# KENYA

## Maasai

Activity: 1963-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Hughes (2006: 6) suggests that the first Maasai political organization was formed in 1930, the Masai Association, which presented Maasai land claims before the 1932 Kenya Land Commission (KLC). It is not clear whether this phase of activity carried over to the 1950s/1960s, but it appears it did not. Hughes notes that in 1945 another Masai organization was formed, the Group of Educated Masai (OLO), but it is not clear whether this group had separatist aims.
* According to Minahan (2002: 1125), the Maasai nationalist movement emerged in the 1950s during the Mau Mau uprising (1952-1956), but he does not provide clear evidence of organized activity. Then, in 1960, Maasai nationalists formed the Maasai United Front (MUF). The MUF propagated ideas of an independent Maasai state (Minahan 2002: 1125; Hughes 2006: 6). Koissaba (2016: 190) describes how, in 1962, during the independence conference held in London, ‘the Maasai presented a petition to the British government seeking [a] guarantee of their interests’. The British ‘promised that the rights and security of tenure for the lands that the Maasai lived on would be secure’ but did not promise ‘that the land that was expropriated through the agreements would be returned to the Maasai’.
* According to Minahan (2002: 1125) land disputes increased in the 1960s and 1970s, including formal appeals to the government in the 1980s (Minahan 2002: 1125). Based on this, we code the start date in 1960. We code the Masai in Kenya as of 1963, the year of Kenya’s independence. We found no separatist violence in 1960-1962, and thus note prior nonviolent activity.
* Since President Moi came into power in 1978, the Maasai have become less marginalized. However, even then, they continue to fight for the return of ancestral lands that are under Kikuyu control. Territorial issues resulted in large-scale inter-ethnic fighting in the Rift Valley in the 1990s, as well as pre/post-election fighting in the late 2000s.
* The Maasai have submitted demands to the Kenyan government over the return of indigenous lands originally leased to British settlers, but the government does not recognize leases with the British. Besides demanding the return on land from the Kenyan government and the eviction of white farmers, the Maasai have also demanded compensation from the United Kingdom. This has resulted in demonstrations, some of which led to the forceful dispersal of protesters in the early 2000s. News article suggest that these forceful dispersals did not result in at least 25 deaths per year. Protests have continued into 2013.
* We found evidence of deadly protests involving the Maasai continuing in 2015 (Maina 2015), and of continuing tensions over land in 2018 (Njagi 2018) We therefore consider the movement as ongoing as of 2020.
* The Maasai are represented by several groups such as: the Organization for the Survival of IL-Laikipia Indigenous Maasai Group Initiatives (OSILIGI), Maasai Cultural, Wildlife and Ethical Tourism Society, and Maasai Mara Women’s Group Pastorialist Indigenous NGO (BBC 2004; Hughes 2006; Lexis Nexis; Maasai Association; Minahan 2002, 2016; MAR; MRGI; NBC News 2006; Wanted in Africa 2011). [start date: 1960; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Maasai United Front (MUF) promoted ideas of an independent Maasai state prior to Kenya’s independence (Minahan, 2002: 1125). After Kenya’s independence in 1963, the Maasai increasingly advocated for their land rights, amongst others the return of their ancestral lands. Their demands were represented by multiple groups like the Organization for the Survival of IL-Laikipia Indigenous Maasai Group Initiatives (OSILIGI), Maasai Cultural, Wildlife and Ethical Tourism Society, and Maasai Mara Women’s Group Pastoralist Indigenous NGO (MAR, 2006). As an interim step on the path to independence, Maasai nationalists have also demanded the introduction of *majimboism* in Kenya, a form of federalism based on ethnicity (Minahan, 2002:1126; MAR, 2006; Refworld, 2004). If implemented, *majimboism* would expel millions of people who have settled in Maasai lands since the 1920s and who have legally purchased land there (Refworld, 2004). [1963-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Prior to Kenya’s independence, the Maasai formed the Maasai United Frony (MUF) in 1960. This group demanded a seperate independence for the Maasai from the British (Minahan 2002: 1125; Hughes 2006: 6). We do not cover colonial independence movements, however. After Kenya’s independence in 1963, the Maasai’s claims shifted to autonomy. Minahan (2016: 254) reports that Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania both seek independence, but other sources refute this, such as Roth (2015: 277-278) who notes that independence is not a priority for the Maasai. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the MUF and other Maasai groups in Kenya consists of the administrative regions Kajiado and Narok, as shown on the corresponding map in (Roth 2015: 270). We code this territory based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Deaths have resulted from inter-ethnic fighting, but this is not considered violent conflict with the government. Based on this, the movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Maasai are indigenous, semi-nomadic pastoralists, concentrated in the south of the Rift Valley Province of Kenya. They are ethnically distinct from other groups in Kenya and have different social customs, religious practices, and their own language (MAR, 2006).
