hinduism, Balinese Hinduism. The Balinese have their own language, Balinese, but many also speak Indonesian. Bali’s population is 3.9 million (Erviani 2013).

**Movement start and end dates**

* Erviani (2013) reports that a number of prominent politicians and academics launched a campaign to push for special autonomy in 2005 and that “[t]he public pressure to have special autonomy status spread widely” over the next years.
* Ramstedt (2009: 331) provides similar evidence, but suggests that Bali had made “a formal call for special autonomy status for the Province of Bali” already in 2004.
* Picard (2005: 111) suggests an even earlier start date: “[o]n 27 September 1999, the Jakarta Post ran an article titled ‘Bali wants special status’, opening with the following statement: ‘Community leaders have urged the province’s newly elected regional representatives to the People’s Consultative Assembly to seek special status for the province be granted.’” In 2001, Balinese leaders repeated their calls, according to Picard (2005: 114).
* Based on this, we code 1999 as the start date, the earliest evidence of organized separatist activity we found.
* In 2007, Bali’s regional government drafted a proposal outlining why Bali should be granted a special form of autonomy. The special autonomy regime they aim at would involve a greater degree of independent decision-making, greater control over the region’s natural resources and over revenues stemming from tourism (The Bali Times 2007).
* Erviani (2013) reports that the Balinese “continue to fight for special autonomy status for their province, following years of being ignored by the central government.” The Balinese are, in particular, asking for more financial autonomy, as they see themselves as the “milking cow” of Jakarta (Karazija 2012). [start date: 1999; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The evidence we have found suggests that the dominant claim is for a special form of autonomy within Indonesia. Thus far, Bali has not been granted special autonomy (Ramstedt 2009: 331). [1999-2020: autonomy claim]
  + In 2007, Bali’s regional government drafted a proposal outlining why Bali should be granted a special form of autonomy. The special autonomy regime they aim at would involve a greater degree of independent decision-making, greater control over the region’s natural resources and over revenues stemming from tourism (The Bali Times 2007).
  + Erviani (2013) reports that the Balinese “continue to fight for special autonomy status for their province, following years of being ignored by the central government.” Furthermore, Erviani reports that “[t]he public pressure to have special autonomy status spread widely at least 8 years ago. In 2005, a number of prominent politicians and academics launched a campaign to push for special autonomy.”
  + Ramstedt (2009: 331), however, notes that already in 2004, Bali made “a formal call for special autonomy status for the Province of Bali.”
  + And Picard (2005: 111) notes that there were claims already in 1999: “[o]n 27 September 1999, the *Jakarta Post* ran an article titled ‘Bali wants special status’, opening with the following statement: ‘Community leaders have urged the province’s newly elected regional representatives to the People’s Consultative Assembly to seek special status for the province be granted.’”
  + In 2001, Balinese leaders repeated their calls, according to Picard (2005: 114).

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Balinese is the Bali province, an island in Indonesia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold, hence a NVIOLSD code. Note: the 2002 bombing that had killed more than 200 people was not over separatism. Similarly, the 2005 bombing that killed 20 was not over separatism either. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1959 a long cycle of centralization began with the introduction of Sukarno’s system of “Guided Democracy” (Ferrazzi 2000: 67; Kimura 2013: 47-48; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). Under his “New Order” (1965-1998), Suharto continued and even intensified the centralization policy initiated by his predecessor (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5). While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50).
* In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, but similar to the 1974 “New Order” legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). We code this as a prior concession since the first evidence for SD mobilization we could find was in September 1999. [1999: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The implementation of the decentralization laws was tricky and chaotic, mainly due to an indeterminate allocation of competencies between the provincial and the district level. 2004 legislation enhanced the provinces’ autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* See above. [2001-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The 1999 decentralization laws, implemented on January 1, 2001, gave the provinces significant autonomy (see above). [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Balinese |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Balinese |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85003000 |

**Power access**

* The Balinese are not included in EPR in 1999-2014.
* According to the EPR coding notes, the Javanese dominated the Indonesian polity until 2004, when the government became much more ethnically inclusive. Thus we code the Balinese as excluded (powerless) until and including 2004.
* In 2004, the Indonesian executive became much more ethnically inclusive. This is reflected in EPR, which begins to code an ethnic power-sharing system in 2005, with the Javanese as senior partner and a number of different groups as junior partners (including the Acehnese, the Malays and the Sundanese). According to the EPR documentation this appears to apply to the Balinese too. Specifically, the EPR documentation reports a Balinese cabinet member in the ‘Second United Cabinet’ (2009-2014) (Jero Wacik, initially Culture and Tourism minister (see The Jakarta Post 2009) and later, after a cabinet reshuffle, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources). The same guy, Jero Wacik, was also in the First United Cabinet, where he had the rank of a state minister (also for Culture and Tourism, see The Jakarta Post 2004). EPR includes the Balinese from 2015 onwards and codes them as junior partner. In sum, Indonesia’s post-2004 cabinets were clearly more ethnically inclusive and the Balinese had some limited representation in 2004-2012. The extent of representation was limited (only one minister), but on the other hand the Balinese also make up but 1.5% of the population (see above). To reflect the change to a more inclusive style of government in 2005, we code the Balinese with junior partner from 2005 onwards. [1999-2004: powerless; 2005-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* EPR suggest a group size of 1%. Yet, according to the 2000 census, the Balinese number approximately 3.1 million (Minority Rights Group International). The same census pegged Indonesia’s population at 206 million, suggesting a group size of 1.5%. [0.015]

**Regional concentration**

* The vast majority of the Balinese is located in Bali, where the Balinese make up approx. 90% of the local population (MRGI; Suryadinatta et al. 2003: 70). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Hindus e.g. in India can be considered kin. [kin in non-adjacent country]

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## Dayaks

Activity: 1953-1957

**General notes**

* Dayak is a collective term referring to non-Muslim indigenous peoples of the island of Borneo.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for separatist activity we have found is in 1953, when an organization called the Indonesian Dayak Kaharingan Society (SKDI, Serikat Kaharingan Dajak Indonesia) demanded the establishment of an autonomous Great Dayak region. Soon after this, fighting broke out in Indonesian Borneo between ethnic Dayaks and Christians. In 1957, a new province was created called Kalimantan Tengah, which appears to have ended the movement (Minahan 2002: 521ff, 2016: 123f; MRGI; van Klinken 2006; William & Robert 1993). [start date: 1953; end date: 1957]
* Dayaks claims for land rights and autonomy resurged in the 1970s and 1980s. This mobilization occurred in parallel with other indigenous groups, and therefore we have included this activity as part of the umbrella Indigenous People’s SDM.

**Dominant claim**

* The Dayak people at early 1950s were mostly against the defederalization of Indonesia, including the annulment of DIKB and Great Dayak, and against the Javanese domination in politics (Minahan 2016: 124). Hence their main claim is to restore the autonomy rights they briefly had in the United States of Indonesia in 1950 (Tanasaldy 2012: 95). [1953-1957: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* According to Minority Rights Group International, Dayaks sought government recognition of a “Great Dayak territory” in 1953. ‘Great Dayak’ refers to the constituent state of the United States of Indonesia, which located in the central and southern parts of Kalimantan with the capital in Banjarmasin. Great Dayak was dissolved in 1950 and became part of Kalimantan Province. The former territory of Great Dayak was first assigned to South Kalimantan, and in 1957, to Central Kalimantan, where it remains today. We code this claim using GIS data on admin units from GADM for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* According to Minahan (2016: 124), “Rebels attempted to create a Dayak state in 1953 but were quickly defeated, though the rebellion resumed in 1956.” We could not find more specific information, such as casualty reports. As it is not clear whether the LVIOLSD threshold was met, we code NVIOLSD throughout. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* At the end of the Second World War, Indonesia would soon establish its independence. In order to get more support from local indigenous people, the newly restored pro-Dutch federal government opened opportunities for Dayaks to organize politically (Klinken 2006). On 12 May 1947, the autonomous region of West Kalimantan was established. Thus, the government accommodated Dayak political aspirations by ensuring their representation in government bodies for the first time in the province’s history. It established a council to look after Dayak affairs and allowed Dayaks to form a political party. It also helped Dayaks to get a better bargaining position vis-à-vis their former masters, the Malay sultanates. As a result many Dayak leaders accepted the pro-Dutch government and were generally not supportive of the nationalist movements emanated from Java (Tanasaldy 2012: 3). [1947: autonomy concession]
* In early 1950, pressure mounted for West Kalimanatan to be merged with independent Indonesia. The unification took place in April 1950. West Kalimanatan (DKIB) was disbanded in August 1950 and subsequently Dayak people were excluded from politics (Tanasaldy 2012: 21). [1950: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Dayaks make up a relative majority in West Kalimantan, one of Indonesia’s Borneo provinces, and a significant share of other Borneo provinces, in particular Central Kalimantan. Therefore, changes in West Kalimantan’s level of autonomy are coded as concessions or restrictions. In 1957, [South Kalimantan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Kalimantan) was divided to provide the Dayak population with greater autonomy from the [Muslim](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim) population in the province. President Sukarno appointed the Dayak-born national hero Tjilik Riwut as the first Governor and [Palangkaraya](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palangkaraya) the provincial capital. This is also accounted by Tanasaldy (2012), who confirms that 1950s were the years when the Dayak people had most political representations at the institutional level. [1957: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* We would code autonomy, but only from 1958 due to January 1 rule. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* See above. [1957: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Dayaks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Dayak |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85016000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.015]

