# MYANMAR

## Kachin

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The earliest evidence for separatist activity we found is in 1947, when the Kachin demanded separate independence at the Panglong Conference. The British, however, were convinced that the small protectorates lacked the resources to become viable independent states and thus urged for the creation of a Burmese federation. After promises of autonomy and the guaranteed right of secession under British protection if they decided to leave Burma after ten years or more, the Kachins eventually agreed to be part of the federation. We code 1947 as the start date but only code the movement from 1948, when Burma was granted independence. We found no separatist violence in 1947 and thus code prior non-violent activity.
* Soon after independence in 1948 the Burmese government abrogated the autonomy agreement by incorporating large tracts of Kachin land into the neighboring provinces and creating a truncated Kachin state with only semiautonomous status. The Kachins rebelled. The rebellion was suppressed in 1950.
* According to MAR, “[b]y the mid-1950s, the Kachin were engaged in rebellion against the state”.
* In 1958 the Kachins formally notified the Burmese government of their intention to secede under the 1948 agreement. The principal Kachin rebel organization in the war that followed, the Kachin Independence organization, was formed in 1961.
* A ceasefire was signed in 1994. The agreement allowed the Kachins to retain some weapons and to control some areas (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53ff, 148; Hewitt et al. 2008; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 256ff, 2002: 870ff; MAR; UCDP/PRIO).
* Non-zero MAR protest scores in subsequent years indicate that the movement remained ongoing. In recent years, the Kachin Independence Army was revived.
* The ceasefire ended in June 2011 when violence between the government and the Kachin Independence Army resumed (see UCDP/PRIO; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). The movement is ongoing as of 2020 (Minahan 2016: 198; Roth 2015: 340f; UCDP/PRIO). [start date: 1947; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Upon Burmese independence, the Kachins demanded a separate state (Kachinland) (Seekins 2006). Dissatisfied with the discriminatory policies and the deteriorating of their autonomous rights, the Kachin leaders notified the Burmese government of their intention to secede in 1958. We therefore code an independence claim from the onset. This claim is also confirmed by the establishment of the Kachin Independence Organization and the Kachin Independence Army in 1961, who “launched an armed struggle for independence” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1948-1989: independence claim]
* When the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) disintegrated in 1989, the leadership of KIO changed its goal from independence to more self-determination (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). This moderation is confirmed by Minahan (2002), which makes us code a claim for autonomy as of 1990, following the first of January rule. There was no change in demands witnessed during the truce. When fighting flared up once again in 2011/2012, the official claim of the KIA and KIO continued to be autonomy within Burma’s federal state system and greater control of resources and territory (BBC 2013; Guardian 2013; Canadian Press 2018). [1990-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1947; end date: 1989]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kachins consists of the current Kachin state in Myanmar Roth (2015: 340). A map can be found in (2015: 328). We code this claim using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas Database (2019) for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The LVIOLSD coding for 1949-1950 follows UCDP/PRIO.
* The MAR quinquennial rebellion score exceeds is four from 1955-1959, suggesting “small-scale guerilla activity”. Yet, no other source reports violence above the threshold. We code NVIOLSD until and including 1960.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 1960 and 1995. This includes the Kachin, but also other groups such as the Karen and the Shan. Not all individual ethnic rebellions had the same start and end dates; and not all escalated to the HVIOLSD level. The SSW coding notes suggest that the Kachin war began in 1961 and, according to UCDP/PRIO reached the 1,000 battle-related deaths threshold in 1961-1971 and then again in 1984. In all other years, between 1961 and 1992 UCDP/PRIO codes a minor war (25-999 deaths). Both SSW and UCDP suggest that the violence had largely subsided by 1992. On this basis, we code HVIOLSD from 1961-1992. It should be noted that the HVIOLSD threshold may not have been met throughout this period, but we could not find sufficiently disaggregated casualty data.
* Clashes in 2010 took place, but fatalities do not reach the level of LVIOLSD (Lexis Nexis). Thus, the movement is coded NVIOLSD until 2010.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 2011 and 2015 (ethnic groups in Kachin, Shan, and Rakhine). UCDP/PRIO suggests a little more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in 2011-2013, suggesting that the HVIOLSD threshold was met for the Kachin. We code the end date as 2015 because cumulative deaths did not reach 500 in 2013-2015.
* The LVIOLSD coding for 2016-2019 follows UCDP/PRIO. UCDP/PRIO records just 10 battle-related deaths in 2020, but more than 100 in 2021, suggesting sustained fighting.
* [1948: NVIOLSD; 1949-1950: LVIOLSD; 1951-1960: NVIOLSD; 1961-1992: HVIOLSD; 1993-2010: NVIOLSD; 2011-2015: HVIOLSD; 2016-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Kachins, having moved from their ancestral land in the eastern Tibetan Plateau to the northern region of what would once become Burma in the eighth century, faced invasion by the Shan (thirteenth century), Burmans (seventeenth and eighteenth century) and the Chinese (1766).
* In the face of increasing pressure from ethnic Burman and Chinese, the Kachins welcomed the British as allies when they attached Burma to the British Empire on January 1, 1886. Similarly to other tribal peoples on the northern frontiers, the Kachins signed separate agreements with the British as the former were outside of the sphere of influence of Burman kings and thus not part of the Burmese kingdom. Under British rule, the Kachin territory was organized as a protectorate and granted significant autonomy under the rule of Kachin traditional chiefs (duwas), including an own army and administration (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International 1997).
* The Kachins fought on the side of the allies in the Second World War and resisted Japanese occupation of Burma in 1942. After the British regained the territory in 1945, the Burman political leadership initiated negotiations for independence from Britain. In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, the Kachins (among others) were thus promised political authority in their own autonomous national states (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958), an equal share in the country’s wealth (International Crisis Group 2003) and the right to preserve and protect their language, culture and religion, in exchange for voluntarily joining the federation (Williams and Sakhong 2005). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung, 1989: 170). In addition, several states were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period. The Kachins, however, were explicitly denied this right (Silverstein 1958). The Panglong Agreement is coded as a concession. [1947: autonomy concession]
  + Note: Panglong could be seen as a continuation of colonial policy, but is often described as a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Shortly after independence the Burmese government abrogated the autonomy agreement of the Panglong Agreement and “incorporated large tracts of autonomous Kachin land into neighboring provinces” (Minahan 2002: 873). A truncated Kachin state with only semiautonomous status and the majority of the Kachin population outside the state was created. [1948: autonomy restriction]
* According to UCDP, “in 1956, negotiations between the Burmese and Chinese governments led to part of Kachin state being transferred to China, something that led to anti-government demonstrations by the Kachin.” This does not constitute a restriction in the sense employed here, however.
* When the Kachin leaders in 1958 notified the government of their intention to secede, the Kachin territory was occupied and placed under direct government administration and Kachin leaders were arrested (Minahan 2002). [1958: autonomy restriction]
* Christian missionaries had converted many Kachins to Catholicism and Protestantism when they came into contact with the Kachins during British colonial rule. As a consequence, religion is the most significant cultural difference between Kachins and the majority Burmans. Whereas the former still adhere to Christian (predominantly Baptist) beliefs, the Burmans follow Theravada Buddhism (Minorities at Risk Project). As part of a “Burmanisation campaign”, Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961. This move was heavily resented by the Kachin, who perceived the move as an affront. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its military wing, the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), were created (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International 1997; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1961: cultural rights restriction]
  + We code an onset of separatist violence in 1961; the above narrative suggests the escalation followed the restriction and not the other way around.
* The semi-autonomous status as promised in the constitution was definitely abrogated after General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). This nullified whatever little autonomy had remained with the Kachins after 1958. [1962: autonomy restriction]
* The Kachins speak a dialect of the Bodo-Naga-Kachin group of the Sino-Tibetan languages. Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* Ceasefires were concluded with the New Democratic Army (Kachin) (NDA-K) in 1989, the Kachin Defence Army (KDA) in 1991 and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in 1994. The ceasefires resulted in the establishment of the Special Region 1 Northeast Kachin State, the Special Region 5 Northern Shan State and the Special Region 2, Kachin State. According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories”. According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were “quasi-states within the state”. Analogously to other cases, we code an autonomy concession in the year the respective ceasefires were signed.
  + Ceasefire concluded with the New Democratic Army (Kachin) (NDA-K) to form the Special Region 1 Northeast Kachin State [1989: autonomy concession]
  + Ceasefire concluded with the Kachin Defence Army (KDA) to form the Special Region 5 Northern Shan State [1991: autonomy concession]
  + Ceasefire concluded with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) to form the Special Region 2, Kachin State. The agreement granted the KIO “political autonomy over a Special Region in Kachin State” (Human Rights Watch 2012: 24) and “the right to create a local civil administration” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1994: autonomy concession]
* As mentioned above, the Kachins are predominantly Christians whereas the dominant Burmans follow Theravada Buddhism. According to the Minorities at Risk Project, the restrictions against Christians were tightened in the period from 1998 until 2000. In addition to the arrest of religious leaders and attempts to forcibly convert the Kachins to Buddhism, these restrictions concerned the attending of church services and the construction of new churches. [1998: cultural rights restriction]
* The 2008 constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). [2008: autonomy restriction]
* The National Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K) and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA), both splinter groups from the KIO, accepted the offer. However, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) rejected the decision. The government sent forces to the Kachin areas and imposed partial boycotts on trade with KIO-controlled areas (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* The KIO’s refusal to join the BGF created tense relations with the government. Fighting broke out in 2011 and escalated in 2012 (also and mainly in order to provide security for the Taping dam project). We code a restriction in 2009 due to the imposition of a partial blockade. We could not find information on when the blockade was ended; by the end of 2012 it had still been in place. [2009: autonomy restriction]
* In May 2013, the KIO and the Myanmar Government signed an agreement ‘to achieve de-escalation and cessation of hostilities’ (PA-X). However, this did not put an end to KIO activity and fighting with the government (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). As the agreement did not involve any autonomy concessions, we do not code it here.
* In 2013, The New Humanitarian reported that recent changes in Myanmar education system meant that matriculation exams taken in KIA-controlled areas’ schools were no longer recognised as official (Yang 2013). This is further confirmed by another source (Thai News Service 2017) stating that degrees obtained in Kachin, Karen and Mon rebels-controlled areas are not recognised by the government. This could be seen as a restriction, but we do not code as it is rather ambiguous.
* In 2015, the KIA refused to join the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (International Crisis Group 2015), an agreement between the government of Myanmar and the representatives of various insurgent groups. The KIA claimed that the ceasefire was biased against minority ethnic groups and the group decided to instead create the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNNC) with six other organisations (Combs 2018). The Ceasefire Agreement was violated by the Tatmadaw (armed forces) in the 2021 coup d’état (see below). We could not find any evidence for concessions as defined here in this context.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). In Kachin, the KIA refused to recognise the new military government and clashes continued between KIA groups and the regime armed forces (Kachin News Group 2021). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* Despite the quick abrogation of the autonomy concessions of the Panglong Agreement, the Kachins still enjoyed some autonomy in the early years of Burmese independence. This is also confirmed by EPR. Following the coding of EPR, we thus code regional autonomy from 1948 until autonomy was canceled and the Kachin territory was occupied and placed under direct government administration in 1958. [1948-1958: regional autonomy]
* The period of de facto independence (see below) is also coded as regional autonomy. [1962-1994: regional autonomy]
* Via cease-fires in 1989, 1991, and 1994, the Burmese government recognized the Kachins’ status, implying that the Kachins gained formally recognized autonomy.
* In 2009, the Myanmar government moved to implement the BGF program discussed above, which effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). However, a major Kachin faction, the KIO, refused to integrate its forces. We code this as de-facto independence, which implies regional autonomy. [1995-2011: regional autonomy]
* In 2011, the central government broke the cease-fire and entered the KIO-controlled territory; thus the autonomous status was ended. The situation has remained unchanged (Associated Press International 2021). [2012-2020: no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* According to Florea (2014) Kachin State (aside from the major towns) became de facto independent in 1961, when the KIA ousted government forces. As a consequence, large parts of Kachinland was “only under nominal government control throughout the 1970s” (Minahan 2002: 873). In the 1980s the KIA even extended the area under its control (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000) and when renewed government offensives in 1989 and 1991 were defeated, it claimed an area larger than the official Kachin state (“Greater Kachinland”). According to Human Rights Watch (2012) and the International Crisis Group (2003), the KIA maintained a civilian administration with departments of health, education, justice, agriculture, women’s affairs and development. Via cease-fires in 1989, 1991, and 1994, the Burmese government recognized the Kachins’ status, implying that the Kachins gained formally recognized autonomy. Thus we end the de-facto independence code in 1994. [1962-1994: de-facto independence]
  + Note: This coding departs from both EPR and Florea, who both continue to code de facto independence.
* We again code de facto independence after the KIO’s refusal to integrate its forces into the Burmese army under the BGF program (which the government moved to implement in 2009). In 2011, the central government broke the cease-fire and entered the KIO-controlled territory; thus the autonomous status was ended. [2010-2011: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. [1948: host change (new]
* According to UCDP, “In 1956, negotiations between the Burmese and Chinese governments led to part of Kachin state being transferred into Chinese territory.” [1956: host change (old)]
* [1958: revocation of regional autonomy]
* [1961: erection of de facto state]
* [1994: abolishment of de facto state; establishment of regional autonomy]
* [2009: revocation of regional autonomy, establishment of de-facto independence]
* [2011: end of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kachin |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kachins |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77505000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1948-1958: junior partner; 1959-1962: discriminated; 1963-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.015]

**Regional concentration**

* Note: group size estimates vary considerably between different sources. For spatial concentration, we draw on Minahan (2002), the most detailed source we could find. Yet it has to be noted that Minahan’s group size estimates is rather on the higher end, and is in particular considerably higher if compared to the EPR-based estimate that we use.
  + According to Minahan (2002: 876), the Kachins are concentrated in Kachin state in northern Myanmar, where they make up 88% of the local population. This amounts to 1.164 million Kachins, which is just over 50% of all Kachins in Myanmar (2.315 million). This is in line with MAR, which codes the Kachins as “concentrated in one region” with 50-75% living in their regional base (Kachin State). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes ethnic kin in India (Scheduled Castes & Tribes) and China (Jingpo). This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 870) who mentions 300,000 Kachins in China and 135,000 in India. China and India are also the two countries mentioned by MAR as the countries with the largest kin groups. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Karen

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first Karen cultural organization, the Karen National Organization (KNA) was founded in 1881; it was the forerunner of the later separatist movement (Minahan 2002: 942). The first formal call for self-determination came in 1928 (UNHCR; Thawnghmung 2008: 5), thus the start date.
* When the Japanese occupied Burma during the Second World War, the Karen, who provided over half of the recruits to the British colonial army, fought alongside the British in the hope that their allegiance would lead to the British granting broad autonomy or independence. This demand resurfaced in 1946, when a Karen delegation travelled to London to discuss the promised independence. Britain rejected the Karen aspirations and group areas were incorporated into Burma when independence was achieved in 1948.
* By Burmese independence, the KNA had joined forces with other Karen nationalist organizations to form the Karen National Union (KNU), Burma’s oldest rebel group which has been involved in separatist armed conflict with the government ever since independence (UCDP).
* The movement is ongoing as of 2020 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53ff, 150f; Hewitt et al. 2008; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996: 289ff, 2002: 940ff, 2016: 206f; MAR; Roth 2015: 340; Thawnghmung 2008; UNHCR 2014; UCDP/PRIO). [start date: 1928; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed branch, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), demanded the establishment of an independent Karen state. This is confirmed by the Minorities at Risk Project, Minority Rights Group International, Hewitt and Cheetham (2000) and Rajah (2008), who states that the aim of the KNU was the establishment of an independent Karen state called Kawthoolei or “The Land of Lilies.” Further evidence is provided by a Karen delegation which was sent to Britain and requested separate independence and a letter by KNU chairman Ba U Gyi to the Burmese government right after independence which also demanded the formation of an independent Karen state (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1948-1988: independence claim]
* According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the KNU changed its demands from independence to autonomy. This is confirmed by other sources, with IRIN (2012) suggesting that KNU is seeking a “genuine federal system” (IRIN 2012). Regarding the timing of the switch, we rely on information by the Minority Rights Group International, which states that after 1988 the KNU entered into a coalition with the National League for Democracy, whose goal was the creation of a federal, democratic state. Following the first of January rule, we code autonomy as the dominant claim from 1989 onwards. As of 2021, the dominant claim has remained autonomy (Landis 2021). [1989-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There were claims for independence made starting in 1928 (UNHCR; Thawnghmung 2008: 5). The KNU shifted to its claim to autonomy in the late 1980s. While KNU remains the most important organization, the movement has splintered since, with new organizations emerging such as Gods Army and Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army. However, the movement splintered as a result of religious factionalism and not as a result of disagreement over the movement’s goal in terms of territorial self-determination (UCDP). [start date: 1928; end date: 1988]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Karen consists of the current Kayin state in Myanmar (Roth 2015: 340). A map can be found in Roth (2015: 328). We code this claim using data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas Database (2019) for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The KNU declared the independence of the Republic of Kawthoolei on June 14, 1949 (Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1949: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD coding for 1948-1951 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
  + Marshall & Gurr (2003) indicate separatist violence from 1945 onwards. They do not explain why; it could be because of Karen participation in WWII on the British side (see above). UCDP/PRIO does not code an armed (extra-state) conflict involving the Karen before 1948; in fact, UCDP/PRIO pegs the onset of the rebellion to 1949 (while noting communal violence emerging on Christmas 1948). The UCDP/PRIO coding notes do not make mention of significant violence pre-independence except during WWII, and nor do SSW’s. We could not find any indications in other sources, either. This suggests the movement was nonviolent in the lead-up to Myanmar’s independence in 1948.
* The LVIOLSD code for 1952-1970 follows UCDP/PRIO, which codes a minor war in all years.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 1960 and 1995. This includes the Karen, but also other groups such as the Kachin and the Shan. Not all individual ethnic rebellions had the same start and end dates; and not all escalated to the HVIOLSD level. According to UCDP, there were more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in 1971, 1983-1984, 1989, and 1992. In other years, UCDP codes a minor war (25-999 deaths). The conflict de-escalated markedly after 1992 with less than 200 deaths between 1993 and 1995, when a cease-fire was signed. Based on this, we code HVIOLSD from 1971-1995. We note that the exact HVIOLSD dates are ambiguous as we could not find sufficiently disaggregated casualty data.
* UCDP/PRIO suggests that low-level violent conflict continued in most years until 2013. According to them, the 25 deaths threshold was not met in only three years: 1996, 1999, and 2012. In 1996, UCDP/PRIO does not record a single death, suggesting conflict termination. However, qualitative evidence suggests that while in 1995 one rebel faction had concluded a ceasefire agreement (DKBA), another continued its insurgency (South 2011). Overall, we judged that the evidence is too thin to code a de-escalation and subsequent re-escalation in 1996, though this decision is ambiguous.
* In 1999, UCDP/PRIO reports 14 deaths; we code ongoing LVIOLSD due to sustained fighting.
* In 2012, UCDP/PRIO records only 4 deaths. The coding notes explain that major strides were made toward a ceasefire in late 2011 and 2012, and that both major rebel groups (DKBA and KNU) had signed ceasefire agreements, leading to a pause in fighting which lasted until April 2013. According to UCDP: “During late 2011 and early 2012 major advances were made towards ending the Karen conflict. On 6 November 2011 the DKBA 5 (Kloh Htoo Baw, Brigade 5) signed a ceasefire agreement with the government that among other things consisted of declaring Kayin State's inclusion in the Union of Myanmar, economic development of the Sukali region, agreement of all parties to combat drug trafficking and to continue discussions to establish a lasting peace. In early 2012 the KNU followed suit by agreeing to a ceasefire with the government on 12 January. The KNU followed up on its ceasefire agreement by holding high level talks with the government and agreeing to establish set locations for garrisoning troops, a transparent ceasefire process as well as the establishment of liaison offices in border regions. As a result of the ceasefire agreement the Karen conflict did not reach 25 battle-related deaths in 2012.” On that basis, 2012 is coded NVIOLSD.
* There were renewed clashes in 2013-2015. According to UCDP, the 25 deaths threshold was met in 2013, with 15 deaths in 2014 and 21 in 2015. We found no reports for violence above the threshold in 2016-2020. In 2021, UCDP counts 78 battle-related deaths, but this is after our timeframe. On that basis, we code 2012 and 2014-2020 as NVIOLSD. 1995-2011 and 2013 are coded with LVIOLSD. [1948-1951: HVIOLSD (prior LVIOLSD); 1952-1970: LVIOLSD; 1971-1995: HVIOLSD; 1996-2011: LVIOLSD; 2012: NVIOLSD; 2013-2015: LVIOLSD; 2016-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Immigrated (supposedly) from Central Asia, the Karens established an early federation of tribes (Thowanabonmi) that flourished until invading Burmans destroyed it in 1044, making the Karens retreat into the highlands. Passionately independent tribes, they fought off the Mongols in the thirteenth century and the Burmans in the sixteenth and seventeenth century (Minahan 2002). Outside pressure, however, continued and for a large part of their history, the Karens were subjugated to the rule of Mon, Shan or Burman kingdoms, although some Karen groups managed to maintain some sort of autonomous existence that lasted until the early nineteenth century (MRG).
* The Burman domination of the Karen was brought to an end by the British colonial period. Colonial power of the British ameliorated the situation for the Karens and was welcomed in light of the historically hostile Karen-Burman relations. Due to the British preference for hill peoples and the missionary education, Christian Karens were favored by the colonial authorities and hence became overrepresented in the colonial army and administration (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minorities at Risk Project). The Karen hills became part of "Burma Proper" after the third Anglo-Burman war in 1885-1886. However, the British colonial authorities allowed the existence of local rulers, making the Karen tribes mostly self-governing during the colonial period (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).
* The Karens remained allied to the British in the Second World War and fought the Japanese and their allies, whereas the parts of the Burmese nationalist movement supported the Japanese. When the Japanese occupied Burma during the Second World War, the Japanese-sponsored Burma Independence Army (BIA) brutally executed many Karens (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Thawnghmung 2008).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung, 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State and the Kayah State were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein 1958).
* The Karens, who sought to become independent and who hoped they would be rewarded for their loyalty to the British, were only present as observers at the Panglong Conference and were excluded from these provisions. Nevertheless, under strong British pressure, a deal was finally reached that promised the Karens far-reaching autonomy within Burma, according to Minahan (2002: 942). [1947: autonomy concession]
* The 1947 constitution of Burma included a Karen Affairs Council, headed by a Minister for Karen affairs, which came into effect when Burma gained independence. The council was created to represent Karen (mainly educational and cultural) interests during the transitional period and to aid and advise the Union Government on matters relating to the Karen (Thawnghmung 2008). [1947: cultural rights concession]
  + Minahan also suggests that the Karens were given the right to secession. Indeed, following the constitution each state had the right to secession. But the detailed account Silverstein (1958) suggests that the right to secession was theoretical for all but the Shan and Kayah states.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The above-mentioned autonomy agreement was short-lived. According to Minahan (2002: 942), the Burmese leaders succeeding Aung San (who had been murdered in July 1947) refused to grant the Karens the promised autonomy. Thus, the autonomy the Karen had enjoyed under the British came to an end with Myanmar’s independence in January 1948. Violence emerged later in the year (see under Separatist armed conflict). [1948: autonomy restriction]
* In 1951, the government promoted legislation to create a Karen state (Thawnghmung 2008: 11). Powers were transferred in 1954 (Silverstein 1958: 43). [1951: autonomy concession]
  + Note: Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code the end of the 1948-1951 civil war in July 1951. The corresponding constitutional amendment was not passed until November 1951 (<http://www.asianlii.org/mm/legis/code/caa1951268.pdf>). Nevertheless, it seems likely that the promise of autonomy had something to do with the decrease in the intensity of fighting (low-intensity fighting continued after 1951). Hence, this concession can be seen as occurring before the end of the full-scale civil war (1951).
* In 1952, additional territory was added to the Karen state (Thawnghmung 2008: 11). The resulting Karen state corresponded roughly to the territory controlled by the KNU at the time. It did not include the demanded seaport and comprised only a minority of the Karen population. The rest of the Karens lived dispersed around Yangon, Irrawaddy and Tenasserim Regions, eastern Bago Region and the Mon State (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; South 2011). Needless to say, the Karen leaders “were not impressed” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Nevertheless, this constitutes a concession as defined in the codebook. [1952: autonomy concession]
* The Karen Affairs Council was abolished in 1956. U Nu expected the Karens to surrender their privileges in return for their own state (Bertrand and Laliberté 2010). [1956: cultural rights restriction]
* The Karens do not share a common religion, language or culture (Cheesman 2002). In terms of religious belief, it is estimated that around 25-30% are Christian, 5-10% animist and 60-70% Buddhist (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International; Thawnghmung 2008). While this could be considered a concession to the majority of the Karens, it constitutes a very harsh restriction for a significant minority of the Karens; thus we code a restriction. [1961: cultural rights restriction]
* State autonomy was abrogated after General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). [1962: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: Other groups, such as the Shan, had lost autonomy already in the late 1950s, but we found no similar account for the Karen. Thus we use the 1962 coup as the marker. Would profit from more research.
* Regarding language, the situation is slightly different. The Karen do not share a common language, but, as opposed to the religious issue, all Karen dialects differ significantly from the Burmese language. The Karen language actually refers to various related but mutually unintelligible dialects that are believed to belong to the Tibeto-Burman group of the Sino-Tibetan language family, but are also heavily influenced by the Thai and Austro-Asiatic languages (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* There were several ceasefires with Karen rebel organizations. A KNU breakaway faction formed the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) in December 1994. Other KNU breakaway factions included the Karen Peace Force (KPF, established 1997), the ‘P’doh Aung San Group’ (formed 1998), the KNU-KNLA Peace Council (2007), a small ceasefire group in Toungoo District (1998), and various local militias. We only consider concessions towards the KNU and the DKBA, since according to South (2011), the KNU (3000+) and the DKBA (3000-4000) have powerful armed forces whereas all other factions are relatively insignificant and only have a few dozens and a maximum of 300 soldiers (and were not granted concessions anyway).
  + The DKBA signed a ceasefire with the government in early 1995. As a consequence, the DKBA units enjoyed considerable operational autonomy from 1995 until 2009 (South 2011). It remains unclear to what extent the DKBA really enjoyed support by the Karen population. According to South (2011), schools in the DKBA controlled areas, for example, do not teach the Karen language but use the government curriculum. We thus code an autonomy concession in 1995, but no regional autonomy for the Karen as a whole. Note that the KNU continued its insurgency (although overall intensity of the conflict decreased). [1995: autonomy concession]
* As mentioned above, around 25%-30% of the Karens are Christians, whereas the dominant Burmans follow Theravada Buddhism. According to the Minorities at Risk Project, the restrictions against Christians were tightened in the period from 1998 until 2000. In addition to the arrest of religious leaders and attempts to forcibly convert the Karens to Buddhism, these restrictions concerned the attending of church services and the construction of new churches. [1998: cultural rights restriction]
* The 2008 constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. In 2010, most DKBA leaders accepted the transformation into a Border Guard Force (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The BGF program clearly decreased the Karens’ autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). [2008: autonomy restriction]
* The KNU negotiated with the government from 1995-1997 with only little progress. With the emergence of the DKBA, fighting continued and often occurred in the form of a non-state conflict between KNU and DKBA as the latter received arms from the government. In January 2012, the KNU finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government. The two parties also signed a 15-point plan that included the commitment to work on the establishment of liaison offices, the resettlement of IDPs, landmine removal and development aid (Financial Times 2012). Since the level of autonomy is not affected, we do not code this event.
* In October 2015, the KNU and the DKBA signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (UCDP), an agreement between the government of Myanmar and the representatives of various insurgent groups. While this agreement decreased violence in the Karen state, human rights abuses and land confiscation by armed groups continued (Minority Rights Group). The Ceasefire Agreement was violated in 2018 after the government troops entered the KNU controlled territory to build a road connecting two government military bases (Sandford 2018). The road building was then postponed due to a violent backlash (Nyein 2018). Overall, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement cannot be seen as a meaningful concession.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). The territories claimed by the KNU saw a significant increase in violence (UCDP). The KNU was one of the most active groups opposing the coup with armed resistance and providing support for protesters (Nachemson 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* We code the period of de-facto independence (see below) also as regional autonomy. [1950-1954, 1963-1995: regional autonomy]
* In 1951, the autonomy promised under the 1947 constitution was brought underway with enabling legislation. Powers were transferred in 1954 (Silverstein 1958: 43). In 1962, state autonomy was fully abolished and given that the KNU retained significant territory. [1955-1962: regional autonomy]
  + Note: Other groups, such as the Shan, had lost autonomy already in the late 1950s, but we found no similar account for the Karen. Thus we use the 1962 coup as the marker. Would profit from more research.
* We do not code autonomy after the 1995 cease-fire because it remains unclear to what extent the DKBA really enjoyed support by the Karen population and can be considered to represent the Karen interests. According to South (2011), schools in the DKBA controlled areas, for example, do not teach the Karen language but use the government curriculum.

