# ISRAEL

## Palestinians

Activity: 1974-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* A 1947 UN Special Committee recommended that Palestine be partitioned into Arab and Jewish states, but the plan was rejected by Arabs who wanted of Palestine to become their own state. Jews subsequently declared an independent Israel. Neighboring Arab states invaded but lost the war and Israel ended up with 30% more territory than under the UN plan. Meanwhile, Egypt took control of the Gaza strip and Jordan annexed the West Bank (Minahan 2002: 1496; Roth 2015: 205). After 1948, Palestinian nationalists mobilized and formed a number of organizations in refugee camps in neighboring Arab countries, such as Jordan (Minahan 2002: 1496). In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed. Initially, the goal of Palestinian nationalist organizations including the PLO was to liberate Palestine, i.e., finish the Jewish state (Becker 1984: 39; Minahan 2002: 1495f). In the 1967 war, Israel captured the West Bank and the Gaza strip and established military rule there. The PLO’s stated goal remained the liberation of Palestine as a whole (Becker 1984: 69; Harms & Ferry 2017: 119), which is not a claim for increased autonomy or secession and therefore not considered here.
* In late 1973, the PLO began to readjust its policy towards claiming that Palestinian self-rule could be installed in the West Bank and Gaza before the liberation of all Palestinian lands (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In other words, the PLO’s official goal became a two-state solution with the borders roughly coinciding with territories that Israel had annexed in 1967 - the West Bank and Gaza. This can be seen as a self-determination claim according to SDM; however, it should be noted that some factions saw this as an intermediate goal on the road towards re-capturing the whole of Palestine. The readjustment was formally adopted by the PLO’s legislative body, the Palestinian National Council, in June 1974 (see the PLO’s Ten Point Program), hence the start date. Palestinian claims for a two-state solution continued in subsequent years and the claims are ongoing (Harms & Ferry 2017). [start date: 1974; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In late 1973, the PLO began to readjust its policy towards claiming that Palestinian self-rule could be installed in the West Bank and Gaza before the liberation of all Palestinian lands (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In other words, the PLO’s official goal became a two-state solution with the borders roughly coinciding with territories that Israel had annexed in 1967 - the West Bank and Gaza. The readjustment was formally adopted by the PLO’s legislative body, the Palestinian National Council, in June 1974 (see the PLO’s Ten Point Program). Palestinian claims for a two-state solution continued in subsequent years and the claims are ongoing (Harms & Ferry 2017; Roth 2015: 207; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1974-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1974; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the PLO starting in 1974 includes the following territories: The West Bank, including eastern Jerusalem, and Gaza (Minahan 2002: 1491; Roth 2015: 206; Minahan 2016: 326). We code this claim using GIS data on from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In November 1988, the PLO proclaimed an independent state of Palestine in the context of a two-state solution (Harms & Ferry 2017: 147; Minahan 2002: 1497; Roth 2015: 207). Ca two thirds of UN members have recognized Palestine, with Israel, the U.S., and Western Europe ranging among the most important exceptions. [1988: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, groups associated with the PLO carried out numerous acts of terrorism; as such, the movement can be seen as violent from the start. The LVIOLSD coding for 1974-1986 follows UCDP/PRIO. The HVIOLSD coding for 1987-1997 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2009).
* In 1997-1999, violence decreased markedly in the wake of the Oslo process. UCDP/PRIO records just two deaths in 1997, 5 in 1998, and 4 in 1999. Given this de-escalation, 1998-1999 are coded as NVIOLSD.
* Violence increased again in 2000. The HVIOLSD coding for 2000-2009 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2009).
* The LVIOLSD codes in 2010-2012, 2014 follow UCDP/PRIO, which also reports 12 battle-related deaths in 2013, suggesting fighting was sustained, so we code ongoing LVIOLSD in 2010-2014.
