# ITALY

## Friuli

Activity: 1966-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Moviment Friül (Friul Movement, or Movimento Friuli, or MF) was formed in 1966 as a pressure group to win increased political autonomy for Friuli, hence the start date of the movement (Movimento Friuli, n.d.; Istitut Ladin Furlan, n.d.). In 1968, the MF ran for regional elections (Ronza 1976: 52, 54). The MF was represented in the Consiglio Regionale from 1968 until 1993 (Ronza 1976: 54). The MF petered out thereafter. According to Wikipedia, the party attempted to run in the regional elections in 2003, but its lists were not accepted. In 2006, the party supported some candidates in the regional elections but, when these candidates were elected, these individuals stated that they were independents. In 2012, the president of the MF wrote a letter to the president of the region to criticise their attitude towards the Friuli language and to announce a return to the political scene (the return did not, however, materialize).
* There are additional organisations of relevance. The Movimento Autonomista Friulano, for instance, was founded in 2008 according to its own website. It remains possible to join the movement, and the organization competed in the 2018 regional elections (Movimento Autonomista Friulano n.d.). The most active group as of 2022 appears to be Patrie Friulane (also known as Patto per l’Autonomia), founded in 2015. This party ran in the recent elections (Autonomie e Ambiente, n.d.). It is a member of Autonomie e Ambiente, an association of regionalist and autonomist Italian groups (Autonomie Ambiente, n.d.).
* Due to the activities of these organisations, we code the movement from 1966, and consider it to be ongoing as of 2020.
* It should be noted that Roth (2015: 96) suggests an earlier start date. According to Roth, the MF was formed already in 1948. This, however, contradicts the MF’s own website. [start date: 1966; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The three organisations of relevance, all appear to put forward claims for increased autonomy (Movimento Friuli, n.d.; Movimento Autonomista Friulano, n.d.; Autonomie e Ambiente, n.d.). For example, Movimento Friuli described itself as “il partito autonomista nazionalitario friulano” [the Friulian nationalist autonomist party]; Movimento Autonomista Friulano as “l’organizzazzione politica unitaria dell’autonomismo friulano, inteso come l’insieme delle persone, delle associazioni e dei gruppi che intendono porre al centro della propria azione e dei propri programmi il principio dell’autonomia della comunita friulana” [the political organization of Friulian autonomy, understood as the set of people, associations and groups which intends to place the principle of Friulian autonomy at the centre of their actions and programmes]; and Patrie Furlane works towards towards “la piene attuazione della Costituzione Italiana (art. 5) che riconosce e promuove le autonomie locali” [the full implementation of the Italian Constitution (Art. 5) which recognizes and promotes local autonomies]. We thus code an autonomy claim throughout the movement. [1966-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Friuli consists of the provinces Udine, Pordenone and parts of Gorizia (excluding Trieste) of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region (Minahan 1996: 184; Roth 2015). We code this claim using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Friuli people have settled the regions north of the Adriatic Sea before the rise of the Etruscans and Romans. They came under Roman rule in the first century B.C. Over the centuries they were ruled by different empires and tribes. On several occasions, the Friuli homeland was divided and reunited. Therefore, the terms Eastern and Western Friuli emerged. These two regions have known different rulers, histories and cultures (Minahan 2002:619).
* The western Friuli region (Friuli-Veneto) became part of the new Italian Kingdom in 1866. Eastern Friuli with Trieste as its capital remained under Habsburg control. After World War I, Austria lost the eastern Friuli region to Italy and the two Friuli regions were reunited (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 620).
* Under Mussolini’s rule and fascist ideology, Italian nationalism and uniform Italian culture and language were promoted. The Friuli minority came under pressure, the Friuli people did not enjoy any form of political autonomy, the Friuli language was outlawed and families were forced to change their names. With an increase of official government repression, many Friuli fled the country (Minahan 2002: 622).
* After the Second World War and the defeat of the Mussolini regime, the Friulian territories were split between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1947. Eastern Friuli was assigned to Yugoslavia except Gorizia. Trieste was designated an independent Free Territory under UN protection (Minahan 2002: 622).
* The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions. Four of the five autonomous regions with special statute (with the exception of Friuli-Venetia Giulia) were immediately set up and were granted significant autonomy, which included recognition of the minority languages (Baldini and Baldi 2014; Minority Rights Group International). The *regioni a statuto speciale* enjoyed “considerably more legislative, administrative and financial autonomy than the other regioni, and the ability to negotiate their bylaws directly with the national government, bypassing the national parliament” (Bilancia et al. 2010: 124). As opposed to the other four special regions, Friuli-Venetia only obtained administrative autonomy and the special statute in 1963 after the end of international control over the city of Trieste (Minahan 2002: 621; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 140; Biancal et al. 2010: 124; Woelk at al. 2007). Friuli comprises the major part of the region Friuli-Venezia Giulia, namely the provinces of Udine, Pordenone and parts of Gorizia, excluding Trieste. According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), the population of Udine (535,430), Pordenone (310,811) and Gorizia excluding Trieste (140,143) amounts to 986,384 in the year 2011. Given the total population of the autonomous region Friuli-Venezia Giulia (1,218,985), the Friuli make up 80.9 per cent of the entire entity. We code a prior concession since the Friuli predominantly benefited from the granting of an autonomous status. [1963: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Constitutional Law No. 3/1989 granted the competence of choosing autonomously electoral system for the five Special Autonomy Regions (Sandri 2008:3). [1989: autonomy concession]
* After the fall of the ‘First Republic’, several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name several major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008). Note that some decentralization legislation is directed at ordinary regions only and did not affect the regions with a special statute.
  + In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provinical president) (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). In the same year, the Constitutional Law 2/1993 (“Amendment of Article 68 of the Constitution”) reformed the Special Autonomy Statute and resulted in more competences for the special regions (Sandri 2008: 12). [1993: autonomy concession]
  + Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments” (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). However, since no additional powers were devolved, and since only regions with ordinary status were concerned, this is not coded.
  + In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005; Bolgherini, 2014: 201). It seems that both ordinary and special regions were affected by these laws (Palermo 2008: 34). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). The 1999 acts intended to narrow the gap between ordinary and special regions. Since only regions with ordinary status were concerned, these acts are not coded.
  + The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In the relevant articles in the constituting (Title V), there is no reference to ordinary regions, which is why we assume that regions with a special autonomy status are also included. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). We do not code a concession because the referendum was not held in Friuli only.
* In 1996, a law was passed especially devoted to the protection and promotion of Friulian in education, public administration and access to the law. These ‘Regulations for the protection and promotion of the Friulian language and culture and the establishment of the Servizio for Regional and Minority Languages’ gave the right to use Friulian in oral communication in public administration and the right to be heard in Friulian in court proceedings if Italian is not understood. The regional government was given the right to conclude broadcasting arrangements for the minority languages (Coluzzi 2004; Minority Rights Group International). Since this is a regional law, passed by the regional jurisdiction, the act is not coded.
* In 1999, law number 482 (‘regulations on the matter of historical language minorities’) was passed to protect twelve minority languages (French, Provençal, Franco-Provençal, German, Ladin, Friulian, Slovene, Sardinian, Catalan, Albanian, Greek and Croatian). The law allowed the use of Friulian in private and public life. The teaching of Friulian at schools was also allowed. (Coluzzi 2004; Minority Rights Group). [1999: cultural rights concession]
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2010, the role of municipal and provincial clerk was significantly revised, and the Ministry of the Interior regained control of this key position (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* In 2016, a potential constitutional reform was rejected in a referendum. This reform “would have produced a shift towards a more cooperative and centralized form of regionalism” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 581). Baldi (2020: 34) also discusses this reform, claiming that it would have “provided for a substantial reduction in regional autonomy” (see also: Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018).

**Regional autonomy**

* As a part of an autonomous region with special statute, the Friuli had already been regionally autonomous before movement onset in 1966. We therefore code regional autonomy throughout. [1966-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Friuli |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Friulians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32503000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.012]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 618), the Friuli make up 91% of the Friuli territory Friuli-Venezia. This amounts to 725,000 Friuli, which is more than half of all Friuli in the whole of Italy. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are smaller Friuli populations in Slovenia and Croatia and in the Americas. However, they are not large enough (>100,000) to be considered here. We do not code Italians in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against an Italian-dominated government. [no kin]

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## Ladins

Activity: 1945-2020

**General notes**

* The Ladin language is spoken by approximately 30,000 people in the regions of Trentino-Alto Adige and Veneto (Minority Rights Group, n.d.).

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first organization established to protect Ladin culture, Naziun Ladina, was founded in 1870. In 1914, the Union di Ladins was set up (Minority Rights Group, n.d.).
* The Ladin movement re-emerged after World War II, when Ladins attempted to win Allied support for the creation of an independent state modeled on Liechtenstein and under the protection of the UN. Since 1945 various Ladin political organizations have sought regional autonomy, even independence, for the Ladin area in northern Italy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 139f; Keesing’s; Minahan 1996: 322ff, 2002: 1068ff).
* More specifically, following World War II, Ladin-speakers formed the Committee for National Liberation (Comitate de Liberazione Nazionale) and petitioned the UN for an independent Ladin Republic, or Ladinia (Roth, 2015: 93). Organisations such as Inant Adum and Union Generela di Ladins were active in the 1980s and 1990s, and sought to “safeguard the culture and language of the Ladin nation” (Minahan, 2002: 1072). Furthermore, in 1983 the political party, Union Autonomista Ladina (UAL) was founded; in 1992, its leader, Ezio Anesi, was elected to the national parliament. In addition, the autonomist political party, Ladins, was launched in 1993 and secured two provincial government seats (Minority Rights Group, n.d.).
  + There is also the General Union of the Ladins of Dolomites (Union Generela di ladins dla Dolomites). However, while this organization seeks to “promote the Ladin cultural and linguistic heritage” and “defend the interests and objectives of the Ladin population in the cultural, social and environmental fields and to work for the respect of their fundamental rights”, it does not appear to seek autonomy for the community (General Union of the Ladins of Dolomites, n.d.).
* In the early 2000s, the movement remained active, petitioning the Italian government (Minahan, 2002: 1072). The UAL remains active as of 2020 and competes in elections (Moviment UAL, 2020). We thus code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1945; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* After the Second World War, the Ladins attempted to win Allied support for the creation of an independent state modeled on Liechtenstein and under the protection of the UN. [1945-1946: independence claim]
* Soon thereafter the Ladins’ claim moderated. According to Minahan (2002: 1072) the Ladins began to claim “more linguistic, economic, and cultural autonomy in a united Ladin district within Italy.” Given the desire to unify Ladina in a separate region, we code a sub-state secession claim. We use 1946 as the cut-off, as this was when the De Gasperi–Gruber Agreement was signed (which assigned South Tyrol to Italy in return for autonomy for Bolzano).
* The sub-state secession/autonomy claim was continued by the Union Autonomista Ladina (UAL), founded in 1983. The UAL claims to be “inspired by the principles of autonomy, [and] unity”, and to seek “to strengthen the common historical and linguistic self-awareness of the Ladin people”, “to defend and claim the rights of the Ladin community”, and to “safeguard, promote and enhance the Ladin language, culture and identity” (Moviment UAL, 2019). [1947-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1945; end date: 1946]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* According to some sources, the territory claimed by the Ladins is composed of the Cadore district of Belluno Province of Veneto and the Val Gardena district of Bolzano Province of Trentino-Alto Adige (Minahan 2002: 1068). However, the exact spatial extent is not clear since the Ladins made multiple different territorial claims. We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 86).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* For many centuries the Ladins were ruled by the Austrian Empire (with two short interruptions of French rule). After World War I, however, the area was awarded to Italy. Under fascist rule, the Ladin language was banned, Ladin schools, cultural institutions and publications were closed and many nationalist leaders were arrested. In 1927, the Fascists divided the Ladin territory between the three provinces of South Tyrol, Trentino and Belluno to weaken resistance to Italian rule.
* Following Italian surrender in the Second World War, German troops occupied the Ladin territory. After the war, the area was returned to Italy - without the approval and against the wishes of the Ladins (Minahan 2002: 1071; Minority Rights Group International).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Constitution of 1948 recognizes the rights of minorities. The Regional Autonomy Statute for Trento/South Tyrol accorded specific rights to the Ladins in the provinces of Bolzano and Trento (but not in Belluno). The minority’s rights included the provision of Ladin teaching in primary schools, the re-introduction of Ladin place names and the enhancement of Ladin culture in general (Minority Rights Group International). The constitution entered into force on January 1, 1948. However, the constitution was “largely prepared in 1946” (Einaudi 1948: 662) and approved by a vote of 453 to 62 on December 11, 1947. 1947: cultural rights concession
* According to the Minority Rights Group International, the Autonomy Statute for South Tyrol also strengthened the rights and the protection of the Ladin minority in Bolzano and Trento as they gained the right for proportional representation in the regional parliament and public administration. Overall, this is too insignificant to be coded as an autonomy concession.
* In 1999, law number 482 (‘regulations on the matter of historical language minorities’) was passed to protect twelve minority languages (French, Provençal, Franco-Provençal, German, Ladin, Friulian, Slovene, Sardinian, Catalan, Albanian, Greek and Croatian). The law constitutes an increase in cultural rights as it allowed the use of Ladin in private and public life and the teaching of Ladin at schools (Coluzzi 2004; Minority Rights Group International). [1999: cultural rights concession]
  + However, it should be noted that the Ladin community has “uneven protection” (Minority Rights Group, n.d.). Protection is dependent upon province (Minority Rights Group, n.d.).
* Minahan (2002: 1072) writes that, “in mid-2000, the Italian government rejected a petition for the creation of a separate Ladin autonomous region”; however, “as an alternative, the Ladins were allowed to create a partially elected government, including a president of the Ladin nation”. This is supported by Roth (2015: 93); however, Roth suggests that the new Ladin council was largely symbolic. We do not code a concession.
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
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* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.