**De facto independence**

* Florea (2014) codes the Karen state as de facto independent from 1949 and throughout the movement’s activity. The existence of a de facto state is confirmed by several sources: By controlling parts of the border trade between Thailand and Burma, the Karens “effectively maintained their own political and economic systems in parts of Karen state” (Minorities at Risk Project). The existence of a de-facto state is also confirmed by Rajah (2008) and Minahan (2002).
  + However, there is some disagreement as to the end of the de facto period.
    - Whereas Florea (2014) assumes the de facto Karen state to be active as of today (2014), the Minorities at Risk Project and Minahan (2002) are more skeptical and would rather advocate an end in the mid-1990s (Minorities at Risk Project) with the fall of the separatists’ capital in 1995 (Minahan 2002). This is confirmed by Oh (2013: 16), who states that the KNU had de facto sovereignty over the eastern borderlands until the mid-1990s, but this has “since been eroded by the (in some cases literal) inroads that the state has made into KNU territory, and the organization’s fragmentation into various other Karen armed groups”. The most informative source in this regard is South (2010), who states that the KNU lost control over most of its “liberated zones” in the mid-1990s with a dramatic fall in revenues, the emergence of the DKBA and increased pressure from government forces. Following these assessments, we code an end to de facto independence in 1995.
  + In addition, we code an interruption of de-facto independence in the 1950s and early 1960s, when the Karen state was recognized as an autonomous unit.
* [1950-1954, 1963-1995: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change and the end of the autonomy the Karen had enjoyed under the British (see above). [1948: host change (new); end of regional autonomy]
* [1949: erection of de facto state]
* In 1951, the autonomy promised under the 1947 constitution was brought underway with enabling legislation. Powers were transferred in 1954 (Silverstein 1958: 43). [1954: establishment of regional autonomy, revocation of de facto independence]
* In 1962, state autonomy was fully abolished and given that the KNU retained significant territory, we again code de-facto independence. [1962: revocation of regional autonomy, establishment of de facto state]
  + Note: Other groups, such as the Shan, had lost autonomy already in the late 1950s, but we found no similar account for the Karen. Thus, we use the 1962 coup as the marker. Would profit from more research.
* [1995: abolishment of de facto state]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Karen |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kayin (Karens) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77506000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-exclusion = powerless. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.07]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR and MAR both code the Karens as concentrated, but they apply lower thresholds.
* According to Minahan (2002: 940), the Karens are concentrated in southern Myanmar. In the state of Kayin (Karen state), the Karen make up 78% of the local population. This amounts to 1.191 million Karens (in 2002), which is less than 50% of all Karens in Myanmar (approx. 3.5 million) in that same year. The Karen also have settlements in areas adjoining the Karen state. However, these are relatively small compared to the Karen settlements that are apart from the Karen state. Thus, even if the Karen population in adjacent areas was added to the 1.191 million Karens in Karen state, we would most likely not get to 50% of the approx. 3.5 million Karens in Myanmar. We thus code the Karens as not concentrated. Further evidence in this direction comes from GeoEPR, which codes many Karen settlement polygons outside the Karen State. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code ethnic kin. Minahan (2002: 940), however, mentions several hundred thousands Karens in Thailand. This number has increased after the 2021 coup, after which it has been estimated that at least 10,000 Karens fled to Thailand due to violence in the state (Reed 2022). This is also in line with MAR, which also codes the Karens in Thailand as kin. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Karenni

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

* The Karenni are also referred to as Kayah or Red Karens.

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to UCDP, “Karenni leaders rejected involvement in the post-War [WWII] discussions about the transfer of power to independent Burma as they did not consider them as being part of the British colony. Instead, they focused on setting up a Karenni administrative structure and the United Kar administrative structure and the United Karenni Independent State Council (UKISC) was set up in 1946 and work on a Karenni draft constitution was initiated.” Based on this, 1946 is indicated as the start date. Burma became independent in 1948, thus we include the movement from 1948.
* In November 1947, two months before Burmese independence, Saw Maw Reh formed the Karenni National Organization (KNO) to support the UKISC politically and pursue the issue of Karenni independence (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* In 1957 the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) was established by nationalists seeking to unify the Karenni cause and has since become a main proponent for Karenni rights and self-determination (Kramer et al. 2018: 16).
* The movement was ongoing as of 2020 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53ff; Hewitt et al. 2008; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996: 292ff, 2002: 934ff, 2016: 207f; Roth 2015: 340; UCDP/PRIO). [start date: 1946; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* There does not seem to be any disagreement on the dominant Karenni claim in the early years of activity. In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Karenni National Organization (KNO) and the United Karenni Independent State Council (UKIS) expressed their wish for separate independence (Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). This claim is confirmed by the formation of the United Karenni States Independence Army (UKSIA) and information provided by the Minority Rights Group International. Further evidence for a claim for independence is provided by the fact that, in 1975, the Karennis joined the Federal National Democratic Front (FNDF) whose aim was the establishment of a federation of independent states. [1948-2005: independence claim]
* The KNPP split in 1977 over diverging views regarding co-operation with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) or the anti-communist Karen National Union (KNU). There is no information on the dominant claim of the different organizations (KNPLF, KNLP) that split from the KNPP. The fact that the KNPLF joined the Border Guard Force in 2009 suggests a moderation of their claim. There is also some evidence (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia) that the KNPP has replaced its demand for independence with a demand for increased autonomy in 2005. Thus, we code autonomy as the dominant claim from 2006 onwards (following the first of January rule). [2006-2014: autonomy claim]
* The KNPP’s dominant claim shifted to independence in 2014. While the KNPP historically distinguished itself from other groups for its demands for ethnic autonomy, a UNHRC (2014) report claims that the party had ‘harmonized its political rhetoric with the positions and objectives’ of other non-state actors. This is confirmed by several sources (APBI 2014; Minahan 2016: 208; Thai News Service 2022). [2015-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* Independence is a dominant claim through most of the SDM timeframe. However, as noted, the KNPP’s claim shifted to autonomy in 2006-2014. In addition to the sources noted above, this is confirmed by Sharma (2014: 162). As noted above, we could not find information on the claim made by other groups, so we code based on the claim of the KNPP. [start date 1: 1946; end date 1: 2005; start date 2: 2014; end date 2: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Karenni consists of the current Kayah state in Myanmar (Roth 2015: 340). A map can be found in Roth (2015: 328). We code this claim using data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas Database (2019) for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict over Karenni in the following years: 1957, 1987, 1992, 1996, and 2005.
  + In stark contrast to this, Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) ­– suggest ongoing armed conflict from 1945-2006, the last year they cover.
  + Even if one considers that those sources code ongoing conflict if conflict recurs within five year and do not use a 25 deaths threshold, the discrepancy is significant. We investigated this case further using qualitative sources.
  + Marshall & Gurr (2003) suggest that the Karenni began in 1945. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the Karenni fought alongside the British in WWII, which could explain the decision. We found no evidence for substantial separatist violence between 1946 and 1947.
  + After Burma’s independence the situation gets murky. Several sources suggest that Karenni has been the site of a decades-long civil war. For example, Amnesty International (1999) suggests that at the time of writing, the Kachin’s had been engaged in civil war for 50 years. Similarly, Kramer et al. (2018) suggest that the Karenni have been involved in wars over autonomy ever since Burma’s independence, more or less without interruption. Roth (2015: 341) suggests that the Karenni have been fighting an insurgency since 1948, and “especially from the 1970s”. However, casualty estimates specific to the Karenni are extremely hard to get by, and several sources including Kramer et al. (2018) suggest that violence in relation to the Karenni has often been of lower intensity when compared with their kin group, the Karen.
  + Minahan (2002: 936f) points to a Karenni insurgency which started after Burma’s independence in 1948 and was crushed in 1950. According to Kramer et al. (2018: 15f), hundreds of Karennis joined the rebels and took up arms in the second half of 1948. No casualty estimates are provided, however. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia concur: “After the assassination of the UKISC leader U Bee Tu Re in 1948, the KNO established an armed wing, the United Karenni States Independence Army (UKSIA), and began gathering arms and recruits. Saw Maw Reh was captured by the government and imprisoned in February 1949 and the leadership of UKSIA passed to Saw Shwe, the hereditary sawbwa of the Karenni state of Kyobogyi. As the Karen rebellion at the time was gaining strength, he then allied the Karenni forces with those of the Karen National Union (KNUP).” Despite this account, UCDP/PRIO does not code an insurgency in 1948-1950. It is not clear why; it is possible that they are combining it with the Karen insurgency during those years due to the alliance, but this is not clear. Since we could not find any better casualty estimates, either, we code NVIOLSD.
  + Kramer et al. (2018) point to a de-escalation in 1950s, though large-scale unrest continued. UCDP/PRIO codes violence above the threshold in 1957. Minahan (2002: 937) suggests that the Karenni next rose in rebellion in 1959; however, we could not find casualty estimates.
  + Minahan suggests that the Karenni rebels allied themselves to Karen, Mon, and Burmese communists, and waged war with them until 1975. That year, the Karennis joined the Karennis joined the multi-ethnic Federal National Democratic Front (FNDF) whose aim was the establishment of a federation of independent states, and was also engaged in violence.
  + UCDP/PRIO next codes violence in 1987, 1992, 1996, and 2005; Minahan (2002: 937f) suggest that there was an escalation in 1996 because of a forced relocation program in which large numbers of Karenni were forcibly removed from where they lived. Minahan would suggest there was violence also in 1994, but again, we could not find casualty estimates.
  + UCDP/PRIO does record significant numbers of deaths in some other years including, most notably, 41 deaths in 2001-2002 and 22 deaths in 2004. Yet, in many cases UCDP/PRIO also records no or very few deaths.
* UCDP/PRIO reports 62 casualties in 2021, but this is beyond the timeframe considered.
* Overall, it seems likely that there was violence above the threshold in several of the years not flagged by UCDP/PRIO, but the evidence to code ongoing LVIOLSD is too thin, with the possible exception of 1996-2005. [1948-1956: NVIOLSD; 1957: LVIOLSD; 1958-1986: NVIOLSD; 1987: LVIOLSD; 1988-1991: NVIOLSD; 1992: LVIOLSD; 1993-1995: NVIOLSD; 1996: LVIOLSD; 1997-2004: NVIOLSD; 2005: LVIOLSD; 2006-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Having migrated into the mountainous Shan plateau from Central Asia over southwestern China, the Karenni erected independent states that were ruled by princes/local chiefs. After the Burmans had conquered the lowlands in the eleventh century, the Karenni came under Shan rule in the thirteenth century, until the latter were defeated by the Burmans in 1586. The five Karenni principalities (later reduced to three), however, managed to maintain their independence against the invading Burmans and – in the eighteenth century – against a Thai incursion (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).
* British penetration of the Karenni territory started after the First Anglo-Burman War in 1826 and intensified after the British annexation of lowland Burma in 1852. Having established direct treaty relations, the British in 1875 “recognized Karenni independence under British protection and provided for full independence should the protectorate agreement be terminated” and in 1881, the Karenni became officially part of the British Empire (Minahan 2002: 936). The Karenni principalities were administered as part of the Frontier Area and distinctly from ‘Burma proper’ (Minority Rights Group International). Due to the British preference for hill peoples and the missionary education, many Karenni were recruited for the colonial army and administration.
* The Karenni remained allied to the British in the Second World War and fought the Japanese and their allies, after the Japanese occupation as guerilla fighters (Minahan 2002).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung, 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State and the Kayah states were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein, 1958).
* The Karenni, who expected adherence to the terms of the 1875 agreement and a separate independence in return for support against the Japanese, were treated differently compared to many other minorities due to their semi-independent status outside of Ministerial Burma. Nevertheless, incorporation into the independent Burma was done without the consent of the Karenni, who did not participate (at least not officially) in the conference nor agree to the final document. Instead, they worked on their own institutions, set up a Karenni administrative structure and the United Karenni Independent State Council (UKISC). Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Karenni were nonetheless incorporated into the Union of Burma. We code an independence concession due to the granting of the right to secession after a 10-year trial period and at the same time also code an autonomy concession given the granting of an own state with far-reaching autonomy within Burma. [1947: autonomy concession, independence concession]
  + Note: Panglong could be seen as a continuation of colonial policy, but is often described as a concession.
* The Karenni leadership refused to cooperate with the new central authority and large-scale protests led to the government sending its military police force to occupy Karenni state in November 1947. The Karenni National Organization (KNO) was formed the same month (Cultural Survival; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). This effectively meant that the Karenni’s autonomy was revoked. [1947: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Karenni insurgency was crushed in 1950 and in 1952 the Karenni state was renamed Kayah state and granted semi-autonomous status. This move supposedly intended to divide the Karenni from the rest of the Karen people, who were both fighting for independence (Minahan 2002). [1952: autonomy concession]
* The newly established Federal Union was federal in name but unitary in practice. The spirit of Panglong and the federal principles were reversed in the years following independence. In 1959, the semi-autonomous status of the Kayah State was withdrawn as the government “deposed the Karenni princes and forced them to renounce their rights and privileges” (Minahan 2002: 937). At the same time, the right to secede was de-facto abolished. We thus also code an independence restriction due to the fact that the right of independence granted in 1947 was renounced. [1959: autonomy restriction, independence restriction]
* As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961. Most Karennis are Christians (see below). [1961: cultural rights restriction]
  + Missionary activities in the late nineteenth century had converted many Karennis to Christianity. According to the Minority Rights Group International, “it is generally thought that most Karennis are Christians”, despite a substantial percentage of a Buddhist population. Minahan (2002) estimates 65% to be Christian. There is no reliable source on the percentage of Buddhists among the Karennis, but since there is also a significant number of animists, we conclude that Buddhists are a clear minority among the Karenni.
* The Karenni’s semi-autonomous status was definitely abrogated after General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). This nullified whatever little autonomy had remained with the Karennis after 1959. [1962: autonomy restriction]
* The Karenni language is a Karen language and part of the Sgaw-Bghai group of Sino-Tibetan languages. Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* Ceasefires were concluded with the Karenni State Nationalities Peoples' Liberation Front (KNPLF; a group that split from the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) in 1977), in May 1994 and with the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) in July 1994. The ceasefire resulted in the establishment of the Special Region 2, Kayah (Karenni) State and the Special Region 3, Kayah (Karenni) State (Minahan 20002; Minority Rights Group International; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories”. According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were “quasi-states within the state”. Analogously to other groups, we code an autonomy concession in the year the ceasefire was signed. Note that the ceasefires did not include all armed Karenni groups as fighting continued. [1994: autonomy concession]
* A ceasefire with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) was announced in March 1995. However, the agreement has subsequently broken down due to disagreement about logging and mining concessions and after troops launched an offensive in Karenni state in 1996 (Callahan 2007; Minority Rights Group International; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). A new ceasefire was reached in March 2012 (see below). Judging by the information provided by the Myanmar Peace Monitor, there were no autonomy concessions. Both events are thus not coded.
* During the first half of 1996, the tatmadaw, or Myanmar armed forces, began a massive relocation program of civilians as part of its counter-insurgency strategy in the Kayah (Karenni) State, eastern Myanmar. 20,000- 30,000 members of the Karenni ethnic minority were forced from their home villages into designated sites, where there was inadequate food, water, medical care, and sanitation facilities necessary for survival (Amnesty International 1999; Minahan 2002: 938). [1996: autonomy restriction]
  + We code an onset of separatist violence in 1996. Minahan (2002: 937f) suggests that the restriction occurred before the onset of violence.
* As mentioned above, the Karenni are predominantly Christians (around 65%) whereas the dominant Burmans follow Theravada Buddhism. According to the Minorities at Risk Project, the restrictions against Christians were tightened in the period from 1998 until 2000. In addition to the arrest of religious leaders and attempts to forcibly convert the Karenni to Buddhism, these restrictions concerned the attending of church services and the construction of new churches. [1998: cultural rights restriction]
* The 2008 constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). In December 2009, the KNPLF was transformed into a Border Guard Force (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). BNI (2009) states that more troops would be deployed to the territory and locals will be used as forced labour. [2008: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012, the KNPP signed a three-point ceasefire agreement with the government and joined the peace process with the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) (Myanmar Peace Monitor). However, according to the Minority Rights Group, despite the agreement, the military increasingly confiscated land from villagers and mining licences in conflict areas continued to being provided. Therefore, we note the agreement but we do not code any concession resulting from it.
* In 2015, the KNPP refused to join the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (Minority Rights Group), an agreement between the government of Myanmar and the representatives of various insurgent groups. The party maintained that all ethnic groups should be included in the agreement (Myanmar Peace Monitor). We could not find any evidence for concessions as defined here in this context.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). The territories controlled by the KNPP saw a significant increase in violence (UCDP; Al Jazeera 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* Note: The autonomy conferred via the Panglong Agreement was effectively revoked in late 1947 (see above), thus no regional autonomy in the initial years. In 1952 the Karenni again received some autonomy, which was more limited but based on Minahan (2002) appears sufficient to warrant an autonomy code. In 1959, much of the Karenni’s autonomy was revoked, thus the end of regional autonomy. [1953-1959: regional autonomy]
* The Karenni (or with the KNLP and the KNPLF at least two organizations that represented the Karenni) enjoyed some degree of self-government in the Special Region 2, Kayah (Karenni) State and the Special Region 3, Kayah (Karenni) State. It remains debatable in how far these arrangements really entailed genuine regional autonomy and to what extent the Karenni people are covered by the two regions. EPR, for example, does not code the Karenni regionally autonomous.
  + We follow the assessment of Callahan (2007), who identifies three types of relationship between the central government and the locally-based non-state actors that emerged after the dissolution of the CPB: near devolution, military occupation and coexistence. The Karenni are considered to “coexist”, suggesting regional autonomy.
  + Kudo (2013: 291) calls the two Karenni special regions “quasi-states within the state” and according to a map of Global Security, the two regions make up a significant part of the Kayah state. Based on this we code the Karenni as regionally autonomous as of 1995 (following the first of January rule) until 2009, when most KNPLF leaders accepted the transformation into a Border Guard Force (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia), an act which South (2011) considers as the origin of decreasing levels of autonomy. The revocation of autonomy as a consequence of the BGF scheme are confirmed by the Myanmar Peace Monitor, where it is stated that the act of absorbing “ethnic militia groups into the national army meant these groups were required to give up most of their autonomy”. [1995-2009: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. [1948: host change (new]
* [1952: establishment of regional autonomy]
* [1959: revocation of regional autonomy]
* [1994: erection of regional autonomy]
* [2009: abolishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Karenni |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Karenni (Red Karens) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77512000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [discriminated]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.004]