* 2015-2017 saw fewer battle-related deaths according to UCDP/PRIO (41 across all three years), but the coding notes suggest there continued to be significant violence: “The West Bank and Jerusalem saw a wave of hundreds of attacks in 2015 and 2016, most commonly knifings, by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israeli settlers and security personnel.” UCDP/PRIO does not count those as battle-related deaths, but this is debatable. 2018-2019 saw more than 25 battle-related deaths according to UCDP/PRIO. In 2020, there were just 8, in 2021 there were more than 200, suggesting sustained ongoing fighting. We code ongoing LVIOLSD. [1974-1986: LVIOLSD; 1987-1997: HVIOLSD; 1998-1999: NVIOLSD; 2000-2009: HVIOLSD; 2010-2020: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Before WWI, Palestine had been part of the Ottoman Empire. In the late 19th century, a growing number of Jews immigrated to today’s Israel in response to anti-Semitism and discrimination in other parts of the world. Arab nationalism grew in reaction to political Zionism (Minahan 2002: 1493). Having previously promised an Arab state to be carved out of the Ottoman Empire, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration in November 1917, which supported the establishment of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine (Minahan 2002: 1494f).
* After WWI, Palestine became a League of Nations mandate, along with Jordan. In 1921, Jordan became a separate British mandate (and 1946 achieved independence). Tensions between Jews and Arabs, who both had been promised the rest of Palestine, erupted (Minahan 2002: 1495).
* In 1937, the British Peel Commission recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab, Jewish, and British regions. The latter should include Jerusalem and important religious sites. Jews agreed to the proposal, but Palestinian Arabs rejected the plan (Minahan 2002: 1495).
* After WWII, Jewish immigration to Israel increased exponentially (UCDP Encyclopedia). A 1947 UN Special Committee again recommended that Palestine be partitioned into Arab and Jewish states. The plan was adopted by the UN General Assembly. Jews accepted the plan, which would have given them 56% of Palestine. Arabs, on the other hand, rejected the plan, instead claiming a single Arab state with minority rights for Jews (Minahan 2002: 1496; UCDP Encyclopedia).
* Palestinian Jews declared an independent Israel in 1948. Armies of the neighboring Arab states immediately invaded, but lost the war. Many Palestinian Arabs fled to neighboring Arab countries during the 1948 war, thus constituting the large Palestinian Arab diaspora. Israel ended up in control of 30% more territory than had been envisioned in the UN plan (ca 78% of Palestine). Meanwhile, Egypt took control of the Gaza strip and Jordan annexed the West Bank (Minahan 2002: 1496; UCDP Encyclopedia). According to MRGI, “Israel confiscated the lands of the Palestinians who had been expelled [in 1948] and also much of that from those who remained. Meanwhile, whilst those who remained in Israel after 1948 were granted citizenship, until 1966 they were subjected to travel restrictions and curfews amounting to martial law.”
* In the 1967 Six Day War, Israel captured the the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula (previously controlled by Egypt), the West Bank (previously controlled by Jordan), and the Golan Heights (previously controlled by Syria) (Minahan 2002: 1496; MRGI; Roth 2015: 207; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The 1967 war further increased Palestinian refugee populations in neighboring Arab states and also initiated the settler issue, with Israeli Jews starting to move into the occupied lands to build settlements on Palestinian lands. However, Israeli settlements in occupied territories remained relatively limited until the late 1970s (Harms & Ferry 2017: 143; UCDP Encyclopedia). We code an independence restriction because Gaza, the West Bank, and other territories transitioned from Arab to Israeli rule. We code another restriction due to the initiation of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, given that with settlement came requisition of land and resources (Harms & Ferry 2017: 143). [1967: independence restriction, autonomy restriction]
* In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria attempted to regain the territory they had lost in 1973, but were defeated by the Israeli military (Harms & Ferry 2017: 122ff; MRGI). Eventually, Jordan and Egypt gave up their sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, which made these territories not just de facto but also de jure occupied territories of Israel. The Golan heights remain occupied by Israel but claimed by Syria (Roth 2015: 207). We do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Israeli settlement in occupied territories increased markedly after 1977, with the average annual number of settlers increasing almost tenfold from 770 between 1967-77 to 5,690 in 1978-87. By 1987, Israel had requisitioned half of the West Bank and a third of Gaza, amounting to virtual annexation (Harms & Ferry 2017: 143). [1978: autonomy restriction]
* The 1978 Camp David Accords established a framework for peace negotiations and promised Palestinians self-rule in the occupied territories (West Bank and Gaza). There were no concrete steps towards implementation, however (Harms & Ferry 2017: 129f).