* The Maasai people migrated to the territory west of Mount Kilimanjaro in the mid-1700s (Minahan, 2016:253). They established their dominance over much of East Africa, reaching the pinnacle of their power in the 1870s (Minahan, 2016:253). The Maasai homeland straddles the international border between Kenya and Tanzania (Minahan, 2002: 1122).
* Kenya became a British protectorate in 1895 (Refworld, 2004). A smallpox epidemic killed 75% of the Maasai in the 1890s (Minahan, 2016: 254).
* The boundaries between colonial British and German territory, which were solidified between 1886 and 1890, divided the traditional Maasailand, and the disputes over land, water and grazing rights which followed ‘generated the beginnings of Maasai nationalism’ (Minahan, 2016: 254).
* While the British made ‘provisions for supposedly inalienable Maasai land reserves in the Rift Valley, the highlands northwest of Nairobi, and the southern Maasai Steppe in Tanganyika’ (Minahan, 2002:1124), the British authorities later ignored these and moved the Maasai into lands in southern Kenya in 1911 before reducing the Maasai reserves in 1913 (Minahan, 2002:1124); offering support, MAR (2006) describes the Maasai as having been ‘forcibly removed from large areas of their land’ during the colonial period (see also: Minority Rights Group, 2018). More broadly, Minahan (2002: 1123) describes the Maasai as suffering from discrimination under the colonial British government.
* In 1939, the colonial regime settled over 4,000 Kikuyu people on land which had traditionally belonged to the Maasai (Minahan, 2002:1125).
* By the end of 1960, two parties dominated the political landscape in Kenya. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) united votes from Kenya’s largest ethnic blocs: Kikuyu and Luo. KANU supported a powerful, central government. Leaders of smaller ethnic groups, including the Kalenjin, Maasai and Mijikenda, coalesced around the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU advanced a platform called *majimboism*: the idea of a constitutional framework which would allow for greater provincial autonomy (Prestholdt, 2014:260).
* After independence, which was achieved in December 1963, Kenya became a one-party state (Minahan, 2002: 1125). Some Maasai were brought into government but they were ‘mostly ignored and marginalised’ (Minahan, 2002: 1125).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under Jomo Kenyatta, the first President of Kenya, much of the land of the Maasai ‘was taken by agriculturalists, mainly the Kikuyu, and they [the Maasai] suffered great poverty’ (MAR, 2006; see also: Minority Rights Group, 2018; Koissaba, 2016:190). Land disputes escalated in the 1960s and 1970s (Minahan, 2002:1125). Lacking a clearer indication as to the start date of the land theft, we code a restriction in Kenya’s year of independence. [1963: autonomy restriction]
* Daniel Arap Moi, a Kalenjin, came to power in 1978 and he forged a political alliance with the Maasai; this gave the Maasai a voice in government, and several Maasai gained high government posts and were employed as armed units against Moi’s political opponents (Minahan, 2002:1126; see also: MAR, 2006; Minority Rights Group, 2018). We do not code a concession if groups gain representation in central government.
* In 1991, violence broke out in the Rift Valley, and disputes over land and water rights swept across the Maasai districts between 1992 and 1993. The Maasai sought to drive Kikuyu and other groups from that which they deemed their lands. They were also wielded as ‘agents of political repression’ amid violence which displaced over 300,000 and left more than 1,500 dead (Minahan, 2002: 1126).
* In 1992, ‘moderate’ Maasai held a conference to discuss the ‘culture and development of Maasailand’ (Minahan, 2002:1126). Also in the 1990s, the Maasai Development Trust, comprising Maasai businesspeople, attempted to gain control of the Loita Hills, ‘the heartland of Maasai culture’ (Minahan, 2002:1126). Neither of these initiatives affected the level of self-rule of the Maasai.