**Regional concentration**

* Note: group size estimates vary considerably between different sources. For spatial concentration, we draw on Minahan (2002), the most detailed source we could find. Yet it has to be noted that Minahan’s group size estimates is rather on the higher end, and is in particular considerably higher if compared to the EPR-based estimate that we use.
  + According to Minahan (2002: 934), the Karenni are “concentrated in Kayah State”, where they make up 85% of the local population. This amounts to 206,550 Karennis (in 2002), which is less than 50% of all Kachins in Myanmar (around 500,000). However, both the Karenni settlement polygon in GeoEPR and the settlement area shown in Minahan (2002: 934) indicate that the Kayah state only covers a part of the Karenni settlement area. The latter also includes the area around the Kayah state. Lacking better information, we assume that if the Karenni people in the areas adjoining Kayah state are added to the 206,550 Karennis in Kayah state, we would get to more than 250,000 Karennis (50% of 500,000) in the spatially contiguous area of the Kayah state and its surrounding area. This seems to be confirmed by an estimate provided by the Minority Rights Group. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code ethnic kin. Minahan (2002: 934), in contrast, mentions around 200,000 Karennis in adjacent areas of Thailand (and smaller groups in India, the United States, and the United Kingdom). Other sources suggest a much smaller number of Karennis (Karenni refugees) in Thailand. Cultural Survival estimates the number of Karenni in Thailand to be around 18,000 (2000 est.). The coup in 2021 has increased the number of displaced Karennis (Fortify Rights 2022) but we could not find any estimate on the exact numbers of displaced people in neighbouring states. Based on this, we do not code numerically significant kin. [no kin]

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## Kokang

Activity: 1958-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The autonomy of the Federated Shan States, of which Kokang constituted a sub-entity, was undermined when the government set up local defense militias and placed the area under military administration in order to dislodge the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces from northern Burma. In 1958, the Kokang were the only sawbwas (traditional hereditary rulers in the Shan state) who resisted an agreement with the government that envisaged incorporation into the Union’s political structure (hence the start date). In 1959, the Kokang leader relented after threats of military action (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, “In early 1961, the Burmese government launched a large-scale offensive on KMT remnants which also led to fighting with members of the Kokang Defence Army (KDA).”
* In 1968, another Kokang rebel group – the Kokang People’s Liberation Army (KPLA) – crossed the border from China and started engaging Burmese government forces. Later that year, the KPLA merged with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the former leaders of the KPLA remained heads of the local communist Kokang administration until March 1989.
* Following a large-scale mutiny within the CPB, in 1989, Kokang established the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), initially known as the Kokang Democratic Party (KDP). According to UCDP, the MNDAA’s “official goal was the re-establishment of local self-administration in Kokang; however, MNDAA also claimed that Kokang would not demand secession from the union.”
* Soon thereafter, the MNDAA signed a ceasefire agreement with the government that promised the Kokang a degree of autonomy. A period of relative calm followed until the late 2000s. According to UCDP: “For almost 20 years, MNDAA was able to maintain a working relationship with the Myanmar authorities; MNDAA profited from lucrative tax collection, drug trade, and other illicit activities, while the Myanmar army was allowed to establish bases in strategic parts of Kokang district. Nominally, and despite being deeply involved in it, the MNDAA was for example charged with combating the opium trade in Kokang. However, this relationship broke down in 2009, after the [Government of Myanmar (Burma)](https://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/144) demanded that the groups (including MNDAA) that had agreed to sign the ceasefire in 1989 should be transformed into paramilitary Border Guard Forces (BGF) under the direct command of the Myanmar military. MNDAA rejected this demand, and an armed conflict with the government erupted.” Intermittent fighting continued throughout the 2010s, and fighting escalated in 2021.
* On this basis, we code an ongoing movement with a start date in 1958, the year that Kokang leadership began to resist an agreement that reduced their autonomy. It should be noted that it is ambiguous whether the movement continued throughout all these years. In particular, it is possible that no claims for increased self-determination were made between 1989, when there was a ceasefire that led to a degree of autonomy for the Kokang, and 2009 when fighting resumed. [start date: 1958; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the initial years, Kokang leaders raised their opposition to incorporation into the union’s political structure, suggesting an autonomy claim (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* From 1961 onwards, the Kokang forces were to a large extent integrated with the forces of the CPB and the Shan State Army. This makes it difficult to determine any specific claim by the Kokang separate from Shan. Throughout the 1961-1989 war, we therefore code as the dominant claim the claim of the broader Shan rebellion, which was autonomy until 1962 and the establishment of an independent state from 1963 onwards (in keeping with 1st of January rule) [1958-1962: autonomy claim] [1963-1989: independence claim]
* When the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) was formed in 1989, its manifesto explicitly pointed out that the MNDAA wants autonomy but does not demand secession. Since 2008, the claim has focused on resistance to the incorporation of Kokang forces in Myanmar’s army, which can be read as a claim for autonomy (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1990-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1962; end date: 1989]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kokang is the Kokang sawbwaship (Self-administered Zone), located within the Shan state in Myanmar. We code the territory based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Kokang were involved in the Shan uprising (1960-1995) as well as the center-seeking Communist rebellion, which lasted until 1988 according to UCDP/PRIO and Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
  + According to UCDP, Kokang involvement in the Shan rebellion began in 1961, “when the Burmese government launched a large-scale offensive on KMT remnants which also led to fighting with members of the Kokang Defence Army (KDA)”.
  + In 1989, the Kokang signed a cease-fire that led to relative calm for the next twenty years (UCDP/PRIO).
  + We could not find any casualty estimates specific to the Kokang, who are a small group (around 100,000 members). We code NVIOLSD, though noting that this decision is ambiguous; it is well possible that the 25 deaths threshold was met in at least some of the years.
* The Kokang incident in 2009, in which Kokang (and other groups) voiced their opposition to their assimilation into the Myanmar Armed Forces as “border guards” resulted in violent clashes. 2009 is coded as LVIOLSD based on UCDP/PRIO.
* According to UCDP/PRIO, there were no casualties in 2010-2013, but the conflict re-erupted in 2014. There was a ceasefire in 2015, and UCDP/PRIO reports no casualties in 2016. Yet, UCDP/PRIO reports that MNDAA, the Kokang rebel group, acted both individually and in conjunction with the Northern Alliance, an alliance of different ethnic rebel groups, which could lead to counting difficulties. In 2017, the conflict re-erupted, with another 35 deaths reported and 11 in 2018. 2019 and 2020 saw no casualties according to UCDP/PRIO. To avoid a bogus de- and re-escalation, we code LVIOLSD throughout 2014-2017. [1958-2008: NVIOLSD; 2009: LVIOLSD; 2010-2013: NVIOLSD; 2014-2017: LVIOLSD; 2018-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups (among which the Shans) were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State and the Kayah State were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein 1958).
* Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Kokang were incorporated into the Union of Burma as part of the Shan State. This implies a concession for the Kokang. After World War II and as a reward for their armed resistance to the Japanese, the British had recognized Kokang as a full-fledged Shan State, or sawbwaship, an entity ruled by a local ruler (Seekins 2006). Thus, as opposed to many other ethnic groups in the Shan state, the Kokang continued to have some significant self-determination as they had their own sawbwaship and were therefore allowed to continue their feudatory rule in their area.
  + Note: Panglong could be seen as a continuation of colonial policy, but is often described as a concession and thus probably implied that the Kokang’s autonomy was increased.
  + Note: The Panglong Agreement foresaw the right to secession for the Shan state after a 10-year period. The majority group in the Shan state, the Shan, were the primary beneficiary of this rule, thus we code an independence concession only for the Shan.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The autonomy of the Shan sawbwas was undermined when the central government, in its efforts to dislodge Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces from northern Burma, set their territories under military administration in the 1950s. The sawbwas’ defense forces were no longer controlled by local rulers and the sawbwas were being sidestepped (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Brown 2003). In 1959, the Kokang were the only sawbwas resisting incorporation into the Union’s political structure. When faced with threats of military action, however, the Kokang gave in and agreed to relinquish their powers (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1959: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: While the above narrative suggests that centralization had started before 1959, we did not find a good date to code a restriction before that.
  + Note as well: the 1959 restriction also removed the Shan state’s right to secession, but this had first and foremost been a concession for the Shan. Therefore, no independence restriction is coded here.
* As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). The Kokang are Buddhists (Minahan 2002: 1698); however, it is clear that increasing the rights of ethnic minorities was not the intention. We do not code a concession.
* The Kokang’s semi-autonomous status as promised in the Panglong Agreement was definitely abrogated after General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). This nullified whatever little autonomy had remained with the Kokang after 1959. [1962: autonomy restriction]
* The Kokang are Mandarin speaking. Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* When the Communist Party of Burma, which has been active in the Shan state since 1968, collapsed in 1989, Kokang was assigned as the autonomous First Special Region of the northern Shan State of Burma. At the same time, a temporary ceasefire was negotiated and, as part of the agreement, the Kokang received development aid and were promised no interference in drug trafficking, their main source of revenue. According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories”. According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were “quasi-states within the state”. As with all other Special Regions, we code this as an autonomy concession in the year the ceasefire was signed. [1989: autonomy concession]
* The 2008 constitution established six new self-administered areas: five zones (Danu, Kokang, Naga, Pa-O, Pa Laung) and one division (Wa).
  + While there appear to be some efforts to develop autonomous principles, this process is hindered by decades of centralization and top-down governance (OECD 2013; Ghai 2008; Myanmar Times 2014).
  + Overall, the Kokang’s autonomy was not increased relative to the 1989 concession. To the contrary, the 2008 constitution sharply decreased the Kokang’s autonomy.
  + Namely, the constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor).
  + Like many other ethnic minority groups, the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) rejected the government proposal to transform into a BGF. As a consequence low-scale violent conflict erupted as government troops occupied Kokang (Kokang incident).
  + In August 2009, the Kokang’s autonomy was eliminated in accordance with the 2008 constitution (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [2008: autonomy restriction]
* On 9 February 2015, the MNDAA returned to Kokang capital, Laukkai, and launched an attack on the Myanmar army in an attempt to retake the area (Eurasia Review 2015). After the attack, clashes spread in the area, leading the Myanmar president Thein Sein to declare a state of emergency and martial law in the Kokang region (Tiezzi 2015). As a result, the military gained executive and judicial authority in the region for three months (Clapp 2015). After four months, following Chinese pressure, the MNDAA declared a unilaterally ceasefire (UCDP; Mizzima 2015a). In June, the government offered a peace deal (Mizzima 2015b). In keeping with the codebook, we do not code the imposition of martial law and emergency rule as a restriction.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). Following the coup, there were several attacks by the government armed forces in the region of Kokang, and fights with the MNDAA resumed (Myanmar Now 2021 and 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* As a result of the Panglong Agreement, the Kokang enjoyed regional autonomy until 1959. [1958-1959: regional autonomy]
* When the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded northern Burma, they quickly joined forces with ethnic minority leaders who became integrated into the CPB (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 1971, the communist army had gained control over almost all of the Shan state territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Almost all of the CPB’s commanders were from minority groups such as the Wa, Kokang, Chinese, Kachin, Shan or others (Lintner 1990). The Shan State was ruled by the CPB until the latter’s dissolution in 1989. Callahan (2007) defines this as a period where authority of the military junta is limited and there appears to be near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders (South 2008). We hence code regional autonomy due to de-facto independence as of 1972 (first of January rule).
* After 1989, the Kokang enjoyed self-government as an autonomous First Special Region until the military junta violated the ceasefire agreement, occupied the territory and eliminated the autonomy in August 2009 (‘Kokang incidence’). The coding of autonomy gets further support by the fact that the Kokang have always maintained their own armed forces and were not restricted in their cultural rights. The Kokang Defence Army (KDA), which was later integrated into the CPB, was established in 1958. When the CPB dissolved in 1989, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) emerged as its successor. Note: because violence erupted in reaction to the autonomy revocation, we stop coding regional autonomy already in 2008 in contravention of the January 1 rule. [1972-2008: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* As outlined above, the CPB period saw near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders after 1971 (South 2008). We code this as de-facto independence. [1972-1989: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1948 Kokang became part of newly independent Burma, implying a host change. But this was before the start date.
* [1959: revocation of regional autonomy]
* [1971: establishment of de facto independence]
* [1989: abolishment of de facto independence]
* [1989: establishment of regional autonomy]
* [2009: revocation of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kokang |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Chinese |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77503000 |

**Power access**

* The Kokang are ethnic Chinese, and thus form a branch of the EPR group ‘Chinese’.
* The Kokang territory is located in the northern part of the Shan State. Although they are ethnically different from the Shan, their access to central state power is closely related to that of the Shan. However, contrary to the Shan, the Kokang were not conceded junior partner status in the Panglong agreement of 1947 (unlike the Shan) and are hence powerless (there is no evidence of discrimination as it is coded for the Chinese group as a whole in Myanmar).
* From 1959, the Bamar dominated the central state; all other groups became discriminated, excluded themselves from central state power, or were simply powerless. In particular, in 1959 the Shan territory was subjected to military rule in an effort to dislodge Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces and to persecute the Shan underground resistance. Since the Kokang sawbwaship was part of the Shan state, discrimination affected not only the Shan, but also the Kokang.
* 1960 onward the Shan, and with them the Kokang, are considered powerless (at times the Shan as well as the Kokang self-excluded themselves from the central state, see above). Note that the Kokang incident of 2009 is not considered evidence of explicit and targeted discrimination against the Kokang. [1958: powerless; 1959: discriminated; 1960-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Information about the Kokangs’ population size is scarce. According to the UNODC, the Kokang region is home to some 106,000. With a country population of 55,746,253 (the CIA World Factbook), the Kokang make up about 0.0019 of the total population. [0.0019]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the UNODC, the Kokang region is home to some 106,000 people, a population which is “predominantly Chinese”. There is no information of Kokang people in other places of Myanmar, Kokang refugees have almost exclusively fled across the border to China (after the clashes in 2015 an estimate of 30-50 thousand Kokang fled to China (Tiezzi 2015)). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Kokang are ethnic Chinese (Mandarin-speaking Han), and thus form a branch of the EPR group ‘Chinese’. According to EPR there are Chinese kin groups in no less than twelve countries (including China, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia). [kin in adjacent country]

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## Lahu

Activity: 1965-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Lahu homeland was incorporated into the new Burmese state in 1948. Alienated by harsh and arbitrary Bamar rule, they soon (early 1950s) allied with other minorities, particularly the Shan, in order to be granted more autonomy. Minahan (2002: 1076) reports that the Lahu joined the Shan in open rebellion against the Burmese state in 1958. This activity is coded under the header of the Shan as claims were focused on an autonomous Shan state.
* The earliest evidence of Lahu-specific mobilization we have found is in the mid-1960s, when “Lahu leadaers […] embraced independence of Greater Lahuland, including the Lahu territories in neighboring states [i.e., China, Thailand, Laos]” (Minahan 2002: 1077).
* In 1973, the government ordered that all local pro-government militia forces in Shan state should be disbanded. This led to an armed conflict between the Lahu National United Party and the Burmese state that lasted until 1982.
* According to Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019): “In 1976, The National Democratic Front (NDF), following an initiative by the Karens, was formed by eleven secessionist ethnic groups, each of which desired its own state: the Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Karennis, Mon, Shan, Lahu, Palaung, Pa’O and Wa. The National Democratic Front (NDF) comprised eight secessionist groups united to prevent internecine fighting and join operations against the government. According to Bartkus, the NDF [later?] renounced secession as the ultimate goal of the rebellion so as to facilitate coordination among those groups. However, not all of the rebel organizations and political parties representing these ethnicities were permitted to join the NDF: only pro-Western, anti-Communist organizations could belong.”
* The LNUP surrendered in 1984. Subsequently, the Lahu National Organization (LNO) was formed (Lintner 1990: 106). However, according to UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, “the limited military action of this organization have since consisted of providing supporting troops to the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) in the Karenni conflict.”
* Minahan (2002: 1077f) reports continued fighting for a democratic federal Myanmar in the 1990s. In 1997, the Lahu National Organization (previously LNUP) merged with the Lahu National Development Party to establish the Lahu Democratic Front (LDF). In 2008, the LDF was reorganized and became the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), which has since demanded a Lahu Self-Administered Zone. In 2015, the LDU was invited to participating in peace talks but not to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) as it had not been an armed group at that point. The movement is ongoing (Minahan 2016: 235; Myanmar Peace Monitor 2018, 2022; Thai News Service 2022). [start date: 1965; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the mid-1960s, Lahu leaders embraced independence of Greater Lahuland, which would include Lahu territories in neighboring states. In 1976, Lahu separatists formed a coalition with other ethnic rebels to form the National Democratic Front (NDF), an umbrella organization with the goal of establishing a loose federation of independent national states (Minahan 2002; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl). We found limited evidence on the exact claim made in subsequent years, and so continue to code independence as the dominant claim. [1965-2008: independence claim]
* According to the sources, since its creation, the LDU has demanded for a Lahu Self-Administered Zone (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2018). As since 2008, the LDU appears to be one of the main groups striving for self-determination and we did not find any evidence for different claims, we code autonomy as the dominant claim. [2009-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1965; end date: 2008]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* We were unable to find a clear definition of this territorial claim. The Lahu population is divided across Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and China, where they live scattered across multiple villages and regions. For this reason, the group cannot claim any specific territory as “Lahuland” (Walker 1974: 330). Some Lahu have made claims for a Greater Lahuland (Minahan 2002: 1074ff), but our coding focuses exclusively on claims within Myanmar. Absent any precise definition of Lahu territorial claims, we flag this claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s settlement area in Myanmar according to the GREG dataset as the best approximation available (Weidmann et al. 2010).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Minahan (2002: 1076) reports “open rebellion” in 1958 and in 1962 alongside the Shan, but we could not find any more specific information. Both years are therefore coded as NVIOLSD.
* UCDP/PRIO codes a low-level intensity armed conflict over Lahu from 1973-1982. [1965-1972: NVIOLSD; 1973-1982: LVIOLSD; 1983-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Lahu, who originate from the Yunnan region in China, used to live in tribal groups that often warred among themselves. Despite being pushed to the mountains by several invading peoples, they maintained a precarious independence but never developed a unified political system. In the seventh century, the Shan invaded the territory and established small monarchies. The Lahu territory was nominally controlled by those. When the Burmans invaded the region in the ninth century, the Lahu were granted cultural independence, but only in return for their tribute to the Burmese king (Minahan 2002).
* Continued invasion attempts were met with fierce resistance by the Lahus. However, in the nineteenth century, the Lahu territory was again under the control of Shan kingdoms and was only liberated when the British took control of the region in the late nineteenth century. Seeing them as liberators from the Burmans and Shans, the Lahu remained loyal to the British during the Second World War and fought the Japanese and their allies, after the Japanese occupation as guerilla fighters (Minahan 2002).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years, including in particular the Shan state, in which the Lahu were located (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958; Maung Maung, 1989: 170; Silverstein, 1958). The Lahu are not mentioned in the Panglong Conference, which is why we can conclude that they were excluded from the whole process.
* Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Lahu were thus – without being consulted – incorporated into the Union of Burma as part of the Shan State (Minahan 2002).
* It does not appear that the Lahu were granted autonomy within the Shan state. According to Seekins (2006: 402), the Shan exercised influence over most of the territory in the State and established a “hierarchical distribution of power and authority” that made the Lahu subject to a “hierarchical distribution of power and authority” (Seekins 2006: 401). We found no evidence that the Lahu had their own sawbwaship (such as the Pa-O or the Palaung), an entity ruled by a local ruler.
  + Note: The Panglong Agreement foresaw the right to secession for the Shan state after a 10-year period. The majority group in the Shan state, the Shan, were the primary beneficiary of this rule, thus we code an independence concession only for the Shan.
* In 1959/1962, the Shan State’s autonomy was revoked (see the Shan). We do not code this as a restriction for the Lahu as they did not have autonomy within Shan state.
* According to the Minahan (2002: 1075), the Lahu mostly retain traditional beliefs with some adhering to Christianity and Buddhism (but these are mostly found in Thailand and Laos). As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961. With only a small percentage adhering to Buddhist beliefs, we code this as a cultural rights restriction. [1961: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The traditional Lahu language belongs to the Lolo-Burmese branch of the Tibeto-Burman group of languages. Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. Note: it is not clear whether this restriction occurred prior or before the movement’s start date. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* According to Minahan (2002), the Lahu National Organization (LNO) signed a ceasefire in 1994. South (2003), on the other hand, lists the LNO under the ‘main non-ceasefire armed groups’. Even if a ceasefire was signed, this event is not coded, since Minahan (2002) does not mention any autonomy concessions.
* The 2008 constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program led to lower levels of autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). In 2009, the Lahu Democratic Front (LDF) was transformed into a Border Guard Force. However, the Lahu had never been granted their own army (or autonomy more generally), thus we do not code a restriction.
* In 2018, the LDU signed Myanmar’s government Nationwide Ceasefire Accord (NCA) along with other ethnic armed groups. The group had reportedly not been clashing with the army for some time, but it had refused to sign the NCA under the former government (Macau Business 2018). Under the 2018 NCA, along other points, the group agreed to the nondisintegration of the union (Mark 2018). As the agreement did not involve any autonomy concessions, we do not code it here.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). We could not find evidence of the specific implications of the coup for Lahu people. Sources suggest that the LDU is among the organizations that have accepted to join peace talks with the junta as of 2022 (Thai News Service 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* When the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded northern Burma, they quickly joined forces with ethnic minority leaders who became integrated into the CPB (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 1971, the communist army gained control over almost all of the Shan state territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Almost all of the CPB’s commanders were from minority groups such as the Wa, Kokang, Chinese, Kachin, Shan or others (Lintner 1990). The Shan State was ruled by the CPB until the latter’s dissolution in 1989. Callahan (2007) defines this as a period where authority of the military junta is limited and there appears to be near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders (South 2008). Hence, we code de facto independence/autonomy as of 1972 (first of January rule). We found no evidence of regional autonomy after 1989. [1972-1989: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* As outlined above, the CPB period saw near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders after 1971 (South 2008). We code this as de facto independence. [1972-1989: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. But since this was before the start date, we do not code a major change.
* [1971: establishment of de-facto independence]
* [1989: abolishment of de-facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lahu |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* Given that EPR does not consider the Lahu a relevant ethnic group (thus neither represented in national politics nor politically discriminated), one would have to conclude that they were powerless throughout. A coding of powerless seems legitimate, given that there is no evidence of political discrimination that effectively blocks the group’s access to (both regional and central) state power. Furthermore, we code de-facto independence from 1972-1989, thus self-exclusion from the political center, which in the EPR2SDM coding scheme also makes up a powerless status. The same applies to the ceasefire years. [1965-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Estimates on the Lahu population in Myanmar fluctuate widely. Whereas Minahan (2002) lists approximately 290,000 Lahu in Myanmar, other sources are more conservative and talk of around 150,000 (Encyclopedia of World Cultures 1996; Matisoff 1988). Since the more conservative estimates are more numerous, we adapt this and follow the Encyclopedia Britannica (125,000). Britannica’s estimate relates to the year 2000. With Myanmar’s population totaling 48.45 million (World Bank) in the year 2000, we code a population share of 0.0026. [0.0026]