**Regional autonomy**

* As mentioned in Concessions and Restrictions, both Minahan (2002: 1072) and Roth (2015: 93) note that, in 2000, the Ladins formed a national council. However, Roth describes this council as being “largely symbolic” and thus we do not code regional autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ladins |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Ladins are not included in EPR. They are demographically small (approx. 35,000) and do not have their own administrative division. We did not find any evidence of the Ladins being part of or having some influence on the Italian government or being actively discriminated against, which is why we code them as powerless throughout. [1945-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According Minority Rights Group International, there are around 33,000 Ladin speakers. This is consistent with Minahan (2002), who states that there are around 36,000 Ladins. We draw on Minahan. Italy’s population was 57.06 million in 2002 (World Bank). [0.0006]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1086), the Ladins are concentrated in the Dolomite Alps region of Trentino-Alto Adige and Veneto. The majority lives in the Val di Badia and Val di Gardena. Their territory (Ladinia) encompasses parts of the provinces of Belluno, South Tyrol, and Trento. The Ladins make up 55% of the local population, and more than half of all Ladins live there (see Minahan 2002: 1086). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1068), there are no significant Ladin communities outside of Italy. Their language is related to the Swiss Romansh, but Switzerland’s 2000 census counted but 60,000 Romansh speakers. [no kin]

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## Lombards

Activity: 1984-1989

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Roth (2015: 87), the Lombard League was founded in 1984 by Umberto Bossi, who later headed the Lega Nord. The Lombard League advocated “full secession” (Roth, 2015: 87).
* It should be noted that other sources suggest a different start date. For one, Minahan (2002: 1113) suggests that the Lombard League was formed in 1981 whereas Ruzza & Schmidtke (1991: 4) suggest 1982 as the year of formation. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the Lega Lombarda website regarding its founding date, but the 1984 data suggested by Roth is supported by another source (Farrell 1993: 10), so we rely on Roth.
* Starting in 1989, the Lombard League began to merge with separatist organizations in other northern regions to form a pan-Northern SDM. The joint party was called Lega Nord (Giordano, 1999: 29). Lega Nord absorbed regional movements, including Bossi’s Lombard League, and its claims shifted to winning autonomy for northern Italy/Padania (Bartlett et al., 2012: 23). Therefore, we stop coding a Lombard SDM in 1989 and instead code a separate “Padanians” movement from that year onwards.
* According to Wikipedia there is a Pro-Lombardy Independence Party, launched in 2011. However, its website does not function and this organisation also does not appear to be politically significant. We do not code a second phase of the movement. [start date: 1984; end date: 1989]

**Dominant claim**

* Roth (2015: 87) claims that, from the beginning, the Lombard League advocated “full secession”. This is supported by Giordano (1999: 29), who cites Agnew’s (1995: 166) claim that the Lega Lombarda used phrases such as “region as nation”. [1984-1989: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1984; end date: 1989]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Lombards is the Lombardy region in northern Italy Roth (2015: 86ff). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* As a result of the Second Italian Independence War against the Austrian Empire, Lombardy was annexed to the Kingdom of Italy in 1859. The fascist years under Benito Mussolini brought an increase in central control and reduced local and regional authority. The 1948 Republican constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions, among which also Lombardy. While four of the five autonomous regions with special statute were immediately set up (all except for Friuli-Venetia Giulia) and were granted significant autonomy, the promise of limited autonomy to the 15 regions with ordinary statute (among which Lombardy) was not implemented until the 1970s. Despite an enormous and deliberate delay, we code a (prior) concession as in 1970 the governing bodies of the regions were finally elected for the first time and a limited transfer of function took place (in 1977) (Baldini and Baldi 2014; Minahan 2002).

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lombards |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Italians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32501000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes Italians as a homogenous group and does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Italians etc. unless they are a distinct linguistic minority such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Suditrol in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1. As a consequence, many of the Northern Italian autonomist movements in the SDM data set do not have a separate EPR group but are incorporated in the EPR group ‘Italians’, which are coded as dominant throughout. To infer that all these movements are also dominant is of course not accurate. However, given the Lombardy’s influence in Italian politics due to its demographic size, its economic power, the important position of the city of Milan, and the fact that the Lombardy has in the relevant years provided two Prime Ministers (Spadolini, Craxi) and many ministers in various cabinets is evidence for the group’s executive influence. We therefore code the Lombards as senior partner throughout. [1984-1989: senior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1109), there are 8,221,000 Lombards, which corresponds to a group size of 0.144228 (given the total population of 57.06 million in 2002 provided by the Worldbank). [0.1442]

**Regional concentration**

* The Lombards are concentrated in Region of Lombardy, where they make up 77% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1109). This amounts to 6.97 million Lombards (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 8.221 million Lombards in the whole of Italy in that same year. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We code the presence of ethnic kin since the EPR group of the Swiss Italians can be considered direct kin of the Lombards (see Minahan 2000: 429). According to Minahan (2002: 1109) there are also “sizeable” Lombard groups in France and Germany and overseas communities in the United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Padanians

Activity: 1989-2020

**General notes**

* Padania, which has “never existed geographically or historically”, encompasses the regions of north and central Italy (Giordano, 1999: 217). Padania is the Latin term for the basin of the River Po.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Starting in 1989, the Lombard League began to merge with other Northern SDMs to form a pan-Northern SDM. The joint party was called Lega Nord (Giordano, 1999: 29). Lega Nord was born as a federation of the following regional parties from northern and central Italy: Lega Lombarda, Liga Veneta, Piemont Autonomista, Uniun Ligure, Lega Emiliano-Romagnola and Alleanza Toscana. Unlike the previous organizations, the Lega Nord’s focus is on northern Italy as a whole (Bartlett et al., 2012: 23).
  + Note: we code separate Lombard and Venetian SDMs prior to the emergence of the Padanian SDM because the Lega Lombarda and the Liga Veneta were both formed several years prior to the formation of Lega Nord and had political significance. The remaining regional groupings all emerged in the late 1980s shortly before the formation of Lega Nord, and they all had limited political significance. Therefore, we do not code separate Piemontese, Ligurian, Emilia-Romagnola, or Tuscan SDMs prior to the emergence of the joint Padanian movement.
  + Note as well: several sources agree that Lega Nord was formed in 1989 (Bridge Initiative, 2020; Albertazzi et al., 2018: 645; Giordano, 1999: 217; Newth, 2019: 392; Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 584; Passarelli, 2016: 224; Cento Bull 2011: 441). However, it should be noted that Bartlett et al. (2012:19) suggests that the League was formally created only in 1991.
* The Lega Nord, under Bossi, was best defined as a “regionalist populist” movement (Albertazzi et al., 2018: 646). Following its formation, the party was successful in “forcing” to “the top of national political agenda” the “northern question”: i.e. the growing economic and social gap between the wealthy north and the less developed south, and the concomitant sense of discontent in the north towards members of Italy’s political elite (Albertazzi et al., 2018: 647). The Lega Nord “advocated a territorial cause”, defended and promoted the North (or Padania), presented the north as being “ontologically different and distinctive from the rest of the country” and contended that “centralization of political authority and economic resources had damaged northern regional interests and identity” (Albertazzi et al., 2018: 648). Lega Nord has “always justified its juxtaposition of northern Italians with Rome by positing the former as a homogenous, hard-working community of people attached to their distinctive traditions, and the latter as the place where the political and cultural elites run the country to the benefit of the South” (Albertazzi et al., 2018: 648; see also: Giordano, 1999: 217). Indeed, Giordano (1999: 215) claims that Lega Nord has “attempted to invent an ethnicity for the North of Italy in order to justify its political claims”.
* Under Salvini, who took the reigns in 2013, the party has deprioritized the autonomy discourse (Bridge Initiative, 2020). Indeed, it has been suggested that Salvini has abandoned the organisation’s “historic cause of regionalism and federalism” (Newth, 2018). He set up a separate movement, Us With Salvini, to campaign for votes in the south and, by adopting the slogan “Italians First”, began to appeal to Italy as a whole and not just the north (Newth, 2018). In 2017, he announced his intention to remove the words “Padania” and “North” from all symbols of the movement and “a reference to autonomy and responsibility in Salvini’s electoral programme for the March 2018 elections was the only lip service paid to the party’s traditional cause of regional autonomy” (Newth, 2018; see also: Albertazzi et al., 2018: 650). Nevertheless, calls for greater autonomy have persisted, if in a more muted form. [start date: 1989; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Since its foundation, the “key issue” for the Lega Nord has been the “procuring of greater autonomy for the north” (Bartlett, 2012: 23; see also: Passarelli, 2016: 231). The degree of autonomy demanded has “oscillated over time”, from federalism, to independence, to devolution, to fiscal federalism (Bartlett, 2012: 23).
* Initially, the focus was on internal autonomy and federalism (Giordano 1999: 217). However, from 1994, Lega Nord advocated independence for Padania (Bartlett, 2012: 20; Newth, 2018; Giordano, 1999: 217; Newth, 2019: 394). This era saw the “questioning of Italy as a nation and an attempt ‘to construct (and invent)’ a Padanian ‘geography and history’” (Newth, 2019: 394).
* In 2000, the “project of building a new state/state, Padania, was abandoned” (Passarelli, 2016: 232). Newth (2018, 2019) suggests the independence claim was abandoned already in 1999. We follow Passarelli. After this, the dominant claim was for autonomy/federalism. [1989-1994: autonomy claim] [1995-2000: independence claim] [2001-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Starting in 1994, Lega Nord began to advocate independence for Padania (Bartlett, 2012: 20; Newth, 2018; Giordano, 1999: 217; Newth, 2019: 394). Newth suggests that the independence claim was dropped by 1999, but that “obtaining independence was still its nominal objective” (2018). Alternatively, Passarelli indicates that the claim was completely dropped in 2000 as LN joined the government in coalition. As sources largely indicate that the independence claim was heavily deemphasized, the period of independence claims is coded to end in 2000. [start date: 1994; end date: 2000]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territorial contours of Padania are not clearly defined (Giordano, 1999: 217). A map of Italy and its regions is provided in Roth (2015: 86); however, as Roth (2015: 87) notes, the form of Padania varies between eight and eleven regions.
* The following eight regions are always included: Liguria, Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna.
* The following three, more central regions are not always included: Tuscany, Umbria and Marche.
* Giordano (1999: 28) includes a poster from the Lega Nord national election campaign which features a “geographical representation” of the boundaries of Padania, and which seems to encompass Tuscany, Umbria and Marche. Therefore, we rely on the more expansive 11-region definition. We code based on GADM.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On September 15, 1996, Umberto Bossi declared the independence of the Federation of Padania at a rally in Venice. The first Padanian government is inaugurated (Minahan 2002; Bishai 2009; AP, 1996). As the LA Times (1996) reported, Bossi declared the following: “We peoples of Padania solemnly proclaim: Padania is an independent and sovereign federal republic”. This declaration was merely a “symbolic gesture, marking a dramatic finale to three days of rallies for secession and against the Rome-based government” (LA Times, 1996; see also: Baldwin, 1996). [1996: sovereignty declaration]