* 2004 marked the end of what the Maasai deemed a 100-year ‘lease’ of their land to the British and saw the reinvigoration of a campaign by the Maasai to claim back their ancestral homeland (MAR, 2006; Vasagar, 2004). The Kenyan government rejected the demand. From 2004, ‘scores of Maasai pastoralists, whose community [were] staking claim to these thousands of acres of their native land, were charged and at times killed for invading private property’ (this land is ‘now primarily occupied by large-scale farms and ranches in Laikipia and other areas in the Rift Valley’) (MAR, 2006). We code a restriction while noting that this decision is ambiguous because, according to some observers, the claims of there having been a 100-year lease are incorrect (Vasagar, 2004). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* The government’s US$1.39 billion Kenya Electricity Expansion Project (KEEP), which was approved in 2010 (World Bank, 2010), led to the resettlement of approximately 1,200 Maasai. Those affected have argued that ‘the land available for resettlement is much reduced and not suitable for grazing’. The project was partly financed by the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and other donors. Therefore, Maasai representatives lodged an inspection request to engage the World Bank’s Inspection Panel and the European Investment Bank’s Complaint Mechanism in October 2014 and, in 2015, a report was released by these two organisations confirming that ‘involuntary resettlement’ had taken place, causing ‘widespread harm’. The World Bank created an action plan in response but ‘the affected Maasai communities remain very critical about the lack of adequate consultation, compensation and livelihood opportunities in their new location’ (Minority Rights Group, 2018). The Coding Instructions note that ‘the denial to live in a given territory constitutes the ultimate restriction of group autonomy’ and we therefore code an autonomy restriction. [2010: autonomy restriction]
* The 2010 constitution led to increased devolution in 2013, when financial and administrative autonomy was transferred to county governments (Kimani, 2020; Wanyade and Mobya, 2013; D’Arcy, 2020). The Maasai form a majority (51.4%) in one of the new counties, Narok county, and the governor there is also Maasai. In the neighbouring Kajiado county, where the Kalenjin form the majority (40.5%), the governor is also a Maasai. These counties are located towards the south of the Great Rift Valley (D’Arcy, 2020:258). [2010: autonomy concession]
* In 2016, Kenya adopted the Community Land Act (CLA) through which ‘each community may, if it wishes, secure a single collective title over all or part of its lands, and lawfully govern this property’. In 2018, this new law was ‘in force’ but not yet ‘fully applied’ (Wily, 2018:1). The CLA ‘empowers communities to make rules for regulating the management and administration of their land, including on the basis of custom’ (Wily, 2018: 9). However, there is ‘reluctance on the part of government to surrender lands to communities it would prefer to keep itself, by defining these as public, not community property’ (Wily, 2018: 20). Moreover, in 2019, it was argued that ‘the majority of indigenous communities and local counties are still unaware of the new law and how to apply for land registration’ and, in addition, that ‘no budget ha[d] been allocated…for the act’s implementation’. Therefore, ‘none of the necessary Community Land Registrars and Deputies’ had been ‘posted in the counties to receive and process the applications’ (IWGIA, 2019; for evidence of delays in the implementation of the act, see also: Migiro, 2017). Due to this lack of meaningful implementation, we do not code an autonomy concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Kenyan counties received a measure of autonomy in 2013. Wanyade and Mboya (2013: 157) suggest that ‘with the onset of devolution, marginalised regions and communities have, in some cases, for the first time since independence received significant resources, enabling them to embark upon meaningful and long-overdue development projects’. They also note that ‘some regions, loosely based on former provinces, have begun to look at regional interests with a view to collaborating in the pursuit of those interests’, and one such example is Mombasa which has joined the Commonwealth of Coast Counties (Wanyade and Mboya 2013:158). According to D’Arcy (2020: 251) the 2010 constitutions saw “significant political, fiscal, and administrative powers” devolved to 47 county governments. Nevertheless, the competencies of Kenya’s regions overall remain relatively limited, and there notably “remains significant tension between national and local responsibilities” (Kimani 2020). We do not code regional autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1963: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Maasai |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 50101000 |