**Regional concentration**

* The Dayaks make up a relative (but not an absolute) majority in West Kalimantan, one of Indonesia’s Borneo provinces, and a significant share of other Borneo provinces, in particular Central Kalimantan (Suryadinata et al. 2003). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found transborder kin in Malaysia: the Iban or Sea Dayaks (approx. 750,000 according to Minahan 2002: 751). Furthermore, the Dayaks are closely related to the Philippines’ Moros (Minahan 2002: 1322). [kin in neighboring country]

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## East Timorese

Activity: 1975-2002

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN; originally the Timorese Social Democratic Association or ASDT), which advocated immediate independence, was formed in 1974 (Minahan 2002: 552). That same year, the Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense was formed, which advocated integration into Indonesia (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 85). As this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, 1974 is coded as start date.
* In 1974, East Timor had still been a Portuguese colony. FRETILIN was involved in a short civil conflict in 1974, which ended in a partial victory on the part of FRETILIN (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 85; Marshall & Gurr 2003).
* In 1975, East Timor declared independence. However, later that year it was annexed by Indonesia. We therefore code the movement from 1975.
* Civil war broke out in 1975. In a UN-supervised popular referendum on August 30, 1999, the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia. On May 20, 2002, East Timor was internationally recognized as an independent state. Therefore, we code an end to the movement in 2002. [start date: 1974; end date: 2002]

**Dominant claim**

* Prior to the Indonesian annexation, the organization that would later become FRETILIN, ASDT, supported immediate independence, while UDT supported a more gradual approach that would have first involved self-government (Stephan 2005: 51). In the 1974 elections, ASDT gained 55% of the vote and the UDT only 45% (Minahan 2002: 552). UDT and ASDT soon broke up due to ideological differences, and UDT aligned with Indonesia. During all periods afterwards, Fretilin was the main/only relevant organization. FRETILIN claimed independence throughout (Stephan 2005: 54). [1975-2002: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1974; end date: 2002]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the East Timorese consists of the current territory East Timor. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Shortly before the Indonesian annexation, Fretilin declared the independence on November 28, 1975 (Minahan 2002: 552). [1975: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD coding for 1975-1999 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
  + Note: Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) suggest that armed conflict started in 1974. However, the case evidence we collected suggested that while there was violence in 1974, this was a different, internal conflict between different factions within East Timor and does not, therefore, meet our criteria for (prior) separatist violence. Specifically, according to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 85): “In 1974, when the armed forces movement came to power in Portugal, three political factions were in existence in East Timor. The Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT) advocated association with Portugal, the Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense wanted integration with Indonesia, and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) called for complete independence. An attempt by the UDT to seize power led to a brief civil war, which ended with victory on the part of FRETILIN.”
  + The 1975-1999 civil war emerged significantly later, in December 1975, after FREITLIN had declared independence, prompting Indonesia to annex East Timor (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 85).
  + In agreement with this narrative, the timeline in Minahan (2002) suggests that claims were self-determination claims as defined here were initially nonviolent and that separatist violence emerged only in 1975.
* [1975-1999: HVIOLSD; 2000-2002: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Malays came to East Timor (ET) in the 13th Century, driving the scattering of small West Papuan tribes into the mountains. The Portuguese first came to the island in 1520, followed by the Spanish in 1522. The island of Timor came under permanent Portuguese rule in 1586. The Dutch seized the Western half of the island in 1618 and defeated the rival Portuguese for control of the East Indies in 1641, leaving ET as the only Portuguese territory in the vast region. Portuguese missionaries exterted a strong influence and Catholicism took a firm root in ET. The Dutch formally ceded ET to Portugal in 1859, and ET was made a separate Portuguese colony in 1896, with a clearly delimited border (somewhat determined by the religion of the inhabitants) with Dutch West Timor (Minahan 2002: 551). The Portuguese started developing the island in earnest after a first rebellion in 1910-1912. ET came under Japanese rule during WWII but was returned to Portugal afterwards, despite Indonesian claims to ET. In 1951, the Portuguese government upgraded ET’s status to that of an overseas territory (Minahan 2002: 552). When a leftist revolutionary government was installed in Lisbon in 1974, Portugal moved to free the leftover colonial possessions. Pro-independence parties developed in ET immediately (Minahan 2002: 552).
* After the Fretilin’s declaration of independence in November 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975, killing over 50,000 in the first two months. The UN did not accept the legality of the Indonesian occupation and demanded a referendum. Indonesia ignored the call and embarked on a brutal campaign to crush resistance (killing about a third of the population in the process). In 1976, East Timor was named Indonesia’s 27th province. East Timor remained closed to visitors until 1989 (Minahan 2002: 552; Jannisa 1997). [1975: independence restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In May 1998, Suharto had to resign and Habibie took over. Shortly after taking over, Habibie announced that Indonesia would grant East Timor a special form of autonomy involving far-reaching devolution (Nevins 2005: 81). However, the proposal was not immediately implemented.
* In May 1999 Jakarta began to decentralize power – not just in East Timor, but across Indonesia (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). Still, we code an autonomy concession. Note: Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl code the end of the 1975-1999 civil war only in October 1999; hence, this concession was made in the context of an ongoing civil war and is coded in the same year as the end of the civil war. [1999: autonomy concession]
* Initially Habibie was opposed to independence, but this soon changed upon international pressure. On May 5, 1999, a tripartite agreement was signed between Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN on a UN-supervised “popular consultation” on independence (Stephan 2005: 92). A no to independence would have implied special autonomy within Indonesia. In the run-up to the referendum, Indonesian forces unleashed a violent intimidation campaign to get people to vote for autonomy rather than independence (Stephan 2005: 93). In August 1999, the East Timorese nonetheless voted with 78.5% to separate from Indonesia. Local Muslim leaders and militia refused to accept the result and rampaged through the province. Over 300,000 fled or were forced into neighboring Indonesian West Timor (Minahan 2002: 553). October 19, 1999, the Indonesian assembly agreed that ET should be allowed to secede from the Indonesian Federation. This led to the end of the 1975-1999 civil war (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). October 25, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor was set up to prepare for independence. In December, a consultative body composed of East Timorese leaders was created to advise the Transitional Administration; in 2000 it became a proper legislative body. In August 2000, an executive body consisting of four East Timorese and four international members was set up. [1999: independence concession]
* In 2002, East Timor became independent.  We do not code another concession since East Timorese independence had been agreed to back in 1999.