**Separatist armed conflicts**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Following the unification of Italy (1848-71), a highly centralized administrative structure was adopted (Minahan, 2002: 1991). Under Mussolini (1922-45), moreover, centralization was extremely high, and regional powers limited. In addition, in 1922, the fascist government launched a campaign to eradicate Italy’s regional languages (Minahan, 2002: 1991).
* The 1948 Constitution “institutionalized regions as a means of decentralizing power and to prevent totalitarian rule”. There are 20 regions in Italy, and five were given “special autonomy status”. Each region “has an authorizing statute that functions as a constitution, a popularly elected unicameral regional council, an executive committee and a president”. The special autonomous regions also boast “powers to make laws and raise taxes” (Minority Rights Group, n.d.). Article 6 of the Constitution states that “linguistic minorities will be protected by appropriate means” (Minority Rights Group, n.d.).
  + The five special regions are: Sicily, Sardinia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, and Aosta Valley (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 580)
  + Limited autonomy was not provided to the other 15 regions until the 1970s. In 1970, the governing bodies of the regions were finally elected for the first time and a limited transfer of function took place in 1977 (Baldini and Baldi, 2014; Minahan, 2002; Baldi, 2020: 29). Indeed, Baldi (2020: 29-30) remarks the following with regard to these “ordinary statute” regions (ORs): “the ORs…appeared to be of less importance [and]…had no territorial grounds: devoid of historical roots and of political movements demanding their institution, they were soon perceived to be of questionable utility”. They “did not achieve any real degree of self-rule”. Furthermore, the “legislative power of ORs, which was already more limited, was gradually eroded by invasive state legislation covering areas of regional competence in the name of protecting national interests”; in the early 1990s, prior to the concessions we discuss in the following section, 80% of the revenue of the ORs was composed of binding transfers from central government, depriving regions of their own financial resources (Baldi, 2020: 30).
  + The above constitute prior concessions, but did not take place in the ten years before the start date of the movement. It is diffult to date the gradual erosion of the already limited powers of the ORs noted by Baldi (2020).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Constitutional law in Italy has gradually been revised (Minority Rights Group, n.d.). Indeed, it has been suggested that, in the early 1990s, as Lega Nord formed, there was an “acceleration of regionalization” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 580). While the reforms which took place from the mid-1990s have been characterized as a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi, 2014: 87), some did nevertheless improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list compiled by Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100) and the same acts can be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008):
  + In 1993, Law No. 81 was passed which strengthened local self-government of the regions. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provincial president), which had previously been appointed by the central government (Bilancia et al., 2020: 125). [1993: autonomy concession]
  + Law No. 43 of 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11), the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments” (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). No additional powers were devolved, however, and we do not code this as a concession.
  + In 1997, the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy-making areas such as economic development, labour market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al., 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer, 2007: 176; OECD, 2005; Bolgherini, 2014: 201). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct elections for the regional presidents were introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statutes was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions could now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional government and no longer the national parliament (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). [1999: autonomy concession]
  + A constitutional reform was approved via referendum in 2001, “introducing substantial changes in the allocation of powers between state and regions” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 580). This entailed a revision of Article 116 which inscribed “a clause for potential asymmetric regionalism”; in practice, none of the Italian regions made use of these new provisions (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 580). The reform to the constitution saw many fiscal competencies and responsibilities transferred to the sub-state levels and we therefore code a concession. It should nevertheless be noted that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national laws were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded separately. [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005, a further effort to reform the Constitution similarly aimed to “increase the authority of regions”; however, it was rejected in a referendum in 2006 (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 580). Following the referendum, Lombardy and Veneto requested they be granted differentiated autonomy under Art. 116 but this was not granted and “never reached the phase of bilateral negotiations with the State” (Baldi, 2020: 33). The proposed reform would have further devolved powers to the sub-state level, mainly in the arenas of education and health (Eironline, 2005). Although the reform was defeated, it nevertheless constitutes an autonomy concession. The reversal, which came in 2006, was enacted due to a referendum and therefore is not coded as a restriction. Furthermore, the reversal came because the proposed reform would have also strengthened the powers of the Prime Minister (The Economist, 2006) and there was strong opposition in Italy against this change. We do not code a concession because the referendum was not held in Padania only.
    - It should be noted that, in response to the outcome of the referendum, “the only two regions where the majority of voters were in favour…namely Lombardy and Veneto, requested that they be granted differentiated autonomy under Article 116 IC”. However, this process became gridlocked “almost immediatiely, and never reached the phase of bilateral negotiations with the State” (Baldi, 2020: 33).
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
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* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* In 2016, a potential constitutional reform was rejected in a referendum. This reform “would have produced a shift towards a more cooperative and centralized form of regionalism” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 581). Baldi (2020: 34) also discusses this reform, claiming that it would have “provided for a substantial reduction in regional autonomy” (see also: Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018).
* In October 2017, two regions in the north of Italy, Venice and Lombardy, convened autonomy referenda. In both regions, voters “backed more powers being devolved from Rome”; indeed, the Presidents of the regions claimed that more than 95% of voters supported increased autonomy (Agence France-Presse, 2017). These votes were not binding but it was suggested at the time that they would provide the leaders of the two regions with “a strong political mandate when they embark[ed] on negotiations with the central government on the devolution of powers and tax revenues from Rome” (Agence France-Presse, 2017). In the wake of the referenda, Lombardy, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna “entered a process of negotiations” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 592). A preliminary agreement was signed in February 2018, which for limited devolution in 23 areas (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 593; see also: Baldi, 2020: 35). However, the negotiations on a final agreement were never concluded, and no further powers were devolved (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 593). In 2019, new preliminary agreements were signed promising autonomy in 23 areas, but as of 2020, there was no final agreement (Baldi, 2020: 35).

**Regional autonomy**

* As with other entries, the level of autonomy which is enjoyed by “ordinary” regions such as Lombardia or Piemonte is insufficient for us to code regional autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Padanians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Italians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32501000 |

**Power access**

* Northerners have been well-represented in Italy’s cabinets. Notably, several Prime Ministers have also been from the North including Silvio Berlusconi, Romano Prodi, Giuliano Amato and Mario Monti). Notably, Lega Nord served as a junior coalition partner in four of Silvio Berlusconi’s governments between 1994 and 2011 (Newth, 2018) and from 2018-2019. [1989-2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* We could not find data on the number of self-identified Padanians/northern Italians. Therefore, we instead rely on the population of the 11 regions which comprise Padania (see above).
* According to Eurostat (n.d.), the eleven potential regions of Padania boast the following populations:
  + Lombardy: 9,981,554 (16.9% of national population)
  + Veneto: 4,869,830 (8.2%)
  + Piemont: 4,274,945 (7.2%)
  + Liguria: 1,518,495 (2.6%)
  + Emilia-Romagna: 4,438,937 (7.5%)
  + Valle d’Aosta: 124,089 (0.2%)
  + Trentino-Alto Adige: 542,166 (0.9%)
  + Friuli-Venezia Giulia: 1,201,510 (2%)
  + Tuscany: 3,692,865 (6.2%)
  + Umbria: 865,452 (1.5%)
  + Marche: 1,498,236 (2.5%)
* Overall, the population in Padania is therefore 33,008,079 (55.7% of the national population). [0.557]

**Regional concentration**

* We could not find data on the number of self-identified Padanians/northern Italians. We assume regional concentration as this is a regionalist movement [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* We code the presence of ethnic kin since the EPR group of the Swiss Italians can be considered direct kin of the Padanians (see Minahan 2000: 429). According to Minahan (2002: 1109) there are also “sizeable” Lombard groups (with Lombardy a prominent part of Padania) in France and Germany and overseas communities in the United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Sardinians

Activity: 1945-2012

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1921 Giovane Sardegna (Young Sardinia) was formed and after World War II it transformed into the the Sardinian Action Party (Partito Sardo d’Azione, PSd’Az), Sardinia’s main self-determination organization (Baldi 2020: 28; De La Calle 2015: 190). Based on this we code 1921 as the start date. However, we only include the movement from 1945 as this is the first year we cover. Prior activity was non-violent.
* There were no public calls for self-rule during fascist rule (De La Calle, 2015: 190). But with the collapse of fascist Italy, political parties became public once more and immediately the issue of regional autonomy resurfaced (De La Calle, 2015: 191), with the PSd’Az leading the call for autonomy. On this basis, we code the start date in 1945, the year Germany was defeated and the German puppet Italy in Italy collapsed.
* The PSd’Az/Sardinian Action Party has made claims for more autonomy and also outright independence (Baldi 2020: 28). According to Roth (2015: 103), the Sardinian Action party has “long claimed that Sardinia should be a separate member-state alongside Italy in a united Europe”. The Sardinian Action Party remains active in politics as of 2020 (PSd’Az, n.d.).
* Another relevant organization is Independent Republic of Sardinia, described as an “outright separatist group”. A third group is Sardinia Possible (Roth, 2015: 103-4).
* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 265) argue that nationalist agitation was absent up until the late 1960s, but their report is contradictory as they describe the Sardinian Action Party as federalist in the post-WWII period.
* Also see: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 139f, 265); Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr (2003: 63); Minahan (1996: 490ff, 2002: 1661ff); MAR; Partito Sardo d’Azione. [start date: 1921; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Sardinian Action Party (Partito Sardo d'Azione), the main organization associated with the movement, initially had federalist goals (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 265). For example, shortly after the war, Psd’Az argued the following: “only a restructuring of the state along republican-federal lines will save and reinforce national unity, guarantee and intensify the exercise of individual, communal and regional rights, and allow for the realization of a substantive social justice” (cited in Hepburn, 2009: 598 and Melis, 1982: 30; see also: De La Calle (2015: 192) who claims that “Sardists called for full federalization”).
* Independence became the dominant claim around 1980. Sources differ on the exact year.
  + According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 265), the Action Party proclaimed independence as its goal in 1979.
  + Farinelli (2020: 145) offers a slightly different perspective, arguing that the Sardinian Action Party “moved from autonomism to independentism in 1981”.
  + In agreement with Fariinelli, Hepburn (2009: 604) suggests that Partido Sardo abandoned “the goal of independence in the early 1980s”.
* We use 1981 as the cut-off, which appears to be supported by more sources. Several sources indicate that the independence claim has been dominant since (RT News 2014; Minorities at Risk Project).
* It is worth mentioning though that while independence is the dominant claim, according to a 2012 survey Sardinians prefer autonomy: according to the survey, 41% of Sardinians favour independence while 46% favour a greater degree of autonomy within Italy, and mostly fiscal autonomy (Santonastaso, 2021). [1945-1981: autonomy claim; 1982-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* Hepburn notes that during the 1960s there was a revival in of Sardinian culture and national identity. By the early 1970s this had converted into political demands including independence, with groups such as ll Fronte Indipendentista Sardo, Sardinnya e Libertat, Democrazia Proletaria Sarda and Su Populu Sardo. The founding dates of these organisations could not be established except for Su Populu Sardo, a student movement founded in 1973. These groups later joined Psd’Az as it shifted its demands to independence around 1980 (Hepburn 2009: 600).
* This is further corroborated by Minahan (2002: 1664), who cites increasing nationalist demands in the late 1960s and a secessionist uprising in 1968. According to Wikipedia, two paramilitary groups were formed in 1968, Fronte Nazionale de Liberazione de sa Sardigna (FNLS) and Movimentu Nazionalista Sardu (MNS), which both claimed independence (<https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indipendentismo_sardo>). [start date: 1968; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Sards consists of the island Sardinia (Minahan 2002: 1661). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1999, the Sardinian Parliament “declared the sovereignty of the Sardinian people over Sardinina, its near islands, territorial waters and contintental shelf” (Farinelli, 2020: 145; see also: Hepburn, 2009). [1999: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Roth (2015: 103) writes that, “in 1968, as part of the general uprising of youths and radical leftists across Europe, Sardinia saw a wave of separatist activism to which Rome responded with military force”. Minahan (2002: 1664) supports this narrative, arguing that “in 1968 Sard nationalists attempted to stir up a separatist uprising on the island, but the movement collapsed following arrests and the arrival of Italian troops”. We found no evidence of separatist violence above the threshold, though.
* Minahan (2002: 1665) argues that, in the 1980s, “young Sards, unable to find work on the island…turned to violence to publicize the island’s plight”; reportedly, “the campaign of violence escalated in the late 1980s and early 1990s” with over 200 bombings hitting the island between 1991 and 1992. In 1992, the Italian government dispatched 5,000 troops to the island “to improve government control in remote areas dominated by local gangs”, a move which some Sards depicted as an occupation (Minahan, 2002: 1665; see also: Farinelli, 2020: 144). We found no evidence of separatist violence above the threshold, though.
* We found no other reports of significant separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After an Aragonese invasion in the fourteenth century, Catalan - and to a lesser extent also Castilian Spanish - were the languages of administration until 1720, when the island was given to the Dukes of Savoy, who in 1861 became kings of Italy (Minorities at Risk Project, Minority Rights Group International).
* The Sardinians speak Sard, a distinctive Italian dialect. The language laws that were passed after the unification of Italy banned regional dialects in education, publishing and official use (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002:1663; Minority Rights Group International). In 1922 the fascist Mussolini regime launched a campaign to eradicate Italian’s regional languages (Minahan 2002:1991).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions. Four of the five autonomous regions with special statute (with the exception of Friuli-Venetia) were immediately set up and were granted significant autonomy, which included recognition of the minority languages (Baldini and Baldi 2014; Minority Rights Group International). The *regioni a statuto speciale* enjoyed “considerably more legislative, administrative and financial autonomy than the other regioni, and the ability to negotiate their bylaws directly with the national government, bypassing the national parliament” (Bilancia et al. 2010: 124). The constitution entered into force on January 1, 1948. However, the constitution was “largely prepared in 1946” (Einaudi 1948: 662) and approved by a vote of 453 to 62 on December 11, 1947. [1947: autonomy concession]
  + Notably, the Sardinians statute “were able to include an article that no other statute had”: Art. 13, which “called for the central government to fund a Plan for the Rebirth of the island (Piano di Rinascita)”. This allowed Sardinian politicians to reduce the substantial gap between the socioeconomic conditions in the north of Italy and those in Sardinia (De La Calle, 2015: 193).
* The Constitutional Law No. 3/1989 granted the competence of choosing autonomously electoral system for the five Special Autonomy Regions (Sandri 2008:3). [1989: autonomy concession]
* After the fall of the ‘First Republic’, several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008). Note that some decentralization legislation is directed at ordinary regions only and did not affect the regions with special statute.
  + In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provinical president) (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). In the same year, the Constitutional Law 2/1993 (“Amendment of Article 68 of the Constitution”) reformed the Special Autonomy Statute and resulted in more competences for the special regions (Sandri 2008: 12). [1993: autonomy concession]
  + Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments” (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). However, this reform concerned only regions without a special status and furthermore, it was not very significant.We do not code a concession.
  + In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005; Bolgherini, 2014: 201). It seems that both ordinary and special regions were affected by these laws (Palermo 2008: 34). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). The 1999 acts intended to narrow the gap between ordinary and special regions. Since only regions with ordinary status were concerned, these acts are not coded.
  + The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In the relevant articles in the constituting (Title V), there is no reference to ordinary regions, which is why we assume that regions with a special autonomy status are also included. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). We do not code a concession because the referendum was not held in Sardinia only.
* In November 1991 the Italian government officially recognized minority languages for use in education, administration, and commerce. The legalization of Sardu ended the ban of the language, which had been in place since the Italian unification (Minahan 2002:1665, Minority Rights Group International). [1991: cultural rights concession]
* In October 1997, a law was passed devoted to the protection and promotion of Sardinian in education, public administration and access to the law (Minority Rights Group International; Coluzzi 2004). Since this law No. 26 for the ‘Promotion and development of the culture and language of Sardinia’ is a regional law, passed by the regional jurisdiction, the act is not coded (see also: Farinelli, 2020: 145).
* In 1999, law number 482 (‘regulations on the matter of historical language minorities’) was passed to protect twelve minority languages (French, Provençal, Franco-Provençal, German, Ladin, Friulian, Slovene, Sardinian, Catalan, Albanian, Greek and Croatian). The law allowed the use of Sardinian in private and public life. The teaching of Sardinian at schools was also allowed. (Coluzzi 2004; Minority Rights Group International). [1999: cultural rights concession]
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
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**Regional autonomy**