**Power access**

* EPR groups the Maasai together with three other groups, the Kalenjin, the Samburu, and the Turkana. The four-group umbrella group is coded as junior partner between 1963 and 1978, then as senior partner between 1979 and 2002, and finally again as junior partner between 2003 and 2012. However, of the four groups, the Kalenjin are by far the largest and most influential according to the EPR coding notes. Minahan (2002: 1125) suggests that some Maasai were brought into government in Kenya after independence, but that they were “mostly ignored and marginalized”. On this basis, we code the Maasai as powerless between 1963 and 1978. [1963-1978: powerless]
* Minahan (2002: 1126) continues to argue that the situation of the Maasai changed in 1978 when Daniel Arap Moi, a Kalenjin, came to power after Kenyatta’s death. According to Minahan, “this gave the Maasai a voice in government, and several Maasai gained high government posts.” On this basis, we code the Maasai as junior partner until and including 2002, which is when Moi’s presidency ended. [1979-2002: junior partner]
* After 2002, power shifted away from the Kalenjin to the Kikuyu again, but according to EPR, several other ethnic groups retained representation and according to Throup (2003: 4) this included the Maasai, with one or even two ministers, depending on how one counts. In late 2005, President Kibaki dismissed the entire cabinet, but the EPR coding notes suggest that while “there is no information about the exact ethnic composition of the dcabinet in this period, […] the author is aware that most other groups were at least represented in government, including members of Odinga’s allies from the Luhya group.” After the large-scale violence in 2007/8, the rival parties reached an agreement on a grand coalition which gave broad ethnic representation including to the Maasai. Joseph Kasaine Ole Nkaissery, a Maasai, was Assistant Minister, Defense between 2008 and 2013 (and later, after the fall of the grand coalition, cabinet secretary until his death in 2017). On this basis, we code the Maasai as junior partner also after 2003. However, we note that the extent of government representation by the Maasai between 2006-2007 is not fully clear. [2003-2012: junior partner]
* Between 2012 and 2013, EPR codes the broader grouping as Junior Partner and then, between 2014 and 2020, EPR codes the broader grouping as Senior Partner. EPR notes that elections were held in March 2013; Kenyatta won and created a ‘new executive’ which included ‘members of all ethnicities’. However, ‘the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin…ha[d] a clear dominant position in the cabinet’. The Maasai should therefore be considered to be a Junior Partner during this period (2013-2018). EPR describes how a further election followed in 2017 and Kenyatta won both the original election (the results were annulled) and the re-run. Violence followed the election but Kenyatta nevertheless created a new cabinet in early 2018. EPR notes that the Luo, Luhya and Kamba communities were excluded from the new cabinet. The Maasai are not described by EPR as being excluded; however, an International Crisis Group (2018) report claims that Kenyatta appointed ‘only ruling-party supporters’ and EPR notes that the Vice President remained the same. We therefore continue the coding of Junior Partner from 2018 until 2020 however we note that the extent of government representation by the Maasai between 2018-2020 is not fully clear. [2013-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* Following Minahan (2002: 1122), the Maasai make up around 1.36% of Kenya's population (if combined with the WB estimate for Kenya's population in 2002). [0.0136]

**Regional concentration**

* MAR codes the Maasai as territorially concentrated while suggesting that they make up the predominant share of the local population in their regional base and that >75% of the Maasai live in their regional base. Minahan (2002: 1122) similarly suggests regional concentration (91% of Maasais live in regional base where they make up 54% of local population), though it should be noted that the figures provided by Minahan refer to a cross-border area covering parts of Kenya and Tanzania. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1222), there are around 650,000 Maasai in neighboring Tanzania. This matches with information from MAR. [kin in adjacent country]

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## Mombasans

Activity: 2005-2020

**General notes**

* The Mombasa movement demands the independence of the (former) Coast province which is inhabited Mijikenda, Swahili and Arab peoples (Jamestown Foundation 2012). Due to the region’s multi-ethnic composition, the movement is best seen as based on a regionalist identity though there is also a religious component (the Coast province is predominantly Muslim, as opposed to much of the rest of the country; see Minahan 2016: 278).