**Regional autonomy**

* See above, following the first of January rule. [2001-2002: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1975, Indonesia annexed East Timor. [1975: host change (new)]
* In 2000, the UN Transitional Administration transformed the formerly consultative body composed of East Timorese into a legislative body and established an executive composed of four international members and four East Timorese. [2000: establishment of regional autonomy]
* [2002: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | East Timorese |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1/No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | East Timorese |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85006000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR and apply the 1976 codes to 1975 (which isn’t included in EPR) and the 2001 codes to 2002 (which also isn’t included in EPR). [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.005]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 550), the vast majority of the East Timorese resides in East Timor, where they form 96% of the population. This matches with information from MAR (see gc6b, gc7). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR and MAR. No other evidence found in other sources either. [no kin]

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## Indigenous Peoples

Activity: 1988-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Indonesia’s indigenous people have mobilized against deforestation and seizing of indigenous lands by the palm oil industry. According to the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center, the indigenous movement on land rights is represented largely by the Community Alliance of Adat Nusantara (AMAN). AMAN is an organization founded in 1999 during the first Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (KMAN I), and aims to unify indigenous communities and groups to fight for their rights, religion, culture, land, and natural resources. There have since been three more KMAN sessions, with the most recent one (KMAN IV) in April 2012. AMAN’s activity remains primarily focused on deforestation and land rights.
* Besides the overarching campaign, indigenous groups have mobilized around land issues individually as well. This includes the Mentawai, Bataks, Dayaks, and others. For example, the Mentawai are an indigenous tribe living in the Mentawai Islands in West Sumatra and are formally represented by several groups including the Foundation for the Development of Mentawai Society (Yayasan Pembinaan Masyarakat Mentawai), the Vision for Autonomy (Yayasan Citra Mandiri), Deliberative Body for the Mentawai Community (Badan Musyawarah Masyarakat Mentawai, and several others. These organizations have been active since the 1990s, and aim to strengthen Mentawai culture, promote indigenous political rights, and protect indigenous lands and natural resources from private drilling companies. They continue to be active today.
* The Bataks, on the other hand, are a group of tribes that live in the North Sumatra region of Aceh province. From 1988 onward, the Bataks have been active in a struggle to retain their lands in the face of industrial deforestation. No formal organization fighting specifically for the Bataks could be found, however.
* In light of this evidence, we code an umbrella indigenous movement that subsumes individual indigenous groups and peg the start date to 1988, the first year we found evidence for separatist activity. AMAN held its last congress in 2012, but the organization continued to exist as of 2023 and continued to make autonomy claims claims (Aliansi 2013; AMAN; Kahin 1997; Kongres Keempat; Minahan 2002: 521ff; Moniaga 2004; Reeves n.d.; Yayasan n.d.). [start date: 1988; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* All sources consulted suggest an autonomy claim and that independence has never been brought up by any relevant organization (e.g., Moniaga 2004; Minority Rights Group International). [1988-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* This movement includes multiple indigenous groups that have called for improved land rights and autonomy in Indonesia. We could not find any information on specific territorial claims. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the ethnic settlement areas as indicated by the GeoEPR dataset. Our coding includes the settlement areas of the Bataks, Dayaks, Gorontalos and Minangkabaus, which are the largest indigenous groups.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found evidence for intercommunal violence, but not for group-state violence over self-rule above the threshold, and thus we code NVIOLSD for the entire time period. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Under his “New Order” (1965-1998), Suharto continued and even intensified the centralization policy initiated by his predecessor (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5). While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50). Furthermore, Suharto continually eroded the rights of indigenous groups (Duncan 2007). We found no restriction in the ten years before the start date, however.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* What we termed the indigenous peoples make up a significant share of some districts and even provinces (Duncan 2007). In particular, the Dayaks make up a relative majority in West Kalimantan, one of Indonesia’s Borneo provinces, and a significant share of other Borneo provinces, in particular Central Kalimantan. The Bataks, on the other hand, make up a relative majority of North Sumatra. Hence, changes in district and provincial autonomy are coded as concessions/restrictions.
* In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, but similar to the 1974 “New Order” legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws, which went into force on January 1, 2001, also affected Indonesia’s indigenous groups (Duncan 2007; Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1999: autonomy concession]
* The implementation of the decentralization laws was tricky and chaotic, mainly due to an indeterminate allocation of competencies between the provincial and the district level. The 2004 enhanced the provinces’ autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). This reform affected also Indonesia’s indigenous groups (Duncan 2007). [2004: autonomy concession]
* In 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that indigenous peoples will be given the rights to own and manage customary forests. Implementation is slow but under way (Minority Rights Group International). [2013: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* See above. [2001-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The 1999 decentralization laws, implemented on January 1, 2001, gave the provinces significant autonomy (see above). [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Indigenous Peoples |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bataks; Gorontalos; Minangkabaus; Dayak |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85004000; 85007000; 85012000; 85016000 |

**Power access**

* The two largest groups associated with the movement, the Bataks and the Minangkabaus, are coded as irrelevant until 1999, when they become powerless. In 2005 they both become junior partners. On the other hand, the Dayaks are irrelevant until 1999, when they become powerless, and the Gorontalos irrelevant throughout. Since there is no sign of discrimination as defined in the codebok, we code the movement as powerless until 2004. Beginning in 2005, the movement is coded as junior partner since the two largest and most important groups were included in the government. [1988-2004: powerless; 2005-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We use the term ‘Indigenous Peoples’ as an umbrella term to refer to Indonesia’s indigenous groups, except for those which are separately coded (Papuans, East Timorese). In particular, the group includes the Dayaks, Bataks, and Mentawai. The number of indigenous peoples members in Indonesia is not fully clear given that Indonesia does not recognize the existence of indigenous groups. EPR codes several groups which could be termed indigenous: the Bataks (about 2% of Indonesia’s population), the Dayaks (1.5%), the Gorontalos (.36%), and the Minangkabaus (3%). The total number seems to be higher, however. Estimates run that there are about 50-70 million indigenous peoples in Indonesia out of a population of around 250 millions (IWGIA). For the group size estimate, we draw on the lower bound estimate of 50 million, also to avoid double-counting separately coded indigenous groups (Papuans, East Timorese). [0.2]

**Regional concentration**

* Even though indigenous peoples dominate in some areas of Indonesia, we could not locate a spatially contiguous territory wherein indigenous peoples not only make up the majority, but where also the majority of all indigenous groups resides.
* This movement comprises a number of indigenous groups in different angles of Indonesia. Indigenous groupings make up a significant share of some districts and even provinces (Duncan 2007). Sumatra is an area with many indigenous group members. Approx. 70% of the Minangkabaus, one of the largest indigenous groups (approx. 3% of Indonesia’s population), reside in West Sumatra, where they form 80% of the local population. And the Bataks (approx. 2% of Indonesia’s population) make up a relative majority of North Sumatra (42%), where 80% of all Bataks reside. The Dayaks, another larger group, make up a relative majority in West Kalimantan, one of Indonesia’s Borneo provinces, and a significant share of other Borneo provinces, in particular Central Kalimantan (Suryadinata et al. 2003). Yet Borneo and Sumatra are far from spatially contiguous. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found kin for the Dayaks, one of the groups we cover, in Malaysia: the Iban or Sea Dayaks (approx. 750,000 according to Minahan 2002: 751). Furthermore, the Dayaks are closely related to the Philippines’ Moros (Minahan 2002: 1322). Finally, there are Minangkabaus in Malaysia (approx. 900,000, see Joshua Project). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Melayus

Activity: 1950-1975; 1999-2020

**General notes**

* The movement relates to Malays located in Riau, a province of Indonesia where Malays form a relative majority. Note that there are also Malays in other provinces, in particular in South Sumatra, where they also form a relative majority.