* As an autonomous region with special statute, the Sardinians have been regionally autonomous since 1948. This is also confirmed by EPR, which codes the Sardinians as regionally autonomous from 1948 onwards. Since the constitution came into force on 1 January 1948, we code regional autonomy as of 1948. [1948-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1948: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Sardinians |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Sardinians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32502000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR; the 1946 code also applies to 1945. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.02]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1661), Sardinians make up 80% of the population of Sardinia. This amounts to 1.334 million Sardinians (in 2002), which is more than half of the Sardinian population in all of Italy in that same year. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Neither EPR nor MAR code ethnic kin. According to Minahan (2002: 1661), there are Sardinian populations in France, Switzerland, and Germany. However, they do not cross the numeric threshold. [no kin]

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## Sicilians

Activity: 1945-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1942, “disaffected monarchists, liberals and socialists came together to form their own autonomist party, MIS, which had a single demand: the right to form a Sicilian nation-state with full independence from Italy” (Mackay, 2021: 207; this is supported by Baldi (2020: 28) who argues that the movement “demanded full self-rule for the region, in defence of its historical identity and its backward economy”). There were armed wings of the independence movement in these years, such as EVIS (Mackay, 2021: 209). We code the movement from 1945, the first year we cover, but note prior activity with a start date of 1942.
* In 1944, EVIS (which was mafia-funded) “led a series of terrorist attacks against Italian state targets”. These were in part “a genuine expression of the islanders' resentment against the old fascist elite”; however, they were also a bid to "assist the old Cosa Nostra families in their efforts to regain positions of influence" (Mackay 2021). We could not find any evidence on casualty numbers and therefore code prior activity as nonviolent.
  + There is no mention of EVIS after 1946, when their leader was murdered.
* With the devastation of World War II behind it, Sicilians reviewed their modern link with the Italian mainland, with thousands deciding the union had been a disaster. A separatist movement gained hold, demanding complete independence for the island.
* In 1945 Sicilian separatists pleaded for independence before the United Nations. In 1946, bowing to pressure, the government in Rome agreed to give Sicily a degree of autonomy. Since then Silician political parties, such as Due Sicilie (Two Sicilies) and Partito d’Azione Siciliano (Sicilian Action Party) have consistently worked through the conventional political process to gain greater autonomy for the island. Specifically, the Sicilian Action Party is seeking the full implementation of Sicily’s regional statute while the Two Sicilies party is seeking autonomy for the area once covered by the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the creation of a “new Europe” based on historic regions. In recent decades, new autonomist parties have joined the separatist movement, such as the Alleanza Siciliana (Sicilian Alliance) (Due Sicilie; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 139f, 268; Keesing’s; Minahan 1996: 515ff, 2002: 1714ff).
* In the 2012 regional elections, an autonomist coalition received 15% of the vote (Roth, 2015: 102-3). Post-2012, autonomist organisations have included #DiventeraBellisima led by the President of Sicily, Bello Musumeci, which boasts the following slogan: “Rigeneriamo la Sicilia [Let’s regenerate Sicily]” (Diventera Bellisima, n.d.). MIS also remained active as recently as 2012 (MIS, n.d). [start date: 1942; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the very beginning of the movement the dominant claim was the independence of Siciliy. This is confirmed by the fact that the Sicilian Independence Movement was established in 1943, declared Sicily independent after they were liberated by the Allies and pleaded for independence before the United Nations in 1945. In the national elections of 1946, the Sicilian Independence Movement received 171,201 votes and in the regional elections in 1947 they received 8.7 percent of the Sicilian votes. Further evidence is provided by Hewitt and Cheetham (2000), who report that the autonomous status was granted “as a result of separatist sentiments in Sicily”. However, the claim clearly moderated as a result of the granting of an autonomous status and the Sicilian Independence Movement’s vote share declined rapidly and the party disappeared from the political scene (Minahan 2002; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000). We thus code a claim for independence until 1947, as Sicily was granted autonomous status on January 1 1948. [1945-1947: independence claim]
* Despite a re-emergence of a secessionist sentiments in the 1990s and 2000s (Movement for the Independence of Sicily), the dominant claim continues to be autonomy, as is clearly shown by the electoral success of the Movement for the Autonomies in recent elections, where it achieved vote shares of over 10% (2006 and 2008). In the 2012 regional elections, an autonomist coalition received 15% of the vote (Roth, 2015: 102-3), demonstrating the continuing autonomy claim. However, it is worth noting that Minahan (2016: 383) suggests there continue to be demands for independence as well. [1948-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The independence movement of Sicily began in 1942 (Mackay 2021: 207; Baldi 2020: 28). Hewitt and Cheetham (2000: 268) indicates there was residual support for independence movement into the 1950s. The Sicilian Independence Movement won seats in the regional assembly in the 1947 elections but was subsequently dissolved in 1951. [start date: 1942; end date: 1951]
* Minahan (2016: 383) indicates that independence sentiment has revived in recent years. Roth indicates this movement was incredibly limited in the early 2010s (2015: 103). Parties such as Free Sicilians (founded 2016) and the Sicilian National Movement (founded 2017) indicate increasing support for independence but no independence parties gained any seats in the 2017 regional elections, indicating limited political significance of the independence movement. Therefore a second period of independence is not coded.

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The dominant claim of Sicilians has been for increased autonomy for the island of Sicily, although some parties, such as Due Sicilie, also have made more expansive claims for autonomy for all areas that once belonged to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Roth 2015: 101). We code the former claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Sicily was ruled by diverse kingdoms and nations. On several occasions, and especially at the end of the nineteenth century, the Sicilians rebelled against their foreign rulers. In 1861 Sicily became part of the Italian Kingdom (Minahan 2002:1717).
* However, Siciliy was neglected by the central government, which had little knowledge of southern Italy. As taxes and conscription efforts intensified, Sicilians rebelled in 1866 in Palermo (Minahan 2002:1717).
* Challenged by leagues of rebellious workers and peasants in Sicily, the Italian central government proclaimed martial law in Sicily in 1894. Mutual suspicion between Northern and Southern Italy remained extremely high (Minahan 2002:1717).
* Sicilian nationalism rose during the Second World War, which was a pleasant development for the allied forces. Sicilian nationalists launched a guerrilla war against the Mussolini regime (Minahan 2002:1718), which wanted to eradicate Italy’s regional languages.
* Supported by the allies, the Sicilian nationalist leader Turiddu Giuliano declared Sicily independent on July 10, 1943. However, when Italy changed sides in the war, the allies no longer supported Sicilian separatism. Italian troops invaded Sicily. Within 8 weeks, the Sicilian nationalists were defeated (Minahan 2002:1718).
* The language laws that were passed after unification of Italy banned regional dialects in education, publishing and official use (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002:1663; Minority Rights Group International).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Statute of Sicily was issued by King Umberto II on May 15, 1946. The statute proceeded the constitution of 1948 and defined Sicily as an “autonomous Region, having a juridical personality, within the political unity of the Italian State, on the bases of the democratic principles” (Grasse 2010; Sicilian Autonomy Statute; Salerno, 2012; Mackay, 2021: 209). This decision meant “that the islanders [gained] the right to their own elected president, to call their own parliament and to take their own decisions about key budgetary issues including urban planning, tourism and the allocation of state jobs” (Mackay, 2021: 209). The Statute of Sicily two years later became a part of the constitution and Sicily a special region. [1946: autonomy concession]
  + The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions. Four of the five autonomous regions with special statute (with the exception of Friuli-Venetia) were immediately set up and were granted significant autonomy, which included recognition of the minority languages (Baldini and Baldi 2014). The *regioni a statuto speciale* enjoyed “considerably more legislative, administrative and financial autonomy than the other regioni, and the ability to negotiate their bylaws directly with the national government, bypassing the national parliament” (Bilancia et al. 2010: 124). The constitution entered into force on January 1, 1948. However, the constitution was “largely prepared in 1946” (Einaudi 1948: 662) and approved by a vote of 453 to 62 on December 11, 1947.
* The Constitutional Law No. 3/1989 granted the competence of choosing autonomously electoral system for the five Special Autonomy Regions (Sandri 2008:3). [1989: autonomy concession]
* After the fall of the ‘First Republic’, several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008). Note that some decentralization legislation is directed at ordinary regions only and did not affect the regions with special statute.
  + In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provinical president) (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). In the same year, the Constitutional Law 2/1993 (“Amendment of Article 68 of the Constitution”) reformed the Special Autonomy Statute and resulted in more competences for the special regions (Sandri 2008: 12). [1993: autonomy concession]
  + Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments” (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). However, this reform concerned only regions without a special status and furthermore, it was not very significant.We do not code a concession.
  + In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005; Bolgherini, 2014: 201). It seems that both ordinary and special regions were affected by these laws (Palermo 2008: 34). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). The 1999 acts intended to narrow the gap between ordinary and special regions. Since only regions with ordinary status were concerned, these acts are not coded.
  + The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In the relevant articles in the constituting (Title V), there is no reference to ordinary regions, which is why we assume that regions with a special autonomy status are also included. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). We do not code a concession because the referendum was not held in Sicily only.
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2010, the role of municipal and provincial clerk was significantly revised, and the Ministry of the Interior regained control of this key position (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* In 2016, a potential constitutional reform was rejected in a referendum. This reform “would have produced a shift towards a more cooperative and centralized form of regionalism” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 581). Baldi (2020: 34) also discusses this reform, claiming that it would have “provided for a substantial reduction in regional autonomy” (see also: Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018).

**Regional autonomy**

* As an autonomous region with special statute, the Sicilians have been regionally autonomous since 1948. Since the constitution came into force on 1 January 1948, we code regional autonomy as of 1948. It is worth noting that Roth (2015: 101) considers Sicily to have “the most generous terms under the constitutional provisions for the five autonomous regions”; it is able to retain 100% of its tax revenue. [1948-2012: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1948: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Sicilians |
| *Scenario* | No match/n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Italians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32501000 |

**Power access**

* With Mario Scelba (Sicily) there has been one Sicilian Prime Minister in addition to several regular ministers such as Giuseppe Provenzano, Franco Restivo, Angelino Alfano and Bernardo Mattarella. The representation of Sicily continued under Letta (2013-14) (three ministers from Sicily); under Renzi (2014-16) (one minister from Sicily); Gentiloni (2016-18) (one minister from Sicily), and Conte (2018-2021) (three ministers from Sicily). Given the almost permanent representation of Sicily in the central government, we code a junior partner throughout. [1945-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), the population of the region of Sicily amounts to 4,999,854 in 2012. With Italy’s population totaling 59.394 million in that same year, the population of Sicily makes up a share of 0.08418. However, since this number is not related to ethnic identity, we follow Minahan (2002), who states that there are approximately 7,550,000 Sicilians in Italy in 2002. With Italy’s population totaling 57.06 million in that same year (World Bank), we thus code a population share of 0.13232. [0.1323]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1714), the Sicilians make up 94% of the population of Sicily. This amounts to 4.904 million Sicilians (in 2002), which is more than half of the 7.55 million Sicilians in all of Italy in that same year. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1714), there are Sicilian populations in Germany, France, and Switzerland and several American countries. However, we could not find evidence that these communities exceed the 100,000 people required to be coded as ethnic kin. According to the 2000 US Census, there are approx. 85,000 Americans of Sicilian birth or ancestry. We do not code Italians in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against an Italian-dominated government. [no kin]

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## South Italians

Activity: 1996-2020

**General notes**

* The Mezzogiorno, or Ausonia as it is referred to by southern nationalists, comprises the southern part of the Italian Peninsula and the territory that was part of the former kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies).