**Regional concentration**

* Information on the Lahus’ settlement pattern is scarce. In particular, Minahan (2002: 1074) does not provide detailed figures. One of the more informative sources is Weidmann (2009), who codes three settlement polygons and a low degree of spatial concentration (0.4). We follow Weidmann (2009) and code the Lahu as not concentrated. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 1074) mentions 275,000 Lahu in China, 75,000 in Thailand, and 30,000 in Laos. We backed up Minahan’s population figures with data from the Joshua Project. According to the Joshua Project, there are 308,000 Lahu in China. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Mons

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1948 Mon nationalists formed the Mon National Defense Organization (MNDO), hence the start date of the movement. Two separatist rebellions were fought in subsequent years. The violence ended in 1997. Still, separatist organizations including the New Mon State Party and the Mon National Liberation Army continued to remain active in Burma. The movement is ongoing as of 2020 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 235ff, 2002: 1282ff, 2012, 2016: 279f; MAR; Reports on Activities of the Mon State Party; Roth 2015: 340f; UCDP/PRIO; University of Central Arkansas). [start date: 1948; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* When Burma negotiated independence from Britain, the Mons petitioned for a separate state (Minahan 2002). This claim was substantiated by the rebellion of the Mon starting in briefly after Burmese independence. According to Hewitt and Cheetham (2000), the rebels sought independence. This is supported by information from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which also states that the Mons were seeking the establishment of an independent Mon state. [1948-1958: independence claim]
* The Mon surrendered in 1958, also in return for a government promise to establish an autonomous Mon state (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). Following the first of January rule, we therefore change the coding of the claim to autonomy from 1959 onwards. [1959-1974: autonomy claim]
* However, when the Mon state was established in 1974, the Mons rejected this move and changed their claim back to an independent Mon state which, in addition to Thaton and Moulmein, should also include Pegu, Tavoy, and Mergui. The claim for independence is substantiated by the fact that the Mon insurgent groups joined the National Democratic Front (NDF), an umbrella organization with the goal to establish a loose federation of independent national states (Minahan 2002). We therefore code independence as the dominant claim for 1975 onwards. [1975-2018: independence claim]
* Following the NCA, the sources we consulted suggest a shift towards an autonomy claim. While we could not find evidence for all the insurgent groups, the NMSP has been in talks with the government for the establishment of a federal union (Monnews 2020; Mizzima Business Weekly 2022). While it is unclear when the claim changed, sources seem to suggest that the shift occurred after the signing of the NCA (2018) and continued following the coup. [2019-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The NMSP is the main group making SDM claims, although it did splinter in 1995 following an agreement with the Myanmar government. One group, the Beik Mon Army emerged arguing that the government were not implementing the agreement (MAR 2004). However, no claims were identified that diverged from the NMSP. [start date 1: 1948; end date 1: 1958; start date 2: 1974; end date 2: 2018]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Mon (Monland or „Honsawatoi“) goes beyond the current Mon state, composed of the districts Thaton and Moulmein (today called Mawlamyine), and also includes the districts Pegu, Tavoy (Dawei), and Mergui, but some have also claimed a smaller territory composed of Mon State and southern Pegu (Minahan 2002: 1285f). We code the former claim, which appears to be the predominant one, based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO codes (minor) separatist armed conflict in 1949-1963, 1990, and 1996. However, other sources suggest additional years:
  + Marshall & Gurr (2003: 60) suggest separatist violence in 1975-1995.
  + MAR’s rebellion score is 5 (“intermediate guerilla activity”) in 1985-1995 and then 3 in 1996-1997 (“local rebellion”).
* The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and the University of Central Arkansas’ conflict data base provides useful background information. According to the latter, Mon nationalists launched an insurgency against the government in August 1948. The Mon People’s Front, formed in 1952, agreed to a ceasefire in July 1958, and more than 1,000 of its troops subsequently surrendered to government troops. However, according to UCDP, one Mon leader rejected the deal and formed the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and fighting continued until the early 1960s.
* According to the University of Central Arkansas’ conflict data base, the NMSP formed an armed wing in 1971 (Mon National Liberation Army, or MNLA). The NMSP joined other Burmese secessionist movements in forming the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1975. The Burmese military launched major military offensives against MNLA in 1980, 1986, and 1990. A ceasefire was signed in 1995, and the last major rebel faction surrendered in 1997 (Marshall & Gurr 2000: 60) after a last violent outburst in 1996 and early 1997, though 1997 saw no deaths according to UCDP/PRIO. UCDP/PRIO records a little less than 200 deaths in 1990 and 1996 while according to the University of Central Arkansas’ conflict data base, more than 1,000 people died in the second phase of war, suggesting UCDP does not include most of the casualties. On the basis of this case narrative, we code LVIOLSD between 1980 (first major military offensive) and the last year the 25 deaths threshold was reached. This coding decision is ambiguous.
* Note: the University of Central Arkansas’ conflict data base suggests that the first insurgency started in 1948, but we found no casualty information that would allow us to code that year with LVIOLSD. Notably, Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 192) also peg the start of violence to 1949. Furthermore, note that all sources agree that the initial phase was nonviolent, as the University of Central Arkansas' conflict project suggests that the movement was founded in early January 1948 but the insurgency began only in August.
* Note: Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 1960 and 1995. Not all individual ethnic rebellions had the same start and end dates; and not all escalated to the HVIOLSD level. According to UCDP/PRIO, the Mon insurgency never escalated to the level of a “major” war. This is also supported by the University of Central Arkansas, which reports that the second phase of the insurgency cost the lives of 1,000 people over the course of more than 20 years. Therefore, we do not code HVIOLSD in any year.
* [1948: NVIOLSD; 1949-1963: LVIOLSD; 1964-1979: NVIOLSD; 1980-1996: LVIOLSD; 1997-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Mons were among the first inhabitants of lower Burma and built a h**ighly sophisticated civilization i**n a series of Mon kingdoms that ruled much of Burma until the **tenth/eleventh century, when their** dominance eroded and their kingdom was conquered by the Burmans in 1057. The Burmans established the kingdom of Bagan and the following centuries saw competing Burman, Mon and Tai kingdoms emerge. The Mons **reestablished their** independent **kingdom after the Burman defeat by the Mongols in 1287** but again lost control over their territory during renewed **Burmese occupation between 1551 and** 1752 and then again from 1757 onwards (Minahan 2002; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International).
* After the First Anglo-Burmese War in 1826, the Mon heartland came under British control. In 1852, after the end of the Second Anglo-Burmese War, the entire Mon territory was annexed by the British. The Mons remained loyal to the British and joined British administration and military forces. During the colonial period, the Mon territory was administered as a part of ‘Burma Proper’ and did not enjoy “any form of autonomy or representation altogether” (Minority Rights Group International). The Mons retained their loyalty to the British during the Second World War.
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung, 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State and the Kayah State were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein, 1958). The Mons were excluded from this whole process as they were not considered separately, but part of ‘Burma Proper’. Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Mons States were thus - without their consent and despite a petition for a separate Mon state - incorporated into the Union of Burma (Minahan 2002).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Mon People’s Front (MPF) signed a ceasefire in 1958 in exchange for a promise that an autonomous Mon State would be created (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 193). Further evidence for this concession is provided by Routray (2013: 105) and South (2013: 9), who states that “it seemed for a while in 1958-1960 that the Mon nationalists’ demands might be met and that the government would create a Mon state”. However, in 1962, the military seized power and General Ne Win declared that there was no need for a separate state. Thus, the earlier promise was abrogated. Ne Win argued that the Burmans and the Mons had intermarried to an extent that no separate Mon state was necessary (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 193). We do not code a concession followed by a restriction because there do not appear to have been steps towards implementation.
* As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). The Mons are Buddhists (Minahan 2002: 1283); however, it is clear that increasing the rights of ethnic minorities was not the intention. We do not code a concession.
* Mon is a Monic language that belongs to the Mon-Khmer group of Austro-Asiatic languages (Minority Rights Group International). Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* To appease the group, the government granted the Mons a nominally autonomous Mon state that covered Thaton and Moulmein in the 1974 constitution. We do not code a concession as this move appears token. Minority Rights Group calls the Mon state a “theoretically autonomous” state only and Minahan (2002) considers this move an attempt to divide and appease the Mons. In light of the fact that the state only covered a small part of the territory claimed by the Mons (Minahan 2002) and only around a third of the Mon population (Minahan 2012), it is not surprising that the New Mon State Party (NMSP) rejected the offer and demanded the incorporation of another five districts.
* In light of the government's superior military force, the loss of half of their territory to the military and increasing pressure from the Thai government, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) signed a ceasefire agreement with the junta on June 29, 1995 (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). The agreement allowed the Mon to “retain control of some territory of Mon State bordering Thailand” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). This is confirmed by South (2001), who compares the terms of the ceasefire agreement with those agreed with the Kachin Independence Organization in 1994. The agreement stipulated that the ex-insurgents would control some ‘liberated zones’ in the countryside and would receive some development assistance. They would, however, be excluded from national politics. Smaller NMSP splinter groups continued armed conflict with the military. [1995: autonomy concession]
* The 2008 constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. Like many other ethnic minority groups, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) rejected the government proposal to transform into a BGF. As opposed to the Kokang (e.g.), whose territory was occupied by the military forces in an attempt to deter others, the Mon have so far successfully resisted the proposal. Nevertheless, the Burmese government clearly intended to implement the measure. Tensions have been rising and the NMSP has been preparing for the eventual case of a war with the Burmese Army. [2008: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012, the NMSP signed another ceasefire agreement with the government. The agreement entailed four main points, which were (1) to cease armed fighting, (2) to initiate a political dialogue, (3) to have cooperation to stability and peace in Mon areas, and (4) to implement various development projects in education, health and social development. Since there were no concessions as regards the level of autonomy, we do not code this event (Monnews 2012; Reuters 2012).
* In 2015, the NMSP had refused to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) as it failed to include all ethnic organizations, and as the government armed forces continued to launch attacks against some of them (Minority Rights Group International). However, the NMSP signed the NCA later in 2018 (AP News 2018). As the agreement did not involve any autonomy concessions, we do not code it here.
* In 2016, the Mon state parliament authorized the teaching of Mon language during school hours (Thai News Service 2017). We do not code a concession because it is the Mon parliament acting and not the central government, and because we could not find clear evidence that the central government changed its language policy vis-à-vis the Mon.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). Following the coup, there was an increase in fighting in the Mon region (Mon and Quadrini 2022), while the Tatmadaw also reportedly attempted to gain the support of Mon people in the region (Thai News Service 2021). Sources also suggest that the NMSP is among the organizations that have accepted to join peace talks with the junta as of 2022 (Thai News Service 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* It is not fully clear whether the 1995 cease-fire agreement implied regional autonomy for the Mons. Unlike many other groups, such as the Kachins, the Mons were not granted a special region. Nevertheless, South (2001) compares the terms of the 1995 cease-fire agreement with the agreements with the Kachin Independence Organization in 1994. The latter granted the Kachin “political autonomy over a Special Region in Kachin State” and “the right to create a local civil administration”. Based on this, we code regional autonomy.
* In 2009, the Myanmar government moved to implement the BGF program discussed above, which effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). [1996-2009: regional autonomy]
* However, the Mons successfully resisted the BGF program, which is coded as the onset of de-facto independence (implying continued regional autonomy). [2010-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* The Mons successfully resisted the BGF program and prepared for war with Burma, which is coded as the onset of de-facto independence. [2010-2020: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. [1948: host change (new]
* See below. [1995: establishment of regional autonomy]
* See below. [2009: revocation of regional autonomy, establishment of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Mons |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Mons |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77507000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-exclusion = powerless. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.02]

**Regional concentration**

* Note: group size estimates vary considerably between different sources. For spatial concentration, we draw on Minahan (2002), the most detailed source we could find. Yet it has to be noted that Minahan’s group size estimates is rather on the higher end, and is higher if compared to the EPR-based estimate that we use.
  + According to Minahan (2002: 1282), the Mons are concentrated in southern Myanmar. In the Mon state, the Mons make up 68% of the local population. This amounts to 1.645 million Mons (in 2002). Minahan does not provide a clear-cut figure of the number of Mons in Myanmar; he mentions estimates ranging from 1.2 million to 4 million (see p. 1283). If we draw on the mean of the two estimates provided by Minahan, the threshold is met. This is in line with MAR which codes the Mons as “concentrated in one region” with more than 75% living in that region. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code ethnic kin. MAR, however, codes ethnic kin in Thailand (approx. 115,000 Mons in Thailand). Minahan (2002: 1282) also mentions a large Mon community in Thailand. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Nagas

Activity: 1949-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Naga National Council (NNC) was formed in the Indian state of Assam during World War II to promote Naga interests. The NNC opened negotiations on separate independence in 1945. In August 1947 it proclaimed Naga independent of both India and Burma (Minahan 2002: 1330). The proposed independent Naga state included large parts of the states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, but also territory in Myanmar, in particular in Kachin State and Sagaing Division (Eastern Nagaland). Initially, the NNC’s activities, however, were limited to India and only with the formation of the Eastern Naga National Council (ENNC) in 1949 is there evidence of an organized claim for self-determination by the Burmese Nagas (Iralu 2003). Hence, we code the movement in Myanmar as of 1949.
* The ENNC and the NNC merged in 1952.
* January 31, 1980, the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was founded in opposition to the NNC’s signing of the Shillong Accord. The NSCN, which split into two factions (NSCN-IM and NSCN-K) in 1988, set up camps in Myanmar’s northwestern Sagaing Division (Human Rights Watch 2002).
* The NSCN-IM and NSCN-K continued to make claims for a Greater Nagaland as of 2020 (South Asia Terrorism Portal). During the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government, the NSCN-K participated in the 21st Century Panglong – Union Peace Conference as an observer and held some peace talks (Myanmar Peace Monitor). [start date: 1949; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Indian Naga leaders of the Naga National Council (NNC) proclaimed Naga independent of both India and Burma in 1947. Franke (and others, see Franke 2006: 77, 212) estimate that by 1949, a majority at least within the Naga National Council (NNC), the most important Indian Naga self-determination organization, favored immediate independence. The proclaimed state included large parts of the states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, but also territory in Myanmar, in particular in Kachin State and Sagaing Division (Eastern Nagaland). The Burmese Naga were organized in the Eastern Naga National Council (ENNC), formed in 1949. There is only limited information on the claim of this organization in its early years. Topich and Leitich (2013: 5) mention a “Naga independence movement in the 1950s”. Since the ENNC and the NNC merged in 1952 we assume an ideological equivalence and equally code independence as the dominant claim for the Nagas in Burma. For the Nagas in India we code a shift in the claim from independence towards the securing of increased autonomy and the incorporation of additional territories into the Naga state. This shift is due to the 1975 decision of the (still independence-minded) Naga National Council’s decision to keep the solution of the Naga question within the Indian framework (Kotwal 2000: 758). There is no evidence of such a switch for the Nagas in Burma. Instead, the Burmese Nagas seem to have continued to advocate independence in a separate Naga state as confirmed by The Telegraph India (2011) and a recent article by Myanmar Now (2018). Furthermore, a claim for sub-state secession would also not be applicable to the Nagas in Myanmar for whom an autonomous Naga state within India would still mean secession from Myanmar and unification with their ethnic kin across the border. Based on this, we code an independence claim throughout. [1949-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1949; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Nagas, also called the Greater Nagaland (“Naga Lim”), consists of the Naga Hills District of Sagaing Division of Myanmar but also the following regions in India: the Nagaland State, the Maram and Tamma districts of Manipur State, the eastern districts of Assam and the Ledo District of Arunachal Pradesh (Minahan 1996: 386, 2002: 1332). We code this claim based on the map in Kashyap (2017). Following SDM coding rules on cross-border claims, we only include those areas within Myanmar.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On August 14, 1947, the Naga leaders of the Naga National Council declared Nagaland independent of India and Burma, one day before the date set for Indian independence (Chasie and and Hazarika 2009: 4; Kotwal 2000: 756). This was before Myanmar’s independence and is thus not coded.
* On March 22, 1956, the Naga National Council set up a parallel government – the Federal Government of Nagaland – and hoisted up its flag (Kotwal 2000: 1958). Since the scope of influence of the Federal Government of Nagaland is limited to Indian territory this declaration is only coded in India but not in Burma.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 1960 and 1995. Most notably, this includes groups such as the Kachin, the Karen, and the Shan. The Nagas were also involved in this war (Human Rights Watch 2002). More specifically, Vashum (2000: 158), suggests that the Burmese government “started to interfere in the Nagas areas of North-Western Myanmar sometime in 1962”. However, the extent of violence in the Naga-Myanmar dyad remains unclear. UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict until 1991. We code NVIOLSD, though noting that any coding decision is inevitably ambiguous due to the limited information. Information on the number of casualties is very scarce, which is at least in part due to the high number of different insurgencies and the various alliances formed (e.g., the NSCN established links with the Kachin rebels). It is possible that UCDP/PRIO attributes casualties to other conflicts as a result.
* UCDP/PRIO codes minor territorial armed conflicts over Nagaland in 1991, 1995, 2000-2001, and 2005-2007. While UCDP/PRIO codes 0 battle-related years in years in-between, it is not clear whether there was any kind of real de-escalation after 1991 or 1995 or 2001 or 2007. We found evidence of a cease-fire that was unilaterally declared by the NSCN in 1996 (Vashum 2000: 158), yet Topich and Leitich (2013: 5) argue that the Nagas were in a “constant state of war”, suggesting the conflict never properly de-escalated. According to several other sources, armed conflict continued until 2012. In April 2012, the NSCN-K signed a ceasefire with the Myanmar government (Myanmar Peace Monitor; Burma Center for Ethnic Studies (2014). The Myanmar Peace Monitor suggests no clashes after 2012 in a report of the NSCN-K.
* Still, UCDP/PRIO is the best available information, and we thus follow their coding decisions. Any coding decision here is ambiguous. [1949-1990: NVIOLSD; 1991: LVIOLSD; 1992-1994: NVIOLSD; 1995: LVIOLSD; 1996-1999: NVIOLSD; 2000-2001: LVIOLSD; 2002-2004: NVIOLSD; 2005-2007: LVIOLSD; 2008-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Nagas once occupied a much wider area than at present, but gradually lost the lowlands to successive waves of invaders. The Naga tribes, often warring among themselves, never developed a state system (Minahan 2002: 1329). The British made first contact with the Nagas in 1832. The encounter was violent, which prompted the British to withdraw and ignore the Nagas for nearly two decades. After much conflict, the various Naga chiefs signed treaties with the British in 1881 that allowed the British to add their tribal lands to the colonial governments of Assam and Burma (Minahan 2002: 1330). In a memorandum sent to the Simon Commission, the Nagas had demanded to remain under direct British rule – the British failed to respond (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 3).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung, 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State and the Kayah State were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein, 1958). The Indian-based Naga National Council (NNC), pleaded for independence and disagreed with Burmese unity, but was disregarded and excluded from the whole process (Chakravarti 2012; Iralu 2003). Following the Panglong Agreement the Nagas were thus – without their consent – incorporated into the Union of Burma.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* European and American Baptist missionaries converted the majority of the Nagas to Christianity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Minorities at Risk Project). According to Minahan (2002: 1329) some sources claim that up to 90% of the Naga population is nominally Christian with the remaining population adhering traditional beliefs or having adopted Hinduism or Buddhism. As part of a Burmanization campaign, Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961. [1961: cultural rights restriction]
* The Naga speak different dialects belonging to the Tibeto-Burman language of the Sino-Tibetan language group (Minahan 2002: 1329). Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* As mentioned above, the Nagas are predominantly Christians (up to 90%), whereas the dominant Burmans follow Theravada Buddhism. According to the Minorities at Risk Project, the restrictions against Christians were tightened in the period from 1998 until 2000. In addition to the arrest of religious leaders and attempts to forcibly convert the Nagas to Buddhism, these restrictions concerned the attending of church services and the construction of new churches. [1998: cultural rights restriction]
* The 2008 constitution established six new self-administered areas (five zones and one division). Although the five self-administered zones (Danu, Kokang, Naga, Pa-O, Pa Laung) and the one self-administered division (Wa) are “self-administered areas in name only”, there seems to be a genuine effort from both sides to develop autonomous principles, a process that is, however, hindered by a decades of centralization and top-down governance (Myanmar Times 2014). This is confirmed by Ghai (2008) and a report of the OECD, which state that the new constitution in principle enables minorities to determine a large amount of internal affairs and that self-administered zones and divisions are granted “a certain degree of self-determination” (OECD 2013: 173). According to the OECD report, progress towards implementation of the autonomy regulation has been limited. Nonetheless, the 2008 constitution marks a difference to the situation before and there have been some steps towards implementation. [2008: autonomy concession]
  + Note: In other cases, we code a restriction in 2008 (see e.g. the Kokang) due to the integration of ethnic militias into the Border Guard Forces (BGF); in this case we instead code a concession because the Nagas started out from a different level (previously they had no autonomy at all).
* In April 2012, the Naga insurgent group NSCN-K signed a ceasefire agreement with the government (UCDP). While some sources (The Telegraph India 2012; UCDP) suggest that there was an increase in autonomy following the ceasefire agreement, others suggest there were no important changes (Myanmar Peace Monitor). According to a translation of the ceasefire (PAX-D), the five-point agreement included the cessation of the armed conflict, free movement for NSCN-K cadres (with arms), the opening of a liaison office of NSCN (K) at Khamti and continued negotiations. As the document does not indicate any concessions as defined here, we do not code a concession.
* In 2019, an operation of the Tatmadaw arrested member of the NSCN-K and suspected Indian rebels, and seized documents in the NSCN-K headquarters. This was seen by the military as a violation to the 2012 ceasefire agreement (Thai News Service 2019).
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). We could not find any evidence relating to the effects of the coup on Naga areas. The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* Implementation of the 2008 concession has been limited, thus we do not code regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. However, the start date is only in 1949, thus we do not code a major change.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Nagas |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* Given that EPR does not consider the Nagas a politically relevant ethnic group (thus neither represented in national politics nor politically discriminated), one would have to conclude that they were powerless throughout. A coding of powerless seems legitimate in the first years of movement activity, given the still relatively inclusive character of the government and the fact that there was no evidence of political discrimination that effectively blocks the group’s access to (both regional and central) state power. The years of the Naga insurgency (we code 1961-1996; 2000-2001; 2005-2007) to some degree constitute self-exclusion from the political center, which in the EPR2SDM coding scheme also makes up a powerless status. There is evidence of discrimination including forced conversion to Buddhism, forced labor and forced relocation (Burma Link 2014; The Irrawaddy 2009). UNPO (2004) also mentions “grave human rights violations” which altogether would justify a ‘discriminated’ coding. However, we abstain from doing this for the following reasons: First, we want to remain consistent with the EPR coding for 1:1 cases in Myanmar. Although many ethnic minorities suffered a similar fate, only the Karenni and the Zomis (Chin) are considered discriminated for longer periods. Groups such as the Wa, Mons, Rohingyas, however, are also coded powerless/self-excluded. Second, EPR does not consider the Nagas relevant, which would be the case if the group were considered discriminated. Third, most discriminatory measures mentioned above, are related to the use of violence. Violence alone, however, does not justify a discriminated coding, due to endogeneity problems. [1949-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Information on the Naga population of Myanmar is very scarce. According to Thomson (1995: 277), the Naga minority makes up “less than 1 percent” of Myanmar’s population. An appropriate number is given by Kachin News (2009), where the number of Nagas in Myanmar is estimated at 200,000. Given Myanmar’s total population of 51.54 million in 2009, we code a population share of 0.00388. [0.0039]