**Movement start and end dates**

* A serious rebellion against the Dutch rule erupted in Riau in 1911, when the last Riau sultan was forced into abdication (Minahan 2002: 1227; Wee 2002: 499), but this appears not to have given way to continued self-determination activity. Riau was occupied by the Japanese military forces during WWII but returned to Dutch control in 1946.
* A Melayu self-determination movement emerged after WWII. According to Wee (2002: 498-499), the Melayus attempted to re-establish the Riau sultanate between 1945 and 1950. The Dutch, however, turned down the Melayus’ demand. Riau was incorporated into Indonesia in 1950 (Wee 2002: 499). Separatist activity continued under the leadership of the Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati (the Union of True-Born Riau Malays). Based on this, we code the start date in 1945, but do not code the movement in the data set before 1950, the year Riau was incorporated into independent Indonesia. We found no violent activity in 1945-1949 and thus note prior non-violent activity.
* There was a revolt against Indonesia in 1959 (Minahan 2002: 1227). Sukarno’s centralization policy and repression of the Melayu leadership appears to have caused the movement to peter out (Wee 2002: 499-502). We found no mention of this movement after 1965, and hence code an end to the first phase in 1975, following the ten-years rule. [start date 1: 1945; end date 1: 1975]
* In 1985, there was an attempt by Riau’s provincial parliament to elect its own governor, but this appears an isolated event and is not coded.
* After the fall of Suharto, several self-determination organizations sprung up (such as the Riau People’s Congress or the Free Riau Movement or Riau Merdeka). Separatists are led mainly be the Free Riau Movement, which was founded in 1999 (Crouch 2010: 95), hence the second start date. Petroleum production from Riau fields without economic control by the Melayus gave the autonomist movement more momentum. The movement’s demands were focused around reforming the revenue-sharing system, but also included federalism and outright independence, depending on the organization. The movement was ongoing as of 2020 (Diprose and Azca 2020). [start date 2: 1999; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Both in the first and the second phase, the dominant calls were for increased autonomy. The Free Riau Movement entertained some talk about independence; however, a vote in the inofficial “Riau People’s Congress” for independence did not pass (Crouch 2010: 95). The only instance that could be read as an outright independence demand was in April 1999, when over 1,500 Melayus gathered in Pekanbaru to demand that the Indonesian government honor a promise to return 10% of all of Riau’s oil revenues to the province. Riau leaders threatened that they would fight for independence if this did not happen (Minahan 2002: 1228). We do not consider this a call for independence in line with Crouch (2010: 95), who argues that the threat was purely strategic and that increased political and economic control over the region are the actual goals of the Free Riau movement. Autonomy continued to be the dominant claim as of 2020, particularly the movement wants a larger share of revenues from natural resources (Diprose and Azca 2020). [1950-1975: autonomy claim; 1999-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There was contention for separate independence between 1945 and 1950; however, upon incorporation into Indonesia the goal of independence was abandoned by most political actors (Wee 2002).
* A second indication of an independence claim came in 1999 when Riau leaders threatened a fight for independence if oil revenue sharing did not come to fruition (Minahan 2002: 1228). Yet, as argued above, this was more of a strategic threat than a claim for independence. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Melayus is the Riau province (Minahan 2002: 1225; Roth 2015: 362). We use the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition..

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1999 the Riau province issued a declaration of sovereignty (Nordholt 2008: 8). [1999: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Though Riau separatist garner large support and have threatened violence in the future, it seems that there has been no violence so far. Thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + Prior to colonization, Riau provided a safe haven for traders and sailors. A period of rivalry between the Dutch, Portuguese, and British lasted until the 19th Century. The Treaty of London, signed in 1824, gave the Dutch control of all territories south of Singapore (Minahan 2002: 1226). The last sultan of Riau was crowned in 1841 and deposed by the Dutch in 1857, when he began threatening colonial interests. The area remained restive (the Dutch introduced plantation agriculture, producing rubber, palm oil, sisal, and quinine – forced labor and population displacement were a frequent occurrence). A serious rebellion against the Dutch rule erupted in 1911 (Minahan 2002: 1227). Riau was occupied by the Japanese military forces during WWII but returned to Dutch control in 1946. Between 1945 and 1950 the Melayus attempted to re-establish the Riau sultanate. The Dutch, however, turned down the Melayus’ demand, and Riau was incorporated into Indonesia on 10 August 1950.
  + Before leaving the country, in 1949, the Dutch had imposed a federal system in Indonesia (Ferrazzi 2000: 66). [1949: autonomy concession]
  + Yet, the Dutch imposition of a federal system was widely objected in Indonesia. In 1950, Indonesia returned to a unitary form of government (Ferrazzi 2000: 66-67). While the provinces retained some autonomy, the return to a unitary form of government is coded as an autonomy restriction. The unitary constitution came into force on August 17, 1950, and the process had been well underway by the time Riau was incorporated; therefore, we treat this as a prior restriction. [1950: autonomy restriction]
* 2nd phase:
  + In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, but similar to the 1974 “New Order” legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). Note: it is not clear whether this concession was made before or after the movement’s re-emergence; since the concession was made in the first half of the year, we code it as a prior concession. [1999: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1957, Jakarta introduced legislation which granted the regions increased autonomy, including the right to elect its own leaders (Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1957: autonomy concession]
* In 1959 Sukarno declared a state of emergency and ended parliamentary democracy. Under Sukarno’s system of “Guided Democracy”, the regions were stripped from most of their powers. In 1959, Sukarno returned to the 1945 constitution, which – since the constitution does not explain what regional autonomy means – effectively meant that the extent of regional autonomy from now on depended on the will of the President (Ferrazzi 2000: 67). Other reforms, enacted in the same year, further weakened the regions (Kimura 2013: 47-48; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1959: autonomy restriction]
* Under his “New Order” (1965-1998), Suharto continued and even intensified the centralization policy initiated by his predecessor (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5). While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50). Hence, we code a restriction. [1974: autonomy restriction]
* The implementation of the decentralization laws was tricky and chaotic, mainly due to an indeterminate allocation of competencies between the provincial and the district level. The 2004 enhanced the provinces’ autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]
* In 2004, the Riau Islands Province was separated from Riau province. While opposed by the Riau government, Riau Islanders appear to have not only endorsed, but actively lobbied for partition (Jakarta Post 2002). Both provinces have a (relative) Malay majority. We do not code either a restriction or a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* See below under major territorial chanes. [1950-1959: regional autonomy; 2001-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Riau became part of Indonesia in 1950 and an autonomous province. [1950: host change (new); establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 1959 Sukarno returned to a heavily centralized system, whereby the regions were stripped from most of their powers (see above). [1959: abolishment of regional autonomy]
* The 1999 decentralization laws, implemented on January 1, 2001, gave the provinces (including Riau with its Melayus majority) significant autonomy (see above). [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 2004, the Riau Islands Province was separated from Riau province. This is not coded as a major change as two majority Malay entities have remained.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Melayus |
| *Scenario* | No match/n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Malay |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85017000 |

**Power access**

* The movement relates to Malays located in Riau, a province of Indonesia where Malays form a relative majority. Note that there are also Malays in other provinces, in particular in Sulawesi/Celebes, where they form an absolute majority (see the South Sulawesi movement), and in South Sumatra, where they form a relative majority. EPR does not code Malays in Riau, but all Malays in Indonesia (and only 1999-2013). Hence, the Melayus form a regional branch of the Malays.
* According to EPR, the Javanese dominated the Indonesian polity until 2004, when the government became much more ethnically inclusive. The Malays were thus clearly excluded until and including 2004. In line with EPR, we found no clear-cut evidence of discrimination; hence, the Melayus are coded as powerless in 1950-1975 and 1999-2004.
* In 2004, the Indonesian executive became much more ethnically inclusive. In particular, some Malays were included into the cabinet. This is reflected in EPR: the Malays are coded as junior partner from 2005 onwards. To reflect the more inclusive style of government, we also code the Melayus as junior partner from 2005 onwards. This is confirmed by Diprose and Azca (2020: 202), as they identify one of the reasons why the Free Riau Movement is weaker than other similar movements elsewhere in Indonesia is the key figure of the Free Riau Movement, Tobrani Rab, was co-opted into the central power structures. [1950-1975: powerless; 1999-2004: powerless; 2005-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002), there are 3.945 million Melayus living in Riau and neighboring provinces. Combined with the World Bank’s 2002 population estimate of Indonesia (215 million), this yields a group size estimate of .0183 (EPR estimates Malay’s population share at 3% – however, this includes Malays living in provinces other than Riau). The changes due to the annexation of West Papua and East Timor are not reflected because they are negligible. [0.0183]

**Regional concentration**

* Minahan (2002: 1225) mentions the Melayus are concentrated in the Province of Riau, where they make up 72% of the population. However, several other sources (e.g., the 2010 and 2020 censuses; Diprose and Azca 2020) suggest that the Malays make up only 40% of Riau’s population. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Melayus are ethnic Malays (see Minahan 2002: 1225). EPR codes ethnic kin due to the Malays in Malaysia. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Minahasa