* In 1992, Israel’s left-wing Labor party won the election for the first time in almost two decades. The subsequent Labor government pursued a more conciliatory approach towards Palestinians and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ordered a freeze on new settlements (Harms & Ferry 2017: 159; MAR). In 1993, Israel agreed on a framework for self-rule for Palestinians as part of the Oslo agreement in return for Palestinian recognition of the right of Israel to exist. Negotiations continued and in 1994, another agreement was signed allowing autonomy in the West Bank concerning education, taxation, and other matters. In the same year, Israeli troops withdrew from the new Palestinian autonomous area. Negotiations continued. In 1995, Israel agreed to the transfer of additional powers to the Palestinian Authority (PA) including in the areas of transportation and employment. Also in 1995, Oslo II (or Oslo B) was signed. Oslo II created three areas A, B, and C in the West Bank. A areas were to be administered by the Palestinian Authority (3% of the West Bank), B areas jointly by the PA and Israel (24% of the West Bank), and C areas, which contain Israeli settlements, are administered by Israel (73% of the West Bank) (Hams & Ferry 2017: 154ff). Negotiations continued after 1995 on the thorniest issues, including the return of refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the evacuation of Israeli settlements, and Palestinian statehood. While several peace agreements were signed between 1997 and 1999, these catered only to some minor issues, such as continued Israeli withdrawals and slight decreases in Areas C to 60% of the West Bank (Harms & Ferry 2017: 160ff; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Overall, the Oslo process led to a small increase in Palestinian autonomy as Israel withdrew from six Area A cities and 400 Area B villages and Palestinians could exercise limited autonomy, so we code an autonomy concession. The division of the West Bank in Oslo II could be seen as a restriction, but we considered this too ambiguous because it largely formalized existing policy of land requisitions and settlements in occupied territories. [1993: autonomy concession]
* In 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister. The new government ended the four-year freeze on new settlements in the occupied territories and began to develop new settlements in Palestinian territories. Settlement expansion continued throughout the remainder of the 1990s, the 2000s, the 2010s, and the early 2020s (Harms & Ferry 2017: 159ff, 207; MRGI). [1996: autonomy restriction]
* In 2002, Israel began construction of a wall between Israel and the West Bank. The wall, built in the name of security, frequently sneaked deep into the West Bank, thus claiming large portions of land. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 2004 that the construction of the wall is equivalent to the annexation of West Bank land (Harms & Ferry 2017: 174ff; MRGI). [2002: autonomy restriction]
* In 2004, prime minister Ariel Sharon announced that Israel would withdrew its forces from Gaza and end all Israeli settlements in Gaza. The withdrawal was implemented in mid-August 2005, lasting just under a week (Hams & Ferry 2017: 182ff). [2004: autonomy concession]
* In 2006, Hamas won elections in the Palestinian Authority. Immediately, Israel froze its monthly payments of over $50 million to the Palestinian Authority comprised of customs and tax receipts in violation of earlier agreements (Hams & Ferry 2017: 184ff). [2006: autonomy restriction]
* Israel restricted the movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza in 2007 (Hams & Ferry 2017: 184ff). [2007: autonomy restriction]
* In March 2018, the Knesset passed the Entry Into Israel Law (Amendment No. 30). This law allows the minister of interior to revoke the residency rights of Palestinians in Jerusalem on the grounds of a “breach of allegiance to the State of Israel” (al Jazeera 2018). Evictions could be seen as a restriction as defined here, but overall this is an ambiguous case. We still code a restriction in 2018 due to the below.