**Movement start and end dates**

* Southern regionalism developed in the 1970s and 1980s as a consequence of industrialization in the north that further divided the country and as a result of deterioration of political institutions and resentment of northern nationalists (Minahan 2002: 1351). Organized separatist agitation, however, only emerged in the 1990s and 2000s with the formation of several small autonomist parties.
* The first evidence for separatist mobilization we could find is the formation of the the Lega Sud Ausonia (Southern League). Both Roth (2015: 100) and Newth (2019: 386) suggest that the Lega Sud was formed in 1991. However, according to the party’s website, Lega Sud was formed only in 1996. Therefore, we use 1996 as the start date.
* Another relevant organization is the Movement for Autonomy (Movimento per le Autonomie MpA), which was founded in 2005 and advocates greater autonomy primarily for Sicily but also for the other southern regions (Movimento per le Autonomie MpA 2015). The MpA, allied with the Lega Nord, won 1.1% of the votes in the 2008 general election.
* Note: already in 1992, another Southern Italian organization, the Southern Action League (Lega d'Azione Meridionale), was formed. However, the Southern Action League’s activities appear concentrated in a single city, Taranto. More importantly, the League’s primary goal was opposition against the north’s secessionist aspirations (Sorens 2008: 348) rather than autonomy, thus 1996 rather than 1992 is coded as the start date.
* The movement is ongoing: both above-mentioned autonomist parties continue to be active in Italian politics. [start date: 1996; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The start date of the movement is coded in 1996 when the Lega Sud Ausonia (Southern League) was formed. The Souther League, despite some voices for independence, primarily advocates more autonomy, as indicated by their program (Lega Sud Ausonia 2013). The party is not represented in any provincial assembly nor in the regional, national, or European parliament. The Movement for Autonomy (Movimento per le Autonomie MpA 2015) was founded in 2005. Unlike the Southern League, the party managed to obtain a few seats in the 2008 general election and joined the Berlusconi cabinet. The MpA hence replaced the Southern League as the dominant representative of the Southern self-determination movement. Since the MpA also favored autonomy (Movimento per le Autonomie 2015), we code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout.In support, Roth (2015: 100) suggests that the majority of proponents of the southern Italy movement advocate autononomy. [1996-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* While there were some musings in the direction of independence, those remained marginal overall (see above). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Southern Italian claims for autonomy concern the seven southernmost regions of Italy including Sicily and Sardinia (Roth 2015: 99f). This claim therefore includes the following nine regions: Abruzzo, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Lazio, Molise, Sardinia, and Siciliy. We code this claim using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Kingdom of Naples, established in 1282 by the Angevins, and the Kingdom of Sicily, formed in 1130, were merged in 1816 by King Ferdinand to form the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The territory was included in the newly founded Italian Kingdom in 1861. This step was welcomed by many Southerners as it swept the unpopular Bourbon regime from power in Naples (Minahan 2002: 1349). At the unification of Italy, a highly centralized administrative structure was adopted. The Italian Kingdom proclaimed a Tuscan dialect from Florence as the national language (Minahan 2002:1991).
* Under the fascist dictatorship, there was extreme centralization and regional powers very limited. In 1922, the fascist government launched a campaign to eradicate Italian’s regional languages (Mianahan 2002:1991).
* The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions, among which the southern regions of Calabria, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo. While four of the five autonomous regions with special statute were immediately set up (all except for Friuli-Venetia Giulia) and were granted significant autonomy, the promise of limited autonomy to the 15 regions with ordinary statute was not implemented until the 1970s. In 1970, regional self-government was finally granted and the governing bodies of the regions were finally elected for the first time and a limited transfer of functions took place (Baldi and Baldini 2014). The regions became operational in 1972 and according to D’Atena (2013), Baldi and Baldini (2014) and Bilancia et al. (2010), effective powers began to be transferred to the regions with ordinary status in 1977.
* The Southern self-determination movement makes claims for the southern part of the Italian Peninsula (Mezzogiorno, Ausonia), which is tantamount to the territory that had been part of the former kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). In terms of today’s administrative division, this includes the regions of Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo. In the absence of any concessions or restrictions to the southern territory as a whole, we code the regional decentralization reform of 1993 as a concession. This reform altered the level of self-determination of all the above regions.
  + In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provinical president), which had previously been appointed by the central government (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). [1993: autonomy concession]
  + Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments”. However, since no additional powers were devolved, we do not code this as an act of concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The self-determination movement comprises the southern part of the Italian Peninsula (Mezzogiorno, Ausonia), equal to the territory that was part of the former kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). In terms of today’s administrative disvision, this includes the regions of Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo. In the absence of any concessions or restrictions to the southern territory as a whole, we code the various regional decentralization reforms of the 1990s and 2000s. These reforms altered the level of self-determination of all the above regions.
* After the fall of the ‘First Republic’, several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008).
  + In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament. [1999: autonomy concession]
  + The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). We do not code a concession because the referendum was not held in the South only.
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2010, the role of municipal and provincial clerk was significantly revised, and the Ministry of the Interior regained control of this key position (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* In 2016, a potential constitutional reform was rejected in a referendum. This reform “would have produced a shift towards a more cooperative and centralized form of regionalism” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 581). Baldi (2020: 34) also discusses this reform, claiming that it would have “provided for a substantial reduction in regional autonomy” (see also: Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018).

**Regional autonomy**

* Sicily is the only southern region with special statute. Special statute regions can be considered autonomous (since 1948). However, the Sicilins make up only around 25% of the Southern Italian population. Thus we do not code regional autonomy. Devolution to ordinary regions is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | South Italians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Italians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32501000 |

**Power access**

* Unless a group is a distinct linguistic minority, such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Suditro, in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1, EPR codes Italians as a homogenous group. As a consequence, there is no distinction between Northern and Southern Italians and the latter’s autonomy movement does not have a separate EPR group but is part of the EPR group ‘Italians’. ‘Italians’ are coded as dominant throughout. To infer that the Southerners are also dominant is of course not accurate.
* Nevertheless, the Southerners do have some influence on Italian politics, which is also reflected in the appointment of several ministers from the south and the election of Guliano Amato (Sicilian origin) as prime minister in 2000. We therefore code the Southerners as junior partner throughout. The fact that the regionalist MpA was part of the Berlusconi IV Cabinet from 2008-2011 provides further evidence for the executive influence of the southerners. Representation of Sicilians and Southerners has continued in the 2013-2020 period, and Prime Minister Guiseppe Conte (2018-2021) was from the South, together with ten of his ministers. We continue to use a code of junior partner throughout the movement. [1996-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), the population of all southern regions (Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo) amounts to 18,969,891 in 2012. With Italy’s population totaling 59.394 million in that same year, the Southerners would make up 0.32 of the country’s total population. However, since this number is not related to ethnic identity, we follow Minahan (2002), who states that there are 11.8 million Neapolitans/Southern Italians in Italy in 2002. With Italy’s population totalling 57.06 million in that same year (according to the World Bank), we code a population share of 0.2068. [0.2068]

**Regional concentration**

* The South Italians are concentrated in Ausonia, where they make up 77% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1347). This amounts to 11.098 million South Italians (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 11.8 million South Italians in the whole of Italy in that same year. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 1347) mentions communities in France, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and several American countries. According to the 2000 US Census, there are approx. 85,000 Americans of Sicilian birth or ancestry, which makes it likely that the numeric threshold is met (the South Italian movement comprises also areas other than Sicily). The same can be said about the Italians in France: There are around 4 million people of Italian ancestry and 174,000 Italian citizens in France. Again, the numeric threshold is likely met. [kin in neighboring country]

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## South Tyroleans

Activity: 1945-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The South Tyrol People's Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei, SVP), the Christian democratic party of the German-speaking population of Bolzano/Bozen province (Alto Adige), was founded in 1945, hence the start date of the movement. As of 2012, the Sudtiroler Volkspartei maintains immediate goals that include minority rights, cultural rights, and economic autonomy. In the long term, the party champions a federal Europe in which South Tyrol would be an autonomous region.
* From 1948 onwards the SVP as consistently held three seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and from 1979 one directly elective seat in the European Parliament.
* The party’s struggle for equal rights for the German-speaking and Ladin-speaking population of South Tyrol led to Austro-ltalian agreements on the status of the province in 1969-71 and a new statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige region in 1971.
* The SVP became the strongest party in the South Tyrol Landtag and the second strongest in the regional council of Trentino-Alto Adige, winning 22 seats out of 70 in November 1983. Normally securing representation in the Rome parliament thereafter, the SVP again won one seat in the June 1994 European Parliament elections. For the April 1996 general elections the SVP was part of the victorious center-left Olive Tree Movement.
* There are other, more radical secessionist parties in addition to the SVP. One such group is the Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol (BAS), which was formed in 1956 as a terrorist group. BAS was mainly active throughout the 1960s, but its activities continued until the late 1980s. Die Freiheitlichen was founded in 1992 as a breakaway group from the SVP and aims for a sovereign state. The Lega Nord Alto-Adige/Südtirol also represents the claim for more self-determination, but in South Tyrol the Lega Nord never had more electoral support than the SVP. Südtiroler Freiheit (STF) was founded in 2007 and aims to secede from Italy and reunite with Austria.
* The South Tyroleans were originally united with the Trentino region of Italy after 1948. BAS was instrumental in fighting against this, while the SVP also demanded a separate autonomous state for South Tyrol. The region was granted its own autonomous district in 1972, which also gave lawful protection to the South Tyrolean’s language (German) and culture as well as greater control over taxes. This grant of greater autonomy pacified South Tyrolean citizens and reduced separatist sentiments. Separatism has been revived due to Italy’s economic recession, which threatens to decrease South Tyrol’s autonomy over taxation. Since 2008, separatist parties have received greater support. Sudtiroler Volkspartei and other separatist organizations continue to operate, and thus the movement is considered to be ongoing (Aschbacher 2012; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 40, 139f, 278, 282f; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 588ff, 1946ff; MAR; Nationalia 2013; Rosenberger 2012; SVP n.d.; Roth 2015: 92-3; Alber 2017).
* In April 2015, South Tyrol’s Provincial Council adopted a law to create a ‘South Tyrol Autonomy Convention’ to discuss the Autonomy Statute of 1972. It began in January 2016, with the convention’s objective being to “give all members of the public the opportunity to speak their mind and offer suggestions on how to revise the Autonomy Statute”. The convention was not “legally binding” (Larin and Röggla, 2016; see also: Lecours, 2021: 139). The process ended in June 2017 with a ‘Proposal in Order to Revise the Autonomy Statute’ (Larin and Röggla, 2019: 1018, 1027). The convention proposed to increase South Tyrol’s legislative, administrative, and fiscal autonomy (Larin and Röggla, 2019: 1027-1029). [start date: 1945; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the early years of movement activity, the South Tyrolean claim was clearly reunification with Austria, as demonstrated by the demand for a plebiscite signed by 150’000 South Tyroleans (Minahan 2002). This is confirmed by the Minority Rights Group International, which states that the South Tyroleans “continued to insist on the eventual re-unification with Austria”.
* On February 11, 1947, the SVP passed its new program, where it stated that the party aims to promote the distinct culture of the South Tyrolean people within Italy. Larin and Röggla (2019: 1027) argue that, “for decades the SVP has argued that ‘internal’ self-determination is the best option for South Tyrol, and has pushed for ‘full autonomy’ within Italy” (see also: Alber 2017: 77). While the SVP was an important representative of the movement, Lecours (2021: 121f) suggests that the dominant claim was secession until the 1970s. Specifically, Lecours suggests that South Tyrolean nationalism “was initially of an irredentist variety since the goal was to reintegrate the predominantly German-speaking territory within Austria”. However, “South Tyrolean nationalism has been looking, since the 1970s, for increased autonomy within Italy”.
* There have been smaller groups advocating secession from Italy and/or reunion with Austria also after the 1970s; these include Die Freiheitlichen, which advocates “secession from Italy” and the creation of a “Free State of South Tyrol”, and the South Tyrolean Freedom-Free Alliance for Tyrol, which “openly advocates unification with Austria” (Roth, 2015: 92; see also: Larin and Röggla, 2019: 1027). However, the dominant claim continued to be for more political autonomy for the South Tyrolese within an Italian state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 283).
* We code a claim for irredentism until 1975 and increased autonomy thereafter. We use 1975 as the cut-off as Lecour refers to the 1970s without providing a clearer date. Note: South Tyrol forms a joint region with Trentino. Nevertheless, we do not code a claim for sub-state secession – the combined region is close to powerless and the dominant claim is for increased autonomy for South Tyrol rather than separation from the joint region. [1945-1975: irredentist claim; 1976-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The main group advocating for independence are Die Freiheitlichen. This party was created in 1992 and has consistently gained seats in the regional assembly since 1993 elections. For example it gained 15% regional votes in 2008 and 17% in 2013 (Roth 2015: 92). [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* Irredentism is coded as the dominant claim from 1945-1975 (Lecour 2021: 121). However, activity by extreme groups such as BAS, calling or the region to join Austria, continued activity into the early 1980s, but this group appears to be marginal by this time (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 40). Therefore the first period of irredentism lasted until the middle of the 1970s. [start date1: 1945; end date1: 1975]
* The South Tyrol Freedom (STF) party was founded in 2007, and it, alongside the Free Alliance for Tyrol, advocated joining Austria. In 2013 the STF won 7% of the regional vote (Roth 2015: 92). Therefore a second period of significant irredentist claims emerges from 2007. [start date2: 2007; end date2: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the South Tyroleans within Italy is the autonomous province of South Tyrol. Claims have also been made for areas across the border in Austria, but we restrict our coding to the areas claimed within Italy (Roth 2015: 99). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There has been violence, particularly in the 1960s. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 40) report that over the years 32 Italian policemen were killed in the 1960s. Yet, none of our standard sources notes separatist violence, and the annual casualty numbers remain below the LVIOLSD threshold we use when manually coding (25 annual deaths). In the 1980s there was another bombing campaign, but we found no evidence of casualties. The movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* South Tyrol was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for fourteen centuries. However, after the First World War and the defeat of the Empire, the area of Tyrol south of the Brenner was annexed by Italy through the Treaty of St. Germain (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000:278; Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International).
* Despite promises of autonomy, the fascist government in Italy followed a systematic policy of Italianization. The South Tyrolese came under severe pressure and they were forced to assimilate to the Italian language and culture. The aim was to de-Germanize the region. German-language schools were closed, German-language publications were suppressed and immigration from southern Italian regions encouraged. Italian became the only official language and people were forced to change their family names (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000:278; Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International; Alber 2017).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* At the end of the Second World War, the South Tyrolese and the Austrian government proposed a plan to reunite the Tyrolean territories. However, the allies rejected the plan. The Italian and Austrian governments signed the De Gasperi–Gruber Agreement in 1946. The agreement guaranteed German-speaking inhabitants of Bolzano and Trento complete equality of rights with the rest of Italians. German would be taught in schools, and German surnames were permitted. The agreement also granted limited autonomy to the Province of Bolzano (Minahan 2002: 1950; Minority Rights Group International). [1946: cultural rights concession, autonomy concession]
  + The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions. Four of the five autonomous regions with special statute (with the exception of Friuli-Venetia) were immediately set up and were granted significant autonomy, which included recognition of the minority languages (Baldini and Baldi 2014). The *regioni a statuto speciale* enjoyed “considerably more legislative, administrative and financial autonomy than the other regioni, and the ability to negotiate their bylaws directly with the national government, bypassing the national parliament” (Bilancia et al. 2010: 124). Trentino Alto-Adige constitutes a special case as power is mostly devolved to the two autonomous provinces Trentino and South Tyrol, leaving the combined region itself almost powerless. If anything, this increases the autonomy of the South Tyroleans since they do not need to share autonomy with Trentino in a combined region. The constitution entered into force on January 1, 1948. However, the constitution was “largely prepared in 1946” (Einaudi 1948: 662) and approved by a vote of 453 to 62 on December 11, 1947.
* In 1961, the Italian government formed the Commission of Nineteen, comprising Italians, South Tyrolean German speakers and a member of the Ladin community. The Commission produced a final report in 1964 which “became the core of a ‘package’ of measures proposed to the SVP as a way to reduce tensions in South Tyrol” (Lecours, 2021: 128-9; see also: Alber, 2017: 77-8). However, the proposals were not implemented (Alber 2017: 78).
* A new autonomy statute was negotiated in 1969. The so-called “Package” of 137 measures was predominantly implemented to “revise the 1948 Autonomy Statute in the benefit of the South Tyrolese” (Alcock 2001: 9). The improved autonomy package was passed by the Italian government in 1972 and the region was renamed Trentino-South Tyrol. Powers from the region were transferred to the ‘Autonomous Provinces’ of Bolzano and Trento. The new statute involved a massive transfer of legislative and administrative powers to the provinces from the region, including the remit for agriculture and tourism, a degree of autonomy for the school system, ethnic ratios for government jobs, and bilingualism within the province. German became a full official-language, equal with Italian, and all official announcements, documents and signs had to be in both languages, German and Italian. Education in the mother tongue was guaranteed (Minahan 2002:1950, Cunningham 2011). However, it is worth noting that it took twenty years before the Second Autonomy Statute of 1972 was fully implemented (Lecours 2021: 122). [1972: cultural rights concession, autonomy concession]
* In 1991, “nationalists demonstrated on the Brenner Pass frontier, demanding a referendum on the reunification of Tyrol within a united Europe” (Minahan, 2016: 436). This does not seem to have been granted and thus we do not code a concession.
* The Constitutional Law No. 3/1989 granted the competence of choosing autonomously electoral system for the five Special Autonomy Regions (Sandri 2008:3). [1989: autonomy concession]
* In 1992 Italy, confronted with increased regional nationalism in different parts of the country, Italy granted South Tyrol further concessions. Bilingualism was made a precondition for public service in South Tyrol. Schooling in German was guaranteed (Minahan 2002:1951, Cunningham 2011). [1992: cultural rights concession]
* After the fall of the ‘First Republic’, several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008). Note that some decentralization legislation is directed at ordinary regions only and did not affect the regions with special statute.
  + In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provinical president) (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). In the same year, the Constitutional Law 2/1993 (“Amendment of Article 68 of the Constitution”) reformed the Special Autonomy Statute and resulted in more competences for the special regions (Sandri 2008: 12). [1993: autonomy concession]
  + Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments” (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). However, this reform concerned only regions without a special status and furthermore, it was not very significant.We do not code a concession.
  + In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005; Bolgherini, 2014: 201). It seems that both ordinary and special regions were affected by these laws (Palermo 2008: 34). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). The 1999 acts intended to narrow the gap between ordinary and special regions. Since only regions with ordinary status were concerned, these acts are not coded.
  + The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In the relevant articles in the constituting (Title V), there is no reference to ordinary regions, which is why we assume that regions with a special autonomy status are also included. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. The year 2001 also saw the passing of a third Autonomy Statute, which included some administrative reorganization and the control over the selection process of local governments (Cunningham 2011). [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). We do not code a concession because the referendum was national.
* Since 1996, Tyroleans have “enjoyed symbolic recognition by the Council of Europe of a transnational but politically inconsequential ‘Euroregion’ of Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino encompassing the Austrian province of Tyrol and the Italian provinces of Trentino and Südtirol/Alto-Adige” (Roth, 2015: 93; see also: Minahan, 2016: 436). Lecours (2021: 138) suggests that this took place in 1998. Nevertheles, this does not constitute an autonomy concession according to our definition.
* There are several laws dedicated to the protection of minority languages in Italy. For the South Tyroleans, Cunninham (2011) codes the 1991 law that recognized several minority languages including German. However, according to Gundle (2000), this law was only passed by one chamber of parliament with the debate ongoing for several years to follow. This is confirmed by (Coluzzi 2007), who states that the Senate rejected the bill, which then stranded due to a political crisis. As for many other minority language groups, we code the 1999 law number 482 (‘regulations on the matter of historical language minorities’), which was passed to protect twelve minority languages (French, Provençal, Franco-Provençal, German, Ladin, Friulian, Slovene, Sardinian, Catalan, Albanian, Greek and Croatian) (Coluzzi 2004; Minority Rights Group International). According to Sierp (2008: 308), this is the “main law protecting Italy’s minority languages”. [1999: cultural rights concession]
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2010, the role of municipal and provincial clerk was significantly revised, and the Ministry of the Interior regained control of this key position (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* A financial agreement signed in 2009 with the central government formalized the norm that 90% of tax revenues collected in the province go back to the South Tyrolean government (Lecours, 2021: 136). However, as this formalized an already existing norm, we do not code a concession.
* In 2011, the aforementioned Euroregion was “formally established as a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) by the EU, providing it with is own legal personality and headquarters in Bolzano-Bozen” (Lecours, 2021: 138). This does not constitute a concession according to our definition.
* A financial agreement signed with the central government in 2014 (known as the Safeguard Pact) further strengthened the fiscal autonomy of South Tyrol (Lecours, 2021: 137). [2014: autonomy concession]
* In 2016, a potential constitutional reform was rejected in a referendum. This reform “would have produced a shift towards a more cooperative and centralized form of regionalism” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 581). Baldi (2020: 34) also discusses this reform, claiming that it would have “provided for a substantial reduction in regional autonomy” (see also: Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018).