Activity: 1957-1961; 2006-2020

**General notes**

* The Minahasans are an ethnic group native to the North Sulawesi province of Indonesia, formerly known as North Celebes.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for separatist mobilization we have found is the Permesta movement (from Perjuangan Semesta or “Inclusive Struggle”). The Permesta movement was launched in March 1957 with the Permesta Charter. The Charter called for “the widest possible autonomy” for Indonesia’s eastern provinces including North Sulawesi. In addition, the Permesta movement made claims related to economic policy. The Charter explicitly ruled out outright secession. The central government went to war against the Permesta movement in 1958 (Cribb & Kahin 2004: 361f; Henley 2007; UCDP/PRIO; Wikipedia). According to Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), the Permesta movement was defeated in the same year; however, members of the Permesta movement then reorganized themselves into the PRRI, which was essentially a continuation of the Permesta movement. In March 1960, the leaders of the Permesta/PRRI rebellion proclaimed the establishment of a federal system, the Republic Persatuan Indonesia (RPI; United Republic of Indonesia), but the movement ended shortly thereafter (Cribb & Kahin 2004: 143). This matches with Hendley (2007), who suggests that fighting lasted for three years and does not report any separatist mobilization after that. Cribb & Kahin (2004: 362) also suggest that fighting ended in 1961, as does Minahan (2016: 270). We code the end of the movement as 1961. [start date 1: 1957; end date 1: 1961]
  + While the Permesta movement was not limited to Minahasans, we associate it with this group based on the following statement from Henley (2007): “When Jakarta went to war against Permesta, Minahasans were the only group to offer serious resistance, and the rebellion quickly became a purely Minahasan affair.”
* The Minahasa movement re-emerged in 2006, when a group called the Minahasa Independence Movement (Gerakan Kemerdekaan Minahasa) declared its goal of holding an independence referendum (Minahan 2016: 270; Roth 2015: 373). Calls for independence were renewed in 2017 (Renaldi 2017). On this basis, we code a second ongoing phase with a start date in 2006. [start date 2: 2006; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Yulianto, Sumampow and Epafras (2020: 90-91) state that the main purpose of the Permesta rebellion was to demand for greater autonomy and resist the over-centralised direction by the Indonesian central government. [1957-1961: autonomy claim]
* Both Roth (2015: 373) and Minahan (2016: 270) suggest that the main goal since 2006 has been to hold an independence referendum, probably inspired by the case of East Timor. But it has not made much headway and it is not clear whether the proposal of the so-called independence referendum is a tactic to demand for more autonomy rights. We code an independence claim here for the second period of activity, since according to the codebook, we code the more radical claim. [2006-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 2006; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The claimed territory is the territory of North Sulawesi province. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Minahan (2016: 484) suggests that an independent State of North Celebes was proclaimed in February 1958. We could not find independent confirmation.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war from 1956-1960 that combines the Darul Islam, the Permesta, and the PRRI uprisings. While the Darul Islam revolt became active already in 1956, according to UCDP/PRIO, the Permesta and PRRI revolts only emerged in 1958. This is confirmed by Cribb & Kahin (2004: 361f) and Henley (2007). On this basis, we code NVIOLSD in 1957 and HVIOLSD in 1958-1960. The LVIOLSD code for 1961 is based on UCDP/PRIO.
  + Note: We could not find casualty information specific to the Minahasa/North Sulawesis and therefore the HVIOLSD code is ambiguous. But the account in SSW suggests more than 30,000 casualties for the three rebellions, so HVIOLSD is likely given.
* We found no evidence for separatist violence above the threshold in 2006-2020. [1957: NVIOLSD; 1958-1960: HVIOLSD; 1961: LVIOLSD; 2006-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

1st phase:

* The Minahasan people consists of many sub-groups with different ethnic origins, but the colonial construct was well accepted by the Minahasan people and Minahasans continue to self-identify as such today (Yulianto, Sumampouw and Epafras 2020: 87). The majority of the Minahasan people adopted Christianity by 1860 and hence had a more intimate relationship with the Dutch colonizers. Many Minahasans joined the colonial military in 1920s and 1930s, which stirred up tensions with other groups in Indonesia.
* In 1946, Sulaewsi was part of the state of East Indonesia, which combined all islands east of Kalimantan and Java. East Indonesia was dissolved in 1950 and the first Sulawesi province was formed with the first two governers as Minahasans (Yulianto, Sumampow and Epafras 2020: 90). Yet, the first Sulawesi province included the whole Sulawesi island, and Minahasans make up a significant proportion only in the northern part.
* In 1950, Indonesia returned to a unitary form of government (Ferrazzi 2000: 66-67). The provinces retained some autonomy, however. We do not code concessions or restrictions because the changes refer to Sulawesi as a whole and not North Sulawesi, which is where the Minahasas are concentrated.

2nd phase:

* In 1964 the People's Representative Council enacted Law no. 13 officially creating the province of North Sulawesi, with Manado as provincial seat. Thus, Minahasans now had heir own province, although provincial autonomy was limited at the time. In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, but similar to the 1974 “New Order” legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1999: autonomy concession]
* The implementation of the decentralization laws was tricky and chaotic, mainly due to an indeterminate allocation of competencies between the provincial and the district level. The 2004 enhanced the provinces’ autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed (Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1957, Jakarta introduced legislation which granted the regions increased autonomy, including the right to elect its own leaders (Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). Yet, at the time, the Minahasas did not have their own province/were part of the Sulawesi province, which includes the whole island and in which the Minahasans do not make up a significant share.
* In 1959 Sukarno declared a state of emergency and ended parliamentary democracy. Under Sukarno’s system of “Guided Democracy”, the regions were stripped from most of their powers. In 1959, Sukarno returned to the 1945 constitution, which – since the constitution does not explain what regional autonomy means – effectively meant that the extent of regional autonomy from now on depended on the will of the President (Ferrazzi 2000: 67). Other reforms, enacted in the same year, further weakened the regions (Kimura 2013: 47-48; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). Yet, at the time, the Minahasas did not have their own province/were part of the Sulawesi province, which includes the whole island and in which the Minahasans do not make up a significant share.

**Regional autonomy**

* Although Indonesia rejected the idea of federalization in 1950, the previously established autonomous regions still enjoyed autonomy rights, but because the creation of North Sulawesi happened only in 1964 and Minahasans do not make up a significant proportion in the whole Sulawesi province, we do not give a regional autonomy code. Since 1964, Minahasans have their own province of North Sulawesi, and after the decentralization in 1999, regions in Indonesia enjoy genuine autonomy rights, hence a regional autonomy code. [2006-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* We would code a major change after the 1999 decentralization laws; however, the movement was not active at the time.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Minahasa |
| *Scenario* | 1:1/No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | Minahasa |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85011000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR for the first phase. [1957-1961: powerless]
* The Minahasa are not covered by EPR in 2006 onwards. We could not find evidence indicating that the Minahasan people would have been included in the central government, and thus we keep coding them as powerless. [2006-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.005]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes the Minahasa as regionally concentrated, but EPR applies a lower bar. The only more detailed data we could find also points to regional concentration: according to Kusnadar (2021), 63% of the population in North Sulawesi are Christian, and Christianity is practised almost exclusively by Minahasan people in North Sulawesi. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not note transborder ethnic kin and we found no other evidence for transborder kin. [no kin]