**Regional concentration**

* Information on the Naga population of Myanmar is very scarce. The Naga Self-Administered Zone appears to have a Naga majority, with a total population of approx. 120,000 people (Tun 2015). Assuming most of this population belongs to Naga communities, we code the Naga as concentrated (there are approx. 200,000 Nagas in Myanmar, see above). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Both the Minorities at Risk data and Minahan (2002: 1328) note kin in neighboring India in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Arunchal States. There are over a million Nagas in India. [ethnic kin in neighboring country]

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## Pa-O

Activity: 1949-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Despite promises of local autonomy by the British in return for anti-Japanese guerilla warfare during the war, the Pa-O districts remained part of the Shan State once Burma gained independence. The revolts that started in 1949 (start date) soon spread across Paoh and, while first targeting taxation by local landlords, soon pursued nationalist goals (Minahan 2002: 1481ff).
* Minahan continues to write that the rebels, almost defeated, retreated into the jungle in 1958, and that many surrendered during a general amnesty. In 1961, the government’s military commander in the region announced that the Pa-O rebellion was defeated, according to Minhahan.
* The 1962 coup reignited the rebellion and renewed the Pa-O insurgency.
* After decades of fighting the Pa-O insurgents capitulated and signed a cease-fire deal with the military junta in 1991 (South 2008). Fighting continued in 1994 according to Minahan (2002: 1483f) and the rebels renewed their aim of Pa-O independence within a federation of states.
* In 1999, Pa-O women set up the Pa-O Women Union, which made claims for a federal system or outright independence (Minahan 2002: 1484). The movement is ongoing (Minahan 2016: 324).
* [start date: 1949; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002), Pa-O leaders put aside claims for autonomy in 1972 and changed their ultimate goal to independence. We therefore code autonomy as the dominant claim from 1949 until 1972 (following the first of January rule) and independence thereafter. In subsequent years both claims for autonomy and independence were made; we could not find information as to which claim is dominant and therefore code the more radical claim throughout in line with the codebook (Minahan 2002).
  + Note: the Pa-O demanded a separate state when Burma gained independence in 1948. This could also be coded as a claim for sub-state secession (from Shan state), but our sources are not clear on this. [1949-1972: autonomy claim; 1973-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1972; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Pa-O lies within the Shan state in Myanmar and consists of the districts Hsuphang, Mong Pan, Mong Kang, and Mauk Mai (Minahan 2002: 1481). We were not able to precisely code the districts identified by Minahan due to inconsistencies across sources in the areas these districts should cover and, therefore, code this claim as ambiguous. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* None of our standard sources suggests separatist violence. However, we found several qualitative indications that the Pa-O have been involved in separatist violence:
  + According to Minahan (2002: 1483), the Pa-O revolt began in 1949 and the Pa-O were involved in a war against the Burmese government “during the 1950s.” In line with this, South (2013: 112) writes that the Pa-O were in revolt “by 1950.”
  + According to Minahan, the rebellion was almost defeated in 1958 and the government announced that the rebels were defeated in 1961; however, the 1962 coup reignited the violence.
  + Following South (2008), the rebels signed a cease-fire with the government in 1991 after decades of fighting.
  + There was then peace until 1994, when the conflict re-ignited, lasting until 1997 (Minahan 2002: 1483-1484).
* We could not find any information on the number of casualties. Therefore, it is unclear whether the violence rose to the 25 deaths threshold in any year. UCDP/PRIO does not code the Pa-O insurgency in any year, but information on the number of casualties is very scarce, which is at least in part due to the high number of different insurgencies and the various alliances formed. It is possible that UCDP/PRIO attributes casualties to other conflicts as a result. Any coding decision here is ambiguous.
* We found reports of five members of the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA) being killed by the Pa-O National Army (PNA), a junta-affiliated Pa-O armed group, in the year after the 2021 coup, i.e., 2022 (Thai News Service 2022a). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Pa-O territory was overrun by the Shan in the seventh century. Although the latter installed their own social order, the Pa-O managed to continue their traditional way of live in small, autonomous villages. With the decline of the Shan in the early nineteenth century, the Pa-O came under the nominal control of the Burman king (Minahan 2002).
* After the Third Anglo-Burman War in 1885-1886, the Pa-O came under British rule. The British installed indirect rule and signed treaties with various Pa-O tribes. British influence in the region grew, also due to increasing missionary activities from the 1890s onwards.
* The Pa-O remained allied to the British in the Second World War and fought the Japanese and their allies, after the Japanese occupation as guerilla fighters (Minahan 2002).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups (among which the Shans/the Federated Shan States formed in 1922) were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong 2005; Silverstein 1958; Maung Maung 1989: 170). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State and the Kayah State were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein 1958).
* The Pa-O were not directly represented at Panglong, although they had initially been promised autonomy in return for anti-Japanese guerilla warfare during the war. Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Pa-O were thus without their consent incorporated into the Union of Burma as part of the Shan State (Minahan 2002).
* Even if they were not represented at Panglong, the Pa-O profited from the agreement. While the Shan state was generally dominated by the Shan (Seekins 2006: 401-402), the Pa-O did have their own sawbwaship within the Shan State, an entity ruled by a local ruler (Hsihseng or Thaton). The Panglong agreement meant that the Palaung were allowed to continue their feudatory rule, which at the very least means that the Pa-O could keep their autonomy, but probably also that their autonomy was increased. Thus, we code a concession. [1947: autonomy concession]
  + Note: Panglong could be seen as a continuation of colonial policy, but is often described as a concession.
  + Note: The Panglong Agreement foresaw the right to secession for the Shan state after a 10-year period. The majority group in the Shan state, the Shan, were the primary beneficiary of this rule, thus we code an independence concession only for the Shan

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The spirit of Panglong and the federal principles were reversed in the years following independence. The central government officially ended the autonomy of the Shan sawbwas and set their territories under military administration in 1959. The sawbwas’ defense forces were no longer controlled by local rulers and the sawbwas were being sidestepped by General Ne (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Brown 1988; Minorities at Risk Project). Thus much of the Pa-Os’ autonomy was revoked. [1959: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: While the above narrative suggests that centralization had started before 1959, we did not find a good date to code a restriction before that.
  + Note as well: the 1959 restriction also removed the Shan state’s right to secession, but this had first and foremost been a concession for the Shan. Therefore, no independence restriction is coded here.
* As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). The Pa-O are predominantly Buddhists (Minahan 2002: 1483); however, it is clear that increasing the rights of ethnic minorities was not the intention. We do not code a concession.
* The Shan States’ semi-autonomous status as promised in the Panglong Agreement was definitely abrogated after General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). This nullified whatever little autonomy had remained with the Pa-O after 1959. [1962: autonomy restriction]
* The Pa-O language is part of the Pho group of Karen dialects and also has considerable borrowings from the Shan language. Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* After decades of fighting the Pa-O insurgents capitulated and signed a cease-fire deal with the military junta in 1991. According to South (2008: 124), there were several business concessions, substantial government development assistance and the “control over some territory in southwest Shan state (Shan State Special Region-6)”. According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories”. Kudo (2013: 291) furthermore states that the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were “quasi-states within the state.” According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms. They were “quasi-states within the state.” As with all other Special Regions, we thus code this as an autonomy concession in the year the ceasefire was signed. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Minahan (2002) mentions another cease-fire signed in 1997, but we found no corroborating evidence.
* The 2008 constitution established six new self-administered areas: five zones (Danu, Kokang, Naga, Pa-O, Pa Laung) and one division (Wa).
  + While there appear to be some efforts to develop autonomous principles, this process is hindered by decades of centralization and top-down governance (OECD 2013; Ghai 2008; Myanmar Times 2014).
  + Overall, the Pa-O’s autonomy was not increased relative to the 1989 concession. To the contrary, the 2008 constitution sharply decreased the Pa-O’s autonomy.
  + Namely, the constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). [2008: autonomy restriction]
* In 2015, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), the political wing of the Pa-O National Army (PNA), signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government of Myanmar (PA-X; Myanmar Pace Monitor). As the agreement did not involve any autonomy concessions, we do not code it here.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). In relation to Pa-O armed groups, we only found an increase in violence associated involving ethnic armed groups associated with the junta, and other Pa-O armed groups (Thai News Service 2022a). The PNLO has also been reporting having joined peace talks with the military forces (Thai News Service 2022b). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* From independence to 1959, the Pa-O had their own sawbwa in the Shan State, implying significant autonomy (see above). [1948-1959: regional autonomy]
* When the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded northern Burma, they quickly joined forces with ethnic minority leaders who became integrated into the CPB (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 1971, the communist army had gained control over almost all of the Shan state territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Almost all of the CPB’s commanders were from minority groups such as the Wa, Kokang, Chinese, Kachin, Shan or others (Lintner 1990). The Shan State was ruled by the CPB until the latter’s dissolution in 1989. Callahan (2007) defines this as a period where authority of the military junta is limited and there appears to be near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders (South 2008). Hence, we code de-facto independence and regional autonomy as of 1972 (first of January rule) until the CPB of Burma dissolved in 1989. [1972-1989: regional autonomy]
* The Pa-O enjoyed some degree of self-government as the Special Region No. 6. It remains debatable in how far these arrangements really entailed genuine regional autonomy. According to Callahan (2007), the ceasefire regions have achieved some degree of coexistence. Kudo (2013: 291) calls them “quasi-states within the state” and according to a map of Global Security, these areas covered a significant part of the settlements of the Pa-O. This is evidence enough for us to code the Pa-O as regionally autonomous as of 1992 (following the first of January rule) until 2009, when the Pa-O National Organization (PNO) was transformed into a Border Guard Force, an act which South (2011) considers as the origin of decreasing levels of autonomy. The revocation of autonomy as a consequence of the BGF scheme are confirmed by the Myanmar Peace Monitor, where it is stated that the act of absorbing “ethnic militia groups into the national army meant these groups were required to give up most of their autonomy.” [1992-2009: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* As outlined above, the CPB period saw near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders after 1971 (South 2008). We code this as d -facto independence. [1972-1989: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. However, this was before the start date and is thus not coded.
* [1959: revocation of regional autonomy]
* [1971: establishment of de-facto independence]
* [1989: abolishment of de-facto independence]
* [1991: erection of regional autonomy]
* [2009: revocation of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Pa-O |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* Although they are linguistically related to the Karennis and the Karens and claim to be akin to the Shan, with whom they share cultural attributes and the Buddhist religion in particular (despite a small Christian minority), the Pa-O must be considered an ethnic group of its own (Minahan 2002). EPR, however, does not consider the Pa-O politically relevant.
* Given that EPR does not consider the group relevant (thus neither represented in national politics nor politically discriminated), one would have to conclude that they were powerless throughout. A coding of powerless seems legitimate in the first years of movement activity, given the still relatively inclusive character of the government and the fact that there was no evidence of political discrimination that effectively blocks the group’s access to (both regional and central) state power. [1949-1958: powerless]
* Due to the increasingly oppressive Burmese government, we code the Pa-O as discriminated for the period before their insurgency. This is consistent with the scenario of the Shan, that were junior partners in the beginning and then changed to being discriminated for the year 1959, just before their insurgency started, changing the status again to powerless (see below). [1959: discriminated]
* 1960 onwards is coded with “powerless.” Clearly, the heavy human rights abuses such as forced labour, forced relocation, indiscriminate attacks, systematic executions, rape and the government’s blocking of the supply of rice which led to sever malnutrition in 1996/1997, could justify a ‘discriminated’ coding. However, we abstain from doing this for the following reasons: First, we want to remain consistent with the EPR coding for 1:1 cases in Myanmar. Although many ethnic minorities suffer a similar fate as the Pa-O, only the Karenni and the Zomis (Chin) are considered discriminated for longer periods. Groups as the Wa, Mons, Rohingyas, however, are also coded powerless/self-exclusion. Second, EPR does not consider the Pa-O relevant, which would be the case if the group were considered discriminated. Third, most discriminatory measures mentioned above, are related to the use of violence. Violence alone, however, does not justify a discriminated coding, due to endogeneity problems. [1960-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Estimates of the Pa-O population in Myanmar are very scarce. According to Minahan (2002: 1481) there are approximately 1.4 million Pa-O in southeast Asia, most in Myanmar but some also in Thailand. This estimate is rather high if compared to other sources. We rely on Ethnologue (based on Leclerc 2017) which estimates 858,000 Pa-O speakers in Myanmar. This is similar to the estimate provided by the Joshua Project, which estimates 860,000 Pa-O people. According to the World Bank, Myanmar’s population in 2017 was 53,382,520. [0.016]

**Regional concentration**

* Note: group size estimates vary between sources. For spatial concentration, we draw on Minahan (2002), the most detailed source we could find. Yet it has to be noted that Minahan’s group size estimates is rather on the higher end, and is higher if compared to the estimate that we use (see above).
  + According to Minahan (2002: 1481), the Pa-O are concentrated in the Mong Pan district and have additional settlements in the Hsuphang, Mong Kang, and Mauk Mai districts in southeastern Shan state. In this region, they make up 75% of the local population. This amounts to 1.335 million Pa-O (in 2002), which is more than 50% of all Pa-O in Myanmar in that same year according to Minahan. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1481), there are Pa-Os also in Thailand; Minahan does not give an exact estimate of the number of Pa-O in Thailand; if we follow Ethnologue it is around 1,000. We found no other evidence for close kindred. [no kin]

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## Palaung

Activity: 1963-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO) was founded in 1963, hence the start date of the movement. The PSLO made claims for an autonomous Palaung state (Minahan 2002; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).
* In the same year, an armed wing – the Palaung National Force (PNF) – was formed and fought along with the Shan against as part of the Shan State Army (SSA) against the Burmese government. In 1976, the PNF was reformed into the Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA) (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* In 1976, Lahus joined the National Democratic Front (NDF), an ethnic umbrella group with the goal of establishing a loose federation of independent national states (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).
* In 1991, the Palaung State Liberation Party (PSLP) agreed a cease-fire with the Burmese regime. Some of its leaders did not accept the agreement and formed a splinter group, the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), in 1992.
* News reports indicate that the PSLO continued to press for autonomy in the 1990s and 2000s. The Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) continued to be active during this time as well.
* The Palaung movement was ongoing as of 2020 (Minahan 2016: 326; UCDP/PRIO). [start date: 1963; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002), the Palaung State Liberation Party (PSLP) and its military wing, the Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA), were founded in order to fight for a separate statehood within a Burmese federation.
* In 1976, the PSLP joined the National Democratic Front (NDF), an ethnic alliance which aimed to establish a loose federation of independent national states (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Based on this, we code an independence claim from 1977 onward.
* When in 1991, the Palaung State Liberation Party (PSLP) made a cease-fire with the Burmese regime, some of its leaders did not accept the agreement and formed a splinter group, the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) in 1992. According to UCDP/PRIO, this group makes claims for autonomy. In a 2012 statement (PSLF 2012), the PSLF demanded that “a genuine autonomous and self-determinable Ta'ang region shall be established”. In a 2016 statement (the most recent source we could find), the PSLF outlined similar objectives, including forming ‘Ta’ang full autonomy’ and establishing ‘a genuine federal union that guarantees autonomy’ (Mizzima Business Weekly 2016). Based on this, we code an autonomy claim from 1992 onward. [1963-1976: autonomy claim; 1977-1991: independence claim; 1992-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1976; end date: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* It is not entirely clear which territory the Palaung claims, but based on the available information it seems that claims concern the group’s traditional settlement areas within the Shan state in northeastern Myanmar (Minahan 2002: 1486; PSLF 2012). These areas overlap with the Palaung Self-Administered Zone that was created in 2008 (Myanmar Information Management Unit 2013). We flag this claim as ambiguous and code it based on Palaung settlement areas according to the World Language Mapping System.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 1960 and 1995. This includes larger groups such as the Kachin or the Shan, but also the Palaung.
  + Since the Palaung are a small ethnicity, they have sought the protection of larger ethnic groups: from 1963-1967 they were allied with the Shans and from 1968 until 1991, when the Palaung signed a cease-fire agreement with the Burmese government, with the Kachins. During this time, the Palaung engaged in concerted military efforts with these groups (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). According to several sources, the Palaung groups contributed to coordinated attacks with other armed ethnic groups, while also suffering setbacks (Gorman 1988; Smucker 1991).
  + Despite an extensive search, we could not find any casualty information specific to the Palaung. UCDP/PRIO does not code the Pa-O insurgency in any year, but information on the number of casualties is very scarce, which is at least in part due to the high number of different insurgencies and the various alliances formed. It is possible that UCDP/PRIO attributes casualties to other conflicts as a result. Any coding decision here is ambiguous, but given the thin evidence, it is not clear when (if at all) the 25 deaths threshold was met. We code NVIOLSD throughout.
* UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict involving a rebel group called the PSLF (Palaung State Liberation Front) in 2013-2015 and 2017-2019. UCDP/PRIO reports just one casualty in 2016 and just 5 in 2020; however, since 2016, the PSLF has been operating as part of the ‘Northern Alliance, an alliance of different ethnic rebel groups, which makes counting causalities difficult (Win 2019). Given sustained fighting, possible reporting difficulties, and to avoid a bogus de- and re-escalation, we code LVIOLSD throughout 2013-2020.
  + Note: UCDP/PRIO treats this as a conflict over government as the PSLF only makes claims for autonomy and not outright secession. In 2021, UCDP/PRIO reports 24 deaths.
* [1963-2012: NVIOLSD; 2013-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Having immigrated from eastern Tibet to the Burmese highlands, the Palaung were further driven to the mountains by the immigrating Shans in the twelfth century. However, despite numerous invaders (also Burmans), the Palaung managed to maintain their independence (Minahan 2002).
* In the eighteenth century the Palaung came under pressure from an invading Chinese army from the east, which resulted in the Palaung losing their eastern districts to China. At the same time, pressure from the Burman forces from the lowlands increased, which led to the Palaung having to pay tribute to the Burman king (Minahan 2002).
* After the Third Anglo-Burman War in 1885-1886, the Shan states, of which the Palaung formed part, came under British rule. As British protectorates, they were not included in British Burma and remained semi-independent under the supervision of British advisors.
* Some of the more remote Palaung resisted British rule until the 1930s. British influence in the region grew, also due to increasing missionary activities from the late nineteenth century (Minahan 2002).
* The Palaung remained allied to the British in the Second World War and fought the Japanese and their allies, after the Japanese occupation as guerilla fighters (Minahan 2002).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups (among which the Shans/the Federated Shan States formed in 1922) were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State and the Kayah State were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein 1958).
* The Palaung were not directly represented at Panglong. Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Palaung were thus without their consent incorporated into the Union of Burma as part of the Shan State (Minahan 2002).
* Even if they were not represented at Panglong, the Palaung profited from the agreement. While the Shan state was generally dominated by the Shan (Seekins 2006: 401-402), the Palaung did have their own sawbwaship within the Shan State, an entity ruled by a local ruler. The Panglong agreement meant that the Palaung were allowed to continue their feudatory rule, which can be considered a concession.
  + Note: Panglong could be seen as a continuation of colonial policy, but is often described as a concession and thus probably implied that the Palaung’s autonomy was increased.
  + Note: The Panglong Agreement foresaw the right to secession for the Shan state after a 10-year period. The majority group in the Shan state, the Shan, were the primary beneficiary of this rule, thus we code an independence concession only for the Shan.
* The spirit of Panglong and the federal principles were reversed in the years following independence. The central government officially ended the autonomy of the Shan sawbwas and set their territories under military administration in 1959. The sawbwas’ defense forces were no longer controlled by local rulers and the sawbwas were being sidestepped by General Ne (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Brown 1988; Minorities at Risk Project). [1959: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: While the above narrative suggests that centralization had started before 1959, we did not find a good date to code a restriction before that.
  + Note as well: the 1959 restriction also removed the Shan state’s right to secession, but this had first and foremost been a concession for the Shan. Therefore, no independence restriction is coded here.
* As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). The Palaung are predominantly Buddhists (Minahan 2002: 1487); however, it is clear that increasing the rights of ethnic minorities was not the intention. We do not code a concession.
* The Shan States’ semi-autonomous status as promised in the Panglong Agreement was definitely abrogated after General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). This nullified whatever little autonomy had remained with the Palaung after 1959. [1962: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Palaung speak Palaungic, which belongs to the Mon-Khmer language group. Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* On April 21, 1991, the PSLA signed a ceasefire with the military junta (note that remnants of the PSLA continued to operate against the government). Although the Palaung were forced to enter into the agreement, the “PSLO/PSLA had been granted with some degree of autonomous administration in the areas of Namsam, Mantong, West of Kyauk Mae, West of Hsiphaw, and Namtu and in Namkham Township as Palaung Special Region No. 7” (Palaungland.org). According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories”. According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were “quasi-states within the state”. We thus code an autonomy concession in the year the ceasefire was signed. [1991: autonomy concession]
* The 2008 constitution established six new self-administered areas: five zones (Danu, Kokang, Naga, Pa-O, Pa Laung) and one division (Wa).
  + While there appear to be some efforts to develop autonomous principles, this process is hindered by decades of centralization and top-down governance (OECD 2013; Ghai 2008; Myanmar Times 2014).
  + Overall, the Palaungs’ autonomy was not increased relative to the 1989 concession. To the contrary, the 2008 constitution sharply decreased the Palaungs’ autonomy.
  + Namely, the constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). [2008: autonomy restriction]
* In 2015, the TNLA was excluded from signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) due to its ongoing clashes with the military (States News Service 2017). While this led to further clashes with the government armed forces after the NCA, it did not lead to any concessions or restrictions.
* In 2017, following clashes with the TNLA in the Shan state, the Myanmar military decided to close all entry and exit points in Mantong township to prevent the TNLA from recruiting new people in the township (States News Service 2017). This could be seen as a blockade as defined in the codebook, but the action is limited to a single township and therefore not coded.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). We could not find specific sources relating to the Palaung groups, apart from some reports of violence (e.g. Thai News Service 2021). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* When the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded northern Burma, they quickly joined forces with ethnic minority leaders who became integrated into the CPB (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 1971, the communist army had gained control over almost all of the Shan state territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Almost all of the CPB’s commanders were from minority groups such as the Wa, Kokang, Chinese, Kachin, Shan or others (Lintner 1990). The Shan State was ruled by the CPB until the latter’s dissolution in 1989. Callahan (2007) defines this as a period where authority of the military junta is limited and there appears to be near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders (South 2008). Hence, we code de-facto independence and regional autonomy as of 1972 (first of January rule) until the CPB of Burma dissolved in 1989. [1972-1989: regional autonomy]
* The Palaung enjoyed some degree of self-government as the Palaung Special Region No. 7 and the Palaung Self-Administered Zone. It remains debatable in how far these arrangements really entailed genuine regional autonomy. According to Callahan (2007), the ceasefire regions have achieved some degree of coexistence. Kudo (2013: 291) calls them “quasi-states within the state” and according to a map of Global Security, these areas covered a significant part of the settlements of the Palaung. This is evidence enough for us to code the Palaung as regionally autonomous as of 1992 (following the first of January rule) until 2009, when the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) was transformed into a Border Guard Force, an act which South (2011) considers as the origin of decreasing levels of autonomy. The revocation of autonomy as a consequence of the BGF scheme are confirmed by the Myanmar Peace Monitor, where it is stated that the act of absorbing “ethnic militia groups into the national army meant these groups were required to give up most of their autonomy.” [1992-2009: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* As outlined above, the CPB period saw near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders after 1971 (South 2008). We code this as de facto independence. [1972-1989: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. This was before movement activity and is thus not coded.
* In 1959, the Palaung’s autonomy was revoked, but this was before the start date.
* [1971: establishment of de-facto independence]
* [1989: abolishment of de-facto independence]
* [1991: erection of regional autonomy]
* [2009: revocation of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Palaung |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* A tribal people, the Palaung are related to the Mons and their language, Palaungic, belongs to the Mon-Khmer language group. However, the Palaung must be considered an ethnic group of its own (Minahan 2002). EPR, however, does not consider the Palaung politically relevant.
* The years of Palaung insurgency constitute self-exclusion from the political center, which in the EPR2SDM coding scheme also makes up a powerless status. The same applies to the ceasefire years. [1963-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Since there is no official census, it is difficult to ascertain the numbers of Palaungs in Myanmar. According to Hattaway (2004), there are three different sub-groups of the Palaungs: the Palé, Shwe and Rumai. Their projected population number for the year 2010 are 159,000 (Palaung Rumai), 337,100 (Palaung Palé) and 209,900 (Palaung Shwe), which adds up to 706,000 Palaungs in total. This estimate is, broadly speaking, in line with Howard (2005: 25, cited in Sidwell and Jenny 2014), who states that there are around 600,000 Palaung in Myanmar, which is 150,000 Shwe, 300,000 Palé and 150,000 Rumai. Similar estimates are provided by the Ethnologue (Lewis et al. 2013, cited in Sidwell and Jenny 2014), who estimates 148,000 Shwe, 137,000 Rumai and 258,000 Palé, thus 543,000 Palaungs in total. Given these three sources, the estimate of Minahan (2002: 1486), who reports approximately 1 million Palaung in Myanmar, seems too high. We draw on Howard (2005: 25, cited in Sidwell and Jenny 2014), who provides the average of all three sources (600,000). With Myanmar’s population totaling 50.18 million (World Bank) in the year 2005, the group size is 0.01195695. [0.012]