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for separatist mobilization we could find is in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when organizations including the Coast African Political Union (CAPU), the Coast Peoples Party (CPP), and the Coast United Front (CUF) made claims for an autonomous or even independent Coast region. This mobilization faded with Kenya’s independence in 1961 (Prestholdt 2014; Willis & Gona 2013).
* The movement re-emerged several decades later in the shape of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), which has advocated the independence of the (former) Coast province from Kenya. The start date of this claim is ambiguous.
  + The Africa Report (2012) claims that the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) was founded in 1999. McGregor (2012) also states that the MRC was founded in 1999.
  + Other sources, however, suggest a later date for the MRC’s formation or at least a later start date for the beginning of its claims for self-determination. According to Willis and Gona (2013: 62), the Republican Council (later to become the Mombasa Republican Council) emerged in 2005; in that year, the “new” Council wrote a letter to the Queen of the UK setting out “the multiple grievances” of those on Kenya’s coast: “poor educational provision, the domination of up-country people in public sectors jobs, the “grabbing of huge chunks of coastal land” by Kenyatta and others”. After this letter was penned, ‘the police raided what they said was a camp where young men were swearing oaths to commit violence and undergoing military training’. Several were killed and arrested (Willis and Gona, 2013: 62-3).
  + Prestholdt (2014: 270) also argues that the MRC became active from 2005, writing: ‘from 2005, and particularly in the wake of the contested 2007 national elections’, the MRC has stressed its ‘exclusive rights to land and other regional resources’.
* Based on this, we code the movement’s start date as 2005.
* Starting in 2010, the MRC “became a prominent presence in the politics of coastal Kenya, articulating multiple, longstanding grievances and setting out a defiant agenda…demanding independence for the coast” (Willis and Gona 2013: 48). The MRC also spoke of “continuing disputes over land ownership; the sense that wealth and jobs are largely held by “up-country” people [and] the belief that the coast is deprived of educational facilities and that the revenues generated by tourism all end up elsewhere” (Willis and Gona 2013: 48-9).
* In 2010, the MRC was outlawed by the Kenyan government (BBC 2012; Chonghaile 2012), but this does not appear to have ended the organization’s activities. In early 2011, the MRC circulated letters ‘evoking history in support of claims to independence in the name of what was now called the Mombasa Republican Council’ (Willis and Gona, 2013: 64). In late 2011, the MRC called for a boycott of Kenya’s next national elections and when ‘youths disrupted a trial poll exercise in Malindi in March 2012, the MRC was blamed’. The government attempted to repress the MRC, accused the organisation of being linked to Somali militants, but also made ‘uncertain offers of negotiation’ (Willis and Gona 2013: 49).
* In 2012, the Kenyan courts lifted the ban on the MRC (BBC 2012; Chonghaile 2012). In the same year, the MRC launched an independence campaign (Minahan 2016: 279).
* Writing in 2021, Quinn (2021) described the MRC, and a second separatist coastal group Uamsho, as follows: ‘while both have been defunct or dormant following crackdowns on their leadership, a purported effort to reinvigorate the MRC – already met with of arrests by Kenyan police – illustrates that discontent is still very much present along the coast’. In agreement with this, Musyoka (2020) reports arrests of separatist leaders in 2020. [start date: 2005; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), the main organization associated with this movement, advocates for the independence of coastal provinces from Kenya (Jamestown Foundation 2012, The Africa Report 2012; also see above). [2005-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 2005; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the MRC consists of a historic coastal area in southern Kenya which was traded between Zanzibar and the United Kingdom in 1896 (Kantai 2012). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 270).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the pre-colonial period, Mombasa and its environs were ‘subordinate to the Sultanate of Zanzibar’ and only became part of the British colony of Kenya at the end of the nineteenth century (Roth, 2015:279); the coast of Kenya was ceded to the British in 1887 (Minahan, 2016:279). However, while Britain administered the protectorate, as per an 1895 treaty, the Sultan of Zanzibar retained titular sovereignty (Prestholdt, 2014:249).
* By the end of 1960, two parties dominated the political landscape in Kenya. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) united votes from Kenya’s largest ethnic blocs: Kikuyu and Luo. KANU supported a powerful, central government. Leaders of smaller ethnic groups, including the Kalenjin, Maasai and Mijikenda, coalesced around the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU advanced a platform called majimboism: the idea of a constitutional framework which would allow for greater provincial autonomy (Prestholdt, 2014: 260).
* In 1961, the British Colonial Office ‘decided that the protectorate should be legally joined’ with Kenya before independence (Prestholdt, 2014: 268).
* From 1962 to 1964, politics in Kenya were ‘dominated by the argument over whether each of Kenya’s provinces should become “regions” at independence, with substantial devolved power, or whether they should continue to be no more than administrative units of a centralized state’. Kenya ultimately became a single, centralised state (Willis and Gona 2013: 50). In 1964, ‘as part of an amendment to the Kenyan constitution, all regional powers were reduced and a central form of territorial authority imposed’ (Kromm, 1967: 363).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 2010 constitution led to increased devolution in 2013, when financial and administrative autonomy was transferred to county governments (including Mombasa) (Kimani, 2020; Wanyade and Mobya, 2013; D’Arcy, 2020). [2010: autonomy concession]
* In 2011, Randu Nzai brought a civil case to the High Court to try to prevent the privatisation of some functions of the Port of Mombasa; the case collapsed when the privatisation process was suspended for other reasons (Willis and Gona 2013: 64).
* In 2016, the MRC President Omar Mwamnuadzi was detained, together with 12 others, and then later disappeared. His lawyer fears that he was abducted and then killed (Saalfeld 2020: 423). However, this does not constitute a restriction as defined in the codebook.
* In December 2020, over 200 people were arrested “in a police operation to stem the resurgence of the Mombasa Republican Council” (Musyoka 2020). Police repression does not constitute a restriction as defined in the codebook.