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## Papuans

Activity: 1963-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The West Papuans were involved in uprisings against Dutch or Japanese rule (during WWII), but the first clear-cut evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1945, when the Suara Rakyat (Voice of the People) was formed, an organization advocating independence. Indonesia’s declaration of independence in 1945 resulted in a split, with some supporting integration into Indonesia and others in favor of separate independence. The latter formed the Gerakan Persatuan Nieuw Guinea (New Guinea Unity Movement or GPNG). (Vermonte 2007: 280). Thus 1945 is coded as start date.
* At the time, Papua was still a Dutch colony. Although forced to recognize Indonesian independence in 1949, the Dutch rejected the Indonesian claim to Dutch New Guinea, the homeland of the Papuans. Despite Indonesian and international pressure to decolonize New Guinea, the Dutch refused to relinquish control. The Papuans were vehemently opposed to inclusion in Indonesia, even with guarantees of autonomy.
* A Dutch plan for Papuan independence, prepared in 1959-60, was blocked by Indonesia’s Communist and Third World supporters in the UN General Assembly. In April 1961 the Dutch created a Papuan legislature and granted a degree of self-government (Minahan 2002: 2055).
* December 1, 1961, the West Papuans declared their independence (Minahan 2002: 2054).
* Despite Papuan resistance, Papua was eventually turned over to Indonesia in 1963. It appears that the movement was active throughout 1945-1963; however, we do not code colonial movements, and thus only code the Papuans as of 1963 and under the header of Indonesia. We found no separatist violence in 1945-1962 and thus note prior non-violent activity.
* In 1969 West Papua became a proper Indonesian territory as a result of the Act of Free Choice.
* The primary leading force of the Papuan independence movement is the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement), or OPM, a political and armed guerrilla group that was founded in 1965. The OPM was the result of a merger of two pre-existing factions, Aser Demotekay (founded in 1963) and Manokwari (founded in 1964, see Vermonte 2007: 284-285). OPM remains active as of 2020 and continues to make self-rule claims (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 129f, 319; Hewitt et al. 2008; International Crisis Group 2022; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996: 623ff, 2002: 2052ff; MAR; Ploughshares 2005; Vermonte 2007). [start date: 1945; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Despite small dissenting factions, there has been a lot of consensus behind the goal of independence. The focus is on securing a UN-supervised referendum on independence (Minahan 2002: 2057). [1963-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1945; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Papuans consists of the western half of the New Guinea island (Minahan 2002: 2052). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Minahan (2002: 2055), leaders of the Papuan movement signed the Serui Declaration, a unilateral declaration of independence for West Papua, on December 9, 1975). It seems, however, that Minahan got the year wrong; most sources indicate the declaration was signed in 1971 (e.g. Pacific Scoop 2014). [1971: independence declaration]
* In 1988, the Republic of West Melanesia was declared, which is corroborated by several sources (e.g., Minahan 2016: 484). [1988: independence declaration]
* A special congress called in June 2000 issued another declaration of independence (Minahan 2002: 2055; New York Times 2000). [2000: independence declaration]
* Minahan (2016: 484) suggests another independence declaration in 2014. However, Minahan appears to refer to the Salana Declaration, by which several separatist groups announced that they would henceforth cooperate and are united under a single body. We do not code a declaration.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Violence emerged soon after Indonesia’s annexation, but different sources disagree on both onset and duration.
  + First, Marshall & Gurr (2003) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code ongoing separatist armed conflict from 1964-2006, the last year they cover.
  + Second, MAR’s rebellion score suggests to an ongoing guerilla uprising or local rebellion between 1964 and 1992, and then again in 1995 and 1996.
  + Third, Fearon & Laitin (2003) code a civil war from 1965-1999.
  + Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl only flag 1976-1978 with full-scale war, but note that there was low-level violent conflict both before and after that.
  + UCDP/PRIO, by contrast, codes armed conflict only in selected years: 1965, 1967-1969, 1976-1978, 1981, 1984, 2018, and 2021. Furthermore, UCDP’s Violent Protest dataset records a violent protest involving >25 deaths in 2019 (Svensson et al. 2022).
* Overall, most sources suggest significant violence starting in the early 1960s and remaining ongoing throughout most of the subsequent years. UCDP/PRIO is the only exception, but it is clear that UCDP/PRIO is missing a lot of violence, probably due to difficulties with exactly pinpointing deaths given that international media has largely been banned from entering West Papua. The total number of casualties is frequently estimated at between 100,000 and 500,000 (Indahona 2020), though some estimates are much lower. We found reports of significant violence also in several years not marked by UCDP/PRIO in qualitative reports:
  + A report by the University of Central Arkansas suggests that the insurgency began in 1965 while Minahan (2002: 2055) suggests that violence was particularly marked between 1967 and 1972 with, according to some reports, between 30-100,000 deaths. Subsequently, the level of armed resistance diminished “in the face of vastly superior force”.
  + Minahan suggests that violence picked up again in the mid-1970, consistent with Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl.
  + UCDP/PRIO next codes an armed conflict in 1981 and 1984. This coincides with the launch of the Operation Clean Sweep against OPM resurgents, which according to case evidence led to more than 15,000 deaths through the end of 1984 (University of Central Arkansas n.d.).
  + In 1986, Indonesia initiated another large-scale military offensive (Operation Skewered Meat), resulting in another 4,000 refugees fleeing into Papua New Guinea (University of Central Arkansas).
  + SSW suggest that while violence was below the HVIOLSD threshold, “There is clear evidence of an ongoing, low-level insurgency that was ongoing until the late 1990s.”
  + Reports of violence in the 1990s-2010s point to a de-escalation; however, figures from Project Ploughshares make clear that UCDP is missing substantial violence in the 1990s and 2000s. For example, they report significant violent activity in 1995-1996, “several deaths” in 1997, dozens of casualties in 1998, at least 11 in 1999, at least 100 in 2000. Indaho (2020) suggests that there is “a relative dearth of data from the 1990s to 2010s, in part due to few journalists reporting on incidents during this period.”
* Overall, there is evidence for significant violence. It is not clear whether violence was above the 25 deaths threshold in all years, but the years suggested by UCDP/PRIO are clearly too limited. Information is very limited due to limited and inconsistent reporting. We code LVIOLSD starting in 1965 and code the violence as ongoing to avoid bogus de- and re-escalations (and HVIOLSD when suggested by SSW). [1963-1964: NVIOLSD; 1965-1975: LVIOLSD; 1976-1978: HVIOLSD; 1979-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The island of Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been inhabited for at least 50,000 years. Before colonization, the island was structured into autonomous villages without central authority, where each small tribe developed its own distinct culture and language (Minahan 2002: 2053). The Portuguese landed on the island in 1527. For a long time, there was no interest among colonizers in PNG. The Dutch laid claim to the coastal region west of the 141st meridian in 1828, while the Germans and British controlled the East. The Dutch restricted migration from the overcrowded Indonesian islands (with the exception of political exile), and penetration into the island proceeded slowly, as did missionary activity. A sense of Papuan unity slowly developed (Minahan 2002: 2054). The Japanese invaded the northern part of the territory in 1942 and held it until 1944; brutal killings and forced labor left the Papuans with an enduring sense of distrust against Asians. They cheered for the return of the Dutch in 1945. When the Dutch administration was forced to recognize Indonesian independence in 1949, they refused to relinquish control of Papua as long as the Papuans wished them to stay. A Dutch plan for West Papuan independence in 1959-1960 was blocked by Indonesia’s communist and Third World supporters in the UN General Assembly (Minahan 2002: 2054).
* In April 1961 the Dutch created a Papuan legislature and granted a degree of self-government (Minahan 2002: 2055). December 1, 1961, the West Papuans declared their independence (Minahan 2002: 2054). [1961: autonomy concession]
* In early 1962, Indonesia’s Sukarno initiated a military campaign to incorporate West Papua into Indonesia and thereby “end Dutch imperialism”. Unwilling to plunge in yet another war (the Dutch had fought a war against Indonesia in 1945-1949), the Dutch accepted American mediation. In September 1962, the New York Agreement was signed, which required authority to be transferred to the United Nations until May 1, 1963, when the territory would be transferred to Indonesia, pending a plebiscite to be held no later than 1969 on West Papua’s incorporation into Indonesia. In accordance with the agreement, the UN handed over West Papua to Indonesia on May 1, 1963. Papua became a “quarantine territory” in September (Minahan 2002: 2054; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 319). [1962: independence concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* With the transfer to Indonesia in 1963, Papua lost the autonomy it had enjoyed under the Dutch. [1963: autonomy restriction]
* The New York Agreement foresaw an “act of self-determination” to be completed before 1969. In 1969, the Suharto regime organized the “Act of Free Choice”, a “referendum” on West Papua’s incorporation into Indonesia in which a handpicked 1,026 elders had to openly discuss incorporation until a unanimous consensus was found. The Act of Free Choice was recognized by the UN, and West Papua became Indonesia’s 26th province (van der Boek and Szalay 2001: 77). The New York Agreement had foreseen a free expression of will of *all* West Papuans. With the “Act of Free Choice”, the West Papuans were deprived of the independence referendum they were promised (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 319), hence we code an independence restriction. [1969: independence restriction]
* Under his “New Order” (1965-1998), Suharto continued and even intensified the centralization policy initiated by his predecessor (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5). While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50). Hence, we code a restriction. [1974: autonomy restriction]
* In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, but similar to the 1974 “New Order” legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1999: autonomy concession]
* In 1999, President Habibie enacted a law which divided Papua, formerly a single province, into three provinces, a move widely considered as part of a divide-and-rule policy (Encyclopedia Britannica). The partition was met by strong opposition, and was annulled in 2000 by Habibie’s successor, Abdurrahman Wahid (Encyclopedia Britannica). The short-term partition could be coded as a restriction (and subsequent concession), but we consider this too ambiguous.
* In October 2001, the Indonesian government passed a special autonomy bill that officially changed the name of the province to “Papua” and permitted greater self-rule. According to the 2001 law, the governor must be an ethnic Papuan and priority in employment and opportunity must be given to ethnic Papuans. In addition to the standard regional legislative assemply, Papua received a special Papua People’s Assembly made up of native Papuans. The consent of the special Papuan assembly is required for passing certain types of regulations and for choosing the governor (Bell 2003: 128). Still, West Papuan leaders rejected the overture as “too little, too late” – they had not been consulted in advance (Minahan 2002: 2057). [2001: autonomy concession]
* Implementation of the 2001 bill was slow, but there were moves towards implementation. However, in 2003, Jakarta revived the idea of partitioning Papua and decided to split the province of Papua into three, the provinces of Papua, West Irian Jaya, and Central Irian Jaya. This can be seen as part of a didivde and ruly policy (independentist sentiment is weaker in West Irian Jaya, see International Crisis Group 2006: 4), and was fiercely opposed by the Papuan independence movement. Neither the local residents nor the local government were consulted (Encyclopedia Britannica), as is required in the 2001 autonomy bill (Human Rights Watch 2007: 16). A main problem was that the 2001 special autonomy law applied only to one province, Papua (International Crisis Group 2006: 2). Hence, the partition decreased the scope of the 2001 law. [2003: autonomy restriction]
* In 2004, the constitutional court ruled that the partition of Papua into three provinces was unlawful and contradicted the 2001 autonomy bill. While this blocked the creation of the third province (which can be considered a concession), the court at the same time recognized the creation of West Papua as a “fait accompli” (since we coded the 2003 policy we do not code this as a restriction) (Human Rights Watch 2007: 16). The same year and due to difficulties with the implementation of decentralization laws, the 1999 laws were revised and replaced with two new laws in 2004. The 2004 legislation enhanced the provinces’ autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]
* In 2007, the governors of the two Papua provinces agreed to extend the special autonomy arrangement to both provinces, meaning that also the newly created West Papua would come under the Special Autonomy Bill. The central government gave green light in 2008, when it officially extended the autonomy bill to West Papua (Jakarta Post 2008; UNDP 2011: 2). [2008: autonomy concession]
* In 2013, a new plan on expanding the Papuan special autonomy was proposed by the erstwhile Indonesian president Yudhoyono, aiming to strengthen the greater autonomy rights and the Papuan control of local politics, but the plan was never implemented (Druce 2020: 107).
* In 2015, the new Indonesian president Jokowi, who is seen as someone committed to solving the West Papuan issue, announced the end of transmigration program to West Papua, but this is not coded as a concession in accordance with the codebook (Druce 2020: 107).