**Regional concentration**

* Information on the Palaung settlement is scarce. In particular, Minahan (2002: 1486) does not provide detailed figures. Weidmann (2009) codes two settlement polygons and a medium degree of spatial concentration (0.59). We follow Weidmann (2009) and code the Palaung as not concentrated. This gets additional support by the map in Minahan (2002: 1486), which suggests a rather scattered settlement pattern. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 1486) mentions around 240,000 Palaung in China and a smaller community of around 60,000 in Thailand. We backed Minahan’s population figures up using data from the Joshua Project. In line with Minahan, the Joshua Project estimates that there are approx. 295,000 Palaung in Myanmar. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Rakhine

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

* The Rakhine are also referred to as the Buddhist Arakanese. They are the majority population in Arakan (Rakhine).

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Arakan National Congress (ANC), formed in 1939, propagated separate Arakanese independence and was soon dominated by politically active Buddhist monks. 1939 is thus coded as the start date of the movement. However, since Burma became independent only in 1948, we code the movement from 1948.
* During the Second World War, the Arakan Defence Force was formed. It first supported the Japanese invaders against British colonial forces and was promised separate administration as a reward for their efforts. The Defence Force later unified into the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) and supported the British reconquest of the territory.
* Tensions between Buddhist and Muslims increased after the war and both “Buddhists and Rohingyas became increasingly militant in their demands for independence” (UCDP).
* The Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP) was formed in 1947 and, in close cooperation with the outlawed Communist Party of Burma (CPB), started an insurgency in southern Arakan. UCDP notes that the insurgency began in November 1947; thus we indicate prior violent activity.
* In 1946, the Muslim Arakanese (Rohingyas) also formed a self-determination organization, the Muslim Liberation Organization (later Mujahid Party). The APLP and the Mujahids quickly came to an agreement to first jointly expulse the Burmese forces from Arakan and then split the territory into two separate independent states. However, the agreement was only short-lived, as the APLP forces defected and openly co-operated with government forces, which primarily targeted Muslims. The APLP was definitively dissolved when its last troops took advantage of a government amnesty in 1958.
* In 1956, a separate Communist Party of Arakan (CPA) was set up. The Arakan unit agitated relatively independent from the Communist Party of Burma and fought for the independence of Arakan. The organization surrendered in 1980 during the general amnesty (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 27, 53ff; Lexis Nexis; Lintner 1990; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* However, there is evidence of continued activity after 1980:
  + The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia suggests that several Buddhist-dominated organizations continued to make claims for Arakanese independence. This includes the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), which was founded in 1967. The ALP claims to represent the Rakhine ethnic group and initially made claims for independence. Later on, the ALP modified its demands to instead focus on the creation of a democratic and federal Myanmar. The group maintained its activities for decades. The ALP signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2012, and has since continued as a minor political party. Other secessionist groups mentioned by the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia are the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP) and the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA).
  + According to Minahan (2016: 36), there were continued “calls for independence and the expulsion of the Muslims” in recent years.
  + In 1994, the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA) was established as a merger of four Rakhine organizations. Roth (2015) reports that NUPA, which is Buddhist-dominated, has demanded independence for the region.
  + In late 2020, NUPA decided to merge with the United League of Arakan (ULA) and its armed wing, the Arakan Army (AA). According to UCDP/PRIO, the Arakan Army was formed in 2016 and fought a separatist armed conflict against the government in 2018-2021.
* On this basis, we code an ongoing movement with a start date of 1939. [start date: 1939; end date: ongoing]
* Additional relevant information:
  + 2012 saw major ethnic violence between the Rakhine (Buddhist Arakanese) and the Rohingyas (Muslim Arakanese) (Minahan 2016: 354; Roth 2015: 342).
  + In 2017, Myanmar’s government drove two-thirds of the one million Rohingyas in Myanmar out of the country.

**Dominant claim**

* There have been claims made for both autonomy and outright secession, but we found many more reports of secessionist claims, including the following:
  + According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and Minahan (2002), the Arakanese Buddhists demanded separate independence in the process of postwar preparations for Burmese independence.
  + After independence, the Muslim Liberation Organization (later Mujahid Party) entered into an alliance with the Buddhist Arakanese. Their intention was to first jointly expulse the Burmese forces from Arakan and then split the territory into two separate independent states (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
  + In subsequent years, several other secessionist organizations were formed including the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), and the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP) (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
  + According to Minahan (2016: 36), there were continued “calls for independence and the expulsion of the Muslims” in recent years.
  + In 1994, the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA) was established as a merger of four Rakhine organizations. Roth (2015) reports that NUPA, which is Buddhist-dominated, has demanded independence for the region.
* In 2018, armed conflict broke out with the Arakan Army (AA). The AA has made claims for the restoration of Arakanese sovereignty. This could indicate an autonomy or an independence claim. Based on the evidence collected, we code independence as the dominant claim throughout. [1948-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* There were calls for a separate Arakanese independence prior to the independence of Burma, and independence is coded as a dominant claim throughout the SDM. [start date: 1939; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Buddhist Arakanese consists of the current Arakan state in western Myanmar. A map can be found in Roth (2015: 328). We code this claim using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas Database (2019) for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO codes a separatist armed conflict over Arakan in 1948-1957 involving two groups, the Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP), a Rakhine rebel group, and the Mujahedin Party, a Rohingya rebel group. UCDP/PRIO codes this as a minor war in all years and does not provide disaggregated casualties; despite this, EPR codes both the Rakhine and the Rohingyas as in armed conflict during those years. We follow UCDP/PRIO and EPR.
  + Note: UCDP notes that the APLP insurgency began in November 1947 and thus shortly before Myanmar’s official date of independence in January 1948. UCDP does not code an extra-state conflict in 1947, suggesting the 25 deaths threshold was not met.
  + The Mujahedin Party continued fighting until 1961 according to UCDP/PRIO, but the APLP conflict is coded as inactive from 1958.
* UCDP/PRIO codes another separatist armed conflict over Arakan starting in 1964. Two rebel groups were involved, the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP) and the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA), which both were associated with the Rakhine (see EPR). UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict involving those two groups as active until 1972 (ANLP) and 1973 (CPA), respectively.
* In 1973, UCDP/PRIO also includes a Rohingya rebel group as a combatant, the Rohingya Patriotic Front, which continues to be coded as active until 1978.
* In 1977, UCDP/PRIO includes the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) as a combatant, which is associated with the Rakhine ethnic group.
* However, it is questionable whether the conflict de-escalated in 1973. As the UCDP coding notes explain, the ALP had been active since the 1960s while neither the CPA nor the ANLP ceased to exist after 1972/1973 and low-intensity fighting continued. Furthermore, Minahan (2002: 171) reports that there was a “major escalation of the sporadic rebellion against Burman domination” in 1974. On that basis, we code ongoing LVIOLSD 1964-1977.
* Sporadic fighting continued in subsequent years, but we found no evidence that the LVIOLSD threshold was met until 2018-2020, when UCDP/PRIO reports a separatist armed conflict between the ULA (i.e., its armed wing, the Arakan Army) and the government. UCDP/PRIO does not report separatist violence in 2021.
* [1948-1957: LVIOLSD; 1958-1963: NVIOLSD; 1964-1977: LVIOLSD; 1978-2017: NVIOLSD; 2018-2020: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Historically ruled as an independent kingdom, the Arakanese state was defeated by the Mogul rulers of India in 1666. The Arakanese kingdom nevertheless managed to retain considerable autonomy that eventually turned into independence when Mogul power declined in the late eighteenth century (Minahan 2002).
* The Burmans again invaded Arakanese territory in 1785, after they had already conquered the Arakanese state in the eleventh century and until 1238. Arakanese rebellions were crushed but eventually led to tensions with the neighboring British territory that turned into the first Anglo-Burmese War in 1824. The defeated Burmans had to cede the Arakanese territory to British India (Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* The independence movement was not popular in Arakan but cooperated with the Arakan National Congress (ANC) that was dominated by Buddhist monks and pursued separate Arakanese independence (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* During the Second World War, the Arakanese first fought on the side of the advancing Japanese against the British forces. Under Japanese occupation, the state was granted autonomy and the right to keep its own army (Arakan Defense Force). In early 1945, however, the Arakanese turned against the Japanese when it turned out that the Japanese would not hand over power to the Arakanese nationalists. As a reward for their efforts in the British reconquest of the territory, both Buddhist-Arakanese and Muslim Rohingyas expected independence. The Buddhist faction, in the form of the Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP), substantiated its demand for independence with an insurgency in southern Arakan (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 1948, however, the Arakan state was integrated into the newly established Union of Burma. The short interlude of autonomy under the Japanese is not considered a concession as this was more something like de-facto autonomy (not granted by the legitimate authorities).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* As part of a “Burmanisation campaign”, Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). The Rakhine are Buddhist; however, it is clear that increasing the rights of ethnic minorities was not the intention. We do not code a concession.
* In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). Arakan is a dialect of Burman (Minahan 2002). Despite differences from standard Burman, many Arakanese speak and read Burman. Nevertheless, this does not appear to imply a significant increase in cultural rights and we do not code it in this case.
* Rakhine Division was granted statehood in 1974 (Rakhine State). This move, however, was merely a nominal acknowledgment and did not constitute a shift in the level of self-determination of the Buddhist Arakanese (IRIN 2012). This event is thus not coded.
* In June 2012, communal riots between Buddhists and Muslims broke out in Rakhine state, prompting the central government to impose a state of emergency in the state (Keane 2012).
* In 2012, the Rakhine State Liberation Party signed a ceasefire agreement with the government (see movement start and end dates), which included the possibility for members to move freely without arms (PA-X). As the agreement did not involve any autonomy concessions, we do not code it here.
* In 2015, the Myanmar government excluded the AA from signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), although sources report that the AA wanted to be part of the agreement (Mizzima 2022).
* On June 21, 2019, the Myanmar government imposed internet restrictions in townships in Rakhine and Chin states because of security concerns (Human Rights Watch 2020). As of 2021, the restrictions were still ongoing and we did not find evidence that stated they had been now lifted (Hlaing 2021). Internet restrictions are not coded as autonomy restrictions according to the codebook.
* In October 2020, the AA kidnapped some members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) who were campaigning for the national election, while also demanding the release of detained AA supporters (Mizzima 2022). As a result of this, the Union Election Commission announced that voting in the November elections would not be allowed in many parts of the central and northern parts of the Rakhine state. This is not a restriction as defined here.
* After the national elections in 2020, the Arakan Army and the Myanmar government agreed to an informal ceasefire. The ceasefire allowed thousands of displaced people to return (Strangio 2022), while the AA used the ceasefire to consolidate its position within the central and northern parts of the Rakhine state (Crisis Group 2022). However, we could not find more detailed information on possible concessions that resulted from the ceasefire, and therefore we do not code the event.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). In Rakhine state, despite the 2020 ceasefire, violent clashes started again after the Myanmar armed forces entered an AA base in the state (Strangio 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. [1948: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Rakhine |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Buddhist Arakanese |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77502000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-exclusion = powerless. [powerless]

**Group size**

* EPR codes the group size with 2%, but the CIA World Factbook estimate (4%) makes more sense. The International Crisis Group (2014: 1), for example, suggests that the Buddhist Arakanese (or Rakhine) presently make up around 60% of the population of Rakhine state (approx. 3.2 million), suggesting that in Rakhine alone, there are 1.9 million Rakhines. This would be in line with the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry which estimates approximately a total of 3 million Arakanese in 2010s, of which more than two-thirds are Buddhist (Rakhine). Similarly, Minahan (2016: 35) estimates around (2015 est.) 3.6–5.2 million Arakanese. EPR would suggest that there are only 1.1 million Rakhines in Myanmar (the CIA estimates Myanmar’s total population at 56 million in 2015). [0.04]

**Regional concentration**

* There are no absolutely reliable figures regarding the number of Buddhist Arakanese (Rakhine) in Myanmar, as there was no reliable census since WWII. According to the CIA World Factbook, the Rakhine make up roughly 4% of Myanmar’s population of approx. 56 million (2015 estimate), or approx. 2.24 million. According to the International Crisis Group (2014: 1), the Buddhist Arakanese (or Rakhine) presently make up around 60% of the population of Rakhine state (approx. 3.2 million). This suggests that the threshold is met, as the Buddhist Arakanese make up an absolute majority in Rakhine state, where approx. 85% of the Rakhines lives. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes ethnic kin in Bangladesh (Tribal-Buddhists). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Rohingyas

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

* The Rohyngyas are also referred to as Muslim Arakanese. They are the minority population in Arakan (Rakhine).

**Movement start and end dates**

* The separatist North Arakan Muslim League (later Mujahidin Party) was formed in 1946. The North Arakan Muslim League, fearing dominance by the Buddhist Burman majority, sent a delegation to the Indian Muslim League in the same year to request the incorporation of northern Arakan into East Pakistan (Chan 2005; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 27; Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Based on this, we code 1946 as the start date of the movement. However, since Burma became independent only in 1948, we only code the movement from 1948. We note prior nonviolent activity. In April 1948 – and therefore after Burma’s independence – the Rohingyas began an insurgency. Accordingly, we denote that prior activity had been non-violent.
* The last Rohingya rebels surrendered to the government in 1961, but the conflict re-ignited in the early 1970s. A ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994.
* Arakan separatist continued to press for autonomy (c.f. non-zero MAR protest scores) and Minahan (2016: 354) describes the movement as ongoing, as does Roth (2015: 342f).
* 2012 saw major ethnic violence between the Rakhine (Buddhist Arakanese) and the Rohingyas (Muslim Arakanese) (Minahan 2016: 354; Roth 2015: 342).
* An organization called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) became increasingly militaristic in the 2000s and 2010s. In 2016, ARSA began fighting an armed conflict. ARSA’s goals included “self-determination” for the Rohyngias.
* In 2017, Myanmar’s government drove two-thirds of the one million Rohyngias in Myanmar out of the country. ARSA drastically reduced its military activity in 2018, but continued to mount some attacks (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Mathieson 2020; Mizzima 2019). In 2019, the group released a 69-page report titled ‘Reviving the Courageous Hearts’, which outlined the history of injustice and discrimination for Rohingyas in Myanmar, and the mobilization of ARSA members at present (ARSA 2019). While ASRA declined, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) resurfaced. Active in the 1990s, RSO is an insurgent group which opposes ARSA and condemns its criminal activity in refugee camps (Dupont 2022; The Irrawaddy 2021). [start date: 1946; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Irredentism was the dominant claim among Rohingya organizations in the process of negotiating Burmese independence from Britain. Fearing dominance by the Buddhist Burman majority, with whom the Muslim Rohingyas had historically tense relations, the North Arakan Muslim League sent a delegation to the Indian Muslim League under Mohammad Ali Jinnah to request the incorporation of northern Arakan into East Pakistan (Chan 2005; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Being rejected by the government of Pakistan, Muslim leaders in Arakan changed their goal to independence. Although there were “different groups and names, with slightly different aims and ideology” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia), the common aim of those groups has always been independence. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP), the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA) and the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) have pursued independence. This is also confirmed by the Minorities at Risk Project: MAR names independence the primary current political objective of the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) and thus also of its component organizations, the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisaton (RSO). Irredentism has never been an option again, the more so as the Muslims in Arakan supported West Pakistan in the Independence War in Bangladesh (Chan 2005). [1948-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* Initially the claim was for a merger with East Pakistan, but the claim shifted to independence after this plan was rejected. It is not fully clear when the shift occurred. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 27) suggest the group did make independence claims coinciding with Burma’s independence in 1948. MAR by contrast suggests that the group was still making claims for a merger with East Pakistan at the time. The most detailed account we found – Chan (2005) –suggests independence claims were first made in 1948. [start date: 1948; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* Irredentist claims were made, but prior to Myanmar’s independence in 1948. [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* Rohingyas have claimed the northern part of Arakan state in western Myanmar, which consists of the Buthidaung and Maungdaw Townships bordering Bangladesh (Chan 2005). Some exile organizations have also made more expansive claims that include the Sittwe district in addition to the two northern townships (Roth 2015), but the former territorial claim seems to have been the predominant one. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Hewitt and Cheetham (2000), Mujahidin rebels declared an Islamic republic in northern Arakan shortly after Burma gained independence in 1948. The movement was quickly crushed by the Burmese government, which is why we do not code de-facto independence. Armed rebellion, however, continued until 1961. [1948: independence declaration]
* According to Roth (2015: 343), Rohingya activists declared an independent state in London in 2012. We do not code this because the declaration was made in exile with unclear links to local actors.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO codes a separatist armed conflict over Arakan in 1948-1961 which, until 1957, involved two groups, the Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP), a Rakhine rebel group, and the Mujahedin Party, a Rohingya rebel group. UCDP/PRIO codes this as a minor war in all years and does not provide disaggregated casualties; despite this, EPR codes both the Rakhine and the Rohingyas as in armed conflict during those years. We follow UCDP/PRIO and EPR. The Mujahedin Party continued fighting until 1961 according to UCDP/PRIO.
* UCDP/PRIO codes another separatist armed conflict over Arakan starting in 1964. Two rebel groups were involved, the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP) and the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA), which both were associated with the Rakhine (see EPR). UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict involving those two groups as active until 1972 (ANLP) and 1973 (CPA), respectively.
* In 1973, UCDP/PRIO also includes a Rohingya rebel group as a combatant, the Rohingya Patriotic Front, which continues to be coded as active until 1978.
* UCDP/PRIO suggest a resurgence of the conflict over Arakan in 1964; however, until 1973 the conflict only involved the following Buddhist-dominated rebel organizations (cf. EPR coding notes): the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP) and the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA).
* In 1973-1978, the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), a Rohingya rebel organization, also became involved in the conflict, hence the LVIOLSD code.
  + Note: In 1973, UCDP/PRIO also includes the CPA as a combatant and in 1977 also the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) as a combatant. Both are associated with Rakhine ethnic group. No disaggregated casualty information is available.
  + Note: the MAR quinquennial rebellion score remains at 4 in 1980-1984, indicating “small-scale guerilla activity”. In agreement with this the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia suggests that some fighting continued. However, based on the available evidence the 25 deaths threshold was not met.
* According to UCDP/PRIO, large numbers of Rohingyas were expulsed in 1991, which led to several rebel groups to take up arms in late 1991 including the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF). UCDP/PRIO suggests the 25 deaths threshold was met in 1991 (25 or more deaths) and 1994 (109). They do not record any casualties in 1992-1993, but also that there are significant reporting difficulties and that “it is likely the conflict continued with a lower intensity [in 1992-1993].”
  + In support of this, the MAR rebellion score is 4 in 1992-1993, indicating   
    “small-scale guerilla activity.”
  + Based on this, 1991-1994 are coded with LVIOLSD.
* Clashes continued in subsequent years, but no source suggests a LVIOLSD code.
* 2016-2017 are coded with LVIOLSD due to the ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) rebellion, which caused 86 and 393 deaths in those years, respectively (UCDP/PRIO). [1948-1961: LVIOLSD; 1962-1972: NVIOLSD; 1973-1978: LVIOLSD; 1979-1990: NVIOLSD; 1991-1994: LVIOLSD; 1995-2015: NVIOLSD; 2016-2017: LVIOLSD; 2018-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Burmans again invaded Arakanese territory in 1785, after they had already conquered the Arakanese state in the eleventh century and until 1238. Arakanese rebellions were crushed, Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Rakhine faced repression and thousands fled their homeland and fled to India. Eventually, Burmese occupation of Arakanese territory led to tensions with the neighboring British that turned into the first Anglo-Burmese War in 1824. The defeated Burmans had to cede the Arakanese territory to British India, a development which improved the situation of the Rohingyas (Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* British colonial administration encouraged Rohingyas from India and Bangladesh to settle in the Arakanese territory (Minority Rights Group International), where Muslims have already been living since the 8th century. Under the British rule, the population of Arakan thus increased from 100,000 to over one million (FIDH 2000).
* When the British retreated during the Second World War, they recruited Muslim Rohingya forces in order to create a buffer zone between British India and the advancing Japanese and to launch guerrilla attacks on the latter (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958; Maung Maung, 1989: 170). Both the Buddhist Arakanese and the Muslim Rohingyas, who expected independence as a reward for their efforts in the British reconquest of the territory, were excluded from this whole process as they were not considered separately, but part of ‘Burma Proper’. Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Muslim Arakanese were thus – without their approval – incorporated into the Union of Burma (Minahan 2002).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Islam was introduced to Arakan by Arab invaders in the late seventh century. As a consequence, religion is the most significant cultural difference between Rohingyas and the Burmans, the country’s dominant ethnic group. Whereas the former adhere to Islam, the Burmans follow Theravada Buddhism (Minorities at Risk Project). As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961. As many other ethnicities, the Rohingyas protested against this move. [1961: cultural rights restriction]
  + We code a termination of separatist armed conflict in 1961 (see above). Buddhism was made the official state religion through the 1961 Act of the Third Amendment of the Constitution on 26 August 1961. UCDP/PRIO suggests that armed conflict lasted until 15 November 1961. Therefore, the restriction occurred before the end of violence.
* In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). Arakan is a dialect of Burman (Minahan 2002). Despite differences from standard Burman, many Arakanese speak and read Burman. Nevertheless, this does not appear to imply a significant increase in cultural rights and we do not code it in this case.
* Rakhine Division was granted statehood in 1974 (Rakhine State). This move, however, was merely a nominal acknowledgment and did not constitute a shift in the level of self-determination of the Rohingya, as the Rohingyas only constituted a minority in the new state. This event is thus not coded.
* In February 1978, following false allegation of violation of nationality laws, the Burmese junta launched “Operation Dragon King” (Naga Mun). Tens of thousands of Rohingyas were killed and an estimated 200,000 ”have been forced by the Myanmar’s military junta to leave the country” (Parnini 2013: 287). Following the codebook, this denial to live on a given territory is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1978: autonomy restriction]
  + We code a termination of separatist armed conflict in 1978; however, according to UCDP/PRIO, violence was ongoing through to the end of 1978. Therefore, the restriction occurred before the end of violence.
* The 1982 Citizenship Law classified Arakan’s Muslims as illegal immigrants and denied them Burmese citizenship. Claiming that the Rohingya are in fact Bengalis, they were not considered a recognized “national race” and therefore had to prove that their ancestors settled in Burma before 1948, an almost impossible task. As a consequence of this law, the Rohingya have been deprived of many fundamental rights. Their property was confiscated, they were religiously persecuted and they face restrictions on freedom of movement, education, marriage and employment (Human Rights Watch 2013, Minahan 2002). The denial of the right to live in Myanmar is similar to a deportation, and thus coded as an autonomy restriction in line with the codebook. [1982: cultural rights & autonomy restriction]
* Another wave of an estimated 250,000 Rohingya fled Burma between December 1991 and June 1992. According to Ullah (2011: 148), this constituted another case of forced expulsion, which is why we code another autonomy restriction. All but 21,117 refugees had been repatriated by April 1997, however, we do not code the repatriation as a concession since it was considered to be “involuntary” and sometimes even “forcible” repatriation (Parnini 2013: 287) following a Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and the government of Bangladesh and, despite an official agreement of the government of Burma to repatriate 8000 refugees, in the light of unwillingness of latter to accept refugees. Burma treated the returning Rohingyas not as citizens but rather illegal immigrants from Bangladesh (UNHCR 2007: 36f). [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + We code an onset of separatist violence in 1991. The narrative in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia suggests that the violence emerged in response to the expulsions, i.e., after the restriction (https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/223).
* A 2012 Human Rights Watch report accused the Myanmar state of carrying out a campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ against Rohingya Muslims (Minority Rights Group). Approximately 100,000 people, most of them Rohingya, were displaced (Bento and Yusuf 2012). We treat this as a denial to live in a territory, and thus code a restriction. [2012: autonomy restriction]
* In May 2013, the government reaffirmed a 2005 regulation, which had implemented a ‘two-child’ policy for Rohingyas (Asian News International 2013). While a clear act of repression, it’s difficult to think of this as a concession or restriction as defined here.
* In 2014, after 30 years Myanmar collected data for its first census. However, it did not allow Rohingya Muslims to self-identify as Rohingyas and instead told the group to register as ‘Bengalis’ (Heijmans 2014). The implication was that Bengalis are illegal immigrants. [2014: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2015, Rohingyas were stripped of their voting rights when the government declared that holders of “white cards” were not eligible to vote (Al Jazeera 2015). Voting rights relate to political inclusion and are not coded here.
* In 2017, violence against Rohingyas worsened, leading to over a third of the community to being evicted within a month, and tens of thousands displaced across the border (Amnesty International 2017; Associated Press 2019; Minority Rights Group). While the government blamed ARSA for the violence, independent reports of human rights organization found that the Myanmar military had been attacking villages in the Rakhine state. Following the codebook, this denial to live in a given territory is coded as an autonomy restriction. [2017: autonomy restriction]
  + The displacements occurred in the aftermath of an attack on Myanmar border guards in late August 2017 (<https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/223>). UCDP/PRIO does not record any rebel attacks in 2017 after the August attack, only one-sided violence. This suggests the restriction occurred after the termination of the armed conflict.
* In 2018, Bangladesh and Myanmar reached an agreement on the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, which was criticized by the UN as no appropriate measures had been put in place for the return of refugees (Ellis-Petersen and Rahman 2018). Few Rohingyas were actually repatriated, and talks were ongoing as of 2022 (Thai News Service 2022).
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). The coup further worsened the Rohingya’s situation within Myanmar and many more fled to Bangladesh (Impact News Service 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Burma attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. [1948: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Rohingyas |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Muslim Arakanese |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77508000 |