**Regional autonomy**

* Kenyan counties received a measure of autonomy in 2013. Wanyade and Mboya (2013: 157) suggest that ‘with the onset of devolution, marginalised regions and communities have, in some cases, for the first time since independence received significant resources, enabling them to embark upon meaningful and long-overdue development projects’. They also note that ‘some regions, loosely based on former provinces, have begun to look at regional interests with a view to collaborating in the pursuit of those interests’, and one such example is Mombasa which has joined the Commonwealth of Coast Counties (Wanyade and Mboya 2013:158). According to D’Arcy (2020: 251) the 2010 constitution saw ‘significant political, fiscal, and administrative powers’ devolved to 47 county governments. Nevertheless, the competencies of Kenya’s regions overall remain relatively limited, and there notably ‘remains significant tension between national and local responsibilities’ (Kimani 2020). Specifically in relation to Mombasa, devolution has been characterised as ‘limited’: ‘to date, the substantive grievances underpinning…perceptions of marginalisation have not been resolved’ (Waddilove, 2020:722). We do not code regional autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Mombasa |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Mijikenda |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 50107000 |

**Power access**

* According to the Jamestown Foundation, several different groups live in the former Coast Province, including the Mijikenda, Swahili, and Arab peoples. EPR codes only the Mijikenda and omits other coastal groups. EPR suggests that the Mijikenda were represented in the national executive throughout 2005-2020 as junior partners. Given that the Mijikenda make up the largest group in the Coast province (42% or approx. 5% of the country's population; IPSOS 2013: 18f), we extend the junior partner code to the Mombasa movement as a whole. [2005-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* The Jamestown Foundation puts the population of the Coast Province at 22.5 million, but other sources suggest a significantly smaller population. According to Kenya's 2009 census, the former Coast Province had a population of 3.3 million (out of a total population of 38.5 million). We use the latter as our estimate for the group size (the IPSOS report also suggests a population in this range; this figure includes non-Coasteners who live there but it excludes Coasterners who don't, so it should be fine). [0.093]

**Regional concentration**

* We could not find concrete evidence on the ethnic make-up of Kenya’s Coast province, but all sources we consulted as well as the regionalist nature of this movement suggest regional concentration. This matches with EPR, which codes the Mijikenda as territorially concentrated. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* We could not find evidence for numerically significant transborder ethnic kin. [no kin]