**Regional autonomy**

* Papua lost its autonomy with the transfer to Indonesia, hence we do not code autonomy in 1963. We code autonomy from 2001 onwards (see above). [2001-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* With the transfer to Indonesia in 1963, Papua lost the autonomy it had enjoyed under the Dutch. [1963: abolishment of autonomy; host change (new)]
* The 1999 decentralization laws, implemented on January 1, 2001, gave the provinces significant autonomy, which was further extended with the 2001 special autonomy bill (see above). [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 2003 Papua was partitioned into two provinces. This is not coded as a major change since the Papuans retained majorities in the two provinces.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Papuans |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Papuans |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85013000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the Papuans only as of 1964. The 1964 power access code (discriminated) applies to 1963 as well, given Indonesia’s annexation of Papua. [1963-1966: discriminated; 1967-2004: powerless; 2005-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1963-1975: 0.0082; 1976-2001: 0.0079; 2002-2020: 0.0082]

**Regional concentration**

* The Papuans are concentrated in West Papua, where they make up 52% of the population (Minahan 2002: 2052). This amounts to 1.158 million Papuans (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 1.16 million Papuans in the whole of Indonesia in that same year. Regional concentration is also confirmed by MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR (scenario 1:1) codes a kin group in neighboring Papua New Guinea. This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 2052) and the Minorities at Risk data which also codes the Papuans in Papua New Guinea as the largest and only kin group. EPR only codes the Papuans relevant as of 1964, one year after West Papua’s incorporation in Indonesia. However, ethnic kin in an adjoining territory (Papua New Guinea was rule by Australia) was also present in 1963, which is why we code ethnic kin throughout. [kin in neighboring country]

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## South Sulawesis

Activity: 1950-2009

**General notes**

* The South Sulawesis live in the Southern two thirds of Sulawesi or Celebes. They are comprised of Buginese and Makassarese and smaller Mandarese groups (Minahan 2002: 1753).

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1949, the United States of Indonesia (in which the constituent of the Republic of Indonesia, based in Java, played a prominent role) decided to send troops to South Sulawesi. When the (mainly Javanese) troops arrived in early 1950, they were met with fierce local resistance (Van Dijk 1981: 163-4). In the following years and until 1962, the South Sulaweis were involved in the Darul Islam revolt, which sought greater autonomy and a Muslim theocracy (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Based on this account, we peg the start date to 1950.
* Claims for autonomy continued to be made in subsequent years. However, according to Roth (2015: 374), the movement was no longer active at the time of his writing. The last documented activity we could find was in 1999, when nationalists demanded the unification of the politically separated Sulawesi island and greater political autonomy. We hence mark the movement as ended in 2009 according to the 10-year rule (International Crisis Group 2009; Minahan 2002: 1752ff; Roth 2007; Mietzner 2009). [start date: 1950; end date: 2009]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim in the initial phase was for increased autonomy. For instance, Minahan (2002: 1755) notes that the 1957 autonomy declaration was motivated by a desire for more self-government and the right to spend 70% of revenues collected in Celebes locally.
* SDM leaders declared independence in 1958 after negotiations with the government had collapsed. Supporters of the “Celebes Republic” subsequently engaged in a guerilla war until 1961 (Minahan 2002: 1755-56; Rother 2015: 374).
* The dominant claim shifted to autonomy thereafter. After 1999, nationalists demanded the unification of the politically separated Sulawesi island, greater political autonomy, and an apology for the massacres in the 1950s (Minahan 2002: 1756). There were also some rather limited calls for independence, but the dominant claim appears to have been for increased autonomy (Minahan 2002: 1757). [1950-1958: autonomy claim; 1959-1961: independence claim; 1962-2009: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Although Minahan notes that the 1957 autonomy declaration was motivated by a desire for more self government (2002: 1755), negotiations between the SDM and the central government broke down and the Celebes Republic declared its independence in February 1958. The Republic was crushed by May 1958 but nationalists continued a gurilla war until 1961 (Minahan, 2002: 1755-56; Roth, 2015: 374). Therefore we code an independence claim from the declaration of independence in 1958 until the end of the nationalist gurilla war. [start date: 1958; end date: 1961]
* Roth (2015: 374) notes demands for an independent East Indonesia by some South Sulawesis students were made in subsequent years, but it is noted that this did not have much support and is therefore not considered a politically significant claim.