**Power access**

* We deviate slightly from EPR and code the Muslim Arakanese as powerless through 1978, and discriminated in subsequent years (EPR would suggest a powerless code until and including 1982). We do this because the military Junta killed tens of thousands of Rohingyas in 1978 and forced an estimated 200,000 to leave the country (Parnini 2013: 287). The 1982 Citizenship Law classified Arakan’s Muslims as illegal immigrants and denied them Burmese citizenship. Claiming that the Rohingya are in fact Bengalis, they were not considered a recognized “national race” and therefore had to prove that their ancestors settled in Burma before 1948, an almost impossible task. As a consequence of this law, the Rohingya have been deprived of many fundamental rights. Their property was confiscated, they were religiously persecuted and they face restrictions on freedom of movement, education, marriage and employment (Human Rights Watch 2013, Minahan 2002). [1948-1978: powerless; 1979-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1948-2017: 0.02; 2018-2020: 0.0065]
  + Note: there were mass expulsions in 1978 and 1991/92 (see above), which likely implied significant population decreases. However, we could not find more precise population estimates.

**Regional concentration**

* Information on the Rohingyas’ settlement pattern is extremely scarce. We found some limited footage that suggests that the Rohingyas were likely spatially concentrated until 2017. This case would profit from more research. [1948-2017: concentrated]
  + Other data sets code them as concentrated, though they apply lower thresholds:
    - MAR V codes the Rohingyas as “concentrated in one region” with more than 75% of group members living in that region.
    - GeoEPR also codes the Rohingyas as regionally concentrated in the northern part of Rakhine state.
  + Minority Rights Group International mentions a large concentration of Rohingyas in the north of Rakhine State, especially around Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathedaung, Akyab and Kyauktaw.
  + Human Rights Watch also describes the northern Rakhine state as an area with “a high Muslim concentration”.
* In 2017, violence against Rohingyas worsened and more than a third of the community was displaced within a month (Amnesty International 2017; Associated Press 2019; Minority Rights Group). According to Human rights Watch, more than 500 Rohingya villages had been bulldozed by early 2018. According to UN OCHA reports, approximately 750,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh, with 909,000 Rohingyas living in camps in the area as of 2019 (Minority Rights Group). Overall, while precise data is not available, these developments make it unlikely that the criteria for regional concentration are met after 2017. [2018-2020: not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Several sources suggest kin in neighboring countries: [kin in neighboring country]
  + EPR codes kin in India (Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Other Muslims, Oriya, Punjabi-Sikhs, Tamil, Telugu).
  + MAR only codes one kin group (the Magh and Tipra in Bangladesh). More generally, the Bengalis from Bangladesh can be considered ethnic kin.
  + The Joshua Project lists numerically significant Rohingya communities in Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia (also see Minahan 2002: 168).

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## Shan

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Shan States were not included in British Burma but existed as separate protectorates with relative autonomy in internal affairs. In 1919, these various Shan states were brought together to form the Federated Shan States (“1919 Act of Federated Shan States”), The Federated Shan State Council served as the first common governing body of the Shan principalities.
* When WWII began, many Shans initially collaborated with the Japanese. In 1942, Shan nationalists declared independence, thus the start date. In late 1943 the Japanese abrogated their de facto independence; the Shan subsequently rebelled against the Japanese. The revolt continued until March 1945, when the British returned (Minahan 2002: 1700).
* At the end of World War II, the United Kingdom announced its intention to grant Burma independence. The Shan States demanded separate independence at the 1947 Panglong Conference, a request that was not met. After promises of autonomy, the Shan eventually agreed to be part of the Burmese federation. We code 1942 as the start date but only code the movement from 1948, when Burma was granted independence. The rebellion against the Japanese is not coded as separatist violence, and we found no other instances of separatist violence before 1948.
* Within months of independence the new Burmese government abrogated the autonomy agreement and attempted to impose direct rule on the Shan federation. The Shans, led by rival princes, produced several rebel organizations in the 1950s and in 1958 the Shan princes notified the Burmese government of their intention to secede under the 1948 independence agreement. The Burmese government responded by stripping the princes of their titles and privileges, a move that was the trigger for decades-long rebellion (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53ff, 267; Hewitt et al. 2008; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 1996: 509ff, 2002: 1697ff; MAR; UCDP/PRIO; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).
* Roth (2015: 338f) describes the movement as ongoing and UCDP/PRIO notes “sporadic” violent clashes. [start date: 1942; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* As a consequence of the feudal structure under the Sawbwas prior to independence, the early period of the Shan self-determination movement was dominated by localized interest groups that were loyal to clan, kin and patron. A common claim is therefore hard to isolate. It was only in the 1950s, when the concept of pan-ethnic community loyalty against the central state emerged (Brown 1988). Given that the Shan signed the devolutionary Panglong Agreement, we assume that autonomy was supported by most group members at that time. In 1959, some Sawbwas went into open secessionist revolt, when the central government refused to discuss the option of Shan secession and, in its efforts to dislodge Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces from northern Burma, set the Shan territories under military administration. However, as Brown (1988) lines out, most of the Sawbwas continued to advocate Shan autonomy as promised by the Panglong Agreement of 1947. Secession, they argued, was only pursued if these demands were not met. In this first period, we thus code autonomy as the dominant claim. [1948-1962: autonomy claim].
* With the military coup of 1962, the secessionist rebellion escalated. Many sawbwas now openly advocated secession and militant Shan organizations were formed (such as the Shan State Army) with the aim of establishing an independent Shan state (Brown 1988; Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* With the decline of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the Shan movement split into different factions, such as the MNDAA (Kokang), the UWSA (Wa) or the Shan State Army - North command (SSA-N), some of which heavily involved in drug trafficking. Many of those groups signed ceasefire agreements with the government or were integrated into its armed forces. The Shan State Army - South command (SSA-S), however, continued the armed opposition in pursuit of independence (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). At a 2000 conference, a majority of the delegates still favored an independent, federal Shan state over the option of membership in a Federal Union of Burma (Minahan 2002). Following the first of January rule, we therefore code independence as the dominant claim as of 1963. As of 2019, the group continued to make claims for independence (Graceffo 2019). [1963-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* The claim for separate independence made prior to Myanmar’s independence 1948 did not persist into the period of Burmese independence after agreeing to autonomy within the Burmese federation. However, this autonomy was revoked over the next decade. In 1958, some of the Shan princes made clear their intention to secede (Minahan 2016: 377; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 267). Although not the dominant claim, independence claims persisted from this point onwards and became dominant from 1962 after a military coup (Brown 1988; Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [start date: 1958; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Shan consists of the current Shan state in Myanmar (Roth 2015: 339). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1993, Khun Sa, head of the Mong Thai Army and heavily involved in opium trafficking, declared an independent Shan state with himself as president. Since his declaration was rejected by Shan leaders, we do not code this event.
* On April 17, 2005, the Shan Interim Council (SIC) published a declaration of independence. Since the SIC did not gain support from any mainstream Shan party (South 2008), we do not code this event either.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The LVIOLSD code for 1959-1963 follows UCDP/PRIO.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 1960 and 1995. This includes the Shan, but also other groups such as the Kachin and the Karen. Not all individual ethnic rebellions had the same start and end dates; and not all escalated to the HVIOLSD level. According to UCDP, the 1,000 battle-related deaths threshold was first reached in 1964; all years before that are coded as “minor war” (25-999 deaths). UCDP continues to code more than 1,000 deaths throughout 1964-1970. It is not clear whether the conflict de-escalated sufficiently in subsequent years since UCDP codes a minor war in most years until 1989, when a cease-fire was signed. According to UCDP/PRIO, significant fighting re-erupted only in 1993. On that basis, we code HVIOLSD in 1964-1989.
* UCDP/PRIO then suggests continued low-intensity armed conflict in 1993-2010, with the exception of two years: 2003 and 2004. Yet, there appears to have been sustained violence; in 2004, there were 10 deaths according to UCDP/PRIO. UCDP/PRIO does not record a death in 2003, but the coding notes suggest there was continued fighting; we considered this too ambiguous to code a de- and re-escalation.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 2011 and 2015 (ethnic groups in Kachin, Shan, and Rakhine). However, while the HVIOLSD threshold is met in case of the Kachin, it does not appear to be met in case of the Shan: UCDP/PRIO suggests 170 battle-related deaths in 2011, 10 in 2012, 83 in 2013, 0 in 2014, and 97 in 2015. We do not code HVIOLSD but do code continued LVIOLSD.
  + UCDP suggests that there were ceasefires signed with different Shan rebel groups in December 2011, which were largely respected in 2012. However, additional research suggests that the 10 battle-related deaths by UCDP may be an under-estimate as we found 22 deaths in 2012: clashes on July 18 killed 10 (The Shan Herald Agency for News 7/31/2012), 10 deaths on September 7 (The Shan Herald Agency for News 9/30/2012) and 2 deaths on October 30 (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 11/1/2012). To avoid a bogus de-escalation, we code LVIOLSD in 2012.
  + UCDP reports that some fighting continued also in 2014, thus we also code LVIOLSD in 2014 in light of possible reporting difficulties.
* We found no reports for separatist violence above the threshold in 2016-2020. [1948-1958: NVIOLSD; 1959-1963: LVIOLSD; 1964-1989: HVIOLSD; 1990-1992: NVIOLSD; 1993-2015: LVIOLSD; 2016-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Shan dominated what is current-day Burma from the thirteenth centruy onwards. In the early seventeenth century, however, the Shan territory was conquered by the ethnic Burman forcing the Shans to retreat to their mountain homelands, where they diffused into over 30 states that were ruled by a feudal structure and led by Sawbwas/Saophas. The authority of the Burmese king was recognized (Minahan 2002, Minority Rights Group International).
* Under British colonial rule, the Shan states existed as protectorates but were relatively autonomous in internal affairs. As of 1920, these various Shan states were brought together to form the Federated Shan States (“1919 Act of Federated Shan States”), which eventually led to the establishment of the Shan State under the 1948 Constitution of the now independent Burma (Sakhong 2004).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, the Shan (among others) were thus promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung, 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State (together with the Kayah and for a time the Kachin State) was given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein, 1958). [1947: autonomy concession, 1947: independence concession]
  + Note: Panglong could be seen as a continuation of colonial policy, but is often described as a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The newly established Federal Union, however, was only federal in name but unitary in practice. The spirit of Panglong and the federal principles were reversed in the years following independence. In the late 1950s, the Shan became increasingly disgruntled with encroaching central rule, making the theoretical option of secession a real alternative among the Shan population. In order to preempt this scenario, and in its efforts to dislodge Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces from northern Burma, the central government removed the autonomy of the Shan sawbwas in 1959 and set their territories under military administration. The sawbwas’ defense forces were no longer controlled by local rulers and the sawbwas were being sidestepped by General Ne Win. With this, the Shans’ right to secession was effectively revoked, too (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Brown 1988; Minorities at Risk Project). [1959: autonomy restriction, 1959: independence restriction]
  + Note: While the above narrative suggests that centralization had started before 1959, we did not find a good date to code a restriction before that. The narrative in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia suggests that the violence occurred in response to the restriction (https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/264).
* As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). The Shan are Buddhists (Minahan 2002: 1698); however, it is clear that increasing the rights of ethnic minorities was not the intention. We do not code a concession.
* The Shans’ semi-autonomous status as promised in the Panglong Agreement was definitely abrogated after General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). This nullified whatever little autonomy had remained with the Shan after 1959. That same year, the Shan territory was occupied by Burmese forces and its political elite was arrested or murdered. [1962: autonomy restriction]
* The Shan language is a Tai language and part of the Sino-Tai language group and has been a core issue of the Shan nationalist movement (Minahan 2002). Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
* When the Communist Party of Burma, which has been active in the Shan state since 1968, collapsed in 1989, the Shan State Army signed a ceasefire with the government that granted them the Special Region 3, Shan State. According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories”. According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were “quasi-states within the state”. As with all other Special Regions, we code this as an autonomy concession in the year the ceasefire was signed. Note that, despite the ceasefire with the Shan State Army, other Shan groups continued their armed opposition against the government. The Shan State National Army (SSNA) surrendered in 1996 and the Shan State Army - South command (SSA-S) signed ceasefires in 2006 and 2011. However, none of the agreements with these groups included autonomy provisions. [1989: autonomy concession]
* The 2008 constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). Like many other ethnic minority groups, the Shan groups rejected the government proposal to transform into a BGF - with the exception of SSA-N brigade 3 and 7, which transformed into a BGF (BNI). As opposed to the Kokang, whose territory was occupied by the military forces in an attempt to deter others, the Shan have so far successfully resisted the proposal. Nevertheless, the intention to limit the Shans’ autonomy is evident, and the government attempted to implement the measure. Thus we code a restriction. [2008: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012, the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) (South) signed a ceasefire at the state and union level (Myanmar Peace Monitor). This agreement did not lead to any concession as defined here (PA-X). Later, in 2015, the SSA-South (RCSS) was part of the ethnic armed groups that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), while the SSA-North refused to sign (Minority Rights Group). We do not code the NCA as it did not involve any concession or restriction as defined here.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). After the coup, the RCSS initially condemned the actions of the junta, but later continued peace talks with the government (Thai News Service 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* Despite the quick abrogation of the autonomy concessions in the Panglong Agreement, the Shan still enjoyed some autonomy in the early years of Burmese independence. This is confirmed by EPR. We thus code regional autonomy from 1948 until autonomy was officially canceled and the Shan territory set under military administration in 1959. The revocation of autonomy sparked a rebellion; to better reflect case history, we do not code regional autonomy in 1959, therefore. [1948-1958: regional autonomy]
* In the late 1950s, several Shan rebel organizations took up arms in order to resist increasing centralization and the new military government under Ne Win. Thus when the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded northern Burma, they quickly joined forces. In 1971, the communist army had gained control over almost all of the Shan territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Almost all of the CPB’s commanders were from minority groups such as the Wa, Kokang, Chinese, Kachin, Shan or others (Lintner 1990). The Shan State was ruled by the CPB until the latter’s dissolution in 1989. Callahan (2007) defines this as a period where authority of the military junta is limited and there appears to be near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders (South 2008). We hence code regional autonomy as of 1972 (first of January rule). [1972-1989: regional autonomy]
* After the collapse of the CPB in 1989, the Shan State Army signed a ceasefire with the government that granted them the Special Region 3, Shan State. As outlined above, the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories” (South 2011: 13) and were hence “quasi-states within the state” (Kudo 2013: 291). We thus continue the coding of regional autonomy.
* In 2009, the Myanmar government moved to implement the BGF program discussed above, which effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). [1990-2009: regional autonomy]
* However, the Shan successfully resisted the BGF program, which is coded as the onset of de-facto independence (implying continued regional autonomy). [2010-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* As outlined above, the CPB period saw near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders after 1971 and until 1989 (South 2008). We code this as de facto independence. [1972-1989: de facto independence]
* As discussed above, the Shan successfully resisted the BGF program in 2009; this is coded as the onset of de facto independence. [2010-2020: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1948, the Shans became part of newly independent Burma. [1948: host change (new)]
* [1959: revocation of regional autonomy]
* [1971: establishment of de facto independence]
* [1989: abolishment of de facto independence, establishment of regional autonomy]
* [2009: revocation of regional autonomy, establishment of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Shan |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Shan |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77509000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-exclusion = powerless. [1948-1958: junior partner; 1959: discriminated; 1960-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.085]

**Regional concentration**

* The Shan are concentrated in the Shan State, where they make up 48% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1697). Other major communities are the Burmese, Karenni, Wa, Kachin, and Chinese. These are mostly concentrated in certain regions, e.g. the Kachins in the north, the Karenni in the south, the Wa in the northeastern Wa division, the Chinese in Kokang, and the Burmese in the west. In the remaining territory, the Shan very likely make up a majority. We code them as not spatially concentrated nevertheless since the Shan in the Shan state (approx. 2.13 million) are less than 50% of the entire Shan population in Myanmar (4.445 million). There are also significant Shan settlements in Kachin and Sagaing state (see GeoEPR) and in major cities. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR (scenario 1:1) there are several kin groups in neighboring countries (Shan and Thai in Thailand, the Lao in Laos, and the Thai-Lao in Cambodia). This is confirmed by the Minorities at Risk data that codes “close kindred in more than one country”, mentioning the Shan in China and Thailand as the two largest kin groups. According to Minahan (2002: 1697), there are about one million Shans in Thailand and Laos and 1.15 million Shans in China. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Wa