**Regional autonomy**

* As an autonomous province within an autonomous region with special statute, South Tyrol has been regionally autonomous since 1948. This is also confirmed by EPR, which codes the South Tyroleans (EPR calls them ‘German speakers’) as regionally autonomous from 1948 onwards. Since the constitution came into force on 1 January 1948, we code regional autonomy as of 1948. [1948-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1948: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | South Tyroleans |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | German speakers (Austrians) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32504000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. The 1946 code can be used also for 1945. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.005]

**Regional concentration**

* Minahan (2002: 1946) does not provide spatial population figures for the South Tyroleans/for South Tyrol, but only for Tyroleans more generally (including the Trentini)/the historical Tyrol region, which covers parts of both Italy and Austria. According to Italy’s 2011 census, German-speakers made up 62.3% of the population of the province of South Tyrol, or approx. 315,000. It is safe to assume that almost all German speakers in South Tyrol see themselves as South Tyroleans. EPR estimates the number of German speakers at around 300,000, thus the threshold is easily met. Further evidence comes from MAR, which codes the South Tyroleans as “concentrated in one region” with more than 75% living in that region. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* MAR codes the Austrians in Austria as the only kin group. EPR, which applies a broader definition of kin, codes ethnic Germans in nine countries as kin. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Trentini

Activity: 1945-2020

**General notes**

* Trentino (today) is an autonomous region in Italy that together with South Tyrol makes up the Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol region.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Associazione Studi Autonomistici Regionali (ASAR) was founded in 1945. The student association “demanded total regional autonomy for the territory from Trentino to the Brenner” (Anderson 2013: 118). Note: this would also have included some territories that then had belonged to Austria (namely they demanded autonomy for the whole area that had been Austrian until 1919). Based on this, 1945 is coded as start date.
* In 1948 the ASAR dissolved to form the Partito del Popolo Trentino Tirolese (PPTT). The PPTT came second in the 1948 Regional Council elections and established itself as the second most important party in the Trentino. The PPTT advocated increased autonomy for Trentino (Panizza 2008). PPTT split in 1982 and reunited again in 1988 as the Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese (PATT), which also advocated increased autonomy.
* Other autonomist parties are the Union for Trentino and Loyal to Trentino (Leali al Trentino)~~.~~ Apart from the 2008 provincial elections, the PATT had always become the second strongest regionalist party. In 2013, “the midly autonomist” Union for Trentino secured just over 13% of the vote in the 2013 provincial elections, and the “more assertive” Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party (PATT) managed over 17% (Roth, 2015: 93). [start date: 1945; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The autonomist Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese (PATT) and its autonomist predecessors, the Partito del Popolo Trentino Tirolese and the Associazione Studi Autonomistici Regionali (ASAR), have been the most significant parties associated with the movement. Apart from the 2008 provincial elections, when the Union for Trentino overtook them, and in the 1994, 2001 and 2006 elections, when the Lega Nord Trentino overtook them, the PATT (and its predecessors) have always come out as the strongest regionalist party (see also: Roth 2015: 93). Thus autonomy is coded as the dominant claim throughout. [1945-2020: autonomy claim]
  + Note: South Tyrol forms a joint region with Trentino. Nevertheless, we do not code a claim for sub-state secession – the combined region is close to powerless and the dominant claim is for increased autonomy rather than separation from the joint region.

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Trentini corresponds to the autonomous Trentino Province (Autonomous Province of Trento) within the Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol region (Roth 2015: 93). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Trentino enjoyed “considerable autonomy” (Anderson 2013: 117) as a member state of the Holy Roman Empire. When the Italian speaking Trentino was attached to the Austrian County of Tyrol in 1803, in which the majority of the people were German speaking, it managed to preserve some linguistic autonomy as the administration remained Italian speaking.
* The territory was heavily contested in the First World War and was annexed to Italy with the Treaty of Saint-Germain in 1919. Under Mussolini’s rule, centralization was extremely high, regional languages were banned, and regional powers very limited in general. Autonomy of cities like Trento or Rovereto was reduced and the number of municipalities was heavily reduced.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After the end of Second World War, the Italian and Austrian governments signed the De Gasperi–Gruber Agreement in 1946. While the accord primarily addressed the rights of the German speaking minority in South Tyrol, the preceding negotiations also included a promise of autonomy for the region of Trentino–Alto Adige by Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi (which was fulfilled in 1948). By including Trentino in the autonomous region of Trentino–Alto Adige, the Italians created an Italian majority with Italian speakers outnumbering German speaker 2.5:1 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 278). [1946: autonomy concession]
  + The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions. Four of the five autonomous regions with special statute (with the exception of Friuli-Venetia) were immediately set up and were granted significant autonomy, which included recognition of the minority languages (Baldini and Baldi 2014). The *regioni a statuto speciale* enjoyed “considerably more legislative, administrative and financial autonomy than the other regioni, and the ability to negotiate their bylaws directly with the national government, bypassing the national parliament” (Bilancia et al. 2010: 124). Trentino Alto-Adige constitutes a special case as power is mostly devolved to the two autonomous provinces Trentino and South Tyrol, leaving the combined region itself almost powerless. If anything, this increases the autonomy of the Trentino since they do not need to share autonomy with South Tyrol in a combined region. The constitution entered into force on January 1, 1948. However, the constitution was “largely prepared in 1946” (Einaudi 1948: 662) and approved by a vote of 453 to 62 on December 11, 1947.
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  + In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005; Bolgherini, 2014: 201). It seems that both ordinary and special regions were affected by these laws (Palermo 2008: 34). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct elections for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). The 1999 acts intended to narrow the gap between ordinary and special regions. Since only regions with ordinary status were concerned, these acts are not coded.
  + The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In the relevant articles in the constituting (Title V), there is no reference to ordinary regions, which is why we assume that regions with a special autonomy status are also included. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. The year 2001 also saw the passing of a third Autonomy Statute, which included some administrative reorganization and the control over the selection process of local governments (Cunningham 2011). [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). We do not code a concession because this was a national referendum.
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2010, the role of municipal and provincial clerk was significantly revised, and the Ministry of the Interior regained control of this key position (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* In 2016, a potential constitutional reform was rejected in a referendum. This reform “would have produced a shift towards a more cooperative and centralized form of regionalism” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 581). Baldi (2020: 34) also discusses this reform, claiming that it would have “provided for a substantial reduction in regional autonomy” (see also: Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018).