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## Somalis

Activity: 1963-2006

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 275), the Somalis of Kenya’s Northern Frontier District (NFD) began to make calls for attachment to Somalia when talks on Kenyan independence began in 1961. Castagno (1964: 176) suggestes that Somali chiefs had expressed their desire for unification with Somalia already in 1960. We code 1960 as the start date. We found no separatist violence before Kenya’s independence and thus indicate prior non-violent activity.
* The issue of the status of the NFD was brought before the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference in 1962. The Somali delegation requested a UN-sponosred plebiscite and unit with Somalia. Britain rejected the Somali request for a UN plebiscite, but announced that a commission would be formed to investigate the issue. The work of the commission is sometimes described as an “informal plebiscite” (Laitin 1977: 75) or even as a UN-mandated referendum (Hyndman and Wenona, 2016), but the detailed account in Castagno (1964: 176) suggests otherwise. According to Castagno, the commission held public hearings in every district of the NFD. These hearings were attended by ca. 40,000 people, but Castagno does not report any voting taking place. Instead, the commission heard oral presentations from 134 delgations and received 106 submissions (Castagno 1964: 176). Overall, this was a fact finding mission and not a referendum, so we do not code a concession.
* The commission concluded that at least 80% of the population were in favor of unity with Somalia (Castagno 1964: 179). Despite this, the NFD became independent along with the rest of Kenya in 1963. A four-year secessionist war followed (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Minahan 2002; MAR; MRGI; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019; UCDP/PRIO).
* The movement did not end after the war. Minority Rights Group (2017) notes that while the conflict had formally ended in 1967, “in practice sporadic secessionist violence and banditry persisted for several decades in the region”. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 275) report a resurgence of the Somali insurgency in the early 1980s to which police responded by massive sweeps of the region in which “scores of ethnic Somalis were killed.”
* The movement appears to have died down at some point over the next few decades, but the exact date is not clear. Writing in 2006, MAR coders note that there does not appear to be a political organisation which represents Somalis’ interests, and that “there has been minimal political activism in the past decade”. Roth (2015:279) similarly suggests that, ‘at the moment there is little enthusiasm…for joining Somalia’ due to the turbulence within this neighbouring state. Based on MAR’s report that there was limited political activism in the 10 years leading to 2006, we code the movement’s end date in 2006, thus following the ten-year rule. However, we note that this coding decision is ambiguous. [start date: 1960; end date: 2006]