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Although the group is concentrated in South and Southeast Sulawesi, nationalists have claimed the entire island of Sulawesi (Minahan 2002: 1752). While some groups have called for the establishment of a Makassar republic in the South, claims for a united and autonomous Sulawesi have been predominant (Roth 2015: 374). We code the claim for all of Sulawesi based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1755), South Sulawesi leaders declared Sulawesi an autonomous/sovereign state in June 1957. [1957: autonomy declaration]
  + Note: Minahan (2016: 485) instead suggests the declaration was in 1953 and involved outright independence.
* Also according to Minahan (2002: 1955-56), “On 16 February 1958 the nationalist leaders, reportedly supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, declared the independence of the island as the Celebes Republic”. [1958: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In South Sulawesi, a rebellion about the degree of autonomy the South Sulawesis broke out soon after Indonesian independence, with the first armed confrontation taking place in early 1950. However, serious fighting started only in May and lasted into August 1950. Van Dijk (1981: 165ff) suggests that more than 1,000 civilians (presumably some of them rebels) were killed in the course and 350 houses destroyed; we could not find figures for security forces but reciprocity criterion is very likely fulfilled. We code LVIOLSD despite the high casualty figures because this conflict is not included in Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* Van Dijk (1981: 172, 1982, 1985f) reports continued skirmishes between the Indonesian army and irregular units throughout 1950 and 1951, which were generally minor, though there also were a few large-scale battles in which guerilla bands of 2-300 men were attacked. On this basis, we extend the LVIOLSD code to 1951.
* Starting in 1952, the South Sulawesi guerillas became involved in the Darul Islam revolt, which though initially was centered on Aceh and West Java, though it is not clear to what extent the rebels shared Darul Islam’s primary goal, the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The rebels seem to have shared Darul Islam’s interest in regional autonomy, however (van Dijk 1981: 187f). However, Van Dijk (1981: 171ff) provides some depictions of the tense situation in the guerrilla war with occasional referrals of the gross damages caused by the guerrilla war and several references to lage-scale military operations in the area. Van Dijk suggests that the total rebel strength was somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 men (p. 195). By 1955, there were almost 300,000 internally displaced in South Sulawesi as a result of the war (p. 201). The conflict escalated further after 1954 (p. 206).
* Starting in 1958, the South Sulawesi rebels joined forces with the Permesta rebels from North Sulawesi, but the cooperation did not come to much (van Dijk 1981: 211f). By the end of the 1950s, the rebellion became increasingly low-intensity. Fighting continued until 1965, however, when the rebel leader (Kahar Muakkar) was captured and subsequently tried and executed (p. 216).
* Overall, we could not find precise casualty estimates except for 1950; however, the account in van Dijk clearly suggests that significant violent activities continued, with the 25 deaths threshold likely met in all, or most, years between 1951-1965. Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war related to Darul Islam in 1953; however, as their coding notes explain, the conflict was concentrated in Aceh and West Java at the time. Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code another civil war due to the Darul Islam revolt in 1956-1960, which though combines fighting in South Sulawesi, Java, and Sumatra (and they also add the Permesta rebellion in North Sulawesi). Still, the high casualty figures cited (more than 30,000) make it likely that the high-level violence threshold was met (though this coding decision is ambiguous). UCDP/PRIO also combines violence from the different rebellions and is therefore of little help.
* Note: violence associated with the Darul Islam revolt had mixed/partly center-seeking motives (creation of an Islamic State). [1950-1955: LVIOLSD; 1956-1960: HVIOLSD; 1961-1965: LVIOLSD; 1966-2009: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The island was originally populated by peoples moving south from the Philippines and by waves of migration from Polynesia. Originally, Buddhism prevailed until Islam came to the island in the 16th Century (Minahan 2002: 1754). The Dutch established a trading post at Makassar in 1609, gradually extending their influence. The Dutch conquered the Sultanate of Makassar during a war from 1666-69, but were unable to conquer the Buginese, who were able to control a sizeable Empire, including parts of the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, and Sumatra. Throughout the 18th century, sporadic conflicts erupted between the Buginese and the Dutch. In the early 19th century, fighting between the Buginese and the neighboring Makassarese Gowa weakened the two relatead nations. In the middle of the 19th century, the South Sulawesis fought against encroachment by Dutch, Spanish and British colonial forces (Minahan 2002: 1754). The Dutch subdued the last sovereign Sulawesi states in 1905-1906 and 1911. The island was divided into two regions, the State of Celebes in the South and the Residency of Manado in the North. Rebellions continued during the 1920s and 1930s (Minahan 2002: 1755).
* The Japanese took control of the island in 1942 and surrendered it to the advancing Allies in 1942. When the Dutch left, South Sulawesi nationalists attempted to establish a sovereign state, unrecognized by the Indonesians and the Dutch (Minahan 2002: 1755).
* In 1946, Sulaewsi was part of the state of East Indonesia, which combined all islands east of Kalimantan and Java.
* Shortly before leaving the country the Duch imposed a federal system upon Indonesia in 1949 (Ferrazzi 2000: 66). South Sulawesi at the time was part of the larger state of East Indonesia; however, South Sulawesi, constituted the military and administrative centre of the State of East Indonesia, so we treat this as a concession (van Dijk 1981: 162). [1949: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* East Indonesia was dissolved in August 1950 and the first Sulawesi province was formed. The province also included the northern parts, in which the Minahasans dominate; and the first two governors were in fact Minahasans, despite the South Sulawesis constituting the larger group (Yulianto et al. 2020: 90). Still, the governorship went to a South Sulawesi after the first two. Also, South Sulawesi separatists make claims regarding the whole island and not just its southern parts (see under Claimed territory). We do not code a concession since South Sulawesi had already been the center of an autonomous province before that (East Indonesia). In fact, the dissolution of East Indonesia was vehemently (and violently) opposed by the South Sulawesis (van Dijk 1981: 165f).
* There is a second, less ambiguous reason to code a restriction in 1950: the Dutch imposition of a federal system was widely objected in Indonesia. In 1950, Indonesia returned to a unitary form of government (Ferrazzi 2000: 66-67). While the provinces retained some autonomy, the return to a unitary form of government is coded as an autonomy restriction. We code a violence onset in 1950. [1950: autonomy restriction]
  + The new constitution came into force in August while severe violence had already broken out in May; therefore, this restriction occurred after the onset of separatist violence.
* In 1957, Jakarta introduced legislation which granted the regions increased autonomy, including the right to elect its own leaders (Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). Although South Sulawesi was a part of a larger Sulawesi Province, it makes up the majority population in Sulawesi and the governor at this point is of South Sulawesis origin. [1957: autonomy concession]
* In 1959 Sukarno declared a state of emergency and ended parliamentary democracy. Under Sukarno’s system of “Guided Democracy”, the regions were stripped from most of their powers. In 1959, Sukarno returned to the 1945 constitution, which – since the constitution does not explain what regional autonomy means – effectively meant that the extent of regional autonomy from now on depended on the will of the President (Ferrazzi 2000: 67). Other reforms, enacted in the same year, further weakened the regions (Kimura 2013: 47-48; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). Moreover, in 1960 South Sulawesi was split into two provinces. [1959: autonomy restriction]
* South Sulawesi province was established in 1964. This is more a concession for the North Sulawesis/Minahasa than the South Sulawesis because the latter claim the whole island of Sulawesi. We do not code a concession or restriction due to this in any case because Indonesian provinces did not have many autonomy rights under Suharto’s “guided democracy” anyway.
* Under his “New Order” (1965-1998), Suharto continued and even intensified the centralization policy initiated by his predecessor (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5). While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50). Hence, we code a restriction. [1974: autonomy restriction]
* In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, but similar to the 1974 “New Order” legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1999: autonomy concession]
* The implementation of the decentralization laws was tricky and chaotic, mainly due to an indeterminate allocation of competencies between the provincial and the district level. The 2004 enhanced the provinces’ autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]
* In 2004, West Sulawesi was split from South Sulawesi; the implications upon the self-determination status are not fully clear and thus, we do not code a restriction/concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* See below under major territorial changes. [1951-1959, 2001-2009: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1949 Indonesia attained independence, implying a host change. But this was before the start date and is thus not coded.
* In 1950, Sulawesi province was established. The South Sulawesis were the largest group, though the region notably also included the northern parts. [1950: sub-state secession]
* In 1959 Sukarno returned to a heavily centralized system, whereby the regions were stripped from most of their powers (see above). [1959: revocation of autonomy]
* South Sulawesi province was created in 1964. However, at the time, regional autonomy was limited. We do not code a major change, therefore.
* The 1999 decentralization laws, implemented on January 1, 2001, gave the provinces significant autonomy (see above). [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | South Sulawesis |
| *Scenario* | 1:1/No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | Makassarese and Bugis |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 85010000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the South Sulawesi (Makassarese and Bugis) as powerless until 1966, after which they are no longer included. Yet, the Javanese are coded as dominant until 2004, suggesting a powerless code for the South Sulawesis until and including 2004.
* After Suharto’s fall, the government became more inclusive (President Habibie was a Bugi, for instance), but not inclusive enough to justify an end to the dominant code for the Javanese according to the coding notes. In 2005-2012, the Javanese become senior partner and a series of other groups (e.g. the Bataks) become junior partners. The Buginese and Makassarese are only included in EPR as of 2015 (when they are coded as junior partner); however, the EPR coding notes make clear that they were represented in the cabinet already before that. [1950-2004: powerless; 2005-2009: junior partner]

**Group size**

* EPR pegs the Makassarese and Bugis at 1% of Indonesia’s population. In contrast, Minahan (2002: 1752) suggests a much higher estimate of around 4% (9.755 million out of Indonesia’s approximately 215 million in 2002 according to the World Bank). Other sources suggest that the South Sulawesis make up more than the 1% in EPR, too. Hence, we follow Minahan. [0.0454]

**Regional concentration**

* Though South Sulawesi nationalists claim the whole island of Sulawesi, the South Sulawesi are concentrated in the southern part of the island (the provinces of South Sulawesi and Southeast Sulawesi), where >80% of all Sulawesis live, and the Sulawesis form approx. 78% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 1752). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The South Sulawesis are ethnic Malays (see Minahan 2002: 1752). EPR codes ethnic kin due to the Malays in Malaysia. [kin in neighboring country]

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