* In July 2018, the Knesset (Israeli parliament) adopted the nation-state law, which stripped Arabic of its status as an official language alongside Hebrew that it had had since 1948. The law also established that “Israel is the historic homeland of the Jewish people and they have an exclusive right to national self-determination in it” and established “Jewish settlement as a national value” (Berger 2018; EPR; MRGI). The language downgrade constitutes a clear cultural rights restriction while the other two provisions seem to mainly reaffirm existing policy. [2018: cultural rights restriction]
* On 19 October 2021, the Israeli minister of defense outlawed six leading Palestinian human rights organizations, declaring them “terrorist organizations” and accused the groups - of diverting funds to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This is based on the 2016 Israeli Counter-Terrorism Law, which criminalizes all activities conducted by an organization deemed to be a ‘terrorist’. Under the act, such an organization can have all of its equipment seized and its staff arrested by the military (Zaher 2021; Masarwa and Mohamed 2021).
* In March 2022, the Knesset voted to renew a law dating back to 2003 that denies naturalization to Palestinians from the occupied West Bank or Gaza married to Israeli citizens and does not apply to Jewish settlers in the West Bank (Krauss 2022). While a restriction, this is not a restriction of ethnic rights.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Oslo process led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the mid-1990s. However, while giving the Palestinians a certain degree of self-rule, the extent to which this can be described as meaningful regional autonomy as described in the codebook is questionable. As argued by Harms & Ferry (2017: 158, 205), the main consequence of the Oslo process was an Israeli consolidation of power. Israel claimed most of the West Bank as Area C territories, roadblocks and checkpoints were erected and A and B territories were reduced to virtual islands surrounded by Israeli control of who went in and out.
* Although the Palestinians have nominal autonomy, Israeli authorities retain primary control over resources and infrastructure and systematically privilege Jewish Israeli settlers over Palestinians in the provision of roads, water, electricity, health care, and other services. Even where Palestinians have a degree of autonomy, they rely on infrastructure projects that require Israeli-issued permits or that cross through Israeli-controlled Area C (Human Rights Watch 2021: 93) Further, the Israeli government has imposed restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in and out of Gaza, the West Bank and beyond (Human Rights Watch 2021: 172).
* We do not code regional autonomy. Notably, this coding decision is in line with EPR. [1974-2020: no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Palestinians |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Palestinian Arabs; Israeli Arabs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 66601200; 66601100 |

**Power access**

* EPR distinguishes between Arabs in Israel proper (‘Israeli Arabs’, coded as powerless from 1974-2018 and discriminated thereafter) and Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza strip (‘Palestinian Arabs’, coded as discriminated throughout). The latter is the larger group, and Palestinians in the occupied territories were not given any rights to participate in Israeli elections. Starting in 2019, EPR codes both Palestinian group (i.e., also those in Israel proper) as discriminated against. [1974-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* The group sizes of the two EPR groups (see above) can be combined. [1974-1976: 0.27+0.11 = 0.38; 1977-1991: 0.29+0.11 = 0.40; 1992-2020: 0.31+0.12 = 0.43]
  + Note: Minahan (2002) suggests a similar group size. According to Minahan, there were around 3.65 mio Palestinians in Israel in 2002 (combining Israel proper, Gaza, and the West Bank). According to the WB, Israel (w/o Palestinian-controlled territories) had a population of 6.5 millions in 2002 and Gaza and West Bank a combined population of 3.1 mio, yielding a relative group size of 38%.

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1491), Palestinians made up 97% of the population of Palestine in 2002, by which he refers to Gaza, the West Bank, and eastern Jerusalem (total population ca. 3 million), where approx 85% of all Palestinian Arabs in Israel resided. The 97% figure seems high given the large number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank (ca 380,000 by 2014) and Gaza and the West Bank are separated by a 20-mile strip of Israeli land. Still, the criteria for territorial concentration are clearly met. MAR and EPR also code territorial concentration, with MAR noting that 50-75% of Palestinians live in their regional base. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are large numbers of Palestinian Arabs in Jordan (ca 2 milion) and Lebanon (several hundred thousands), and smaller communities in many other states including Egypt, and Syria, as well as other Arab states (EPR; MAR; Minahan 2002: 1491). [kin in neighboring country]

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