**Dominant claim**

* The claim was for union with Somalia. The irredentist claim is confirmed by Botha (2016: 44), who states that the war was “a secessionist conflict in which ethnic Somalis in the NFD attempted to join with their fellow Somalis in a Greater Somalia. Prior to Kenya’s independence in 1963, a British commission had found that ca. 80% of the population favored union with Somalia (Castagno 1964: 179). Minority Rights Group (2017) notes that while the conflict had formally ended in 1967, “in practice sporadic *secessionist* violence and banditry persisted for several decades in the region [emphasis added]”, thus implying a continuation of the movement and its aspirations post-1967 for several years [1963-2006: irredentism claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. [start date: 1960; end date: 2006]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Somalis is the Northern Frontier district of Kenya (Hewitt & Cheetham: 275). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD coding for 1963-1967 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* There was violence in subsequent years (see above), but this is not picked up by our standard sources. We found no other clear evidence to suggest that the criteria for separatist violence were met after 1967, though there appears to have been significant one-sided violence. Specifically, according to Accord (2015): “'Kenyatta's response to Somalis in the north-east was unremitting, and was followed even more aggressively under the second president, Daniel arap Moi. Although details are hard to retrieve, in November 1980, state authorities are alleged to have massacred approximately 3,000 ethnic Somalis of Bulla Kartasi in retaliation to a previous ambush of government officials by local bandit Abdi Madobe. Further, in February 1984, around 5,000 of the Degodia Somali sub-clan were killed at Wagalla airstrip.” For separatist violence, we need evidence of reciprocal killings; therefore, we do not code separatist violence after 1967. [1963-1967: HVIOLSD; 1968-2006: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1920, the border between what was then Italian Somaliland and Kenya was demarcated ‘without regard to ethnic factors, and the Somalis moved freely across the international border’. Somalis were not permitted to migrate to other parts of Kenya, ‘and the region was administered separately from the rest of the colony’ (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000:275). Most of Kenya’s Somalis are Muslim and, traditionally, are pastoralists (Minority Rights Group, 2017).
* With the onset of independence talks in 1961, ‘the Somalis of the Northern Frontier District called for the area to be joined to Somalia’. The British government charged a commission with determining ‘local attitudes’ which concluded in December 1962 ‘that the Somalis were almost unanimous in desiring to secede’ (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000: 275; Kromm, 1967: 362; Minority Rights Group, 2017; see also: Roth, 2015:279). Early in 1963, “Britain assured Somalia that no decision would be made regarding the Northern Frontier District without prior consultation with the Republic.” However, the idea was opposed by Kenyan nationalists (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000: 275) and, on March 8, 1963, Britain announced that it was not prepared to cede the Northern Frontier District to Somalia after all. Instead, the district would become a region of Kenya equipped with a degree of local autonomy analogous to the other six regions of Kenya. Unsatisfied with this solution, Somalia severed diplomatic relations with the UK on March 18, 1963. In 1963, Kenya became independent, initially with a federal form of territorial organization (Kromm 1967: 363). Based on this, we code a prior autonomy concession in 1963 and a a prior independence restriction. The latter is somewhat ambiguous because Britain does not appear to have formally committed to handing the territory to Somalia; however, they did establish a commission to establish the local population’s wishes, which came out very clearly in favor of cession to Somalia (88% local support), promised to make a decision in consultation with Somalia, and despite all this decided to keep the territory with Kenya without further consultation. [1963: autonomy concession, independence restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1964, ‘as part of an amendment to the Kenyan constitution, all regional powers were reduced and a central form of territorial authority imposed. This action as apparently designed to eliminate regionalism as found in the Somali-occupied province’ (Kromm, 1967:363). [1964: autonomy restriction]
* The Somali region remained ‘subject to emergency rule until 1991’ (Whittaker, 2015: 642). This does not constitute a restriction or concession according to the Coding Instructions since emergency rule was related to the conflict/violence.
* In 1989, “amidst the continued threat of secession, reprisal attacks and the displacement of numerous Somalis fleeing the civil war in Somalia, the Kenyan government introduced a form of screening for Kenyan Somalis before issuing them with identity cards” (Minority Rights Group, 2017). While a form of discrimination, this is not a restriction as defined here.
* It is worth nothing that, in 2014, ‘the Somali community was subjected to extensive profiling and victimization as the government attempted a crackdown on extremist militia groups’, moreover, this was ‘accompanied by anti-Somali statements by politicians and in the media’ (Minority Rights Group, 2017). In addition, Somalis currently face difficulties in securing citizenship as they are asked to meet unreasonable requirements; while some ‘hurdles have been removed, government officials still require Somalis to attend with both of their parents to apply for identity documents’ and face a ‘vetting committee’ (Minority Rights Group, 2017). The vetting has been in place since 1989 but existed without the force of law until 2015. Minority Rights Group (2017) notes that the Somali community remain at ‘risk of statelessness’; the Somali community in Kenya includes both descendants of the original cross border community as well as more recent migrants and refugees who have fled instability and violence in Somalia. As they continue, ‘large refugee flows, regular violent attacks and the fact that almost all Somalis are Muslim, in contrast to Kenya’s largely Christian population, have together contributed to both official and social discrimination against the Somali community’. In this context, there have been ‘increasing efforts to limit the recognition of citizenship of those of Somali origin’ (Minority Rights Group, 2017; see also: MAR, 2006). This does not, however, constitute a restriction according to the Coding Instructions and, moreover, as noted above, we consider the end date of the movement to be 2006.

**Regional autonomy**

* While Kromm (1963) describes the initial form of government as “federal”, the extent of autonomy is somewhat ambiguous. We do not code autonomy in 1963-1964; after that, autonomy was further reduced (see above).

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Somalis |
| *Scenario* | 1:1/no match |
| *EPR group(s)* | Somali |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 50108000 |

**Power access**

* We adopt EPR’s power access coding for 1963-2002 (discriminated). EPR does not code the Somalis in 2003-2006 due to political irrelevance, but the EPR coding notes point to a junior partner coding. According to the EPR Atlas, p. 1025: “the discrimination of the Somali under Kibaki seems to be of a more general character and not directly limiting the access to government positions of these groups. In fact, according to Throup (2003), the Somali actually obtained a cabinet member in the NARC cabinet of 2003.” [1963-2002: discriminated; 2003-2006: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We adopt EPR’s group size coding. [0.02]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes regional concentration, but EPR applies a lower bar. MAR also codes regional concentration while noting that Somalis make up the predominant share of the population of their regional base and that >75% of Somalis in Kenya live in their regional base. The information in Minahan (2002: 2065) also suggests a regional concentration code, though it mainly refers to Somali in Ethiopia. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* There are >100,000 Somalis in Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the U.S., among other countries (e.g., Minahan 2002: 2065). [kin in adjacent country]

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