Activity: 1972-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Wa rebelled against the Burmese in 1959 after the government deposed their princes. Subsequently the Wa participated in the communist insurgency. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) established control over almost all of north-eastern Burma between 1962-1978 with support from China. This included the Wa hills.
* Wa leaders first espoused a separatist platform in 1972 with the formation of the Wa National Organization (WNO). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1972 (Minahan 2002: 2027). The WNO was active from 1976 to 1988 under the aegis of the National Democratic Front (NDF), which espoused a loose federation of independent ethnic states (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).
* After the end of the communist insurgency in 1988, the CPB disintegrated into several ethnic-based rebel groups including the United Wa State Army (UWSA) (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). The UWSA had over 12,000 troops, the strongest faction emerging from the CBP. The UWSA established a de facto independent Wa state in 1989 (Roth 2015: 338) and subsequently signed a ceasefire with the state in the same year which allowed them to keep the territory they controlled (Minahan 2002: 2027; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* In 1996/1997, the government demanded that the Wa give up their southern territories, which led to clashes with the government in the first months of 1997. UWSA was also involved in several conflicts with rival rebel factions in relation to the drug business (Minahan 2002: 2027; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* The USWA has managed to create a largely independent administration in their territory; even Myanmar officials require permission to visit. The USWA is sometimes called Myanmar’s largest ethnic army, with possibly over 30,000 fighters (Roth 2015: 339). The stated goal of the USWA is to retain and make official their current de facto autonomy (Minahan 2002: 2028, 2016: 456; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The USWA has also made claims for their formal status to be upgraded to a separate autonomous state within Myanmar (rather than being a part of the Shan states) and also outright independence (Roth 2015: 339). UCDP/PRIO reports continued clashes between the USWA and the government after 1997, with the most recent report of casualties being in 2015. [start date: 1972; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1972, the first year of self-determination activity, the Wa leaders declared independence in a federation of states as their main goal (Minahan 2002). The WNO was active from 1976 to 1988 under the aegis of the National Democratic Front (NDF), which espoused a loose federation of independent ethnic states (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). [1972-1989: independence claim]
* The CPB disintegrated into different ethnic factions in 1989. One of these factions was the United Wa State Party, which proceeded to set up the Wa states and is the most important Wa faction. The stated goal of the USWA is to retain and make official their current de facto autonomy (Minahan 2002: 2028, 2016: 456; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The USWA has also made claims for their formal status to be upgraded to a separate autonomous state within Myanmar (rather than being a part of the Shan states). This is further confirmed by Sun (2016), which states that UWSA is currently looking for an ‘upgrade’ from its current Self-Administered Division to that of an ethnic state. Sun (2016) further adds that ‘the most striking feature of the UWSA’s relations with Burma is that the armed group never has and does not currently seek independence’. [1990-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1972; end date: 1989]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Wa, the Wa State, consists of two separate regions. One lies in the northeastern part of the Shan state (bordering China), the other in the eastern part (bordering Thailand). We code the region based on Roth (2015: 328) and a secondary map from Wikipedia (2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1989, according to Roth (2015: 339), the UWSA declared two discontinuous territories in the Shan state as an independent Wa state. We could not find corroborating evidence. It is possible that Roth (2015: 339) refers to the creation of a Wa region in 1989 (see concessions and restrictions). As there is no further evidence that this was an independence declaration, we do not code this event.
* In January 2009, the UWSA announced the upgrading of its territory to the Wa state government special administrative region, a status that would imply increased political and economic autonomy for the area which is officially known as Shan state special region-2. The government rejected this move (South Asia Analysis Group 2014; DVB 2009). [2009: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Wa were the most prominently represented group in the ranks of the Communist insurgency (1948-1988), but we could not find clear evidence for self-rule claims made by Was in this context and therefore do not code separatist violence (see SSW coding notes).
* In 1989, the United Wa State Army (1989) broke away from the CPB and made claims for Wa self-determination. Marshall & Gurr (2003) suggest there was a separatist armed conflict in that year; however, UCDP/PRIO suggests that this violence was inter-communal.
* 1997 is coded as LVIOLSD because UCDP/PRIO reports an armed conflict over Wa territory involving the UWSA in that year.
* There were clashes in subsequent years, but according to UCDP/PRIO the number of casualties never exceeded 15 in any given year and most years saw no casualties at all, so all other years are coded as NVIOLSD. [1972-1996: NVIOLSD; 1997: LVIOLSD; 1998-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Wa territory was overrun by the Shan in the seventh century. The latter installed their own social order which included the establishment of small Wa States ruled by an aristocratic elite. With the decline of the Shan in the early nineteenth century, the Wa States became virtually independent as vassal states of the Burman king (Minahan 2002).
* As the Shan States, the Wa States came under British rule following the Third Anglo-Burman War in 1885-1886. As British protectorates, they were not included in British Burma and remained semi-independent. British influence in the region grew, also due to increasing missionary activities from the 1920s onwards. In 1922, the Shan and Wa States were combined to form the Federated Shan States (Minahan 2002).
* The Wa remained allied to the British in the Second World War and fought the Japanese and their allies, after the Japanese occupation as guerilla fighters (Minahan 2002).
* In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups (among which the Shans) were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958; Maung Maung, 1989: 170)
* The Wa did not directly participate in the conference (they were subsumed under the Shan states). Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Wa States were thus – without their consent – incorporated into the Union of Burma as part of the Shan State (Minahan 2002).
* Contrary e.g. to the Pa-O, the Wa do not appear to have had autonomy within the Shan state, i.e., we found no evidence that the Wa would have had their own sabwaship, contrary to the Pa-O e.g. Rather, the Wa were subject to a “hierarchical distribution of power and authority” (Seekins 2006: 401) in the Shan state with the Shan exercising influence over most other ethnic groups in the State.
  + Note: The Panglong Agreement foresaw the right to secession for the Shan state after a 10-year period. The majority group in the Shan state, the Shan, were the primary beneficiary of this rule, thus we code an independence concession only for the Shan.
* In 1959/1962, the autonomy given to the Shan states was revoked (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Brown 1988; Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International); this is not coded as a restriction for the Wa because they did not have autonomy within the Shan state.
* In the early 1960s and following increased support from China, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) gained control over large areas of northeastern Burma, including the Wa hills. The CPB unified the Wa clans and incorporated them into its army (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). According to Minahan (2002: 2025), the Wa predominantly adhere to traditional beliefs with only a minority of Buddhists and Christians. This constitute a cultural rights restriction.
* The Wa language belongs to the Palaung-Wa group of the Mon-Khmer language (Minahan 2002: 2025). Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We thus code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
  + Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Chinese government withdrew support for the CPB, resulting in the CPB disintegrating into different ethnic factions in 1989. The Wa faction, with over 12,000 troops, emerged as the strongest of these breakaway groups. It established a Wa Region under the control of United Wa State Army (UWSA). However, after some consideration, the UWSA signed a ceasefire agreement with the central government still in 1989. The ceasefire not only allowed the Wa to keep their territory and weapons but also granted them a high degree of autonomy in the Shan State Special Region-2 and the freedom to expand drug trafficking operations that helped the rebel army fund itself. In return, the government could focus on containing insurgencies elsewhere while hoping that the UWSA would concentrate on attacking the Shan insurgent leader Khun Sa (Minahan 2002; Stratfor; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories”. According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were “quasi-states within the state”. We thus code an autonomy concession in the year the ceasefire was signed. [1989: autonomy concession]
* The 2008 constitution established six new self-administered areas: five zones (Danu, Kokang, Naga, Pa-O, Pa Laung) and one division (Wa). The UWSA had participated in the National Convention held by the government in order to draft the 2008 Constitution.
  + While there appear to be some efforts to develop autonomous principles, this process is hindered by decades of centralization and top-down governance (OECD 2013; Ghai 2008; Myanmar Times 2014).
  + The area of the new Wa unit is very similar to the Shan State Special Region-2 that had been granted under the 1989 ceasefire.
  + Overall, the Wa’s autonomy was not increased relative to the 1989 concession. To the contrary, the 2008 constitution sharply decreased the Wa’s autonomy.
  + Namely, the constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor).
* Like many other ethnic minority groups, the UWSA rejected the government proposal to transform into a BGF. As opposed to the Kokang, whose territory was occupied by the military forces in an attempt to deter others, the Wa have so far successfully resisted the proposal (South Asia Analysis Group 2014). Nevertheless, we code this because the government tries to implement the measure. Tensions have been rising recently (June 2014), when the Burma Army deployed more troops to areas close to the UWSA (Shan Herald 2014). [2008: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012, the UWSA signed a six-point Peace Agreement with the Union government (PA-X). The agreement was concerned with efforts from both parties to ensure ongoing peace talks, and the development of the region. Later, in 2015, the UWSA refused to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (Myanmar Peace Monitor). No concessions or restrictions as defined here resulted from these two agreements.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). The Myanmar Peace Monitor reports that Wa civil societies and Wa people sent an open letter to the UWSA urging them to condemn the coup, but the group has not issued a statement to date. The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* When the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded northern Burma, they quickly joined forces with ethnic minority leaders who became integrated into the CPB (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 1971, the communist army had gained control over almost all of the Shan state territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Almost all of the CPB’s commanders were from minority groups such as the Wa, Kokang, Chinese, Kachin, Shan or others (Lintner 1990). The Shan State was ruled by the CPB until the latter’s dissolution in 1989. Callahan (2007) defines this as a period where authority of the military junta is limited and there appears to be near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders (South 2008). Hence, we code regional autonomy as of 1972 (first of January rule). [1972-1989: regional autonomy]
* In 1989, the Wa’s status was formalized and formal autonomy established. In 2009, the Myanmar government moved to implement the BGF program discussed above, which effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). [1990-2009: regional autonomy]
  + Based on the following narrative, the Wa could also be considered de facto independent beyond 1989; we do not do so because the Myanmar government formally recognized this status.
  + Regarding the post-CPB period, Callahan (2007) identifies three types of relationship between the central government and the locally-based non-state actors that emerged after the dissolution of the CPB: near devolution, military occupation and coexistence. The first pattern can be seen in the Wa region, where there was “minimal influence from the SPDC” (Callahan 2007: 25) and far greater power in the hands of former insurgent leaders. This is confirmed by the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which states that the UWSA has managed “to create a largely independent state-like administration in their territory”, where “even Myanmar officials and military have had to receive permission to visit.” This state is sustained by the UWSA, which is reportedly 20,000 strong and considered to be the largest among the non-junta armed forces. It sustains a peaceful co-existence with the central government (also due to the UWSA engagement as a proxy guerrilla force against the Shan-based MTA) enjoys good relations with the Chinese government and due to its involvement in the drug trade, is economically self-sufficient.
* The BGF program would have ended autonomy, but the Wa successfully resisted the BGF program, which is coded as the onset of de-facto independence (implying continued regional autonomy). [2010-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* As outlined above, the Wa became de facto independent in 1971 (but we code from 1972 onwards because the movement started only then). In 1989, the Wa’s autonomous status was formally recognized; thus we code an end to de facto independence (see above). [1972-1989: de facto independence]
* The Wa successfully resisted the implementation of the BGF program in 2009, which is coded as the onset of de facto independence (Kombun 2019). [2010-2020: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Burmese independence in 1948 would imply a host change, but this was before the start date.
* The Wa were de facto independent since 1971, thus before a movement emerged making separatist claims. We do not code a major change.
* In 1989, the Wa’s autonomous status was formally recognized. [1989: revocation of de facto independence; establishment of regional autonomy]
* The attempted implementation of the BGF program in 2009 ended formal autonomy. Given that the Wa successfully resisted implementation, we code the establishment of de facto independence in the same year. [2009: revocation of de autonomy, establishment of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Wa |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Wa |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77510000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* EPR suggests a group size of 0.2% (or around 100,000 Wa), but this seems way off. Minahan (2002: 2024) suggests that there are approx. 615,000 Wa in Myanmar, a figure that appears more in line with most other sources that we consulted. Thus, we overrule EPR’s group size estimate. The World Bank estimate of Myanmar’s total population in 2002 is 49.3 million. [0.0125]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 2024), the Wa are concentrated in the Wa states region of Shan State, where they make up 80% of the local population. This amounts to 571,000 Wa (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the number of Wa in Myanmar according to Minahan. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes the Wa in China as the only kin group. This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 2024) who mentions 85,000 Wa in Yunnan in China. Other sources (e.g. EPR) estimate the number of Wa in China to be much higher (over 400,000). We rely on the latter and code ethnic kin. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Zomi (Chin)

Activity: 1948-2020

**General notes**

* The Zomi (Chin) are closely related to the Kuki as well as the Mizo in India and Bangladesh.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Haokip (2015: 27) suggest that an organization called the Chin Union demanded autonomy for Chinland from the British governor of Burma in 1933, which was denied. As this is the first evidence of separatist mobilization we could find, 1933 is coded as the start date.
* Haokip (2015) reports a Kuki uprising in 1942-1945, which ended in defeat for the Kukis.
* It is not fully clear whether separatist mobilization continued after Burma’s independence in 1948. According to Minahan (2002: 2105), there continued to be separatist sentiment, but he does not provide evidence of separatist mobilization. A 2009 report by Human Rights Watch suggests that “armed insurgency groups have been operating in the ethnic Chin areas since Burma’s independence in 1948”. The report does not make clear the goals of the rebels, but does seem to draw a direct line with the Chin National Front (CNF), which emerged in 1988 and espoused separatist goals (see below). Haokip (2015: 29) confirms that there was a low-level insurgency after 1948, and that several organizations were active in the 1950s. Haokip does not report on their goals; however, Haokip’s general topic in the article is ethnic separatism among the Kuki/Chin in India and Myanmar. Relevant Chin organizations at the time according to Haokip included the Chin Union, the Chin People’s Freedom League, and the Chin National Liberation Front. Based on this, we code an ongoing Zomi/Chin movement throughout the late 1940s and 1950s.
* In the early 1960s, the Zomis rebelled against a law that made Buddhism the official state religion in Burma (Minahan 2002: 2105). According to Minahan, the separatist rebellion began after the 1962 military coup, demanding the consolidation of the Zomi-populated areas of Chin Hills, Magwe, Sagaing, and Arakan in an independent state. By 1964, all Zomi tribes had joined the rebellion.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) report that the Zomis were active from 1976 under the aegis of the National Democratic Front (NDF), which espoused a loose federation of independent ethnic states.
* The Chin National Front was founded on in 1988. The organization makes claims for a democratic, federal Myanmar. It has an armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA) (Chin National Front).
* Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) report continued separatist claims. Minahan (2012: 367) notes that “[a] number of Zomi military organizations continue to resist the brutal military government of Myanmar to the present.” Minahan (2016: 477) also suggests that sporadic clashes were continuing at the time of his writing. Roth (2015: 339) suggests that there is a continuing independence movement, but that it is marginal. After the 2021 coup, clashes between Zomi military organizations and the junta escalated (Myanmar Now 2021; Zaw 2022). [start date: 1933; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* There are several indications that the initial claim was for independence:
  + Minahan (2002: 2105) reports that the Zomis made claims for separate independence after WWII, and that sentiment for independence continued in the 1950s.
  + According to Minahan, separatist rebels demanded the consolidation of the Zomi-populated areas of Chin Hills, Magwe, Sagaing, and Arakan in an independent state in the 1960s.
  + Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) report that the Zomis were active from 1976 under the aegis of the National Democratic Front (NDF), which espoused a loose federation of independent ethnic states.
* The Chin National Front was founded in 1988. The organization makes claims for a democratic, federal Myanmar (Minorities at Risk Project; UNTERM). “More autonomy” and the “establishment of a democratic federal union” is also mentioned as the Chin goal by other sources (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). This is confirmed by the fact that the Chin National Front supported the Manepalaw Agreement to establish a genuine federal union (chinland.org). We code autonomy as the dominant claim from 1989 onwards (following 1st of Jan rule) and independence before that. [1948-1988: independence claim; 1989-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan mentions that the Chin made claims for independence after WWII (2002: 2105) but does not cite an exact date for these claims. Roth however notes that the Chin have made claims for an independent state since 1948 due to the prospect of joining Myanmar (2015: 338). Since the coup in 2020, there has been uncertainty over whether the CNF will pursue outright independence in the future (Fishburn 2023: Online). Other than this, no further independence claims could be identified beyond those mentioned above. [start date: 1948; end date: 1988]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Zomi (Chin) is the contemporary Chin state in western Myanmar (Roth 2015: 338f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Human Rights Watch (2009) and Haokip (2015) report small-scale armed insurgencies starting in 1948. We could not find more specific evidence and therefore code the initial years as NVIOLSD.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code a civil war involving several ethnic groups between 1960 and 1995, including the Zomi (Chin), but also several other ethnic groups including the Kachin, the Karen, and the Shan. Clearly, the Zomi insurgency was comparatively less virulent. UCDP/PRIO does not code an armed conflict involving the Zomi at all.
* The qualitative account in Minahan (2002: 2105) suggests that “fierce fighting” over self-determination broke out in 1962-1963, and that more Zomi tribes joined the rebellion in 1964. In 1988, fighting de-escalated as the Burmese military retreated. Yet, according to Minahan, the fighting escalated again in 1989, leading to the “fiercest fighting of the separatist war in 1991-1992” (p. 2106). In line with the latter, MAR’s rebellion score is at 5 (out of 7) in 1985-1993, suggesting “intermediate guerilla activity”. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) even suggest continued violence until 2006.
* Despite an extensive search, we could not find casualty estimates specific to the Zomis, however. This could well be due to reporting issues, given the many insurgencies in Myanmar. But since we lack any clear indication that the 25 deaths threshold was met, we code all years as NVIOLSD. [1948-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Chins’ presence in what is today Burma dates back to the 12th century. Organized in autonomous tribes, the Chins never developed a state structure but only united when they were faced by an outside threat. Although conquered many times, they managed to maintain some degree of self-determination during most of their history (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project)
* The Chins came under pressure from the expanding Burmans in the seventeenth century. Eventually, they came under nominal Burmese rule in the 1820s, remained however effectively independent in their highland isolation (Minahan 2002).
* As a consequence of the Third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885, in which independent Burma lost sovereignty over its remaining territory, the Chin Hills came under British influence. Christian missionaries arrived soon after and introduced Christianity and European education to the region. With the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896 that covered the present Chin State in Burma as well as the present Mizoram State, Nagaland State, and parts of Manipur and Meghalaya States in India, the British laid the provision for the governance and administration in the Chin region. The entire Chin territory came under British control only in the early 20th century (Chinland.org; Minahan 2002; Williams and Sakhong 2005).
* Chins were recruited into the British colonial forces and fought their ancient enemies, the lowland Burmans. Eventually, they also turned against British authority in their attempt to unify with their close relatives, the Mizos in neighboring India. Most Chins, however, remained allied to the British during the Second World War against the Japanese, who promised them autonomy (Minahan 2002).
* After the war, in the process of negotiating independence, the Chins demanded separate independence and separation from the Union of Burma. In 1947 representatives of the Chins participated in the Panglong Conference along with many other ethnic minorities of the country. Under increased British pressure, the Chins finally accepted autonomy within the Union of Burma and joined the union as an equal constituent state, the Chin Special Division. The entire territory inhabited by the Chins was divided between India, Burma and Bangladesh. Contrary to other minority states such as the Shan or the Kayah state, the Chin Special Division was not granted the right to secession after ten years (Minahan 2002; Silverstein 1958). [1947: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). Since the Chins are predominantly Christians (Haokip 2015; Minahan 2002: 2103), this is coded as a cultural rights restriction. [1961: cultural rights restriction]
* The spirit of Panglong and the federal principles were reversed in the years following independence, particularly after the 1962 coup d’état by General Ne Win, who imposed military rule on the Chin heartland and thus effectively abrogated the Chins’ autonomy (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International 1997; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1962: autonomy restriction]
* In 1965, a single education system was introduced, all schools came directly under the authority of the state and only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014). The government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). [1965: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1974 a new constitution was adopted. Article 30 of section B abolished the Chin Special division and formed the Chin State (this did not give the Zomis actual autonomy). The government then abolished the "Chin National Day" on February 20 and only allowed holding "Chin State Day", with the goal of purging “the Chin patriotic spirit and nationalities” (BNI 2010). This move was refused by Chin leaders. [1974: cultural rights restriction]
* Since the mid-1990s, Burmese has been the only language of instruction in high schools. To circumvent this restriction and in order to resolve the problem of the limited number of state schools available for the Chin population, there were many private elementary schools in Chin areas. In 1998, however, the regime started to ban these schools (Minority Rights Group International 1997). We therefore code a cultural rights restriction in 1998. [1998: cultural rights restriction]
* As mentioned above, the Chins are predominantly Christians (80% according to the Minority Rights Group International), whereas the dominant Burmans follow Theravada Buddhism. According to the Minorities at Risk Project, the restrictions against Christians were tightened in the period from 1998 until 2000. In addition to the arrest of religious leaders and attempts to forcibly convert the Chins to Buddhism, these restrictions concerned the attending of church services and the construction of new churches. In addition to 1998 (see above), we code a cultural rights restriction in the year 2000, when “major cities in Chin state were ordered not to hold large Christmas celebrations while in smaller areas, all Christmas celebrations were banned”. These restrictions are still in place. [2000: cultural rights restriction]
* On 11 December 2012, the government and the Chin National Front signed a ceasefire agreement (UNPO). The agreement consisted of points concerning Chin national issues, military agreements, national reconciliation, human rights, development and social and cultural matters. If implemented, the measures mentioned in the agreement would bring about a change in the level of Chin self-determination. “The parties agreed that such a dialogue will be held with the view to establish a genuine Union based on the ideals of equality and self-determination rooted in the Spirit of Panglong” (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2012). Furthermore, the agreement also stipulated to settle the issue of the Chin National Day and Chin State Day. However, the agreement is only a basis for talks and further negotiations that may eventually lead to concessions. This is also confirmed by the vague language of the agreement (“It is agreed that the Union Government will take forward matters”, “The parties agreed that such a dialogue will be held”). We therefore do not code a concession.
* The CNF signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 2015, which however did not involve any concession or restriction as defined here (Myanmar Peace Monitor).
* On June 21, 2019, the Myanmar government imposed internet restrictions in townships in Chin and Rakhine states because of security concerns (Human Rights Watch 2020). As of 2021, the restrictions were still ongoing (Hlaing 2021). Internet restrictions are not restrictions as defined here.
* On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) seized power by detaining the democratically elected leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (BBC 2021). The armed forces installed the State Administration Council (SAC), which took legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and declared a nationwide state of emergency until the next election (UCDP). The Chin National Front is among the ethnic armed groups that refused to join peace talks with the junta and joined the armed resistance against the coup leaders (Strangio 2022). The coup should likely be treated as a restriction, but we do not code past 2020.

**Regional autonomy**

* As a result of the Panglong agreement. Autonomy was effectively abrogated in 1962 as a result of the military coup. This sparked a rebellion (see above); to better reflect case history, we stop coding regional autonomy already in 1961. [1948-1961: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1948: host change (new)]
* [1962: revocation of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Zomi (Chin) |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Zomis (Chins) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77511000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-exclusion = powerless. [1948-1962: discriminated; 1963-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.021]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 2102), the Zomis make up 92% of the population of the Chin State. This amounts to 517,000 Zomis (in 2002), which is just under 50% of all Zomis in Myanmar in that same year. Based on Minahan, we should code the Zomis as not concentrated. Further evidence in this direction comes from MAR, which codes the Zomis as “primarily urban or minority in one region” with less than 50% living in that region. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes the Mizo in India as the only kin group. This is confirmed by MAR, which also codes the Mizo in India as the largest kin group and the Tedim Chins in India as the second largest. Minahan (2002: 2102) also mentions large Zomi communities in India (and Bangladesh). The Zomis/Chin in Myanmar are also closely related to the Kukis in India (>300,000) (see Minahan 2002: 2102). [kin in neighboring country]

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