**Regional autonomy**

* As an autonomous province within an autonomous region with special statute, Trentino has been regionally autonomous since 1948. Since the constitution came into force on 1 January 1948, we code regional autonomy as of 1948. [1948-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1948: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Trentini |
| *Scenario* | No match/n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Italians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32501000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the Italians as a homogenous group and does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Italians, or between different constituents of the Padania movement; unless they are a distinct linguistic minority such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Suditrol in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1. As a consequence, many of the Northern Italian autonomist movements in the SDM data set do not have a separate EPR group but are incorporated in the EPR group ‘Italians’, which are coded as dominant throughout. To infer that all these movements are also dominant is of course not accurate.
* As part of the dominant northern group, the Trentini had some influence despite their small size. With Alcide De Gasperi, Prime Minister from 1945 until 1953 and a native of Trentino, there is indeed some evidence in this regard. However, we did not find any evidence of other people from Trentino being part of or having some influence on the Italian government which is why we code them as junior partner from 1945 until 1953 and powerless thereafter. [1945-1953: junior partner] [1954-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We found little information on the number of self-identified Trentini, but an estimate can be inferred from Minahan (2002: 1946). Minahan gives figures for the Tyroleans as a whole, which in his view includes Tyroleans in Austria, South Tyroleans in Italy, and the Trentini. According to Minahan, almost all Tyroleans (99%) live in the historic Tyrol region, which includes territories Tyrol in Austria, South Tyrol, and Trentino (both in Italy). Furthermore, according to Minahan, the Trentinis make up approx. 29% of the historic Tyrol region’s population, or approx. 470,000. We use this as group size estimate. Italy’s total population was 57.06 million in 2002 according to the World Bank. [0.0082]

**Regional concentration**

* Establishing group concentration is difficult since we lack adequate data on the number and distribution of self-identified Trentini. Nevertheless, it appears very likely that the threshold is met. As argued above, there were approx. 470,000 Trentini in 2002. Meanwhile, the region of Trentino, according to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), has a population of 524,832 in 2012, and according to Italy’s 2001 census, 96% in Trentino are Italian speakers (like the Trentini). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We could not find evidence suggesting that there are numerically significant populations of Trentini outside of Italy. We do not code Italians in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against an Italian-dominated government. [no kin]

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## Triestines

Activity: 1975-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Trieste was claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia after the Second World War. In 1947 Trieste was designated an independent Free Territory under UN protection and was named the Free Territory of Trieste. It was divided into two zones: Zone A (including Trieste) and Zone B (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 299). Minahan (1996: 584) reports a Triestine declaration of independence in 1947. He probably refers to the peace treaty that was signed with Italy on February 10 of that year that led to the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste. Minahan (2002) does not report this as a declaration of independence, and we found no evidence of a separatist movement. In any case, we would not code this because Trieste at the time had not been part of either Italy or Yugoslavia, but occupied by the allies.
* In 1954, Zone A was de-facto incorporated into Italy and Zone B into Yugoslavia, following the London Memorandum of Understanding (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 299). The 1975 Osimo Treaty formalized the de-facto border changes made in 1954.
* The Osimo Treaty prompted the emergence of a Triestine self-determination movement. ~~I~~n 1975, an autonomist party, La Lista Per Trieste was formed, and achieved a level of success in local elections in the 1970s and 80s (Scabar, 2020: 411). In 1993, the party was dissolved and then absorbed by Forza Italia; in 2005, it made a failed attempt to reactivate (Scabar, 2020).
* In Roth (2015: 95), it is noted that an organisation named the Giulian Front was founded in the 1990s as a political party “seeking the establishment of the tiny Province of Trieste as a separate autonomous region”. Roth (2015: 95) notes that, at times, the movement “had links to Lega Nord”; while it achieved 8% of the vote in the late 1990s, it has since “drastically declined in popularity”. From searching online, this organization no longer appears to be active.
* Nevertheless, we found evidence of a newer organisation, the Free Territory of Trieste Movement. According to its website, it was established in 2011 (Trieste Libera, n.d.) and, according to a BBC (2014) article, the movement “claims independence for the city and its hinterland”. Supporters “believe that Trieste is legally free under international law”, and its leader has “sent several letters and signed petitions to the United Nations, demanding recognition of Trieste’s free status”. Between 2,000 and 8,000 protesters have joined rallies organised by the movement. [start date: 1975; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* La Lista Per Trieste, formed in 1975, was an autonomist party which was dissolved in 1993 (Scabar, 2020). We code an autonomy claim during this period.
* An organisation named the Giulian Front was founded in the 1990s as a political party “seeking the establishment of the tiny Province of Trieste as a separate autonomous region”. While the party achieved 8% of the vote in the late 1990s, it has since “drastically declined in popularity” (Roth 2015: 95). From searching online, this movement no longer appears to be active.
* However, another organization emerged in 2011, the Free Territory of Trieste Movement. According to a BBC (2014) article, the movement “claims independence for the city and its hinterland”. Supporters “believe that Trieste is legally free under international law”, and its leader has “sent several letters and signed petitions to the United Nations, demanding recognition of Trieste’s free status”. We thus code an independence claim from 2012 onwards, following the 1st January rule. [1975-2011: autonomy claim] [2012-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 2011; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Triestines consists of the Trieste province in the Friuli - Venezia Giulia region. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Triestines were ruled by the Habsburg Empire until 1918. After the First World War and the defeat of the Habsburg Empire, Trieste and the Istrian peninsula were awarded to Italy (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 299).
* At the end of the Second World War, Trieste was claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia. In 1947 Trieste was designated an independent Free Territory under UN protection and was named the Free Territory of Trieste. It was divided into two zones: Zone A (including Trieste) was under British/US military control, and Zone B was under Yugoslav control (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 299).
* In 1952, municipal elections were held, in which 60 percent voted for a reunification with Italy and only 6 percent favored incorporation into Yugoslavia. The London Memorandum of Understanding in 1954 led to the annexation of Zone A by Italy, Zone B became part of Yugoslavia (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 299).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Osimo Treaty of 1975 finalized the border changes made in 1954. The signing of the treaty led to the establishment of the Lista per Trieste, which claimed a special status for the city of Trieste in the special region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and not merely an incorporation into the region (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000:299). We do not code this act since it merely made the border change of 1954 definite.
* In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provinical president) (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). Trieste does not have provincial status (it forms part of Friuli-VeneziaGiulia, of which it has about 1/6 of the population), thus only the introduction of mayoral elections really concerned Trieste. We do not code the introduction of mayors as a concession as it relates to the local level.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The annexation of Trieste by Italy in 1954 would constitute a host change, but this was before the start date and is thus not coded.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Triestines |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Italians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32501000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes Italians as a homogenous group and does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Italians, or between different constituents of the Padania movement; unless they are a distinct linguistic minority such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Suditrol in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1. As a consequence, many of the Northern Italian autonomist movements in the SDM data set do not have a separate EPR group but are incorporated in the EPR group ‘Italians’, which are coded as dominant throughout. To infer that all these movements are also dominant is of course not accurate. This is particularly true for the Triestines, which are demographically small (approx. 232,300). We did not find any evidence of the Triestines being part of or having some influence on the Italian government or being actively discriminated against, which is why we code them as powerless throughout. [1975-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), the population of the province of Trieste amounts to 232,300 in 2012. With Italy’s population totaling 59.394 million in that same year, the population of Trieste makes up a share of 0.00391. However, since this number is not related to ethnic identity, we follow Minahan (2002: 672), who states that there are approximately 370,000 Triestines in Italy in 2002. With Italy’s population totaling 57.06 million in that same year (World Bank), we thus code a population share of 0.0065.  [0.0065]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (1996: 582), the Triestines make up 72% of the population of province of Trieste. Above (see group size) we state that the population of the province of Trieste amounts to 232,300 in 2012. Triestines in Triest thus number approximately 167,000 in that same year. This is less than 50% of the 370,000 Triestines in all of Italy in 2002 (Minahan 2002: 672). It thus seems that the community of Triestines outside Triest – Minahan (2002: 672) states that there are Triestines in Veneto, Lombardy, and other parts of Friuli-Venezia Giulia – is larger than the number of Triestines in Trieste. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* We could not find evidence suggesting that there are numerically significant populations of Triestines outside of Italy. We do not code Italians in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against an Italian-dominated government. [no kin]

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## Valdaostans

Activity: 1945-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Valdostan Union (Union Valdôtaine/Unione Valdostana, UV) was founded in 1945 to further the interests of the French-speaking minority in Val d’Aosta. The VU demanded secession from Italy and reunification with French Savoy in an independent Etat Montagne. Hence, 1945 is coded as start date. Although secessionist sentiment among the Valdaostans died down after the Italian government separated Val D’Aosta from Piedmont and granted some political autonomy to the region in 1948, the movement is coded as ongoing since the UV has since demanded increased autonomy. Another party, the Movimento Autonomista Valdostano has also made claims for increased autonomy.
* The UV has been represented in the regional assembly from 1959, winning 17 of 35 seats (40.1% of vote) in the May 1998 elections and it has usually also been represented in the national parliament, retaining one Chamber and one Senate seat in 1999. The UV continues to operate as of 2020, and thus the movement is ongoing (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 139f, 223, 313; Keesing’s; Minahan 1996: 493ff, 1667ff; Union Valdotaine Progressiste; Union Valdotaine, n.d.).
* Another ongoing organization representing the Valdaostan claim is the Lega Nord Valle d’Aosta, though this party never gained more electoral support than the UV. Moreover, we cover Lega Nord and its regional sections within the Padanians entry. [start date: 1945; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Aostans sent a delegation to Bern in 1919 in order to ask for membership in the Swiss Confederation, which was refused. In 1923, a petition was presented to Mussolini requesting autonomy within Italy. The Valdostan Union (Union Valdôtaine/Unione Valdostana, UV) was founded in 1945 and demanded secession from Italy and a federal status within a French or Swiss state or, as another source argues, reunification with French Savoy in an independent Etat Montagne. Clearly, the dominant claim was independence. We thus code a claim for independence until 1947, as the Val d’Aosta was granted autonomous status on January 1, 1948 (Minority Rights Group International). [1945-1947: independence claim]
* After the granting of a special statute in 1948 the claim of the Valdostan Union moderated and changed to political autonomy for the French-speaking minority within Italy (Sandri 2008:1; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 313). Supporting the continuation of the autonomy claim through to 2020, is the following statement on the UV website: “the main objective” of the Union is “the defence of the Aosta Valley ethnic-linguistic minority and its activity has always been aimed at extending the powers of self-government, considered insufficient, attributed to the region” (Union Valdotaine, n.d.).
* While there have been claims for independence after 1947, these are marginal (Roth 2015). [1948-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Roth identifies the Nation Val d’Outa as an independence seeking party but highlights the severely limited support for this position. Therefore, independence claims are only coded for the beginning of the SDM, where independence was the movement’s dominant claim (see above). [start date: 1945; end date: 1947]

**Irredentist claims**

* The VU also made irredentist claims (see above). [start date: 1945; end date: 1947]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Valdaostans consists of the Val d’Aosta in northwestern Italy (Roth 2015: 86, 90). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* From 1034 the House of Savoy ruled the Aosta province. Autonomy in the form of an own government, laws and finances was granted in 1191. French became the official language in most transactions from the thirteenth century and became the official language of Savoy in 1561. The Valle d’Aosta remained part of Savoy when the latter gained independence from France and move its capital to Turin.
* The Piedmontese and Italian languages gained influence. In 1773 the autonomy of the Valdaostans was abolished and the territory was ruled from Turin directly, with a short intermezzo between 1804 and 1824, when the region was part of the French Empire.
* In 1860 the Aostans, who wanted to join France, were annexed by Italy during the unification process of the Italian Kingdom. Due to this development the notion of a *valdôtaine nation* became more important given that the large majority spoke French in the region and felt threatened by the centralization policies of the Italian Kingdom (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1670/71; Sandri 2008: 1).
* Shortly after the unification, Italian was imposed in the Valle d’Aosta although only very few people spoke Italian. The French language was no longer respected and banned from schools in 1879 and from law courts in 1880. Many Aostans left for France. French-speakers started to organize themselves to protect their language and began to claim autonomy (Minority Rights Group International).
* In the interwar years nationalism among the Aostans rose due to the fascist policies that suppressed Aostan culture and language. The Fascist government suppressed any form of political autonomy and the distinct culture of the Valdaostans was neglected and harshly suppressed. French and Franco-Provençal, the two main languages in the region, were banned (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002:1671; Sandri 2008:1).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions. Four of the five autonomous regions with special statute (with the exception of Friuli-Venetia) were immediately set up and were granted significant autonomy, which included recognition of the minority languages (Baldini and Baldi 2014; Minority Rights Group International). Article 38 of the Special Statute (a Constitutional Law of February 26, 1948) states that “in the Aosta Valley the French language is recognised as equal to the Italian language” (Coluzzi 2004: 8). The *regioni a statuto speciale* enjoyed “considerably more legislative, administrative and financial autonomy than the other regioni, and the ability to negotiate their bylaws directly with the national government, bypassing the national parliament” (Bilancia et al. 2010: 124). The constitution entered into force on January 1, 1948. However, the constitution was “largely prepared in 1946” (Einaudi 1948: 662) and approved by a vote of 453 to 62 on December 11, 1947. [1947: autonomy concession]
* In 1981 state law 36 was passed, which granted large financial autonomy. The region was allowed to keep 90% of the fiscal revenues collected within the Aosta valley territory. As a long-term consequence, the regional budget increased from 188 million Lire in 1980 to 2.778 million in 1998. The new law allowed the region to have “complete control over the administrative competences allocated by the Statute” (Sandri 2008:12). According to Claeys and Martire (2011), the percentage was cut to 70 per cent one year later. However, the overall effect was clearly positive, which is why we code a concession. [1981: autonomy concession]
* The Constitutional Law No. 3/1989 granted the competence of choosing autonomously electoral system for the five Special Autonomy Regions (Sandri 2008:3). [1989: autonomy concession]
* After the fall of the ‘First Republic’, several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008). Note that some decentralization legislation is directed at ordinary regions only and did not affect the regions with special statute.
  + In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provinical president) (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). In the same year, the Constitutional Law 2/1993 (“Amendment of Article 68 of the Constitution”) reformed the Special Autonomy Statute and resulted in more competences for the special regions (Sandri 2008: 12). [1993: autonomy concession]
  + Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments” (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). However, this reform concerned only regions without a special status and furthermore, it was not very significant.We do not code a concession.
  + In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005; Bolgherini, 2014: 201). It seems that both ordinary and special regions were affected by these laws (Palermo 2008: 34). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). The 1999 acts intended to narrow the gap between ordinary and special regions. Since only regions with ordinary status were concerned, these acts are not coded.
  + The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In the relevant articles in the constituting (Title V), there is no reference to ordinary regions, which is why we assume that regions with a special autonomy status are also included. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). We do not code a concession because this was a national referendum.
* In 1998 the regional government adopted a law protecting the German Walser community (Minority Rights Group International; Coluzzi 2004). Since they only make up a small percentage of the Valdaostan community, this event is not coded.
* In 1999, law number 482 (‘regulations on the matter of historical language minorities’) was passed to protect twelve minority languages (French, Provençal, Franco-Provençal, German, Ladin, Friulian, Slovene, Sardinian, Catalan, Albanian, Greek and Croatian) (Coluzzi 2004; Minority Rights Group International). According to Sierp (2008: 308), this is the “main law protecting Italy’s minority languages” as it decreed that these languages were allowed to be taught in school and to be sued for official documents and local broadcasting information. [1999: cultural rights concession]
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2010, the role of municipal and provincial clerk was significantly revised, and the Ministry of the Interior regained control of this key position (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* In 2016, a potential constitutional reform was rejected in a referendum. This reform “would have produced a shift towards a more cooperative and centralized form of regionalism” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 581). Baldi (2020: 34) also discusses this reform, claiming that it would have “provided for a substantial reduction in regional autonomy” (see also: Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018).

**Regional autonomy**

* Italy granted the Aosta Valley autonomy by way of the Republican Act, which entered into force on January 1, 1948. [1948-2020: regional autonomy]
  + However, the sources we consulted differ regarding the first few years of activity. What is clear is that the French occupied the Aosta Valley at the very end of WWII with the intention to annex it to France. MRGI claims that the French occupation lasted until 1947 or even 1948. According to MRGI, the French troops “withdrew when the Italian government set up an autonomous regime [which happened on January 1, 1948; see above]”.
  + Based on this, EPR codes the Aostans as regionally autonomous from 1946 onwards, noting that the first two years of regional autonomy were coded due to the occupation of the French Army and thus constitute a case of self-exclusion/separatist autonomy.
  + According to Benvenisti (2012: 88), however, the Val d’Aosta has already “reverted to the control of the Italian government by the end of 1945.” Additional evidence suggests that the French had withdrawn already be the end of 1945 (Truman 1955).
  + In sum, it appears as if the French de facto regime was established in 1945 and had been disestablished by the end of 1945. Thus we do not code regional autonomy/de facto independence in 1945 (1st of January rule).

**De facto independence**

* See under regional autonomy.

**Major territorial changes**

* Due to the French occupation and de facto regime (see under regional autonomy):
  + [1945: establishment of de facto independence]
  + [1945: abolishment of de facto independence]
* [1948: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Valdaostans |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Aostans (French speakers) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32505000 |

**Power access**

* The Valdaostans are only coded in EPR as of 1946 (powerless throughout). For 1945, we adopt the powerless code as there is no evidence of discrimination or representation in the central government. For all other years, we follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* The majority of the Valdaostans resides in the Val d’Aosta region in Italy, where they comprise 61% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 1667). Further evidence comes from Minority Rights Group International; according to MRGI 55.4% of the population of the Aosta Valley speaks Franco-Provençal, the French dialect of the Valdaostans, while approx. 75% in the region can speak standard French. Note: There are also smaller communities of French speakers in other parts of northern Italy, namely several alpine valleys in the Province of Torino (Val Sangone, Valle di Susa, Valle Cenischia, Valle di Viù, Valle di Ala, Val Grande, Valle di Locana, Valle di Piantonetto, Val Soana) (see e.g. GeoEPR; Weidmann 2009). But the majority of the French speakers resides in the Aosta Valley. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes French speakers in Canada, the French in France, the Walloons in Belgium, and the Swiss French as ethnic kin. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Venetians

Activity: 1979-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Liga Veneta (Venetian League) was founded in 1979 with the aim of restoring the historic Republic of Venice (which fell in 1797) within a region-based European Union (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 139f, 223; Ford 2014; Keesing’s). We use 1979 as the start date, but it should be noted that Minahan (2002: 1911) suggests that the Liga Veneta was only formed in the 1990s.
* Minahan (2002: 1911) suggests that the Liga Veneta became part of the Lega Nord in the late 1980s. Activities related to the Lega Nord are covered under the Padanian SDM.
* However, there continued to be Venetian separatist mobilization independently of the Lega Nord. Roth (2015: 93) writes of ‘Venetism’ which he suggests “refers specifically to separatists who do not follow Lega Nord’s vision of an independent Padania, no matter how federalised”. He argues that, in the late 1980s, “some members of Lega Nord-allied Veneto League split away to push a more aggressive agenda, declaring a Most Serene Venetian Government to be Venice’s legitimate government”. Furthermore, a “more serious radical separatist party”, the Venetian Republic League, separated from the Veneto League in 1998 and initially “did well in elections” (Roth, 2015: 94). According to Roth (2015: 94), there is also the movement, Veneto Independence, which organised an independence rally in 2012 (but which only managed to secure 1.1% of the vote in the 2013 elections). According to Roth (2015: 94) Veneto Independence did, however, manage to rally various separatist movements in the region in order to hold a non-binding online referendum for independence in which the ‘yes’ vote secured 89%. Ford (2014), however, suggests that it was the organization, Plebiscito.eu, which held the “unofficial referendum on breaking with Rome”; Ford nevertheless does agree with the figure of 89%. [start date: 1979; end date: ongoing]
  + We also found the organization Patto per l’Autonomia Veneto which is part of the Autonomie e Ambiente network (Autonomie e Ambiente, n.d.). However, the website for the organization does not appear to function and no information regarding the organization, its activities and aspirations are provided on the Autonomie e Ambiente site.

**Dominant claim**

* The Venetian League (Liga Veneta) was founded in 1979 and the largest autonomist party in the region at that time (4.3% of the votes in Veneto in the 1983 general election and later the second largest party after Christian Democracy), demanded a federal Italian state and aimed at an autonomous Venetia in a federalized Europe.
* In the late 1980s, the Liga Veneta became part of Lega Nord and therefore the Padanian SDM. As argued above, there were several other organizations which made claims specific to Veneto, though. For example, in 1987 the Veneto Serenissimp Governo split from Liga Venta to make more extreme claims of independence (Roth 2015: 94). Other radical separatists who claimed outright secession includes the Venetian Republic League (Roth 2015: 93). According to Roth (2015: 94), there is also the movement, Veneto Independence, which organised an independence rally in 2012, secured 1.1% of the vote in the 2013 elections, and organized a non-binding online referendum for independence in which the ‘yes’ vote secured 89% (Roth, 2015: 94; also see: Indipendenza Veneta, 2021). As the remaining organizations all appear to make claims for outright independence, we code independence as the dominant claim after the Liga Veneta’s merger with Lega Nord. [1979-1989: autonomy claim; 1990-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1987; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Although the Venetian League at time has made claims that appear to be related to the historical Republic of Venice, which roughly corresponds to today’s regions of Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Roth 2015: 93), the movement’s dominant claim is confined to the present-day Region of Veneto. We code the territory based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Veneti people have settled the Venetian plain by 1000 B.C. The region was contested and ruled by various rulers, including the Romans, Huns, Germanic Lombards and the Byzantinne Empire. In the tenth century the Republic of Venice gained power came to be one of the wealthiest and most powerful states in Europe and established itself as the premier Mediterranean maritime power. The fifteenth century marks the peak of the Republic’s influence. The beginning of the decline of the Republic of Venice is usually dated to 1453 when Constantinople fell to the Turks and the Venetian dominance was challenged by the emergence of the Ottoman Empire (Minahan 2002: 1989f).
* In 1797 Venice came under Napoleon’s rule. Due to territorial exchanges between Napoleon and Austria, the Venetians were shortly after ruled by the Austrian Empire (Minahan 2002: 1990). In 1848 the Venetians rebelled against Austrian rule. The rebels proclaimed Venetian independence as the Republic of St. Mark. However, Austrian rule over the region continued until the unification of Italy.
* Venetia became part of Italy in 1866 after the third round of Italian independence wars. The Kingdom of Italy installed a centralised administrative structure and installed a Tuscan dialect from Florence as the national language (Minahan 2002: 1990-1991).
* In 1922 the fascist government launched a campaign to eradicate Italian’s regional languages (Mianahan 2002:1991). During the fascist government centralization was extremely high and regional power very limited.
* The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions, among which Veneto. The promise of limited autonomy to the 15 regions with ordinary statute (among which Veneto) was not implemented until 1970, when regional self-government was finally granted. The governing bodies of the regions were finally elected for the first time and a limited transfer of function took place (Baldi and Baldini 2014). The regions became operational in 1972 and according to D’Atena (2013), Baldi and Baldini (2014) and Bilancia et al. (2010) effective powers began to be transferred to the regions with ordinary status only in 1977. We code the concession in 1970, the year when the process was initiated. [1970 autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After the fall of the ‘First Republic’, several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008):
  + In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provinical president) (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). [1993: autonomy concession]
  + Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments” (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). However, since no additional powers were devolved, we do not code this as an act of concession.
  + In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD, 2005; Bolgherini, 2014: 201). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘regioni a statuto ordinario’ now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament (see also: Bolgherini, 2014: 201). [1999: autonomy concession]
  + The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
  + In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). We do not code a concession because the referendum was national.
    - It should be noted that, in response to the outcome of the referendum, “the only two regions where the majority of voters were in favour…namely Lombardy and Veneto, requested that they be granted differentiated autonomy under Article 116 IC”. However, this process became gridlocked “almost immediatiely, and never reached the phase of bilateral negotiations with the State” (Baldi, 2020: 33).
* In 2007, the national budget law made a provision for reducing or abolishing all municipal agencies and bodies: “municipalities were no longer allowed to set up agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting their autonomy and self-organisation powers”. One year later, the creation of municipal functional consortiums was forbidden (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). However, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2009, again in the national budget law, there was reduction of almost 20% in the number of representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* Law 191 of 2009 “abolished city districts” for cities with a population of under 250,000. This law also “envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions”, including the municipal ombudsman. In addition, the post of director-general was suppressed, a post which was “an important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities” (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2010, the role of municipal and provincial clerk was significantly revised, and the Ministry of the Interior regained control of this key position (Bolgherini, 2014: 205). Once more, this restriction related to the municipal level and not the regional level and thus we do not code a restriction.
* During 2009 and 2010, “tough financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to their population” and “an emergency economic measure” of 2011 “further cut state financial transfers to local governments” (Bolgherini, 2014: 202). This does not constitute an autonomy restriction according to our definition.
* In 2016, a potential constitutional reform was rejected in a referendum. This reform “would have produced a shift towards a more cooperative and centralized form of regionalism” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 581). Baldi (2020: 34) also discusses this reform, claiming that it would have “provided for a substantial reduction in regional autonomy” (see also: Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018).
* In October 2017, two regions in the north of Italy, Venice and Lombardy, convened autonomy referenda. In both regions, voters “backed more powers being devolved from Rome”; indeed, the Presidents of the regions claimed that more than 95% of voters supported increased autonomy (Agence France-Presse, 2017). These votes were not binding but it was suggested at the time that they would provide the leaders of the two regions with “a strong political mandate when they embark[ed] on negotiations with the central government on the devolution of powers and tax revenues from Rome” (Agence France-Presse, 2017). In the wake of the referenda, Lombardy, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna “entered a process of negotiations” (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 592). A preliminary agreement was signed in February 2018, which for limited devolution in 23 areas (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 593; see also: Baldi, 2020: 35). However, the negotiations on a final agreement were never concluded, and no further powers were devolved (Giovannini and Vampa, 2019: 593).
* In 2019, new preliminary agreements were signed promising autonomy in 23 areas, but as of 2020, there was no final agreement (Baldi, 2020: 35). Notably, Venice held a further autonomy referendum in 2019 (Giuffrida, 2019).

**Regional autonomy**

* Devolution to ordinary regions (such as Veneto) is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Venetians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Italians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 32501000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the Italians as a homogenous group and does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Italians, or between different constituents of the Padania movement; unless they are a distinct linguistic minority such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Suditrol in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1. As a consequence, many of the Northern Italian autonomist movements in the SDM data set do not have a separate EPR group but are incorporated in the EPR group ‘Italians’, which are coded as dominant throughout. To infer that all these movements are also dominant is of course not accurate.
* However, as part of the dominant northern groups, the Venetians do have some influence in Italian politics, which is also reflected in the appointment of several ministers and one Prime Minister (Mariano Rumor (1968-1970; 1973-1974). Under Letta (2013-14), one minister was from Veneto (Flavio Zanonato); and under Conte (2018-2021), there were three ministers from Veneto. We therefore code the Venetians as junior partner throughout. [1979-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), the population of the region of Veneto amounts to 4,853,657 in 2012. With Italy’s population totaling 59.394 million in that same year, the population of Venetia makes up a share of 0.08172. However, since this number is not related to ethnic identity, we follow Minahan (2002: 1987), who states that there are approximately 3,570,000 Venetians in Italy in 2002. With Italy’s population totaling 57.06 million in that same year, we thus code a population share of 0.063.  [0.0626]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1987), the Venetians mostly live in Veneto, where they comprise approx. 78% of the local population (in 2002). This amounts to around 3.532 million Venetians, which is more than half of the 3.67 million Venetians in all of Italy. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 1987) mentions Venetian communities in Croatia and Slovenia that in combination amount to 100,000. Other Venetian communities are in Germany, Switzerland, and outside Europe in Australia, Argentina, Brazil , the United States, and Brazil. However, these are not large enough to be coded here. We do not code Italians in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against an Italian-dominated government. [no kin]

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